WEBVTT

00:00.009 --> 00:02.009
The committee meets this morning to

00:02.009 --> 00:04.449
receive testimony on the posture of the

00:04.449 --> 00:07.369
United States European Command and the

00:07.369 --> 00:09.810
United States Transportation Command .

00:10.439 --> 00:13.340
I'd like to thank our witnesses today ,

00:13.760 --> 00:16.399
General Grikowicz and General Reed ,

00:16.450 --> 00:18.680
for being here , and I want to extend a

00:18.680 --> 00:21.180
special welcome to their families .

00:21.520 --> 00:23.280
General Grikowicz oversees

00:23.280 --> 00:26.639
approximately 80,000 military

00:26.639 --> 00:29.959
personnel in the US European Command

00:29.959 --> 00:33.400
UCO . He also serves as the Supreme

00:33.400 --> 00:35.939
Allied . Commander Europe , making him

00:35.939 --> 00:37.939
the military commander of the North

00:37.939 --> 00:40.360
Atlantic Treaty alliance NATO , the

00:40.360 --> 00:44.229
world's only nuclear alliance . General

00:44.229 --> 00:46.479
Grikowicz comes before this committee

00:46.479 --> 00:49.970
at a time of great turmoil . The United

00:49.970 --> 00:52.290
States is engaged in a high intensity

00:52.290 --> 00:54.179
conflict in the Middle East while

00:54.179 --> 00:56.959
simultaneously supporting Ukraine's

00:56.959 --> 00:59.549
self-defense against the Russians'

00:59.689 --> 01:03.590
invasion . UCon is involved in both

01:03.590 --> 01:05.312
efforts . The command provides

01:05.312 --> 01:07.312
extensive operational and logistics

01:07.312 --> 01:11.199
support to Operation Epic Fury . At the

01:11.199 --> 01:13.255
same time it facilitates the flow of

01:13.255 --> 01:15.669
weapons and intelligence to Ukraine and

01:15.669 --> 01:17.780
of course our forces in Europe remain

01:17.780 --> 01:20.419
at the ready to deter and defend

01:20.760 --> 01:23.790
against Russian aggression . Our

01:23.790 --> 01:25.989
European allies provide access basing

01:25.989 --> 01:29.069
and overflight rights to our forces .

01:29.349 --> 01:31.071
This creates enormous military

01:31.071 --> 01:33.750
advantages for the United States . Our

01:33.750 --> 01:35.583
presence in Europe enables us to

01:35.583 --> 01:37.889
project power into adjacent theaters ,

01:38.190 --> 01:40.669
most obviously into the Middle East ,

01:40.750 --> 01:44.150
but also to Africa and now the Arctic .

01:45.379 --> 01:47.157
Our European allies are rightly

01:47.157 --> 01:50.489
increasing their defense spending , but

01:50.489 --> 01:52.711
we must recognize that they are sharing

01:52.711 --> 01:55.569
the political and military risk of war

01:55.569 --> 01:58.690
too , and that is every bit as

01:58.690 --> 02:02.410
important to US interest , so this is a

02:02.410 --> 02:05.550
welcome development , defending against

02:05.610 --> 02:08.339
armed aggression from Russia . Remains

02:08.339 --> 02:10.899
the most compelling rationale for the

02:10.899 --> 02:14.100
NATO alliance . Russia is led by

02:14.100 --> 02:17.139
Vladimir Putin , a war criminal and

02:17.139 --> 02:20.080
ruthless murderer and dictator .

02:21.529 --> 02:23.585
He possesses the world's largest and

02:23.585 --> 02:25.696
most diverse nuclear arsenal , and he

02:25.696 --> 02:28.630
always cheats on his arms control

02:28.770 --> 02:32.169
commitments . In Putin's twisted view

02:32.169 --> 02:35.529
of the world , Russia is the victim of

02:35.529 --> 02:39.039
historical injustices . He has proven

02:39.050 --> 02:41.759
willing to take on extreme risks to

02:41.759 --> 02:44.470
redress these perceived historical

02:45.009 --> 02:47.029
injustices against Russia , most

02:47.029 --> 02:49.210
notably by launching a full scale

02:49.210 --> 02:51.850
invasion . Of Ukraine

02:52.210 --> 02:55.940
and entirely a war of choice .

02:56.669 --> 02:58.550
Some have proposed a precipitate

02:58.550 --> 03:02.110
reduction in US forces deployed in

03:02.110 --> 03:04.770
Europe . Such an action , which some

03:05.190 --> 03:07.759
have entitled NATO

03:07.869 --> 03:11.470
3.0 , would have us

03:11.470 --> 03:15.240
on . Um , would have us

03:15.240 --> 03:17.919
take an unnecessary vulnerability on at

03:17.919 --> 03:20.869
a precarious moment . Putin could

03:20.869 --> 03:23.199
easily interpret that action as

03:23.199 --> 03:25.310
weakness rather than resolve . During

03:25.310 --> 03:27.479
the Cold War , we shared the burden of

03:27.479 --> 03:29.240
conventional defense in Europe

03:29.440 --> 03:32.520
precisely because it was in America's

03:32.520 --> 03:35.839
interest to do so . This remains the

03:35.839 --> 03:38.229
case today . Europe has heeded

03:38.240 --> 03:40.296
President Trump's call to step up on

03:40.296 --> 03:42.570
defense spending . We now need to

03:42.570 --> 03:44.979
ensure that political will is turned

03:44.979 --> 03:48.110
into hard combat capability

03:48.690 --> 03:50.490
as soon as possible .

03:55.690 --> 03:58.610
Mr . Putin has a predilection for war

03:58.610 --> 04:02.399
and aggression . That is a fact , and

04:02.399 --> 04:05.580
it led this committee to place a floor

04:05.580 --> 04:09.479
on the US military's force posture in

04:09.479 --> 04:12.759
Europe , particularly the army ground

04:12.759 --> 04:15.940
maneuver forces . Mr .

04:16.140 --> 04:19.290
Putin's aggression has caused us to

04:19.290 --> 04:21.457
make that decision . We took that step

04:21.457 --> 04:23.568
in the National Defense Authorization

04:23.568 --> 04:26.589
Act that became law in December . A

04:26.589 --> 04:29.589
bipartisan achievement . The law

04:29.589 --> 04:31.700
reflects our collective judgment that

04:31.700 --> 04:33.367
now is not the time to accept

04:33.367 --> 04:36.630
unnecessary risks in Europe . The best

04:36.630 --> 04:38.741
way to reduce the need for defense in

04:38.741 --> 04:41.049
Europe is to degrade the threat posed

04:41.149 --> 04:44.390
by Russia's military . Ukraine is doing

04:44.390 --> 04:46.829
exactly that . Its success in defending

04:46.829 --> 04:48.718
against Russia reflects Ukraine's

04:48.718 --> 04:51.470
resolve and ability to innovate during

04:51.470 --> 04:54.190
wartime . We should support these

04:54.190 --> 04:57.589
efforts . We should immediately begin a

04:57.589 --> 05:00.750
crash program to take advantage of new

05:00.750 --> 05:02.779
production lines here in America ,

05:03.149 --> 05:05.470
building new low-cost weapons to help

05:05.470 --> 05:08.470
the Ukrainians defend themselves . This

05:08.470 --> 05:10.869
includes low-cost cruise missiles which

05:10.869 --> 05:12.925
we can build thousands of every year

05:13.179 --> 05:15.529
and includes new , more easily

05:15.790 --> 05:18.779
producible air defense interceptors .

05:19.070 --> 05:21.429
While General Grinkowic is focused on

05:21.429 --> 05:23.609
the European theater , General Reed

05:23.950 --> 05:26.230
supports the global joint force .

05:26.859 --> 05:30.100
Transcom's expertise and precision

05:30.100 --> 05:32.899
allows the joint force to extend its

05:32.899 --> 05:35.121
reach far beyond the safety of friendly

05:35.121 --> 05:37.239
confines whether supporting Operation

05:37.239 --> 05:39.700
Midnight Hammer , Operation Absolute

05:39.700 --> 05:42.540
Resolve , or the hundreds of regular

05:42.540 --> 05:44.318
refueling and sea lift missions

05:44.318 --> 05:47.359
required by other combatant commands .

05:48.589 --> 05:50.429
When most Americans think of the

05:50.429 --> 05:52.790
military , they imagine airplanes ,

05:53.100 --> 05:55.529
warships , and big guns .

05:56.220 --> 05:59.220
Correctly I might add what they do not

05:59.220 --> 06:02.769
see is the system that moves all these

06:02.769 --> 06:06.329
pieces around the globe . A worldwide

06:06.329 --> 06:08.529
network of American logistics assets

06:08.529 --> 06:11.079
keeps our far flung bases ready for

06:11.079 --> 06:12.970
action . We are the world's best

06:12.970 --> 06:16.369
military in part because Transcom runs

06:16.369 --> 06:20.040
this complex system . China and

06:20.040 --> 06:22.380
Russia know this , these adversaries

06:22.750 --> 06:24.959
are not simply modernizing their armed

06:24.959 --> 06:26.681
forces , they're intentionally

06:26.681 --> 06:29.170
targeting our global logistics network

06:29.359 --> 06:33.040
to prevent us from operating around the

06:33.040 --> 06:35.373
world . Congress recognizes this danger .

06:35.373 --> 06:38.359
The fiscal year 2026 National Defense

06:38.359 --> 06:40.470
Authorization Act , again , which was

06:40.470 --> 06:42.192
signed , which was passed on a

06:42.192 --> 06:44.137
bipartisan basis and signed by the

06:44.137 --> 06:46.137
president of the United States last

06:46.137 --> 06:49.100
December . Elevated contested logistics

06:49.100 --> 06:51.959
management to a senior leader

06:51.959 --> 06:54.540
responsibility , we charge the Deputy

06:54.540 --> 06:56.596
Secretary of Defense , Vice Chief of

06:56.596 --> 06:59.239
the Joint Staffs Staff , and the

06:59.239 --> 07:01.920
commander of Transcom to work together

07:02.420 --> 07:05.260
to integrate contested logistics across

07:05.260 --> 07:07.660
the joint force . This statutory

07:07.660 --> 07:10.230
direction makes explicit what the

07:10.230 --> 07:12.179
battlefield has already proven

07:12.470 --> 07:14.869
congested logistics is not owned by any

07:14.869 --> 07:16.989
single command or service , as I've

07:16.989 --> 07:19.156
outlined , these witnesses come before

07:19.156 --> 07:21.211
the committee at an important moment

07:21.670 --> 07:23.614
for American national security . I

07:23.614 --> 07:25.837
thank them for appearing today . I look

07:25.837 --> 07:28.429
forward to our conversation and with

07:28.429 --> 07:30.910
that , I turn to my colleague Ranking

07:30.910 --> 07:33.100
Member Reed . Well thank you very much

07:33.100 --> 07:34.989
Mr . Chairman and welcome General

07:34.989 --> 07:37.156
Grikovich and General Reed . Thank you

07:37.156 --> 07:39.156
for appearing today . Thank you for

07:39.156 --> 07:41.579
your service to the nation and to , to

07:41.579 --> 07:44.720
those who you command our warmest

07:44.720 --> 07:47.299
thanks and appreciation . Both European

07:47.299 --> 07:49.466
Command and Transportation Command are

07:49.466 --> 07:51.299
deeply engaged in supporting the

07:51.299 --> 07:53.670
ongoing conflict with Iran . From

07:53.670 --> 07:56.119
enabling combat operations to moving

07:56.359 --> 07:58.470
personnel , equipment , weapons , and

07:58.470 --> 08:01.600
medical support across continents , UCO

08:01.600 --> 08:03.839
and TransSCO are playing critical roles

08:03.839 --> 08:05.617
in sustaining the United States

08:05.617 --> 08:08.239
military effort . This conflict is a

08:08.239 --> 08:10.359
reminder that modern warfare requires

08:10.359 --> 08:12.700
the full integration of every element

08:12.700 --> 08:15.519
of American military power from

08:15.519 --> 08:17.559
operational forces , logistical

08:17.559 --> 08:20.230
networks , allied base access , and the

08:20.230 --> 08:22.359
strategic mobility that connects them

08:22.359 --> 08:24.440
all . General Grikovich , the

08:24.440 --> 08:26.730
convergence of interest among potential

08:26.730 --> 08:29.769
adversaries like Russia , Iran , China ,

08:29.809 --> 08:32.729
and North Korea is of great concern to

08:32.729 --> 08:35.140
this committee . There is a recent

08:35.140 --> 08:37.239
development that deserves scrutiny .

08:37.650 --> 08:40.450
Media outlets report last week that

08:40.450 --> 08:43.280
Russia has been providing Iran with the

08:43.280 --> 08:45.450
locations of US military personnel and

08:45.450 --> 08:48.159
assets for targeting in the Middle East .

08:48.530 --> 08:50.489
I'm deeply concerned about this

08:50.489 --> 08:52.545
development . Especially because the

08:52.545 --> 08:54.656
White House has sought to downplay it

08:54.656 --> 08:56.822
and Secretary of Defense has said that

08:56.822 --> 08:59.849
he is not concerned . If this reporting

08:59.849 --> 09:01.849
is true , it must be addressed with

09:01.849 --> 09:04.609
resolute and vocal condemnation by

09:04.609 --> 09:06.929
America's leaders . Our service members

09:06.929 --> 09:09.750
deserve nothing less . For more than 3

09:09.750 --> 09:11.929
years , UCO has been the backbone of

09:11.929 --> 09:13.929
the international effort to support

09:13.929 --> 09:16.890
Ukraine in the war of survival against

09:16.890 --> 09:19.929
Russia . UCO has enabled the Ukrainians

09:19.929 --> 09:23.000
to defeat their . And defend , defeat

09:23.000 --> 09:24.667
the Russians and defend their

09:24.667 --> 09:26.278
sovereignty while sending an

09:26.278 --> 09:28.167
unmistakable message to America's

09:28.167 --> 09:30.278
adversaries about the strength of the

09:30.278 --> 09:32.333
NATO alliance and the resolve of the

09:32.333 --> 09:34.659
United States and its partners . The

09:34.659 --> 09:36.548
operational picture today remains

09:36.548 --> 09:39.000
difficult . Neither side has been able

09:39.000 --> 09:41.159
to secure a decisive advantage on the

09:41.159 --> 09:43.960
battlefield , but Ukrainian forces

09:43.960 --> 09:46.016
continue to battle bravely , and the

09:46.016 --> 09:48.520
Ukrainian people remain steadfast in

09:48.520 --> 09:51.369
their resolve at the same time . The

09:51.369 --> 09:53.536
broader strategic context in Europe is

09:53.536 --> 09:56.049
evolving . The Trump administration's

09:56.049 --> 09:59.090
new national defense strategy outlines

09:59.090 --> 10:01.210
a significant shift in how the United

10:01.210 --> 10:03.489
States views its role in the European

10:03.489 --> 10:07.049
AOR . The administration's argued for a

10:07.049 --> 10:08.938
significant reduction in American

10:08.938 --> 10:11.450
military engagement in Europe and for

10:11.450 --> 10:13.729
European allies to assume a much larger

10:13.729 --> 10:16.130
share of NATO's conventional defense

10:16.130 --> 10:18.739
responsibilities . Strengthening

10:18.739 --> 10:21.419
Europe's own defense capabilities is an

10:21.419 --> 10:24.559
important and necessary goal which it

10:24.700 --> 10:26.900
should be noted our European partners

10:26.900 --> 10:29.679
are already making impressive strides ,

10:30.140 --> 10:32.059
but any significant shifts in the

10:32.059 --> 10:34.619
capabilities or capacity of the United

10:34.619 --> 10:37.580
States will offer to the NATO alliance

10:37.820 --> 10:40.099
must be carefully assessed and closely

10:40.099 --> 10:42.380
coordinated with our allies . Anything

10:42.380 --> 10:46.250
less than . Close coordination could

10:46.250 --> 10:48.929
create unnecessary gaps and increased

10:48.929 --> 10:51.109
risk during a period of significant

10:51.270 --> 10:54.510
geopolitical tension . I worry that the

10:54.559 --> 10:56.781
administration is singularly focused on

10:56.781 --> 10:58.781
the speed of transition and not the

10:58.781 --> 11:00.837
strategic implications of getting it

11:00.837 --> 11:03.570
wrong . General Grikovich , I would ask

11:03.570 --> 11:06.140
for your perspective on this . Is it

11:06.140 --> 11:08.084
your expectation that Europe could

11:08.084 --> 11:09.751
assume the majority of NATO's

11:09.751 --> 11:11.918
conventional defense burden by the end

11:11.918 --> 11:14.084
of this decade , and what risks do you

11:14.084 --> 11:15.807
foresee in accelerating such a

11:15.807 --> 11:18.780
transition before our allies may be

11:18.780 --> 11:22.059
fully constituted to do that , General

11:22.059 --> 11:25.289
Reed , Transcom is vital to the ongoing

11:25.289 --> 11:27.619
operations in Iran . The success of any

11:27.619 --> 11:29.940
military campaign ultimately depends on

11:29.940 --> 11:32.218
the ability to move forces , equipment ,

11:32.218 --> 11:34.619
and supplies across the globe at speed

11:34.619 --> 11:37.609
and scale . From strategic airlift and

11:37.609 --> 11:40.049
sea lift to aerial refueling and the

11:40.049 --> 11:42.327
movement of munitions between theaters ,

11:42.570 --> 11:44.690
your command is a logistical network

11:44.690 --> 11:46.857
that allows the United States military

11:46.929 --> 11:49.409
to operate worldwide . I would

11:49.409 --> 11:51.409
appreciate an update on the demands

11:51.409 --> 11:53.631
these current operations are placing on

11:53.631 --> 11:55.631
Transcom and your assessment of the

11:55.631 --> 11:57.809
command's readiness to sustain them

11:57.809 --> 12:00.289
while maintaining the capacity to

12:00.289 --> 12:02.400
respond to crises in other theaters .

12:02.929 --> 12:05.169
Looking further ahead , one of the most

12:05.169 --> 12:06.947
important challenges facing the

12:06.947 --> 12:09.169
Department of Defense is the problem of

12:09.169 --> 12:11.280
contested logistics . For decades ,

12:11.650 --> 12:13.539
American military operations have

12:13.539 --> 12:16.090
benefited from secure sea and air lines

12:16.090 --> 12:18.609
of communication . However , we have

12:18.609 --> 12:20.409
reached a point where potential

12:20.409 --> 12:22.353
adversaries will likely target the

12:22.353 --> 12:25.090
logistics network that underpin US

12:25.090 --> 12:28.400
military power . These threats could

12:28.400 --> 12:30.622
include attacks against forward bases ,

12:30.622 --> 12:32.919
aircraft , and ships that resupply

12:32.919 --> 12:35.679
those bases , cyber attacks on the

12:35.679 --> 12:37.719
information technology systems that

12:37.719 --> 12:39.960
manage deployments , and even kinetic

12:39.960 --> 12:42.320
strikes against ports and airfields in

12:42.320 --> 12:44.719
the United States and abroad , General

12:44.719 --> 12:46.960
Reed . These vulnerabilities raise

12:46.960 --> 12:48.627
difficult questions about the

12:48.627 --> 12:50.627
survivability and resilience of the

12:50.627 --> 12:52.909
logistics systems on which our military

12:52.909 --> 12:54.909
depends . I would like an update on

12:54.909 --> 12:57.020
your command's efforts to address the

12:57.020 --> 12:59.570
contested logistics problem . In

12:59.570 --> 13:01.681
particular , how are you working with

13:01.681 --> 13:03.770
the military services to ensure that

13:03.770 --> 13:06.429
future logistics platforms and

13:06.429 --> 13:08.596
operational concepts are better suited

13:08.596 --> 13:10.818
to operate in a contested environment .

13:11.289 --> 13:13.345
Gentlemen , thank you again for your

13:13.345 --> 13:15.456
leadership and for the service of the

13:15.456 --> 13:17.511
men and women under your command . I

13:17.511 --> 13:19.678
look forward to your testimony . Thank

13:19.678 --> 13:21.567
you , Mr . Chairman . Thank you ,

13:21.567 --> 13:23.789
Senator Reed , and I also thank you for

13:23.789 --> 13:23.739
giving them a preview of the questions

13:23.739 --> 13:25.906
you're going to ask . Who'd like to go

13:25.906 --> 13:28.017
first ? General Grikowicz , would you

13:28.017 --> 13:30.128
like to go first ? You are recognized

13:30.128 --> 13:32.239
for your opening statement . Chairman

13:32.239 --> 13:34.183
Wicker and Ranking Member Reed and

13:34.183 --> 13:36.461
distinguished members of the committee ,

13:36.461 --> 13:38.461
uh , it's an honor to be here today

13:38.461 --> 13:40.517
representing the men and women of US

13:40.517 --> 13:42.295
European Command , and I'm also

13:42.295 --> 13:44.517
grateful to have Command Sergeant Major

13:44.517 --> 13:46.295
TJ Holland , our command senior

13:46.295 --> 13:48.789
enlisted leader , joining me today . It

13:48.789 --> 13:50.956
is also a privilege to be here with my

13:50.956 --> 13:52.900
good friend General Randall Reed .

13:52.900 --> 13:54.733
Throughout my career , I've seen

13:54.733 --> 13:56.900
firsthand the extraordinary capability

13:56.900 --> 13:58.845
US Transportation Command delivers

13:58.845 --> 14:01.539
across our joint force . I'd like to

14:01.539 --> 14:03.595
begin by thanking this committee and

14:03.595 --> 14:05.761
Congress for your steadfast support to

14:05.761 --> 14:07.706
the warfighters and missions of US

14:07.706 --> 14:09.761
European Command . The United States

14:09.761 --> 14:11.761
faces a complex and evolving global

14:11.761 --> 14:13.483
security environment . Growing

14:13.483 --> 14:15.440
cooperation between Russia , North

14:15.440 --> 14:17.239
Korea , Iran , and the People's

14:17.239 --> 14:19.400
Republic of China has increased

14:19.400 --> 14:21.700
military risk across multiple theaters

14:21.700 --> 14:24.830
and domains . In Europe , North Korean

14:24.830 --> 14:27.909
troops and materi , Iranian drone

14:27.909 --> 14:29.869
technology , and Chinese economic

14:29.869 --> 14:32.020
support enable Moscow to sustain its

14:32.020 --> 14:34.900
war in Ukraine . I have been privileged

14:34.900 --> 14:37.067
to be part of the negotiations working

14:37.067 --> 14:39.122
to fulfill the president's goal of a

14:39.122 --> 14:41.233
lasting peace , but in the meantime ,

14:41.233 --> 14:43.380
this brutal war continues , recently

14:43.380 --> 14:45.539
starting its 5th year as both sides

14:45.539 --> 14:48.219
trade human life for time and territory .

14:49.159 --> 14:51.048
And despite significant losses in

14:51.048 --> 14:53.270
Ukraine , Russia retains the capability

14:53.270 --> 14:55.919
and capacity to threaten US interests

14:55.919 --> 14:58.141
with its large and increasingly diverse

14:58.141 --> 14:59.919
nuclear stockpile , asymmetric

14:59.919 --> 15:02.059
capabilities , and competent ground ,

15:02.239 --> 15:05.380
air , and maritime forces . Given this

15:05.380 --> 15:07.436
environment , US European Command is

15:07.436 --> 15:10.340
focused on 3 priority missions . The

15:10.340 --> 15:12.419
first of these is protecting the US

15:12.419 --> 15:15.299
homeland . To do this , US European

15:15.299 --> 15:17.700
Command works closely with NORAD and US

15:17.700 --> 15:19.940
Northern Command to monitor and secure

15:19.940 --> 15:21.829
the strategic approaches to North

15:21.829 --> 15:24.030
America . Allies help with this by

15:24.030 --> 15:26.086
sharing intelligence , strengthening

15:26.086 --> 15:28.197
our early warning , and enhancing our

15:28.197 --> 15:30.530
ability to respond to potential threats .

15:30.530 --> 15:32.863
In the North Atlantic and in the Arctic ,

15:32.863 --> 15:34.697
they help us monitor Russian and

15:34.697 --> 15:36.808
Chinese activity , including subs and

15:36.808 --> 15:39.109
long range bomber patrols . Together we

15:39.109 --> 15:41.331
ensure these capabilities are unable to

15:41.331 --> 15:43.630
threaten the US or our interests in

15:43.630 --> 15:46.789
this hemisphere . Our second mission is

15:46.789 --> 15:48.900
to serve as a platform for projecting

15:48.900 --> 15:51.309
US combat power both in and beyond

15:51.309 --> 15:53.780
Europe . Our forces , bases , and

15:53.780 --> 15:55.836
infrastructure take advantage of the

15:55.836 --> 15:57.836
continent's strategic geography and

15:57.836 --> 16:00.058
allow the United States to rapidly move

16:00.058 --> 16:02.190
forces , sustain operations , and

16:02.190 --> 16:04.134
provide the president with diverse

16:04.134 --> 16:05.968
military options across multiple

16:05.968 --> 16:08.330
theaters . In the past year alone , US

16:08.330 --> 16:10.497
European Command increased pressure on

16:10.497 --> 16:12.719
the shadow fleet with the seizure of MV

16:12.719 --> 16:15.309
Bella . Enabled strikes against Iranian

16:15.309 --> 16:17.253
nuclear facilities during midnight

16:17.253 --> 16:19.440
Hammer and facilitated strikes on

16:19.440 --> 16:21.900
ISIS-affiliated terror groups in Africa .

16:22.440 --> 16:24.329
This mission continues today with

16:24.329 --> 16:26.607
support to Operation Epic Fury in Iran .

16:28.250 --> 16:30.472
Our 3rd mission area is positioning the

16:30.472 --> 16:32.472
NATO alliance to deter and defend .

16:32.729 --> 16:34.840
Given the possibility of simultaneous

16:34.840 --> 16:36.760
conflict in multiple theaters , a

16:36.760 --> 16:38.982
strong NATO allows the United States to

16:38.982 --> 16:41.093
redirect focus while still protecting

16:41.093 --> 16:43.260
our European interests . This requires

16:43.260 --> 16:45.371
allies to step up , and they're doing

16:45.371 --> 16:47.260
just that . Allies are increasing

16:47.260 --> 16:49.260
defense spending and building their

16:49.260 --> 16:50.816
readiness to assume primary

16:50.816 --> 16:52.816
responsibility for the conventional

16:52.816 --> 16:55.038
defense of Europe . This shift requires

16:55.038 --> 16:57.093
continued investment in a robust and

16:57.093 --> 16:59.260
resilient defense industrial base that

16:59.260 --> 17:01.149
can deliver the required military

17:01.149 --> 17:03.390
capabilities at scale . As the

17:03.390 --> 17:05.557
character of war continues to evolve ,

17:05.557 --> 17:07.779
US European Command is working directly

17:07.779 --> 17:09.890
with NATO allies , industry , and the

17:09.890 --> 17:12.001
joint force to capture the lessons of

17:12.001 --> 17:13.723
contemporary conflicts . We're

17:13.723 --> 17:15.890
committed to ensuring NATO remains the

17:15.890 --> 17:17.779
most capable military alliance in

17:17.779 --> 17:20.001
history and to protecting our interests

17:20.001 --> 17:22.057
at home and abroad . Chairman Wicker

17:22.057 --> 17:23.612
and Ranking Member Reid and

17:23.612 --> 17:25.946
distinguished members of this committee ,

17:25.946 --> 17:28.057
thank you for your unwavering support

17:28.057 --> 17:30.112
to our warfighters and our mission .

17:30.112 --> 17:32.057
It's an honor to appear before you

17:32.057 --> 17:31.859
today , and I look forward to your

17:31.859 --> 17:33.748
questions . Thank you very much ,

17:33.748 --> 17:35.526
General . General Reed , you're

17:35.526 --> 17:38.329
recognized . Chairman Wicker , Ranking

17:38.329 --> 17:40.496
Member Reed , distinguished members of

17:40.496 --> 17:44.089
the committee . Today I'm joined by my

17:44.089 --> 17:46.089
wonderful bride Lynn and our senior

17:46.089 --> 17:48.200
enlisted leader Chief Master Sergeant

17:48.200 --> 17:50.422
Brian Kraselnik . Together we represent

17:50.422 --> 17:52.311
the men , women , and families of

17:52.311 --> 17:54.478
United States Transportation Command .

17:54.478 --> 17:56.367
I am also privileged to serve and

17:56.367 --> 17:58.449
testify along alongside my longtime

17:58.449 --> 18:00.671
friend General Crinkovich . Thank you ,

18:00.671 --> 18:02.910
Grinch , for your leadership . As the

18:02.910 --> 18:04.989
champions of global logistics , US

18:04.989 --> 18:06.930
Transcom is a total force team of

18:06.930 --> 18:09.349
soldiers , sailors , airmen , marines ,

18:09.390 --> 18:11.750
guardians , coast guardsmen , civilians ,

18:11.829 --> 18:15.109
and merchant mariners . Your unwavering

18:15.109 --> 18:16.887
support of these experts in the

18:16.887 --> 18:19.053
missions they fulfill daily allows the

18:19.053 --> 18:21.630
warfighter to thrive . I must highlight

18:21.630 --> 18:23.630
our most unique experts , the Joint

18:23.630 --> 18:25.989
Enabling Capabilities Command . This

18:25.989 --> 18:28.189
subordinate command is your first

18:28.189 --> 18:30.133
responder in a global crisis , the

18:30.133 --> 18:33.229
Joint Forces 911 . They rapidly deploy

18:33.229 --> 18:35.396
planners , communicators , and command

18:35.396 --> 18:37.618
and control specialists that activate a

18:37.618 --> 18:39.729
joint task force headquarters and set

18:39.729 --> 18:41.979
the conditions for success . US

18:41.979 --> 18:44.140
Transcom has 3 military service

18:44.140 --> 18:45.973
components . The Air Force's Air

18:45.973 --> 18:48.619
Mobility Command delivers rapid global

18:48.619 --> 18:51.239
airlift , air refueling . And

18:51.239 --> 18:53.350
aeromedical evacuation with speed and

18:53.350 --> 18:55.699
reach to provide immediate response .

18:56.119 --> 18:58.119
The Navy's Military Sealift Command

18:58.119 --> 19:00.400
delivers the mass of our combat power

19:00.400 --> 19:02.511
through the decisive strength of Seal

19:02.511 --> 19:04.122
lifts sustainment . The Army

19:04.122 --> 19:06.289
Transportation Command is the critical

19:06.289 --> 19:08.511
link deploying the joint force from our

19:08.511 --> 19:10.289
forts to our strategic seaports

19:10.289 --> 19:12.400
connecting the homeland to the global

19:12.400 --> 19:14.344
fight and operating critical ports

19:14.344 --> 19:17.040
worldwide . Completing the US Transcom

19:17.040 --> 19:18.707
team as our 4th component are

19:18.707 --> 19:20.739
commercial partners . Commercial

19:20.739 --> 19:22.795
airlines , trucking companies , rail

19:22.795 --> 19:24.517
operators , and ocean shipping

19:24.517 --> 19:26.859
companies move our service members and

19:26.859 --> 19:30.260
cargo anywhere , anytime . These

19:30.260 --> 19:32.260
industry leaders and partners offer

19:32.260 --> 19:34.260
expertise , capacity , and networks

19:34.260 --> 19:37.040
required for mission success . US

19:37.040 --> 19:39.318
Transcom is the heart of a larger team ,

19:39.318 --> 19:41.096
the Global Joint Deployment and

19:41.096 --> 19:43.318
Distribution Enterprise , or the JDDE .

19:43.640 --> 19:46.079
Together , the military , commercial

19:46.079 --> 19:48.599
industry , allies and partners form a

19:48.599 --> 19:50.680
network with a single mission to

19:50.680 --> 19:52.920
deliver power and presence at the time

19:52.920 --> 19:55.699
and place of our choosing . We know the

19:55.699 --> 19:57.643
strategic environment continues to

19:57.643 --> 20:00.310
transform . Our competitors trained to

20:00.310 --> 20:02.310
contest our every move and turn

20:02.310 --> 20:04.930
logistics into a primary battle space .

20:05.660 --> 20:07.900
We acknowledge the challenge . This is

20:07.900 --> 20:11.010
precisely why we exist . US Transcom

20:11.010 --> 20:13.232
specializes in winning the fight to get

20:13.232 --> 20:15.454
to the fight . Therefore , there should

20:15.454 --> 20:17.288
be no surprise that our priority

20:17.288 --> 20:19.510
remains keeping power projection as the

20:19.510 --> 20:21.288
joint forces decisive strategic

20:21.288 --> 20:24.369
advantage . First , we champion the

20:24.369 --> 20:26.480
American warfighters starting here in

20:26.480 --> 20:28.702
our homeland . The journey to the fight

20:28.702 --> 20:30.758
begins not on the battlefield but on

20:30.758 --> 20:32.925
the nation's highways , railways , and

20:32.925 --> 20:35.091
commercial seaports . Your interest in

20:35.091 --> 20:37.250
in securing and modernizing this fort

20:37.250 --> 20:39.810
to port network is a direct investment

20:39.810 --> 20:42.089
in the ability to project power . The

20:42.089 --> 20:43.645
resilience of this civilian

20:43.645 --> 20:45.645
infrastructure , the bedrock of the

20:45.645 --> 20:47.867
domestic supply chain , allows Transcom

20:47.867 --> 20:50.400
forces to deploy and win . Second ,

20:50.479 --> 20:52.646
your continued partnership helps forge

20:52.646 --> 20:55.530
the future of maritime dominance . By

20:55.530 --> 20:57.729
recapitalizing strategic sea lift ,

20:58.260 --> 21:00.149
America will deliver overwhelming

21:00.149 --> 21:02.316
combat power to any shore for the next

21:02.316 --> 21:04.482
50 years . We must continue this vital

21:04.482 --> 21:06.427
work and champion the mariners who

21:06.427 --> 21:08.482
formed the backbone of our fleet and

21:08.482 --> 21:11.500
underwrite our national security . We

21:11.500 --> 21:13.839
support the maritime policies including

21:14.060 --> 21:16.619
maritime security program , tanker

21:16.619 --> 21:19.060
security program , cable security

21:19.060 --> 21:21.380
program , the Jones Act , and cargo

21:21.380 --> 21:23.699
preference laws . Together these

21:23.699 --> 21:25.866
programs secure US flagged vessels and

21:25.866 --> 21:28.219
the merchant merchant mariners

21:28.219 --> 21:30.339
necessary to move sensitive defense

21:30.339 --> 21:33.650
material in emergency . Third , your

21:33.650 --> 21:35.729
support guarantees our air mobility

21:35.729 --> 21:37.729
fleet remains a dominant projection

21:37.729 --> 21:39.569
force , the ultimate display of

21:39.569 --> 21:41.680
American resolve . Through our global

21:41.680 --> 21:43.458
reach , we unleash the power of

21:43.458 --> 21:45.599
presence , reassuring allies , and

21:45.599 --> 21:47.770
deterring adversaries . Continued

21:47.770 --> 21:49.930
modernization and recapitalization

21:49.930 --> 21:51.930
secures this advantage for the next

21:51.930 --> 21:54.041
generation of warfighters . Finally .

21:55.089 --> 21:57.199
We're transforming all mobility

21:57.199 --> 21:59.310
operation platforms into a survivable

21:59.410 --> 22:01.577
connected node within the war fighting

22:01.577 --> 22:03.729
network as tankers and cargo planes

22:03.729 --> 22:06.130
link to battle space awareness . They

22:06.130 --> 22:07.908
become the eyes and ears of our

22:07.908 --> 22:10.130
commanders as they drive toward mission

22:10.130 --> 22:12.719
success . Your support makes our forces

22:12.719 --> 22:14.849
more resilient . We are grateful for

22:14.849 --> 22:16.516
air fleet investments because

22:16.516 --> 22:18.849
connectivity creates survivability .

22:20.300 --> 22:22.522
Distinguished members , your leadership

22:22.522 --> 22:24.670
positions US Transcom to overcome any

22:24.670 --> 22:26.569
challenge . Together we send the

22:26.569 --> 22:28.359
message that America's logistic

22:28.660 --> 22:31.329
outreach is unmatched . Our resolve is

22:31.329 --> 22:33.810
unbreakable . We are ready , united ,

22:33.819 --> 22:35.819
and decisive , and that together we

22:35.819 --> 22:38.099
will always deliver . Thank you for the

22:38.099 --> 22:40.155
opportunity to represent US Transcom

22:40.155 --> 22:42.266
and to answer your questions . Well ,

22:42.266 --> 22:44.432
thank you both for your service . Uh ,

22:44.432 --> 22:46.543
uh , General Gee , uh , I'm gonna ask

22:46.543 --> 22:48.939
you to pronounce your name . Uh ,

22:49.060 --> 22:51.171
Senator , it's , uh , Grikowic , OK ,

22:51.171 --> 22:53.619
with a witch , OK , very good , um ,

22:53.780 --> 22:55.891
well , let me just ask you brief to ,

22:55.891 --> 22:58.060
to answer , uh , a few questions

22:58.060 --> 22:59.838
briefly , and then I'll let you

22:59.838 --> 23:01.893
elaborate . Do , do you agree that ,

23:01.893 --> 23:05.579
that , uh , Russian the

23:05.579 --> 23:07.579
Russian military's lack of tactical

23:07.579 --> 23:10.500
skill has been exposed in the war in

23:10.500 --> 23:11.500
Ukraine .

23:14.410 --> 23:18.300
Senator Uh , Russia invaded

23:18.300 --> 23:20.522
Ukraine thinking it would be a two week

23:20.522 --> 23:22.411
war , and as I heard a friend say

23:22.411 --> 23:24.578
recently , the hardest part of a short

23:24.578 --> 23:26.578
two week war is the first couple of

23:26.578 --> 23:28.689
years , and I think Putin has learned

23:28.689 --> 23:30.911
that because of the problems he's had ,

23:30.911 --> 23:32.911
he's had with fielding a modern and

23:32.911 --> 23:32.430
effective force . In spite of that , do

23:32.430 --> 23:34.486
you agree that Russia has maintained

23:34.550 --> 23:37.989
the ability to wage war , um , and

23:37.989 --> 23:40.689
continues to threaten our treaty allies

23:40.689 --> 23:43.459
in Europe ? I do , Senator .

23:44.160 --> 23:47.979
Um , And do you , and clearly you've

23:47.979 --> 23:50.219
already said that Russia stated Russia

23:50.219 --> 23:53.420
has demonstrated its its ability to

23:53.420 --> 23:56.699
sustain high intensity war for over 4

23:56.699 --> 24:00.660
years . And um I guess it's fair to say

24:00.660 --> 24:04.439
also that the public somehow

24:04.439 --> 24:07.020
over there is willing to suffer suffer

24:07.300 --> 24:10.630
deprivation . In pursuit of return

24:10.880 --> 24:13.250
to what they feel is Russian greatness ,

24:13.329 --> 24:15.273
do you agree with that statement .

24:15.869 --> 24:18.060
Senator , I do . I'd just say that ,

24:18.150 --> 24:20.372
you know , Putin as an autocrat is able

24:20.372 --> 24:22.539
to control the information environment

24:22.539 --> 24:24.650
in Russia , so the Russian people are

24:24.650 --> 24:26.817
probably not hearing all of the trials

24:26.817 --> 24:28.983
and tribulations that their forces are

24:28.983 --> 24:30.817
facing or understanding the high

24:30.817 --> 24:32.983
casualty rates of the Russian forces .

24:32.983 --> 24:32.829
And I guess it would be fair to say the

24:32.829 --> 24:36.060
elite in Russia are not , uh ,

24:36.069 --> 24:38.589
feeling all of the .

24:39.410 --> 24:42.050
Negative effects that the general

24:42.050 --> 24:45.439
populace is feeling . Uh , ISS that's

24:45.439 --> 24:48.910
correct , Senator , um , OK . NATO

24:48.910 --> 24:50.743
Secretary General and the German

24:50.743 --> 24:53.430
Chancellor have both publicly stated

24:53.430 --> 24:56.150
that Russia , once the war is over ,

24:56.290 --> 25:00.150
will again pose a dire threat to

25:00.150 --> 25:03.619
Europe by the end of a decade . Do

25:03.619 --> 25:05.739
you agree with that ? And I'll , I'll

25:05.739 --> 25:07.628
let you elaborate if you'd like .

25:08.910 --> 25:10.959
Senator , thank you . You know , in

25:10.959 --> 25:13.630
Ukraine today , Russia has well over

25:13.630 --> 25:16.390
500,000 troops , and so , uh , should

25:16.390 --> 25:18.501
the war in Ukraine end , which we all

25:18.501 --> 25:20.723
hope it does , uh , we will have to see

25:20.723 --> 25:22.890
the contours of the agreement and then

25:22.890 --> 25:25.112
monitor Russian behavior to see . Their

25:25.112 --> 25:27.057
intentions are , but from a purely

25:27.057 --> 25:29.525
military perspective , when 500,000

25:29.525 --> 25:31.469
battle-hardened Russian troops are

25:31.469 --> 25:33.469
repositioned to other areas , we'll

25:33.469 --> 25:35.414
have to pay attention to that as a

25:35.414 --> 25:37.247
potential military threat and be

25:37.247 --> 25:39.435
cognizant of what it could pose to the

25:39.435 --> 25:42.520
alliance . Um , OK .

25:44.040 --> 25:46.739
We're delighted to see our European

25:47.319 --> 25:51.219
allies agree to the 5%

25:51.640 --> 25:55.359
and to do their fair share of um their

25:55.359 --> 25:57.900
part of the burden sharing . How long

25:58.400 --> 26:01.400
do you think it's going to take for our

26:01.400 --> 26:03.567
European friends , uh , once they've ,

26:03.760 --> 26:07.359
um , enacted this 5% to build the

26:07.359 --> 26:10.359
capabilities and force structure needed .

26:10.699 --> 26:14.640
To um actually assume the lead role in

26:14.640 --> 26:16.696
the conventional defense of Europe .

26:17.219 --> 26:19.219
Yeah , Chairman , thank you . I , I

26:19.219 --> 26:21.386
agree with you that the agreement they

26:21.386 --> 26:23.608
made at the Hague summit to spend 5% of

26:23.608 --> 26:25.497
military spending is a tremendous

26:25.497 --> 26:27.386
accomplishment , and it shows how

26:27.386 --> 26:29.330
seriously the Europeans are taking

26:29.330 --> 26:31.497
their own security . Uh , many nations

26:31.497 --> 26:33.663
are already on a pathway , uh , with 5

26:33.663 --> 26:35.775
or 6 nations this year , uh , already

26:35.775 --> 26:39.150
near or above 5% of GDP . The biggest

26:39.150 --> 26:42.189
risk for those countries is now turning

26:42.189 --> 26:44.069
that money into actual military

26:44.069 --> 26:46.069
capability in their inventory , and

26:46.069 --> 26:48.236
that does take an industrial base that

26:48.236 --> 26:50.402
can deliver on time . So I see that as

26:50.402 --> 26:52.569
the biggest risk to them being able to

26:52.569 --> 26:54.902
achieve this on a , on a quick timeline .

26:54.910 --> 26:56.521
Uh , so , you know , from my

26:56.521 --> 26:58.799
perspective , I think we're looking at ,

26:58.799 --> 27:00.966
uh , you know , different capabilities

27:00.966 --> 27:03.021
will show up at different times . It

27:03.021 --> 27:04.910
will be a gradual slope that will

27:04.910 --> 27:06.966
increase in the , the pace of , uh ,

27:06.966 --> 27:08.910
European rearmament as the defense

27:08.910 --> 27:10.910
industrial base gets healthy . So I

27:10.910 --> 27:12.966
think you'll see it start slowly and

27:12.966 --> 27:15.188
then as the industrial base investments

27:15.188 --> 27:15.150
take off , uh , they'll be able to

27:15.150 --> 27:17.261
rearm quickly . So I would say by the

27:17.261 --> 27:19.261
end of this decade , uh , they will

27:19.261 --> 27:21.428
have made great progress toward that .

27:21.428 --> 27:23.594
They won't be all the way there , uh ,

27:23.594 --> 27:26.219
but certainly by 2035 they will be . OK .

27:26.359 --> 27:28.800
So by 2030 , they will have made great

27:28.800 --> 27:31.022
progress , but they won't be there . By

27:31.022 --> 27:33.319
2035 , if their commitment continues ,

27:33.760 --> 27:36.000
uh , they should be able to be in the

27:36.000 --> 27:38.099
leadership position on that . Yes ,

27:38.180 --> 27:40.236
Senator , I believe that's correct .

27:40.236 --> 27:42.930
Thank you very much , Senator Reid . Oh

27:42.930 --> 27:44.930
thank you very much Mr . Chairman .

27:44.930 --> 27:47.263
Thank you gentlemen . Uh , General Reed ,

27:47.263 --> 27:49.263
uh , you have been quoted as saying

27:49.263 --> 27:51.410
that we must start a new program to

27:51.410 --> 27:54.209
modernize our strategic airlift , the

27:54.209 --> 27:58.010
C5 and the C-17 . Uh , I know you can't

27:58.010 --> 28:00.130
disclose details of the forthcoming

28:00.130 --> 28:01.959
budget proposals , but are you

28:02.369 --> 28:04.591
confident that we'll begin that process

28:04.591 --> 28:07.630
of modernization this year ? Senator ,

28:07.699 --> 28:09.588
thank you for the question . Uh ,

28:09.588 --> 28:11.643
strategic airlift is one of the most

28:11.643 --> 28:13.939
critical capabilities that we provide .

28:14.219 --> 28:16.420
It's what we call the immediate force

28:16.420 --> 28:18.939
when our nation needs to respond right

28:18.939 --> 28:20.883
away . That's how we get the force

28:20.900 --> 28:22.956
quickly projected out of the country

28:22.956 --> 28:25.067
and to the point of , point of need .

28:25.067 --> 28:28.040
Uh , the challenge here is that for the ,

28:28.180 --> 28:30.660
uh , capabilities that we need in those

28:30.660 --> 28:33.459
aircraft , it takes a long lead time to

28:33.459 --> 28:35.237
design and actually deliver the

28:35.237 --> 28:38.290
aircraft . Uh , C5s and C-17s are

28:38.290 --> 28:40.457
capable today . Uh , thank you for the

28:40.457 --> 28:42.750
investment for the upkeep , but the

28:42.750 --> 28:45.089
time has passed now to start on the

28:45.089 --> 28:47.369
development of the next pla uh , the

28:47.369 --> 28:49.939
next platform . Um , in that platform ,

28:50.119 --> 28:52.650
uh , not only will it have to be able

28:52.650 --> 28:55.160
to do the things of the C5 and the C17

28:55.160 --> 28:57.216
today , but we're also going to make

28:57.216 --> 28:59.438
sure that we have secure communications

28:59.438 --> 29:01.979
that the platform will have the , uh ,

29:02.010 --> 29:04.121
uh , awareness of the space around it

29:04.121 --> 29:06.121
for the crews to be aware of what's

29:06.121 --> 29:08.250
going on around them and at the same

29:08.250 --> 29:10.472
time it needs to be as survivable as we

29:10.472 --> 29:12.806
can create . Thank you . Thank you . Uh ,

29:12.839 --> 29:14.561
General Grikovich , one of the

29:14.561 --> 29:17.089
unexpected beneficiaries of our

29:17.089 --> 29:20.719
operations in Iran has been Russia . Uh ,

29:20.800 --> 29:24.359
the price of gas is . Increased

29:24.359 --> 29:27.000
dramatically , which benefits their

29:27.000 --> 29:29.167
economy at a point where their economy

29:29.167 --> 29:32.199
was suffering after multiple years of

29:32.199 --> 29:34.680
warfare . We've in fact lifted

29:34.680 --> 29:36.847
sanctions on the delivery of their oil

29:36.847 --> 29:40.290
with India and other countries . We are

29:40.290 --> 29:42.829
now in a position where we must send

29:43.969 --> 29:46.290
missiles , uh , particularly Patriot ,

29:46.810 --> 29:49.130
to the Gulf area to replenish our

29:49.130 --> 29:51.910
supplies rather than to provide them to

29:51.910 --> 29:55.680
Ukrainians . This all

29:55.680 --> 29:58.810
seems to be a situation where Putin is

29:58.920 --> 30:01.780
benefiting dramatically . Is that your

30:01.780 --> 30:04.069
perception that that this has

30:04.069 --> 30:06.709
unexpectedly or unintentionally given

30:06.709 --> 30:09.489
him , uh , a significant increase in

30:10.069 --> 30:13.849
staying power ? Senator , a couple of

30:13.849 --> 30:15.849
thoughts on this . First , I'm very

30:15.849 --> 30:18.071
proud of the role that European Command

30:18.071 --> 30:20.127
is playing to support Operation Epic

30:20.127 --> 30:22.127
Fury , and our soldiers , sailors ,

30:22.127 --> 30:21.969
airmen , marines , and guardians have

30:21.969 --> 30:24.609
been operating at a high tempo in the

30:24.609 --> 30:26.720
eastern Med and elsewhere , defending

30:26.720 --> 30:28.776
alliance territory and defending our

30:28.776 --> 30:30.887
forces and projecting power into into

30:30.887 --> 30:33.209
US Central Command . As you noted , the

30:33.209 --> 30:35.849
price of oil and gas has gone up . We

30:35.849 --> 30:38.071
know that Putin does depend on that . I

30:38.071 --> 30:40.127
think how much he benefits from it ,

30:40.127 --> 30:42.349
depends on how long those prices remain

30:42.349 --> 30:44.571
elevated . I know , uh , the leadership

30:44.571 --> 30:46.793
of the department is watching this very

30:46.793 --> 30:48.627
closely . I know the president's

30:48.627 --> 30:50.849
watching this very closely . And uh and

30:50.849 --> 30:52.682
that they're , they're certainly

30:52.810 --> 30:55.520
concerned about the the the prices that

30:55.520 --> 30:57.742
are out there . So I guess , you know ,

30:57.742 --> 30:59.798
on the , on the minis front , what I

30:59.798 --> 31:01.964
would say on that is we do continue to

31:01.964 --> 31:04.076
flow munitions into Ukraine . I could

31:04.076 --> 31:05.964
get into some of the specifics on

31:05.964 --> 31:08.131
implications in the classified session

31:08.131 --> 31:10.131
later today , but I assure you that

31:10.131 --> 31:12.560
support continues . Should we increase

31:12.560 --> 31:14.640
our security assistance to Ukraine

31:14.640 --> 31:16.979
given the at least

31:17.709 --> 31:20.239
momentary strengthening of Russia's

31:20.239 --> 31:22.239
economy and Russia's capabilities ?

31:24.660 --> 31:28.260
Senator , I think the the the there are

31:28.260 --> 31:30.149
always global trade-offs with the

31:30.149 --> 31:32.260
amount of security assistance that we

31:32.260 --> 31:34.204
can provide . So ultimately it's a

31:34.204 --> 31:36.371
policy question on , on what the level

31:36.371 --> 31:38.593
of support should be . I am in constant

31:38.593 --> 31:38.540
contact with the Ukrainians though ,

31:38.579 --> 31:40.523
and they do tell me where they see

31:40.523 --> 31:43.020
opportunities . I am validating and

31:43.020 --> 31:45.020
looking at those opportunities that

31:45.020 --> 31:47.242
they're providing to us and the weapons

31:47.242 --> 31:49.464
that they're requesting . Uh , and then

31:49.464 --> 31:51.464
providing my recommendations to the

31:51.464 --> 31:53.464
department on what we could provide

31:53.464 --> 31:55.353
them to help them exploit certain

31:55.353 --> 31:57.409
situations . I'd be happy to discuss

31:57.409 --> 31:56.810
more of that in detail in the

31:56.810 --> 31:58.643
classified session . Thank you ,

31:58.643 --> 32:00.699
General . General , quickly , uh , I

32:00.699 --> 32:02.866
have about 45 seconds . Uh , contested

32:02.866 --> 32:05.420
logistics is an issue we've been

32:05.420 --> 32:07.699
grappling with for several years . Any

32:07.699 --> 32:11.500
quick thoughts about what we can do and

32:11.500 --> 32:14.719
what we are doing ? Senator , thank you

32:14.719 --> 32:17.060
very much . Uh , we continue to pursue

32:17.800 --> 32:20.022
changes in how we operate , uh , both ,

32:20.160 --> 32:21.949
uh , any opportunity in current

32:21.949 --> 32:23.640
operations exercises and

32:23.640 --> 32:25.819
experimentation as well . Thank you

32:25.819 --> 32:28.041
very much . Thank you , Mr . Chairman .

32:28.041 --> 32:30.800
Senator Fisher , you're recognized .

32:31.000 --> 32:33.111
Thank you , Mr . Chairman . Thank you

32:33.111 --> 32:35.278
both for being here today and for your

32:35.278 --> 32:37.389
service to our country . Uh , General

32:37.389 --> 32:40.000
Reed , how is Transcom preparing to

32:40.000 --> 32:42.199
perform strategic lift in , in a

32:42.199 --> 32:44.880
contested environment that presents

32:44.880 --> 32:48.780
unique challenges , correct ? Yes ,

32:48.859 --> 32:51.219
Senator , thank you . Uh , the

32:51.219 --> 32:53.859
strategic challenge as we see it begins

32:53.859 --> 32:55.859
here at , here at home . Uh , we're

32:55.859 --> 32:57.939
finding that the adversaries are

32:57.939 --> 33:00.380
aligning and they are trying to contest

33:00.380 --> 33:03.619
us in every domain possible , um , that

33:03.619 --> 33:06.020
also begins in the cyber realm . Uh ,

33:06.140 --> 33:08.362
some of the ways that we're making sure

33:08.362 --> 33:10.251
that we harden ourselves there is

33:10.251 --> 33:12.307
through increased cyber hygiene . We

33:12.307 --> 33:14.418
also get , uh , great assistance from

33:14.418 --> 33:17.219
US Cybercom as well and law enforcement .

33:17.739 --> 33:20.439
Um , that , uh , extends not only

33:20.439 --> 33:22.328
within the department but since a

33:22.328 --> 33:24.495
significant portion of what we're able

33:24.495 --> 33:26.717
to do is in the commercial realm , uh ,

33:26.717 --> 33:29.020
we're also able to extend assistance to

33:29.020 --> 33:31.770
them as well when it comes to , uh ,

33:31.780 --> 33:33.947
being able to project the force and to

33:33.947 --> 33:36.000
project power , uh , we continue

33:36.000 --> 33:38.000
investments and we welcome more and

33:38.000 --> 33:40.609
making the aircraft more survivable and

33:40.609 --> 33:42.776
also with more secure communications .

33:42.776 --> 33:45.140
Thank you . Thank you , General

33:45.140 --> 33:47.479
Grikowicz , uh , what's your assessment ?

33:47.859 --> 33:50.060
Of the Russian military's progress

33:50.060 --> 33:52.959
reconstituting its losses in Ukraine ,

33:53.329 --> 33:55.959
in particular in terms of the missile

33:55.959 --> 33:58.459
production or other weapons systems .

34:00.089 --> 34:02.449
Senator , uh , the , uh , the , the

34:02.449 --> 34:06.430
Russian , uh , war economy is , is in ,

34:06.439 --> 34:08.717
uh , high gear , uh , if you will . So ,

34:08.810 --> 34:11.032
uh , in terms of missile production and

34:11.032 --> 34:12.754
UAV production , and , uh , my

34:12.754 --> 34:14.588
assessment is that they have the

34:14.588 --> 34:16.532
capacity resident in their defense

34:16.532 --> 34:18.643
industrial base to continue with high

34:18.643 --> 34:20.866
levels of production , uh , and then as

34:20.866 --> 34:23.032
far as their personnel are concerned ,

34:23.032 --> 34:25.032
uh , to date they have been able to

34:25.032 --> 34:24.770
replenish the battlefield losses , the

34:24.770 --> 34:26.714
tremendous battlefield losses that

34:26.714 --> 34:28.826
they've been taking , uh , on a month

34:28.826 --> 34:32.658
to month basis . In September we saw

34:32.658 --> 34:36.358
a Russian drone incursion along the

34:36.358 --> 34:39.408
Polish border . How has UCO and NATO

34:39.408 --> 34:42.968
responded to that ? Yeah , Senator ,

34:43.049 --> 34:45.216
thanks . Uh , I was extremely proud of

34:45.216 --> 34:47.339
the immediate response that the

34:47.339 --> 34:49.450
alliance was able to take in response

34:49.450 --> 34:51.450
to that incursion . As you , as you

34:51.450 --> 34:53.617
probably recall , uh , Dutch F-35s who

34:53.617 --> 34:55.728
were operating under NATO command and

34:55.728 --> 34:57.950
control were able to shoot down several

34:57.950 --> 34:59.895
of those drones that came into the

34:59.895 --> 35:01.839
Polish airspace . Since then , the

35:01.839 --> 35:03.839
alliance has established uh Eastern

35:03.839 --> 35:05.950
Century , a vigilance activity that .

35:05.950 --> 35:08.172
Stitches together a number of disparate

35:08.172 --> 35:10.228
air and missile defense capabilities

35:10.228 --> 35:09.840
across the eastern flank of the

35:09.840 --> 35:12.030
alliance to thicken the lines for

35:12.030 --> 35:14.399
defense . And now we are also in the

35:14.399 --> 35:16.343
progress of rewriting our standing

35:16.343 --> 35:18.343
defense plan for integrated air and

35:18.343 --> 35:20.455
missile defense across the alliance .

35:20.455 --> 35:22.288
First time this has been done in

35:22.288 --> 35:24.177
decades and should be done by the

35:24.177 --> 35:26.399
summit this summer . So you feel pretty

35:26.399 --> 35:29.040
positive about eastern sentry . Senator ,

35:29.090 --> 35:30.923
I do , and I would just how it's

35:30.923 --> 35:33.257
working now , but in the future as well .

35:33.257 --> 35:35.423
Yeah , yeah , I do , Senator , and I ,

35:35.423 --> 35:37.201
I would cite as evidence of the

35:37.201 --> 35:39.312
alliance's ability to defend a couple

35:39.312 --> 35:41.090
of ballistic missiles that were

35:41.090 --> 35:43.330
launched by Iran toward Turkey and the

35:43.330 --> 35:45.052
successful engagement of those

35:45.052 --> 35:47.163
ballistic missiles to neutralize that

35:47.163 --> 35:49.274
threat . General , can you tell us in

35:49.274 --> 35:51.497
this setting , um , what your views are

35:51.497 --> 35:53.608
and what you anticipate seeing in the

35:53.608 --> 35:56.409
future and uh cooperation between

35:56.409 --> 36:00.250
Russia and China . Yeah , Senator , uh ,

36:00.330 --> 36:02.552
I can talk a little bit about it , uh ,

36:02.552 --> 36:04.719
here and , uh , of course elaborate in

36:04.719 --> 36:06.830
the classified session , but you know

36:06.830 --> 36:09.163
what we see , uh , is , uh , 22 primary ,

36:09.250 --> 36:11.570
um , means of support that the Chinese

36:11.570 --> 36:13.403
provide to the Russians . One is

36:13.403 --> 36:15.514
assisting them with evading sanctions

36:15.514 --> 36:17.737
and thereby helping their economy . And

36:17.737 --> 36:20.090
then the second is dual use equipment

36:20.090 --> 36:21.757
that comes out of the Chinese

36:21.757 --> 36:23.979
industrial base and flows into Russia .

36:23.979 --> 36:26.201
You might think of this as , you know ,

36:26.201 --> 36:28.368
different chips and different antennas

36:28.368 --> 36:30.423
that are then used on weapons of war

36:30.423 --> 36:30.159
that the Russians produce in their

36:30.159 --> 36:32.870
industrial base . So that certainly .

36:33.270 --> 36:35.270
Uh , is concerning to us . Uh , you

36:35.270 --> 36:37.326
know , if I look into the future , I

36:37.326 --> 36:39.492
would accept that type of relationship

36:39.492 --> 36:41.770
to continue when their interests align ,

36:41.770 --> 36:43.770
uh , and for Russia to , uh , to be

36:43.770 --> 36:45.937
willing to support China , uh , in the

36:45.937 --> 36:45.879
opposite direction if China finds

36:45.879 --> 36:47.990
itself , uh , in need of assistance .

36:48.669 --> 36:51.979
Uh , General Reed , I appreciated the

36:51.979 --> 36:54.201
conversation that we had concerning our

36:54.201 --> 36:56.389
tanker , uh , fleet . How are you

36:56.389 --> 36:58.389
working with the Air Force to

36:58.389 --> 37:00.909
communicate your needs , uh , to meet

37:00.909 --> 37:04.590
your requirements ? Thank you . Uh ,

37:04.679 --> 37:07.012
we enjoy great support from the service .

37:07.012 --> 37:09.959
Uh , we continue to , uh , ask them to

37:09.959 --> 37:12.020
support us with , uh , spare parts ,

37:12.360 --> 37:14.527
weapons systems , sustainment , and to

37:14.527 --> 37:16.693
keep the training pipeline strong . In

37:16.693 --> 37:18.804
addition to that , they are assisting

37:18.804 --> 37:20.916
us with survivability of the aircraft

37:20.916 --> 37:23.082
as well . Thank you . Thank you , Mr .

37:23.082 --> 37:25.416
Chair . Thank you , Senator Fisher . Uh ,

37:25.416 --> 37:27.416
we have Senator Gillibrand and then

37:27.416 --> 37:30.219
Senator Ernst . General Grikovich , um .

37:31.090 --> 37:34.129
We have seen Horrific

37:34.510 --> 37:38.389
reports . Of A US

37:38.389 --> 37:41.050
missile hitting a girls' school in Iran .

37:44.360 --> 37:46.527
I recognize you are at CEO and this is

37:46.527 --> 37:50.409
not your AOR , but . Can you speak to

37:50.409 --> 37:54.040
the process that you at least have at

37:54.040 --> 37:56.260
UCO for developing targets ? What type

37:56.260 --> 37:59.060
of protections you have based on what

37:59.060 --> 38:03.010
I've heard from reporting . The

38:03.010 --> 38:05.066
data that was looked at was a decade

38:05.066 --> 38:08.489
old . That any

38:08.489 --> 38:12.370
person who can get satellite access

38:12.370 --> 38:16.260
to Google Maps Today

38:17.949 --> 38:21.110
Can see That this was a school

38:22.320 --> 38:24.209
The New York Times had no problem

38:24.209 --> 38:26.431
getting that data and information for a

38:26.431 --> 38:29.820
report today . What do you intend to do

38:29.820 --> 38:32.979
at UCO to make sure you're targeting is

38:32.979 --> 38:36.770
consistent with American values ? Yeah ,

38:36.870 --> 38:39.250
Senator , thanks . You know , um , over

38:39.250 --> 38:41.361
the course of my career , I've , uh ,

38:41.361 --> 38:43.583
as a , as a fighter pilot , I've always

38:43.583 --> 38:45.806
done everything I can to avoid civilian

38:45.806 --> 38:48.028
harm and civilian casualties , uh , and

38:48.028 --> 38:49.806
I would tell you I'm absolutely

38:49.806 --> 38:51.528
committed to that . I know the

38:51.528 --> 38:53.694
department is committed to that , uh ,

38:53.694 --> 38:53.209
and that , uh , when tragedies like

38:53.209 --> 38:55.098
this happen , it causes us all to

38:55.098 --> 38:56.820
reflect and try to improve our

38:56.820 --> 38:58.770
processes . Um , I've I've been

38:58.770 --> 39:00.770
involved in the targeting process ,

39:00.770 --> 39:02.381
both at the tactical and the

39:02.381 --> 39:04.714
operational levels throughout my career .

39:04.714 --> 39:04.409
And I would tell you we do have a

39:04.409 --> 39:06.465
number of safeguards in the system .

39:06.465 --> 39:08.520
You know , every single time that at

39:08.520 --> 39:10.409
the tactical level I was going to

39:10.409 --> 39:12.465
release a weapon on a target , I was

39:12.465 --> 39:14.576
personally making an assessment as to

39:14.576 --> 39:16.353
whether there was any chance of

39:16.353 --> 39:18.520
civilian harm , and if there was , was

39:18.520 --> 39:20.409
that proportional to the military

39:20.409 --> 39:22.520
necessity of striking the target . At

39:22.520 --> 39:24.687
the operational level , uh , both from

39:24.687 --> 39:26.353
my time in US Central Command

39:26.353 --> 39:28.520
previously and then now at US European

39:28.520 --> 39:30.742
Command , I can assure you that we have

39:30.742 --> 39:32.965
robust standards that we go through and

39:32.965 --> 39:35.076
look to see uh and update the imagery

39:35.076 --> 39:37.076
and update our understanding of the

39:37.076 --> 39:39.242
target and refresh the intelligence on

39:39.242 --> 39:41.187
a recurring basis to determine the

39:41.187 --> 39:43.409
chances of civilian harm and to address

39:43.409 --> 39:45.520
any collateral concerns that might be

39:45.520 --> 39:47.631
there . So you , you just , just know

39:47.631 --> 39:47.620
I'm absolutely committed to trying to

39:47.620 --> 39:49.787
mitigate that risk . I appreciate your

39:49.787 --> 39:51.731
testimony . I'm highly concerned ,

39:51.731 --> 39:53.842
however , that Secretary Hegseth does

39:53.842 --> 39:55.842
not agree with you . Uh , Secretary

39:55.842 --> 39:58.439
Hegseth has , um , criticized rules of

39:58.439 --> 40:00.495
engagement designed to adhere to the

40:00.495 --> 40:02.439
laws of armed conflict and support

40:02.439 --> 40:04.800
civilian harm mitigation . Um ,

40:05.129 --> 40:07.449
Secretary Hegseth has also cut the

40:07.449 --> 40:09.330
civilian protection center of

40:09.330 --> 40:11.830
excellence by about 90% .

40:13.419 --> 40:16.149
Their mission was to help you and to

40:16.149 --> 40:17.899
help protect against civilian

40:17.899 --> 40:20.870
casualties . So how do these changes by

40:20.870 --> 40:24.020
Secretary Hegseth affect your mission ,

40:24.149 --> 40:26.316
your judgment , and the responsibility

40:26.316 --> 40:29.879
that you take so seriously ? Senator ,

40:30.239 --> 40:32.719
they have not affected my ability to

40:32.719 --> 40:35.320
prevent civilian harm in any way . It's

40:35.320 --> 40:37.320
embedded in the targeting process .

40:37.639 --> 40:39.583
It's embedded in the culture of US

40:39.583 --> 40:41.695
European Command , and I would say in

40:41.695 --> 40:43.806
the culture of the US military to try

40:43.806 --> 40:45.972
to avoid that civilian harm . So we're

40:45.972 --> 40:47.972
continuing to do the things that we

40:47.972 --> 40:47.600
have always done to comply with the law

40:47.600 --> 40:49.656
of armed conflict and ensure that we

40:49.656 --> 40:51.822
mitigate that risk . Can you guess how

40:51.822 --> 40:54.156
he could have gotten this wrong in Iran ?

40:54.156 --> 40:56.267
I'm sorry , ma'am . Can you guess how

40:56.267 --> 40:58.489
he could have gotten this wrong in Iran

40:58.489 --> 41:00.433
and targeted a children's school ,

41:00.433 --> 41:02.544
Ma'am , I would hesitate to speculate

41:02.544 --> 41:04.822
with any , with any incident like this .

41:04.822 --> 41:04.030
There's , you know , I would just say

41:04.030 --> 41:06.159
there's usually a chain of errors and

41:06.159 --> 41:08.103
mistakes that happen similar to an

41:08.103 --> 41:09.881
aviation accident or some other

41:09.881 --> 41:12.103
transportation accident , and I would ,

41:12.103 --> 41:14.103
I would say we just need to let the

41:14.103 --> 41:13.459
investigation play out and find all

41:13.459 --> 41:16.040
those factors . Thank you , General .

41:16.580 --> 41:19.760
Um . I'd like to talk a little bit

41:19.760 --> 41:22.939
about , um , following the firing

41:22.939 --> 41:26.750
of the . Pitifi base base

41:26.750 --> 41:28.806
commander and the stand up of NATO's

41:28.806 --> 41:31.649
Arctic Century mission . How is UCO

41:31.649 --> 41:33.550
managing the operational friction

41:33.550 --> 41:35.772
caused by the administration's rhetoric

41:35.772 --> 41:37.550
regarding Greenland's sovereign

41:37.550 --> 41:39.661
sovereignty and the associated tariff

41:39.661 --> 41:41.550
threats against our NATO allies ?

41:43.520 --> 41:45.800
Senator , uh , at the , uh , military

41:45.800 --> 41:47.856
to military level , I can assure you

41:47.856 --> 41:49.919
that , uh , our relationship remains

41:49.919 --> 41:53.500
strong , uh , that , uh , um , the , uh ,

41:53.679 --> 41:55.623
with , with every chief of defense

41:55.623 --> 41:57.290
across the alliance , uh , we

41:57.290 --> 41:59.346
maintained our focus on , on what it

41:59.346 --> 42:01.623
was that we were responsible for doing ,

42:01.623 --> 42:03.679
which was defending , uh , deterring

42:03.679 --> 42:03.679
and defending every inch of alliance

42:03.679 --> 42:05.901
territory from any form of aggression .

42:06.159 --> 42:08.320
Uh , and , uh , our , our ability to

42:08.320 --> 42:10.264
focus on that , on to focus on the

42:10.264 --> 42:12.487
Hague commitments and make our military

42:12.487 --> 42:14.764
stronger , uh , kept us , uh , uh , uh ,

42:15.489 --> 42:17.822
kept us on task , uh , if you will , uh ,

42:17.822 --> 42:19.489
throughout , throughout those

42:19.489 --> 42:21.600
discussions . Thank you . Thank you ,

42:21.600 --> 42:23.889
Mr . Chairman . Just , just to clarify

42:23.889 --> 42:26.169
for your benefit , Senator Gillibrand ,

42:26.209 --> 42:28.570
you , you did not mean to say that that

42:28.570 --> 42:31.929
we had targeted , um , a school .

42:33.489 --> 42:35.860
That a missile hit a school . No , but ,

42:35.949 --> 42:38.282
but , but it's the word targeting . Yes ,

42:38.550 --> 42:41.209
you did not mean how we chose a target

42:41.510 --> 42:44.149
that turned out to be a school , albeit

42:44.149 --> 42:46.590
next to an appropriate target of a

42:46.590 --> 42:49.290
naval base . But the fact that it is

42:49.479 --> 42:51.909
chosen as a target , I'd like to know ,

42:51.979 --> 42:53.979
and I hope that we can have an open

42:53.979 --> 42:56.201
hearing on this , Mr . Chairman . Thank

42:56.201 --> 42:58.368
you , um , Senator Ernst . Thank you ,

42:58.368 --> 43:00.389
Mr . Chair , and thank you to our

43:00.389 --> 43:02.611
witnesses today for your service to our

43:02.611 --> 43:04.850
nation . Uh , President Trump has

43:04.850 --> 43:08.479
pushed our NATO allies very hard to

43:08.479 --> 43:12.129
commit 5% of their GDP toward defense

43:12.129 --> 43:14.570
and resilience , and we've seen a lot

43:14.570 --> 43:16.681
of headlines highlighting new defense

43:16.681 --> 43:19.530
investments across Europe . Uh , at the

43:19.530 --> 43:21.641
same time , NATO defense plans depend

43:21.641 --> 43:24.219
on interoperability , excuse me ,

43:24.489 --> 43:27.764
across 32 . Allies operating across air ,

43:27.804 --> 43:30.844
land , maritime , cyber , and space

43:30.844 --> 43:33.274
domains . So General Grinkovic Grikoic ,

43:34.804 --> 43:36.526
uh , are these new investments

43:36.526 --> 43:39.284
translating into , um , shared

43:39.284 --> 43:41.324
capabilities with NATO that are

43:41.324 --> 43:44.405
interoperable , or are there gaps that

43:44.405 --> 43:47.074
our allies need to find and fill ?

43:48.379 --> 43:50.601
Senator , that's a terrific , uh , uh ,

43:50.601 --> 43:53.270
question . The , uh , we focus very

43:53.270 --> 43:55.437
much on interoperability , uh , across

43:55.437 --> 43:57.270
the alliance and the US European

43:57.270 --> 43:59.326
Command , uh , and I would say , you

43:59.326 --> 44:01.437
know , one of the best ways to ensure

44:01.437 --> 44:01.419
interoperability , uh , is when our

44:01.419 --> 44:03.475
allies buy American equipment , uh ,

44:03.475 --> 44:05.808
from our defense industrial base . That ,

44:05.808 --> 44:07.641
that solves the interoperability

44:07.641 --> 44:09.752
problem just , uh , at , uh , at , at

44:09.752 --> 44:11.530
face value . Of course , the US

44:11.530 --> 44:13.197
industrial base can't deliver

44:13.197 --> 44:15.197
everything that Europeans need , so

44:15.197 --> 44:14.193
they're investing in their own

44:14.193 --> 44:16.403
industrial base as well . Uh , and to

44:16.403 --> 44:18.625
ensure that everything works together ,

44:18.625 --> 44:20.847
we have NATO standards that , uh , both

44:20.847 --> 44:22.959
countries in the alliance and outside

44:22.959 --> 44:22.522
the alliance , including in the

44:22.522 --> 44:24.802
Indo-Pacific , uh , adhere to in order

44:24.802 --> 44:27.024
to ensure that interoperability . But ,

44:27.024 --> 44:28.913
you know , uh , they're , they're

44:28.913 --> 44:31.080
especially new members of the alliance

44:31.080 --> 44:33.302
or folks who are newly certified . NATO

44:33.302 --> 44:33.055
standards , we do need to help them

44:33.055 --> 44:34.722
along and make sure that they

44:34.722 --> 44:36.777
understand that this gets to be very

44:36.777 --> 44:38.944
technical when you get into the , uh ,

44:38.944 --> 44:38.815
the beeps and squeaks , if you will ,

44:38.946 --> 44:40.946
of , of making sure that things can

44:40.946 --> 44:42.946
work together . Yeah , I appreciate

44:42.946 --> 44:44.946
that very much and the shout out as

44:44.946 --> 44:47.224
well about the defense industrial base ,

44:47.224 --> 44:49.446
and I think this just lends credibility

44:49.446 --> 44:51.668
to all of our voices when we are saying

44:51.668 --> 44:54.496
that we need to invest in more here in

44:54.496 --> 44:56.607
the United States . I'm glad that our

44:56.607 --> 44:58.829
partners are stepping up and developing

44:58.829 --> 45:00.718
their own industrial base , but .

45:00.780 --> 45:03.280
Certainly we need a stronger one here

45:03.280 --> 45:05.489
in our own nation . Um , just very

45:05.489 --> 45:07.969
briefly , uh , I am a huge supporter of

45:07.969 --> 45:10.136
the state partnership program . I know

45:10.136 --> 45:12.330
we have spoken about this before . Our

45:12.330 --> 45:15.489
Iowa National Guard and Kosovo are

45:15.489 --> 45:19.010
partnered through SPP , and we know

45:19.010 --> 45:22.169
that a strong American presence in

45:22.169 --> 45:25.129
these countries does maintain stability .

45:25.449 --> 45:28.629
Can you speak briefly about the state

45:28.689 --> 45:30.911
partnership program and your thoughts ?

45:30.911 --> 45:32.911
Yes , Senator , thanks . I've spent

45:32.911 --> 45:32.830
some . Time with your commanding

45:32.830 --> 45:35.270
general of the of the guard unit and of

45:35.270 --> 45:37.437
your , your , your guard , and they do

45:37.437 --> 45:39.603
tremendous work in Kosovo and I'm very

45:39.603 --> 45:41.937
thankful for it . Writ large , you know ,

45:41.937 --> 45:43.714
the SPP builds deep and lasting

45:43.714 --> 45:45.603
relationships . Some of our state

45:45.603 --> 45:47.826
partners have been in the program for ,

45:47.826 --> 45:49.989
for 30 years or more , and over the

45:49.989 --> 45:52.110
course of those 30 years as exercises

45:52.110 --> 45:54.277
happen on both sides of the Atlantic ,

45:54.277 --> 45:56.332
uh , it just , it just builds a bond

45:56.332 --> 45:58.499
you can't replace . Yes , thank you so

45:58.499 --> 46:00.499
much . I'm in full agreement . Uh ,

46:00.499 --> 46:03.219
General Reed , we have automatic

46:03.219 --> 46:05.510
equipment identifiers , um ,

46:05.590 --> 46:08.800
identification tags that help rail

46:08.800 --> 46:10.800
providers track the location of our

46:10.800 --> 46:13.919
assets across our transportation system ,

46:14.280 --> 46:15.836
uh , but one of the largest

46:15.836 --> 46:18.280
manufacturers of those tags and the

46:18.280 --> 46:20.520
technology is owned by a parent company

46:20.520 --> 46:22.479
with ties to the Chinese Communist

46:22.479 --> 46:25.439
Party . Uh , currently Transcom uses

46:25.439 --> 46:27.879
our rail system to move heavy assets

46:27.879 --> 46:30.879
like tanks from Fort Stewart or , you

46:30.879 --> 46:32.990
know , you name it , or other armored

46:32.990 --> 46:36.239
vehicles throughout the US . So my

46:36.239 --> 46:39.850
concern is that the CCP could utilize

46:39.850 --> 46:43.010
these tracking technologies to monitor

46:43.010 --> 46:45.550
our . Military movements , uh , which

46:45.550 --> 46:48.689
is a major security risk , uh , during

46:48.689 --> 46:51.709
a buildup or a surge . So , uh , would

46:51.709 --> 46:54.110
you agree with that vulnerability ? Uh ,

46:54.199 --> 46:56.830
do you think we are giving the Chinese

46:56.830 --> 46:59.189
access into a window of our military

46:59.189 --> 47:01.909
movements and engagements and what can

47:01.909 --> 47:05.000
we do about that ? Senator , first and

47:05.000 --> 47:07.167
foremost , the department works really

47:07.167 --> 47:09.570
hard to eliminate any kind of Chinese

47:09.570 --> 47:11.840
component , uh , wherever we find it ,

47:11.879 --> 47:14.580
and , uh , that , that , that continues ,

47:15.040 --> 47:18.120
uh , with all the energy and effort

47:18.120 --> 47:20.479
that we can put to that . Uh , second

47:20.479 --> 47:23.090
of all , when it comes to all domain

47:23.090 --> 47:25.989
con uh being contested in all domain ,

47:26.040 --> 47:28.800
the cyber realm , uh , is one where

47:28.800 --> 47:31.760
this presents itself , uh , plain and

47:31.760 --> 47:34.189
clear . With that being said , uh ,

47:34.320 --> 47:36.689
while it may be , uh , a vulnerability ,

47:36.760 --> 47:38.927
there are ways that we can harden that

47:38.927 --> 47:41.149
and we continue to do that . Uh , there

47:41.149 --> 47:43.316
are alternative ways to make sure that

47:43.316 --> 47:45.038
we can , we , we can track the

47:45.038 --> 47:47.760
information , uh , increasingly as we

47:47.760 --> 47:50.000
get stronger tools , uh , we apply

47:50.000 --> 47:53.080
those , those tools , and the one thing

47:53.080 --> 47:55.439
that's very , very important is , as we

47:55.439 --> 47:57.606
continue to use the commercial realm ,

47:58.000 --> 48:00.000
there are lots of other things that

48:00.000 --> 48:01.944
move in the , the , the commercial

48:01.944 --> 48:04.167
space . And that itself makes it very ,

48:04.209 --> 48:06.320
very hard for folks to , to track our

48:06.320 --> 48:08.431
equipment . Yeah , very good . I , we

48:08.431 --> 48:10.209
need to recognize if we do have

48:10.209 --> 48:12.320
vulnerabilities and make sure they're

48:12.320 --> 48:14.542
not being exploited . So thank you very

48:14.542 --> 48:16.653
much . Thank you , Mr . Chair . Thank

48:16.653 --> 48:18.542
you , Senator . Senator Kaine , I

48:18.542 --> 48:20.610
understand you intend to yield your

48:20.610 --> 48:23.050
time to a person who's not yet in the

48:23.050 --> 48:25.161
room . That is correct . So I'll take

48:25.161 --> 48:27.161
my time . I think that would be the

48:27.340 --> 48:29.507
best backup plan . You're recognized .

48:29.507 --> 48:31.673
Thank you . America's been at war with

48:31.673 --> 48:33.618
Iran for 12 days . The cost to our

48:33.618 --> 48:35.840
troops , to everyday Americans , and to

48:35.840 --> 48:37.729
innocent Iranian civilians , even

48:37.729 --> 48:39.951
schoolchildren , are dramatic . The war

48:39.951 --> 48:42.007
is deeply unpopular . To begin , the

48:42.007 --> 48:44.229
war is illegal . The Constitution makes

48:44.229 --> 48:46.284
plain that only Congress can declare

48:46.284 --> 48:48.507
war . The reason for this provision was

48:48.507 --> 48:50.673
articulated by Abraham Lincoln . Kings

48:50.673 --> 48:52.340
had always been involving and

48:52.340 --> 48:54.396
impoverishing their people in wars ,

48:54.396 --> 48:56.562
pretending that the good of the people

48:56.562 --> 48:58.618
was the object . This our convention

48:58.618 --> 49:00.840
understood to be the most kingly of all

49:00.840 --> 49:03.007
kingly oppressions , and they resolved

49:03.007 --> 49:05.062
to so frame the Constitution that no

49:05.062 --> 49:06.896
one man should hold the power of

49:06.896 --> 49:09.062
bringing this oppression upon us . The

49:09.062 --> 49:11.007
president has escalated his use of

49:11.007 --> 49:13.118
military to carry out hostilities all

49:13.118 --> 49:15.229
over the globe without Congress while

49:15.229 --> 49:17.229
threatening military action against

49:17.229 --> 49:19.090
many more nations . We're at war

49:19.090 --> 49:21.146
because of the unilateral actions of

49:21.146 --> 49:23.429
one man who has grown very confident

49:23.570 --> 49:25.626
that Congress will not challenge his

49:25.626 --> 49:27.237
kingly behavior . The war is

49:27.237 --> 49:29.292
unprecedented . We've heard from the

49:29.292 --> 49:31.514
president many shifting reasons for the

49:31.514 --> 49:33.681
war , but senators have now heard both

49:33.681 --> 49:35.737
publicly from the Secretary of State

49:35.737 --> 49:37.514
and from multiple sessions with

49:37.514 --> 49:39.570
civilian and military leaders a more

49:39.570 --> 49:41.570
precise and consistent reason . The

49:41.570 --> 49:43.792
president sent our sons and daughters ,

49:43.792 --> 49:45.737
spouses , parents into war because

49:45.737 --> 49:47.959
another nation was determined to invade

49:47.959 --> 49:50.040
Iran , and if that occurred , Iran

49:50.040 --> 49:51.929
would likely target US troops for

49:51.929 --> 49:54.550
retaliation . The trigger event of this

49:54.550 --> 49:56.790
war was Israel's decision to invade

49:56.790 --> 49:59.639
Iran on February 28th . We could have

49:59.639 --> 50:01.750
avoided this war by persuading Israel

50:01.750 --> 50:03.972
that it shouldn't invade and that doing

50:03.972 --> 50:05.917
so would hurt its ally America and

50:05.917 --> 50:08.028
cause global instability . There's no

50:08.028 --> 50:10.195
evidence that we tried to do that , or

50:10.199 --> 50:12.421
we could have focused on protecting our

50:12.421 --> 50:14.532
own troops from retaliation following

50:14.532 --> 50:16.310
an Israeli invasion . Instead ,

50:16.310 --> 50:18.255
President Trump decided to join an

50:18.255 --> 50:20.429
invasion of Iran initiated by another

50:20.429 --> 50:22.840
nation . He is not the first American

50:22.840 --> 50:24.896
president who has been urged to take

50:24.896 --> 50:28.120
this step . Others wisely resisted . He

50:28.120 --> 50:30.489
did not . The war's unnecessary . Iran

50:30.489 --> 50:32.439
and America were allies during and

50:32.439 --> 50:35.050
after World War II until America

50:35.050 --> 50:36.939
engineered the toppling of Iran's

50:36.939 --> 50:38.994
democratically elected government in

50:38.994 --> 50:42.689
1953 . That act , followed by 26 years

50:42.689 --> 50:45.010
of a brutal dictatorship that the US

50:45.010 --> 50:47.570
helped fund , create a deep hostility

50:47.570 --> 50:49.514
between our two nations , formerly

50:49.514 --> 50:51.449
friends . When the Iranian people

50:51.449 --> 50:53.338
finally threw off that oppressive

50:53.338 --> 50:56.649
dictatorship in 1979 , that hostility

50:56.649 --> 50:59.285
resulted in five decades of . Violence

50:59.285 --> 51:01.341
between our countries , the facts of

51:01.341 --> 51:03.396
which are well known to American and

51:03.396 --> 51:05.946
Iranian citizens alike . Iran engages

51:05.946 --> 51:08.057
in dangerous behavior toward the US ,

51:08.057 --> 51:10.224
its neighbors , and its citizens . But

51:10.224 --> 51:12.446
does that danger , more than 6000 miles

51:12.446 --> 51:14.668
from our shores , warrant the sacrifice

51:14.668 --> 51:16.890
of our troops , the killing of innocent

51:16.890 --> 51:19.113
civilians , and the expense of billions

51:19.113 --> 51:21.016
of taxpayer dollars ? If more war

51:21.016 --> 51:23.238
between Iran and the United States were

51:23.238 --> 51:25.238
the answer , we would have found it

51:25.238 --> 51:27.405
sometime in the last 73 years . We had

51:27.405 --> 51:29.516
a diplomatic . Off-ramp to decades of

51:29.516 --> 51:31.627
hostility in the Iranian nuclear deal

51:31.761 --> 51:33.817
that the US and Iran , together with

51:33.817 --> 51:35.761
our European allies plus China and

51:35.761 --> 51:38.802
Russia negotiated in 2015 . President

51:38.802 --> 51:41.221
Trump's decision to abandon that deal ,

51:41.562 --> 51:43.562
even though it was working and even

51:43.562 --> 51:45.562
though many of his closest advisers

51:45.721 --> 51:47.888
told him to maintain it , ushered in a

51:47.888 --> 51:50.041
sharp spike of Iranian aggression .

51:50.481 --> 51:52.882
American troops are dying because this

51:52.882 --> 51:54.741
nation's political leadership

51:54.862 --> 51:57.860
tragically abandoned diplomacy . We owe

51:57.860 --> 51:59.804
our troops better than this . They

51:59.804 --> 52:02.139
serve with such skill and bravery , but

52:02.139 --> 52:04.419
as our experiences in Vietnam and Iraq

52:04.419 --> 52:06.500
have shown , the bravest , patriotic

52:06.500 --> 52:09.020
service cannot overcome poor civilian

52:09.020 --> 52:10.742
decision making , whether by a

52:10.742 --> 52:12.798
president grown too fond of war or a

52:12.798 --> 52:14.909
Congress unwilling to provide a check

52:14.909 --> 52:17.225
against such behavior . Virginians feel

52:17.225 --> 52:18.947
this deeply . One of the first

52:18.947 --> 52:21.058
casualties of the war , Chief Warrant

52:21.058 --> 52:22.892
Officer Robert Marzon , lived in

52:22.892 --> 52:24.836
Spottsylvania County . Hundreds of

52:24.836 --> 52:26.892
Virginians are now deployed with the

52:26.892 --> 52:29.003
Ford carrier strike group . More have

52:29.003 --> 52:28.985
received orders that they'll deploy

52:28.985 --> 52:31.041
with the Bush carrier strike group .

52:31.114 --> 52:33.665
Their families ask me , have we learned

52:33.665 --> 52:36.399
nothing ? From 25 years of war in the

52:36.399 --> 52:38.639
Middle East , more than 14,000 American

52:38.639 --> 52:41.040
troops and contractors dead , more than

52:41.040 --> 52:44.439
65,000 injured , more than $8 trillion

52:44.439 --> 52:46.620
spent that could have gone to our

52:46.620 --> 52:48.731
education or healthcare , or economic

52:48.731 --> 52:50.842
development have we learned nothing .

52:51.169 --> 52:53.169
Like all in this room , I pray that

52:53.169 --> 52:55.225
this war ends soon . Virginians have

52:55.225 --> 52:57.169
suffered this year as a sputtering

52:57.169 --> 52:59.391
economy burdened by tariffs and chaos ,

52:59.391 --> 53:01.502
produces higher prices , fewer jobs ,

53:01.570 --> 53:04.169
and slower growth . Gas has gone up 60

53:04.169 --> 53:06.225
cents a gallon in the last 11 days ,

53:06.360 --> 53:08.889
costing Virginians nearly $5 million a

53:08.889 --> 53:11.949
day just in increased fuel costs . We

53:12.050 --> 53:14.879
need a president . Who will honor his

53:14.879 --> 53:17.439
promises to avoid foreign wars of

53:17.439 --> 53:19.959
choice and strengthen the economy here

53:19.959 --> 53:23.040
at home , and we need a congress who

53:23.040 --> 53:25.860
will not stand silent as these promises

53:26.100 --> 53:27.656
are broken . I yield back .

53:29.320 --> 53:31.376
Senator Scott , you are recognized .

53:31.399 --> 53:33.590
Thank you , Chairman . First , I wanna

53:33.590 --> 53:36.729
um . I want to thank our troops , um .

53:37.649 --> 53:40.610
The um . I had the opportunity to serve

53:40.610 --> 53:42.832
in the , in the navy at the tail end of

53:42.832 --> 53:44.832
Vietnam . Fortunately , I was not ,

53:44.832 --> 53:46.777
didn't have to go to Vietnam , but

53:46.777 --> 53:48.943
anybody that puts on the uniform , you

53:48.943 --> 53:51.277
have to admire them , uh , because they ,

53:51.277 --> 53:53.499
uh , they're making the decision to put

53:53.499 --> 53:53.330
their life on the line , uh , for our

53:53.330 --> 53:55.497
freedom . Uh , we have a lot of troops

53:55.497 --> 53:57.570
at risk right now . Uh , I pray for

53:57.570 --> 53:59.848
their safety . Uh , we , unfortunately ,

53:59.848 --> 54:02.489
we've lost 7 , members , one in Florida ,

54:02.639 --> 54:06.530
Cody Cork . Um , I know we have 140

54:06.530 --> 54:08.790
or so . Uh , injured . I hope they have

54:08.790 --> 54:11.179
a full recovery , but I wanted , the

54:11.179 --> 54:13.401
most important thing I think we can all

54:13.401 --> 54:15.568
say is we admire what the military has

54:15.568 --> 54:17.790
done . We respect what the military has

54:17.790 --> 54:19.957
done . We support what the military is

54:19.957 --> 54:22.123
doing , and we hope they all come back

54:22.123 --> 54:24.290
safely . Um , and the , uh , the goals

54:24.290 --> 54:26.709
of , um , of this conflict is that they

54:26.709 --> 54:28.931
don't have a nuclear weapon . The goals

54:28.931 --> 54:31.098
of this conflict , they don't have the

54:31.098 --> 54:32.931
ability to . Um , have ballistic

54:32.931 --> 54:35.153
missiles that it's gonna kill Americans

54:35.153 --> 54:34.969
like they've been doing for , for

54:34.969 --> 54:37.489
decades . So , um , I don't think any

54:37.489 --> 54:39.729
of us ever want to go to war , um , but

54:39.729 --> 54:41.840
I think we all do respect our freedom

54:42.090 --> 54:44.090
and want to keep our freedom . So I

54:44.090 --> 54:46.090
want to thank all of our troops for

54:46.090 --> 54:48.312
what they're doing . Thank you both for

54:48.312 --> 54:50.368
being here . Thank you for your hard

54:50.368 --> 54:52.146
work . Uh , one of the things I

54:52.146 --> 54:51.629
appreciate about this president is he

54:51.629 --> 54:53.851
sees the value in putting America first

54:53.851 --> 54:55.851
and working with our friends across

54:55.851 --> 54:58.073
Europe , Asia , and around the world to

54:58.073 --> 55:00.129
ensure peace through strength . Over

55:00.129 --> 54:59.540
the past few years I've had the

54:59.540 --> 55:01.429
opportunity to visit a lot of our

55:01.429 --> 55:03.429
allies . Last year I went to , uh ,

55:03.429 --> 55:05.596
Denmark , Estonia , and Finland , um ,

55:05.596 --> 55:07.651
all of which are doing their part to

55:07.651 --> 55:07.229
increase their national defense

55:07.229 --> 55:09.679
spending . Uh , they all had great

55:09.679 --> 55:11.810
things to say about President Trump's

55:11.810 --> 55:13.921
efforts in the defense space and as a

55:13.921 --> 55:16.032
partner . But a number of allies have

55:16.032 --> 55:18.088
been frustrated with being told as a

55:18.088 --> 55:20.310
matter of policy that they can't buy US

55:20.310 --> 55:22.421
weapons , and the White House and the

55:22.421 --> 55:22.379
Secretary I know have had to deal with

55:22.379 --> 55:24.379
that . Nevertheless , the problem I

55:24.379 --> 55:26.546
want to focus on today is that they're

55:26.546 --> 55:28.379
also frustrated with the foreign

55:28.379 --> 55:30.435
military sales program . Frankly , I

55:30.435 --> 55:32.379
understand why . They're , they're

55:32.379 --> 55:32.370
facing a defense industry that too

55:32.370 --> 55:34.203
often fails to deliver ships and

55:34.203 --> 55:36.370
aircraft . I think you've talked about

55:36.370 --> 55:38.314
that a little bit . We can't , our

55:38.314 --> 55:40.370
manufacturers are not getting things

55:40.370 --> 55:42.481
done on time or on budget , or people

55:42.481 --> 55:42.280
in the Department of War saying they

55:42.280 --> 55:44.502
can't have the weapons that they want .

55:44.502 --> 55:46.447
It's forcing them to turn to other

55:46.447 --> 55:48.669
countries because they need the weapons

55:48.669 --> 55:50.836
now . They're doing exactly what we've

55:50.836 --> 55:50.000
asked . They're stepping up their

55:50.000 --> 55:52.639
defense spending , uh , but they , they ,

55:52.790 --> 55:54.957
there's not enough American weapons to

55:54.957 --> 55:56.790
buy . Uh , they want our weapons

55:56.790 --> 55:58.734
because they know they're the best

55:58.734 --> 55:58.540
weapons in the world . They want to

55:58.540 --> 56:00.762
train with us . Uh , they don't want to

56:00.762 --> 56:02.873
buy other systems , and I know you're

56:02.873 --> 56:05.040
working on interoperability , but they

56:05.040 --> 56:07.040
want to buy American weapons . Um ,

56:07.040 --> 56:09.262
what's unfortunate is the president and

56:09.262 --> 56:11.429
secretary of heads have made clear why

56:11.429 --> 56:11.139
it's good for our allies to buy

56:11.139 --> 56:13.195
American-made ships , aircraft , and

56:13.195 --> 56:15.306
weapons . It creates good paying jobs

56:15.306 --> 56:17.528
in America , allows our allies to fight

56:17.528 --> 56:19.528
their own fights and do it with the

56:19.528 --> 56:21.639
best weaponry in the world . And when

56:21.639 --> 56:21.550
I've gone over , I've said , the most

56:21.550 --> 56:23.606
important thing is you got to defend

56:23.606 --> 56:25.606
yourself . We'll be a partner , but

56:25.606 --> 56:25.310
we're not going to be your first line

56:25.310 --> 56:29.169
of defense . Um , so And

56:29.169 --> 56:31.729
General , uh , Greenowicz , um , is it

56:31.729 --> 56:33.229
good for our allies to buy

56:33.229 --> 56:35.173
American-made planes , ships , and

56:35.173 --> 56:37.340
weapons and to train with us ? And how

56:37.340 --> 56:37.169
does this impact our relationship with

56:37.169 --> 56:39.169
our allies and does it make all our

56:39.169 --> 56:41.659
military a better fighting force ? Yes ,

56:41.939 --> 56:44.161
Senator , I , I encourage our allies to

56:44.161 --> 56:46.272
buy American equipment as , as , uh ,

56:46.272 --> 56:48.439
as often as possible . Uh , we do make

56:48.439 --> 56:50.606
the best equipment in the world . It's

56:50.606 --> 56:52.328
the highest end kit in so many

56:52.328 --> 56:54.661
different areas , uh , and it does , uh ,

56:54.661 --> 56:56.772
enhance interoperability when they do

56:56.772 --> 56:58.995
so . Fortunately , uh , uh , uh , there

56:58.995 --> 57:01.272
is action that's being taken here , uh ,

57:01.272 --> 57:03.217
with the America First arms export

57:03.217 --> 57:05.439
strategy that the department is working

57:05.439 --> 57:05.260
on at the direction of the president .

57:05.520 --> 57:07.742
Uh , which will move several things out

57:07.742 --> 57:09.742
of the very frustrating FMS process

57:09.742 --> 57:11.853
that you described , and rightly so .

57:11.853 --> 57:11.719
I've heard that from allies time and

57:11.719 --> 57:14.052
time again , uh , in moving things , uh ,

57:14.052 --> 57:16.108
into direct commercial sales , which

57:16.108 --> 57:18.108
will speed the pace , uh , at which

57:18.108 --> 57:20.163
they can acquire . Uh , and then I'd

57:20.163 --> 57:22.275
also say that the work that Secretary

57:22.275 --> 57:24.497
Feinberg , uh , our deputy , is doing ,

57:24.497 --> 57:26.663
uh , to , uh , supercharge the defense

57:26.663 --> 57:26.360
industrial base is going to have a big

57:26.360 --> 57:28.138
payoff here and help allies get

57:28.138 --> 57:30.416
equipment quicker than they would , uh ,

57:30.416 --> 57:32.582
without those actions . General , when

57:32.582 --> 57:34.804
General Cavalli , uh , testified before

57:34.804 --> 57:37.027
Congress , he told us the current force

57:37.027 --> 57:39.193
posture was 5 brigade combat teams and

57:39.193 --> 57:41.249
2 division headquarters . He said it

57:41.249 --> 57:43.360
was his advice to maintain that force

57:43.360 --> 57:45.582
posture . Is that the force posture the

57:45.582 --> 57:47.693
same today ? Uh , Senator , we have ,

57:47.693 --> 57:49.929
uh , 11 infantry brigade combat team ,

57:50.030 --> 57:52.141
uh , returned home at the end of last

57:52.141 --> 57:54.197
year . Uh , so that's the , uh , the

57:54.197 --> 57:56.419
only adjustment that's been made . OK ,

57:56.419 --> 57:58.530
well , I want , first of all , I just

57:58.530 --> 57:58.469
want to finish by thanking you for what

57:58.469 --> 58:00.580
you're doing . Um , I , I pray all of

58:00.580 --> 58:02.636
our troops come home , home safely .

58:02.636 --> 58:04.858
Thank you . Thank you , Senator Scott ,

58:04.858 --> 58:07.659
Senator Kelly . Thank you , Mr .

58:07.669 --> 58:09.750
Chairman . Uh , General Reed .

58:10.949 --> 58:14.000
Everything happening in Iran . In the

58:14.000 --> 58:16.879
Middle East right now highlights the uh

58:16.879 --> 58:19.979
how critical the maritime domain is ,

58:20.639 --> 58:22.989
not just for our ability to sustain

58:22.989 --> 58:24.878
military operations , but for the

58:24.878 --> 58:27.399
global economy . I want to drill into

58:27.399 --> 58:29.621
this a little bit with you . So first ,

58:29.621 --> 58:32.139
on March 2nd , while docked at the port

58:32.760 --> 58:35.250
in Bahrain , the US flagged tanker

58:35.250 --> 58:38.830
Stena Imperative . Was struck by

58:38.830 --> 58:41.530
projectiles that caused a fire on board .

58:41.840 --> 58:44.007
Are you familiar with this , General ?

58:44.520 --> 58:46.576
I'm aware , Senator . Thankfully the

58:46.576 --> 58:48.798
crew is safe . Uh , one shipyard worker

58:48.798 --> 58:51.340
was killed . That vessel's part of

58:51.629 --> 58:53.840
MARAD's tanker security program . Is

58:53.840 --> 58:57.550
that correct ? That's correct . And how

58:57.550 --> 58:59.939
many tankers are enrolled in that

58:59.939 --> 59:03.500
program ? Sir , the program is

59:03.510 --> 59:05.566
fully subscribed at this point , and

59:05.566 --> 59:08.590
it's upwards of 60 , upwards of 60 .

59:09.729 --> 59:12.360
Um , um , excuse me if you're talking

59:12.360 --> 59:14.709
about the tanker security program , uh ,

59:14.800 --> 59:17.080
yes , we currently , uh , have 10 that

59:17.080 --> 59:19.370
are funded . OK , 10 that are funded .

59:19.760 --> 59:22.600
This ship , uh , Stena Imperative was

59:22.600 --> 59:26.340
one of those . It's now damaged . Um ,

59:26.739 --> 59:29.050
so obviously not a large fleet , 10

59:29.050 --> 59:32.379
ships . So when even just one of these

59:32.379 --> 59:35.899
vessels is damaged or unavailable , it

59:35.899 --> 59:38.419
can have an outsized impact . Is that

59:38.419 --> 59:41.090
correct ? That's great . So in your

59:41.090 --> 59:43.312
opening statement , you highlighted the

59:43.312 --> 59:45.423
importance of the commercial maritime

59:45.423 --> 59:47.257
industry to Transcom's strategic

59:47.257 --> 59:49.312
sealift capability during a crisis ,

59:49.409 --> 59:51.760
and I agree with that . But what we're

59:51.760 --> 59:53.482
seeing in the Middle East also

59:53.482 --> 59:55.704
demonstrates that we need to do more to

59:55.704 --> 59:58.280
support the commercial industry we rely

59:58.280 --> 01:00:01.280
on . So let me ask a

01:00:01.280 --> 01:00:04.439
practical question here . So since

01:00:04.439 --> 01:00:06.840
Transcom relies on commercial vessels

01:00:06.840 --> 01:00:10.000
that require insurance , what happens

01:00:10.000 --> 01:00:13.189
when no one is willing to insure ships

01:00:13.189 --> 01:00:16.199
that are operating in a conflict zone ?

01:00:19.810 --> 01:00:22.399
Senator , uh , thanks to the

01:00:23.129 --> 01:00:25.320
emergency program of the tanker

01:00:25.320 --> 01:00:28.129
security program , uh , the value of

01:00:28.129 --> 01:00:30.449
that for US Transportation Command is

01:00:30.449 --> 01:00:32.729
the fact that we have assured access to

01:00:32.729 --> 01:00:35.370
those ships . Uh , those ships are

01:00:35.370 --> 01:00:38.250
committing to serve with us and to

01:00:38.250 --> 01:00:40.689
partner with us , and we have the

01:00:40.689 --> 01:00:44.250
ability to to employ them in a maneuver

01:00:44.250 --> 01:00:46.969
scheme in conjunction with the , with

01:00:46.969 --> 01:00:49.780
the theater commanders . Part of that

01:00:49.780 --> 01:00:52.520
also drives us to plan with the

01:00:52.530 --> 01:00:54.474
theaters to make sure that we have

01:00:54.474 --> 01:00:56.530
force protection with them as well ,

01:00:56.530 --> 01:00:58.560
but to meet the need . We fully

01:00:58.560 --> 01:01:00.727
understand can you explain , general ,

01:01:00.727 --> 01:01:02.727
can you explain the tender security

01:01:02.727 --> 01:01:04.838
program ? That you just mentioned . I

01:01:04.838 --> 01:01:07.060
mean , is this the reinsurance that the

01:01:07.060 --> 01:01:09.393
president mentioned the other day , sir ,

01:01:09.393 --> 01:01:12.600
that the tanker security program . Uh ,

01:01:13.629 --> 01:01:16.000
are US flagged ships . No , no , no , I ,

01:01:16.120 --> 01:01:18.176
I , I , I thought you said something

01:01:18.176 --> 01:01:20.009
else . So my concern is with the

01:01:20.009 --> 01:01:22.360
insurance , right ? Can these ships in

01:01:22.360 --> 01:01:24.679
the tanker security program , the 10

01:01:24.679 --> 01:01:27.040
ships , which really 9 are available

01:01:27.040 --> 01:01:30.399
right now , are they without the

01:01:30.399 --> 01:01:33.270
required insurance because they're in a

01:01:33.270 --> 01:01:35.326
conflict zone , how does that affect

01:01:35.360 --> 01:01:38.439
their ability to be used to our benefit ?

01:01:39.409 --> 01:01:41.919
There is a provision for war risk

01:01:41.919 --> 01:01:45.010
insurance . Um , that program by and

01:01:45.010 --> 01:01:48.219
large is run by , uh , the Maritime

01:01:48.219 --> 01:01:50.441
Administration within the Department of

01:01:50.441 --> 01:01:53.399
Transportation . US Transcom works with

01:01:53.399 --> 01:01:56.770
them in , in conjunction . Um , if that

01:01:56.770 --> 01:01:59.320
is required , uh , there is a

01:01:59.320 --> 01:02:01.209
conversation and cooperation that

01:02:01.209 --> 01:02:03.264
exists between the , the two of us ,

01:02:03.264 --> 01:02:05.959
and we can . Recommend the requirement

01:02:05.959 --> 01:02:08.360
for that , at which time the carriers

01:02:08.360 --> 01:02:10.471
have the opportunity to apply for the

01:02:10.471 --> 01:02:13.270
insurance . So do you see this as an as

01:02:13.270 --> 01:02:16.719
an issue today that It's going to be

01:02:16.719 --> 01:02:18.886
challenging to get some of these ships

01:02:18.886 --> 01:02:21.052
underway through the Straits of Hormuz

01:02:21.360 --> 01:02:23.582
because of insurance issues , or do you

01:02:23.582 --> 01:02:27.189
think there's no problem ? Senator ,

01:02:27.239 --> 01:02:29.128
the challenge with transiting the

01:02:29.128 --> 01:02:31.270
strait , uh , really depends on the

01:02:31.270 --> 01:02:33.381
conditions that exist and actually to

01:02:33.381 --> 01:02:35.590
make the safe transit , uh , that will

01:02:35.590 --> 01:02:37.909
depend on the conditions at hand , uh ,

01:02:38.270 --> 01:02:41.300
that will be , uh , judged best by the

01:02:41.310 --> 01:02:43.588
theater commander in this case Centcom ,

01:02:44.310 --> 01:02:46.532
but once the conditions are set , we'll

01:02:46.532 --> 01:02:49.719
sail . So no resistance by the ,

01:02:50.370 --> 01:02:53.129
the ship owners in the tanker security

01:02:53.129 --> 01:02:55.610
program , uh , to sail as soon as

01:02:55.610 --> 01:02:58.830
Transcom says it's OK . Uh , we hold

01:02:58.830 --> 01:03:00.774
conversations with the ship owners

01:03:00.774 --> 01:03:02.941
several times a week . Uh , there's an

01:03:02.941 --> 01:03:04.886
information exchange that exists .

01:03:04.886 --> 01:03:07.108
There's also a form that we have called

01:03:07.108 --> 01:03:09.219
the executive working group . Um , in

01:03:09.219 --> 01:03:11.719
that , uh , we , we advise them of the

01:03:11.719 --> 01:03:13.941
situation . We point out to them what's

01:03:13.941 --> 01:03:15.997
going on . They fully understand the

01:03:15.997 --> 01:03:18.219
risk and they also give advice to us in

01:03:18.219 --> 01:03:20.469
terms of the best way ahead . If I

01:03:20.469 --> 01:03:22.802
could just have uh 30 more seconds , Mr .

01:03:22.802 --> 01:03:24.747
Chairman . So , you , you know , I

01:03:24.747 --> 01:03:26.747
think a lot of this highlights , we

01:03:26.747 --> 01:03:28.580
only have 10 ships in the tanker

01:03:28.580 --> 01:03:30.750
security program . Uh , MSC has a

01:03:30.750 --> 01:03:32.861
limited number of vessels . Would you

01:03:32.861 --> 01:03:34.861
agree that that our country needs a

01:03:34.861 --> 01:03:36.972
whole of government national maritime

01:03:36.972 --> 01:03:38.583
strategy ? So their maritime

01:03:38.583 --> 01:03:41.790
transportation system is prepared for

01:03:41.790 --> 01:03:44.889
crises . When we look at a conflict

01:03:45.590 --> 01:03:47.479
going across the Pacific , in the

01:03:47.479 --> 01:03:49.423
Western Pacific , let's say in the

01:03:49.423 --> 01:03:51.790
future , you know , with China , are we

01:03:51.790 --> 01:03:54.070
prepared with our current maritime

01:03:54.070 --> 01:03:57.750
industry um to support a long-term

01:03:57.750 --> 01:03:59.861
conflict with a near peer adversary ?

01:04:01.520 --> 01:04:03.742
Senator , I'll tell you that if we were

01:04:03.742 --> 01:04:05.853
given the task to go today , we would

01:04:05.853 --> 01:04:08.149
all go . We would all take what we have

01:04:08.149 --> 01:04:11.300
and we would execute and support the

01:04:11.300 --> 01:04:13.610
combatant commander and their needs

01:04:13.790 --> 01:04:15.989
based on what they require . I will

01:04:15.989 --> 01:04:18.211
tell you that there is a lot of work to

01:04:18.211 --> 01:04:20.433
be done to strengthen the health of the

01:04:20.433 --> 01:04:23.020
fleet , to strengthen the health of the .

01:04:23.590 --> 01:04:25.790
Workforce . Part of the challenge of

01:04:25.790 --> 01:04:28.629
that is cargo . Um , having cargo

01:04:28.629 --> 01:04:30.870
available will actually drive the

01:04:30.870 --> 01:04:33.189
overall plan for the demand to build

01:04:33.189 --> 01:04:35.790
ships , the demand to have the ships ,

01:04:36.050 --> 01:04:38.870
and work to be done , but by the crews .

01:04:39.030 --> 01:04:41.086
Well , thank , thank you , General ,

01:04:41.086 --> 01:04:43.141
because I'm out of time , but that's

01:04:43.141 --> 01:04:45.252
what my , and that issue is addressed

01:04:45.252 --> 01:04:47.530
in my bipartisan Ships for America Act .

01:04:47.530 --> 01:04:49.474
So I hope to move that legislation

01:04:49.474 --> 01:04:51.641
forward so you're in a better position

01:04:51.641 --> 01:04:53.863
to be able to do your job . Thank you .

01:04:53.863 --> 01:04:56.086
General Reed , have you had a chance to

01:04:56.086 --> 01:04:58.086
look at the Ships for America Act ?

01:04:58.580 --> 01:05:00.580
Senator , I have , uh , excuse me ,

01:05:00.580 --> 01:05:03.459
Chairman , I have . You have , yes , I

01:05:03.459 --> 01:05:05.459
have . What do you think about it ?

01:05:06.360 --> 01:05:08.360
He's got a pretty good suggestion ,

01:05:08.360 --> 01:05:10.469
don't you think ? Chairman , there ,

01:05:10.679 --> 01:05:13.360
there are a lot of aspects in that ,

01:05:13.439 --> 01:05:16.080
and it's incredibly comprehensive , and

01:05:16.080 --> 01:05:18.790
uh it does address a lot of things , uh ,

01:05:18.919 --> 01:05:21.830
but it does . Bring home the fact that

01:05:21.830 --> 01:05:23.969
we do need a comprehensive approach

01:05:23.969 --> 01:05:27.149
with comprehensive investment and we

01:05:27.149 --> 01:05:29.260
also need to make sure that there's a

01:05:29.260 --> 01:05:31.659
provision to invite to invite the

01:05:31.659 --> 01:05:34.389
commercial leaders as well to help us

01:05:34.389 --> 01:05:36.810
through this . In the end , the

01:05:36.810 --> 01:05:38.977
fundamental success will ultimately be

01:05:38.977 --> 01:05:41.389
driven by the amount of cargo and when

01:05:41.389 --> 01:05:43.629
we have cargo that will drive the

01:05:43.629 --> 01:05:46.350
demand for shipping , we'll find a way

01:05:46.350 --> 01:05:48.679
to actually construct here . And then

01:05:48.679 --> 01:05:50.790
we'll actually have the , the , the ,

01:05:50.790 --> 01:05:53.012
uh , crews because they'll have work to

01:05:53.012 --> 01:05:55.290
do . Well , thank you for that insight ,

01:05:55.290 --> 01:05:59.250
uh , Senator Sheehy . Thank

01:05:59.250 --> 01:06:01.330
you Mr . Chairman , and um , I would

01:06:01.330 --> 01:06:03.386
second what Senator Kelly was saying

01:06:03.386 --> 01:06:05.552
and some others that , uh , we need to

01:06:05.552 --> 01:06:07.663
be focusing not just on our exquisite

01:06:07.663 --> 01:06:09.886
platforms but also the broader capacity

01:06:09.886 --> 01:06:11.941
of the logistics system that's gonna

01:06:11.941 --> 01:06:13.997
support that front line fight and to

01:06:13.997 --> 01:06:16.108
that end , uh , to General Reed , and

01:06:16.108 --> 01:06:15.050
I'm sorry you're getting all the

01:06:15.050 --> 01:06:17.290
inbounds here , but , um , specifically

01:06:17.290 --> 01:06:19.179
I'd like to talk about our future

01:06:19.179 --> 01:06:21.290
airlift platforms . We spend a lot of

01:06:21.290 --> 01:06:23.290
time in these hearing rooms talking

01:06:23.290 --> 01:06:25.889
about the F-47 and the B-21 . And the

01:06:25.889 --> 01:06:28.330
F-35 and the F-22 and and of course

01:06:28.330 --> 01:06:30.497
those are all critical platforms , but

01:06:30.497 --> 01:06:32.386
uh at the end of the day , moving

01:06:32.386 --> 01:06:34.497
material into theater , especially as

01:06:34.497 --> 01:06:36.497
we evaluate uh a Westpac engagement

01:06:36.497 --> 01:06:38.497
with a peer adversary , I don't say

01:06:38.497 --> 01:06:40.663
near peer because I believe we're in a

01:06:40.663 --> 01:06:42.886
peer to peer situation now with China ,

01:06:42.886 --> 01:06:45.219
uh , physically moving people , bullets ,

01:06:45.219 --> 01:06:48.050
bombs , food , clothes , physically

01:06:48.050 --> 01:06:51.330
moving millions of tons of gear halfway

01:06:51.330 --> 01:06:53.108
around the world quickly . Uh ,

01:06:53.108 --> 01:06:54.997
Especially in an area where we're

01:06:54.997 --> 01:06:57.219
fighting in someone else's backyard and

01:06:57.219 --> 01:06:59.330
we're having to project that material

01:06:59.330 --> 01:07:01.441
around the world to tiny islands that

01:07:01.441 --> 01:07:03.552
we may or not be in control of . Uh ,

01:07:03.860 --> 01:07:07.100
our C5s are , I've heard in some cases ,

01:07:07.179 --> 01:07:09.459
40% dispatch reliability . They're half

01:07:09.459 --> 01:07:12.020
century old , if not more . Our C-17s ,

01:07:12.070 --> 01:07:14.126
as incredible platform as they are ,

01:07:14.126 --> 01:07:16.739
are also aging , and , uh , as far as I

01:07:16.739 --> 01:07:18.572
know , we don't currently have a

01:07:18.572 --> 01:07:20.459
follow-on long range heavy lift

01:07:20.459 --> 01:07:23.020
logistics aircraft that's been decided

01:07:23.020 --> 01:07:25.020
on , awarded , and certainly not in

01:07:25.020 --> 01:07:27.353
production , but it isn't quite even in ,

01:07:27.353 --> 01:07:29.464
uh , uh , decided conceptual stages .

01:07:29.464 --> 01:07:31.576
And when we look at how challenging a

01:07:31.576 --> 01:07:34.479
KC-46 program has been to roll out , uh ,

01:07:34.560 --> 01:07:36.782
to replace , uh , I still hear that the

01:07:36.782 --> 01:07:38.949
the last KC-135 pilot hasn't been born

01:07:38.949 --> 01:07:41.060
yet , and that's probably true , uh ,

01:07:41.060 --> 01:07:43.080
and the KC-46 rollout has been very

01:07:43.080 --> 01:07:45.191
problematic . So , I think we need to

01:07:45.191 --> 01:07:47.524
have a very serious focused effort , um ,

01:07:47.524 --> 01:07:49.636
this committee does , but also , um ,

01:07:49.636 --> 01:07:51.413
at the general officer level of

01:07:51.413 --> 01:07:53.159
focusing on bringing that next

01:07:53.159 --> 01:07:55.437
generation heavy airlift platform , uh ,

01:07:55.437 --> 01:07:57.459
into reality . And whether that's

01:07:57.459 --> 01:07:59.459
restart on the C-17 with some great

01:07:59.459 --> 01:08:01.348
upgrades , uh , or whether that's

01:08:01.348 --> 01:08:03.459
reimagining a new platform , whatever

01:08:03.459 --> 01:08:05.570
we do , we gotta do it quick . So I'd

01:08:05.570 --> 01:08:04.760
like your thoughts on that , please .

01:08:04.939 --> 01:08:06.717
And I understand you're not the

01:08:06.717 --> 01:08:08.550
procurement command for this . I

01:08:08.550 --> 01:08:08.340
realize you're the customer of this

01:08:08.340 --> 01:08:10.284
platform , but I think part of the

01:08:10.284 --> 01:08:12.229
defense acquisition paradigm we're

01:08:12.229 --> 01:08:14.340
trying to change at this committee is

01:08:14.340 --> 01:08:16.562
making sure the customer is closer to ,

01:08:16.562 --> 01:08:18.784
to the actual specification process for

01:08:18.784 --> 01:08:20.784
the platforms because we've , we've

01:08:20.784 --> 01:08:22.896
given the power to the PEOs and , and

01:08:22.896 --> 01:08:25.118
the , the contract officers and , and .

01:08:25.118 --> 01:08:27.173
The , the most powerful voice in any

01:08:27.173 --> 01:08:29.062
acquisition process should be the

01:08:29.062 --> 01:08:31.173
actual end user customer . So you and

01:08:31.173 --> 01:08:33.284
your captains and majors flying these

01:08:33.284 --> 01:08:32.679
planes and driving these ships should

01:08:32.679 --> 01:08:34.846
be the ones driving the requirements ,

01:08:34.846 --> 01:08:36.957
not bureaucrats somewhere else . So ,

01:08:36.957 --> 01:08:39.123
if you could talk to us about next-gen

01:08:39.123 --> 01:08:41.179
airlift and , and where you think it

01:08:41.179 --> 01:08:40.238
needs to go , I'd appreciate that .

01:08:41.628 --> 01:08:43.869
Thank you . Our primary job at Transcom

01:08:43.869 --> 01:08:46.258
is to set the conditions to , to move ,

01:08:46.269 --> 01:08:48.749
um , within the headquarters , excuse

01:08:48.749 --> 01:08:49.048
me .

01:08:54.479 --> 01:08:56.535
We frequently start with the idea we

01:08:56.535 --> 01:08:58.368
need to set the globe to set the

01:08:58.368 --> 01:09:00.423
theater . What that means is we have

01:09:00.423 --> 01:09:02.590
aircraft that are operating around the

01:09:02.590 --> 01:09:04.646
world each day along with sea lift ,

01:09:04.646 --> 01:09:07.080
but when a crisis arises , there's the

01:09:07.080 --> 01:09:09.640
need to make the shift . Uh , once we

01:09:09.640 --> 01:09:12.529
do that , uh . Every aircraft that we

01:09:12.529 --> 01:09:15.479
have available that already originates

01:09:15.479 --> 01:09:18.979
in the region , we employ them directly .

01:09:19.319 --> 01:09:21.439
All the aircraft that we have here in

01:09:21.439 --> 01:09:23.959
the United States , we generate that

01:09:23.959 --> 01:09:25.792
and then we build the network to

01:09:25.792 --> 01:09:28.529
connect the two . Our C-17s and our

01:09:28.529 --> 01:09:31.810
C-5s , uh , are the most capable things

01:09:31.810 --> 01:09:34.169
in the world right now to make that

01:09:34.169 --> 01:09:36.370
bridge to get the force out of the

01:09:36.370 --> 01:09:38.850
United States . That's incredibly key

01:09:38.850 --> 01:09:41.089
because greater than 85% of the joint

01:09:41.089 --> 01:09:43.330
force still resides here . And so when

01:09:43.330 --> 01:09:45.490
they're needed abroad , those are the

01:09:45.490 --> 01:09:47.750
aircraft that we use to start that that

01:09:47.750 --> 01:09:50.279
move . The challenge that we have

01:09:50.279 --> 01:09:52.439
predominantly with our with our

01:09:52.439 --> 01:09:55.040
competitor is that they are actively

01:09:55.040 --> 01:09:58.339
developing weapon systems to threaten

01:09:58.479 --> 01:10:01.040
our aircraft . And so not only do we

01:10:01.040 --> 01:10:03.096
need new aircraft to get us into the

01:10:03.096 --> 01:10:05.318
future , we also need the aircraft that

01:10:05.318 --> 01:10:07.540
are more survivable . So in dealing

01:10:07.540 --> 01:10:09.540
with the Air Force , we are working

01:10:09.540 --> 01:10:11.651
with them on the requirements to meet

01:10:11.651 --> 01:10:13.879
that , um , but also to track the

01:10:13.879 --> 01:10:15.823
development of the threats as they

01:10:15.823 --> 01:10:17.439
emerge from , from our , our

01:10:17.439 --> 01:10:21.149
competitors . When I'd also

01:10:21.149 --> 01:10:23.029
encourage us to explore all

01:10:23.029 --> 01:10:25.350
alternatives , expanding and having a

01:10:25.350 --> 01:10:27.183
wider guarantee for our contract

01:10:27.183 --> 01:10:29.779
operated cargo carriers , um , not best

01:10:29.779 --> 01:10:31.779
for contested environments , but at

01:10:31.779 --> 01:10:34.112
least they can get tonnage forward , um ,

01:10:34.112 --> 01:10:35.835
and then exploring things like

01:10:35.835 --> 01:10:37.779
amphibious aircraft or even , uh ,

01:10:37.779 --> 01:10:39.946
submarines that can provide logistical

01:10:39.946 --> 01:10:41.890
support . Subs have typically been

01:10:41.890 --> 01:10:43.668
reserved for exquisite tactical

01:10:43.668 --> 01:10:45.779
missions as they should . But um when

01:10:45.779 --> 01:10:48.001
we're gonna be operating in a Westpac 1

01:10:48.001 --> 01:10:50.279
2nd island chain contested environment ,

01:10:50.279 --> 01:10:50.229
uh , literally moving logistics under

01:10:50.229 --> 01:10:52.062
the water uh where we still have

01:10:52.062 --> 01:10:54.062
dominance . So thanks for your time

01:10:54.062 --> 01:10:56.340
today . I yield back , sir . Thank you ,

01:10:56.340 --> 01:10:59.220
Senator Sheehy . We have Senator King

01:10:59.220 --> 01:11:02.810
and then Senator Hirono . Thank you ,

01:11:02.839 --> 01:11:04.950
Mr . Chairman . There's been a lot of

01:11:04.950 --> 01:11:08.000
confusion about the war and uh the uh

01:11:08.000 --> 01:11:10.200
the effects , the causes , why we did

01:11:10.200 --> 01:11:12.367
it , why we didn't , what our strategy

01:11:12.367 --> 01:11:14.533
is . But one thing has emerged just in

01:11:14.533 --> 01:11:16.589
the last few days , there is a clear

01:11:16.589 --> 01:11:18.700
winner in this war . The clear winner

01:11:18.700 --> 01:11:21.100
is Vladimir Putin and Russia . Uh ,

01:11:21.220 --> 01:11:23.387
estimates released a few hours ago are

01:11:23.387 --> 01:11:26.859
that Russia has reaped $6 billion of

01:11:26.859 --> 01:11:28.915
benefit from this war since it began

01:11:28.915 --> 01:11:31.081
just two weeks ago . That's about $400

01:11:31.081 --> 01:11:33.259
billion a day from the increase in oil

01:11:33.259 --> 01:11:35.620
prices and the easing , the easing of

01:11:35.620 --> 01:11:37.787
sanctions , which is somewhat puzzling

01:11:37.787 --> 01:11:40.419
to me . Uh , so I just think the record

01:11:40.419 --> 01:11:42.586
should show that . Uh , the , the real

01:11:42.586 --> 01:11:44.870
winner so far is , uh , is Vladimir

01:11:44.870 --> 01:11:47.810
Putin , uh , to the tune of $6 billion

01:11:47.810 --> 01:11:51.549
in two weeks . Um , General Reed , can

01:11:51.549 --> 01:11:53.716
you give me a percentage if we had a ,

01:11:53.750 --> 01:11:56.750
a , a , a serious need for transport ,

01:11:56.830 --> 01:11:59.163
what percentage of the transport on the ,

01:11:59.470 --> 01:12:01.414
on the sea and in the air would be

01:12:01.414 --> 01:12:03.303
commercial carriers who are under

01:12:03.589 --> 01:12:05.350
contract to Transcom ?

01:12:08.149 --> 01:12:10.669
Senator , uh , day to day in

01:12:10.669 --> 01:12:14.350
competition , uh , about 40% of what we

01:12:14.350 --> 01:12:17.089
fly around the skies is commercial . Uh ,

01:12:17.229 --> 01:12:19.870
when we transition to crisis or

01:12:19.870 --> 01:12:22.390
conflict , uh , we make a conscious

01:12:22.390 --> 01:12:24.750
decision on where we actually employ

01:12:24.750 --> 01:12:27.540
the commercial aircraft . Um , even as

01:12:27.540 --> 01:12:29.859
we're supporting operations in Centcom

01:12:29.859 --> 01:12:32.899
today , uh , the commercial airlines

01:12:32.899 --> 01:12:36.120
are supporting us , um , in high volume

01:12:36.339 --> 01:12:38.672
in places outside the theater . So in a ,

01:12:38.672 --> 01:12:41.100
in a conflict situation , that 40%

01:12:41.100 --> 01:12:44.399
would go up , I presume . Uh , if it's

01:12:44.399 --> 01:12:46.479
required , yes . Um , in the case of

01:12:46.479 --> 01:12:49.270
sea lift , uh , once the ready reserve

01:12:49.270 --> 01:12:51.839
force makes the initial surge , uh ,

01:12:51.990 --> 01:12:53.720
commercial really plays in for

01:12:53.720 --> 01:12:56.560
sustainment , and greater than 90% of

01:12:56.560 --> 01:12:58.600
all the sustainment is done by the

01:12:58.600 --> 01:13:00.600
commercial fleet . OK , that's what

01:13:00.600 --> 01:13:04.390
worries me , uh . You

01:13:04.390 --> 01:13:06.819
have controlled and I'm sure pay great

01:13:06.819 --> 01:13:09.740
attention to cyber possibilities . But

01:13:09.740 --> 01:13:11.740
we're talking about hundreds if not

01:13:11.740 --> 01:13:13.796
thousands of commercial carriers who

01:13:13.796 --> 01:13:16.018
may or may not be as secure in terms of

01:13:16.018 --> 01:13:18.500
cyber as you are . Uh , my question is ,

01:13:18.859 --> 01:13:22.779
what steps do we take to ensure that

01:13:22.779 --> 01:13:25.950
this , you said 90% on the ships , 40% ,

01:13:26.060 --> 01:13:28.979
50% , 60% in the air , are commercial

01:13:28.979 --> 01:13:31.959
carriers , to ensure that they are

01:13:32.459 --> 01:13:34.626
protected from a cyberattack . Because

01:13:34.626 --> 01:13:37.600
if we're in a serious conflict , With a

01:13:37.600 --> 01:13:39.822
significant adversary , the first thing

01:13:39.822 --> 01:13:41.711
that's going to happen is a major

01:13:41.711 --> 01:13:43.878
cyberattack to attempt to blind us and

01:13:43.878 --> 01:13:46.044
disable our transportation system . Do

01:13:46.044 --> 01:13:47.878
you red team , for example , the

01:13:47.878 --> 01:13:49.933
commercial carriers to determine the

01:13:49.933 --> 01:13:52.044
extent of their cyber vulnerability ?

01:13:52.689 --> 01:13:54.856
Senator , we do , and there's a lot of

01:13:54.856 --> 01:13:57.000
cooperation in that realm . Uh , we

01:13:57.000 --> 01:13:59.056
operate mainly through two different

01:13:59.056 --> 01:14:01.290
channels . So within the Department of

01:14:01.290 --> 01:14:04.279
War , uh , when we organize and plan ,

01:14:04.410 --> 01:14:06.589
uh , that is done on secure systems ,

01:14:06.609 --> 01:14:08.776
and we have a lot of help to make sure

01:14:08.776 --> 01:14:10.942
that . Uh , we can protect ourselves .

01:14:10.942 --> 01:14:12.998
I understand that . What I'm worried

01:14:12.998 --> 01:14:15.109
about is , is Delta Airlines security

01:14:15.109 --> 01:14:16.740
if they're called upon to be

01:14:16.740 --> 01:14:18.970
transporting troops and the extent to

01:14:18.970 --> 01:14:20.914
which they can be penetrated their

01:14:20.914 --> 01:14:23.192
systems , not yours , but theirs . Yes ,

01:14:23.192 --> 01:14:25.500
Senator , once that planning is

01:14:25.500 --> 01:14:28.060
complete , uh , we do have some secure

01:14:28.060 --> 01:14:29.759
channels with the commercial

01:14:30.899 --> 01:14:34.180
transportation providers and also we

01:14:34.180 --> 01:14:36.419
red team and we cooperate and provide

01:14:36.419 --> 01:14:39.740
help with them for cyber hygiene . Um ,

01:14:39.790 --> 01:14:42.068
among some of the sources are CyberCom ,

01:14:42.549 --> 01:14:45.459
National Security Agency , as well as

01:14:45.459 --> 01:14:47.348
the Department of War Cyber Crime

01:14:47.348 --> 01:14:49.403
Center . I , I , I would urge you to

01:14:49.403 --> 01:14:51.626
step up those efforts because this is ,

01:14:51.626 --> 01:14:53.626
this is where the first wave of the

01:14:53.626 --> 01:14:55.792
attack is going to come . Uh , General

01:14:55.792 --> 01:14:57.848
Grinkowitz , uh . To what extent are

01:14:57.848 --> 01:14:59.903
the Russians , and there's been some

01:14:59.903 --> 01:15:01.740
discussion about this probing in

01:15:01.740 --> 01:15:04.819
Eastern Europe and and doing uh uh

01:15:04.819 --> 01:15:06.986
asymmetric warfare in in the Baltics ,

01:15:07.020 --> 01:15:09.049
for example , in Poland , um ,

01:15:09.370 --> 01:15:12.459
disinformation , cyber attacks , even

01:15:12.459 --> 01:15:15.339
drone incursions . Uh , what are the

01:15:15.339 --> 01:15:17.283
Russians up to ? Are they building

01:15:17.283 --> 01:15:19.620
troops up along along their western

01:15:19.620 --> 01:15:22.689
border ? Yes , Senator , right now , uh ,

01:15:22.990 --> 01:15:26.270
we , uh , we see , uh , a fairly robust

01:15:26.270 --> 01:15:28.381
amount of what we call Russian hybrid

01:15:28.381 --> 01:15:30.492
activities or asymmetric activities ,

01:15:30.492 --> 01:15:32.381
and you mentioned some of those ,

01:15:32.381 --> 01:15:34.548
whether it's information operations or

01:15:34.548 --> 01:15:36.548
sabotage , and , and those types of

01:15:36.548 --> 01:15:38.659
things . Um , there have been several

01:15:38.659 --> 01:15:40.881
incidences , uh , in the Baltics and in

01:15:40.881 --> 01:15:40.350
Poland , uh , in particular over the

01:15:40.350 --> 01:15:42.461
last , uh , several months since I've

01:15:42.461 --> 01:15:44.100
been in command . As far as

01:15:44.100 --> 01:15:46.419
conventional troop buildups , uh , most

01:15:46.419 --> 01:15:49.169
of the Russian ground forces are

01:15:49.319 --> 01:15:51.819
focused on Ukraine , so we do not see

01:15:51.819 --> 01:15:54.097
significant Russian buildups right now .

01:15:54.097 --> 01:15:56.319
Uh , but I know that there are concerns

01:15:56.319 --> 01:15:58.263
that those could be coming at some

01:15:58.263 --> 01:16:00.486
point in the future , particularly once

01:16:00.486 --> 01:16:02.375
Russia's able to reconstitute its

01:16:02.375 --> 01:16:04.708
forces . And if , if you , if there was ,

01:16:04.708 --> 01:16:06.597
if Vladimir , uh , I'm sorry , if

01:16:06.597 --> 01:16:08.541
President Zelensky was here , what

01:16:08.541 --> 01:16:10.763
would be the one thing he would tell us

01:16:10.763 --> 01:16:13.319
that he needed right now ? Senator you

01:16:13.319 --> 01:16:15.640
hear that that fairly regularly . Yes

01:16:15.640 --> 01:16:17.584
sir , he would ask for air defense

01:16:17.584 --> 01:16:20.390
capability based on the Russian attacks

01:16:20.390 --> 01:16:23.200
on his his heating and electrical

01:16:23.200 --> 01:16:25.256
infrastructure , and a great deal of

01:16:25.256 --> 01:16:27.422
our air defense capability is now tied

01:16:27.422 --> 01:16:29.756
up in the Gulf region . Is that correct ?

01:16:29.756 --> 01:16:32.089
Uh , Senator , yeah , we , we do have a

01:16:32.089 --> 01:16:34.390
robust set of air defense capabilities

01:16:34.390 --> 01:16:36.557
in the , in the Middle East , and I've

01:16:36.557 --> 01:16:38.390
used some of our UCO air defense

01:16:38.390 --> 01:16:40.612
capabilities to defend some of our NATO

01:16:40.612 --> 01:16:42.890
allies as well . In the Middle East Uh ,

01:16:43.689 --> 01:16:45.911
near the Middle East , if you will , in

01:16:45.911 --> 01:16:48.022
the eastern Mediterranean . OK , so ,

01:16:48.022 --> 01:16:50.133
so air defense capabilities have been

01:16:50.133 --> 01:16:52.022
moved toward the Middle East as a

01:16:52.022 --> 01:16:53.967
result of this conflict . That's ,

01:16:53.967 --> 01:16:56.133
that's correct . Yes sir , thank you .

01:16:56.133 --> 01:16:58.411
Absolutely , thank you , Mr . Chairman .

01:16:58.411 --> 01:17:00.689
Senator Cotton . Thank you , gentlemen .

01:17:00.689 --> 01:17:02.911
Thank you for your appearance today and

01:17:02.911 --> 01:17:04.911
more importantly for your service .

01:17:04.911 --> 01:17:07.133
General Grikowic , um , it's well known

01:17:07.133 --> 01:17:09.078
that Iran has supplied Russia with

01:17:09.078 --> 01:17:11.229
hundreds , maybe thousands of one-way

01:17:11.229 --> 01:17:13.285
attack drones since the start of the

01:17:13.285 --> 01:17:15.669
Ukraine conflict . Um , I assume you

01:17:15.669 --> 01:17:17.891
agree that passing on the counter drone

01:17:17.891 --> 01:17:20.109
warfare lessons that Ukraine and UCO

01:17:20.109 --> 01:17:22.629
has learned , um , from that fight to

01:17:22.629 --> 01:17:24.962
the forces in the Middle East today and ,

01:17:25.069 --> 01:17:26.902
and also to the Pacific is a top

01:17:26.902 --> 01:17:29.236
priority , right ? Absolutely , Senator ,

01:17:29.236 --> 01:17:31.236
and we are doing that and deploying

01:17:31.236 --> 01:17:33.347
capabilities into the Middle East for

01:17:33.347 --> 01:17:35.347
those purposes . Could you use some

01:17:35.347 --> 01:17:37.569
additional funds to ensure that we have

01:17:37.569 --> 01:17:39.680
all the right people and processes to

01:17:39.680 --> 01:17:41.902
capture all those lessons and implement

01:17:41.902 --> 01:17:44.069
them , Senator ? More funds for things

01:17:44.069 --> 01:17:46.291
like that is always welcome . I agree .

01:17:46.291 --> 01:17:48.513
um , and I look forward to working with

01:17:48.513 --> 01:17:50.625
the committee to consider the funding

01:17:50.625 --> 01:17:52.180
for the NDAA or a potential

01:17:52.180 --> 01:17:54.458
supplemental , uh , down the road . Uh ,

01:17:54.458 --> 01:17:56.680
I know that the experience that Ukraine

01:17:56.680 --> 01:17:58.736
has had and that UCO's had , uh , in

01:17:58.736 --> 01:18:01.459
that fight . Has saved lives in the

01:18:01.459 --> 01:18:03.899
Middle East today . Um

01:18:05.430 --> 01:18:07.597
General , can you tell us a little bit

01:18:07.597 --> 01:18:09.708
about what's going on on the southern

01:18:09.708 --> 01:18:11.763
flank of Yukon in Cyprus right now ?

01:18:11.779 --> 01:18:13.890
Yes , Senator , down in the , uh , we

01:18:13.890 --> 01:18:16.001
have a fair amount of activity in the

01:18:16.001 --> 01:18:18.168
eastern Mediterranean . Our destroyers

01:18:18.168 --> 01:18:20.335
are out in the eastern Mediterranean ,

01:18:20.335 --> 01:18:22.557
uh , defending our allies and defending

01:18:22.557 --> 01:18:24.723
our US forces in that region . Several

01:18:24.723 --> 01:18:26.835
of , uh , several capabilities are on

01:18:26.835 --> 01:18:29.001
the island of Cyprus . I could go into

01:18:29.001 --> 01:18:28.540
some of the details of what those are

01:18:28.540 --> 01:18:30.707
in the classified session , but we are

01:18:30.707 --> 01:18:32.818
very , uh , very much watching that .

01:18:32.818 --> 01:18:34.873
There have been a few one-way attack

01:18:34.873 --> 01:18:37.040
drones that we've assessed , uh , have

01:18:37.040 --> 01:18:39.318
come from somewhere , likely from , uh ,

01:18:39.318 --> 01:18:41.540
from Lebanon . Towards Cyprus and so we

01:18:41.540 --> 01:18:43.707
are focused on defending that piece of

01:18:43.707 --> 01:18:47.609
terrain . OK , thank you . You're no

01:18:47.609 --> 01:18:50.229
fodder pilot , right ? Yes sir ,

01:18:50.310 --> 01:18:54.140
sixteens and twenty-twos . Yes sir . Um ,

01:18:55.250 --> 01:18:57.250
Well , I , I think that the men and

01:18:57.250 --> 01:18:59.472
women we have in uniform . Um , are the

01:18:59.472 --> 01:19:01.528
best fighting force in the world . I

01:19:01.528 --> 01:19:03.639
know you agree and that our Air Force

01:19:03.639 --> 01:19:05.861
and Navy right now are on the forefront

01:19:05.861 --> 01:19:08.028
of the current campaign Operation Epic

01:19:08.028 --> 01:19:10.139
Fury . So I have just a few questions

01:19:10.139 --> 01:19:12.306
about what they may be seeing based on

01:19:12.306 --> 01:19:14.472
your tactical experience . How complex

01:19:14.472 --> 01:19:16.859
of an operation . Is it for our

01:19:17.319 --> 01:19:19.541
fighters to conduct a campaign the size

01:19:19.541 --> 01:19:22.810
of Operation Epic Fury ? Uh , Senator ,

01:19:23.169 --> 01:19:25.391
based on my , uh , my experience , uh ,

01:19:25.529 --> 01:19:27.640
looking at campaigns like this in the

01:19:27.640 --> 01:19:29.862
past , it is incredibly complex and the

01:19:29.862 --> 01:19:32.029
sequence of events and the technical ,

01:19:32.029 --> 01:19:33.973
uh , acumen that's required at the

01:19:33.973 --> 01:19:36.196
operational or tactical level is , uh ,

01:19:36.196 --> 01:19:38.307
is quite high . It's my understanding

01:19:38.307 --> 01:19:40.418
from the briefings that the secretary

01:19:40.418 --> 01:19:42.640
and the chairman have given is that our

01:19:42.640 --> 01:19:44.862
combined force and the CITO commander ,

01:19:44.862 --> 01:19:46.973
I should say that the combined forces

01:19:46.973 --> 01:19:49.140
dropped no less than 5000 bombs on key

01:19:49.140 --> 01:19:51.330
enemy targets . Um , how impressive is

01:19:51.330 --> 01:19:53.552
it for our bombers to execute a mission

01:19:53.552 --> 01:19:55.497
of that size with such precision ?

01:19:56.399 --> 01:19:58.799
Senator , that's a , a very powerful

01:19:58.799 --> 01:20:01.132
demonstration of American strength , uh ,

01:20:01.200 --> 01:20:04.060
and , uh , uh , to orchestrate that

01:20:04.060 --> 01:20:06.116
size of a campaign , I think Admiral

01:20:06.116 --> 01:20:08.227
Coopermint , uh , you know , deserves

01:20:08.227 --> 01:20:10.393
great , great praise for how he's been

01:20:10.393 --> 01:20:12.560
able to manage that at the operational

01:20:12.560 --> 01:20:14.671
level . Yeah , General Kaine has said

01:20:14.671 --> 01:20:16.893
that ballistic missile attacks continue

01:20:16.893 --> 01:20:18.727
to trend downward 90% from where

01:20:18.727 --> 01:20:20.782
they've started , and one-way attack

01:20:20.782 --> 01:20:22.782
drones have decreased 83% since the

01:20:22.782 --> 01:20:24.504
beginning of the operation . A

01:20:24.504 --> 01:20:26.671
testament to our air defenders and our

01:20:26.671 --> 01:20:28.893
air defense system . Um , based on your

01:20:28.893 --> 01:20:31.060
experience flying those fighters , I ,

01:20:31.060 --> 01:20:33.060
I would assume that you would agree

01:20:33.060 --> 01:20:35.227
with him that Operation Epic Fury is a

01:20:35.227 --> 01:20:38.250
real testament to those . Young men and

01:20:38.250 --> 01:20:40.083
women we have on the front lines

01:20:40.083 --> 01:20:42.028
operating those systems and flying

01:20:42.028 --> 01:20:44.083
those aircraft . Senator , I would ,

01:20:44.083 --> 01:20:45.972
and you know , I'll just take the

01:20:45.972 --> 01:20:48.083
opportunity to say it's always better

01:20:48.083 --> 01:20:50.306
to get the archer than the arrows , and

01:20:50.306 --> 01:20:50.100
so the offensive counterair aspect of

01:20:50.100 --> 01:20:52.100
this that is being prosecuted in US

01:20:52.100 --> 01:20:54.322
Central Command , uh , is as impressive

01:20:54.322 --> 01:20:56.489
as the defensive side of things . OK .

01:20:56.489 --> 01:20:58.779
Uh , General Reed , you also have prior

01:20:58.779 --> 01:21:01.339
experience in the cockpit . Um , how

01:21:01.339 --> 01:21:03.540
impressive is it that our tanker fleet

01:21:03.540 --> 01:21:05.262
has supported these continuous

01:21:05.262 --> 01:21:07.373
operations in the Middle East for the

01:21:07.373 --> 01:21:09.596
largest air campaign in recent memory ?

01:21:10.609 --> 01:21:12.620
The tanker fleet has been very

01:21:12.620 --> 01:21:15.259
impressive to get the forces across the

01:21:15.259 --> 01:21:18.459
ocean and to get them into CEO . Um ,

01:21:18.540 --> 01:21:20.939
I'm also very grateful to my friend

01:21:20.939 --> 01:21:23.106
here who's also been able to help with

01:21:23.106 --> 01:21:25.328
the portion of his fleet , but the fact

01:21:25.328 --> 01:21:27.495
that we were able to get our forces in

01:21:27.495 --> 01:21:29.606
place to get defense set and to go on

01:21:29.606 --> 01:21:31.772
the offensive is quite impressive . Do

01:21:31.772 --> 01:21:33.828
you think there's any other force in

01:21:33.828 --> 01:21:35.717
the world that has the tanker and

01:21:35.717 --> 01:21:37.529
mobility aircraft to sustain an

01:21:37.529 --> 01:21:39.879
operation like Epic Fury ? Not to the

01:21:39.879 --> 01:21:42.101
scale that we can at the moment . Thank

01:21:42.101 --> 01:21:44.323
you . Yeah , I didn't think so either .

01:21:44.323 --> 01:21:44.080
All right , thank you , gentlemen .

01:21:45.009 --> 01:21:47.065
Thank you , Senator Cotton . Senator

01:21:47.065 --> 01:21:49.370
Blumenthal . Thank you , Mr . Chairman .

01:21:49.490 --> 01:21:51.434
Uh , thank you both for being here

01:21:51.434 --> 01:21:55.229
today and , and for your . Service , um .

01:21:56.729 --> 01:22:00.000
General Grinkwich , um , I've recently

01:22:00.000 --> 01:22:03.859
visited Ukraine . And uh .

01:22:04.549 --> 01:22:08.120
In addition to Going to

01:22:08.120 --> 01:22:11.770
Odessa . To visit with the .

01:22:12.549 --> 01:22:14.629
And women of the Ukrainian armed

01:22:14.629 --> 01:22:16.685
services who were serving there also

01:22:16.685 --> 01:22:18.518
met with the American Chamber of

01:22:18.518 --> 01:22:21.109
Commerce , 600 major businesses .

01:22:21.990 --> 01:22:24.640
With operations in Ukraine , almost

01:22:24.649 --> 01:22:28.430
half of them . have been Targeted

01:22:28.609 --> 01:22:30.819
and attacked . By Russia

01:22:32.750 --> 01:22:35.600
Within days of my visit , an Oreo

01:22:35.600 --> 01:22:39.390
manufacturing plant . Was hit by .

01:22:40.879 --> 01:22:43.799
Russian attacks Uh , are you looking

01:22:43.799 --> 01:22:46.910
into the attacks on American businesses

01:22:47.399 --> 01:22:49.621
in Ukraine ? Are you familiar with that

01:22:50.169 --> 01:22:52.250
issue , Senator , I am familiar with

01:22:52.250 --> 01:22:54.569
that . Uh , this is mostly managed

01:22:54.569 --> 01:22:56.625
through the US embassy in Kiev , who

01:22:56.625 --> 01:22:58.847
takes those reports and sends them back

01:22:58.847 --> 01:23:01.069
through State Department channels , but

01:23:01.069 --> 01:23:03.013
our defense attache office is also

01:23:03.013 --> 01:23:05.180
aware of them and reports them to me .

01:23:05.180 --> 01:23:05.120
Are you taking action to protect those

01:23:05.120 --> 01:23:08.790
businesses ? Uh , Sir , we are , we

01:23:08.790 --> 01:23:11.750
are , uh , not taking any direct action ,

01:23:11.870 --> 01:23:14.037
uh , but I would tell you that all the

01:23:14.037 --> 01:23:16.037
support that the department and the

01:23:16.037 --> 01:23:18.314
United States provides to Ukraine , uh ,

01:23:18.314 --> 01:23:20.314
is , uh , certainly going to have a

01:23:20.314 --> 01:23:22.314
benefit for those businesses as the

01:23:22.314 --> 01:23:24.203
Ukrainians fight back against the

01:23:24.203 --> 01:23:26.314
Russian assaults . Isn't an attack on

01:23:26.314 --> 01:23:28.537
those businesses in effect an attack on

01:23:28.537 --> 01:23:32.299
American interests ? Sir , on

01:23:32.299 --> 01:23:34.077
American property , is it not ?

01:23:34.879 --> 01:23:37.157
Certainly it is , uh , Senator . I , I ,

01:23:37.819 --> 01:23:40.041
I think it's a , it's a complex issue ,

01:23:40.279 --> 01:23:42.379
uh , and , uh , you know , from a

01:23:42.379 --> 01:23:44.546
policy perspective , the approach that

01:23:44.546 --> 01:23:46.435
we've taken is to try to help the

01:23:46.435 --> 01:23:48.490
Ukrainians to defend things that are

01:23:48.490 --> 01:23:50.268
within their country as best as

01:23:50.268 --> 01:23:49.859
possible . And so that's where we're

01:23:49.859 --> 01:23:51.779
focused in Yukon . Wouldn't you

01:23:51.779 --> 01:23:53.819
recommend that we take a more

01:23:53.819 --> 01:23:57.149
aggressive posture ? Vis a vis Russia ,

01:23:57.410 --> 01:23:59.354
when it's attacking our businesses

01:23:59.354 --> 01:24:01.919
purposefully , these are not mistakes .

01:24:02.290 --> 01:24:04.850
Close to 300 American businesses have

01:24:04.850 --> 01:24:07.017
been damaged significantly as a result

01:24:07.017 --> 01:24:10.720
of these . Attacks targeting them by

01:24:10.720 --> 01:24:14.450
Russia . Yeah , Senator , it's

01:24:14.450 --> 01:24:17.490
certainly a a tragedy that Russia

01:24:17.490 --> 01:24:19.434
targeting is indiscriminate . It's

01:24:19.434 --> 01:24:21.212
indiscriminate against American

01:24:21.212 --> 01:24:23.046
businesses . It's indiscriminate

01:24:23.046 --> 01:24:25.212
against other targets across Ukraine ,

01:24:25.212 --> 01:24:27.268
you know , as we , as we think about

01:24:27.268 --> 01:24:29.490
how do we best enable the Ukrainians to

01:24:29.490 --> 01:24:31.601
fight back against the Russians , all

01:24:31.601 --> 01:24:33.823
of this goes into ours , I respectfully

01:24:33.823 --> 01:24:35.768
disagree with your use of the word

01:24:35.768 --> 01:24:37.729
indiscriminate . It is very

01:24:37.729 --> 01:24:40.410
discriminating . They are purposely

01:24:40.410 --> 01:24:44.390
targeting hospitals . I saw a hospital .

01:24:45.470 --> 01:24:48.189
Specifically destroyed in large part .

01:24:48.589 --> 01:24:50.867
They are targeting electric generation .

01:24:51.899 --> 01:24:54.066
Facilities which I also saw , and they

01:24:54.066 --> 01:24:56.066
are targeting American businesses ,

01:24:56.370 --> 01:24:59.680
discriminating . In a very purposeful

01:24:59.680 --> 01:25:03.419
way . Let me move on . Uh , well ,

01:25:03.600 --> 01:25:05.878
uh , I'll give you a little extra time .

01:25:05.878 --> 01:25:07.989
Do , do you agree with that , General

01:25:07.989 --> 01:25:10.879
Grikoic ? Uh , he's , he's pretty much

01:25:10.879 --> 01:25:13.046
correct . Yeah , Senator , I , I , I ,

01:25:13.046 --> 01:25:15.046
I do agree . So when I use the word

01:25:15.046 --> 01:25:17.212
indiscriminate , I'm applying to the ,

01:25:17.212 --> 01:25:19.212
the moral lens perhaps that they're

01:25:19.212 --> 01:25:21.323
looking at this through and that they

01:25:21.323 --> 01:25:23.546
aren't , uh , discriminating in the way

01:25:23.546 --> 01:25:22.669
that we would under the law of armed

01:25:22.669 --> 01:25:24.780
conflict as to what the targets are .

01:25:24.780 --> 01:25:26.669
Yeah , yeah , I think you and the

01:25:26.669 --> 01:25:28.780
senator actually agree on that . Um ,

01:25:28.780 --> 01:25:30.836
you can resume your time , Senator .

01:25:31.399 --> 01:25:33.455
Thank you , Mr . Chairman , and uh I

01:25:33.455 --> 01:25:35.288
think your , your questions were

01:25:35.288 --> 01:25:36.899
helpful and I appreciate the

01:25:36.899 --> 01:25:38.788
distinction that you're drawing ,

01:25:38.788 --> 01:25:41.950
general . Um , UCO is the global

01:25:41.950 --> 01:25:43.990
integrator for all defense matters

01:25:43.990 --> 01:25:47.669
relating to Russia . Uh , so

01:25:47.669 --> 01:25:50.069
I'm presuming you know about Russia's

01:25:50.069 --> 01:25:52.470
role in the war with Ukraine . I know

01:25:52.470 --> 01:25:55.080
you've been asked . A bit about it so

01:25:55.080 --> 01:25:56.680
far , um .

01:25:59.120 --> 01:26:02.169
I am assuming the public reports are

01:26:02.169 --> 01:26:04.729
correct and that Russia is aiding

01:26:04.729 --> 01:26:08.080
Ukraine . Uh Can

01:26:08.080 --> 01:26:11.379
you tell us more about

01:26:11.879 --> 01:26:15.459
requests from you ? I'm sorry , aiding

01:26:15.459 --> 01:26:19.169
Iran . Uh , can you tell us more

01:26:19.169 --> 01:26:22.390
about the request from Iran to Russia

01:26:22.649 --> 01:26:24.910
for assistance and how Russia has

01:26:24.910 --> 01:26:27.270
responded ? Senator , I'm certainly

01:26:27.270 --> 01:26:29.326
aware of all the public reporting on

01:26:29.326 --> 01:26:31.729
this . I can go into specifics on your

01:26:31.729 --> 01:26:33.785
question in the classified session ,

01:26:33.785 --> 01:26:35.840
but I , you know , I would just echo

01:26:35.840 --> 01:26:37.618
what Secretary Hegseth has said

01:26:37.618 --> 01:26:39.840
recently that if Russia is doing this ,

01:26:39.840 --> 01:26:41.673
they would be wise to reconsider

01:26:41.673 --> 01:26:43.451
providing any assistance to the

01:26:43.451 --> 01:26:45.673
Iranians during epic fury . You believe

01:26:45.673 --> 01:26:47.785
that we should respond . Aggressively

01:26:48.089 --> 01:26:49.978
to that kind of assistance that's

01:26:49.978 --> 01:26:52.680
putting our men and women . In greater

01:26:52.680 --> 01:26:55.600
harm's way , Senator , any time anyone

01:26:55.600 --> 01:26:58.120
puts American service members in harm's

01:26:58.120 --> 01:27:00.240
way in any manner whatsoever , I

01:27:00.240 --> 01:27:02.296
believe we should respond robustly .

01:27:02.399 --> 01:27:05.779
Why haven't we done it ? Uh , Senator ,

01:27:06.410 --> 01:27:09.290
I am confident that we are responding

01:27:09.290 --> 01:27:12.250
robustly to anyone who is assisting the

01:27:12.250 --> 01:27:14.689
Iranians with targeting US forces .

01:27:16.120 --> 01:27:18.009
Perhaps you can tell us more in a

01:27:18.009 --> 01:27:20.231
classified setting . Yes , sir , I'd be

01:27:20.231 --> 01:27:23.500
happy to elaborate . Thank you . Thank

01:27:23.500 --> 01:27:25.556
you very much , Senator Budd . Thank

01:27:25.556 --> 01:27:27.722
you , Chairman . General Griinkowicz ,

01:27:27.722 --> 01:27:29.778
it's , uh , good to see you . Thanks

01:27:29.778 --> 01:27:31.611
for the meeting yesterday , very

01:27:31.611 --> 01:27:33.667
informative . You know , much of the

01:27:33.667 --> 01:27:35.889
discussion of the Russia-Ukraine wars ,

01:27:35.889 --> 01:27:38.000
it's , it's focused just on those two

01:27:38.000 --> 01:27:40.056
countries , but I want to talk about

01:27:40.056 --> 01:27:42.111
other nations that are assisting the

01:27:42.111 --> 01:27:44.056
Russians , if you will . Um , talk

01:27:44.056 --> 01:27:45.889
about North Korea's role in this

01:27:45.889 --> 01:27:48.056
conflict and the threat that they pose

01:27:48.056 --> 01:27:51.790
and also about the Iranian contribution

01:27:52.709 --> 01:27:55.879
today and even prior to Operation Epic

01:27:55.879 --> 01:27:59.160
Fury . Yep , Senator , uh , you bet .

01:27:59.209 --> 01:28:01.265
One of the things that we watch very

01:28:01.265 --> 01:28:03.580
closely is how , uh , some of our , um ,

01:28:03.609 --> 01:28:05.776
competitors around the globe will work

01:28:05.776 --> 01:28:07.942
with each other , uh , when they share

01:28:07.942 --> 01:28:09.998
interests , and we've certainly seen

01:28:09.998 --> 01:28:09.890
that with the North Koreans and the

01:28:09.890 --> 01:28:12.250
Iranians and the Russians . Uh , in the

01:28:12.250 --> 01:28:14.819
North Korean case , uh , as you know ,

01:28:14.890 --> 01:28:17.001
it's been widely reported , there's a

01:28:17.001 --> 01:28:19.223
number of North Korean troops that have

01:28:19.223 --> 01:28:21.446
been deployed , uh , to the border with

01:28:21.446 --> 01:28:23.501
Ukraine and have , uh , made up some

01:28:23.501 --> 01:28:25.501
substantial combat power shortfalls

01:28:25.501 --> 01:28:27.223
that the Russians have had and

01:28:27.223 --> 01:28:29.446
supplemented them . Uh , there's also a

01:28:29.446 --> 01:28:31.334
number of reports of , uh , North

01:28:31.334 --> 01:28:33.501
Korean , uh , individuals now going to

01:28:33.501 --> 01:28:35.446
work in the , uh , in the , in the

01:28:35.446 --> 01:28:37.446
Russian industrial base to generate

01:28:37.446 --> 01:28:39.668
some of the ballistic missiles and UAVs

01:28:39.668 --> 01:28:41.612
that they're building based on the

01:28:41.612 --> 01:28:41.609
labor shortages that uh that the

01:28:41.609 --> 01:28:43.831
Russians have . within their industrial

01:28:43.831 --> 01:28:45.942
base . Uh , of course that industrial

01:28:45.942 --> 01:28:48.165
base got started because of the Iranian

01:28:48.165 --> 01:28:50.276
sharing of technology of their Shahad

01:28:50.276 --> 01:28:52.498
drones , and sharing the blueprints and

01:28:52.498 --> 01:28:54.720
teaching the Russians how to build them

01:28:54.720 --> 01:28:56.776
and how to build them at scale , and

01:28:56.776 --> 01:28:56.365
that's one of the main threats facing

01:28:56.365 --> 01:28:58.587
the Ukrainians today . Are the Russians

01:28:58.587 --> 01:29:00.365
short on people and essentially

01:29:00.484 --> 01:29:02.694
bringing in labor from North Korea ?

01:29:03.484 --> 01:29:06.109
That's my assessment , Senator . Uh ,

01:29:06.140 --> 01:29:08.196
General Reed , thanks also for being

01:29:08.196 --> 01:29:10.307
here . I appreciate you , what you've

01:29:10.307 --> 01:29:12.251
done at Transcom and just a heroic

01:29:12.251 --> 01:29:14.473
effort , um , leading up to epic fury .

01:29:14.799 --> 01:29:17.021
Talk about some of the numbers , if you

01:29:17.021 --> 01:29:19.399
will , um , some of the success stories

01:29:19.399 --> 01:29:21.640
so far , and then where are the gaps

01:29:21.640 --> 01:29:25.600
where Congress can assist . Thank

01:29:25.600 --> 01:29:27.433
you , Senator . Uh , some of the

01:29:27.433 --> 01:29:30.520
success is the ability to generate the

01:29:30.520 --> 01:29:32.687
aircraft to actually get on the move .

01:29:32.687 --> 01:29:34.909
And so I'm grateful to the Congress for

01:29:34.959 --> 01:29:36.848
the sustained funding for weapons

01:29:36.848 --> 01:29:38.959
system sustainment and spares . Uh ,

01:29:39.279 --> 01:29:41.501
because of that we're able to , to keep

01:29:41.501 --> 01:29:43.612
pace and , uh , we've been doing that

01:29:43.612 --> 01:29:45.890
extremely well , so thank you for that .

01:29:45.890 --> 01:29:48.057
Um , other success stories is the fact

01:29:48.057 --> 01:29:50.600
that we've been able to establish a

01:29:50.600 --> 01:29:53.680
network for air medical evacuation in

01:29:53.680 --> 01:29:57.069
order to bring home the wounded and to

01:29:57.069 --> 01:29:59.402
also get them to a higher level of care .

01:30:00.200 --> 01:30:02.311
Thank you . What , what concerns does

01:30:02.311 --> 01:30:04.311
Transcom have regarding Chinese and

01:30:04.311 --> 01:30:07.970
Russian , uh , naval deployments and

01:30:07.970 --> 01:30:10.169
commercial investments in ports across

01:30:10.169 --> 01:30:13.910
the globe ? For the Russian deployments ,

01:30:14.000 --> 01:30:16.750
uh , we monitor those , uh , we

01:30:16.750 --> 01:30:18.917
maintain an awareness of where they're

01:30:18.917 --> 01:30:21.229
going and make assessments in terms of

01:30:21.229 --> 01:30:23.629
what capabilities they may be seeking .

01:30:24.000 --> 01:30:26.278
Uh , when it comes to the Chinese , uh ,

01:30:26.278 --> 01:30:28.278
fleet deployments , we do the exact

01:30:28.278 --> 01:30:30.278
same , uh , but we also go one step

01:30:30.278 --> 01:30:32.359
further to track their , uh , their

01:30:32.359 --> 01:30:34.990
footprint , infrastructure , and , uh ,

01:30:35.000 --> 01:30:37.111
what types of things that they put in

01:30:37.111 --> 01:30:39.333
place , mainly in seaports . Uh , so we

01:30:39.333 --> 01:30:41.056
keep a very close eye on their

01:30:41.056 --> 01:30:43.439
electronic systems , uh , cranes , and

01:30:43.439 --> 01:30:45.799
that , uh , that type of thing . Uh ,

01:30:45.879 --> 01:30:47.990
we work with port authorities to make

01:30:47.990 --> 01:30:50.120
sure that we know where those are and

01:30:50.120 --> 01:30:52.549
then we operate in ways to circumvent

01:30:52.549 --> 01:30:55.020
that . So at this point , General Reed ,

01:30:55.259 --> 01:30:57.092
are those adversaries , are they

01:30:57.092 --> 01:31:00.069
limiting your ability at Transcom , uh ,

01:31:00.419 --> 01:31:02.586
to enable logistics around the globe ?

01:31:03.540 --> 01:31:05.596
Currently they are not . We plan for

01:31:05.596 --> 01:31:07.373
that . Thank you , uh , General

01:31:07.373 --> 01:31:09.540
Grikovich , um , how is our air domain

01:31:09.540 --> 01:31:11.318
awareness in the Russia-Ukraine

01:31:11.318 --> 01:31:14.899
conflict throughout UCO ? Uh ,

01:31:15.419 --> 01:31:17.308
Senator , we have a robust set of

01:31:17.308 --> 01:31:19.308
agreements with allies and partners

01:31:19.308 --> 01:31:21.030
that we stitch together a very

01:31:21.030 --> 01:31:23.141
comprehensive air picture . Certainly

01:31:23.141 --> 01:31:25.363
it's not perfect , but I'm , uh , I'm ,

01:31:25.363 --> 01:31:27.419
I'm very confident that we're on the

01:31:27.419 --> 01:31:29.697
right path to , to make it better . Uh ,

01:31:29.697 --> 01:31:32.030
but we , we do have very good awareness ,

01:31:32.030 --> 01:31:34.363
uh , particularly in and around Ukraine .

01:31:34.363 --> 01:31:36.363
I'm concerned about the uncertainty

01:31:36.363 --> 01:31:38.363
around the purchase of the E7 wedge

01:31:38.363 --> 01:31:40.475
tail , uh , that's affecting our NATO

01:31:40.475 --> 01:31:42.530
partners who also canceled E7 orders

01:31:42.530 --> 01:31:44.586
last November . What's your , what's

01:31:44.586 --> 01:31:46.808
your thoughts on this platform in terms

01:31:46.808 --> 01:31:48.697
of current and future UCO needs ?

01:31:49.819 --> 01:31:51.819
Senator , I've , I've seen the

01:31:51.819 --> 01:31:53.875
capabilities of the E-7 in action in

01:31:53.875 --> 01:31:56.097
previous jobs , uh , particularly for ,

01:31:56.100 --> 01:31:59.040
uh , low radar cross section , uh ,

01:31:59.339 --> 01:32:01.689
platforms , things like the UAS's .

01:32:01.939 --> 01:32:04.220
It's an incredibly capable platform for

01:32:04.220 --> 01:32:06.299
detecting those . They had canceled

01:32:06.299 --> 01:32:08.720
orders though . Any concern there ? Uh ,

01:32:08.950 --> 01:32:10.728
Senator , I am concerned on the

01:32:10.728 --> 01:32:13.379
alliance side , the E3 fleet is , is

01:32:13.379 --> 01:32:16.240
aging . It's about 50% combat effective ,

01:32:16.959 --> 01:32:18.959
uh , as many of the aircraft are in

01:32:18.959 --> 01:32:21.020
depot that the alliance does need a

01:32:21.020 --> 01:32:23.700
replacement aircraft . The E7 was the

01:32:23.700 --> 01:32:25.540
plan for a while , but now we're

01:32:25.540 --> 01:32:27.429
looking at other options based on

01:32:27.429 --> 01:32:29.651
affordability and who is purchasing the

01:32:29.651 --> 01:32:31.596
E7 , depending on where the United

01:32:31.596 --> 01:32:33.818
States goes , considering the E7 in the

01:32:33.818 --> 01:32:36.040
future , it may be back on the table or

01:32:36.040 --> 01:32:38.096
it may not , but we're looking at it

01:32:38.096 --> 01:32:40.262
closely . Thank you , Chairman . Thank

01:32:40.262 --> 01:32:42.429
you very much , Senator Hirono . Thank

01:32:42.429 --> 01:32:44.373
you , Mr . Chairman . Uh , General

01:32:44.373 --> 01:32:46.262
Grinkovich noted that the Russian

01:32:46.262 --> 01:32:48.709
people are probably not given accurate

01:32:48.779 --> 01:32:51.560
information on Russia's war against

01:32:51.560 --> 01:32:54.299
Ukraine , so I do think that it is very

01:32:54.299 --> 01:32:56.355
important for the American people to

01:32:56.355 --> 01:32:58.669
know what is happening with regard to

01:32:58.669 --> 01:33:00.891
Iran . So before I begin my questions ,

01:33:01.029 --> 01:33:03.910
I'd like to take a moment to highlight

01:33:03.910 --> 01:33:07.109
for the American people the cost of

01:33:07.109 --> 01:33:09.910
this president's reckless decision to

01:33:09.910 --> 01:33:12.959
take our country into war . Uh , with ,

01:33:13.040 --> 01:33:15.339
uh , Iran without congressional

01:33:15.839 --> 01:33:19.160
authorization . 7 brave US service

01:33:19.160 --> 01:33:22.330
members have been killed , 150 wounded ,

01:33:22.410 --> 01:33:25.850
8 severely injured , over 11

01:33:25.850 --> 01:33:29.839
billion in the 1st 6 days , and this is ,

01:33:29.879 --> 01:33:33.290
uh , day 13 , so , um , uh , we're

01:33:33.290 --> 01:33:36.370
likely closer to 20 billion already

01:33:36.370 --> 01:33:38.649
spent on this , what I would consider

01:33:38.649 --> 01:33:41.009
an illegal war with no end in sight .

01:33:41.299 --> 01:33:43.740
And no plan for what will come next .

01:33:44.140 --> 01:33:46.196
Oil prices are going up , as noted .

01:33:46.196 --> 01:33:50.160
The major beneficiary of this is Russia .

01:33:50.620 --> 01:33:53.020
And despite how impressive and

01:33:53.020 --> 01:33:56.299
professional our military is , this is

01:33:56.299 --> 01:33:58.450
a real war . It is not a game . It is

01:33:58.450 --> 01:34:01.660
certainly not an excursion , and it is

01:34:01.660 --> 01:34:03.993
important , even if the president won't ,

01:34:04.100 --> 01:34:06.459
to acknowledge when errors happen .

01:34:07.240 --> 01:34:09.669
Preliminary findings of the strike on

01:34:09.669 --> 01:34:12.040
an elementary school in Iran that

01:34:12.040 --> 01:34:15.339
killed 175 civilians , mostly children ,

01:34:15.919 --> 01:34:19.080
point to US responsibility , but this

01:34:19.080 --> 01:34:22.520
tragedy didn't happen in a vacuum .

01:34:23.359 --> 01:34:25.799
Secretary Hicks said in his misguided

01:34:25.799 --> 01:34:29.379
attempt to focus on lethality , gutted

01:34:29.520 --> 01:34:32.479
the office that focuses on mitigating

01:34:32.479 --> 01:34:35.240
civilian casualties , reducing

01:34:35.240 --> 01:34:39.180
personnel there from 200 people to less

01:34:39.250 --> 01:34:42.990
than 40 . In that kind of an

01:34:42.990 --> 01:34:45.709
environment , errors can occur and as

01:34:45.709 --> 01:34:47.931
noted once again by General Grikovich ,

01:34:48.350 --> 01:34:50.517
what may have happened in the instance

01:34:50.517 --> 01:34:52.461
of the killing of all these school

01:34:52.461 --> 01:34:55.310
children as , uh , it's , uh , it's

01:34:55.310 --> 01:34:59.229
just a uh error upon error , a chain of

01:34:59.229 --> 01:35:02.330
errors as he put it . So , uh , we

01:35:02.330 --> 01:35:04.910
mourn the deaths of our brave , uh ,

01:35:04.930 --> 01:35:07.049
soldiers , but as this war continues

01:35:07.049 --> 01:35:09.290
there will be more civilian deaths

01:35:09.290 --> 01:35:12.430
there will be more cost to our , uh ,

01:35:13.049 --> 01:35:16.189
American families and . I joined uh all

01:35:16.189 --> 01:35:18.549
those who pray that this war will end

01:35:18.549 --> 01:35:21.350
even if there is really no uh

01:35:21.350 --> 01:35:25.240
articulated uh end in sight . I'd like

01:35:25.240 --> 01:35:28.200
to start my questions with General Reed .

01:35:29.229 --> 01:35:31.451
Well , it was nice to meet with you the

01:35:31.451 --> 01:35:33.618
other day , and uh Transcom is playing

01:35:33.618 --> 01:35:36.029
a vital role supporting this war in

01:35:36.029 --> 01:35:39.069
Iran , even uh though as I noted , I

01:35:39.069 --> 01:35:41.180
totally disagree with the president's

01:35:41.180 --> 01:35:45.169
decision to launch this war . Um , that

01:35:45.169 --> 01:35:47.910
said , this war is placing significant

01:35:47.910 --> 01:35:50.609
demands on our aging , acknowledged

01:35:50.609 --> 01:35:53.450
aging air mobility , and refueling

01:35:53.450 --> 01:35:55.339
fleets , both of which need to be

01:35:55.339 --> 01:35:58.169
recapitalized . I'm also concerned this

01:35:58.169 --> 01:36:00.709
war is going to impact Transcom's

01:36:00.709 --> 01:36:03.729
ability to support important planned

01:36:03.729 --> 01:36:05.970
exercises and training in other

01:36:05.970 --> 01:36:07.720
theaters , particularly in the

01:36:07.720 --> 01:36:11.220
Indo-Pacific . General Reed , have you

01:36:11.220 --> 01:36:14.339
had to cancel or scale back any planned

01:36:14.339 --> 01:36:17.750
Transom exercises with Indoacom because

01:36:17.750 --> 01:36:18.660
of this war ?

01:36:21.930 --> 01:36:24.097
Senator , since the start of the war ,

01:36:24.097 --> 01:36:26.319
we have sent , uh , certainly surged to

01:36:26.319 --> 01:36:28.486
meet the need of , uh , uh , CENTCOM .

01:36:28.609 --> 01:36:30.831
One of the things we've been able to do

01:36:30.831 --> 01:36:33.479
is to , uh , get access to greater

01:36:33.479 --> 01:36:35.879
numbers of guard and reserve to assist

01:36:35.879 --> 01:36:38.000
with that . Um , in addition , uh ,

01:36:38.319 --> 01:36:40.486
access to guard and reserve also helps

01:36:40.486 --> 01:36:42.479
to preserve our ability to support

01:36:42.479 --> 01:36:44.839
other combatant commanders as well , uh ,

01:36:44.970 --> 01:36:47.399
to include exercises in the Pacific .

01:36:47.950 --> 01:36:50.061
Um , and , in addition to that , uh ,

01:36:50.069 --> 01:36:52.509
we also work with the joint staff , uh ,

01:36:52.669 --> 01:36:55.189
to make sure that , uh , as the needs

01:36:55.189 --> 01:36:57.509
arise that we can meet the needs , uh ,

01:36:57.660 --> 01:37:00.149
as best we can while we support the war

01:37:00.149 --> 01:37:02.470
fight . So you're telling me that as

01:37:02.470 --> 01:37:05.279
this war with um against Iraq continues

01:37:05.279 --> 01:37:06.890
that you are needing to make

01:37:06.890 --> 01:37:09.057
adjustments with regard to any needs ,

01:37:09.240 --> 01:37:12.120
uh , particularly in in the paycom

01:37:12.120 --> 01:37:14.342
because we have a lot of exercises that

01:37:14.342 --> 01:37:16.398
are really important , uh , with our

01:37:16.398 --> 01:37:18.564
allies in that part of the , the world

01:37:18.564 --> 01:37:20.787
so you are having to make adjustments .

01:37:21.080 --> 01:37:24.080
Uh , will you commit to informing of

01:37:24.359 --> 01:37:27.589
this committee . Um , if CRASCO is

01:37:27.589 --> 01:37:30.709
unable to fully support upcoming

01:37:30.709 --> 01:37:32.970
exercise in , in , Indo PECO or other

01:37:32.970 --> 01:37:35.819
combatant commands . Yes , Senator .

01:37:37.109 --> 01:37:40.029
For General Grinkovitch Uh , one of the

01:37:40.029 --> 01:37:42.520
United States' greatest asymmetric ,

01:37:42.629 --> 01:37:46.430
I'm running out of time , um , Mr .

01:37:46.549 --> 01:37:48.660
Chairman , may I finish my question ?

01:37:48.950 --> 01:37:51.089
Yes , ma'am , I did wanna get your

01:37:51.089 --> 01:37:53.310
assent that , that , uh , um .

01:37:55.009 --> 01:37:57.209
We are stronger when we work closely

01:37:57.209 --> 01:37:59.370
with our international partners and

01:37:59.370 --> 01:38:01.770
would you agree , General , that this

01:38:01.770 --> 01:38:03.970
requires constant investment in

01:38:03.970 --> 01:38:06.709
interoperability and training as

01:38:06.709 --> 01:38:08.910
technology and the threats evolve ?

01:38:09.490 --> 01:38:11.323
Would you agree with that ? Uh ,

01:38:11.419 --> 01:38:13.419
Senator , I would , and we focus on

01:38:13.419 --> 01:38:15.363
that , uh , every single day at US

01:38:15.363 --> 01:38:17.308
European Command . There's a whole

01:38:17.308 --> 01:38:19.363
series of questions that follows our

01:38:19.363 --> 01:38:21.030
need to maintain that kind of

01:38:21.030 --> 01:38:23.086
interoperability , and I will submit

01:38:23.086 --> 01:38:25.197
those questions as well as others for

01:38:25.197 --> 01:38:27.197
we'll , we'll take another round if

01:38:27.197 --> 01:38:29.419
necessary , and of course there'll be a

01:38:29.419 --> 01:38:31.308
classified portion . Uh , Senator

01:38:31.308 --> 01:38:33.740
Slotkin is next . Thank you , Mr .

01:38:33.899 --> 01:38:35.955
Chairman . Thanks to both of you for

01:38:35.955 --> 01:38:38.220
being here , um , and thanks for all

01:38:38.220 --> 01:38:40.910
you're doing , um , to support . Uh ,

01:38:40.990 --> 01:38:43.157
the significant effort that's going on

01:38:43.157 --> 01:38:45.157
in the Middle East . Um , it , it's

01:38:45.157 --> 01:38:47.379
hard , you know , as someone who was at

01:38:47.379 --> 01:38:49.601
the Pentagon and at the CIA , it's hard

01:38:49.601 --> 01:38:51.768
to miss , I think two important trends

01:38:51.768 --> 01:38:53.879
that are happening in this war in the

01:38:53.879 --> 01:38:55.823
Middle East that are connected , I

01:38:55.823 --> 01:38:57.934
think , to , to what you all do . One

01:38:57.934 --> 01:39:00.500
is just , I feel like The conversation

01:39:00.500 --> 01:39:02.950
on drones has come home to roost . You

01:39:02.950 --> 01:39:05.700
know , the , the Pentagon over many

01:39:05.700 --> 01:39:07.422
administrations , Democrat and

01:39:07.422 --> 01:39:09.660
Republican , has had this unbelievably

01:39:09.660 --> 01:39:13.060
glacially slow process of acquisition .

01:39:13.379 --> 01:39:16.109
And so even though we know , um , that

01:39:16.109 --> 01:39:18.299
the drones we build are big and

01:39:18.299 --> 01:39:20.521
expensive and take 2 years to build and

01:39:20.521 --> 01:39:22.632
they're $30 million and . And you can

01:39:22.632 --> 01:39:24.743
buy them off Amazon . We just haven't

01:39:24.743 --> 01:39:27.270
been able to get them into the doctrine ,

01:39:27.350 --> 01:39:29.950
into the force in a serious way . And

01:39:29.950 --> 01:39:32.750
now I feel like , unfortunately , we're ,

01:39:32.830 --> 01:39:34.997
we're paying the price for that . This

01:39:34.997 --> 01:39:36.941
is a different chapter in American

01:39:36.941 --> 01:39:38.941
warfare with the Shahid drones from

01:39:38.941 --> 01:39:42.350
Iran . Um , killing American forces ,

01:39:42.589 --> 01:39:45.560
hitting US embassies , hitting civilian

01:39:45.560 --> 01:39:47.359
targets , and I think 11 other

01:39:47.359 --> 01:39:51.069
countries , um , evading our air

01:39:51.069 --> 01:39:53.125
defenses , which are set up for much

01:39:53.125 --> 01:39:55.458
bigger projectiles . And then we've had ,

01:39:55.458 --> 01:39:57.625
I think , according to press reports ,

01:39:57.625 --> 01:40:00.430
11 MQ-9s downed in the course of two

01:40:00.430 --> 01:40:03.919
weeks . Um , the Iranians are figuring

01:40:03.919 --> 01:40:06.141
out how to bleed us with money and with

01:40:06.141 --> 01:40:08.252
time . Um , to the point where we now

01:40:08.252 --> 01:40:10.970
have Ukrainian advisors coming from

01:40:10.970 --> 01:40:13.529
Ukraine to train us , right ? Because

01:40:13.529 --> 01:40:16.410
they're the , the experts , and I , I

01:40:16.410 --> 01:40:18.521
just , it's not for either of you two

01:40:18.521 --> 01:40:21.729
to , to , respond to , but I , I just

01:40:21.729 --> 01:40:25.180
feel . Like , you know , we need to

01:40:25.180 --> 01:40:26.736
understand that warfare has

01:40:26.736 --> 01:40:28.779
fundamentally changed . Um , and if

01:40:28.779 --> 01:40:31.779
Iran is able to hold us at bay and

01:40:31.779 --> 01:40:33.835
continue that power projection , you

01:40:33.835 --> 01:40:35.946
know , the , we keep hearing that the

01:40:35.946 --> 01:40:38.112
reason why , or one of the reasons why

01:40:38.112 --> 01:40:40.001
we went to this war is because of

01:40:40.001 --> 01:40:42.112
Iran's power projection . They're now

01:40:42.112 --> 01:40:44.168
holding the Persian Gulf at bay . We

01:40:44.168 --> 01:40:46.057
can't move ships through it . And

01:40:46.057 --> 01:40:48.168
they're able to use low-cost drones ,

01:40:48.168 --> 01:40:50.660
$20,000 to $50,000 each to kill US

01:40:50.660 --> 01:40:53.660
forces . So I just , I hope this is in

01:40:53.660 --> 01:40:56.040
a moment of inflection for the Pentagon ,

01:40:56.259 --> 01:40:58.740
for all of us , that unless we

01:40:58.740 --> 01:41:00.907
understand how to more quickly get our

01:41:00.907 --> 01:41:03.060
acquisition system to be responsive ,

01:41:03.180 --> 01:41:05.580
we're going to continue to lose our

01:41:05.580 --> 01:41:07.660
soldiers . And , and I just , I hope

01:41:07.660 --> 01:41:09.716
that's a major lesson that we're all

01:41:09.716 --> 01:41:11.827
learning . The second one is the role

01:41:11.827 --> 01:41:13.993
of Iran and China , I'm sorry , Russia

01:41:13.993 --> 01:41:17.790
and China in supporting Iran . And

01:41:17.899 --> 01:41:19.899
I know we can't talk about it in an

01:41:19.899 --> 01:41:22.129
open setting , but the You know ,

01:41:22.450 --> 01:41:25.049
there's press reports that the Russians

01:41:25.049 --> 01:41:28.569
are helping target US ships and

01:41:28.569 --> 01:41:32.350
aircraft . Um , and I just hope we can

01:41:32.350 --> 01:41:34.850
all be on the same page and certainly

01:41:35.029 --> 01:41:37.160
in the in Europe , you understand the

01:41:37.160 --> 01:41:40.149
threat of Russia , that if Russia is

01:41:40.149 --> 01:41:43.470
helping to kill US forces , we have

01:41:43.470 --> 01:41:46.450
crossed a Rubicon . We are in another

01:41:46.830 --> 01:41:50.589
moment and that we have to take

01:41:50.589 --> 01:41:53.109
decisive action on that . And instead ,

01:41:53.240 --> 01:41:55.200
we're giving them breaks on oil .

01:41:55.390 --> 01:41:57.910
They're making a ton of money . Um ,

01:41:57.979 --> 01:42:00.620
and , and all the weapons and all the

01:42:00.620 --> 01:42:02.740
systems that we need for this war are

01:42:02.740 --> 01:42:04.684
what we would have otherwise given

01:42:04.684 --> 01:42:07.220
Ukraine to defend themselves . So I , I

01:42:07.220 --> 01:42:10.290
just Um , I just hope we're all on the

01:42:10.290 --> 01:42:12.179
same page on this committee and a

01:42:12.179 --> 01:42:14.179
bipartisan basis that the situation

01:42:14.179 --> 01:42:16.129
with drones in this war and the

01:42:16.129 --> 01:42:18.529
situation with Russia in helping to

01:42:18.529 --> 01:42:20.609
potentially kill American forces and

01:42:20.609 --> 01:42:22.665
target our weapons and our systems ,

01:42:22.665 --> 01:42:24.899
our ships are totally , they are new ,

01:42:25.250 --> 01:42:27.139
and we need to adjust to that new

01:42:27.139 --> 01:42:29.729
reality . Um , can , can you just tell

01:42:29.729 --> 01:42:32.729
me in my last , um , minute here , um ,

01:42:32.810 --> 01:42:36.140
General Grinkovich , just , um . I'm

01:42:36.140 --> 01:42:38.196
concerned that we're going to lose a

01:42:38.196 --> 01:42:40.418
lot of capabilities out of Europe , and

01:42:40.418 --> 01:42:42.584
then this administration's never going

01:42:42.584 --> 01:42:44.529
to put them back in . Can you talk

01:42:44.529 --> 01:42:47.540
about the importance of capability in

01:42:47.540 --> 01:42:51.310
Europe ? Yes , Senator , thanks . I , I

01:42:51.310 --> 01:42:53.199
think , uh , having capability in

01:42:53.199 --> 01:42:55.580
Europe , uh , ultimately provides

01:42:55.580 --> 01:42:57.691
options uh for this administration or

01:42:57.691 --> 01:42:59.870
any administration , uh , in the event

01:42:59.870 --> 01:43:02.370
of a conflict . And , you know , I , I

01:43:02.370 --> 01:43:04.750
would , uh , highlight , uh , that in

01:43:04.750 --> 01:43:06.861
my opening statement , I talked about

01:43:06.861 --> 01:43:08.806
one of the missions of US European

01:43:08.806 --> 01:43:10.528
Command is to serve as a power

01:43:10.528 --> 01:43:12.472
projection platform . And so it is

01:43:12.472 --> 01:43:14.250
having capabilities in Europe ,

01:43:14.250 --> 01:43:16.472
munitions in Europe that allow us to to

01:43:16.472 --> 01:43:18.470
help US Africa Command to target

01:43:18.470 --> 01:43:20.750
terrorists in Africa or to help US

01:43:20.750 --> 01:43:22.528
Central Command as they execute

01:43:22.528 --> 01:43:24.861
Operation Epic Fury . And so , you know ,

01:43:24.910 --> 01:43:27.021
the distances are shorter , it's less

01:43:27.021 --> 01:43:29.021
expensive , and it's much easier to

01:43:29.021 --> 01:43:31.243
project power with our network of bases

01:43:31.243 --> 01:43:34.370
and allies . Just say American power is

01:43:34.370 --> 01:43:37.290
still important and deterrence is the

01:43:37.290 --> 01:43:39.401
best option and the way we do that is

01:43:39.401 --> 01:43:41.457
with capabilities . If anyone thinks

01:43:41.457 --> 01:43:43.679
that Vladimir Putin is deterred when we

01:43:43.679 --> 01:43:45.679
leave Europe , I would love to sell

01:43:45.679 --> 01:43:47.734
them a bridge . Thanks very much . I

01:43:47.734 --> 01:43:49.901
yield back , Senator Slotkin , Senator

01:43:49.901 --> 01:43:52.209
Banks , uh , General Gri Grinkovich ,

01:43:52.439 --> 01:43:56.209
um , we hear a lot from Democrats often

01:43:56.209 --> 01:43:58.209
about how our European allies don't

01:43:58.209 --> 01:43:59.987
trust us . They don't like us .

01:43:59.987 --> 01:44:02.153
President Trump has pushed them away .

01:44:02.359 --> 01:44:04.303
But can you , could you talk for a

01:44:04.303 --> 01:44:06.415
minute about what President Trump has

01:44:06.415 --> 01:44:08.637
taught us in , in , uh , Operation Epic

01:44:08.637 --> 01:44:11.910
Fury about how to . Um , how to bring

01:44:11.910 --> 01:44:14.132
our European allies on board . It seems

01:44:14.132 --> 01:44:16.354
like there's a lot of good news here of

01:44:16.354 --> 01:44:18.466
our European allies come to the table

01:44:18.466 --> 01:44:20.799
to help us out . Yes , Senator , uh , I

01:44:20.799 --> 01:44:23.021
would , I would tell you that , uh , by

01:44:23.021 --> 01:44:25.132
and large , uh , the vast majority of

01:44:25.132 --> 01:44:27.355
our European allies , especially at the

01:44:27.355 --> 01:44:29.632
military level , which is where I , uh ,

01:44:29.632 --> 01:44:31.855
engage most often , uh , uh , have been

01:44:31.855 --> 01:44:33.855
extremely supportive . Uh , they've

01:44:33.855 --> 01:44:35.743
provided , uh , access basing and

01:44:35.743 --> 01:44:37.910
overflight , uh , that enables General

01:44:37.910 --> 01:44:39.855
Reed's , uh , operations , uh , to

01:44:39.855 --> 01:44:42.021
refuel aircraft coming from the United

01:44:42.021 --> 01:44:41.799
States or the , the great amount of

01:44:41.799 --> 01:44:44.290
logistics that flow through Europe . Um ,

01:44:44.310 --> 01:44:46.254
and , uh , it's , it's really been

01:44:46.254 --> 01:44:49.430
incredible to see , uh , the , uh , you

01:44:49.430 --> 01:44:52.509
know , there's certainly , uh , some

01:44:52.509 --> 01:44:54.709
discussions in the press about allies

01:44:54.709 --> 01:44:57.020
who did not move quick enough or , uh ,

01:44:57.029 --> 01:44:59.196
who did not provide the access that we

01:44:59.196 --> 01:45:01.140
wanted , but I would tell you that

01:45:01.140 --> 01:45:03.196
under the tip of that iceberg , uh ,

01:45:03.196 --> 01:45:05.307
there's much more support in Europe ,

01:45:05.307 --> 01:45:07.529
uh , for the things that are ongoing in

01:45:07.529 --> 01:45:06.750
the Middle East right now . What do we

01:45:06.750 --> 01:45:08.972
make of it ? What do , what do we learn

01:45:08.972 --> 01:45:11.240
from that ? Uh , sir , I think that the

01:45:11.240 --> 01:45:13.462
relationships we have with our European

01:45:13.462 --> 01:45:15.462
allies matter . I think they admire

01:45:15.462 --> 01:45:17.796
what the US military is able to do . Uh ,

01:45:17.796 --> 01:45:20.129
I think , uh , many nations , of course ,

01:45:20.129 --> 01:45:22.184
recognize , as several senators have

01:45:22.184 --> 01:45:24.609
mentioned , the threat that Iran has

01:45:24.609 --> 01:45:26.776
played over the years . You know , I ,

01:45:26.776 --> 01:45:28.887
I , uh , I reflect on my time in Iraq

01:45:28.887 --> 01:45:31.270
during the defeat ISIS operations in

01:45:31.270 --> 01:45:34.149
2019 to 2020 , and our European allies

01:45:34.149 --> 01:45:36.149
were side by side with us , and the

01:45:36.149 --> 01:45:38.260
biggest threat to us was not actually

01:45:38.260 --> 01:45:40.427
ISIS , it was Iranian threat network ,

01:45:40.427 --> 01:45:42.649
uh , you know , backed forces that were

01:45:42.649 --> 01:45:44.538
in , in Iraq , uh , attacking and

01:45:44.538 --> 01:45:47.015
killing US . And European forces and so

01:45:47.174 --> 01:45:49.785
I think on the military level many of

01:45:49.785 --> 01:45:51.625
us understand that threat and

01:45:51.625 --> 01:45:53.736
understand the menace that it poses .

01:45:53.736 --> 01:45:55.958
Can you give us a quick thumbnail on an

01:45:55.958 --> 01:45:57.903
update on NATO's strength and what

01:45:57.903 --> 01:46:00.014
we're seeing from our allies stepping

01:46:00.014 --> 01:46:01.958
up to the plate to do more ? Yes ,

01:46:01.958 --> 01:46:04.330
Senator , you bet . This coming year

01:46:04.330 --> 01:46:06.649
we'll have 5 or 6 allies that will

01:46:06.649 --> 01:46:09.009
already be at or near the 5% Hague

01:46:09.009 --> 01:46:10.898
spending commitments . Many other

01:46:10.898 --> 01:46:13.065
allies , some of the biggest economies

01:46:13.065 --> 01:46:15.065
in Europe like Germany , on a rapid

01:46:15.065 --> 01:46:17.176
pace to achieve 3 or 3.5% spending by

01:46:17.176 --> 01:46:19.287
the end of the decade . Uh , so there

01:46:19.287 --> 01:46:21.453
is , uh , there's plenty of appetite .

01:46:21.453 --> 01:46:23.676
And plenty of understanding that a more

01:46:23.676 --> 01:46:25.676
balanced and strong European pillar

01:46:25.676 --> 01:46:27.620
within the NATO alliance , uh , to

01:46:27.620 --> 01:46:29.842
complement what America has done for so

01:46:29.842 --> 01:46:32.120
many years is , uh , is essential , uh ,

01:46:32.120 --> 01:46:32.089
and that it will make for a stronger

01:46:32.089 --> 01:46:33.922
and more healthy alliance moving

01:46:33.922 --> 01:46:36.089
forward . It's really , this is really

01:46:36.089 --> 01:46:35.890
good news , right ? And compared to

01:46:36.049 --> 01:46:38.129
years in the past where the NATO is

01:46:38.129 --> 01:46:40.410
stronger and has more money and doing

01:46:40.410 --> 01:46:42.970
more to step up to the plate to support

01:46:42.970 --> 01:46:45.290
all of our , all of our , uh , shared

01:46:45.290 --> 01:46:47.568
causes , right ? I , I agree , Senator .

01:46:47.568 --> 01:46:49.568
One thing that I am concerned about

01:46:49.568 --> 01:46:51.734
though with our NATO allies . Is their

01:46:51.734 --> 01:46:54.089
reliance on Chinese technology that

01:46:54.089 --> 01:46:55.922
could compromise the security of

01:46:55.922 --> 01:46:57.978
critical infrastructure that impacts

01:46:57.978 --> 01:47:00.200
our forces , US forces . Um , thanks to

01:47:00.200 --> 01:47:02.200
President Trump's leadership , NATO

01:47:02.200 --> 01:47:04.422
allies have committed to spending 5% of

01:47:04.422 --> 01:47:06.589
GDP , as you just discussed , on their

01:47:06.589 --> 01:47:08.250
security , including 1.5% on

01:47:08.250 --> 01:47:11.020
defense-related activities . If allies

01:47:11.020 --> 01:47:13.560
use part of this funding to rip and

01:47:13.560 --> 01:47:16.080
replace high-tech Chinese technology ,

01:47:16.419 --> 01:47:18.363
how would that contribute to UCO's

01:47:18.363 --> 01:47:21.459
mission ? Senator , we want Chinese

01:47:21.459 --> 01:47:23.681
technology out of anything related with

01:47:23.681 --> 01:47:25.737
the , with the defense of the United

01:47:25.737 --> 01:47:28.070
States or Europe or across the alliance .

01:47:28.070 --> 01:47:30.292
And so we focus our efforts to help our

01:47:30.292 --> 01:47:32.515
allies identify where they have Chinese

01:47:32.515 --> 01:47:34.292
technology in their information

01:47:34.292 --> 01:47:36.403
networks , particularly their defense

01:47:36.403 --> 01:47:38.570
information networks . Uh , and then ,

01:47:38.570 --> 01:47:40.348
uh , you know , there's Chinese

01:47:40.348 --> 01:47:42.570
technology and ownership across much of

01:47:42.570 --> 01:47:42.379
the infrastructure that folks like

01:47:42.379 --> 01:47:44.601
General Reed would . Uh , would rely on

01:47:44.601 --> 01:47:46.657
to flow forces either across or into

01:47:46.657 --> 01:47:48.490
the continent . So you're seeing

01:47:48.490 --> 01:47:50.712
progress on this front . Do , do all of

01:47:50.712 --> 01:47:52.935
our NATO allies share our concern about

01:47:52.935 --> 01:47:55.046
Chinese technology , Sir , sir , they

01:47:55.046 --> 01:47:57.157
do . you know , even the , the allies

01:47:57.157 --> 01:47:59.157
that I would traditionally put in a

01:47:59.157 --> 01:48:01.379
category where , you know , they , they

01:48:01.379 --> 01:48:03.435
didn't pay attention to this when we

01:48:03.435 --> 01:48:05.101
highlighted today , uh , they

01:48:05.101 --> 01:48:07.157
absolutely understand the threat and

01:48:07.157 --> 01:48:09.323
the risk , and they take action . Um ,

01:48:09.323 --> 01:48:09.319
and would it likewise , uh , be helpful

01:48:09.319 --> 01:48:11.790
if , um , our allies removed China from

01:48:11.790 --> 01:48:14.123
satellite ground stations in the Arctic ?

01:48:14.799 --> 01:48:16.966
Absolutely , Senator . OK , that's all

01:48:16.966 --> 01:48:18.966
I have . Thank you . I yield back .

01:48:18.966 --> 01:48:21.410
Thank you , Senator Duckworth . Thank

01:48:21.410 --> 01:48:23.521
you , Chairman . We're now in the 2nd

01:48:23.521 --> 01:48:25.632
week of President Trump's illegal war

01:48:25.632 --> 01:48:27.854
against Iran with no end in sight , and

01:48:27.854 --> 01:48:30.188
I fear the longer that this war goes on ,

01:48:30.188 --> 01:48:32.188
it will have lasting impacts on the

01:48:32.188 --> 01:48:34.410
readiness of our military to respond to

01:48:34.410 --> 01:48:34.350
crises and threats elsewhere .

01:48:34.770 --> 01:48:36.714
Meanwhile , this administration is

01:48:36.714 --> 01:48:38.659
hiding its incompetence behind the

01:48:38.659 --> 01:48:40.770
valor of our military men and women ,

01:48:40.770 --> 01:48:42.930
as if questioning why we're at war is

01:48:42.930 --> 01:48:45.041
equal to questioning the valor of our

01:48:45.041 --> 01:48:47.152
troops . We all know that that is not

01:48:47.152 --> 01:48:49.208
true . I know that our military will

01:48:49.208 --> 01:48:50.763
always do the best and most

01:48:50.763 --> 01:48:52.819
professional job possible , but that

01:48:52.819 --> 01:48:54.874
means that we here in these chambers

01:48:54.874 --> 01:48:57.041
who are the elected representatives of

01:48:57.041 --> 01:48:59.208
the American people are beholden to do

01:48:59.208 --> 01:49:01.374
our job and make sure that this is the

01:49:01.374 --> 01:49:03.263
right war , one that is worth our

01:49:03.263 --> 01:49:05.152
troops' sacrifices , and we can't

01:49:05.152 --> 01:49:07.263
forget that that sacrifice extends to

01:49:07.263 --> 01:49:09.486
our logisticians and support staff , as

01:49:09.486 --> 01:49:11.708
we've been tragically reminded by the 6

01:49:11.708 --> 01:49:13.597
soldiers of the 103rd Sustainment

01:49:13.597 --> 01:49:16.529
Command that we lost last week . Any

01:49:16.529 --> 01:49:18.362
time that we conduct significant

01:49:18.362 --> 01:49:20.418
military action , especially on this

01:49:20.418 --> 01:49:20.229
scale , we must understand the demands

01:49:20.229 --> 01:49:22.390
that it puts on our military . By

01:49:22.390 --> 01:49:24.612
choosing this illegal war , one that he

01:49:24.612 --> 01:49:26.668
still cannot justify , Trump has put

01:49:26.668 --> 01:49:28.390
our service members at risk in

01:49:28.390 --> 01:49:30.612
completely unnecessary ways . 7 service

01:49:30.612 --> 01:49:32.723
members have been killed . 7 families

01:49:32.723 --> 01:49:34.723
had to hear the worst news of their

01:49:34.723 --> 01:49:36.668
lives , and the department has now

01:49:36.668 --> 01:49:38.834
confirmed at least 140 service members

01:49:38.834 --> 01:49:40.890
have been wounded , 8 severely . And

01:49:40.890 --> 01:49:43.001
with the expansion of this campaign ,

01:49:43.001 --> 01:49:44.668
including to overhead air air

01:49:44.668 --> 01:49:46.668
operations within Iran and possible

01:49:46.668 --> 01:49:48.723
naval escorts , our troops may be at

01:49:48.723 --> 01:49:50.612
even greater risk going forward .

01:49:50.612 --> 01:49:52.446
General Reed , Transcom has been

01:49:52.446 --> 01:49:54.390
working for years to modernize our

01:49:54.390 --> 01:49:56.446
global patient movement enterprise .

01:49:56.446 --> 01:49:58.446
Rises for the complexities of large

01:49:58.446 --> 01:50:00.334
scale combat operations , can you

01:50:00.334 --> 01:50:02.557
explain the challenges that our medical

01:50:02.557 --> 01:50:04.779
evacuation system faces in transporting

01:50:04.779 --> 01:50:06.890
critical care patients when airspaces

01:50:06.890 --> 01:50:08.946
and maritime routes are contested as

01:50:08.946 --> 01:50:11.168
we're seeing currently happening in the

01:50:11.168 --> 01:50:13.334
Middle East ? Senator , initially what

01:50:13.334 --> 01:50:15.501
has to happen is we need to , uh , put

01:50:15.501 --> 01:50:17.950
the entire system in place . Uh , that

01:50:17.950 --> 01:50:21.149
requires us to forward stage teams , um ,

01:50:21.270 --> 01:50:23.326
not just the teams that will provide

01:50:23.326 --> 01:50:25.437
the care , but the teams who actually

01:50:25.437 --> 01:50:27.492
provide the , the scheduling and the

01:50:27.492 --> 01:50:28.992
teams who have the initial

01:50:28.992 --> 01:50:31.330
communications with , um , higher level

01:50:31.620 --> 01:50:34.049
facilities along the route . Um ,

01:50:34.520 --> 01:50:36.853
sometimes we have to put those in place ,

01:50:36.853 --> 01:50:39.020
uh , in an environment that's , that's

01:50:39.020 --> 01:50:41.131
contested , and then they continue to

01:50:41.131 --> 01:50:43.131
serve throughout . Uh , but that is

01:50:43.131 --> 01:50:45.000
done in concert with the theater

01:50:45.000 --> 01:50:48.029
commander who provides the force force

01:50:48.029 --> 01:50:50.140
protection . And then , uh , once the

01:50:50.140 --> 01:50:52.140
scheduling begins , we then put the

01:50:52.140 --> 01:50:54.759
aircraft in place , uh , at the point

01:50:54.759 --> 01:50:57.439
in time of need . It requires that the

01:50:57.439 --> 01:51:00.080
patients are stabilized and , um , and

01:51:00.080 --> 01:51:02.191
once they're assembled , we pick them

01:51:02.191 --> 01:51:05.399
up . And then we fly them out . Um , we

01:51:05.399 --> 01:51:08.000
also depend on force protection to

01:51:08.009 --> 01:51:10.231
clear the airspace so that the aircraft

01:51:10.231 --> 01:51:12.959
can get to the next station . And then

01:51:12.959 --> 01:51:15.589
also important for us is the permission

01:51:15.589 --> 01:51:17.919
to overfly so that we can have the

01:51:17.919 --> 01:51:20.979
shortest and the , uh , fastest routes .

01:51:21.680 --> 01:51:23.720
So to summarize , it's incredibly

01:51:23.720 --> 01:51:25.831
complex . We need to make investments

01:51:25.831 --> 01:51:27.959
in the system . Um , uh , and , and ,

01:51:27.979 --> 01:51:30.312
uh , there's a lot more work to be done ,

01:51:30.312 --> 01:51:32.368
but you're doing the absolute heroic

01:51:32.368 --> 01:51:34.312
best with what you have . Uh , our

01:51:34.312 --> 01:51:36.423
wounded service members and logistics

01:51:36.423 --> 01:51:38.646
professionals now face the realities of

01:51:38.646 --> 01:51:40.812
medical evacuation in an airspace , as

01:51:40.812 --> 01:51:42.590
you've mentioned , contested by

01:51:42.590 --> 01:51:44.757
missiles and drones from the enemy . I

01:51:44.757 --> 01:51:46.812
don't believe Trump considered these

01:51:46.812 --> 01:51:46.509
risks when he chose this war without

01:51:46.509 --> 01:51:48.565
understanding how it would spread in

01:51:48.565 --> 01:51:50.565
the region , and I know they're not

01:51:50.565 --> 01:51:52.676
investing in medical readiness in the

01:51:52.676 --> 01:51:54.676
Indo-Pacific where despite the real

01:51:54.676 --> 01:51:54.589
possibility of military conflict

01:51:54.589 --> 01:51:56.419
actually in our nation national

01:51:56.419 --> 01:51:58.252
interest , we have actually less

01:51:58.252 --> 01:52:00.363
medevac experience and much greater .

01:52:00.363 --> 01:52:02.475
Distances to cover similarly uh uh is

01:52:02.475 --> 01:52:04.649
the same situation in Africa even

01:52:04.649 --> 01:52:06.482
before this war , the department

01:52:06.482 --> 01:52:08.705
underinvested in our medical evacuation

01:52:08.705 --> 01:52:10.760
system , which is why I've advocated

01:52:10.760 --> 01:52:12.705
for years to give Transcom and the

01:52:12.705 --> 01:52:14.927
services the resources that you need to

01:52:14.927 --> 01:52:16.816
rapidly adapt to future contested

01:52:16.816 --> 01:52:18.816
environments . These gaps will only

01:52:18.816 --> 01:52:20.760
widen as we continue to strain our

01:52:20.760 --> 01:52:22.927
system . General Reeve , can you speak

01:52:22.927 --> 01:52:24.482
to the importance of secure

01:52:24.482 --> 01:52:26.316
connectivity ? And the potential

01:52:26.316 --> 01:52:28.371
impacts , I mean , both logistically

01:52:28.371 --> 01:52:30.482
for logistical support , but also its

01:52:30.482 --> 01:52:32.593
potential impacts on existing gaps to

01:52:32.593 --> 01:52:34.482
this essential medical evacuation

01:52:34.482 --> 01:52:36.538
mission . You and I discussed this a

01:52:36.538 --> 01:52:38.371
little bit the other day . Yes ,

01:52:38.371 --> 01:52:40.427
Senator , what's important is , uh ,

01:52:40.427 --> 01:52:42.260
making sure that we can pass the

01:52:42.260 --> 01:52:44.149
information on the status of each

01:52:44.149 --> 01:52:46.260
person that we attend to , um , being

01:52:46.260 --> 01:52:48.482
able to make sure that that information

01:52:48.482 --> 01:52:50.538
gets , uh , established at the point

01:52:50.538 --> 01:52:52.705
but also forwarded to the next station

01:52:52.705 --> 01:52:54.482
that way we can have the proper

01:52:54.482 --> 01:52:56.427
physician with the proper care and

01:52:56.427 --> 01:52:58.649
proper equipment to , to , to attend to

01:52:58.649 --> 01:53:00.871
them , uh , as we continue to press for

01:53:00.871 --> 01:53:02.927
more secure communications , then we

01:53:02.927 --> 01:53:05.149
will make sure that there is no drop in

01:53:05.149 --> 01:53:07.220
the care . Are are you facing some

01:53:07.220 --> 01:53:10.689
challenges right now ? We are facing

01:53:10.689 --> 01:53:12.911
challenges in terms of secure funding .

01:53:13.129 --> 01:53:15.359
OK , thank you . This administration's

01:53:15.359 --> 01:53:17.581
inexcusable poor , poor planning in the

01:53:17.581 --> 01:53:19.748
lead up to this war of choice has only

01:53:19.748 --> 01:53:21.859
exacerbated the toll on our logistics

01:53:21.859 --> 01:53:24.081
system . Uh , General Grikovich , I , I

01:53:24.081 --> 01:53:23.990
would not ask you to speak to current

01:53:23.990 --> 01:53:26.101
operations , but in your experience ,

01:53:26.101 --> 01:53:28.101
do you agree that coordinating with

01:53:28.101 --> 01:53:30.323
allies and partners before an operation

01:53:30.323 --> 01:53:32.379
is critical to ensuring that our air

01:53:32.379 --> 01:53:34.434
assets have the necessary logistical

01:53:34.434 --> 01:53:34.330
nodes for rest and refueling to reduce

01:53:34.330 --> 01:53:36.052
the strain on our aging aerial

01:53:36.052 --> 01:53:39.339
refueling tanker fleet ? Senator ,

01:53:39.459 --> 01:53:41.660
there's always a balance in terms of

01:53:41.660 --> 01:53:43.771
when you do the coordination , if you

01:53:43.771 --> 01:53:45.493
have the luxury of it based on

01:53:45.493 --> 01:53:47.716
operational security concerns to engage

01:53:47.716 --> 01:53:49.716
with allies and partners and secure

01:53:49.716 --> 01:53:51.771
access basing an overflight ahead of

01:53:51.771 --> 01:53:51.680
time , that that is incredibly valuable ,

01:53:51.970 --> 01:53:54.137
but there's a host of factors that may

01:53:54.137 --> 01:53:56.248
limit your ability to do that . Thank

01:53:56.248 --> 01:53:58.137
you , Senator Duckworth . Senator

01:53:58.137 --> 01:54:02.029
Warren . Thank you , Mr . Chairman . So

01:54:02.370 --> 01:54:04.490
on February 28th , Donald Trump

01:54:04.490 --> 01:54:07.049
launched his war against Iran . By

01:54:07.049 --> 01:54:09.450
March 1st , Iranian strikes had hit at

01:54:09.450 --> 01:54:12.529
least six surrounding countries , but

01:54:12.529 --> 01:54:14.609
all the Trump administration said to

01:54:14.609 --> 01:54:17.490
Americans in the region was exercise

01:54:17.490 --> 01:54:20.490
caution . On March 2nd , the State

01:54:20.490 --> 01:54:22.546
Department finally told Americans in

01:54:22.546 --> 01:54:24.890
over a dozen countries to evacuate ,

01:54:25.450 --> 01:54:27.617
but gave no real guidance on how to do

01:54:27.617 --> 01:54:30.169
that . As thousands of flights were

01:54:30.169 --> 01:54:31.947
canceled , the State Department

01:54:31.947 --> 01:54:35.459
initially told Americans to not rely on

01:54:35.459 --> 01:54:37.403
the US government for assistance ,

01:54:37.779 --> 01:54:41.540
departure , or evacuation . Let's be

01:54:41.540 --> 01:54:43.740
clear , the Trump administration chose

01:54:43.740 --> 01:54:46.500
this war . They planned this war for

01:54:46.500 --> 01:54:49.339
months , and they made no plans to

01:54:49.339 --> 01:54:51.379
safeguard hundreds of thousands of

01:54:51.379 --> 01:54:53.740
Americans in the region . There is no

01:54:53.740 --> 01:54:55.979
excuse for this , and I just want to

01:54:55.979 --> 01:54:59.819
draw a comparison here . In 2006 , the

01:54:59.819 --> 01:55:02.220
State Department requested support from

01:55:02.220 --> 01:55:05.580
DOD just two days into the war in

01:55:05.580 --> 01:55:08.459
Lebanon . Transcom arranged ships ,

01:55:08.660 --> 01:55:10.879
commercial . Charter and military

01:55:10.879 --> 01:55:14.399
flights for nearly 15,000 Americans .

01:55:14.799 --> 01:55:16.910
So General Reed , let me ask you , if

01:55:16.910 --> 01:55:18.632
the Secretary of State and the

01:55:18.632 --> 01:55:21.799
Secretary of Defense asked Transcom for

01:55:21.799 --> 01:55:24.359
help to evacuate Americans , would you

01:55:24.359 --> 01:55:27.359
provide that support ? Senator , I

01:55:27.359 --> 01:55:29.919
would thank you . So General Reed ,

01:55:30.040 --> 01:55:32.419
we're almost 2 weeks into this war .

01:55:32.779 --> 01:55:35.080
Have Secretary Rubio and State

01:55:35.080 --> 01:55:37.720
Department made any requests for

01:55:37.720 --> 01:55:41.189
Transcom to help evacuate Americans out

01:55:41.189 --> 01:55:44.149
of the Middle East ? Senator , on the

01:55:44.149 --> 01:55:45.927
twenty-eighth of February , the

01:55:45.927 --> 01:55:48.038
Department of State made a request to

01:55:48.038 --> 01:55:50.205
my department for that , and we have ,

01:55:50.205 --> 01:55:52.427
uh , we have provided some assistance .

01:55:52.910 --> 01:55:55.132
So you're saying they made that request

01:55:55.132 --> 01:55:57.310
back on February twenty-eighth . Yes ,

01:55:57.390 --> 01:56:00.390
Senator . So when we called them

01:56:00.390 --> 01:56:02.334
yesterday , they said they had not

01:56:02.334 --> 01:56:04.279
asked you for assistance . Can you

01:56:04.279 --> 01:56:06.700
explain why that would be so ? Senator ,

01:56:06.740 --> 01:56:10.470
I cannot explain that . I just don't

01:56:10.470 --> 01:56:13.229
understand this , uh , uh , and you

01:56:13.229 --> 01:56:15.396
have been helping them all this time .

01:56:17.540 --> 01:56:19.939
Senator , what we have done is through

01:56:19.939 --> 01:56:22.050
Central Command have responded to the

01:56:22.050 --> 01:56:24.850
request for the State Department to

01:56:24.859 --> 01:56:27.459
provide airlift at locations that they

01:56:27.459 --> 01:56:29.899
have specified . And how much have you

01:56:29.899 --> 01:56:32.066
airlifted in this period of time ? How

01:56:32.066 --> 01:56:34.121
many people , Senator , I'll have to

01:56:34.121 --> 01:56:36.343
get that number for you give me a rough

01:56:36.343 --> 01:56:38.232
idea , Senator . It's been in the

01:56:38.232 --> 01:56:40.066
hundreds , hundreds , not in the

01:56:40.066 --> 01:56:42.870
thousands . That's correct . And , but

01:56:42.870 --> 01:56:45.109
I will say that uh as we continue to

01:56:45.109 --> 01:56:47.750
watch the situation , uh , there have

01:56:47.750 --> 01:56:50.100
been other flights and , and , um ,

01:56:50.109 --> 01:56:52.629
other opportunities for American

01:56:52.629 --> 01:56:54.740
citizens to get out of the way . Some

01:56:54.740 --> 01:56:56.240
of that has been by ground

01:56:56.240 --> 01:56:58.407
transportation and some of it has been

01:56:58.407 --> 01:57:00.407
by commercial charters by the State

01:57:00.407 --> 01:57:02.573
Department . Are you saying you're not

01:57:02.629 --> 01:57:04.589
doing more because you think that

01:57:04.589 --> 01:57:07.350
Americans who are in the region are

01:57:07.350 --> 01:57:09.990
currently being adequately served by .

01:57:10.609 --> 01:57:14.250
Commercial flights and and private

01:57:14.250 --> 01:57:16.306
vehicles out of the region , is that

01:57:16.306 --> 01:57:18.528
what you're saying , Senator ? What I'm

01:57:18.528 --> 01:57:20.750
saying is we have responded to requests

01:57:20.750 --> 01:57:22.850
for for specific tasks , um , in

01:57:22.850 --> 01:57:25.072
conjunction with the commercial flights

01:57:25.072 --> 01:57:27.239
and what Transcom is providing . There

01:57:27.239 --> 01:57:29.128
are a number . Ways to to get our

01:57:29.128 --> 01:57:31.239
citizens out of harm's way . OK , and

01:57:31.239 --> 01:57:33.294
what I'm trying to understand is why

01:57:33.294 --> 01:57:35.294
you're not doing more , because I'm

01:57:35.294 --> 01:57:37.350
hearing from my constituents who are

01:57:37.350 --> 01:57:39.461
stranded there , who've been stranded

01:57:39.461 --> 01:57:41.628
there for 2 weeks , and they're asking

01:57:41.628 --> 01:57:43.739
for help and they're not getting help

01:57:43.739 --> 01:57:45.739
from the US government , and you're

01:57:45.739 --> 01:57:47.683
telling me that you're not helping

01:57:47.683 --> 01:57:49.906
because you think they've got plenty of

01:57:49.906 --> 01:57:49.410
other ways to get out of the region .

01:57:50.080 --> 01:57:52.890
Or is it that Secretary Rubio is not

01:57:52.890 --> 01:57:55.057
asking you for that help ? I just want

01:57:55.057 --> 01:57:57.330
to understand who bears responsibility

01:57:57.330 --> 01:58:01.180
here . Senator , it is the

01:58:01.180 --> 01:58:03.859
responsibility of all to care for the

01:58:03.859 --> 01:58:05.970
citizens that we have in harm's way ,

01:58:05.979 --> 01:58:08.490
and as we receive a tasking and the

01:58:08.490 --> 01:58:10.657
opportunities to do that , Transcom is

01:58:10.657 --> 01:58:14.279
responding . OK , so my

01:58:14.379 --> 01:58:17.580
constituents and other Americans who

01:58:17.580 --> 01:58:20.100
are trapped in the region are trapped

01:58:20.100 --> 01:58:23.779
there because Secretary Rubio is not

01:58:23.779 --> 01:58:26.001
asking you for help , is that right ? I

01:58:26.001 --> 01:58:27.723
just want to understand what's

01:58:27.723 --> 01:58:30.609
happening . We've been asked for help

01:58:30.609 --> 01:58:33.100
and we're available to do that and ,

01:58:33.189 --> 01:58:36.810
and , and so as we are able and the

01:58:36.810 --> 01:58:39.939
conditions permit with Centcom we are

01:58:39.939 --> 01:58:41.495
involved in all the all the

01:58:41.495 --> 01:58:44.209
coordination to meet our citizens where

01:58:44.209 --> 01:58:46.265
we can get to them and then and then

01:58:46.265 --> 01:58:48.376
transport them to safety provided all

01:58:48.376 --> 01:58:50.431
the help you've been asked for . You

01:58:50.431 --> 01:58:52.542
just been haven't been asked for more

01:58:52.542 --> 01:58:54.542
help , is that right ? Senator , we

01:58:54.542 --> 01:58:56.709
have been , we have been tasked and we

01:58:56.709 --> 01:58:58.931
have responded to each of those tasks .

01:58:58.931 --> 01:59:01.370
Look , I , I understand military speak

01:59:01.370 --> 01:59:04.049
here . But I don't understand how it is

01:59:04.049 --> 01:59:05.970
that we could get 15,000 people

01:59:05.970 --> 01:59:08.930
evacuated shortly after the war in

01:59:08.930 --> 01:59:10.819
Lebanon , and now we've still got

01:59:10.819 --> 01:59:13.041
thousands , tens of thousands of people

01:59:13.041 --> 01:59:15.041
trapped in the region , and I'm not

01:59:15.041 --> 01:59:17.319
understanding what your answer is here ,

01:59:17.319 --> 01:59:19.430
and I don't think the American people

01:59:19.430 --> 01:59:21.763
are either . Thank you , Senator Warren .

01:59:21.763 --> 01:59:23.986
General Reed , has the State Department

01:59:23.986 --> 01:59:26.208
contacted you in this regard to ask for

01:59:26.208 --> 01:59:29.399
help ? The State Department has , uh ,

01:59:29.410 --> 01:59:32.180
just as they did in the response to

01:59:32.180 --> 01:59:35.020
Lebanon as well , um , during that time

01:59:35.020 --> 01:59:37.259
there were provisions to get people out

01:59:37.259 --> 01:59:40.700
by , uh , sea lift and charter and so

01:59:40.700 --> 01:59:43.459
the , the , the amount of people who

01:59:43.459 --> 01:59:46.620
left um left with Transcom help as well

01:59:46.620 --> 01:59:48.842
as State Department charter . Thank you

01:59:48.842 --> 01:59:52.779
very much Senator Peters . Thank you ,

01:59:52.830 --> 01:59:54.941
uh , thank you , Mr . Chairman . Uh ,

01:59:54.941 --> 01:59:57.108
General Reed , as you're fully aware ,

01:59:57.108 --> 01:59:59.386
the Straits of Hormuz , uh , is a , uh ,

01:59:59.386 --> 02:00:01.497
strategic choke point . In the Middle

02:00:01.497 --> 02:00:03.839
East , with nearly 1/5 of the global

02:00:03.839 --> 02:00:07.200
petroleum and 3.5 trillion cubic feet

02:00:07.200 --> 02:00:09.839
of liquefied natural gas annually

02:00:09.839 --> 02:00:12.229
transits the straits , the straits

02:00:12.229 --> 02:00:15.669
closure that we're seeing right now has

02:00:15.680 --> 02:00:18.799
left about 1000 vessels stuck in the

02:00:18.799 --> 02:00:21.399
Persian Gulf . Two tankers were set

02:00:21.399 --> 02:00:25.000
ablaze just this morning . And

02:00:25.000 --> 02:00:26.790
even before these attacks , the

02:00:26.790 --> 02:00:29.200
uncertainty has caused gas prices to

02:00:29.200 --> 02:00:33.120
skyrocket . Oil trading up to $120

02:00:33.120 --> 02:00:35.500
a barrel this weekend and still at

02:00:35.500 --> 02:00:37.680
elevated levels and likely to continue

02:00:37.680 --> 02:00:39.879
to go up . In fact , according to the

02:00:39.879 --> 02:00:42.040
International Energy Agency , the war

02:00:42.040 --> 02:00:44.151
has caused , and this is a quote from

02:00:44.151 --> 02:00:47.200
them , the largest supply disruption in

02:00:47.200 --> 02:00:50.970
the history of the global oil market .

02:00:51.120 --> 02:00:53.231
That's a big statement in the history

02:00:53.231 --> 02:00:55.342
of the global market . Additionally ,

02:00:55.342 --> 02:00:57.459
30% of the world's fertilizer supply

02:00:57.790 --> 02:00:59.679
passes through the straits . This

02:00:59.679 --> 02:01:01.790
increases prices for American farmers

02:01:01.790 --> 02:01:03.957
as they're beginning planting season .

02:01:03.957 --> 02:01:06.179
This will mean food prices will also go

02:01:06.179 --> 02:01:09.839
up dramatically across the world . We

02:01:09.839 --> 02:01:11.895
have felt the impacts of the straits

02:01:11.895 --> 02:01:14.080
closure here , surely in prices and

02:01:14.080 --> 02:01:16.240
many goods , but we also can't forget

02:01:16.240 --> 02:01:18.407
the impacts of our service members who

02:01:18.407 --> 02:01:21.540
rely on being resupplied . So a

02:01:21.540 --> 02:01:23.651
question for you , sir , is , are you

02:01:23.651 --> 02:01:25.707
in talks with the CENCOM commander ,

02:01:25.707 --> 02:01:28.560
Admiral Cooper , on having actual plans

02:01:28.850 --> 02:01:30.859
to open up the strait to commercial

02:01:30.859 --> 02:01:33.859
traffic and also to ease uh service

02:01:33.859 --> 02:01:35.859
member resupply in the region and .

02:01:38.729 --> 02:01:41.319
We are working with Admiral Cooper as

02:01:41.319 --> 02:01:44.959
he continues to prosecute , uh , the

02:01:44.959 --> 02:01:47.580
operations that he has . Uh , in the

02:01:47.919 --> 02:01:50.240
warfighting sense , we are doing all

02:01:50.240 --> 02:01:53.470
that we can to help him . Uh , get

02:01:53.470 --> 02:01:56.220
after the targets that he needs to , uh ,

02:01:56.240 --> 02:01:58.669
actually suppress the threats on the

02:01:58.669 --> 02:02:01.689
straits . Uh , there is intense

02:02:02.060 --> 02:02:04.470
concentration to make sure that we can

02:02:04.470 --> 02:02:06.549
reduce that enough to get to a point

02:02:06.549 --> 02:02:08.716
where we can get through the straits .

02:02:09.104 --> 02:02:11.160
When it comes to the sustainment for

02:02:11.160 --> 02:02:13.382
the forces , uh , the strait is not the

02:02:13.382 --> 02:02:15.548
only way that , uh , that , that we're

02:02:15.548 --> 02:02:18.035
restricted to in order to resupply for

02:02:18.035 --> 02:02:20.504
sustainment . Uh , we have alternatives

02:02:20.504 --> 02:02:23.165
for that , and we're currently , uh ,

02:02:23.205 --> 02:02:24.816
executing that as we speak .

02:02:27.189 --> 02:02:29.419
General Reed , the Transcom provides

02:02:29.740 --> 02:02:32.060
basically the logistics backbone to

02:02:32.060 --> 02:02:34.290
support our forces in any conflict ,

02:02:34.819 --> 02:02:37.041
including the war in Iran , as you were

02:02:37.041 --> 02:02:39.263
talking about . But this means not only

02:02:39.263 --> 02:02:41.430
moving troops into the region but also

02:02:41.430 --> 02:02:41.180
ensuring they have food , fuel , and

02:02:41.180 --> 02:02:43.236
munitions , and we talked about this

02:02:43.236 --> 02:02:46.500
issue at length on an office call . We

02:02:46.500 --> 02:02:48.333
talked about how Transcom relies

02:02:48.333 --> 02:02:50.500
heavily upon commercial partners to be

02:02:50.500 --> 02:02:53.120
able to augment your capacity to ensure

02:02:53.500 --> 02:02:55.810
the delivery of these key supplies . So

02:02:55.810 --> 02:02:57.921
my question for you is , how has your

02:02:57.921 --> 02:02:59.810
ability to deliver these critical

02:02:59.810 --> 02:03:01.643
supplies been impacted given the

02:03:01.643 --> 02:03:03.754
contested logistics environment we're

02:03:03.754 --> 02:03:05.866
in right now where we have commercial

02:03:05.866 --> 02:03:08.089
ports , commercial fuel networks , and

02:03:08.089 --> 02:03:10.033
commercial partners that have been

02:03:10.033 --> 02:03:12.250
significantly disrupted as a result of

02:03:12.250 --> 02:03:14.361
the closure of the Strait of Hormuz ?

02:03:15.919 --> 02:03:18.080
So , uh , we do acknowledge the

02:03:18.080 --> 02:03:20.247
disruptions , but this is exactly what

02:03:20.247 --> 02:03:22.569
we expect in a contested environment .

02:03:22.919 --> 02:03:24.697
When it comes to the commercial

02:03:24.697 --> 02:03:27.509
participation , uh , they are able to

02:03:27.859 --> 02:03:29.970
deliver to points that are safe , and

02:03:29.970 --> 02:03:32.026
then we will transload , and then we

02:03:32.026 --> 02:03:34.359
take the responsibility from there . Um ,

02:03:34.359 --> 02:03:37.399
and so in this way , uh , together we

02:03:37.399 --> 02:03:39.600
do and operate where we can , where we

02:03:39.600 --> 02:03:41.656
operate the best , and then we still

02:03:41.656 --> 02:03:43.656
get the war fighter the things that

02:03:43.656 --> 02:03:45.878
they need in their hands when they need

02:03:45.878 --> 02:03:48.049
it . So are you , are you believe

02:03:48.049 --> 02:03:50.271
you're still able to rely on commercial

02:03:50.271 --> 02:03:52.493
partners for logistic capabilities , or

02:03:52.493 --> 02:03:54.716
does this mean we have to shift to more

02:03:54.716 --> 02:03:56.882
military options where we have greater

02:03:56.882 --> 02:03:58.993
control and greater security ? We can

02:03:58.993 --> 02:04:01.990
absolutely rely on them . Very good .

02:04:03.509 --> 02:04:07.109
General Kuch , we have seen

02:04:07.109 --> 02:04:09.750
public reporting on the DOD withdrawing

02:04:09.750 --> 02:04:11.759
Patriot and THAAD missile defense

02:04:11.759 --> 02:04:14.029
systems from the Indo-Pacific . These

02:04:14.029 --> 02:04:16.350
are public reports and repositioning

02:04:16.350 --> 02:04:19.580
them into the Middle East . These moves ,

02:04:19.629 --> 02:04:21.689
I know , have alarmed our allies ,

02:04:22.029 --> 02:04:24.609
simultaneously weakening our regional

02:04:25.069 --> 02:04:27.029
deterrence and emboldening our

02:04:27.029 --> 02:04:29.251
adversaries , including China , as well

02:04:29.251 --> 02:04:31.362
as North Korea . Uh , have , have you

02:04:31.362 --> 02:04:33.418
been asked to reposition any of your

02:04:33.418 --> 02:04:35.307
missile defense systems away from

02:04:35.307 --> 02:04:37.307
Europe in order to send them to the

02:04:37.307 --> 02:04:39.418
Middle East ? No , sir , I have not .

02:04:39.418 --> 02:04:41.640
Very good . Thank you , Mr . Chairman .

02:04:41.640 --> 02:04:43.751
Thank you very much , Senator Rosen .

02:04:43.751 --> 02:04:45.751
Well thank you Chairman Rick Ricker

02:04:45.751 --> 02:04:47.807
Ranking Member Reed for holding this

02:04:47.807 --> 02:04:49.751
hearing . Uh , thank you , General

02:04:49.751 --> 02:04:51.862
Grinkovich and General Reed . We have

02:04:51.862 --> 02:04:54.085
two Reids here today , right , uh , for

02:04:54.085 --> 02:04:56.140
your service to our country . So I'm

02:04:56.140 --> 02:04:58.307
gonna talk about support for Ukraine's

02:04:58.307 --> 02:05:00.473
critical infrastructure right now . So

02:05:00.473 --> 02:05:02.418
General Grinkovich , uh , you know

02:05:02.418 --> 02:05:04.307
Russia has engaged in a concerted

02:05:04.307 --> 02:05:06.418
campaign to attack Ukraine's civilian

02:05:06.418 --> 02:05:08.640
power infrastructure during what's been

02:05:08.640 --> 02:05:10.696
a brutally cold winter . Despite now

02:05:10.696 --> 02:05:12.529
entering spring , I'm incredibly

02:05:12.529 --> 02:05:14.696
concerned that Russia will continue to

02:05:14.696 --> 02:05:16.807
sustain attacks in Ukraine's civilian

02:05:16.807 --> 02:05:18.830
infrastructure . So I know you have

02:05:18.830 --> 02:05:21.129
thoughts on this based on our recent

02:05:21.129 --> 02:05:23.351
conversation in Munich . And so can you

02:05:23.351 --> 02:05:25.518
discuss your views on the threat posed

02:05:25.518 --> 02:05:27.296
by Russian attacks on Ukraine's

02:05:27.296 --> 02:05:29.518
infrastructure and what kind of support

02:05:29.518 --> 02:05:31.685
has the US government provided Ukraine

02:05:31.685 --> 02:05:33.962
to support its critical infrastructure ?

02:05:33.962 --> 02:05:36.018
What more should we be doing in this

02:05:36.018 --> 02:05:38.790
space ? Yes , Senator , uh , as you

02:05:38.790 --> 02:05:40.790
alluded to , there were a number of

02:05:40.790 --> 02:05:42.750
attacks over the coldest winter in

02:05:42.750 --> 02:05:46.049
decades in , in Eastern Europe against

02:05:46.450 --> 02:05:48.672
the Ukrainian civilian infrastructure .

02:05:48.990 --> 02:05:51.919
This included their electrical grid at

02:05:51.919 --> 02:05:55.290
times during this . Period we saw down

02:05:55.290 --> 02:05:56.901
to just a couple of hours of

02:05:56.901 --> 02:05:58.810
electricity per day in Kiev as an

02:05:58.810 --> 02:06:01.549
example . And then attacks on the

02:06:01.689 --> 02:06:04.200
thermal heating plants as well , uh ,

02:06:04.290 --> 02:06:06.410
cutting , cutting heat to to large

02:06:06.410 --> 02:06:09.049
swaths of uh of many of the cities

02:06:09.049 --> 02:06:11.216
across Ukraine . So , you know , the ,

02:06:11.216 --> 02:06:13.382
the , uh , what I would say is I think

02:06:13.382 --> 02:06:15.160
that these attacks were broadly

02:06:15.160 --> 02:06:16.938
intended to put pressure on the

02:06:16.938 --> 02:06:18.993
civilian population to then pressure

02:06:19.140 --> 02:06:21.509
the government of Ukraine to come to a

02:06:21.509 --> 02:06:23.620
to an agreement to end the war . Um ,

02:06:24.209 --> 02:06:26.370
and the what I've observed over the

02:06:26.370 --> 02:06:28.537
course of studying airpower in history

02:06:28.537 --> 02:06:30.649
is that anytime you attack a civilian

02:06:30.649 --> 02:06:32.930
population , you usually end up finding

02:06:32.930 --> 02:06:35.152
that it just hardens their resolve . We

02:06:35.152 --> 02:06:37.041
take this all the way back to the

02:06:37.041 --> 02:06:38.986
London Blitz in World War II . The

02:06:38.986 --> 02:06:41.041
Brits just had a stiff upper lip and

02:06:41.041 --> 02:06:40.930
kept on fighting , and I think that's

02:06:40.930 --> 02:06:42.986
what we've seen in Ukraine as well .

02:06:43.029 --> 02:06:45.029
Moving forward , I am watching very

02:06:45.029 --> 02:06:47.251
carefully to see now that it is warming

02:06:47.251 --> 02:06:49.251
up , do the Russians continue these

02:06:49.251 --> 02:06:51.473
attacks on that civilian , electrical ,

02:06:51.473 --> 02:06:53.696
and thermal infrastructure , or do they

02:06:53.696 --> 02:06:55.751
shift to other targets yet ? At this

02:06:55.751 --> 02:06:55.709
point it's still unclear , but we're

02:06:55.709 --> 02:06:57.931
watching it closely . Thank you . We'll

02:06:57.931 --> 02:07:00.265
be looking forward to updates from that .

02:07:00.265 --> 02:07:02.320
I also want to talk about NATO cyber

02:07:02.320 --> 02:07:04.320
preparedness because NATO Secretary

02:07:04.320 --> 02:07:06.431
General Mark Rutte , they warned that

02:07:06.431 --> 02:07:08.542
Russia could be ready to use military

02:07:08.542 --> 02:07:10.709
force against NATO within 5 years . So

02:07:10.709 --> 02:07:12.320
as you know , Russia's cyber

02:07:12.320 --> 02:07:14.487
capabilities were core to its invasion

02:07:14.487 --> 02:07:16.320
and continued war with Ukraine .

02:07:16.320 --> 02:07:18.542
Russia's demonstrating , uh , a growing

02:07:18.542 --> 02:07:20.709
willingness to employ cyber aggression

02:07:20.709 --> 02:07:22.931
towards NATO . I'm glad that NATO hosts

02:07:22.931 --> 02:07:24.820
an annual cyber exercise . Locked

02:07:24.820 --> 02:07:26.487
Shields , the world's largest

02:07:26.487 --> 02:07:28.653
multinational cyber defense exercise ,

02:07:28.653 --> 02:07:30.542
has begun to strengthen its cyber

02:07:30.542 --> 02:07:32.765
capabilities by creating the integrated

02:07:32.765 --> 02:07:34.876
cyber Defense Center , but that's not

02:07:34.876 --> 02:07:36.931
gonna be operational until 2028 . So

02:07:36.931 --> 02:07:38.987
General Grinkovich , how are you and

02:07:38.987 --> 02:07:41.098
CyberCom working with our NATO allies

02:07:41.098 --> 02:07:43.265
Ukraine , European partners to enhance

02:07:43.265 --> 02:07:45.320
our cybersecurity capabilities , our

02:07:45.320 --> 02:07:47.376
cooperation , uh , particularly with

02:07:47.376 --> 02:07:49.320
those less cyber capable nations ,

02:07:49.320 --> 02:07:51.542
because that puts us all , um , at risk

02:07:51.542 --> 02:07:53.542
and makes us more vulnerable to our

02:07:53.542 --> 02:07:55.598
adversaries . Yes , Senator , that ,

02:07:55.598 --> 02:07:57.765
that's a great question and thanks for

02:07:57.765 --> 02:07:59.820
asking it . This is one of the areas

02:07:59.820 --> 02:08:02.042
where the alliance and , and , uh , and

02:08:02.042 --> 02:08:03.765
I are focused to , to try to .

02:08:03.765 --> 02:08:05.876
Understand how we can bring the cyber

02:08:05.876 --> 02:08:07.931
capabilities to bear that nations do

02:08:07.931 --> 02:08:10.153
have . And while there's some countries

02:08:10.153 --> 02:08:12.320
that don't have a lot of capability in

02:08:12.320 --> 02:08:12.290
cyber , there are some within the

02:08:12.290 --> 02:08:14.179
alliance that do and some that we

02:08:14.179 --> 02:08:16.123
wouldn't expect that we're only as

02:08:16.123 --> 02:08:18.179
strong as our weakest link , right ?

02:08:18.179 --> 02:08:20.290
That's true , ma'am . But in alliance

02:08:20.290 --> 02:08:22.512
that's built on collective defense , we

02:08:22.512 --> 02:08:24.734
can help each other . If one country is

02:08:24.734 --> 02:08:24.140
strong in air defense and another

02:08:24.140 --> 02:08:26.307
country is strong in cyber . There's a

02:08:26.307 --> 02:08:28.529
natural synergy there where we can help

02:08:28.529 --> 02:08:30.640
each other to get stronger together .

02:08:30.640 --> 02:08:32.862
Uh , in the classified session , I'd be

02:08:32.862 --> 02:08:32.450
happy to give you some details on who

02:08:32.450 --> 02:08:34.617
the main players are , uh , but we are

02:08:34.617 --> 02:08:36.561
working to modernize how we access

02:08:36.561 --> 02:08:38.783
those cyber effects and can use them in

02:08:38.783 --> 02:08:41.117
a potential conflict . Thank you . Well ,

02:08:41.117 --> 02:08:42.950
I'm going to stick on this topic

02:08:42.950 --> 02:08:44.839
because over the past year , uh ,

02:08:44.839 --> 02:08:47.006
Russian aircraft and drones have flown

02:08:47.006 --> 02:08:48.728
into NATO airspace on multiple

02:08:48.728 --> 02:08:50.894
occasions . Um , I don't believe these

02:08:50.894 --> 02:08:53.149
incursions were accidental . Russia's

02:08:53.149 --> 02:08:55.260
deliberately testing NATO countries ,

02:08:55.260 --> 02:08:57.371
the readiness , the resolve , and the

02:08:57.371 --> 02:08:59.149
manner and timing of all of our

02:08:59.149 --> 02:09:00.982
response to this aggression . So

02:09:00.982 --> 02:09:03.205
building on Senator Fisher , I know she

02:09:03.205 --> 02:09:05.427
asked this earlier , you think NATO can

02:09:05.427 --> 02:09:07.593
and should most effectively respond to

02:09:07.593 --> 02:09:09.705
these Russian acts of aggression even

02:09:09.705 --> 02:09:12.680
if they say they were accidental . Yes ,

02:09:12.799 --> 02:09:14.910
Senator , I'm , I'm very proud of the

02:09:14.910 --> 02:09:17.077
initial responses I mentioned a little

02:09:17.077 --> 02:09:19.299
bit earlier , but I would also say That

02:09:19.299 --> 02:09:21.299
the stand up of our Eastern century

02:09:21.299 --> 02:09:23.466
vigilance activity across the alliance

02:09:23.466 --> 02:09:25.632
has resulted in a dramatic decrease in

02:09:25.632 --> 02:09:27.799
this activity . So it has had not just

02:09:27.799 --> 02:09:29.966
a preventive effect in terms of when ,

02:09:29.966 --> 02:09:31.910
when drones are incurring into the

02:09:31.910 --> 02:09:33.966
airspace , being able to stop them ,

02:09:33.966 --> 02:09:35.966
but it's also deterred the Russians

02:09:35.966 --> 02:09:37.855
from taking that kind of reckless

02:09:37.855 --> 02:09:39.799
behavior in the first place . So I

02:09:39.799 --> 02:09:41.910
think there's always , there's always

02:09:41.910 --> 02:09:44.243
work to be done here . It's not perfect .

02:09:44.243 --> 02:09:46.521
We continue to have limited incursions ,

02:09:46.521 --> 02:09:46.270
but I think we're on the right path and

02:09:46.270 --> 02:09:48.381
making great progress . Thank you . I

02:09:48.381 --> 02:09:50.714
look forward to the classified briefing .

02:09:51.609 --> 02:09:55.500
Which will begin precisely at 12 noon .

02:09:55.899 --> 02:09:58.540
A vote is going on right now . Members

02:09:58.540 --> 02:10:00.779
are encouraged to , to go ahead and

02:10:00.779 --> 02:10:03.620
vote , and we will see you in the SBC

02:10:03.839 --> 02:10:05.419
precisely at 12 noon .