Thank you for that kind introduction, and thank you for the opportunity to be with you here today. It is a great honor to represent the United States and Secretary of War Pete Hegseth in this session with all of you.
As the National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy make clear, we are now living through a period of profound strategic change that requires clear-eyed realism and fundamental adaptation by all of us. The world that shaped the habits, assumptions, and force posture of NATO during the so-called "unipolar moment" following the Cold War no longer exists. Power politics has returned, and military force is again being employed at a large scale.
In this environment, the United States is prioritizing the most consequential threats to Americans' interests, especially the defense of the U.S. homeland and interests in the Western Hemisphere, as well as reinforcing deterrence by denial in the Western Pacific. At the same time - and critically - the United States and its allies must be prepared for the possibility that potential opponents will act simultaneously across multiple theaters, whether in a coordinated fashion or opportunistically.
These realities compel us to think clearly, soberly, and realistically about how we defend ourselves - and how we do so together in a way that is sustainable, sensible, and enduring.
Times have changed, and it is only prudent that we adapt to meet them. This is not an abandonment of NATO. To the contrary, it is a return to and validation of its foundational purpose. The Alliance was created in the late 1940s to provide a strong, credible, and equitable defense of the North Atlantic area. Throughout the Cold War, "NATO 1.0" as we might describe it, was defined by a hard-nosed, realistic, clear-eyed approach to deterrence and defense. Allies from the beginning were expected to pull their weight, as evidenced as early as Article III of the Washington Treaty and the Lisbon Commitments of 1951. Tough conversations about burden-sharing were the norm, whether under Presidents like Lyndon Johnson during the Balance of Payments Crisis, Richard Nixon during Vietnam and Détente, or Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan during the Euromissiles era. President Eisenhower himself - one of the men most responsible for Allied victory in the Second World War and the first SACEUR - was very clear that NATO's success hinged upon our allies stepping up to lead in their own defense.
This model was tremendously successful. It made sure that the USSR never saw military aggression against the Western Alliance as a viable strategy. It thus saw us through the Cold War with peace in Europe - an incredible achievement for which we must all be grateful.
When the Soviet Union collapsed, however, NATO transformed into something else - perhaps what one might call "NATO 2.0". This version of the Alliance was typified by a shift of effort and focus away from Europe's defense toward "out of area" operations and substantial disarmament on the continent, as well as a change in frame from the hard-nosed, flexible realism of the Cold War "NATO 1.0" to much more of a liberal internationalist mindset of the "rules-based international order."
It is clear, however, that this approach of "NATO 2.0" is no longer fit for purpose - certainly not for the United States and, we would submit, not for our allies either. The times are changing, and we must adapt - in terms of how we think about the world and the Alliance's role in it and how we posture to meet it in practical terms.
What is needed is a "NATO 3.0" - something much closer to "NATO 1.0" than the approach of the last thirty-five years. This "NATO 3.0" requires much greater efforts by our allies to step up and assume primary responsibility for the conventional defense of Europe. Nor, I should stress, does it necessitate a one-sided focus on military strength alone. Rather, in line with "NATO 1.0"'s policy of the Harmel Report, it provides for an approach that classically matches such strengthening with diplomatic outreach - represented by the Dual Track approach of the 1970s and 1980s and today by President Trump's efforts to both strengthen NATO and negotiate an end to the tragic war in Ukraine.
To President Trump's great credit and to the great credit of the Allies, the Alliance took historic, momentous steps in 2025 to chart a new course in line with this needed shift. With the Hague Summit commitments, there is now a shared recognition that the approach typified by "NATO 2.0," in which the United States provided the overwhelming share of high-end military power for Europe's defense while European allies on the whole spent relatively little on defense, was no longer sustainable. More importantly, beyond recognition, we are beginning to see a promising start to demonstrated action by the Allies to meet the Hague Summit commitment of 3.5% and 5% of GDP on core and broader defense spending, a level that now forms, as the National Security and National Defense Strategies make clear, a new global standard for our allies around the world.
So, the turning of the tide has happened. And we should take pride and confidence in that. But the great task before us in 2026 and beyond is to turn that recognition into durable and real results. The commitment to aligning resources with strategic requirements must now be fulfilled in practice.
The core strategic reality laid out by the NSS and NDS is this: Europe must assume primary responsibility for its own conventional defense.
This is not a matter of ideology or rhetorical flourish. It is a conclusion grounded in a clear-eyed and rigorous assessment of the strategic environment we face as well as a pragmatic evaluation of the capabilities at our disposal.
Europe has immense strengths: it is wealthy, populous, and has formidable industrial and technological capabilities. And Europe faces, on its own continent, a real and persistent military challenge.
At the same time, the United States must - and will - prioritize those theaters and challenges where only American power can play a decisive role, as the National Defense Strategy lays out. That is not a retreat from Europe. It is, rather, an affirmation of strategic pragmatism and a recognition of our allies' undeniable ability to step up and lead on Europe's defense in a way that leaves all of us stronger and safer. By leveraging our respective strengths and specializing in areas where we are best positioned to act, we can build a more balanced, effective, and resilient Alliance.
Under President Trump's leadership, we are reprioritizing the defense of our homeland and the protection of our interests in our Hemisphere. We are grappling forthrightly with the fact that the Indo-Pacific is now a central arena of geopolitics, one with fundamental implications for American security, economic vitality, and technological leadership.
It follows that Europe should field the preponderance of the forces required to deter and, if necessary, defeat conventional aggression in Europe.
A strategy that pretends the United States can indefinitely serve as the primary conventional defender of Europe while also carrying the decisive burden everywhere else is neither sustainable nor prudent. It is an aspiration divorced from resources. It is a strategy that serves neither regular Americans nor, I must stress, Europeans. Continuing to proclaim the shibboleths of "NATO 2.0" without a credible strategy for how to meet them would not help Europe - it would hurt it, by perpetuating expectations that cannot realistically be met. That is not friendship. True friendship is speaking truly, forthrightly, and credibly.
That is why Secretary General Rutte is so right that President Trump has been a true friend to the Alliance - by making it, in the face of enormous resistance, confront the reality of the situation and become fit for that purpose.
So, what does this mean going forward?
For Europe, it means moving beyond inputs and intentions toward outputs and capabilities. Defense spending levels matter, and there is no substitute for it. But what matters at the end of the day is what those resources produce: ready forces, usable munitions, resilient logistics, and integrated command structures that work at scale under stress.
It means prioritizing war-fighting effectiveness over bureaucratic and regulatory stasis. It means making hard choices about force structure, readiness, stockpiles, and industrial capacity that reflect the realities of modern conflict rather than peacetime politics.
It also means embracing strategic discipline. Not every mission can be the top priority. Not every capability can be gold-plated. The measure of seriousness is whether European forces can fight, sustain, and prevail in the scenarios that matter most for the defense of the Alliance. This is the approach we are taking in the United States under Secretary Hegseth's leadership, as laid out in his landmark speeches this year and the National Defense Strategy. We are doing our part and being honest about what we can and can't do.
Thus, for the United States, our responsibility is to be clear, candid, and consistent. We will continue to provide the U.S. extended nuclear deterrent. And we will also continue, in a more limited and focused fashion, to provide conventional capabilities that contribute to NATO's defense. Our commitment is to be candid with you, both in regard to the timeline and scale of change, and about the challenges and tradeoffs we face. We will continue to train, exercise, and plan alongside our allies. And we in the Department of War will continue to ready our forces to do our part under Article V with Europe taking the lead for its conventional defense.
But we will also continue to press, respectfully but firmly and insistently, for a rebalancing of roles and burdens within the Alliance. That is not pressure for its own sake. It is pressure in service of a stronger, more credible NATO.
Let me stress something: There is nothing anti-European about this vision. To the contrary, it reflects hope and indeed confidence in Europe's capacity to act substantially and vigorously. This is the message of the National Security and National Defense Strategies: We want, as Secretary Rubio has laid out, strong and confident allies in Europe and beyond. We want partnerships, not dependencies.
This is because experience teaches us that alliances are strongest when responsibilities are shared in ways that reflect underlying power and interests. When those alignments drift too far out of balance, alliances weaken - not because of ill will, but because of structural strain.
The encouraging news is that we are already seeing signs of significant forward movement. Several European allies have increased defense spending significantly. Others are reforming procurement and readiness systems that had long been neglected. Under General Grynkewich's and Admiral Vandier's superb leadership, NATO's defense planning process is becoming more demanding, more operationally grounded, and more focused on real war-fighting requirements.
These are positive developments. They must be accelerated and deepened.
Looking ahead, the promise of 2026 and the years beyond is this: a NATO in which Europe is the primary conventional defender of the European theater, backed by American strategic power and global reach; an Alliance that is militarily credible, politically durable, and strategically realistic; and a transatlantic relationship defined not by dependency nor by canned recitations detached from reality, but rather by common strength and a shared grammar rooted in flexible realism.
This future will not be achieved by declarations alone. It will require sustained political will, investment, and follow-through. It will require uncomfortable conversations and difficult trade-offs. And it will require a shared understanding that the essence of NATO is not symbolism or cloud-castle abstractions, but, rather, deterrence and, if deterrence fails, effective defense that leaves all our peoples better off.
The United States stands ready to walk this road with you. But partnership, by definition, means walking together - each carrying a fair share of the load. We must - and the United States will insist - that we hold each other accountable for meeting our commitments. In that vein, we look forward to NDPP Step 5 and Deputy SACEUR's Suitability and Risk Assessment that comes out of Step 5.
If Europe rises to this moment, if it truly embraces primary responsibility for its own defense, then the Alliance will emerge stronger, more resilient, and better prepared for the challenges ahead. And the transatlantic bond will not weaken - it will mature, embodying the vision of a "NATO 3.0" that is balanced, credible, and rooted in shared strength and realism. This is a NATO that can do its part for Europe's defense not just in the months and years ahead but for decades to come.
That is the opportunity before us. It is a demanding task. But it offers a promising and worthy result.
Thank you very much.