Thank you for that generous introduction.
This is my first official trip to Southeast Asia as Under Secretary of War for Policy. Starting here in Manila is deeply fitting. The Philippines is our oldest mutual defense treaty ally in Asia, and we share a deep and abiding historical connection in addition to our profound alignment of strategic interest.
From Manila, I will be traveling onward to Jakarta, Bangkok, and Phnom Penh. As in Manila, I intend to deliver a clear message that is at once both realistic and perhaps bracing but also reassuring: That America's interests are more engaged than ever in the Indo-Pacific, and that we at the Department of War are concentrated on ensuring those interests are stoutly defended. This means a strong and growing U.S. investment in the region. But it is also coupled with a newfound but common sense expectation of much greater effort and contribution by our allies and partners. Not in a hectoring or unbalanced way. To the contrary, in a spirit of partnership, not dependency; of realism, not idle cloud-castle abstraction; of respect, not patronization.
Our approach, as laid out in the Administration's National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy and set out eloquently by Secretary Hegseth in his Shangri-La speeches this year and last, is straightforward. Our legacy foreign policy of the post-Cold War period was fundamentally out of date and ill-advised.
In the years following the collapse of the Soviet Union, American strategy was characterized by high-flown abstractions and comfortable illusions of permanent unipolarity. Washington's strategic approach became unmoored from the concrete realities of power, geography, economics, and limits. Our foreign policy became detached from clear-headed strategic rationality, and the results were demonstrably poor.
President Trump has reversed that failed course. Under Secretary Hegseth's leadership at the Pentagon, we are carrying out the President's agenda to restore American strength, put Americans' concrete interests first, and do so in a way that updates our relationships around the world and puts them on a much sounder footing. As we see it, President Trump's approach to foreign policy is one of common sense. Accordingly, he is recalibrating America's foreign policy to serve the practical, concrete interests of regular Americans, with significant implications from defense to trade to counternarcotics to migration.
To be clear, this is not some dramatic abandonment of America's historic foreign policy. Actually quite to the contrary: It is a return to the best tradition of America's foreign policy — of a hard-nosed, clear-eyed republican realism that puts our people's concrete interests first, but in ways that also align with the interests of many other countries. It is not isolation, but rather a business-like recalibration, a model of collaborative self-interest — enlightened self-interest, yes, but very much practical and pragmatic rather than ideological or rigid.
In Europe, we talk about this as NATO 3.0 — a rejection of the fanciful era of post-Cold War talking shop NATO and a return to the tradition of the hard-nosed Atlantic Alliance of the Cold War period, focused on the core business of military strength and readiness. In the Western Hemisphere, meanwhile, we see the Trump Corollary as a return to the best tradition of the Monroe Doctrine — of a policy designed to empower and enable the countries of Latin America to deal with the serious challenges we together face in the Western Hemisphere.
In both of these regions, despite a lot of sniping in the outlets of the old order, we see real, concrete, and accelerating momentum to join us in building new, more pragmatic, and more durable partnerships with our allies and partners. NATO is demonstrably much stronger than it was before President Trump's leadership. And in the Western Hemisphere countries across the region are joining us in efforts like the America's Counter-Cartel Coalition initiative to combat the scourge of narcoterrorism that afflicts us all.
We see similar trends here in Asia. Countries in the region know that we are not embarking on some novel approach of retrenchment. That is the cheap talk of the cognoscenti. Instead, countries here in Asia understand that America is returning to a traditional, time-tested strategy of flexible realism: clarity about our priorities, seriousness about deterrence, and an understanding of the value of both forcefulness and diplomacy. It is the foreign policy of common sense.
Viewing the world through this lens, we see Asia as of paramount importance. The National Security Strategy states, in plain terms, that in order "to thrive at home, we must successfully compete" here. The National Defense Strategy, meantime, lays out that maintaining U.S. access to this critical region has "exceptionally real — indeed, fundamental — implications" for America's vital interests. And, as Secretary Hegseth said at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, "a Pacific dominated by any hegemon would unravel the regional balance of power and undermine the equilibrium we all seek to preserve." This longstanding view of the United States — an Asia free of hegemony — has been at the core of our regional approach since the earliest days of our Republic.
America's interests here in the Indo-Pacific region are therefore clear, abiding, and profound. Not in some vague way. But in the concrete, practical sense that this region will be the world's largest market. It is where not only scale is, but growth as well, including especially here in ASEAN. This is not a new observation. Indeed, this recognition of the importance of Asia is also a return to the deep roots of American foreign policy. Such an understanding of the rising importance of Asia and its economic heft goes back not only to the postwar period but to the 19th century — to the Open Door, the opening of Japan, and of course America's presence here in the Philippines as well as across the Pacific in places like Hawaii and Samoa.
In light of these factors, as the NSS says, our driving and abiding purpose is to maintain a favorable balance of power in the Indo-Pacific. From a defense perspective, as that seminal document makes clear, this requires us to maintain a posture of deterrence by denial along the first island chain. As Secretary Hegseth put it at the 2026 Shangri-La Dialogue, "We will build and sustain a strong denial defense in the Western Pacific that ensures aggression is infeasible, escalation unattractive, and war deemed irrational." This is what we at the Pentagon are focused on building and sustaining here in this region. And the results and progress are clear, not only in our operations and activities, but in the unprecedented degree of investment reflected in the Administration's Fiscal Year 2027 defense budget.
But, to be clear, this strong and focused approach is fully consistent with an active and creative diplomacy aimed at promoting strategic stability and reducing pressures toward conflict. To many today in Washington and the elite commentariat, this seems hard to wrap their heads around. But it is simple common sense, and indeed in the best traditions of American foreign policy. Dwight Eisenhower, Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger, and, yes, Ronald Reagan all both sought to strengthen America's military position while simultaneously engaging actively at the highest levels with our potential opponents. As Winston Churchill himself put it, "it is better to jaw jaw than war war."
Indeed, this is much closer to the ASEAN way than Washington's foreign policy of the last generation. Our understanding of the ASEAN way is that it is defined by pragmatism, an openness to dialogue, respect for counterparts, proud nationalism, and a focus on economic prosperity. The United States is now taking a page from the ASEAN Way.
These are also the key themes of President Trump's administration. This is not an approach that purports to stand in judgment of every action by other countries, as has been so typical of the post-Cold War American approach here in the region. We will of course stick to and stand for our principles, but we will not hold hostage progress on key issues of strategic importance because of them. The concrete, practical progress with many countries here in ASEAN over the last eighteen months shows that. We may not agree on everything, but we respect your countries, your independent pathways, your nationalism, and the reality of our shared interests to work together collaboratively wherever we can.
In summary, then, our approach is one of flexible realism, of building strength in ways that are durable and achieve their intended effect, of genuine peace through strength rather than rhetorical pressurization without adequate material strength and resolve. In other words, strong and clear but quiet, as Secretary Hegseth puts it: not peacocking but the intelligent, realistic, and quiet development and demonstration of strength.
Now, I acknowledge that this is a different reality than what you might hear if you confine yourself to listening only to the panjandrums of the global elite or their most prominent outlets. There, you will read or hear a different story: that America is in retreat or decline or too unreliable, and that Asian countries are fleeing from working with us.
The commentariat plays an important role and often makes valuable points.
But they are missing the reality of the situation — perhaps not seeing it, and in some cases perhaps not wishing to admit to seeing it.
Governments in the region, though, do not have this luxury. For them and for those in the commentariat who wish seriously to help governments here understand what is happening, I humbly advise looking at the reality of the situation.
If you do this, you will quickly observe a far different reality than what is commonly presented.
First, America is decidedly not in decline. Our economy under President Trump's leadership is growing, and indeed substantially outgrowing the other OECD economies. Our technology remains at the world's forefront, and in key respects we are extending our lead. In fact, it now seems increasingly likely that America will remain the largest economy in nominal GDP terms for the foreseeable future — something that would not have been so clear a decade ago.
Second, America is definitely not disengaging from Asia — to the contrary. Our vital national interests dictate our enduring presence here. What the commentariat frequently misinterprets as "disengagement" or "retrenchment" is, in reality, a disciplined and necessary strategic prioritization. We are replacing the hollow, merely symbolic engagement of previous decades with a formidable, resource-backed posture calibrated to actual structural realities. We are not leaving; in fact, we are digging in, to ensure a favorable balance of power where it matters most.
Third, contrary to the hubbub, you most definitely can cooperate with America — in fact, there are new vistas opening up to do so. But the terms of engagement have changed. Allow me to try to explain this.
There is a canard out there that America today is too unreliable to work with anymore. That is a combination of wrong and missing the point.
Before, America was at the same time calculable from a negotiating point of view but frequently rigid and ideologically fixed on liberal shibboleths.
Under President Trump's visionary leadership, we have a new approach defined by common sense. It is true that America now drives a harder bargain. But that is downstream of republican realism oriented on actually putting Americans first. Under President Trump's leadership, the simple fact is that countries can no longer take America for granted. No longer can countries simply assume America will go along with unbalanced relationships that are not clearly in Americans' practical interests. We are proud to implement that in the defense arena, where this has very clear and direct implications in terms of pressing allies to spend more on defense, for instance.
But saying countries can no longer take America for granted is definitely not the same thing as saying we cannot be dealt with. To the contrary. Rather, if you approach as we approach you — with a practical mindset, focused on delivering results that reflect a reasonable balance in the relationship — you will find us willing partners, and indeed more willing than past administrations, which were hidebound by outdated convention or rigid adherence to liberal dogma.
Moreover, the reality that is well appreciated by governments in this region but not always by the commentariat is that a strong, constructive relationship with America is a vital anchor for our shared strategic and economic future. I say that not with arrogance but with a spirit of candor and respect. America is the world's largest market, with its dominant global currency and its best companies and technologies. America is making enormous investments in key areas like artificial intelligence and rare earths. On the defense side, America has the world's strongest military and makes the best military equipment at an unparalleled scale. The American defense budget is already the world's largest and we are actively seeking to substantially grow it.
This is not to say you should deal only with us, and certainly not to frame our goals as hegemonic. To the contrary, we seek partnerships, not dependencies, and we understand that countries will engage widely, just as we do.
But it is to counsel rejecting the delusion of fashionable but superficial ideas like middle power alliances designed to exclude America. To be clear, we encourage collaboration among allies and partners as well as efforts to build up their defense industrial capacities as part of increased defense spending in line with the new global standard set by the 2025 Hague NATO Summit. But such efforts by our allies and close partners should integrate and be complementary with America's — not vainly and futilely seek to exclude or supplant us. The watchwords should be strategies of practicality, pragmatism, and realism, not the buzzword-deep strategies of international conferences.
This should come naturally here in Southeast Asia, where these attitudes are commendably habitual. Our advice to governments here in the region and beyond is to focus on the structural realities and what America under President Trump's leadership is actually doing and offering — and not on the picture that some of the commentariat paints.
Of course, commentary is important and has its rightful place. But, to be frank, I think much of the commentary on the Trump Administration and what it is doing has more to do with the realm of words, symbols, and political reaction rather than actually helping us to understand reality. There are certainly many noble exceptions, but much of the conventional wisdom out there misses what is really happening.
Take the issue of middle powers. There has been a lot of discussion on that issue. If you confine yourself to the commentary, you might come away with one impression. But if you look at the reality of the situation, as we advise, you will come away with another one. Thus, if you focus on words and symbols, you might think that a declaration by a group of leaders to build a new type of plane or space asset is the result. Or the convening and agreeing of a conference on increasing military strength is the result. We ourselves look at whether that plane or satellite was delivered or is likely to be delivered, and whether that platform has the required level of quality and mission suitability, and so forth. We humbly advise you to do the same.
Or take, for example, the announcements of new multilateral security frameworks regarding maritime cooperation. While these agreements often generate favorable headlines, we evaluate them by a much harder but more important metric: Do they actually result in more ships in the water, expanded stockpiles of critical munitions, and genuine interoperability? A signed piece of paper or a newly formed working group does not deter coercion; fielded hard power and the demonstrated political will to use it do.
Fortunately, I think my message here is already well-understood by regional governments. In fact, we see a wide chasm between the narrative described by some of the cognoscenti as compared to what we experience with governments in this region.
Our counterparts in Manila, Bangkok, Jakarta, Singapore, Hanoi, Kuala Lumpur, and elsewhere — who have regular and frequent conversations with us — know exactly what the War Department has been doing. There is no confusion about our strategy and approach among those who actually bear the responsibility for national defense. They know that we are actively expanding our forward posture, accelerating the delivery of hard combat capabilities to the theater, and building out the physical architecture of a true denial defense. Under the leadership of President Trump and Secretary Hegseth, we are speaking softly and carrying a big stick. As Secretary Hegseth has said, we are pursuing an approach that is strong and clear but quiet.
They know that we do not feel the need to engage in needless, loud, rhetorical provocations to prove our resolve. They understand that we judge strength not by the volume of moralizing speeches we deliver or the number of attendees at multilateral summits but rather through hard capability, through posture, through industrial readiness, and through the quiet, relentless strengthening of deterrence. This is both what we are focused on and how we expect to be measured and judged.
And they are equally clear about what we are doing: We are putting our alliances on a sustainable, realistic, and durable footing for the long haul. When we ask our allies and partners to step up, to invest more in their own defense, and to take responsibility for their own sovereign security, we are not signaling abandonment. We are doing the exact opposite: we are inviting you to build a true partnership. This is motivated by our practical judgment that alliances are most durable when they are based on shared responsibility — mutual interest, governed by pragmatic respect, and underwritten by real capability on both sides — rather than permanent dependency. We are looking for partners, not protectorates.
When our partners are strong, deterrence is strong. And that is exactly what we have here in Manila, under the leadership of President Marcos, Secretary of National Defense Teodoro, and other key leaders. We see and respect a resolute and proud nation that is determined to strengthen its own capabilities to better defend itself and its interests. A model ally. I commend the Philippines for its outstanding leadership of ASEAN during its chairmanship this year, guiding the region with a clear-headed pragmatism that matches the strategic demands of our time.
And with our allies and partners throughout this region, we are actively building a strong denial defense to back up a peace through strength approach of a lastingly favorable balance of power in Asia. We are systematically strengthening our forward posture, hardening our footprint, and driving deep interoperability with key countries that are willing to shoulder their share of the burden. This is not merely about performing in symbolic exercises for the cameras; it is about fielding combat-credible forces capable of defeating real military aggression. That is what we mean by strong and clear.
The proof of our success is evident in the results of our efforts in this critical region. The success of our strategy — and the very foundation of this denial defense — rests on the concrete, practical partnerships we are building and modernizing across the region, including here in Southeast Asia.
Here in the Philippines, our alliance is undergoing a historic modernization, rooted in profound mutual respect. We are co-investing in resilient infrastructure, training on cutting-edge capabilities, and operationalizing our Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement sites. This is not a one-sided partnership — the Philippines is stepping up, taking the lead to defend itself, and investing more to modernize its military and coast guard. We are backing up those investments with concrete, visible support, including the rotational deployment of four Fast Response Cutters to actively partner with the Philippine Coast Guard in patrolling and securing its Exclusive Economic Zone. By strengthening our joint posture, we are ensuring that both our nations possess the hard capabilities required to deter aggression.
With Thailand, our oldest diplomatic partner in Asia and only mainland ally, we are accelerating the pace and scope of our strong defense relationship. Rather than giving ideological lectures, the Department of War is focused on what practically matters to both of us: transforming legacy exercises into high-end, combat-credible training that actually tests our joint warfighting readiness and ensures our forces can operate together efficiently.
We view Indonesia as a pivotal strategic actor, and we are engaging Jakarta with deep respect for its proud traditions and history. Through our Major Defense Cooperation Partnership, announced earlier this year, our relationship is growing substantially. We are focused on tangible defense modernization and deep interoperability — including through enhanced joint special forces training — that directly bolsters Jakarta's sovereign capabilities. We want a strong, independent Indonesia capable of securing its own vast archipelago.
Our partnerships with Vietnam and Malaysia are compelling examples of flexible realism in action. In both cases, we leave yesterday's ideological preconditions at the door. We are stripping away diplomatic platitudes and focusing strictly on the intersection of our national interests: advancing practical maritime domain awareness and providing the hard power tools necessary to protect their sovereign rights and resist external encroachment.
And in Singapore, we see the ultimate model of pragmatic, business-like cooperation. Without the need for an overarching ideological framework, we have built a deeply mutually beneficial relationship based on a clear-eyed read of the region's security environment. By supporting U.S. rotational forces, Singapore is an anchor of U.S. posture in the region, demonstrating that our presence is actively welcomed when it is grounded in shared security and economic realities rather than patronizing heavy-handedness.
Across the region, from Manila to Bangkok, from Jakarta to Phnom Penh, we are pursuing ambitious, interest-based partnerships that respect national sovereignty and directly contribute to collective deterrence.
Nor, I stress, is the Department of War is alone in this effort. What Secretary Rubio announced during his recent visit to Manila is a preview of the consistent and effective diplomacy our defense strategy complements.
Looking ahead, let me be clear about how we will measure success in this region over the next several years. Executing a strategy of flexible realism will deliver an Indo-Pacific that is demonstrably more secure, structurally resilient, and self-reliant.
Consistent with the NSS, our priority is to field a fully operational, resilient architecture of denial defense stretching along the First Island Chain. This includes robust, distributed theater logistics and prepositioned assets in the Western Pacific. We are committed to building this shared logistics infrastructure alongside our allies and partners, ensuring we can sustain combat-credible power where it matters most. Yet this defense architecture cannot rest on American shoulders alone. It must be upheld by a network of highly capable, sovereign nations that have modernized their own forces and stepped up to secure their own territory — transforming our relationships into true partnerships of equals.
Because these modernized alliances will be grounded in mutual respect and pragmatic cooperation, they will be durable, deeply rooted in shared national interests.
Ultimately, these hard-power realities serve a single, overriding objective: maintaining a genuinely favorable balance of power in the region. By fielding combat-credible forces, we will make aggression demonstrably infeasible and ensure deterrence is stout, resulting in a durable balance of power. This is not about empty rhetoric; it is the time-tested, historical recipe for lasting peace. And beneath that umbrella of security, the sovereign nations of this region — and the United States alongside them — can focus on what they do best: fostering the dynamic, growing economies that will define prosperity in the 21st century.
Let me close by returning to the central theme of our approach: strong and clear but quiet.
We will mean what we say, and say what we mean. We will not engage in peacocking or moralizing speeches. We will continue to speak softly. But we will continue to carry the world's biggest stick. We will maintain our peerless and formidable strength here in the world's key region. We will achieve peace through strength and common sense.
This is the spirit we carry in this critical region. We extend our hand to work with countries throughout Asia in a spirit of partnership, respect, and pragmatism. We invite you to take advantage of this extraordinary opportunity of an Administration guided by common sense and realism, not rigidity and pretensions of moralistic superiority. There is an historic opening for us to work together more deeply and more practically. Let us seize this opportunity together.
Thank you very much.