1
00:00:00,289 --> 00:00:03,390
OK , today's will come to order . It's 

2
00:00:03,390 --> 00:00:05,501
good to see you there , Mr . Bolton . 

3
00:00:05,501 --> 00:00:07,390
Good afternoon and welcome to the 

4
00:00:07,390 --> 00:00:09,501
Strategic Forces Subcommittee's first 

5
00:00:09,501 --> 00:00:11,723
hearing of the 2027 fiscal year posture 

6
00:00:11,723 --> 00:00:14,001
season . I am filling in for the chair , 

7
00:00:14,001 --> 00:00:16,112
uh , who's still in transit trying to 

8
00:00:16,112 --> 00:00:18,223
get here . I am proud to be a part of 

9
00:00:18,223 --> 00:00:20,168
this committee . First , I want to 

10
00:00:20,168 --> 00:00:19,659
welcome all the members back to the 

11
00:00:19,659 --> 00:00:21,659
best subcommittee here on the House 

12
00:00:21,659 --> 00:00:23,770
Armed Services Committee , with maybe 

13
00:00:23,770 --> 00:00:26,579
the exception of cyber . They have a 

14
00:00:26,579 --> 00:00:28,801
little bit better chairman on the cyber 

15
00:00:28,801 --> 00:00:30,635
Subcommittee . I look forward to 

16
00:00:30,635 --> 00:00:32,801
working with you all again as we build 

17
00:00:32,801 --> 00:00:35,079
the National Defense Authorization Act . 

18
00:00:35,079 --> 00:00:34,930
As you sit here today , the Joint Force 

19
00:00:34,930 --> 00:00:37,097
is conducting operations in the Middle 

20
00:00:37,097 --> 00:00:39,319
East against the Iranian threat . We do 

21
00:00:39,319 --> 00:00:41,486
not take for granted the sacrifices of 

22
00:00:41,486 --> 00:00:43,708
our men and women in uniform , and that 

23
00:00:43,708 --> 00:00:43,139
is why it is more important than ever 

24
00:00:43,139 --> 00:00:45,361
that we make sure they have the best or 

25
00:00:45,361 --> 00:00:47,528
have what they need and when they need 

26
00:00:47,528 --> 00:00:49,583
it . I'd like to thank our witnesses 

27
00:00:49,583 --> 00:00:51,806
for appearing before us today . With us 

28
00:00:51,806 --> 00:00:54,028
we have Mr . Mark Berkowitz , Assistant 

29
00:00:54,028 --> 00:00:56,250
Secretary of Defense for Space Policy , 

30
00:00:56,250 --> 00:00:58,195
and Doctor Robert Call , Assistant 

31
00:00:58,195 --> 00:01:00,028
Secretary of Defense for Nuclear 

32
00:01:00,028 --> 00:00:59,930
Deterrence , chemical and Biological 

33
00:00:59,930 --> 00:01:02,097
Defense , someone who I've worked with 

34
00:01:02,097 --> 00:01:04,208
extensively over the last few years , 

35
00:01:04,370 --> 00:01:06,537
General Stephen Whiting , Commander of 

36
00:01:06,537 --> 00:01:09,150
the US Space Command . Joe Gre Gregory 

37
00:01:09,150 --> 00:01:11,261
Gillo , who at one time commanded the 

38
00:01:11,261 --> 00:01:13,150
best wing in the Air Force , uh , 

39
00:01:13,150 --> 00:01:15,261
commander of the US , now a commander 

40
00:01:15,261 --> 00:01:17,094
of the US Northern Command , and 

41
00:01:17,094 --> 00:01:19,261
Admiral Richard Correll , commander of 

42
00:01:19,261 --> 00:01:21,483
US Strategic Command at one of the best 

43
00:01:21,483 --> 00:01:21,360
the best base in America right there , 

44
00:01:21,440 --> 00:01:23,662
head off it . Gerald Whiting and Gerald 

45
00:01:23,662 --> 00:01:25,884
Guillo , it's good to see you again . A 

46
00:01:25,884 --> 00:01:28,218
special welcome to Admiral Correll , Mr . 

47
00:01:28,218 --> 00:01:30,329
Berkowitz , Doctor Callac , and their 

48
00:01:30,329 --> 00:01:32,551
first appearance for the subcommittee . 

49
00:01:32,551 --> 00:01:34,496
As we await the president's budget 

50
00:01:34,496 --> 00:01:34,230
request for the upcoming fiscal year , 

51
00:01:34,470 --> 00:01:36,692
we look forward to hearing from each of 

52
00:01:36,692 --> 00:01:38,803
you about the complex threats you are 

53
00:01:38,803 --> 00:01:40,970
seeing in your areas of responsibility 

54
00:01:40,970 --> 00:01:42,803
and the capabilities you need to 

55
00:01:42,803 --> 00:01:45,026
address them . Space plays a vital role 

56
00:01:45,026 --> 00:01:45,000
in everything the Joint Force does , 

57
00:01:45,040 --> 00:01:47,207
and it's more apparent now than ever . 

58
00:01:47,279 --> 00:01:49,057
GPS jamming has become a common 

59
00:01:49,057 --> 00:01:51,057
occurrence in every recent conflict 

60
00:01:51,057 --> 00:01:53,112
from Ukraine to now as we've seen in 

61
00:01:53,112 --> 00:01:55,112
Iran . How we fight and posture our 

62
00:01:55,112 --> 00:01:57,390
space assets is central to the success . 

63
00:01:57,889 --> 00:02:00,111
Of the success of the mission both here 

64
00:02:00,111 --> 00:02:02,333
and abroad in defense of the homeland . 

65
00:02:02,333 --> 00:02:04,333
Whiting , I look forward to hearing 

66
00:02:04,459 --> 00:02:06,181
from you how this increasingly 

67
00:02:06,181 --> 00:02:08,181
threatened space domain is factored 

68
00:02:08,181 --> 00:02:10,181
into your plans to both support the 

69
00:02:10,181 --> 00:02:12,181
joint force but also break red kill 

70
00:02:12,181 --> 00:02:13,959
chains . I was happy to see the 

71
00:02:13,959 --> 00:02:13,699
administration's national defense 

72
00:02:13,699 --> 00:02:16,130
strategy recognize that nuclear threats 

73
00:02:16,130 --> 00:02:18,352
are growing , particularly with China's 

74
00:02:18,352 --> 00:02:20,519
rapid nuclear buildup . And emphasizes 

75
00:02:20,519 --> 00:02:22,352
the need for a robust and modern 

76
00:02:22,352 --> 00:02:24,574
nuclear deterrent . However , while our 

77
00:02:24,574 --> 00:02:26,574
strategy may recognize that threats 

78
00:02:26,574 --> 00:02:28,686
have changed , we continue to field a 

79
00:02:28,686 --> 00:02:30,519
deterrent designed for a bipolar 

80
00:02:30,519 --> 00:02:32,309
nuclear world and to pursue a 

81
00:02:32,309 --> 00:02:34,420
modernization plan that was developed 

82
00:02:34,420 --> 00:02:36,587
nearly a decade before China's nuclear 

83
00:02:36,587 --> 00:02:38,642
breakout began . Doctor Cadillac and 

84
00:02:38,642 --> 00:02:40,587
Admiral Korral , I look forward to 

85
00:02:40,587 --> 00:02:42,809
hearing from you about what changes are 

86
00:02:42,809 --> 00:02:42,789
needed to adapt to the current threat 

87
00:02:42,789 --> 00:02:44,678
environment . And what additional 

88
00:02:44,678 --> 00:02:46,789
capabilities are necessary to prevent 

89
00:02:46,789 --> 00:02:48,789
deterrence gaps , as the warfighter 

90
00:02:48,789 --> 00:02:51,039
responsible for homeland defense , you 

91
00:02:51,039 --> 00:02:53,095
stand at the intersection of all the 

92
00:02:53,095 --> 00:02:55,095
subcommittee's missionaries nuclear 

93
00:02:55,095 --> 00:02:57,095
deterrence , space operations , and 

94
00:02:57,095 --> 00:02:59,039
missile defense . While many of us 

95
00:02:59,039 --> 00:02:58,649
continue to have questions about how 

96
00:02:58,649 --> 00:03:00,538
the Golden Dome architecture will 

97
00:03:00,538 --> 00:03:02,871
address your needs for domain awareness , 

98
00:03:02,871 --> 00:03:05,110
defense capabilities . I know Gutland 

99
00:03:05,110 --> 00:03:07,277
is working hard to finalize the plan , 

100
00:03:07,277 --> 00:03:09,710
and there's only such such . 

101
00:03:10,479 --> 00:03:12,889
So much can we discuss at this time . 

102
00:03:13,250 --> 00:03:15,306
With that , I'll turn it over to the 

103
00:03:15,306 --> 00:03:17,472
ranking member Moulton for any remarks 

104
00:03:17,472 --> 00:03:19,806
he'd like to make . Thank you very much , 

105
00:03:19,806 --> 00:03:21,750
uh , Mr . Chairman . I , I had all 

106
00:03:21,750 --> 00:03:23,806
these nice things I was going to say 

107
00:03:23,806 --> 00:03:25,972
about the real , the real chairman . I 

108
00:03:25,972 --> 00:03:28,083
have to take a look and see if , uh , 

109
00:03:28,083 --> 00:03:30,306
well , actually they apply even more so 

110
00:03:30,306 --> 00:03:32,306
to you . So thank you very much for 

111
00:03:32,306 --> 00:03:34,528
your partnership , longtime partnership 

112
00:03:34,528 --> 00:03:34,309
on this , on this committee . We're 

113
00:03:34,309 --> 00:03:36,839
gonna miss you . Thank you . I also 

114
00:03:36,839 --> 00:03:39,279
want to welcome our witnesses and thank 

115
00:03:39,279 --> 00:03:41,390
you for your continued service to our 

116
00:03:41,390 --> 00:03:43,446
country . It's a difficult time . We 

117
00:03:43,446 --> 00:03:45,723
seem to have a new war every few weeks . 

118
00:03:45,723 --> 00:03:47,779
Uh , but before we begin , I want to 

119
00:03:47,779 --> 00:03:49,779
take a moment to especially welcome 

120
00:03:49,779 --> 00:03:51,946
Admiral Correll , Doctor , uh , Cali , 

121
00:03:51,946 --> 00:03:54,112
and Mr . Berkowitz on the subcommittee 

122
00:03:54,112 --> 00:03:56,335
as this is our final hearing with you . 

123
00:03:56,335 --> 00:03:58,668
Get that right ? First hearing with you . 

124
00:03:59,470 --> 00:04:03,240
Did not get it right . The 

125
00:04:03,240 --> 00:04:05,679
policy and programmatic issues in front 

126
00:04:05,679 --> 00:04:07,179
of us are some of the most 

127
00:04:07,179 --> 00:04:09,457
consequential that we face as a nation , 

128
00:04:09,457 --> 00:04:11,568
and we must continue to work together 

129
00:04:11,568 --> 00:04:13,512
to ensure the department is a good 

130
00:04:13,512 --> 00:04:15,623
steward of the taxpayers' money , but 

131
00:04:15,623 --> 00:04:17,679
also because the world we will leave 

132
00:04:17,679 --> 00:04:19,679
our children depends on it . I also 

133
00:04:19,679 --> 00:04:21,790
would like to thank General Guillo as 

134
00:04:21,790 --> 00:04:23,957
this will be his final posture hearing 

135
00:04:23,957 --> 00:04:25,957
in front of this committee . I have 

136
00:04:25,957 --> 00:04:28,123
always appreciated your thoughtful and 

137
00:04:28,123 --> 00:04:29,957
measured approach as the head of 

138
00:04:29,957 --> 00:04:31,623
NORTHCOM and NORAD , and your 

139
00:04:31,623 --> 00:04:33,735
leadership there will be missed . The 

140
00:04:33,735 --> 00:04:35,679
responsibilities of this committee 

141
00:04:35,679 --> 00:04:35,619
encompassing our space , missile 

142
00:04:35,619 --> 00:04:37,675
defenses and nuclear forces form the 

143
00:04:37,675 --> 00:04:40,339
foundation of security in America . So 

144
00:04:40,339 --> 00:04:42,700
the issues before us should be debated 

145
00:04:42,700 --> 00:04:46,140
rigorously and honestly . On that count , 

146
00:04:46,260 --> 00:04:48,316
I'm going to be blunt , speaking not 

147
00:04:48,316 --> 00:04:50,093
just as a senior member of this 

148
00:04:50,093 --> 00:04:52,260
committee , but as a 4 tour veteran of 

149
00:04:52,260 --> 00:04:54,482
a misguided war in the Middle East . We 

150
00:04:54,482 --> 00:04:56,593
simply cannot ignore the fact that as 

151
00:04:56,593 --> 00:04:58,760
we sit here today , America is more at 

152
00:04:58,760 --> 00:05:00,871
risk than we were before the Iran war 

153
00:05:00,871 --> 00:05:02,871
began , both in the Middle East and 

154
00:05:02,929 --> 00:05:05,151
here at home . We should all hope for a 

155
00:05:05,151 --> 00:05:06,873
miracle , but miracles are not 

156
00:05:06,873 --> 00:05:09,096
strategies , and it's very difficult to 

157
00:05:09,096 --> 00:05:11,290
see our way forward right now . Since 

158
00:05:11,290 --> 00:05:13,290
taking office 14 months ago , the 

159
00:05:13,290 --> 00:05:15,123
so-called President of Peace has 

160
00:05:15,123 --> 00:05:17,290
attacked 7 countries and through these 

161
00:05:17,290 --> 00:05:19,890
conflicts of choice has expended scarce 

162
00:05:19,890 --> 00:05:22,720
munitions and emboldened both , Russia , 

163
00:05:22,730 --> 00:05:25,130
and China . He has sought regime change 

164
00:05:25,130 --> 00:05:27,450
in both Venezuela and Iran and failed 

165
00:05:27,450 --> 00:05:29,809
twice . Maduro's regime is now headed 

166
00:05:29,809 --> 00:05:32,209
by his vice president . In Iran , we've 

167
00:05:32,209 --> 00:05:34,320
succeeded in replacing an 86-year-old 

168
00:05:34,320 --> 00:05:36,730
in failing health with his son in his 

169
00:05:36,730 --> 00:05:38,897
50s . And in case you wondered whether 

170
00:05:38,897 --> 00:05:40,899
he was more or less hardline . We 

171
00:05:40,899 --> 00:05:43,540
killed his wife and his son . It's hard 

172
00:05:43,540 --> 00:05:45,739
to imagine a better way to turn the 

173
00:05:45,739 --> 00:05:48,459
pro-American Iranian people against us 

174
00:05:48,859 --> 00:05:50,915
than raining down bombs from the sky 

175
00:05:50,915 --> 00:05:54,220
and killing at least 187 innocent 

176
00:05:54,220 --> 00:05:56,579
civilians , most of them little 

177
00:05:56,579 --> 00:05:59,390
schoolgirls . But Trump did find a 

178
00:05:59,390 --> 00:06:01,168
better way of doing it with the 

179
00:06:01,168 --> 00:06:04,589
Israelis . And now implausibly with the 

180
00:06:04,589 --> 00:06:06,910
Strait of Hormuz closed and oil prices 

181
00:06:06,910 --> 00:06:09,750
skyrocketing , Trump is actually losing 

182
00:06:09,750 --> 00:06:12,549
the war . He has kicked a hornet's nest 

183
00:06:12,549 --> 00:06:15,709
and gotten hislheim shoed foot stuck in 

184
00:06:15,709 --> 00:06:19,209
it . Russia is happily helping Iran 

185
00:06:19,209 --> 00:06:21,450
target American troops . Some Democrats 

186
00:06:21,450 --> 00:06:23,394
criticized Trump for enforcing oil 

187
00:06:23,394 --> 00:06:25,672
sanctions on the high seas . I did not . 

188
00:06:25,672 --> 00:06:27,894
I said it was long overdue , especially 

189
00:06:27,894 --> 00:06:30,117
against Russia's so-called Dark Fleet . 

190
00:06:30,117 --> 00:06:32,228
But now , as if to thank the Russians 

191
00:06:32,228 --> 00:06:34,172
for targeting Americans , Trump is 

192
00:06:34,172 --> 00:06:36,117
rewarding Putin by lifting the oil 

193
00:06:36,117 --> 00:06:38,283
sanctions and giving him more money to 

194
00:06:38,283 --> 00:06:40,506
fight Ukraine and build out its nuclear 

195
00:06:40,506 --> 00:06:42,450
arsenal . I can't imagine what our 

196
00:06:42,450 --> 00:06:42,450
troops who risked their lives to board 

197
00:06:42,450 --> 00:06:44,228
those ships a few weeks ago are 

198
00:06:44,228 --> 00:06:46,172
thinking now . Except that I can't 

199
00:06:46,172 --> 00:06:48,394
imagine what they're thinking because I 

200
00:06:48,394 --> 00:06:50,283
lived through similar harebrained 

201
00:06:50,283 --> 00:06:52,339
decisions in Iraq . The president is 

202
00:06:52,339 --> 00:06:54,506
now appealing to both China and Russia 

203
00:06:54,506 --> 00:06:56,929
for help . That's how bad it is . You 

204
00:06:56,929 --> 00:06:59,089
can't make this up , and yet it's no 

205
00:06:59,089 --> 00:07:01,145
fairy tale . The cost is paid in the 

206
00:07:01,145 --> 00:07:03,410
lives of brave young Americans willing 

207
00:07:03,410 --> 00:07:05,890
to serve as the president was not , as 

208
00:07:05,890 --> 00:07:07,723
well as by children and innocent 

209
00:07:07,723 --> 00:07:10,489
civilians . Against this backdrop of 

210
00:07:10,489 --> 00:07:12,869
self-inflicted geopolitical idiocy , 

211
00:07:13,140 --> 00:07:15,251
the mission we are discussing in this 

212
00:07:15,251 --> 00:07:17,418
hearing is increasingly important . It 

213
00:07:17,418 --> 00:07:19,418
represents the backstop against our 

214
00:07:19,418 --> 00:07:21,307
worst day , even as the threat is 

215
00:07:21,307 --> 00:07:23,307
growing in scope , importance , and 

216
00:07:23,307 --> 00:07:25,529
urgency . The Chinese Communist Party's 

217
00:07:25,529 --> 00:07:27,418
ICBM fleet continues to exceed US 

218
00:07:27,418 --> 00:07:29,584
intelligence estimates , and they have 

219
00:07:29,584 --> 00:07:31,584
deployed several hypersonic weapons 

220
00:07:31,584 --> 00:07:33,418
that can carry nuclear weapons . 

221
00:07:33,418 --> 00:07:35,307
Warheads . Russia has developed a 

222
00:07:35,307 --> 00:07:37,362
treaty violating space-based nuclear 

223
00:07:37,362 --> 00:07:39,418
weapon that would destroy nearly all 

224
00:07:39,418 --> 00:07:41,529
the satellites we rely on for GPS and 

225
00:07:41,529 --> 00:07:43,696
communications every day . And again , 

226
00:07:43,696 --> 00:07:45,918
as a reminder , we're lifting sanctions 

227
00:07:45,918 --> 00:07:48,029
on Russia , the only country with the 

228
00:07:48,029 --> 00:07:50,084
capability to completely destroy the 

229
00:07:50,084 --> 00:07:52,251
United States . Last year I spoke at a 

230
00:07:52,251 --> 00:07:54,418
defense conference about how dangerous 

231
00:07:54,418 --> 00:07:56,640
the president's golden dome idea is for 

232
00:07:56,640 --> 00:07:58,751
strategic deterrence , instigating an 

233
00:07:58,751 --> 00:08:00,973
arms race where our adversaries develop 

234
00:08:00,973 --> 00:08:03,140
weapons to get around it . When I came 

235
00:08:03,140 --> 00:08:02,850
off the stage , my team told me that 

236
00:08:02,850 --> 00:08:05,072
the senior Republican speaking after me 

237
00:08:05,072 --> 00:08:08,049
had just asked his staff to ask Chat 

238
00:08:08,049 --> 00:08:11,250
GPT why Golden Dome is good . 

239
00:08:12,209 --> 00:08:14,730
Again , you can't make this up . I 

240
00:08:14,730 --> 00:08:16,952
don't know if Chad GPT has come up with 

241
00:08:16,952 --> 00:08:19,063
a better answer yet or not , but I do 

242
00:08:19,063 --> 00:08:21,174
know that the Russians are developing 

243
00:08:21,174 --> 00:08:23,341
multiple weapons systems to attack the 

244
00:08:23,341 --> 00:08:24,952
US that will not be defended 

245
00:08:24,952 --> 00:08:27,174
effectively by Golden Dome years before 

246
00:08:27,174 --> 00:08:29,174
we will ever see anything fielded . 

247
00:08:29,174 --> 00:08:31,397
Never before has Congress spent so much 

248
00:08:31,397 --> 00:08:33,563
money on something so ineffective with 

249
00:08:33,563 --> 00:08:35,786
no strategy whatsoever . Though I guess 

250
00:08:35,786 --> 00:08:37,897
the Iran war could give Golden Dome a 

251
00:08:37,897 --> 00:08:40,119
run for that record . Now for the first 

252
00:08:40,119 --> 00:08:42,230
time since the Cold War we are living 

253
00:08:42,230 --> 00:08:44,008
in a world with no agreement to 

254
00:08:44,008 --> 00:08:46,230
constrain nuclear weapons . And that is 

255
00:08:46,230 --> 00:08:48,563
to our disadvantage because to be clear , 

256
00:08:48,563 --> 00:08:50,674
our adversaries have and are building 

257
00:08:50,674 --> 00:08:52,619
more than we are . I don't know if 

258
00:08:52,619 --> 00:08:54,619
that's the art of the deal or not . 

259
00:08:54,619 --> 00:08:56,563
With everything going wrong in the 

260
00:08:56,563 --> 00:08:58,674
Middle East , it's easy to lose focus 

261
00:08:58,674 --> 00:08:58,429
on America's strate strategic defense , 

262
00:08:58,650 --> 00:09:00,539
but it remains the bedrock of our 

263
00:09:00,539 --> 00:09:02,761
national security and must remain a top 

264
00:09:02,761 --> 00:09:04,928
priority . Even the right weapons with 

265
00:09:04,928 --> 00:09:07,150
the wrong policy can be destabilizing , 

266
00:09:07,169 --> 00:09:09,225
weakening our national security . We 

267
00:09:09,225 --> 00:09:11,299
need strength , not chaos . We need 

268
00:09:11,299 --> 00:09:13,469
weapons to deter our enemies , not 

269
00:09:13,469 --> 00:09:15,669
recruit more . We need defenses that 

270
00:09:15,669 --> 00:09:17,869
work to defend the country , not 

271
00:09:17,869 --> 00:09:19,789
bankrupt us , and we need leaders 

272
00:09:19,789 --> 00:09:21,622
focused on reducing the need for 

273
00:09:21,622 --> 00:09:24,349
nuclear weapons , not stoking an arms 

274
00:09:24,349 --> 00:09:26,516
race for even more . I look forward to 

275
00:09:26,516 --> 00:09:28,738
working closely with the members of the 

276
00:09:28,738 --> 00:09:30,905
subcommittee and our witnesses to make 

277
00:09:30,905 --> 00:09:33,016
America stronger and more secure . We 

278
00:09:33,016 --> 00:09:35,238
often say that our nuclear arsenal must 

279
00:09:35,238 --> 00:09:38,650
be safe , secure , and reliable . Our 

280
00:09:38,650 --> 00:09:40,928
country should be the same . Thank you , 

281
00:09:40,928 --> 00:09:42,983
Mr . Chairman . I yield back . We'll 

282
00:09:42,983 --> 00:09:42,849
now move to opening statements from our 

283
00:09:42,849 --> 00:09:44,793
witnesses . I would note that your 

284
00:09:44,793 --> 00:09:47,016
prepared comments or statements will be 

285
00:09:47,016 --> 00:09:49,071
made part of the record , but you'll 

286
00:09:49,071 --> 00:09:50,905
have each 5 minutes to make some 

287
00:09:50,905 --> 00:09:52,849
opening remarks . Mr . Berkowitz , 

288
00:09:52,849 --> 00:09:51,979
let's begin with you . 

289
00:09:57,099 --> 00:09:59,460
Oh , thank you . Uh , Chairman 

290
00:09:59,460 --> 00:10:01,571
DesJarlais , Ranking Member Moulton , 

291
00:10:01,979 --> 00:10:04,090
uh , and distinguished members of the 

292
00:10:04,090 --> 00:10:07,590
committee . Congressman Bolton , um , 

293
00:10:07,760 --> 00:10:09,593
thank you for the opportunity to 

294
00:10:09,593 --> 00:10:11,816
testify , uh , about the department's , 

295
00:10:11,816 --> 00:10:14,093
uh , space and missile defense posture . 

296
00:10:14,093 --> 00:10:16,149
It's an honor to appear alongside my 

297
00:10:16,149 --> 00:10:18,427
colleagues , Assistant Secretary Catli , 

298
00:10:18,427 --> 00:10:20,649
Admiral Correll , General Whiting , and 

299
00:10:20,649 --> 00:10:22,204
General Glo . America faces 

300
00:10:22,204 --> 00:10:24,316
intensifying strategic competition in 

301
00:10:24,316 --> 00:10:26,482
the security environment . Outer space 

302
00:10:26,482 --> 00:10:28,204
is an increasingly complex and 

303
00:10:28,204 --> 00:10:29,927
contested warfighting domain . 

304
00:10:29,927 --> 00:10:31,982
Competitors have fielded and operate 

305
00:10:31,982 --> 00:10:33,871
sophisticated arsenals of space , 

306
00:10:33,989 --> 00:10:36,520
counterpace . Missile and integrated 

307
00:10:36,520 --> 00:10:38,409
air and missile defense systems . 

308
00:10:38,799 --> 00:10:41,780
Indeed , as Secretary of War Hegseth 

309
00:10:41,780 --> 00:10:44,000
has stated , space is the most 

310
00:10:44,000 --> 00:10:46,222
important domain of warfare . The fight 

311
00:10:46,222 --> 00:10:48,389
for space is a fight for the future of 

312
00:10:48,389 --> 00:10:50,840
the world as we know it . President 

313
00:10:50,840 --> 00:10:53,062
Trump is restoring American strength to 

314
00:10:53,062 --> 00:10:55,284
meet these challenges to secure peace . 

315
00:10:55,830 --> 00:10:57,774
He issued an executive order which 

316
00:10:57,774 --> 00:10:59,830
prioritizes the defense of US vital 

317
00:10:59,830 --> 00:11:02,390
interests to , in and from space by 

318
00:11:02,390 --> 00:11:04,557
ensuring America's space superiority . 

319
00:11:05,159 --> 00:11:07,400
The president also issued an executive 

320
00:11:07,400 --> 00:11:09,511
order to field and operate the Golden 

321
00:11:09,511 --> 00:11:12,700
Dome for America , a comprehensive next 

322
00:11:12,700 --> 00:11:14,700
generation defense against the most 

323
00:11:14,700 --> 00:11:16,867
catastrophic threats facing the United 

324
00:11:16,867 --> 00:11:19,000
States . The Golden Dome will protect 

325
00:11:19,000 --> 00:11:21,119
our homeland , citizens , critical 

326
00:11:21,119 --> 00:11:23,159
infrastructure , and second strike 

327
00:11:23,159 --> 00:11:25,799
capability . Space and missile defense 

328
00:11:25,799 --> 00:11:28,200
forces are central to US strategy . 

329
00:11:28,599 --> 00:11:30,599
They help to ensure America has the 

330
00:11:30,599 --> 00:11:32,655
world's most powerful , lethal , and 

331
00:11:32,655 --> 00:11:34,669
advanced military . To protect our 

332
00:11:34,669 --> 00:11:36,549
interests , deter wars , and if 

333
00:11:36,549 --> 00:11:39,150
necessary , win them quickly and 

334
00:11:39,150 --> 00:11:42,109
decisively . Access to and use of space 

335
00:11:42,109 --> 00:11:44,220
is a US vital interest because of its 

336
00:11:44,220 --> 00:11:46,331
overriding importance to our security 

337
00:11:46,331 --> 00:11:48,909
and economic prosperity . Space systems 

338
00:11:48,909 --> 00:11:51,131
contribute to all elements of America's 

339
00:11:51,131 --> 00:11:53,820
national power , and we will secure and 

340
00:11:53,820 --> 00:11:56,309
defend our interests to and from space . 

341
00:11:57,000 --> 00:11:58,880
Space assets enable strategic 

342
00:11:58,880 --> 00:12:00,713
deterrence . They provide domain 

343
00:12:00,713 --> 00:12:02,960
awareness , including access to denied 

344
00:12:02,960 --> 00:12:05,559
and hostile territory , indications and 

345
00:12:05,559 --> 00:12:08,080
warning , launch detection , command 

346
00:12:08,080 --> 00:12:10,320
control and communications , detonation 

347
00:12:10,320 --> 00:12:13,299
detection , and attack assessment . The 

348
00:12:13,299 --> 00:12:15,410
president's Golden Dome initiative is 

349
00:12:15,410 --> 00:12:17,632
the cornerstone of our homeland defense 

350
00:12:17,632 --> 00:12:19,355
posture . It's a necessary and 

351
00:12:19,355 --> 00:12:21,243
pragmatic response to the growing 

352
00:12:21,243 --> 00:12:23,739
threat posed by ballistic , hypersonic , 

353
00:12:23,820 --> 00:12:25,987
and advanced cruise missiles , as well 

354
00:12:25,987 --> 00:12:28,799
as other next generation weapons . The 

355
00:12:28,799 --> 00:12:31,021
Golden Dome will complement our nuclear 

356
00:12:31,021 --> 00:12:33,080
deterrent . Today our capability to 

357
00:12:33,080 --> 00:12:35,320
defend the nation is limited , and its 

358
00:12:35,320 --> 00:12:37,153
effectiveness is eroding against 

359
00:12:37,153 --> 00:12:39,679
increasingly advanced threats . The 

360
00:12:39,679 --> 00:12:41,520
Golden Dome will rectify this by 

361
00:12:41,520 --> 00:12:43,742
creating a layered defense and depth of 

362
00:12:43,742 --> 00:12:45,853
the United States . Combined with the 

363
00:12:45,853 --> 00:12:48,169
prospect of US retaliation , it will 

364
00:12:48,169 --> 00:12:50,010
strengthen deterrence by denying 

365
00:12:50,010 --> 00:12:52,450
adversaries to to achieve their 

366
00:12:52,450 --> 00:12:54,580
objectives through coercion or 

367
00:12:54,580 --> 00:12:57,369
aggression . Moreover , the Golden Dome 

368
00:12:57,369 --> 00:12:59,830
will save lives and limit damage should 

369
00:12:59,830 --> 00:13:02,640
deterrence break down . China is our 

370
00:13:02,640 --> 00:13:05,359
pacing competitor . We will deter China 

371
00:13:05,359 --> 00:13:07,248
from a position of strength , not 

372
00:13:07,248 --> 00:13:09,479
confrontation , with the denial defense 

373
00:13:09,479 --> 00:13:12,640
along the first island chain . Space 

374
00:13:12,640 --> 00:13:14,696
and missile defense capabilities are 

375
00:13:14,696 --> 00:13:16,807
essential to this effort because they 

376
00:13:16,807 --> 00:13:18,918
enable the intelligence , command and 

377
00:13:18,918 --> 00:13:20,751
control , and other war fighting 

378
00:13:20,751 --> 00:13:22,640
functions needed to project power 

379
00:13:22,640 --> 00:13:24,640
effectively across the Indo-Pacific 

380
00:13:24,640 --> 00:13:26,890
region . Our global alliances will 

381
00:13:26,890 --> 00:13:28,960
remain a strategic advantage if our 

382
00:13:28,960 --> 00:13:31,190
allies and partners invest properly in 

383
00:13:31,200 --> 00:13:33,609
in their defense . The department will 

384
00:13:33,609 --> 00:13:35,665
continue to pursue opportunities for 

385
00:13:35,665 --> 00:13:37,776
space and missile defense cooperation 

386
00:13:37,776 --> 00:13:39,887
to increase burden sharing , capacity 

387
00:13:39,887 --> 00:13:42,210
and interoperability . We are also 

388
00:13:42,210 --> 00:13:44,432
supercharging the US defense industrial 

389
00:13:44,432 --> 00:13:46,654
base by cutting bureaucratic red tape , 

390
00:13:46,809 --> 00:13:48,753
empowering program leaders to take 

391
00:13:48,753 --> 00:13:50,890
calculated risks , and leveraging 

392
00:13:50,890 --> 00:13:53,239
private sector innovation . We must 

393
00:13:53,239 --> 00:13:55,239
accelerate the delivery of critical 

394
00:13:55,239 --> 00:13:57,406
space and missile defense capabilities 

395
00:13:57,406 --> 00:13:59,250
at scale . In closing , with the 

396
00:13:59,250 --> 00:14:01,472
continued support of Congress , the War 

397
00:14:01,472 --> 00:14:03,694
Department will invest in the space and 

398
00:14:03,694 --> 00:14:05,750
missile defense posture necessary to 

399
00:14:05,750 --> 00:14:07,917
achieve peace through strength . Thank 

400
00:14:07,917 --> 00:14:09,639
you and I look forward to your 

401
00:14:09,639 --> 00:14:08,739
questions . 

402
00:14:13,719 --> 00:14:17,119
Doctor Kdlick Thank you , 

403
00:14:17,159 --> 00:14:20,159
Chairman DesJarlais and Ranking Member 

404
00:14:20,159 --> 00:14:22,381
Moulton , members of the subcommittee . 

405
00:14:22,381 --> 00:14:24,215
Thank you for the opportunity to 

406
00:14:24,215 --> 00:14:26,103
testify on our nation's strategic 

407
00:14:26,103 --> 00:14:28,270
posture . US strategy is at a critical 

408
00:14:28,270 --> 00:14:30,326
inflection point . China's strategic 

409
00:14:30,326 --> 00:14:32,739
nuclear breakout means we now face the 

410
00:14:32,739 --> 00:14:34,840
unprecedented challenge of deterring 

411
00:14:34,840 --> 00:14:37,039
two nuclear peers . This is not a 

412
00:14:37,039 --> 00:14:38,919
distant problem . It's a central 

413
00:14:38,919 --> 00:14:41,719
organizing challenge for our defense 

414
00:14:41,719 --> 00:14:43,979
strategy today . Compounding this 

415
00:14:43,979 --> 00:14:46,140
external pressure are two additional 

416
00:14:46,140 --> 00:14:48,979
factors immense budgetary , industrial , 

417
00:14:49,020 --> 00:14:52,099
and programmatic strains of modernizing 

418
00:14:52,099 --> 00:14:54,859
at once the three legs of our nuclear 

419
00:14:54,859 --> 00:14:57,739
triad and its command and control , and 

420
00:14:57,739 --> 00:14:59,906
the expiration of the new START Treaty 

421
00:14:59,906 --> 00:15:01,830
this past February . We must be 

422
00:15:01,830 --> 00:15:04,108
clear-eyed about these threats we face . 

423
00:15:04,549 --> 00:15:06,716
China is engaged in the most rapid and 

424
00:15:06,716 --> 00:15:09,140
opaque nuclear expansion in its history . 

425
00:15:09,520 --> 00:15:11,687
This nuclear buildup is coupled with a 

426
00:15:11,687 --> 00:15:13,687
massive investment in theater range 

427
00:15:13,687 --> 00:15:16,190
delivery systems designed to hold US 

428
00:15:16,190 --> 00:15:19,229
forces , allies and partners at risk in 

429
00:15:19,229 --> 00:15:22,030
the Indo-Pacific . A force of this size 

430
00:15:22,030 --> 00:15:24,309
and sophistication provides China with 

431
00:15:24,309 --> 00:15:26,750
a spectrum of nuclear options to try to 

432
00:15:26,750 --> 00:15:29,789
deter US intervention . And coerce a 

433
00:15:29,789 --> 00:15:32,150
resolution of a conflict on China's 

434
00:15:32,150 --> 00:15:34,760
terms . Russia fields the world's 

435
00:15:34,760 --> 00:15:37,109
largest arsenal and retains a doctrine 

436
00:15:37,109 --> 00:15:39,229
that explicitly integrates nuclear 

437
00:15:39,229 --> 00:15:41,770
weapons for regional coercion . Its 

438
00:15:41,770 --> 00:15:43,881
ongoing modernization and development 

439
00:15:43,881 --> 00:15:45,780
of novel systems like Poseidon's 

440
00:15:45,780 --> 00:15:48,190
Skyfall cruise missile underscore its 

441
00:15:48,190 --> 00:15:50,580
continued reliance on nuclear forces to 

442
00:15:50,580 --> 00:15:53,080
offset conventional weaknesses . The 

443
00:15:53,080 --> 00:15:55,359
2026 National Defense strategy 

444
00:15:55,359 --> 00:15:57,880
correctly identifies this new and more 

445
00:15:57,880 --> 00:16:00,200
dangerous environment . To support that 

446
00:16:00,200 --> 00:16:02,144
strategy , the reality is that our 

447
00:16:02,144 --> 00:16:04,239
nuclear posture must be a credible 

448
00:16:04,239 --> 00:16:07,280
backstop to our denial strategy , not a 

449
00:16:07,280 --> 00:16:09,880
substitute for it . In Asia , this 

450
00:16:09,880 --> 00:16:11,880
means building a conventional force 

451
00:16:12,280 --> 00:16:14,169
alongside our allies and partners 

452
00:16:14,359 --> 00:16:16,581
capable of defeating a Chinese invasion 

453
00:16:16,581 --> 00:16:18,650
of Taiwan . The role of our nuclear 

454
00:16:18,650 --> 00:16:21,150
arsenal in this context is not to fight 

455
00:16:21,150 --> 00:16:23,789
and win a nuclear war but to deter 

456
00:16:23,789 --> 00:16:26,909
China . Escalating to nuclear use in 

457
00:16:26,909 --> 00:16:29,109
the first place or from believing it 

458
00:16:29,109 --> 00:16:31,580
can use its nuclear arsenal to coerce 

459
00:16:31,580 --> 00:16:34,909
us into accepting a fait accompli , our 

460
00:16:34,909 --> 00:16:36,687
nuclear forces must provide the 

461
00:16:36,687 --> 00:16:38,710
president with credible options to 

462
00:16:38,710 --> 00:16:40,960
manage the escalation , demonstrating 

463
00:16:40,960 --> 00:16:43,429
that any nuclear use will be met with a 

464
00:16:43,429 --> 00:16:45,373
response that leaves the adversary 

465
00:16:45,373 --> 00:16:47,900
worse off . This requires a flexible 

466
00:16:47,900 --> 00:16:51,159
and modern nuclear posture . A solvent 

467
00:16:51,159 --> 00:16:53,530
defense strategy also requires our 

468
00:16:53,530 --> 00:16:55,890
allies and partners to carry their fair 

469
00:16:55,890 --> 00:16:58,210
share of the conventional burden . US 

470
00:16:58,210 --> 00:17:00,250
nuclear extended deterrence is a 

471
00:17:00,250 --> 00:17:03,210
powerful enabler of this , providing 

472
00:17:03,210 --> 00:17:05,890
our allies in both Europe and in the 

473
00:17:05,890 --> 00:17:08,250
Indo-Pacific region the critical 

474
00:17:08,250 --> 00:17:10,489
security backstop they need to invest 

475
00:17:10,489 --> 00:17:12,322
in their own conventional denial 

476
00:17:12,322 --> 00:17:15,800
capabilities . We must now plan for the 

477
00:17:15,800 --> 00:17:18,449
real possibility of coordinated or 

478
00:17:18,449 --> 00:17:20,589
opportunistic aggression across 

479
00:17:20,589 --> 00:17:22,989
multiple theaters . Our force structure , 

480
00:17:23,150 --> 00:17:25,609
posture , and nuclear strategy must be 

481
00:17:25,609 --> 00:17:29,589
robust . Enough to 

482
00:17:29,589 --> 00:17:31,756
deter both peers simultaneously , even 

483
00:17:31,756 --> 00:17:33,790
if we were to be engaged in a major 

484
00:17:33,790 --> 00:17:36,219
conventional conflict with one . This 

485
00:17:36,219 --> 00:17:38,108
does not mean we must match their 

486
00:17:38,108 --> 00:17:40,330
combined arsenals warhead for warhead . 

487
00:17:40,650 --> 00:17:43,250
It means we require a nuclear force 

488
00:17:43,430 --> 00:17:45,479
sufficient to inflict unacceptable 

489
00:17:45,479 --> 00:17:47,979
costs on both adversaries under any 

490
00:17:47,979 --> 00:17:50,630
contingency , either ensuring that 

491
00:17:50,630 --> 00:17:52,797
neither believes that they can exploit 

492
00:17:52,797 --> 00:17:55,019
a crisis elsewhere for their own gain . 

493
00:17:55,069 --> 00:17:56,791
To execute this strategy , our 

494
00:17:56,791 --> 00:17:58,847
modernization programs are an urgent 

495
00:17:58,847 --> 00:18:00,920
necessity . The transition from our 

496
00:18:00,920 --> 00:18:03,599
legacy systems to a modernized triad 

497
00:18:03,599 --> 00:18:05,520
occurs during a period of maximum 

498
00:18:05,520 --> 00:18:08,349
geopolitical risk . There is no room 

499
00:18:08,349 --> 00:18:10,770
for error . We must fully fund and 

500
00:18:10,770 --> 00:18:12,560
where possible , accelerate the 

501
00:18:12,560 --> 00:18:14,969
Sentinel ICBM , the Columbia class 

502
00:18:14,969 --> 00:18:17,650
submarine , the B-21 bomber , and the 

503
00:18:17,650 --> 00:18:20,209
LRSO cruise missile . Critically , we 

504
00:18:20,209 --> 00:18:23,250
must also field theater range nuclear 

505
00:18:23,250 --> 00:18:26,569
options . Slick is one example . It is 

506
00:18:26,569 --> 00:18:28,791
essential and a vital tool for managing 

507
00:18:28,791 --> 00:18:31,020
escalation in a conflict with a peer 

508
00:18:31,020 --> 00:18:34,750
competitor . We're entering into a new , 

509
00:18:34,989 --> 00:18:37,229
more dangerous era . The luxury of 

510
00:18:37,229 --> 00:18:39,949
assuming a single major adversary is 

511
00:18:39,949 --> 00:18:42,109
gone . The cost of modernizing our 

512
00:18:42,109 --> 00:18:44,630
nuclear deterrent is significant , but 

513
00:18:44,630 --> 00:18:46,949
the cost of failing to do so is 

514
00:18:46,949 --> 00:18:49,670
immeasurably greater . Congress's 

515
00:18:49,670 --> 00:18:51,709
continued support is essential to 

516
00:18:51,709 --> 00:18:53,931
ensure we have the deterrent we need to 

517
00:18:53,931 --> 00:18:56,153
preserve peace , protect our nation and 

518
00:18:56,153 --> 00:18:58,209
our freedom . Thank you , and I look 

519
00:18:58,209 --> 00:18:59,765
forward to your questions . 

520
00:19:04,300 --> 00:19:06,356
Thank you , Doctor General Whiting . 

521
00:19:06,500 --> 00:19:08,890
You're recognized . Chairman DesJarlais , 

522
00:19:08,939 --> 00:19:10,550
Ranking Member Moulton , and 

523
00:19:10,550 --> 00:19:12,717
Distinguished members of the Strategic 

524
00:19:12,717 --> 00:19:14,939
Forces Subcommittee , it's an honor for 

525
00:19:14,939 --> 00:19:14,780
Sergeant Major Stackpole and me to 

526
00:19:14,780 --> 00:19:16,669
appear before you today alongside 

527
00:19:16,669 --> 00:19:18,447
Assistant Secretary Berkowitz , 

528
00:19:18,447 --> 00:19:20,391
Assistant Secretary Cale , General 

529
00:19:20,391 --> 00:19:22,336
Guillo , and Chief Master Sergeant 

530
00:19:22,336 --> 00:19:24,169
Storms , and Admiral Correll and 

531
00:19:24,169 --> 00:19:26,224
Command Sergeant Major Naumann , and 

532
00:19:26,224 --> 00:19:28,280
I'm privileged to testify before the 

533
00:19:28,280 --> 00:19:28,060
subcommittee for a 3rd time as the 

534
00:19:28,060 --> 00:19:29,838
commander of US Space Command , 

535
00:19:30,180 --> 00:19:32,402
representing the men and women who work 

536
00:19:32,402 --> 00:19:34,569
tirelessly to ensure the United States 

537
00:19:34,569 --> 00:19:36,750
maintains our dominance in space . US 

538
00:19:36,750 --> 00:19:38,917
Space Command's area of responsibility 

539
00:19:38,917 --> 00:19:41,083
is the ultimate high ground from which 

540
00:19:41,083 --> 00:19:43,139
we provide critical capabilities and 

541
00:19:43,139 --> 00:19:45,083
overwatch that enhance joint force 

542
00:19:45,083 --> 00:19:47,139
lethality in space . We also protect 

543
00:19:47,139 --> 00:19:49,361
American interests from the threats now 

544
00:19:49,361 --> 00:19:51,417
arrayed against our space systems to 

545
00:19:51,417 --> 00:19:53,417
include our opponents' capabilities 

546
00:19:53,417 --> 00:19:55,250
that allow them to conduct space 

547
00:19:55,250 --> 00:19:57,028
enabled attacks . Thanks to the 

548
00:19:57,028 --> 00:19:58,972
steadfast support of Congress , US 

549
00:19:58,972 --> 00:20:00,750
space capabilities ranging from 

550
00:20:00,750 --> 00:20:02,528
precision navigation and global 

551
00:20:02,528 --> 00:20:04,639
communications to missile warning and 

552
00:20:04,639 --> 00:20:06,583
real-time intelligence provide the 

553
00:20:06,583 --> 00:20:08,750
joint force with unmatched precision , 

554
00:20:08,750 --> 00:20:11,060
accuracy , reach , and lethality . We 

555
00:20:11,060 --> 00:20:12,782
saw the joint forces unmatched 

556
00:20:12,782 --> 00:20:14,338
integration of multi-domain 

557
00:20:14,338 --> 00:20:16,282
capabilities in Operation Midnight 

558
00:20:16,282 --> 00:20:18,393
Hammer , Operation Absolute Resolve , 

559
00:20:18,459 --> 00:20:20,792
and more recently , Operation Epic Fury , 

560
00:20:21,140 --> 00:20:22,918
during which space effects were 

561
00:20:22,918 --> 00:20:25,060
critical to mission success . As the 

562
00:20:25,060 --> 00:20:27,171
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs recently 

563
00:20:27,171 --> 00:20:29,260
highlighted , Space and cyber forces 

564
00:20:29,260 --> 00:20:31,149
were the first movers , employing 

565
00:20:31,149 --> 00:20:33,939
layered non-kinetic effects to enable 

566
00:20:33,939 --> 00:20:36,272
freedom of maneuver for the joint force . 

567
00:20:36,439 --> 00:20:38,550
General Kane's remarks underscore the 

568
00:20:38,550 --> 00:20:40,772
importance of achieving and maintaining 

569
00:20:40,772 --> 00:20:42,560
space superiority , not only to 

570
00:20:42,560 --> 00:20:44,680
safeguard the systems essential for 

571
00:20:44,680 --> 00:20:46,847
precision strike , missile warning and 

572
00:20:46,847 --> 00:20:49,013
tracking , and secure communications , 

573
00:20:49,013 --> 00:20:51,280
but also to provide overwatch for 

574
00:20:51,280 --> 00:20:53,447
terrestrial forces operating in harm's 

575
00:20:53,447 --> 00:20:55,839
way . Should an adversary degrade or 

576
00:20:55,839 --> 00:20:58,079
destroy our space capabilities , the 

577
00:20:58,079 --> 00:21:00,560
joint forces' ability to fight as it is 

578
00:21:00,560 --> 00:21:03,160
sized and designed would be immediately 

579
00:21:03,160 --> 00:21:05,739
and materially impacted . At US Space 

580
00:21:05,739 --> 00:21:07,572
Command , we command and control 

581
00:21:07,572 --> 00:21:09,239
offensive and defensive space 

582
00:21:09,239 --> 00:21:11,350
capabilities provided by the military 

583
00:21:11,350 --> 00:21:13,640
services to conduct operations that set 

584
00:21:13,640 --> 00:21:15,807
favorable conditions for our joint war 

585
00:21:15,807 --> 00:21:18,040
fighters . This operational imperative 

586
00:21:18,040 --> 00:21:20,439
aligns with Secretary Heg's observation 

587
00:21:20,439 --> 00:21:22,979
during his Arsenal of Freedom tour that 

588
00:21:22,979 --> 00:21:25,201
space is the ultimate high ground , and 

589
00:21:25,201 --> 00:21:27,312
we must deliver supporting fires from 

590
00:21:27,312 --> 00:21:29,479
our position of advantage to cover our 

591
00:21:29,479 --> 00:21:31,739
maneuver forces . Make no mistake , our 

592
00:21:31,739 --> 00:21:33,739
opponents are moving at an alarming 

593
00:21:33,739 --> 00:21:35,517
pace , developing and deploying 

594
00:21:35,517 --> 00:21:37,461
capabilities to deny us the use of 

595
00:21:37,461 --> 00:21:39,406
space . China has integrated space 

596
00:21:39,406 --> 00:21:41,461
enabled effects across its forces to 

597
00:21:41,461 --> 00:21:43,572
make them more lethal , precise , and 

598
00:21:43,572 --> 00:21:45,599
far ranging while fielding weapons 

599
00:21:45,599 --> 00:21:47,432
purpose-built to outmaneuver and 

600
00:21:47,432 --> 00:21:49,550
destroy our satellites . At the same 

601
00:21:49,550 --> 00:21:51,717
time , Russia continues to demonstrate 

602
00:21:51,717 --> 00:21:53,772
capabilities designed to disrupt our 

603
00:21:53,772 --> 00:21:55,829
assets , including the potential 

604
00:21:55,829 --> 00:21:58,107
placement of a nuclear weapon on orbit . 

605
00:21:58,107 --> 00:22:00,329
The single greatest threat to our space 

606
00:22:00,329 --> 00:22:02,218
architecture . These developments 

607
00:22:02,218 --> 00:22:04,107
threaten our joint force in every 

608
00:22:04,107 --> 00:22:06,107
domain , since the control of space 

609
00:22:06,107 --> 00:22:08,218
shapes outcomes on land , at sea , in 

610
00:22:08,218 --> 00:22:10,739
the air , and in cyberspace . To ensure 

611
00:22:10,739 --> 00:22:12,961
US Space Command can deter conflict and 

612
00:22:12,961 --> 00:22:15,130
maintain dominance in space , we 

613
00:22:15,130 --> 00:22:17,390
request continued congressional support 

614
00:22:17,650 --> 00:22:20,170
of our key fiscal year 2027 priorities . 

615
00:22:20,530 --> 00:22:22,969
This includes fielding integrated space 

616
00:22:22,969 --> 00:22:25,270
fires , active protection of our high 

617
00:22:25,270 --> 00:22:27,609
value satellites , enhancing our battle 

618
00:22:27,609 --> 00:22:29,290
space awareness , building an 

619
00:22:29,290 --> 00:22:31,512
integrated command and control system , 

620
00:22:31,512 --> 00:22:33,401
sustaining our forces' freedom to 

621
00:22:33,401 --> 00:22:35,401
maneuver , and providing sufficient 

622
00:22:35,401 --> 00:22:37,734
cyber defenses for our space enterprise . 

623
00:22:37,819 --> 00:22:39,986
We thank Congress for its support this 

624
00:22:39,986 --> 00:22:41,986
past year , which has enabled us to 

625
00:22:41,986 --> 00:22:44,208
begin the disciplined transition to our 

626
00:22:44,208 --> 00:22:46,152
permanent headquarters at Redstone 

627
00:22:46,152 --> 00:22:48,375
Arsenal as directed by the President to 

628
00:22:48,375 --> 00:22:50,486
guarantee mission continuity . We are 

629
00:22:50,486 --> 00:22:52,708
executing a phased relocation operating 

630
00:22:52,708 --> 00:22:54,708
from interim facilities while a new 

631
00:22:54,708 --> 00:22:56,597
purpose-built command and control 

632
00:22:56,597 --> 00:22:58,652
facility is constructed . Our people 

633
00:22:58,652 --> 00:23:00,875
are central to this effort , and we are 

634
00:23:00,875 --> 00:23:02,597
using retention and relocation 

635
00:23:02,597 --> 00:23:04,819
incentives to keep our mission critical 

636
00:23:04,819 --> 00:23:06,708
talent throughout the move . Your 

637
00:23:06,708 --> 00:23:08,763
continued support and authorizations 

638
00:23:08,763 --> 00:23:10,819
for FY 2026 and 027 are essential to 

639
00:23:10,819 --> 00:23:12,708
accelerate the completion of this 

640
00:23:12,708 --> 00:23:14,652
modern headquarters and ensure our 

641
00:23:14,652 --> 00:23:16,619
uninterrupted readiness . With the 

642
00:23:16,619 --> 00:23:18,563
continued support of Congress , US 

643
00:23:18,563 --> 00:23:20,675
Space Command will remain prepared to 

644
00:23:20,675 --> 00:23:22,897
address the evolving threat landscape , 

645
00:23:22,897 --> 00:23:24,952
deter aggression , counter adversary 

646
00:23:24,952 --> 00:23:26,841
actions , and safeguard America's 

647
00:23:26,841 --> 00:23:28,619
interest in space today and for 

648
00:23:28,619 --> 00:23:31,040
generations to come . Armed conflict in 

649
00:23:31,040 --> 00:23:33,096
space is not inevitable , but should 

650
00:23:33,096 --> 00:23:35,262
deterrence fail , the integrated space 

651
00:23:35,262 --> 00:23:37,096
power of our team will provide a 

652
00:23:37,096 --> 00:23:39,318
decisive advantage . Thank you for your 

653
00:23:39,318 --> 00:23:41,318
steadfast leadership and unwavering 

654
00:23:41,318 --> 00:23:43,207
support to our mission . And Mr . 

655
00:23:43,207 --> 00:23:45,207
Chairman , my posture statement has 

656
00:23:45,207 --> 00:23:44,989
been submitted for the record , and I 

657
00:23:44,989 --> 00:23:46,711
look forward to answering your 

658
00:23:46,711 --> 00:23:49,045
questions . Thank you , General Whiting . 

659
00:23:49,045 --> 00:23:51,267
Uh , General Gil , you are recognized . 

660
00:23:51,670 --> 00:23:53,837
Good afternoon , Chairman DesJarlais , 

661
00:23:53,837 --> 00:23:55,989
the ranking member Moulton , and 

662
00:23:55,989 --> 00:23:57,600
distinguished members of the 

663
00:23:57,600 --> 00:23:59,545
subcommittee . I thank you for the 

664
00:23:59,545 --> 00:24:01,711
opportunity to appear today along with 

665
00:24:01,711 --> 00:24:03,878
my teammates to the left and right and 

666
00:24:03,878 --> 00:24:06,100
represent the dedicated and disciplined 

667
00:24:06,100 --> 00:24:08,045
men and women of the United States 

668
00:24:08,045 --> 00:24:10,045
Northern Command and North American 

669
00:24:10,045 --> 00:24:11,989
Aerospace Defense Command . As the 

670
00:24:11,989 --> 00:24:14,045
strategic environment has grown more 

671
00:24:14,045 --> 00:24:16,100
complex , NORAD and US NORTHCOM have 

672
00:24:16,100 --> 00:24:18,322
responded by fundamentally transforming 

673
00:24:18,322 --> 00:24:20,600
both commands , taking on new missions , 

674
00:24:20,600 --> 00:24:22,600
and rapidly implementing innovative 

675
00:24:22,600 --> 00:24:24,822
approaches to safeguard North America , 

676
00:24:24,822 --> 00:24:26,878
from intercepting long-range bombers 

677
00:24:26,878 --> 00:24:28,933
off the coast of Alaska and Canada , 

678
00:24:28,933 --> 00:24:31,156
tracking advanced maritime platforms in 

679
00:24:31,156 --> 00:24:33,211
the approaches to North America , or 

680
00:24:33,211 --> 00:24:35,045
standing ready to defend against 

681
00:24:35,045 --> 00:24:37,211
long-range missile attacks , NORAD and 

682
00:24:37,211 --> 00:24:39,433
US NORTHCOM remain vigilant , capable , 

683
00:24:39,433 --> 00:24:41,322
and committed . The commands have 

684
00:24:41,322 --> 00:24:43,545
undertaken several initiatives over the 

685
00:24:43,545 --> 00:24:45,711
last year to build on our preparedness 

686
00:24:45,711 --> 00:24:47,767
to respond to any threat , including 

687
00:24:47,767 --> 00:24:49,878
two that are particularly relevant to 

688
00:24:49,878 --> 00:24:51,989
this subcommittee . In January 2026 , 

689
00:24:51,989 --> 00:24:54,156
US NORTHCOM activated Joint Task Force 

690
00:24:54,156 --> 00:24:56,229
Gold to serve as the operational arm 

691
00:24:56,229 --> 00:24:58,118
for future layered defense system 

692
00:24:58,118 --> 00:25:00,229
provided by Golden Dome for America . 

693
00:25:00,739 --> 00:25:02,869
And US NCO developed a rapidly 

694
00:25:02,869 --> 00:25:06,140
deployable counterm UA flyaway kit to 

695
00:25:06,140 --> 00:25:08,029
defend military installations and 

696
00:25:08,029 --> 00:25:10,229
critical infrastructure through 

697
00:25:10,229 --> 00:25:12,229
exercises like Falcon Peak . We are 

698
00:25:12,229 --> 00:25:14,285
also accelerating the development of 

699
00:25:14,285 --> 00:25:16,189
new counter UAS technologies in 

700
00:25:16,189 --> 00:25:19,310
partnership with Giata 401 and industry . 

701
00:25:20,180 --> 00:25:22,420
NORAD and US NRTHCOM continue to pursue 

702
00:25:22,420 --> 00:25:24,500
critical investments in modernized 

703
00:25:24,500 --> 00:25:26,667
domain awareness systems and defensive 

704
00:25:26,667 --> 00:25:28,833
capabilities to meet the challenges of 

705
00:25:28,833 --> 00:25:30,778
tomorrow . The ability to detect , 

706
00:25:30,778 --> 00:25:32,889
track , and discriminate threats from 

707
00:25:32,889 --> 00:25:34,944
the sea floor to space is critical , 

708
00:25:34,944 --> 00:25:36,611
and I remain grateful for the 

709
00:25:36,611 --> 00:25:38,556
subcommittee's ongoing support for 

710
00:25:38,556 --> 00:25:40,500
space-based airborne moving target 

711
00:25:40,500 --> 00:25:42,556
indicator , over the horizon radar , 

712
00:25:42,556 --> 00:25:44,778
airborne early warning , and integrated 

713
00:25:44,778 --> 00:25:47,000
undersea surveillance systems . The men 

714
00:25:47,000 --> 00:25:49,111
and women of US NRHCOM and NORAD have 

715
00:25:49,111 --> 00:25:51,222
embraced these new challenges and are 

716
00:25:51,222 --> 00:25:53,111
unwavering in our no fail mission 

717
00:25:53,250 --> 00:25:55,472
disciplined defense of our homelands in 

718
00:25:55,472 --> 00:25:57,361
all domains , from all avenues of 

719
00:25:57,361 --> 00:25:59,472
approach against all those who intend 

720
00:25:59,472 --> 00:26:01,969
us harm . We appreciate the excuse me , 

721
00:26:02,050 --> 00:26:04,161
steadfast support of this committee , 

722
00:26:04,161 --> 00:26:06,328
and I look forward to your questions . 

723
00:26:06,328 --> 00:26:08,550
We have the watch . Thank you , General 

724
00:26:08,550 --> 00:26:10,606
Guillo . uh Admiral Correll , you're 

725
00:26:10,606 --> 00:26:13,500
recognized . Good afternoon , Chairman 

726
00:26:13,500 --> 00:26:15,611
DesJarlais , Ranking Member Moulton , 

727
00:26:15,699 --> 00:26:17,532
and distinguished members of the 

728
00:26:17,532 --> 00:26:19,477
Committee . Command Sergeant Major 

729
00:26:19,477 --> 00:26:21,477
Naumann and I are honored to appear 

730
00:26:21,477 --> 00:26:23,421
before you today alongside General 

731
00:26:23,421 --> 00:26:25,477
Whiting , General Guillo , Assistant 

732
00:26:25,477 --> 00:26:27,477
Secretary Berkowitz , and Assistant 

733
00:26:27,477 --> 00:26:29,588
Secretary Cadlick . Before I begin my 

734
00:26:29,588 --> 00:26:31,699
prepared remarks , I'd like to take a 

735
00:26:31,699 --> 00:26:33,810
moment to honor our fallen US service 

736
00:26:33,810 --> 00:26:35,977
members . The Joint Force is eternally 

737
00:26:35,977 --> 00:26:38,199
grateful to those who paid the ultimate 

738
00:26:38,199 --> 00:26:41,560
price and service to our country . This 

739
00:26:41,560 --> 00:26:43,393
is my first time addressing this 

740
00:26:43,393 --> 00:26:45,560
committee as commander of US Strategic 

741
00:26:45,560 --> 00:26:47,504
Command , and I want to express my 

742
00:26:47,504 --> 00:26:49,727
gratitude for the committee's steadfast 

743
00:26:49,727 --> 00:26:51,893
support . Your commitment to providing 

744
00:26:51,893 --> 00:26:53,782
the resources necessary for us to 

745
00:26:53,782 --> 00:26:55,569
execute our mission during this 

746
00:26:55,569 --> 00:26:57,890
critical bi-generational period of 

747
00:26:57,890 --> 00:27:00,089
modernization and recapitalization is 

748
00:27:00,089 --> 00:27:03,119
deeply appreciated . I also extend my 

749
00:27:03,119 --> 00:27:05,341
sincere thanks to the American people . 

750
00:27:05,380 --> 00:27:07,547
Their unwavering support enables us to 

751
00:27:07,547 --> 00:27:09,769
remain the most advanced , lethal , and 

752
00:27:09,769 --> 00:27:11,936
credible fighting force in the world . 

753
00:27:12,630 --> 00:27:15,270
Our nuclear forces , the foundation of 

754
00:27:15,270 --> 00:27:17,214
our national security , are safe , 

755
00:27:17,229 --> 00:27:19,869
secure , effective , and credible . My 

756
00:27:19,869 --> 00:27:21,925
confidence does not come solely from 

757
00:27:21,925 --> 00:27:24,589
our combat capabilities , but from the 

758
00:27:24,589 --> 00:27:26,811
professionals at US Strategic Command , 

759
00:27:26,811 --> 00:27:28,922
the very essence of our credibility . 

760
00:27:29,650 --> 00:27:31,428
As I testify before you today , 

761
00:27:31,540 --> 00:27:33,873
StratCom and its components stand ready , 

762
00:27:33,873 --> 00:27:35,873
not seeking out confrontation , but 

763
00:27:35,873 --> 00:27:37,619
deterring strategic attack and 

764
00:27:37,619 --> 00:27:40,270
underpinning all Department of War 

765
00:27:40,270 --> 00:27:42,630
operational plans . The strategic 

766
00:27:42,630 --> 00:27:44,686
capabilities provided by each leg of 

767
00:27:44,686 --> 00:27:46,709
the triad , coupled with assured 

768
00:27:46,709 --> 00:27:48,376
nuclear command , control and 

769
00:27:48,376 --> 00:27:51,810
communications or NC3 systems underpin 

770
00:27:51,810 --> 00:27:53,699
everything the department does in 

771
00:27:53,699 --> 00:27:55,643
defense of our nation and American 

772
00:27:55,643 --> 00:27:57,588
interests abroad . Our fundamental 

773
00:27:57,588 --> 00:27:59,643
challenge , one that we successfully 

774
00:27:59,643 --> 00:28:01,754
face each and every day , is to deter 

775
00:28:01,754 --> 00:28:03,790
great power conflict and to deter 

776
00:28:03,790 --> 00:28:05,949
multiple nuclear competitors while 

777
00:28:05,949 --> 00:28:08,430
simultaneously adapting to dramatic 

778
00:28:08,430 --> 00:28:11,510
technological change . This change is 

779
00:28:11,510 --> 00:28:13,566
most evident in five evolving threat 

780
00:28:13,566 --> 00:28:16,510
vectors cyber , counter US space 

781
00:28:16,510 --> 00:28:18,390
capabilities , a contested 

782
00:28:18,390 --> 00:28:20,630
electromagnetic spectrum , novel 

783
00:28:20,630 --> 00:28:23,030
missile systems , and supply chain 

784
00:28:23,030 --> 00:28:25,729
challenges . Adapting to this changing 

785
00:28:25,729 --> 00:28:28,062
environment requires constant vigilance , 

786
00:28:28,062 --> 00:28:30,229
sustainment , and modernization of our 

787
00:28:30,229 --> 00:28:32,949
strategic forces as we bring the B-21 

788
00:28:32,949 --> 00:28:35,171
bomber , the Columbia class submarine , 

789
00:28:35,270 --> 00:28:37,159
and the Sentinel intercontinental 

790
00:28:37,159 --> 00:28:39,270
ballistic missile system online . We 

791
00:28:39,270 --> 00:28:41,492
will continue to ensure the credibility 

792
00:28:41,492 --> 00:28:43,714
of our deterrence for decades to come . 

793
00:28:44,290 --> 00:28:46,346
Thank you again for your support and 

794
00:28:46,346 --> 00:28:48,234
trust in the soldiers , sailors , 

795
00:28:48,234 --> 00:28:50,068
airmen , marines , guardians and 

796
00:28:50,068 --> 00:28:52,290
civilian professionals that comprise US 

797
00:28:52,290 --> 00:28:54,457
Strategic Command . And for dedicating 

798
00:28:54,457 --> 00:28:56,679
your time and effort to our mission and 

799
00:28:56,679 --> 00:28:58,623
portfolio . I look forward to your 

800
00:28:58,623 --> 00:29:01,219
questions . Thank you , Admiral . I 

801
00:29:01,219 --> 00:29:05,020
will now yield to myself for questions . 

802
00:29:05,380 --> 00:29:07,602
Doctor Cadlick , I'd like to start with 

803
00:29:07,602 --> 00:29:09,602
you . Our nuclear strategy from the 

804
00:29:09,602 --> 00:29:11,436
Cold War to the present has been 

805
00:29:11,436 --> 00:29:13,640
remarkably consistent . Bad policy 

806
00:29:13,640 --> 00:29:16,260
ideas such as counterva , targeting or 

807
00:29:16,260 --> 00:29:18,699
no first use policy have been rejected 

808
00:29:18,699 --> 00:29:20,689
by presidents on both sides of the 

809
00:29:20,689 --> 00:29:22,245
aisle and remain completely 

810
00:29:22,245 --> 00:29:24,300
inconsistent with the threats we see 

811
00:29:24,300 --> 00:29:27,930
today . As I mentioned , as General 

812
00:29:27,930 --> 00:29:30,263
Bacon mentioned in my opening statement , 

813
00:29:30,670 --> 00:29:32,892
I think the main question is whether we 

814
00:29:32,892 --> 00:29:35,114
have sufficient capabilities to achieve 

815
00:29:35,380 --> 00:29:37,102
our strategy in the new threat 

816
00:29:37,102 --> 00:29:39,349
environment we face . I understand that 

817
00:29:39,349 --> 00:29:41,829
the department will not be conducting a 

818
00:29:41,829 --> 00:29:44,650
formal NPR , but can you talk about 

819
00:29:45,790 --> 00:29:48,012
the follow-on work you will be doing to 

820
00:29:48,012 --> 00:29:50,068
look at this question ? Well , thank 

821
00:29:50,068 --> 00:29:52,290
you for the question , sir , and I just 

822
00:29:52,290 --> 00:29:54,401
want to make sure that you understand 

823
00:29:54,401 --> 00:29:56,123
that what we've decided in the 

824
00:29:56,123 --> 00:29:57,846
department , and this is Under 

825
00:29:57,846 --> 00:29:59,901
Secretary Colby working with Admiral 

826
00:29:59,901 --> 00:30:02,012
Korrell , is to do a nuclear strategy 

827
00:30:02,012 --> 00:30:04,179
review which is really looking at some 

828
00:30:04,179 --> 00:30:06,550
very specific issues as it relates to 

829
00:30:06,550 --> 00:30:08,790
the two-tier problem , and that is the 

830
00:30:08,790 --> 00:30:11,150
pace of modernization and sufficiency 

831
00:30:11,150 --> 00:30:13,390
of what we have already in the programs 

832
00:30:13,390 --> 00:30:16,060
of record . We're going to be taking a 

833
00:30:16,060 --> 00:30:18,150
look at the theater nuclear forces 

834
00:30:18,150 --> 00:30:21,900
issue as well and also other 

835
00:30:21,900 --> 00:30:24,180
factors that have been identified in 

836
00:30:24,180 --> 00:30:26,969
the national defense strategy . All of 

837
00:30:26,969 --> 00:30:30,569
this is to come back to the president 

838
00:30:30,569 --> 00:30:33,609
and I think to the Congress to identify 

839
00:30:33,609 --> 00:30:36,349
those things where there may need to be 

840
00:30:36,650 --> 00:30:39,540
some changes . Or additions made in 

841
00:30:39,540 --> 00:30:41,596
previous conversations , people have 

842
00:30:41,596 --> 00:30:43,762
asked about numbers , and I think this 

843
00:30:43,762 --> 00:30:45,707
is the first opportunity to really 

844
00:30:45,707 --> 00:30:47,873
evaluate the threat in a way that it's 

845
00:30:47,873 --> 00:30:50,239
real and tangible with the commander of 

846
00:30:50,239 --> 00:30:53,780
StratCOM to actually see what we will 

847
00:30:53,780 --> 00:30:56,469
need to have going forward and again 

848
00:30:56,469 --> 00:30:59,420
that will identify areas for maybe 

849
00:30:59,420 --> 00:31:02,680
expansion . But I will just pause and 

850
00:31:02,680 --> 00:31:04,736
remember remind you of the Strategic 

851
00:31:04,736 --> 00:31:07,439
Posture Commission's findings is that 

852
00:31:07,439 --> 00:31:09,328
what we have as far as program of 

853
00:31:09,328 --> 00:31:12,040
records is necessary but not sufficient 

854
00:31:12,040 --> 00:31:14,040
to deal with the two-tier threat . 

855
00:31:14,920 --> 00:31:17,119
Thank you , Mr . Berkowitz . The space 

856
00:31:17,119 --> 00:31:19,510
domain faces similar challenges . Our 

857
00:31:19,510 --> 00:31:21,399
adversaries are moving rapidly to 

858
00:31:21,399 --> 00:31:23,343
counter our space capabilities and 

859
00:31:23,343 --> 00:31:25,410
deploy their own . And I don't think 

860
00:31:25,410 --> 00:31:27,521
the previous administration responded 

861
00:31:27,521 --> 00:31:29,688
sufficiently . I was disappointed that 

862
00:31:29,688 --> 00:31:31,743
the national defense strategy had no 

863
00:31:31,743 --> 00:31:33,743
discussion of space , which doesn't 

864
00:31:33,743 --> 00:31:35,521
seem to reflect the president's 

865
00:31:35,521 --> 00:31:37,849
long-standing prioritization of this 

866
00:31:37,849 --> 00:31:40,329
domain with the creation of space force . 

867
00:31:40,819 --> 00:31:43,089
How is the policy team working to set a 

868
00:31:43,089 --> 00:31:45,311
strategy for space and align budgets to 

869
00:31:45,311 --> 00:31:49,260
meet our objectives ? Thank 

870
00:31:49,260 --> 00:31:51,427
you for the question , Chairman . Um , 

871
00:31:52,949 --> 00:31:55,810
Space is absolutely essential to the 

872
00:31:55,810 --> 00:31:57,754
security and defense of the United 

873
00:31:57,754 --> 00:31:59,699
States . The president's executive 

874
00:31:59,699 --> 00:32:01,589
order on ensuring American space 

875
00:32:01,589 --> 00:32:04,189
superiority states very clearly that 

876
00:32:04,189 --> 00:32:06,310
the Defense Department will take all 

877
00:32:06,310 --> 00:32:08,199
the steps necessary to be able to 

878
00:32:08,199 --> 00:32:10,260
detect , characterize , and counter 

879
00:32:10,260 --> 00:32:13,390
threats to our interests , both from 

880
00:32:13,390 --> 00:32:15,390
very low Earth orbit all the way to 

881
00:32:15,390 --> 00:32:17,501
lunar space , including the placement 

882
00:32:17,501 --> 00:32:19,223
of a nuclear weapon in orbit . 

883
00:32:19,810 --> 00:32:21,810
Consistent with the president's 

884
00:32:21,810 --> 00:32:23,643
direction , the national defense 

885
00:32:23,643 --> 00:32:25,689
strategy , top two priorities , the 

886
00:32:25,689 --> 00:32:27,911
defense of the homeland and our ability 

887
00:32:27,911 --> 00:32:29,856
to deter China in the Indo-Pacific 

888
00:32:29,856 --> 00:32:32,209
region , are , are fundamentally 

889
00:32:32,209 --> 00:32:34,770
enabled by our space capabilities , and 

890
00:32:35,010 --> 00:32:37,689
I look forward to the to the classified 

891
00:32:37,689 --> 00:32:40,449
session so we can get into the details 

892
00:32:40,449 --> 00:32:42,449
of , of , of what we're planning on 

893
00:32:42,449 --> 00:32:44,282
doing there . OK , sounds good . 

894
00:32:45,660 --> 00:32:47,604
Admiral Correll , your predecessor 

895
00:32:47,604 --> 00:32:49,549
strongly supported the Slick amend 

896
00:32:49,549 --> 00:32:51,382
program . Do you also agree this 

897
00:32:51,382 --> 00:32:54,109
capability is extremely important ? I 

898
00:32:54,109 --> 00:32:57,060
do , Ranking Member DesJarlais . It's 

899
00:32:57,060 --> 00:32:58,727
very important to address the 

900
00:32:58,727 --> 00:33:00,727
deterrence challenge in front of us 

901
00:33:00,727 --> 00:33:02,504
from my perspective , where the 

902
00:33:02,504 --> 00:33:05,349
adversary is developing and fielding a 

903
00:33:05,349 --> 00:33:08,010
range of theater nuclear capabilities 

904
00:33:08,310 --> 00:33:11,530
and so our ability to have a capability 

905
00:33:11,849 --> 00:33:14,790
that raises the threshold or decision 

906
00:33:14,790 --> 00:33:17,069
calculus for the adversary for theater 

907
00:33:17,069 --> 00:33:19,469
nuclear weapons is important . And I 

908
00:33:19,469 --> 00:33:21,525
know we can talk about this a little 

909
00:33:21,525 --> 00:33:23,802
more in the classified session as well . 

910
00:33:23,802 --> 00:33:25,729
Doctor Klick , when we talk about 

911
00:33:25,729 --> 00:33:27,785
nuclear modernization , we typically 

912
00:33:27,785 --> 00:33:29,673
think about the major acquisition 

913
00:33:29,673 --> 00:33:32,380
programs to recapitalize our triad like 

914
00:33:32,380 --> 00:33:34,547
Sentinel or Columbia or our efforts to 

915
00:33:34,547 --> 00:33:36,713
rebuild our production complex . While 

916
00:33:36,713 --> 00:33:38,880
these programs are foundational to the 

917
00:33:38,880 --> 00:33:40,880
future of our deterrent . They take 

918
00:33:40,880 --> 00:33:43,047
decades to execute and cannot pace the 

919
00:33:43,047 --> 00:33:45,213
dynamic security environment . Can you 

920
00:33:45,213 --> 00:33:47,380
talk about the importance of investing 

921
00:33:47,380 --> 00:33:49,491
in tailored supplemental capabilities 

922
00:33:49,491 --> 00:33:51,520
that can rapidly are being rapidly 

923
00:33:51,520 --> 00:33:53,409
developed to complement the major 

924
00:33:53,409 --> 00:33:56,439
modernization programs . Thank you 

925
00:33:56,439 --> 00:33:58,772
Mister Chairman again for that question . 

926
00:33:59,239 --> 00:34:01,239
The whole intent here and there are 

927
00:34:01,239 --> 00:34:03,072
efforts underway in a classified 

928
00:34:03,072 --> 00:34:05,295
setting , we can talk a little bit more 

929
00:34:05,295 --> 00:34:07,461
about them , particularly in the areas 

930
00:34:07,461 --> 00:34:09,517
of theater nuclear forces that would 

931
00:34:09,517 --> 00:34:11,628
represent some of our efforts to kind 

932
00:34:11,628 --> 00:34:13,683
of get to capabilities that would be 

933
00:34:13,683 --> 00:34:15,540
using the existing stockpile and 

934
00:34:15,540 --> 00:34:17,651
existing platforms that are available 

935
00:34:17,729 --> 00:34:20,639
to expand our capabilities rapidly . My 

936
00:34:20,639 --> 00:34:22,861
time's just about expired , but Admiral 

937
00:34:22,861 --> 00:34:24,972
Correll , from a threat perspective , 

938
00:34:24,972 --> 00:34:27,139
do you believe this is necessary , and 

939
00:34:27,139 --> 00:34:29,195
can you also discuss how StratCOM is 

940
00:34:29,195 --> 00:34:31,195
working with Doctor Cadlick and the 

941
00:34:31,195 --> 00:34:33,195
Nuclear Weapons Council to put this 

942
00:34:33,195 --> 00:34:35,417
approach into practice ? Yes , Chairman 

943
00:34:35,417 --> 00:34:37,639
DesJarlais , we're working very closely 

944
00:34:37,639 --> 00:34:41,590
with Mr . Cadlick and his team on the 

945
00:34:41,590 --> 00:34:43,550
capabilities and prioritization of 

946
00:34:43,550 --> 00:34:45,772
those capabilities , and we can discuss 

947
00:34:45,772 --> 00:34:47,994
that more in a classified setting . And 

948
00:34:47,994 --> 00:34:49,883
don't worry , generals , I've got 

949
00:34:49,883 --> 00:34:51,883
questions for you in the classified 

950
00:34:51,883 --> 00:34:51,739
setting . I'll my good friend and 

951
00:34:51,739 --> 00:34:55,229
ranking member Seth Moulton for his 

952
00:34:55,229 --> 00:34:57,396
questions . Thank you very much , Mr . 

953
00:34:57,396 --> 00:34:59,618
Chairman . I thought the chairman asked 

954
00:34:59,618 --> 00:35:01,562
a great question to Mr . Berkowitz 

955
00:35:01,562 --> 00:35:03,451
about the prioritization of space 

956
00:35:03,451 --> 00:35:05,562
strategy , which we've heard from the 

957
00:35:05,562 --> 00:35:07,673
president is important and yet that's 

958
00:35:07,673 --> 00:35:09,729
not reflected in the budget . I mean 

959
00:35:09,729 --> 00:35:11,785
they say you can judge values by the 

960
00:35:11,785 --> 00:35:13,562
budget and the national defense 

961
00:35:13,562 --> 00:35:15,896
strategy strategy , of course , as well , 

962
00:35:15,896 --> 00:35:17,562
both the unclassified and the 

963
00:35:17,562 --> 00:35:19,507
classified versions are completely 

964
00:35:19,507 --> 00:35:23,399
silent on space . Um , Can you 

965
00:35:23,399 --> 00:35:26,080
elaborate on why that is and what 

966
00:35:26,080 --> 00:35:28,136
you're doing to rectify given that , 

967
00:35:28,159 --> 00:35:30,103
given the fact that we're spending 

968
00:35:30,103 --> 00:35:32,159
billions of dollars on something the 

969
00:35:32,159 --> 00:35:34,381
department can't even prioritize in the 

970
00:35:34,381 --> 00:35:36,492
only strategy document that they have 

971
00:35:36,492 --> 00:35:39,909
delivered to Congress thus far . Well , 

972
00:35:39,989 --> 00:35:43,590
I appreciate the opportunity to uh to 

973
00:35:43,590 --> 00:35:46,260
correct the mischaracterization . Uh , 

974
00:35:46,270 --> 00:35:48,830
in fact , the National Defense strategy 

975
00:35:48,830 --> 00:35:52,570
is classified . Report addresses 

976
00:35:52,570 --> 00:35:55,699
space , so it is addressed within the 

977
00:35:55,699 --> 00:35:58,959
actual document . What I can say in 

978
00:35:58,959 --> 00:36:02,959
addition is that the inter agency is 

979
00:36:02,959 --> 00:36:05,209
in the process of conducting a broad 

980
00:36:05,209 --> 00:36:07,265
range of activities to implement the 

981
00:36:07,265 --> 00:36:09,487
president's executive order on ensuring 

982
00:36:09,487 --> 00:36:11,810
American space superiority . Part of 

983
00:36:11,810 --> 00:36:14,050
that effort includes developing a new 

984
00:36:14,050 --> 00:36:17,290
national security strategy for space 

985
00:36:17,290 --> 00:36:20,010
security . As part of that , we will be , 

986
00:36:20,129 --> 00:36:22,129
uh , that will be used to drive an 

987
00:36:22,129 --> 00:36:24,370
architecture as well as a technology 

988
00:36:24,370 --> 00:36:26,860
roadmap that will be reflected in the 

989
00:36:26,860 --> 00:36:29,138
president's forthcoming budget request . 

990
00:36:32,050 --> 00:36:34,272
We look forward to seeing it . I mean , 

991
00:36:34,272 --> 00:36:36,161
you have a subcommittee here that 

992
00:36:36,161 --> 00:36:38,328
recognizes this is important and would 

993
00:36:38,328 --> 00:36:38,060
very much like to invest in 

994
00:36:38,060 --> 00:36:40,219
capabilities and we'd love to see the 

995
00:36:40,219 --> 00:36:41,780
prioritization , you know , 

996
00:36:41,820 --> 00:36:43,764
commensurate with what we saw from 

997
00:36:43,764 --> 00:36:45,820
previous administrations , including 

998
00:36:45,820 --> 00:36:47,876
the first Trump administration . I'm 

999
00:36:47,876 --> 00:36:49,820
not sure how you rank Venezuela in 

1000
00:36:49,820 --> 00:36:51,876
space , but to me space is much more 

1001
00:36:51,876 --> 00:36:53,889
important . In the national defense 

1002
00:36:53,889 --> 00:36:56,409
strategy , the department supposes to 

1003
00:36:56,409 --> 00:36:58,929
deal with simultaneity via burden 

1004
00:36:58,929 --> 00:37:01,096
sharing amongst allies . It's been the 

1005
00:37:01,096 --> 00:37:03,096
country's position for many years , 

1006
00:37:03,169 --> 00:37:05,449
across decades , in fact , that global 

1007
00:37:05,449 --> 00:37:07,671
proliferation of nuclear weapons , even 

1008
00:37:07,671 --> 00:37:09,560
if amongst allies , is inherently 

1009
00:37:09,560 --> 00:37:12,149
destabilizing . It's hard not to 

1010
00:37:12,149 --> 00:37:14,316
correlate France's recent announcement 

1011
00:37:14,316 --> 00:37:16,205
to increase their nuclear weapons 

1012
00:37:16,205 --> 00:37:18,209
arsenal as not directly tied to 

1013
00:37:18,209 --> 00:37:20,376
President Trump's continued bashing of 

1014
00:37:20,376 --> 00:37:22,570
our European allies . And questioning 

1015
00:37:22,570 --> 00:37:24,770
America's commitment to NATO , Doctor 

1016
00:37:24,770 --> 00:37:26,937
Cali , can you please elaborate on how 

1017
00:37:26,937 --> 00:37:28,937
the department views burden sharing 

1018
00:37:28,937 --> 00:37:30,826
with regards to nuclear weapons . 

1019
00:37:33,419 --> 00:37:35,586
Ranking Member Moulton , thank you for 

1020
00:37:35,586 --> 00:37:37,697
the question . I would just offer you 

1021
00:37:37,697 --> 00:37:39,919
the insights from Under Secretary Colby 

1022
00:37:39,919 --> 00:37:42,500
who recognized that proliferation even 

1023
00:37:42,500 --> 00:37:44,722
within our allies is not something that 

1024
00:37:44,939 --> 00:37:47,719
we would accept or find beneficial . 

1025
00:37:48,090 --> 00:37:50,201
And so I think from the standpoint of 

1026
00:37:50,201 --> 00:37:52,423
France they have an independent nuclear 

1027
00:37:52,423 --> 00:37:54,479
force that operates independently of 

1028
00:37:54,479 --> 00:37:56,646
NATO , and I think that's their choice 

1029
00:37:56,646 --> 00:37:58,820
to make . But as far as NATO members , 

1030
00:37:58,899 --> 00:38:01,340
I think Under Secretary Colby is on the 

1031
00:38:01,340 --> 00:38:03,699
record , whether it's in this chamber 

1032
00:38:03,699 --> 00:38:05,540
or in the Senate , saying very 

1033
00:38:05,540 --> 00:38:07,373
specifically about that it's not 

1034
00:38:07,373 --> 00:38:10,010
beneficial . So is there anything that 

1035
00:38:10,060 --> 00:38:12,004
the Secretary or the Department of 

1036
00:38:12,004 --> 00:38:15,610
Defense Intends to do to alleviate 

1037
00:38:15,610 --> 00:38:18,350
France's concerns about our reliability 

1038
00:38:18,350 --> 00:38:20,760
in defending NATO so that they do not 

1039
00:38:20,760 --> 00:38:22,871
expand their arsenal ? Well , I think 

1040
00:38:22,871 --> 00:38:24,760
we've already done it , and Under 

1041
00:38:24,760 --> 00:38:26,927
Secretary Colby again is on the record 

1042
00:38:26,927 --> 00:38:29,038
publicly in the Munich conference and 

1043
00:38:29,038 --> 00:38:30,816
during his visit to NATO to say 

1044
00:38:30,816 --> 00:38:33,330
unequivocally America extends its 

1045
00:38:33,330 --> 00:38:36,530
extended deterrence capabilities to 

1046
00:38:36,530 --> 00:38:38,850
NATO and to the Indo-Pacific region . 

1047
00:38:39,209 --> 00:38:41,320
Well , that's great that he said it . 

1048
00:38:41,449 --> 00:38:43,560
But the reality that's transpiring is 

1049
00:38:43,560 --> 00:38:45,727
quite different . Well , sir , I think 

1050
00:38:45,727 --> 00:38:47,893
the reality is that we have aircraft , 

1051
00:38:47,893 --> 00:38:49,949
F-35s that are stationed in Europe , 

1052
00:38:50,169 --> 00:38:52,280
and we have dual capable aircraft and 

1053
00:38:52,280 --> 00:38:54,169
we have nuclear weapons stored in 

1054
00:38:54,169 --> 00:38:56,336
Europe , and I think that's a pretty , 

1055
00:38:56,370 --> 00:38:58,537
pretty loud statement in terms of what 

1056
00:38:58,850 --> 00:39:01,072
our policy is and what our capabilities 

1057
00:39:01,072 --> 00:39:03,489
are . President Macron's statement was 

1058
00:39:03,489 --> 00:39:05,949
pretty loud as well , and I think we 

1059
00:39:06,090 --> 00:39:09,149
ignore it at our peril . Um , 

1060
00:39:10,149 --> 00:39:12,790
Doctor , Doctor , I was pleased to hear 

1061
00:39:12,790 --> 00:39:14,790
you talk about the challenges of 

1062
00:39:14,790 --> 00:39:17,068
dealing with two near peer adversaries . 

1063
00:39:17,110 --> 00:39:19,110
Some might call this the three-body 

1064
00:39:19,110 --> 00:39:21,054
problem as opposed to the two body 

1065
00:39:21,054 --> 00:39:23,277
problem and the mathematical challenges 

1066
00:39:23,277 --> 00:39:25,110
that that presents . Uh , I know 

1067
00:39:25,110 --> 00:39:28,149
General Cotton was pursuing this both 

1068
00:39:28,149 --> 00:39:30,669
within the Pentagon but also within 

1069
00:39:30,669 --> 00:39:33,469
academia . Uh , I , I , I got the 

1070
00:39:33,469 --> 00:39:35,691
chance to talk to Admiral Correll about 

1071
00:39:35,691 --> 00:39:37,636
this . Would either of you like to 

1072
00:39:37,636 --> 00:39:40,179
comment on how you intend to continue 

1073
00:39:40,179 --> 00:39:42,639
General Cotton's work and get us a 

1074
00:39:42,639 --> 00:39:46,419
better answer here in Congress than as 

1075
00:39:47,399 --> 00:39:50,399
the distinguished gentleman from Omaha 

1076
00:39:50,399 --> 00:39:52,840
said in the gentleman from Tennessee's 

1077
00:39:52,840 --> 00:39:55,989
opening statement . We don't have good 

1078
00:39:55,989 --> 00:39:58,669
numbers here . They're really outdated , 

1079
00:39:59,030 --> 00:40:01,197
and we want to be good stewards of the 

1080
00:40:01,197 --> 00:40:03,252
taxpayer dollars to get what we need 

1081
00:40:03,252 --> 00:40:05,586
for our fundamental strategic stability . 

1082
00:40:10,020 --> 00:40:13,770
Yes , Ranking Member Moulton , 

1083
00:40:14,479 --> 00:40:16,535
um , the , the work that John Cotton 

1084
00:40:16,535 --> 00:40:18,540
has done forms the basis of the 

1085
00:40:18,540 --> 00:40:20,318
starting point for the strategy 

1086
00:40:20,318 --> 00:40:22,820
discussion and the ongoing work in 

1087
00:40:22,820 --> 00:40:26,500
terms of force sufficiency for our 

1088
00:40:26,500 --> 00:40:28,820
nuclear forces to address that 

1089
00:40:28,820 --> 00:40:29,820
challenge . 

1090
00:40:33,399 --> 00:40:34,955
Thank you , Mr . Chairman . 

1091
00:40:41,439 --> 00:40:43,439
My first question , well , I have 3 

1092
00:40:43,439 --> 00:40:45,550
questions , but I just want to make a 

1093
00:40:45,550 --> 00:40:47,772
comment . Mr . Berkowitz , I appreciate 

1094
00:40:47,772 --> 00:40:47,149
what you're saying about missile 

1095
00:40:47,149 --> 00:40:49,149
defense . I couldn't imagine having 

1096
00:40:49,149 --> 00:40:51,371
this fight right now in the Middle East 

1097
00:40:51,371 --> 00:40:53,649
without it . Cities are being targeted . 

1098
00:40:53,649 --> 00:40:55,816
We see it also in Ukraine . This isn't 

1099
00:40:55,816 --> 00:40:57,982
going to go away , and leaving America 

1100
00:40:57,982 --> 00:40:59,927
undefended is not an option , so I 

1101
00:40:59,927 --> 00:41:01,927
appreciate your comments . My first 

1102
00:41:01,927 --> 00:41:04,093
question is to Admiral Correll . We're 

1103
00:41:04,093 --> 00:41:06,969
hearing now that maybe 150 B-21 bombers 

1104
00:41:06,969 --> 00:41:09,025
is the target area . I'd like you to 

1105
00:41:09,025 --> 00:41:11,025
maybe comment on that . What is the 

1106
00:41:11,025 --> 00:41:13,191
Stratcom numbers ? Are we building the 

1107
00:41:13,191 --> 00:41:17,090
infrastructure to support that ? Yes , 

1108
00:41:17,250 --> 00:41:20,530
Representative Bacon , Stratcom has Jo 

1109
00:41:20,530 --> 00:41:23,689
Cotton has gone on the record and said 

1110
00:41:23,689 --> 00:41:26,110
based on our analysis for our portfolio 

1111
00:41:26,110 --> 00:41:28,221
of capabilities and the bomber leg of 

1112
00:41:28,221 --> 00:41:32,110
the Triad . That 145 

1113
00:41:32,399 --> 00:41:34,709
is the number , um , you know , from a 

1114
00:41:34,709 --> 00:41:37,120
Stratcom perspective . There's ongoing 

1115
00:41:37,120 --> 00:41:40,100
work within the within the joint force 

1116
00:41:40,399 --> 00:41:42,510
to determine what that endpoint might 

1117
00:41:42,510 --> 00:41:44,121
be , and there are of course 

1118
00:41:44,121 --> 00:41:47,199
investments that have been made to 

1119
00:41:47,199 --> 00:41:49,679
increase the production rate and to 

1120
00:41:49,679 --> 00:41:51,879
potentially open a second production 

1121
00:41:51,879 --> 00:41:54,212
line . That decision has yet to be made , 

1122
00:41:54,212 --> 00:41:57,820
but clearly , The B-21 represents a 

1123
00:41:57,820 --> 00:41:59,876
really significant capability , both 

1124
00:41:59,876 --> 00:42:02,659
from a conventional and a nuclear 

1125
00:42:02,659 --> 00:42:04,826
perspective for the joint force . It's 

1126
00:42:04,826 --> 00:42:07,320
1/6 generation stealth capability . 

1127
00:42:07,750 --> 00:42:10,310
With stand-in or standoff precision 

1128
00:42:10,310 --> 00:42:12,510
distance strike or stand-in precision 

1129
00:42:12,510 --> 00:42:15,909
strike , and the ability to maneuver 

1130
00:42:15,909 --> 00:42:17,853
within a contested electromagnetic 

1131
00:42:17,853 --> 00:42:19,965
spectrum . So what it enables for the 

1132
00:42:19,965 --> 00:42:22,469
joint force goes beyond , you know , 

1133
00:42:22,639 --> 00:42:25,110
the strike capability associated with 

1134
00:42:25,110 --> 00:42:27,229
it . It's an important capability for 

1135
00:42:27,229 --> 00:42:29,062
the joint force . I sure hope we 

1136
00:42:29,062 --> 00:42:31,229
accomplish this because I know what we 

1137
00:42:31,229 --> 00:42:33,340
said about the B-2 . We ended up with 

1138
00:42:33,340 --> 00:42:35,396
it's currently 19 , I think 145 is . 

1139
00:42:35,790 --> 00:42:37,846
The number we should be aiming for . 

1140
00:42:37,846 --> 00:42:39,790
Doctor Cadillac , I'd like to talk 

1141
00:42:39,790 --> 00:42:41,734
about electronic warfare . I am an 

1142
00:42:41,734 --> 00:42:43,846
electronic warfare officer by trade . 

1143
00:42:43,899 --> 00:42:46,219
The PACO and Air Combat Command say 

1144
00:42:46,219 --> 00:42:49,500
they need 22 EA 37s . If it wasn't for 

1145
00:42:49,500 --> 00:42:51,939
Congress , we'd be at 6 . Coming out of 

1146
00:42:51,939 --> 00:42:54,489
this committee or , or the the Armed 

1147
00:42:54,489 --> 00:42:56,711
Services Committee , we've been able to 

1148
00:42:56,711 --> 00:42:58,767
fund 4 more . I think we have enough 

1149
00:42:58,767 --> 00:43:00,989
money for 2 more , but I'm not too sure 

1150
00:43:00,989 --> 00:43:03,100
if the , if the department's going to 

1151
00:43:03,100 --> 00:43:05,267
fund 11 or 12 yet . So I'd like to ask 

1152
00:43:05,267 --> 00:43:07,045
you , what's the plans from the 

1153
00:43:07,045 --> 00:43:09,939
department on aircraft 11 and 12 , and 

1154
00:43:09,939 --> 00:43:13,919
is the target 22 ? I can't talk 

1155
00:43:13,919 --> 00:43:15,863
about what's in the budget , but I 

1156
00:43:15,863 --> 00:43:17,863
would love to provide you with that 

1157
00:43:17,863 --> 00:43:19,975
briefing on where we are and where we 

1158
00:43:19,975 --> 00:43:22,086
need to be , and I do believe that in 

1159
00:43:22,086 --> 00:43:24,141
terms of what the Indoacom commander 

1160
00:43:24,141 --> 00:43:26,363
needs , it's a very important factor in 

1161
00:43:26,363 --> 00:43:28,530
what we purchase and what we supply to 

1162
00:43:28,530 --> 00:43:31,540
the war fighter . I think all the 

1163
00:43:31,540 --> 00:43:34,260
services and the wars like the A37 has 

1164
00:43:34,260 --> 00:43:37,260
significant capabilities way beyond the 

1165
00:43:37,260 --> 00:43:40,530
old EC-130 platform , and I would tell 

1166
00:43:40,530 --> 00:43:42,752
you if it wasn't for Congress , we'd be 

1167
00:43:42,752 --> 00:43:44,974
at 6 right now , and that concerns me . 

1168
00:43:44,974 --> 00:43:46,697
It's been Congress pushing the 

1169
00:43:46,697 --> 00:43:49,739
department to fund this platform and so 

1170
00:43:49,739 --> 00:43:51,906
my confidence has always been a little 

1171
00:43:51,906 --> 00:43:53,906
shaky on are we going to get to the 

1172
00:43:53,906 --> 00:43:56,239
numbers . Our warfighters say they need . 

1173
00:43:56,550 --> 00:43:58,550
My last question deals with nuclear 

1174
00:43:58,550 --> 00:44:00,050
command and control , uh , 

1175
00:44:00,050 --> 00:44:01,939
survivability , really for Doctor 

1176
00:44:01,939 --> 00:44:03,994
Cadillac , but maybe Admiral Correll 

1177
00:44:03,994 --> 00:44:05,994
would like to comment as well . You 

1178
00:44:05,994 --> 00:44:07,939
know , Stratcom , Pentagon , White 

1179
00:44:07,939 --> 00:44:10,060
House . Peterson Air Force Base , we 

1180
00:44:10,060 --> 00:44:12,004
can all get hit in 15 minutes with 

1181
00:44:12,004 --> 00:44:15,389
hypersonic weapons . I'd like to know 

1182
00:44:15,389 --> 00:44:17,556
what is the plan for the Looking Glass 

1183
00:44:17,556 --> 00:44:21,399
mission one . But , isn't it beyond 

1184
00:44:21,399 --> 00:44:23,455
time that we have a 24 hour airborne 

1185
00:44:23,455 --> 00:44:25,621
alert again like we did for 29 years , 

1186
00:44:25,760 --> 00:44:27,982
because I don't think we can dependably 

1187
00:44:27,982 --> 00:44:30,379
have survivable command and control 

1188
00:44:30,860 --> 00:44:34,350
without an airborne 24 hour a day alert 

1189
00:44:34,350 --> 00:44:36,628
or something comparative on the ground . 

1190
00:44:36,979 --> 00:44:38,979
And right now I think we're leaving 

1191
00:44:38,979 --> 00:44:41,146
ourselves vulnerable , and it makes me 

1192
00:44:41,146 --> 00:44:43,257
concerned . Dr . Kla . Well , sir , I 

1193
00:44:43,257 --> 00:44:45,201
do agree with you that NC3 nuclear 

1194
00:44:45,201 --> 00:44:47,201
command and control is probably the 

1195
00:44:47,201 --> 00:44:49,368
king jewel in our crown of our nuclear 

1196
00:44:49,368 --> 00:44:51,590
deterrence and certainly the ability to 

1197
00:44:51,590 --> 00:44:54,379
ensure the ability to provide , you 

1198
00:44:54,379 --> 00:44:57,219
know , detection . Decision space for 

1199
00:44:57,219 --> 00:44:59,659
the president and direction of our 

1200
00:44:59,659 --> 00:45:01,780
forces is critical and whether that 

1201
00:45:01,780 --> 00:45:04,580
takes air or land or both . I do know 

1202
00:45:04,580 --> 00:45:06,899
that during my recent trip to Omaha I 

1203
00:45:06,899 --> 00:45:09,979
saw one leg of that and again very 

1204
00:45:09,979 --> 00:45:12,260
impressed with the development of 

1205
00:45:12,260 --> 00:45:15,219
technologies and I do know that looking 

1206
00:45:15,219 --> 00:45:17,860
glass next is part of the plan . So 

1207
00:45:17,860 --> 00:45:20,379
I'll defer to Admiral Korrell to offer 

1208
00:45:20,379 --> 00:45:22,780
some more specifics as to timing . I 

1209
00:45:22,780 --> 00:45:24,724
know you've got a short time , but 

1210
00:45:24,724 --> 00:45:26,780
please . Uh , thanks , Doctor Cadlik 

1211
00:45:26,780 --> 00:45:29,020
and uh uh Congressman Bacon , and I 

1212
00:45:29,020 --> 00:45:31,131
appreciate the robust discussion that 

1213
00:45:31,131 --> 00:45:33,300
we had on you and , uh , in , uh , in 

1214
00:45:33,300 --> 00:45:35,899
your office , in our office call . I 

1215
00:45:35,899 --> 00:45:37,899
would just reiterate what I've said 

1216
00:45:37,899 --> 00:45:40,340
previously and that we've got to with 

1217
00:45:40,340 --> 00:45:42,620
assured command and control both for 

1218
00:45:42,620 --> 00:45:45,020
conventional and especially for nuclear 

1219
00:45:45,020 --> 00:45:47,131
capabilities we've got to account for 

1220
00:45:47,131 --> 00:45:50,219
those five threat vectors and where we 

1221
00:45:50,219 --> 00:45:52,330
don't have the strategic warning that 

1222
00:45:52,330 --> 00:45:54,219
we feel we need , then we need to 

1223
00:45:54,219 --> 00:45:56,386
complicate the adversaries's targeting 

1224
00:45:56,386 --> 00:45:58,608
problem associated with that . And so , 

1225
00:45:58,608 --> 00:46:00,739
you know , mobile distributed 

1226
00:46:00,739 --> 00:46:04,540
capability is . is what our trade 

1227
00:46:04,540 --> 00:46:06,979
space study associated with future 

1228
00:46:06,979 --> 00:46:08,919
command and control architecture 

1229
00:46:09,139 --> 00:46:12,419
indicates , and you know it is likely 

1230
00:46:12,419 --> 00:46:14,659
to be a mixture of air and terrestrial 

1231
00:46:14,659 --> 00:46:16,881
mobile capability . I'll go back to the 

1232
00:46:16,881 --> 00:46:18,826
chairman , but I just think to the 

1233
00:46:18,826 --> 00:46:18,739
chairman and the ranking member , this 

1234
00:46:18,739 --> 00:46:20,979
is something that we can really work on 

1235
00:46:20,979 --> 00:46:23,620
in this NDAA . Thank you . Thank you , 

1236
00:46:23,699 --> 00:46:26,979
General . Chair now yields to the 

1237
00:46:26,979 --> 00:46:29,146
distinguished member from California , 

1238
00:46:29,146 --> 00:46:33,060
Mr . G Garamendi . Thank you Mr . 

1239
00:46:33,219 --> 00:46:35,989
Chairman . Gentlemen , thank you for 

1240
00:46:35,989 --> 00:46:39,229
your testimony . It is extremely 

1241
00:46:39,229 --> 00:46:41,489
important . Unfortunately we're not 

1242
00:46:41,489 --> 00:46:43,656
going to be able to get into the depth 

1243
00:46:43,656 --> 00:46:46,189
that's necessary . Mister Berkowitz , 

1244
00:46:46,270 --> 00:46:49,330
you spent your entire opening 

1245
00:46:50,310 --> 00:46:52,550
in a discussion at the Golden Dome . 

1246
00:46:53,610 --> 00:46:56,860
What is the goal Of the Golden Dome 

1247
00:46:58,149 --> 00:47:01,149
And what would it cost ? Uh 

1248
00:47:04,129 --> 00:47:05,740
Thank you for the question , 

1249
00:47:05,740 --> 00:47:07,851
Representative . Um , I'm gonna defer 

1250
00:47:07,851 --> 00:47:10,169
any conversations about cost to the 

1251
00:47:10,169 --> 00:47:12,391
direct reporting program manager , uh , 

1252
00:47:12,391 --> 00:47:14,447
since that's outside of my purview . 

1253
00:47:14,447 --> 00:47:16,613
Excuse me . Just what are you doing if 

1254
00:47:16,613 --> 00:47:18,891
you don't know what the cost is ? Well , 

1255
00:47:18,891 --> 00:47:21,058
I do know what the cost is , sir , but 

1256
00:47:21,058 --> 00:47:23,280
as you may be aware , there is a number 

1257
00:47:23,280 --> 00:47:25,280
from the president . I would repeat 

1258
00:47:25,280 --> 00:47:27,391
that number , but I'm not responsible 

1259
00:47:27,391 --> 00:47:29,520
for the program or its cost . I'm 

1260
00:47:29,520 --> 00:47:32,040
responsible for policy matters 

1261
00:47:32,040 --> 00:47:34,207
associated with the program . Then let 

1262
00:47:34,207 --> 00:47:35,984
me go to the opening part of my 

1263
00:47:35,984 --> 00:47:38,096
question . Sure . What is the purpose 

1264
00:47:38,096 --> 00:47:40,373
of Golden Dome ? What is it to achieve ? 

1265
00:47:40,373 --> 00:47:43,590
The purpose of the Golden Dome is to 

1266
00:47:43,590 --> 00:47:45,812
provide a comprehensive next generation 

1267
00:47:45,812 --> 00:47:48,030
defense of the United States against 

1268
00:47:48,030 --> 00:47:49,863
the most consequential threats , 

1269
00:47:49,909 --> 00:47:51,798
potentially the most catastrophic 

1270
00:47:51,798 --> 00:47:53,989
threat that we face . Our adversaries 

1271
00:47:53,989 --> 00:47:56,149
are diversifying , expanding , and 

1272
00:47:56,149 --> 00:47:58,909
modernizing . Nuclear arsenals and 

1273
00:47:58,909 --> 00:48:00,909
their long range delivery systems , 

1274
00:48:00,909 --> 00:48:02,853
those include ballistic missiles , 

1275
00:48:02,853 --> 00:48:05,189
hypersonic weapons , advanced cruise 

1276
00:48:05,189 --> 00:48:07,590
missiles , and other forms of advanced 

1277
00:48:07,590 --> 00:48:09,701
aerial attack . So the purpose of the 

1278
00:48:09,701 --> 00:48:13,229
Golden Dome is to defend . To 

1279
00:48:13,229 --> 00:48:15,830
stop all of those threats , is that 

1280
00:48:15,830 --> 00:48:18,052
correct ? The purpose of Golden Dome is 

1281
00:48:18,052 --> 00:48:20,108
to provide a defense of the homeland 

1282
00:48:20,108 --> 00:48:23,550
and in the process to deter coercion 

1283
00:48:23,550 --> 00:48:27,159
and aggression . And in so doing , we 

1284
00:48:27,159 --> 00:48:29,840
will do so in combination as a 

1285
00:48:29,840 --> 00:48:31,951
complement to our nuclear deterrent . 

1286
00:48:36,979 --> 00:48:39,201
I'm going to go back to just being very 

1287
00:48:39,201 --> 00:48:41,312
simple . It's to stop those threats . 

1288
00:48:41,312 --> 00:48:43,899
Is that correct ? That is correct , sir . 

1289
00:48:44,340 --> 00:48:46,899
The deterrence . Thank you . Well , if 

1290
00:48:46,899 --> 00:48:50,219
I could , General or Admiral Correll . 

1291
00:48:52,989 --> 00:48:56,429
Your task . is to penetrate . 

1292
00:48:57,159 --> 00:48:59,360
The defensive systems of our 

1293
00:48:59,360 --> 00:49:03,330
adversaries , is that correct ? Or to 

1294
00:49:03,330 --> 00:49:06,290
be able to penetrate those defensive 

1295
00:49:06,290 --> 00:49:09,679
systems . That's correct . And 

1296
00:49:09,679 --> 00:49:12,090
therefore achieve deterrence . That's 

1297
00:49:12,090 --> 00:49:14,330
correct . The ability to hold at risk 

1298
00:49:14,330 --> 00:49:16,449
and achieve the damage expectancy for 

1299
00:49:16,449 --> 00:49:18,282
whatever particular target we're 

1300
00:49:18,282 --> 00:49:20,610
holding at risk . War games at the 

1301
00:49:20,610 --> 00:49:24,300
Pentagon are rather common . Have you 

1302
00:49:24,300 --> 00:49:26,449
thought about how you are going to 

1303
00:49:27,459 --> 00:49:30,429
Penetrate the Golden Dome defensive 

1304
00:49:30,429 --> 00:49:34,189
system . And do you have the necessary 

1305
00:49:35,139 --> 00:49:37,199
Offensive systems to do that . 

1306
00:49:41,060 --> 00:49:44,639
The Golden Dome is a US 

1307
00:49:44,639 --> 00:49:47,479
capability , so we have not done 

1308
00:49:47,479 --> 00:49:51,399
analysis on our ability , and that's a 

1309
00:49:51,399 --> 00:49:54,120
system that's still being developed in 

1310
00:49:54,120 --> 00:49:56,176
terms of adversary capabilities . We 

1311
00:49:56,176 --> 00:49:58,919
pay very close attention to . I'm going 

1312
00:49:58,919 --> 00:50:02,419
to go to my point . My point is Golden 

1313
00:50:02,419 --> 00:50:05,020
Dome is to stop a whole array of 

1314
00:50:05,020 --> 00:50:07,760
nuclear threats as just listed by 

1315
00:50:08,179 --> 00:50:11,540
Mister Berkowitz . Your task is to 

1316
00:50:11,540 --> 00:50:15,000
provide An American system to penetrate . 

1317
00:50:15,669 --> 00:50:19,110
The defensive mechanisms that Russia 

1318
00:50:19,110 --> 00:50:21,989
and China might deploy , and I'm just 

1319
00:50:21,989 --> 00:50:25,590
curious how you would address . 

1320
00:50:26,379 --> 00:50:30,219
The task and purpose of Golden 

1321
00:50:30,219 --> 00:50:33,449
Dome . In other words , a very 

1322
00:50:34,149 --> 00:50:36,316
interesting little war game , wouldn't 

1323
00:50:36,316 --> 00:50:39,270
it ? In other words , testing the 

1324
00:50:39,270 --> 00:50:42,340
purposes and the effectiveness of the 

1325
00:50:42,560 --> 00:50:44,889
multibillion hundreds of billions of 

1326
00:50:44,889 --> 00:50:47,280
dollars that would be spent . In other 

1327
00:50:47,280 --> 00:50:51,159
words , as my ranking member next to me 

1328
00:50:51,159 --> 00:50:53,159
so eloquently put up in his opening 

1329
00:50:53,159 --> 00:50:55,326
statement , it becomes a fool's errand 

1330
00:50:55,326 --> 00:50:58,909
here . You defend , we offend . You 

1331
00:50:58,909 --> 00:51:01,899
defend . We defend back and forth , and 

1332
00:51:01,899 --> 00:51:04,177
we're caught up in a nuclear arms race . 

1333
00:51:05,639 --> 00:51:09,110
I'll yield back at this point , but it 

1334
00:51:09,110 --> 00:51:12,409
would seem to me beneficial 

1335
00:51:13,000 --> 00:51:14,889
for us to think about this in the 

1336
00:51:14,889 --> 00:51:17,239
context of the purposes of the Golden 

1337
00:51:17,239 --> 00:51:20,399
Dome and how it would or would , 

1338
00:51:21,360 --> 00:51:23,138
would achieve or would fail its 

1339
00:51:23,138 --> 00:51:25,249
purposes and the kind of weapons that 

1340
00:51:25,249 --> 00:51:27,320
we presently have that might be 

1341
00:51:27,320 --> 00:51:29,889
deployed with China . 

1342
00:51:31,310 --> 00:51:35,290
Or Russia or even similar weapons , 

1343
00:51:36,229 --> 00:51:38,285
many of which were already discussed 

1344
00:51:38,285 --> 00:51:40,330
here . That are now being 

1345
00:51:41,510 --> 00:51:44,760
Deployed , developed by Russia and 

1346
00:51:44,760 --> 00:51:47,360
China . Taking us back to the Golden 

1347
00:51:47,360 --> 00:51:49,969
Dome , is it indeed a fool's errand ? 

1348
00:51:50,560 --> 00:51:52,727
I'll let that hang out there . I yield 

1349
00:51:52,727 --> 00:51:56,600
back , yields back and just 

1350
00:51:56,600 --> 00:51:59,320
for thought purposes , the way the 

1351
00:51:59,320 --> 00:52:02,000
pendulum swings in Washington in 2029 , 

1352
00:52:02,080 --> 00:52:04,136
this may not be called Golden Dome , 

1353
00:52:04,136 --> 00:52:06,358
but would you all agree that everything 

1354
00:52:06,358 --> 00:52:08,080
that you're doing right now is 

1355
00:52:08,080 --> 00:52:10,191
something we should be doing anyway , 

1356
00:52:10,191 --> 00:52:12,358
whether it had a fancy name or not ? I 

1357
00:52:12,358 --> 00:52:15,540
see mostly nods . Thank you all . Um , 

1358
00:52:16,550 --> 00:52:18,661
no disrespect to my colleagues , um , 

1359
00:52:19,149 --> 00:52:21,149
but I , I , I , I just think we get 

1360
00:52:21,149 --> 00:52:23,371
hung up on , on , on the name more than 

1361
00:52:23,371 --> 00:52:25,482
what the purpose of what we're trying 

1362
00:52:25,482 --> 00:52:27,593
to do because our adversaries are not 

1363
00:52:27,593 --> 00:52:29,649
slowing down . I would now recognize 

1364
00:52:29,649 --> 00:52:31,593
the gentleman from Colorado , Mr . 

1365
00:52:31,593 --> 00:52:33,816
Crank . Thank you , Mr . Chairman . I , 

1366
00:52:33,816 --> 00:52:35,927
I apologize for my voice in advance , 

1367
00:52:35,927 --> 00:52:37,982
so I'll ask short questions and give 

1368
00:52:37,982 --> 00:52:39,927
you more time to respond . General 

1369
00:52:39,927 --> 00:52:41,927
Guillo , is NRHCOM prepared for the 

1370
00:52:41,927 --> 00:52:44,129
tight decision timeline uh needed for 

1371
00:52:44,129 --> 00:52:46,929
boost phase intercepts , um , and what 

1372
00:52:46,929 --> 00:52:48,985
more needs to be done in that area ? 

1373
00:52:49,909 --> 00:52:52,580
Congressman , yes , we are prepared and 

1374
00:52:52,580 --> 00:52:55,030
we train and exercise that multiple 

1375
00:52:55,030 --> 00:52:58,780
times each day . General Whiting , 

1376
00:52:58,939 --> 00:53:01,106
um , to the extent you can share in an 

1377
00:53:01,106 --> 00:53:03,719
open hearing , how do you at , uh , 

1378
00:53:03,729 --> 00:53:05,840
Space Command view the cyber threat , 

1379
00:53:05,840 --> 00:53:08,007
and we talked about this earlier today 

1380
00:53:08,007 --> 00:53:09,562
in my office , to our space 

1381
00:53:09,562 --> 00:53:11,396
capabilities , and what more can 

1382
00:53:11,396 --> 00:53:13,507
Congress be doing ? To ensure that we 

1383
00:53:13,507 --> 00:53:16,129
stay ahead of our adversaries in the 

1384
00:53:16,129 --> 00:53:18,296
cyber domain , Congressman , thank you 

1385
00:53:18,296 --> 00:53:20,407
for the question . We think the cyber 

1386
00:53:20,407 --> 00:53:22,729
threat is a is a is a true threat to 

1387
00:53:22,729 --> 00:53:24,840
our space capabilities , while Russia 

1388
00:53:24,840 --> 00:53:26,896
and China have demonstrated they can 

1389
00:53:26,896 --> 00:53:28,951
attack us in space with weapons like 

1390
00:53:28,951 --> 00:53:31,409
direct ASA or high energy lasers . I 

1391
00:53:31,409 --> 00:53:33,631
think they would rather attack us using 

1392
00:53:33,631 --> 00:53:35,853
cyber because it's cheaper for them and 

1393
00:53:35,853 --> 00:53:38,076
harder for us to attribute . So we have 

1394
00:53:38,076 --> 00:53:40,076
to harden . In the cyber domain are 

1395
00:53:40,076 --> 00:53:42,187
space enterprise and we've made a lot 

1396
00:53:42,187 --> 00:53:43,909
of progress in that area , but 

1397
00:53:43,909 --> 00:53:46,020
Congressman , I think I would ask the 

1398
00:53:46,020 --> 00:53:47,965
Congress to continue to support US 

1399
00:53:47,965 --> 00:53:49,853
Cyber Command as it grows out its 

1400
00:53:49,853 --> 00:53:52,020
forces and capabilities and the forces 

1401
00:53:52,020 --> 00:53:54,076
of the individual services that they 

1402
00:53:54,076 --> 00:53:56,298
delivered to Cyber Command that provide 

1403
00:53:56,298 --> 00:53:58,187
defensive cyber capabilities . We 

1404
00:53:58,187 --> 00:54:00,580
routinely have defensive cyber teams 

1405
00:54:00,580 --> 00:54:02,802
from the different services that help . 

1406
00:54:02,802 --> 00:54:05,229
Us harden our systems , but there's 

1407
00:54:05,229 --> 00:54:07,451
more that could be done there . Are the 

1408
00:54:07,451 --> 00:54:10,110
main , the main cyber threats China and 

1409
00:54:10,110 --> 00:54:13,149
Russia with regard to space , do you 

1410
00:54:13,149 --> 00:54:15,260
believe , or are there other actors ? 

1411
00:54:15,909 --> 00:54:17,909
Congressman , I agree those are the 

1412
00:54:17,909 --> 00:54:19,965
fundamental principal threats . OK . 

1413
00:54:19,965 --> 00:54:22,187
And then General Guillo , a key element 

1414
00:54:22,187 --> 00:54:24,298
of Golden Dome will be the ability to 

1415
00:54:24,298 --> 00:54:26,820
defeat missiles in the initial launch 

1416
00:54:26,820 --> 00:54:29,020
phase . However , the compressed 

1417
00:54:29,020 --> 00:54:31,699
timelines inherent uh to boost phase , 

1418
00:54:32,020 --> 00:54:33,853
intercept , challenge , legacy , 

1419
00:54:33,853 --> 00:54:36,399
command and control architectures 

1420
00:54:36,780 --> 00:54:38,979
designed around longer mid-course 

1421
00:54:38,979 --> 00:54:40,939
engagement windows . How are you 

1422
00:54:40,939 --> 00:54:42,995
thinking about your requirements for 

1423
00:54:42,995 --> 00:54:45,060
sensor integration , uh , sensor 

1424
00:54:45,060 --> 00:54:47,100
integration , battle management 

1425
00:54:47,100 --> 00:54:49,580
software , and operational procedures 

1426
00:54:49,580 --> 00:54:52,290
to compress the timeline , boost phase 

1427
00:54:52,290 --> 00:54:54,949
intercept . Congressman , 

1428
00:54:56,649 --> 00:54:58,871
the way we need to do this is through a 

1429
00:54:58,871 --> 00:55:00,982
layered approach that takes a variety 

1430
00:55:00,982 --> 00:55:03,205
of different types of sensors . There's 

1431
00:55:03,205 --> 00:55:04,982
not a single sensor that we can 

1432
00:55:04,982 --> 00:55:07,729
establish and put either on orbit or on 

1433
00:55:07,729 --> 00:55:10,159
the ground that will give us all of the 

1434
00:55:10,159 --> 00:55:12,360
cues that we need to go from boost 

1435
00:55:12,360 --> 00:55:15,040
phase all the way through . Midcourse 

1436
00:55:15,040 --> 00:55:17,096
or even into terminal phase , so the 

1437
00:55:17,096 --> 00:55:19,719
layered approach is essential and 

1438
00:55:19,719 --> 00:55:21,840
perhaps the biggest challenge that 

1439
00:55:21,840 --> 00:55:24,600
General Gutlein and I discuss is how do 

1440
00:55:24,600 --> 00:55:26,711
we tie all this into a single command 

1441
00:55:26,711 --> 00:55:29,250
and control system . That takes 

1442
00:55:29,250 --> 00:55:31,870
probably a dozen or more disparate 

1443
00:55:32,560 --> 00:55:34,782
command and control systems and ties it 

1444
00:55:34,782 --> 00:55:37,004
into one screen where the operators can 

1445
00:55:37,004 --> 00:55:39,227
look from the boost all the way through 

1446
00:55:39,227 --> 00:55:41,370
the terminal phase and seamlessly 

1447
00:55:41,370 --> 00:55:43,739
inject all of the different sensors and 

1448
00:55:43,739 --> 00:55:46,169
effectors that it would take to defeat 

1449
00:55:46,169 --> 00:55:48,169
that . He does think that we're on 

1450
00:55:48,169 --> 00:55:51,290
track for that within the next year or 

1451
00:55:51,290 --> 00:55:53,401
two for the demonstrated capability , 

1452
00:55:53,401 --> 00:55:55,679
and I'm confident that he'll get there . 

1453
00:55:55,679 --> 00:55:58,020
How about AI , AI and how that would 

1454
00:55:58,020 --> 00:56:00,620
relate and how do you keep a , the 

1455
00:56:00,620 --> 00:56:03,260
reliability of a human in the loop if 

1456
00:56:03,260 --> 00:56:05,179
we're , if we're using AI in that 

1457
00:56:05,179 --> 00:56:07,346
process ? Congressman , I , I do think 

1458
00:56:07,346 --> 00:56:10,659
AI is necessary . Uh , what we usually 

1459
00:56:10,659 --> 00:56:13,139
face today , for example , would be a 

1460
00:56:13,139 --> 00:56:16,050
single North Korean . Interceptor and 

1461
00:56:16,050 --> 00:56:18,272
if you looked to our headquarters , you 

1462
00:56:18,272 --> 00:56:20,328
see we have 6 or 8 different screens 

1463
00:56:20,328 --> 00:56:22,272
and hundreds of people yelling and 

1464
00:56:22,272 --> 00:56:24,494
talking about one interceptor inbound . 

1465
00:56:24,494 --> 00:56:26,510
If we looked at a raid from a peer 

1466
00:56:27,129 --> 00:56:29,407
nation , the number that that might be , 

1467
00:56:29,407 --> 00:56:32,290
we would have to have AI . But as you 

1468
00:56:32,290 --> 00:56:34,512
mentioned , we cannot replace the human 

1469
00:56:34,512 --> 00:56:36,568
on the loop to make the decisions at 

1470
00:56:36,568 --> 00:56:38,623
the right points from detect all the 

1471
00:56:38,623 --> 00:56:40,734
way through engagement , but it would 

1472
00:56:40,734 --> 00:56:43,840
allow us to . You know , address 

1473
00:56:43,840 --> 00:56:46,062
multiple threats simultaneously , which 

1474
00:56:46,062 --> 00:56:48,118
we'd be challenged to do now . Thank 

1475
00:56:48,118 --> 00:56:50,062
you , General , and I apologize to 

1476
00:56:50,062 --> 00:56:52,284
everyone in the room for my voice , and 

1477
00:56:52,284 --> 00:56:54,340
Mr . Chairman , I yield back . Thank 

1478
00:56:54,340 --> 00:56:56,507
you . I thought it sounded wonderful . 

1479
00:56:56,507 --> 00:56:58,562
gentleman yields back . The chairman 

1480
00:56:58,562 --> 00:57:00,673
now recognizes the gentleman from New 

1481
00:57:00,673 --> 00:57:02,951
Jersey , Mr . Norcross , for 5 minutes . 

1482
00:57:02,951 --> 00:57:04,673
Thank you , Chairman , and for 

1483
00:57:04,673 --> 00:57:06,784
witnesses for being here today . Um , 

1484
00:57:06,879 --> 00:57:08,990
The bulk of my questions I'm going to 

1485
00:57:08,990 --> 00:57:11,320
hold off for the classified , but one 

1486
00:57:11,320 --> 00:57:13,542
that I think we can have the discussion 

1487
00:57:13,542 --> 00:57:16,340
here today is talking about our ability 

1488
00:57:16,340 --> 00:57:18,879
to deliver that one leg through our 

1489
00:57:18,879 --> 00:57:22,340
bomber fleets . 74 

1490
00:57:22,340 --> 00:57:25,830
B-52s . 1920 

1491
00:57:26,149 --> 00:57:28,909
B-2s . I'm talking for the nuclear dual 

1492
00:57:28,909 --> 00:57:31,429
capable and what we're looking at the 

1493
00:57:31,429 --> 00:57:34,169
145-ish 21s . 

1494
00:57:35,100 --> 00:57:37,156
Unfortunately over the course of the 

1495
00:57:37,156 --> 00:57:40,090
last few weeks we saw losing . 

1496
00:57:41,189 --> 00:57:44,840
Six of the lost or damaged 6 

1497
00:57:44,840 --> 00:57:48,360
KC-135s certainly will make 

1498
00:57:48,360 --> 00:57:51,320
an impact , but I'm far from the only 

1499
00:57:51,320 --> 00:57:53,610
ones that we have available . It is an 

1500
00:57:53,610 --> 00:57:57,179
aging platform . It's one that will run 

1501
00:57:57,179 --> 00:58:00,120
its time in the next part of the 

1502
00:58:00,120 --> 00:58:02,399
century . How long it makes it 

1503
00:58:03,080 --> 00:58:06,080
certainly up there . KC 46 is coming in 

1504
00:58:06,080 --> 00:58:08,959
quickly and at some point will be dual 

1505
00:58:08,959 --> 00:58:11,389
capable . But with the increased 

1506
00:58:11,389 --> 00:58:13,611
bombers , in addition to taking care of 

1507
00:58:13,611 --> 00:58:16,310
the entire flying force that we have . 

1508
00:58:17,090 --> 00:58:20,169
Are the refuelers , the KC-46 , being 

1509
00:58:20,169 --> 00:58:23,870
delivered at a rate that is acceptable 

1510
00:58:24,209 --> 00:58:28,090
to keep our other platforms flying when 

1511
00:58:28,090 --> 00:58:31,739
we need it ? General , or excuse me , 

1512
00:58:31,800 --> 00:58:32,800
Admiral Correll . 

1513
00:58:36,070 --> 00:58:38,810
You highlight the absolute essentiality 

1514
00:58:38,810 --> 00:58:42,550
of the bomber fleet to enable 

1515
00:58:42,550 --> 00:58:45,629
air operations . Any operation the 

1516
00:58:45,629 --> 00:58:47,740
department conducts that involves the 

1517
00:58:47,740 --> 00:58:50,790
air leg is enabled by our our tanker 

1518
00:58:50,790 --> 00:58:52,901
fleet . I'm sorry , I said bomber , I 

1519
00:58:52,901 --> 00:58:56,719
meant tanker fleet . And the 

1520
00:58:56,719 --> 00:58:59,739
RC-135 is an aging platform as you know , 

1521
00:59:00,110 --> 00:59:03,750
and the KC-46 is is 

1522
00:59:03,750 --> 00:59:06,070
ramping up in terms of delivery and 

1523
00:59:06,070 --> 00:59:08,989
production and the department has 

1524
00:59:08,989 --> 00:59:12,709
analyzed and indicated that we need to 

1525
00:59:12,709 --> 00:59:15,929
sustain the tanker fleet that we have 

1526
00:59:16,290 --> 00:59:18,729
and expand that tanker fleet 

1527
00:59:19,469 --> 00:59:22,870
to more platforms . The minimum 

1528
00:59:22,870 --> 00:59:26,629
number is about 502 

1529
00:59:26,629 --> 00:59:29,189
tankers total . How many of those are 

1530
00:59:29,189 --> 00:59:31,590
dual capable , or are you assuming they 

1531
00:59:31,590 --> 00:59:34,429
all will be ? Ideally they're all dual 

1532
00:59:34,429 --> 00:59:37,120
capable , but as you know , the RC-135 

1533
00:59:37,120 --> 00:59:39,176
is currently nuclear certified . The 

1534
00:59:39,176 --> 00:59:42,310
KC-46 is not yet nuclear certified , 

1535
00:59:42,389 --> 00:59:46,379
but we can . We , we are on a 

1536
00:59:46,379 --> 00:59:48,959
path to be able to use 

1537
00:59:49,929 --> 00:59:53,169
the new tankers to 

1538
00:59:53,169 --> 00:59:55,899
refuel nuclear capable bombers for 

1539
00:59:55,899 --> 00:59:59,020
conventional missions , and that's 

1540
00:59:59,020 --> 01:00:01,076
where we need to get to . And then . 

1541
01:00:01,260 --> 01:00:03,204
You know , fully certified for the 

1542
01:00:03,204 --> 01:00:04,927
nuclear mission and that's the 

1543
01:00:04,927 --> 01:00:07,149
survivability and endurability piece in 

1544
01:00:07,149 --> 01:00:09,540
a trans attack environment . But in the 

1545
01:00:09,540 --> 01:00:11,790
interim , we accept the risk and we use 

1546
01:00:11,790 --> 01:00:14,500
the capability we have to refuel all 

1547
01:00:14,500 --> 01:00:17,969
aircraft . Because as we look down the 

1548
01:00:17,969 --> 01:00:20,080
road , those numbers are increasing , 

1549
01:00:20,080 --> 01:00:22,300
those flying platforms , obviously the 

1550
01:00:22,300 --> 01:00:26,290
nuclear capable . I say would take 

1551
01:00:26,290 --> 01:00:28,512
precedent , but we don't know depending 

1552
01:00:28,512 --> 01:00:30,401
on the mission and how it's being 

1553
01:00:30,401 --> 01:00:32,729
delivered at the rate in Boeing has had 

1554
01:00:32,729 --> 01:00:34,896
issues and I think we're past the back 

1555
01:00:34,896 --> 01:00:36,810
end of that . Are we getting the 

1556
01:00:36,810 --> 01:00:39,149
delivery rate or do we have to look at 

1557
01:00:39,399 --> 01:00:43,250
increasing that through Boeing ? I 

1558
01:00:43,250 --> 01:00:45,530
would advocate for continuing to look 

1559
01:00:45,530 --> 01:00:47,879
at options to accelerate delivery of 

1560
01:00:47,879 --> 01:00:51,479
the tanker fleet . I yield back . 

1561
01:00:52,879 --> 01:00:55,070
Gentleman yields back . The chair now 

1562
01:00:55,070 --> 01:00:56,737
recognizes the gentleman from 

1563
01:00:56,737 --> 01:00:58,681
California , Mr . Carvajal , for 5 

1564
01:00:58,681 --> 01:01:00,792
minutes . Thank you , Mr . Chairman , 

1565
01:01:00,792 --> 01:01:02,959
and thank you to all the witnesses for 

1566
01:01:02,959 --> 01:01:05,014
being here today . General Whiting , 

1567
01:01:05,330 --> 01:01:07,929
space debris continues to be a concern 

1568
01:01:07,929 --> 01:01:10,290
in orbit . There are thousands of 

1569
01:01:10,290 --> 01:01:12,068
objects in orbit that we cannot 

1570
01:01:12,068 --> 01:01:14,123
maneuver . And at the same time , we 

1571
01:01:14,123 --> 01:01:16,457
have more satellites in orbit than ever . 

1572
01:01:17,139 --> 01:01:19,459
Requiring increased maneuvers to avoid 

1573
01:01:19,459 --> 01:01:22,469
collision . This is a compounding issue , 

1574
01:01:22,889 --> 01:01:25,056
and the longer we wait to address it , 

1575
01:01:25,056 --> 01:01:27,360
the harder it will be to do so . Do you 

1576
01:01:27,360 --> 01:01:29,399
view space debris as a threat to US 

1577
01:01:29,399 --> 01:01:31,919
systems in orbit , and what are you 

1578
01:01:31,919 --> 01:01:34,600
doing to address this concern ? Thank 

1579
01:01:34,600 --> 01:01:36,767
you , Congressman , for the question . 

1580
01:01:36,767 --> 01:01:38,933
Just to put a number on the scale that 

1581
01:01:38,933 --> 01:01:41,156
the debris and number of satellites has 

1582
01:01:41,156 --> 01:01:43,211
increased since US Space Command was 

1583
01:01:43,211 --> 01:01:45,156
stood back up 6.5 years ago , that 

1584
01:01:45,156 --> 01:01:47,378
number has gone up about 90% . So we've 

1585
01:01:47,378 --> 01:01:49,600
almost doubled the number of objects on 

1586
01:01:49,600 --> 01:01:51,767
orbit in the last 6.5 years . So we do 

1587
01:01:51,767 --> 01:01:53,489
see it as a concern , but it's 

1588
01:01:53,489 --> 01:01:55,656
something we have to work every day so 

1589
01:01:55,656 --> 01:01:55,080
that we can continue to derive the 

1590
01:01:55,080 --> 01:01:57,929
benefits of space . So right now , the 

1591
01:01:57,929 --> 01:02:00,096
Department of Defense through US Space 

1592
01:02:00,096 --> 01:02:02,151
Command and our Space Force tactical 

1593
01:02:02,151 --> 01:02:04,489
squadrons provides warning to every we 

1594
01:02:04,489 --> 01:02:06,600
track all the objects on orbit and we 

1595
01:02:06,600 --> 01:02:08,850
provide warnings to any satellite owner 

1596
01:02:08,850 --> 01:02:11,129
operator anywhere around the world so 

1597
01:02:11,129 --> 01:02:12,969
they can know if their satellite 

1598
01:02:12,969 --> 01:02:14,913
potentially is going to run into a 

1599
01:02:14,913 --> 01:02:16,802
piece of debris . And uh and take 

1600
01:02:16,802 --> 01:02:18,969
action , um , so it's something we are 

1601
01:02:18,969 --> 01:02:21,025
concerned about and , and we applaud 

1602
01:02:21,025 --> 01:02:23,080
commercial efforts that we've seen . 

1603
01:02:23,080 --> 01:02:25,247
There's been some recent announcements 

1604
01:02:25,247 --> 01:02:24,320
in the last few months about how 

1605
01:02:24,320 --> 01:02:26,959
commercial industry is rallying to to 

1606
01:02:26,959 --> 01:02:29,070
help each other understand where this 

1607
01:02:29,070 --> 01:02:31,237
debris is as well . So we think , uh , 

1608
01:02:31,237 --> 01:02:33,237
government has a role in this , but 

1609
01:02:33,237 --> 01:02:35,403
also commercial industry . Thank you , 

1610
01:02:35,403 --> 01:02:37,570
General Whiting . Let's for one second 

1611
01:02:37,570 --> 01:02:39,515
put aside the technical and fiscal 

1612
01:02:39,515 --> 01:02:41,515
concerns that have been raised with 

1613
01:02:41,515 --> 01:02:43,292
regard to the development . And 

1614
01:02:43,292 --> 01:02:45,515
deployment of a space-based interceptor 

1615
01:02:45,515 --> 01:02:48,479
system . As the combatant commander 

1616
01:02:48,479 --> 01:02:50,679
responsible for operations in and in 

1617
01:02:50,679 --> 01:02:53,219
defense of the domain , in your best 

1618
01:02:53,219 --> 01:02:55,800
military judgment , the deployment of a 

1619
01:02:55,800 --> 01:02:58,239
space-based interceptor constellation 

1620
01:02:58,879 --> 01:03:01,360
introduce risk to the domain as a new 

1621
01:03:01,360 --> 01:03:03,760
target for both Russia and the PRC ? 

1622
01:03:05,580 --> 01:03:07,580
Congressman , I think we've already 

1623
01:03:07,580 --> 01:03:09,510
seen that Russia and China have 

1624
01:03:09,510 --> 01:03:11,510
demonstrated that they are building 

1625
01:03:11,510 --> 01:03:13,288
capabilities to hold all of our 

1626
01:03:13,288 --> 01:03:15,399
satellites at risk . So it's hard for 

1627
01:03:15,399 --> 01:03:17,343
me to say that the introduction of 

1628
01:03:17,343 --> 01:03:19,510
another satellite or a different class 

1629
01:03:19,510 --> 01:03:21,566
of satellites is going to change the 

1630
01:03:21,566 --> 01:03:23,510
amount of capability that they are 

1631
01:03:23,510 --> 01:03:23,510
developing . Uh , if we look at China , 

1632
01:03:23,629 --> 01:03:25,740
they have developed , uh , everything 

1633
01:03:25,740 --> 01:03:28,149
from cyber capabilities to reversible 

1634
01:03:28,149 --> 01:03:30,429
jammers to direct ascent ASAT weapons 

1635
01:03:30,429 --> 01:03:32,485
that can hold all orbital regimes at 

1636
01:03:32,485 --> 01:03:34,389
risk to high energy lasers to 

1637
01:03:34,389 --> 01:03:37,790
co-orbital ASA satellites . So the 

1638
01:03:37,790 --> 01:03:40,012
breadth of threats are now there , Mr . 

1639
01:03:40,012 --> 01:03:42,510
Congressman . Thank you , Tara Whiting . 

1640
01:03:42,550 --> 01:03:44,739
You recently underscored the need for 

1641
01:03:44,739 --> 01:03:46,949
space-based logistics and sustainment 

1642
01:03:46,949 --> 01:03:48,949
at the Space mobility conference in 

1643
01:03:48,949 --> 01:03:51,179
January . However , investments and 

1644
01:03:51,179 --> 01:03:53,290
acquisitions that focus , focus on 

1645
01:03:53,290 --> 01:03:56,100
space mobility and logistics beyond 

1646
01:03:56,100 --> 01:03:58,219
rapid launch don't seem to have 

1647
01:03:58,219 --> 01:04:01,050
materialized yet . Despite increasing 

1648
01:04:01,050 --> 01:04:03,106
commercial capabilities and relevant 

1649
01:04:03,106 --> 01:04:05,770
government demonstrators going back 

1650
01:04:05,770 --> 01:04:08,580
many years . Can you explain why 

1651
01:04:08,580 --> 01:04:10,691
logistical capabilities are important 

1652
01:04:10,691 --> 01:04:12,636
to sustain effective operations in 

1653
01:04:12,636 --> 01:04:14,580
space , and is the capability that 

1654
01:04:14,580 --> 01:04:17,260
SpaceCom needs in order to improve our 

1655
01:04:17,260 --> 01:04:20,219
readiness in space ? Thank you , 

1656
01:04:20,260 --> 01:04:22,379
Congressman , for the question . I do 

1657
01:04:22,379 --> 01:04:24,157
think logistics and sustainment 

1658
01:04:24,157 --> 01:04:26,323
capabilities on orbit are critical and 

1659
01:04:26,323 --> 01:04:28,323
not because I just want to see that 

1660
01:04:28,323 --> 01:04:30,157
result . It's because it enables 

1661
01:04:30,157 --> 01:04:32,323
maneuver warfare on orbit and maneuver 

1662
01:04:32,323 --> 01:04:34,435
warfare has been an advantage for the 

1663
01:04:34,435 --> 01:04:36,546
United States in all domains at sea , 

1664
01:04:36,546 --> 01:04:38,601
in the air , and on the ground . And 

1665
01:04:38,601 --> 01:04:40,657
it's even a principle of warfare and 

1666
01:04:40,657 --> 01:04:40,620
it's a joint function , and we need to 

1667
01:04:40,620 --> 01:04:42,975
bring . This idea that we can maneuver 

1668
01:04:42,975 --> 01:04:45,086
for advantage to space and to do that 

1669
01:04:45,086 --> 01:04:47,253
there's several ways that are going to 

1670
01:04:47,253 --> 01:04:49,475
have to or several means that will have 

1671
01:04:49,475 --> 01:04:51,475
to be required , but , but on orbit 

1672
01:04:51,475 --> 01:04:51,415
logistics , refueling and sustainment 

1673
01:04:51,415 --> 01:04:53,582
is one of those so that we're not just 

1674
01:04:53,582 --> 01:04:55,693
sitting ducks and we can maneuver for 

1675
01:04:55,693 --> 01:04:57,582
advantage away from threats or to 

1676
01:04:57,582 --> 01:04:59,693
maneuver , uh , you know , where best 

1677
01:04:59,693 --> 01:05:01,859
to execute our operations from . Thank 

1678
01:05:01,859 --> 01:05:04,082
you , Admiral Correll . We all know the 

1679
01:05:04,082 --> 01:05:06,114
issues Sentinel continues to face . 

1680
01:05:06,574 --> 01:05:08,796
This program was supposed to be fielded 

1681
01:05:08,796 --> 01:05:11,120
by the end of this decade . But we know 

1682
01:05:11,120 --> 01:05:13,179
it won't be . At the same time , 

1683
01:05:13,260 --> 01:05:15,939
Minimum 3 continues to age . The test 

1684
01:05:15,939 --> 01:05:18,939
bodies are not infinite . How balancing 

1685
01:05:18,939 --> 01:05:20,939
the need to continue tests with the 

1686
01:05:20,939 --> 01:05:23,340
limited supply until the ground leg is 

1687
01:05:23,340 --> 01:05:27,229
modernized . Thanks for the question , 

1688
01:05:27,469 --> 01:05:30,270
Congressman . Um , I'm balancing the 

1689
01:05:30,270 --> 01:05:32,939
risk of sustainment versus bringing on 

1690
01:05:32,939 --> 01:05:34,939
the new capability and working very 

1691
01:05:34,939 --> 01:05:38,030
closely with uh direct report portfolio 

1692
01:05:38,030 --> 01:05:40,141
manager , General White in terms of , 

1693
01:05:40,469 --> 01:05:42,691
uh , sentinel coming online . We have a 

1694
01:05:42,691 --> 01:05:46,620
weekly conversation on um where the , 

1695
01:05:46,790 --> 01:05:48,957
you know , where the opportunities are 

1696
01:05:48,957 --> 01:05:50,679
to accelerate delivery of that 

1697
01:05:50,679 --> 01:05:52,840
capability . In those conversations , 

1698
01:05:52,850 --> 01:05:55,290
we also talk about sustainment of 

1699
01:05:55,290 --> 01:05:57,649
Minuteman 3 . As the combatant 

1700
01:05:57,649 --> 01:06:00,629
commander , you know , responsible for 

1701
01:06:01,449 --> 01:06:03,250
the ability to employ those 

1702
01:06:03,250 --> 01:06:06,530
capabilities . I see my job as to 

1703
01:06:06,530 --> 01:06:08,649
communicate precisely within the 

1704
01:06:08,649 --> 01:06:10,649
department where risks manifest 

1705
01:06:10,649 --> 01:06:12,593
themselves and what we're doing to 

1706
01:06:12,593 --> 01:06:14,371
mitigate those risks . I remain 

1707
01:06:14,371 --> 01:06:16,482
confident . In our ability to sustain 

1708
01:06:16,482 --> 01:06:18,899
the minimum 3 as we transition to 

1709
01:06:18,899 --> 01:06:21,070
Sentinel , and I'm encouraged by the 

1710
01:06:21,070 --> 01:06:23,237
progress that Joel White has made as a 

1711
01:06:23,237 --> 01:06:26,729
direct report portfolio manager with 

1712
01:06:26,729 --> 01:06:29,007
Sentinel . Thank you . I'm out of time . 

1713
01:06:29,007 --> 01:06:30,951
I yield back , Mr . Chairman . The 

1714
01:06:30,951 --> 01:06:33,062
gentleman yields back . The chair now 

1715
01:06:33,062 --> 01:06:35,340
recognizes the gentleman from Missouri , 

1716
01:06:35,340 --> 01:06:38,969
Mr . Bell , for 5 minutes . Thank you , 

1717
01:06:39,020 --> 01:06:41,187
Mr . Chairman and the ranking member . 

1718
01:06:41,187 --> 01:06:43,353
Hello to the witnesses . Thank you for 

1719
01:06:43,353 --> 01:06:46,290
being here . Um , Admiral Correll , the 

1720
01:06:46,290 --> 01:06:48,346
Saint Louis region is home to one of 

1721
01:06:48,346 --> 01:06:50,229
the fastest growing geospatial 

1722
01:06:51,449 --> 01:06:53,616
technology ecosystems in the country , 

1723
01:06:53,739 --> 01:06:56,350
anchored with the new NGA West campus . 

1724
01:06:57,070 --> 01:06:59,659
Given how central geospatial 

1725
01:06:59,659 --> 01:07:03,070
intelligence is to nuclear command and 

1726
01:07:03,070 --> 01:07:05,403
control , targeting and missile warning , 

1727
01:07:05,469 --> 01:07:07,229
how is StratCom integrating 

1728
01:07:07,229 --> 01:07:09,810
next-generation geospatial analytics 

1729
01:07:10,070 --> 01:07:12,870
and AI enabled data from places like 

1730
01:07:12,870 --> 01:07:16,149
NGA West into strategic deterrence 

1731
01:07:16,149 --> 01:07:20,120
operations ? Congressman , we have 

1732
01:07:20,120 --> 01:07:23,840
a , a phased approach , um , and we've 

1733
01:07:23,840 --> 01:07:27,169
built an analytic engine to account for 

1734
01:07:27,169 --> 01:07:29,280
the threat environment for those five 

1735
01:07:29,280 --> 01:07:31,225
threat vectors that I talked about 

1736
01:07:31,225 --> 01:07:33,679
before , accurately representing those 

1737
01:07:33,679 --> 01:07:36,280
threat vectors and testing . The new 

1738
01:07:36,280 --> 01:07:38,639
capabilities to come online , the 

1739
01:07:38,639 --> 01:07:40,840
capabilities you're referring to are 

1740
01:07:40,840 --> 01:07:43,959
part of the universe of 

1741
01:07:43,959 --> 01:07:46,760
capabilities that we're considering for 

1742
01:07:46,760 --> 01:07:49,520
next generation nuclear command and 

1743
01:07:49,520 --> 01:07:51,320
control , and I acknowledge the 

1744
01:07:51,320 --> 01:07:54,570
importance of those capabilities . And 

1745
01:07:54,570 --> 01:07:56,737
and workforce development is something 

1746
01:07:56,737 --> 01:07:58,860
I've prioritized during my time in 

1747
01:07:58,860 --> 01:08:01,600
Congress . From Stratcom's perspective , 

1748
01:08:01,719 --> 01:08:04,100
how important is a skilled workforce 

1749
01:08:04,280 --> 01:08:06,320
and resilient industrial base to 

1750
01:08:06,320 --> 01:08:08,800
sustaining long-term strategic 

1751
01:08:08,800 --> 01:08:12,070
deterrence . Congressman , it is 

1752
01:08:12,070 --> 01:08:14,949
exceptionally important , um , it , uh , 

1753
01:08:15,030 --> 01:08:17,580
it's essential . Thank you , General 

1754
01:08:17,580 --> 01:08:21,240
Guillo . You've been busy today . Um , 

1755
01:08:21,259 --> 01:08:23,779
our missile and homeland defenses 

1756
01:08:23,779 --> 01:08:25,879
ultimately depend on a resilient 

1757
01:08:26,259 --> 01:08:29,299
defense industrial base . Whether it is 

1758
01:08:29,299 --> 01:08:31,720
interceptors , sensors , or aircraft , 

1759
01:08:32,220 --> 01:08:34,387
we cannot afford gaps in production or 

1760
01:08:34,387 --> 01:08:36,600
capability or capacity , excuse me , 

1761
01:08:36,939 --> 01:08:38,828
when we have numerous adversaries 

1762
01:08:38,828 --> 01:08:41,339
watching our every move . Communities 

1763
01:08:41,339 --> 01:08:43,117
like mine in Saint Louis play a 

1764
01:08:43,117 --> 01:08:45,006
critical role in that ecosystem . 

1765
01:08:45,069 --> 01:08:46,569
Through advanced aerospace 

1766
01:08:46,569 --> 01:08:48,990
manufacturing and a strong supplier 

1767
01:08:48,990 --> 01:08:51,810
base . From your perspective , how 

1768
01:08:51,810 --> 01:08:53,699
important is maintaining a strong 

1769
01:08:53,699 --> 01:08:56,270
domestic aerospace industrial base to 

1770
01:08:56,270 --> 01:08:58,492
sustaining our strategic deterrence and 

1771
01:08:58,492 --> 01:09:01,729
homeland defense posture ? Congressman , 

1772
01:09:02,359 --> 01:09:05,490
it's extremely important , and we also 

1773
01:09:05,490 --> 01:09:07,689
benefit from many of the NGA 

1774
01:09:07,689 --> 01:09:09,911
capabilities that Admiral Correll spoke 

1775
01:09:09,911 --> 01:09:12,069
about and then into the aircraft 

1776
01:09:13,410 --> 01:09:16,930
manufacture and development . Keeping a 

1777
01:09:16,930 --> 01:09:19,959
fleet of aircraft that can operate in 

1778
01:09:19,959 --> 01:09:22,830
the high Arctic all the way down to the 

1779
01:09:22,830 --> 01:09:25,089
southeast part of the United States is 

1780
01:09:25,089 --> 01:09:27,410
imperative . We have some old but very 

1781
01:09:27,410 --> 01:09:30,990
capable aircraft , but They're going 

1782
01:09:30,990 --> 01:09:33,157
through the process with the Air Force 

1783
01:09:33,157 --> 01:09:35,819
of being replaced , and I know that 

1784
01:09:36,049 --> 01:09:38,160
some of the manufacturers that you're 

1785
01:09:38,160 --> 01:09:40,216
talking about are critical to that , 

1786
01:09:40,410 --> 01:09:43,609
giving us a longer range , more ability 

1787
01:09:43,609 --> 01:09:46,770
to ability to carry more weapons at the 

1788
01:09:46,770 --> 01:09:49,529
same time , and having fused avionics 

1789
01:09:49,529 --> 01:09:52,689
that bring in inputs from all different 

1790
01:09:52,689 --> 01:09:54,911
types of sensors into the cockpit , all 

1791
01:09:54,911 --> 01:09:57,078
of which benefit NORAD and NCO . Thank 

1792
01:09:57,490 --> 01:10:00,580
you , General Whiting . China is 

1793
01:10:00,580 --> 01:10:03,020
reportedly developing satellites 

1794
01:10:03,020 --> 01:10:05,020
capable of inspecting , moving , or 

1795
01:10:05,020 --> 01:10:07,299
potentially disabling other spacecraft , 

1796
01:10:07,779 --> 01:10:09,979
potentially ours . How concerned is 

1797
01:10:09,979 --> 01:10:12,146
Space Command about these capabilities 

1798
01:10:12,146 --> 01:10:14,368
being used to physically interfere with 

1799
01:10:14,368 --> 01:10:16,759
US military satellites during a crisis ? 

1800
01:10:17,669 --> 01:10:19,447
Thank you , Congressman for the 

1801
01:10:19,447 --> 01:10:21,669
question . It's a capability we have to 

1802
01:10:21,669 --> 01:10:21,549
pay great attention to because we've 

1803
01:10:21,549 --> 01:10:23,709
we've seen China demonstrate that 

1804
01:10:23,709 --> 01:10:25,765
capability on orbit by maneuvering a 

1805
01:10:25,765 --> 01:10:28,430
satellite to one of their uh defunct 

1806
01:10:28,430 --> 01:10:30,640
satellites , moving that satellite up 

1807
01:10:30,640 --> 01:10:32,862
to a higher orbit and then and then the 

1808
01:10:32,862 --> 01:10:34,862
first satellite returning and while 

1809
01:10:34,862 --> 01:10:37,229
that might have a commercial or a civil 

1810
01:10:37,229 --> 01:10:39,229
use it also demonstrates a military 

1811
01:10:39,229 --> 01:10:41,451
capability . So we have to consider all 

1812
01:10:41,451 --> 01:10:44,500
of those from a dual use perspective as 

1813
01:10:44,500 --> 01:10:46,759
potential threats and make sure that 

1814
01:10:46,770 --> 01:10:49,140
that we have mitigation strategies 

1815
01:10:49,140 --> 01:10:51,251
appropriately . And then quickly , do 

1816
01:10:51,251 --> 01:10:53,140
we have the ability to detect and 

1817
01:10:53,140 --> 01:10:55,307
attribute these types of operations in 

1818
01:10:55,307 --> 01:10:59,040
real time ? Congressman , we have 

1819
01:10:59,040 --> 01:11:01,259
an outstanding , or let me say it this 

1820
01:11:01,259 --> 01:11:03,315
way , we have the world's best space 

1821
01:11:03,315 --> 01:11:05,315
domain awareness capability , but I 

1822
01:11:05,315 --> 01:11:05,049
would like it to be even better so that 

1823
01:11:05,049 --> 01:11:07,250
I can constant maintain constant 

1824
01:11:07,250 --> 01:11:09,209
custody of these kind of potential 

1825
01:11:09,209 --> 01:11:11,209
threats . So you asked if we can do 

1826
01:11:11,209 --> 01:11:13,320
that in near real time . Um , uh , we 

1827
01:11:13,320 --> 01:11:15,431
work every day to try to mitigate the 

1828
01:11:15,431 --> 01:11:17,376
amount of time it would take us to 

1829
01:11:17,376 --> 01:11:19,598
detect that , but I cannot say today we 

1830
01:11:19,598 --> 01:11:21,765
can do that in real time . Thank you , 

1831
01:11:21,765 --> 01:11:23,765
and I yield back . Gentleman yields 

1832
01:11:23,765 --> 01:11:26,029
back . And last but not least , my 

1833
01:11:26,029 --> 01:11:28,196
Democratic colleagues have a very deep 

1834
01:11:28,196 --> 01:11:30,910
bench today and I appreciate your 

1835
01:11:30,910 --> 01:11:33,243
interest in this very important hearing . 

1836
01:11:33,243 --> 01:11:34,966
I recognize the gentleman from 

1837
01:11:34,966 --> 01:11:37,021
California , Mr . Whitesides , for 5 

1838
01:11:37,021 --> 01:11:39,077
minutes . Today and every day , Mr . 

1839
01:11:39,077 --> 01:11:41,870
Chairman , um , thank you . Uh , good 

1840
01:11:41,870 --> 01:11:45,290
to see you all . I tell my kids that 

1841
01:11:45,290 --> 01:11:47,457
this is the subcommittee where we have 

1842
01:11:47,457 --> 01:11:49,512
the adults in the room , and I think 

1843
01:11:49,512 --> 01:11:51,734
that that's very important , you know , 

1844
01:11:51,734 --> 01:11:53,901
when we're dealing with a subject that 

1845
01:11:53,901 --> 01:11:55,790
has the capacity to Cause extreme 

1846
01:11:55,790 --> 01:11:57,790
damage to human civilization . It's 

1847
01:11:57,790 --> 01:11:59,790
very important to know that we have 

1848
01:11:59,790 --> 01:12:01,568
serious people in charge of the 

1849
01:12:01,568 --> 01:12:03,568
relevant organizations , and I know 

1850
01:12:03,568 --> 01:12:05,623
that you are serious people . I have 

1851
01:12:05,623 --> 01:12:07,819
one comment and 3 questions . My 

1852
01:12:07,819 --> 01:12:09,652
comment is directed primarily at 

1853
01:12:09,652 --> 01:12:12,100
General Whiting , which is simply that 

1854
01:12:12,720 --> 01:12:14,720
I believe that the United States is 

1855
01:12:14,720 --> 01:12:16,942
acting as the most responsible actor in 

1856
01:12:16,942 --> 01:12:19,569
space . And I think it's crucial that 

1857
01:12:19,569 --> 01:12:22,120
we continue to be so . I know that you 

1858
01:12:22,120 --> 01:12:24,569
share that commitment . That extends 

1859
01:12:24,569 --> 01:12:28,490
from public to classified worlds as 

1860
01:12:28,490 --> 01:12:30,890
we head into , frankly , a singularity 

1861
01:12:30,890 --> 01:12:33,410
moment in space activity , it is 

1862
01:12:33,410 --> 01:12:35,850
crucial , I think , that we continue to 

1863
01:12:35,850 --> 01:12:38,017
set a good example for the rest of the 

1864
01:12:38,017 --> 01:12:40,072
world on how space can be maintained 

1865
01:12:40,072 --> 01:12:43,580
sustainably . Whether militarily or in 

1866
01:12:43,580 --> 01:12:45,747
commercial areas , and so I would just 

1867
01:12:45,747 --> 01:12:48,080
urge you to carry on that ethos that is , 

1868
01:12:48,080 --> 01:12:50,413
I think , embodied in the new and young , 

1869
01:12:50,950 --> 01:12:53,117
you know , organizations that you that 

1870
01:12:53,117 --> 01:12:56,430
you lead . B 21 , 

1871
01:12:57,009 --> 01:12:59,176
Admiral Correll , it was great to meet 

1872
01:12:59,176 --> 01:13:01,342
with you and discuss your approach and 

1873
01:13:01,342 --> 01:13:03,120
priorities , uh , including the 

1874
01:13:03,120 --> 01:13:04,953
importance of the airbase leg of 

1875
01:13:04,953 --> 01:13:06,676
deterrence . As you know , I'm 

1876
01:13:06,676 --> 01:13:08,842
extremely proud to represent the folks 

1877
01:13:08,842 --> 01:13:10,898
at Palmdale and the people who build 

1878
01:13:10,898 --> 01:13:13,120
the B-21 . Can you briefly describe the 

1879
01:13:13,120 --> 01:13:15,009
ways in which the ability to more 

1880
01:13:15,009 --> 01:13:17,176
quickly produce the necessary aircraft 

1881
01:13:17,176 --> 01:13:19,342
in the fleet could act as an effective 

1882
01:13:19,342 --> 01:13:21,065
deterrent to our adversaries ? 

1883
01:13:21,819 --> 01:13:24,620
Congressman , uh , because the B-21 

1884
01:13:24,620 --> 01:13:26,500
represents that sixth generation 

1885
01:13:26,500 --> 01:13:28,879
stealth capability and what I talked 

1886
01:13:28,879 --> 01:13:31,799
about earlier , it's enabling , uh , 

1887
01:13:31,810 --> 01:13:34,540
function for the joint force . The 

1888
01:13:34,540 --> 01:13:37,859
sooner we field that capability and the 

1889
01:13:37,859 --> 01:13:40,660
sooner we ramp up in delivery of that 

1890
01:13:40,660 --> 01:13:43,540
capability , the stronger position that 

1891
01:13:43,540 --> 01:13:46,859
puts the joint force in . To , uh , to 

1892
01:13:46,859 --> 01:13:48,740
address , uh , the strategic 

1893
01:13:48,740 --> 01:13:51,620
environment from deterrence to any 

1894
01:13:51,620 --> 01:13:53,842
spectrum of , uh , conflict that , uh , 

1895
01:13:53,842 --> 01:13:56,064
that we would contemplate . Thank you , 

1896
01:13:56,064 --> 01:13:58,342
and I support Congressman Bacon's , um , 

1897
01:13:58,342 --> 01:14:01,939
support of the 145 number . Um , Mr . 

1898
01:14:02,020 --> 01:14:04,187
Berkowitz , you've written extensively 

1899
01:14:04,187 --> 01:14:05,964
on our asymmetric vulnerability 

1900
01:14:05,964 --> 01:14:07,853
regarding GPS and PNT . China and 

1901
01:14:07,853 --> 01:14:09,464
Russia have developed robust 

1902
01:14:09,464 --> 01:14:11,687
terrestrial backups for their satellite 

1903
01:14:11,687 --> 01:14:14,879
navigation . Uh , does our current 

1904
01:14:14,879 --> 01:14:16,720
policy prioritize a domestic 

1905
01:14:16,720 --> 01:14:18,720
terrestrial backup , and how are we 

1906
01:14:18,720 --> 01:14:20,887
incentivizing the commercial sector to 

1907
01:14:20,887 --> 01:14:22,387
harden their PNT dependent 

1908
01:14:22,387 --> 01:14:24,609
infrastructure against the navigational 

1909
01:14:24,609 --> 01:14:27,229
warfare you've warned about ? Uh , 

1910
01:14:27,310 --> 01:14:29,532
thank you very much for that question . 

1911
01:14:29,532 --> 01:14:31,589
Um , I , I absolutely share your 

1912
01:14:31,589 --> 01:14:33,700
concern about , uh , the need to make 

1913
01:14:33,700 --> 01:14:36,069
sure that we have a very robust set of 

1914
01:14:36,069 --> 01:14:38,109
capabilities to provide , uh , both 

1915
01:14:38,109 --> 01:14:39,910
space-based and terrestrial PNT 

1916
01:14:39,910 --> 01:14:42,629
services to all of our , our critical 

1917
01:14:42,629 --> 01:14:44,830
infrastructures , uh , and especially 

1918
01:14:44,830 --> 01:14:48,740
for , for national defense . Um , as I 

1919
01:14:48,740 --> 01:14:51,419
mentioned , uh , previously , the , uh , 

1920
01:14:51,430 --> 01:14:53,486
we're in the process of implementing 

1921
01:14:53,486 --> 01:14:55,652
the president's executive order and On 

1922
01:14:55,652 --> 01:14:58,200
ensuring US base superiority . One of 

1923
01:14:58,200 --> 01:15:00,367
the issues we're gonna be taking up is 

1924
01:15:00,367 --> 01:15:03,740
looking at our , uh our PNT policy . Um , 

1925
01:15:03,799 --> 01:15:06,200
as part of the overall process of 

1926
01:15:06,200 --> 01:15:09,479
reviewing , um , as , as a new 

1927
01:15:09,479 --> 01:15:11,590
administration , reviewing all of our 

1928
01:15:11,590 --> 01:15:13,701
policies , we're going to be focusing 

1929
01:15:13,701 --> 01:15:15,812
in particular on the question of , of 

1930
01:15:15,812 --> 01:15:17,701
the future of our space-based PNT 

1931
01:15:17,701 --> 01:15:19,923
capability and ensuring that that is uh 

1932
01:15:19,923 --> 01:15:22,035
not only robust but resilient , sir . 

1933
01:15:22,035 --> 01:15:24,257
Thank you , and I absolutely , I should 

1934
01:15:24,257 --> 01:15:26,146
have mentioned space-based backup 

1935
01:15:26,146 --> 01:15:25,990
capability as well . Doctor Cadli , 

1936
01:15:26,470 --> 01:15:28,303
briefly , um , you've identified 

1937
01:15:28,303 --> 01:15:30,470
deterring adversary biological weapons 

1938
01:15:30,470 --> 01:15:32,526
use as a top tier priority alongside 

1939
01:15:32,526 --> 01:15:34,692
nuclear deterrence . In the context of 

1940
01:15:34,692 --> 01:15:36,414
this hearing , are we properly 

1941
01:15:36,414 --> 01:15:38,414
integrating bio resilience into our 

1942
01:15:38,414 --> 01:15:40,637
integrated deterrence framework , or is 

1943
01:15:40,637 --> 01:15:42,803
this still being treated as a separate 

1944
01:15:42,803 --> 01:15:44,748
health crisis issue ? How does our 

1945
01:15:44,748 --> 01:15:46,748
budget and our policies reflect the 

1946
01:15:46,748 --> 01:15:48,914
reality that a biological strike could 

1947
01:15:48,914 --> 01:15:51,081
be a strategic prelude to a kinetic or 

1948
01:15:51,081 --> 01:15:53,248
nuclear conflict ? Sir , thank you for 

1949
01:15:53,248 --> 01:15:55,303
the question . I think the key thing 

1950
01:15:55,303 --> 01:15:57,470
here is that we're in the process here 

1951
01:15:57,470 --> 01:15:59,850
right now in response to a joint urgent 

1952
01:15:59,850 --> 01:16:02,729
operational need by INECOM commander to 

1953
01:16:02,729 --> 01:16:04,609
actually deploy a bio deterrence 

1954
01:16:04,609 --> 01:16:06,950
approach into the Indopeycom theater , 

1955
01:16:07,450 --> 01:16:09,561
and it's not focused on public health 

1956
01:16:09,561 --> 01:16:11,728
as it is indications , early warning , 

1957
01:16:12,040 --> 01:16:14,096
characterization , and attribution . 

1958
01:16:14,109 --> 01:16:15,831
And this is really the link of 

1959
01:16:15,831 --> 01:16:18,540
integrating . Bio deterrence with our 

1960
01:16:18,540 --> 01:16:21,589
nuclear capabilities or capabilities to 

1961
01:16:21,589 --> 01:16:24,330
respond in a way that we be decisive in 

1962
01:16:24,330 --> 01:16:27,020
response to some use of this in that 

1963
01:16:27,020 --> 01:16:29,379
theater and then again propagated 

1964
01:16:29,379 --> 01:16:31,939
globally around the world as well as 

1965
01:16:31,939 --> 01:16:34,009
domestically . So we're we're in the 

1966
01:16:34,009 --> 01:16:36,350
midst of that . I would be welcome to 

1967
01:16:36,689 --> 01:16:38,856
come and brief your staff and yourself 

1968
01:16:38,856 --> 01:16:41,330
on that because it gets a little geeky , 

1969
01:16:41,410 --> 01:16:43,490
but I think the point here is the 

1970
01:16:43,490 --> 01:16:44,939
intent is we're trying to 

1971
01:16:44,939 --> 01:16:47,169
operationalize this in real time to 

1972
01:16:47,169 --> 01:16:49,959
meet a commander's need . Thank you . I 

1973
01:16:49,959 --> 01:16:52,129
yield back . And I'd like to thank all 

1974
01:16:52,129 --> 01:16:55,810
our witnesses today for their testimony , 

1975
01:16:56,009 --> 01:16:58,231
very insightful , and I look forward to 

1976
01:16:58,231 --> 01:17:00,176
continuing our discussion . In the 

1977
01:17:00,176 --> 01:17:02,398
closed setting , we'll meet upstairs in 

1978
01:17:02,398 --> 01:17:04,620
approximately 5 minutes after a short 

1979
01:17:04,620 --> 01:17:06,580
comfort break if needed . The open 

1980
01:17:06,580 --> 01:17:08,279
portion of the hearing is now adjourned .