WEBVTT

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And he meets today to consider the

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nominations of Vice Admiral Mitch

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Bradley to be commander of United

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States Special Operations Command . And

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Lieutenant General Dagve Anderson to be

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commander United States Africa Command .

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I welcome our witnesses and their

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families , and I thank them for their

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continued willingness to serve our

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nation . If confirmed , Admiral Bradley

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will assume command at a time when

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Special Operations Command SOCOM faces

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a formidable challenge . SOCOM is being

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asked to build a force capable of

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combating the advanced militaries of

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China and Russia while simultaneously .

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Remain fully engaged in the fight

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against violent Islamic terrorism . At

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the same time , special operators must

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be ready to respond at a moment's

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notice as our nation's premier crisis

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response force . It is clear to me that

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the role and importance of SOCOM is

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greater today than at any time since

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its establishment for decades ago .

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However , SOCOM's budget does not

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reflect this reality . Its budget has

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remained flat since 2019 , adjusted for

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inflation , that amounts to roughly a

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14% cut in purchasing power . To

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amplify that point , SOCOM identifies

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$757 million in

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unfunded requirements for fiscal year

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2026 . We want to ensure that SOCOM is

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fully resourced to meet the demands

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placed on it . Admiral Bradley should

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tell us how he plans to meet those

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demands and how we can help . If

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confirmed , General Anderson will

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confront a growing array of threats on

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the African continent . The Chinese

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Communist Party views Africa as a

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critical link in Xi Jinping's

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unprecedented global military expansion .

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And continues to purchase new bases for

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the People's Liberation Army . Vladimir

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Putin remains fully engaged in his

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destabilizing campaign to trade

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security assistance for access to

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Africa's abundant natural resources .

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This is one of Mr . Putin's ways to

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fund his malign activities around the

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world , all the while Islamic violent

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extremist groups aligned with ISIS and

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Al Qaeda remain an enduring threat in

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Africa . Despite the growing complexity

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and scale of threats on the continent ,

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AFRO remains under resources in both

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manpower and in critical capabilities

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like intelligence surveillance and

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reconnaissance . I look forward to

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General Anderson's assessment of

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Africa's importance to our national

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security , as well as his description

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of what AFRO's strategy should be to

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counter the growing threat posed by

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China , Russia , and other adversaries

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across the continent . I'm particularly

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interested in how General Anderson

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plans to use America's economic tools ,

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including the Office of Strategic

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Capital to combat Chinese influence .

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If confirmed , our nominees will

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confront a global security environment .

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That is defined by emboldened ,

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aggressive dictators in Beijing ,

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Moscow , Tehran , and Pyongyang .

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They view this fight as a global fight

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unconstrained by geographic boundaries

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in the traditional forms of warfare .

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This axis of aggressors blends

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conventional military power with

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asymmetric tactics including economic

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warfare , disinformation , and the use

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of proxy networks to undermine

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Americans security interests . The

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witnesses before us today will play a

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key role in the Department of Defense's

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efforts to combat these challenges .

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And I look forward to hearing them

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address these and many other concerns

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during today's hearing . With that , I

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turn to my friend and colleague Ranking

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Member Reed . Oh , thank you very much ,

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Mr . Chairman , uh , Admiral Bradley ,

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General Anderson , welcome and

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congratulations on your nominations . I

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wanna thank you for stepping forward to

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continue your long career of service .

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I'd also like to extend my appreciation

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to your families , who were with you

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every step of the way and will continue

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to serve alongside you . Admiral

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Bradley , you've been nominated to lead

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the United States Special Operations

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Command , or SOCOM , at a time of

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important transformation . Because of

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the efforts and sacrifices of the

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special operations community over the

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past two decades , the threat from ISIS ,

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al Qaeda , and other violent extremist

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groups has been greatly diminished .

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Now America's national security

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interests are challenged by the

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aggressive and often coordinated

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ambitions of China , Russia , Iran ,

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and North Korea . Our special

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operations forces are so are not only

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needed to maintain pressure on violent

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extremist groups that threaten our

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homeland , they are also key to

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addressing the challenges posed by

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these adversarial nations . As the

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recently released soft operating

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concept proposes , quote , Joint soft

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capabilities will help deter conflict

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by changing a competitors political

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calculations , denying achievement or

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imposing costs that outweigh potential

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benefits . This concept is ambitious

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and will require close partnership with

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the military services and other

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elements of the interagency ,

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especially the intelligence community .

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And with our network of allies and

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partners around the world , Admiral

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Bradley , if confirmed , I expect your

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experience commanding special operators

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and SEALs around the world will serve

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you extremely well . Today I would ask

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that you share how you would plan to

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lead the special operations community

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to adjust to the rapid pace of change

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on the battlefield and how lessons

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learned from Ukraine , Gaza , the Red

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Sea , Syria , and elsewhere can inform

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the tactics and modernization efforts

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of SOCOM . Additionally , I'm

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interested in how you would leverage

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unmanned systems , artificial

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intelligence , space , cyber

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information operations , and other

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capabilities in SOCOM missions .

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Finally , as a combatant command with

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service like responsibility , SOCOM

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needs and deserves a senior civilian to

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provide service secretary-like

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oversight and advocacy for our special

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operations forces . Congress has sought

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to empower the Assistant Secretary of

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Defense for Special Operations and low

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intensity conflict to fulfill that

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mandate . Admiral Bradley has confirmed ,

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I ask for your support as the

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department continues to work to fully

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implement those reforms . General

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Anderson , you have been nominated to

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lead US Africa Command or AFRO . In

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Africa , our adversaries are focused on

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building trade relationships while

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seizing influence from us . China's

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military ambitions on the continent are

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no secret from their growing presence

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in Djibouti to more than 100 sea ports

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that have been constructed , financed ,

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or operated by Chinese-owned

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enterprises and could serve as dual use

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for future military contingencies .

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Russia has also expanded its military

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engagement in Africa . It is investing

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heavily in disinformation campaigns

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across the continent to spread

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anti-Western movements , undermine

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democracy , and promote Russian-backed

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authoritarian leaders , especially in

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West Africa . General Anderson , given

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these challenges , AFRO must continue

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to explore new methods to maintain US

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security interests in the region . Our

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forces continue to train and advise

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partner militaries , but will be asked

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to do so with fewer resources and

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troops going forward . I would ask you

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to share your views on the current

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security situation , the best approach

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to establish and maintain close

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partnerships with partner nations , and

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how we can seek to engage a whole of

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government effort to address the

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political and economic instability in

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Africa . Indeed , stability is

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essential for any successful nation .

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For decades we have relied upon our

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State Department diplomats and the US

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Agency for International Development ,

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or USAID to develop deep lasting

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relationships in Africa that can

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outlast China and Russia's coercion .

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The outgoing AFICO commander General

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Langley described our competitive

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advantage against Russia as quote . Not

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just building military and security

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capacity , the story needs to be told

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about the successes of USAID and State

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Department collectively for all of our

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operations , activities , and

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investments . I am deeply concerned

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that our soft power leadership in

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Africa has been significantly

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undermined over the past several months .

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General Anderson , I would like to know

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your perspective on the importance of

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diplomacy and development tools to

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achieve our national security

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objectives in Africa and how you would

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work to ensure our competitors do not

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capitalize on the dismantling of USAID

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in the region . Thank you both for your

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service and willingness to lead in this

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challenging time . And I look forward

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to your testimonies . Thank you , Mr .

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Chairman . Thank you very much ,

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Ranking Member Reed . Now , um ,

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Admiral Bradley , you may make your

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opening statement and , and feel free

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to introduce any friends and relatives

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you have with you supporting you today .

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Thank you , uh , and good morning

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Chairman Reed , uh , Chairman Wicker ,

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ranking member Reid , and , uh ,

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distinguished members of the committee .

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It is an honor to appear before you

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today as the president's nominee to be

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the next commander of the United States

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Special Operations Command . I'm

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grateful to the president , to the

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Secretary of Defense , and to Chairman

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Caine for their trust and confidence in

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me for this important nomination . I'd

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like to recognize and thank the current

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SOCOM command team first , uh , General

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Brian Fenton and CSM Shane Shorter and

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their families for their leadership of

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the SOCOM force and families these past

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3 years . I'm privileged to be

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alongside my teammate , Lieutenant

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General Dag Anderson , longtime friend

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and colleague , and if we are confirmed ,

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I very much look forward to working and

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teaming with them again in our new

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capacities . I'd like to recognize , uh ,

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my family that are here with me today .

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They've been critical to my service and

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to our nation and without whom I , I

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can't imagine being here today . My

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best friend and wife of 34 years ,

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Katie , is here with me . The ground ,

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the grounding rod and conscience of our

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family . She has weathered the storms

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of this career , mentoring young soft

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families and rearing our four children .

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And keeping me humble and centered

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throughout . She grew up in an army

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family , daughter to an infantry

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officer who served in Vietnam before

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joining me in the navy and has moved

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households 27 times in her life , a

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testament to resilience if there ever

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was one . Our children , their families

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are here with me as well . Mary

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Catherine and husband Ralph ,

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scientists and parents to our first

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granddaughter Rose Mary Louise , our

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oldest son Henry , an FBI special agent ,

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and his wife Brianna , also an FBI

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employee , we seem to be making

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interagency cooperation a bit of family

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business here . Our son , Lieutenant

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Frank Bradley , a fellow SEAL , and his

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wife Kylie , a public servant in Hawaii ,

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and our youngest son James , a data

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scientist working in the national

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industrial base and on on autonomous

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underwater systems . So I come from a

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small ranching community in Southwest

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Texas where I learned the foundations

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of meritocracy at an early age . I'm

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the son of a World War II veteran Army

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Air Corps master sergeant who worked on

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P-38s from Operation Torch in North

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Africa to the final assault on Berlin .

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After the war , my father ranched and

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served as the justice of the peace and

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elected judge in our small Texas

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community . I learned a deep

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appreciation for our democracy and the

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judicial system , watching him dispense

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judgment in our community . His example

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of service and the allure of adventure

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or what drew me to the United States

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Naval Academy and the SEAL community ,

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and I have had ample opportunity for

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both in my 37 years since leaving El

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Dorado , Texas . My mother was a

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compassionate influence as much of a

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rancher as any man in our family , she

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and my grandmother were the matriarchs

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who would weave discipline with love in

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appropriate measure . Their influence

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looms large in everything I do .

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Finally , I must thank my siblings and

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the countless coaches , professors and

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pastors who have helped to shape me

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both on and off the field . Special

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operations is the ultimate team sport ,

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where to win is to live and to lose

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often means someone you care for does

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not . As such , I am grateful to be a

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member of the most precise and lethal

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fighting force the world has ever known

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on a strategic landscape where the

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adversaries and competitors challenge

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the rules-based international order .

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YourSoft provides the agility ,

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precision , and nuance needed to

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confront and disrupt these threats and

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competition . But should the need arise ,

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we're also ready to integrate into the

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joint force to respond to crisis and

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engage in high end conflict where the

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precise delivery of violence will be

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critical to shaping success on the

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battlefield to this committee and your

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predecessors , I say thank you .

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SOCOM's existence reflects the strong

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bipartisan commitment in Congress to

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ensure that the United States leads the

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world in special operations , and that

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commitment has paid off . If confirmed ,

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I'll work closely with ASDOLIC , with

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my fellow combatant commanders ,

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service leadership , and the chairman ,

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the Secretary of Defense , and this

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committee to sustain and strengthen the

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force , to man , train , equip , and

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care for our soft warriors and their

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families . I will provide the Secretary

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of Defense and the President candid and

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clear military advice , and I will

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remain fully transparent with this

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committee , ensuring that you have the

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information necessary to continue your

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critical constitutional oversight of

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our national defense . I thank you for

14:05.194 --> 14:07.250
your service to our country . I look

14:07.250 --> 14:06.880
forward to answering your questions and

14:06.880 --> 14:09.102
engaging with you on the important work

14:09.102 --> 14:11.580
ahead . Thank you very much , Admiral

14:11.909 --> 14:14.131
General Anderson , you are recognized .

14:15.250 --> 14:17.361
Chairman Wicker , ranking member Reid

14:17.361 --> 14:19.472
and distinguished committee members ,

14:19.472 --> 14:21.694
thank you for the opportunity to appear

14:21.694 --> 14:23.917
before you this morning . It is truly a

14:23.917 --> 14:25.917
humbling honor . I'm honored by the

14:25.917 --> 14:27.972
president's trust and confidence and

14:27.972 --> 14:30.139
nominated me to serve as the commander

14:30.139 --> 14:32.361
of US Africa Command , and I'm grateful

14:32.361 --> 14:31.549
for the support of the Secretary of

14:31.549 --> 14:33.660
Defense and the Chairman of the Joint

14:33.660 --> 14:35.605
Chiefs of Staff . I'd also like to

14:35.605 --> 14:37.827
recognize General Langley's 40 years of

14:37.827 --> 14:39.660
distinguished service and strong

14:39.660 --> 14:41.660
leadership and the team that he and

14:41.660 --> 14:43.969
Sergeant Major Mike Woods forged . I'm

14:43.969 --> 14:46.289
joined today by my wife of 26 years ,

14:46.450 --> 14:48.506
Liz , a native of the great state of

14:48.506 --> 14:51.239
Maine . Her unwavering support and

14:51.239 --> 14:53.489
sacrifice have been instrumental to my

14:53.489 --> 14:55.711
service in the success of the mission .

14:56.000 --> 14:58.056
Liz is the heart of our family , and

14:58.056 --> 15:00.200
despite 9 schools in 6 states and 3

15:00.200 --> 15:02.311
countries , she is the reason we have

15:02.311 --> 15:04.429
two strong and talented daughters ,

15:04.760 --> 15:06.704
Holla , who is watching from Paris

15:06.704 --> 15:09.038
today , and Lilia , who is here with us .

15:10.909 --> 15:13.020
My commitment to service is rooted in

15:13.020 --> 15:15.353
the values instilled in me by my family .

15:15.353 --> 15:17.465
My grandmother , a nurse , served her

15:17.465 --> 15:20.200
community well into her 80s . My

15:20.200 --> 15:22.256
grandfathers , one a sailor in World

15:22.256 --> 15:24.478
War 1 , the other a Marine in World War

15:24.478 --> 15:27.000
2 , were ordinary people who answered

15:27.000 --> 15:29.270
the call during extraordinary times .

15:31.390 --> 15:33.168
My mother , Roberta , a special

15:33.168 --> 15:35.168
education teacher , and my father ,

15:35.168 --> 15:37.223
Charles , a police officer , modeled

15:37.223 --> 15:39.112
public service , selflessness and

15:39.112 --> 15:41.669
integrity . These values have guided me

15:41.669 --> 15:43.836
through 33 years of military service .

15:44.599 --> 15:46.821
My parents are walking from my hometown

15:46.821 --> 15:49.043
of Ypsilanti , Michigan , home of Rosie

15:49.043 --> 15:51.155
the Riveter and Willow Run , where at

15:51.155 --> 15:52.988
the age of 17 , I learned to fly

15:52.988 --> 15:54.988
alongside these symbols of American

15:54.988 --> 15:57.640
ingenuity and resilience . It is an

15:57.640 --> 15:59.830
honor to sit beside Vice Admiral Mick

15:59.830 --> 16:02.052
Bradley , a special operations teammate

16:02.052 --> 16:03.941
and one of the finest leaders and

16:03.941 --> 16:05.830
warfighters I've served with . If

16:05.830 --> 16:07.719
confirmed , I concur with Admiral

16:07.719 --> 16:09.830
Bradley that it is truly a team sport

16:09.830 --> 16:11.719
and look forward to collaborating

16:11.719 --> 16:13.886
closely with him and all the combatant

16:13.886 --> 16:15.830
commanders to confront the complex

16:15.830 --> 16:17.719
emerging challenges of today . My

16:17.719 --> 16:19.830
career has followed a non-traditional

16:19.830 --> 16:21.997
path with 7 joint assignments across 4

16:21.997 --> 16:24.052
commands , ranging from conventional

16:24.052 --> 16:25.719
war fighting exercises in the

16:25.719 --> 16:27.663
Indo-Pacific to conducting special

16:27.663 --> 16:29.552
operations in the Middle East and

16:29.552 --> 16:32.270
Africa . And from global mobility to

16:32.270 --> 16:34.880
stateside training . My experiences

16:34.880 --> 16:37.119
abroad have shaped my career . I had

16:37.119 --> 16:39.286
the privilege of studying in the Czech

16:39.286 --> 16:40.952
Republic where I witnessed an

16:40.952 --> 16:43.175
outpouring of support for America after

16:43.175 --> 16:45.309
9/11 . Almost 23 years later , I had

16:45.309 --> 16:47.031
the honor to speak at the 80th

16:47.031 --> 16:49.253
anniversary of the liberation of Pilsen

16:49.253 --> 16:51.580
by Patton's 3rd army . Thousands

16:51.580 --> 16:53.729
gathered , waving check and American

16:53.729 --> 16:56.159
flags , a powerful reminder of our

16:56.159 --> 16:59.890
shared values and enduring ties . And

16:59.890 --> 17:02.112
while I've flown several aircraft , the

17:02.112 --> 17:04.209
missions flying the U-28 , a modest

17:04.209 --> 17:06.479
single engine prop , were among my most

17:06.479 --> 17:09.609
rewarding . In under 2 years , a team

17:09.609 --> 17:11.331
of operators , engineers , and

17:11.331 --> 17:13.442
acquisitions experts turned an urgent

17:13.442 --> 17:15.449
need into a mission ready , highly

17:15.449 --> 17:18.329
capable surveillance platform . A

17:18.329 --> 17:20.329
testament to empowered innovation

17:20.329 --> 17:23.319
meeting battlefield requirements . As

17:23.319 --> 17:25.541
commander of Special Operations Command

17:25.541 --> 17:27.430
Africa , I witnessed South Africa

17:27.430 --> 17:29.486
strategically positioned between the

17:29.486 --> 17:31.430
Atlantic and the Indo-Pacific . is

17:31.430 --> 17:33.375
increasingly at the convergence of

17:33.375 --> 17:35.486
great power rivalry , and terrorism .

17:35.630 --> 17:37.686
China is expanding its approach from

17:37.686 --> 17:39.852
focus on economic influence to greater

17:39.852 --> 17:41.963
military and information operations .

17:41.963 --> 17:43.741
Russians actions are frequently

17:43.741 --> 17:45.741
destabilizing and run counter to US

17:45.741 --> 17:47.963
interests . Terrorist networks continue

17:47.963 --> 17:50.074
to exploit ungoverned spaces posing a

17:50.074 --> 17:51.852
direct threat to our safety and

17:51.852 --> 17:53.908
security . During my time at Special

17:53.908 --> 17:56.130
Operations Command Africa , an American

17:56.130 --> 17:58.329
citizen was taken hostage in . Within

17:58.329 --> 18:00.969
96 hours , we located him , coordinated

18:00.969 --> 18:02.913
with multiple African partners and

18:02.913 --> 18:04.913
European allies , and Joint Special

18:04.913 --> 18:07.191
Operations Command executed the rescue .

18:07.369 --> 18:10.060
The speed and success of that mission

18:10.060 --> 18:12.282
underscored the seamless integration of

18:12.282 --> 18:14.393
the joint force and the importance of

18:14.393 --> 18:16.504
strong relationships . When we called

18:16.504 --> 18:18.338
in the middle of the night , our

18:18.338 --> 18:21.540
partners answered . If confirmed , I

18:21.540 --> 18:23.373
look forward to building on that

18:23.373 --> 18:25.373
success and those relationships . I

18:25.373 --> 18:27.484
will keep this committee informed . I

18:27.484 --> 18:29.318
will be a responsible steward of

18:29.318 --> 18:31.619
taxpayer dollars , and I will lead by

18:31.619 --> 18:33.619
example to advance US interests and

18:33.619 --> 18:36.150
counter adversary threats . Thank you

18:36.150 --> 18:38.317
for your unwavering support to the men

18:38.317 --> 18:40.483
and women in the US military and thank

18:40.483 --> 18:42.372
you for this opportunity . I look

18:42.372 --> 18:44.483
forward to your questions . Thank you

18:44.483 --> 18:46.483
very much , General Anderson and uh

18:46.483 --> 18:48.706
thank you both for being with us . It's

18:48.706 --> 18:52.469
now time for me to ask some standard

18:52.469 --> 18:55.109
questions that we ask of all military

18:55.109 --> 18:57.589
nominees to exercise its legislative

18:57.589 --> 18:59.533
and oversight responsibilities and

18:59.533 --> 19:01.533
important it is important that this

19:01.533 --> 19:03.422
committee . And other appropriate

19:03.422 --> 19:06.199
committees of the Congress be able to

19:06.199 --> 19:09.160
receive testimony briefings and other

19:09.160 --> 19:12.660
communications of information . So if

19:12.660 --> 19:15.479
you'll just answer yes or no , you can

19:15.479 --> 19:18.160
answer simultaneously and we'll be

19:18.160 --> 19:20.439
watching . Have you adhered to

19:20.439 --> 19:22.217
applicable laws and regulations

19:22.217 --> 19:24.520
governing conflicts of interest ? Yes ,

19:24.599 --> 19:27.670
Senator . OK , just a yes or no is fine .

19:27.750 --> 19:30.310
Do you agree when asked to give your

19:30.310 --> 19:32.459
personal views , even if those views

19:32.459 --> 19:34.792
differ from the administration in power ?

19:34.792 --> 19:37.310
Yes . Have you assumed any duties or

19:37.310 --> 19:39.949
undertaken any actions which would

19:39.949 --> 19:42.005
appear to presume the outcome of the

19:42.005 --> 19:45.310
confirmation process ? Will you ensure

19:45.310 --> 19:47.900
your staff complies with deadlines

19:47.900 --> 19:49.390
established for requested

19:49.390 --> 19:51.446
communications , including questions

19:51.446 --> 19:54.930
for the record in hearings ? Yes . Will

19:54.930 --> 19:56.986
you cooperate in providing witnesses

19:56.986 --> 19:59.239
and briefers in response to

19:59.239 --> 20:02.949
congressional requests ? Yes . Will

20:02.949 --> 20:04.838
those witnesses be protected from

20:04.838 --> 20:06.616
reprisal for their testimony or

20:06.616 --> 20:09.550
briefings ? You agree if confirmed to

20:09.550 --> 20:12.010
appear and testify upon request before

20:12.010 --> 20:15.280
this committee . Yes . Do you agree to

20:15.280 --> 20:17.869
provide documents including copies of

20:17.869 --> 20:21.520
electronic forms of communications in a

20:21.520 --> 20:24.160
timely manner when requested by a duly

20:24.160 --> 20:26.750
constituted committee or to consult

20:26.750 --> 20:29.160
with that committee regarding the basis

20:29.160 --> 20:32.079
for any good faith delay or denial in

20:32.079 --> 20:34.709
providing such documents . Yes .

20:36.030 --> 20:39.479
And thus ends our standard questions .

20:39.839 --> 20:42.260
uh , let me ask though , let me ask one

20:42.260 --> 20:45.099
that , uh , has become , uh , somewhat

20:45.099 --> 20:47.321
standard , and we've gotten encouraging

20:47.321 --> 20:49.432
responses from all of our witnesses .

20:49.432 --> 20:51.377
Much of the funding in the defense

20:51.377 --> 20:53.890
reconciliation bill , the big beautiful

20:53.890 --> 20:56.660
bill as the president calls it , um ,

20:56.780 --> 21:00.140
is unspecific and uh unspecific and

21:00.140 --> 21:02.251
will technically be at the discretion

21:02.251 --> 21:04.362
of the Department of Defense . Though

21:04.362 --> 21:05.807
this committee will write

21:05.807 --> 21:07.918
recommendations for them , we do that

21:07.918 --> 21:10.029
because of the rules . A quick yes or

21:10.029 --> 21:12.029
no answer from each of you . Do you

21:12.029 --> 21:13.807
commit to follow the Congress's

21:13.807 --> 21:15.918
spending recommendations in defense ,

21:15.918 --> 21:18.380
reconciliation , unequivocally ,

21:19.089 --> 21:21.479
Admiral Bradley ? Yes , General

21:21.479 --> 21:23.719
Anderson . And Admiral Bradley , you in

21:23.719 --> 21:25.880
particular will be receiving quite a

21:25.880 --> 21:28.839
sum of money for SOCOM priorities , and

21:28.839 --> 21:31.829
we want to work together to make sure

21:31.829 --> 21:35.160
it is used for the most pressing needs .

21:36.280 --> 21:38.680
So , um , I thank you for your answers

21:39.089 --> 21:42.760
there . General Anderson , um .

21:43.829 --> 21:47.689
You , you talked about um . You talked

21:47.689 --> 21:50.829
about the activities of China .

21:51.609 --> 21:54.310
Um , in , in , um , Africa , you talked

21:54.310 --> 21:57.800
about the um activities of Of ,

21:57.839 --> 22:00.390
um , Russia under their dictator ,

22:00.400 --> 22:02.390
Vladimir Putin . um .

22:04.780 --> 22:07.790
Why , why did they do this ? They are

22:07.790 --> 22:10.189
they helping Africa out of the goodness

22:10.189 --> 22:14.160
of their hearts ? Uh ,

22:14.270 --> 22:16.437
Senator , I appreciate the concern . I

22:16.437 --> 22:18.437
see that , uh , from my time at SOC

22:18.437 --> 22:20.603
Africa and , uh , my time in the joint

22:20.603 --> 22:23.589
staff that there is growing activity

22:23.589 --> 22:25.478
from both China and Russia on the

22:25.478 --> 22:27.589
continent . Both of those nations see

22:27.589 --> 22:29.478
their futures running through the

22:29.478 --> 22:31.756
continent and is key to their strategy .

22:31.756 --> 22:33.867
I think we can look at several of the

22:33.867 --> 22:35.922
things that have been done that have

22:35.922 --> 22:35.510
not necessarily been good for the

22:35.510 --> 22:37.869
people of Africa . I think they're

22:37.869 --> 22:39.869
aware of that . I think when we can

22:39.869 --> 22:42.091
highlight that it helps them understand

22:42.091 --> 22:44.150
the risks of dealing with China and

22:44.150 --> 22:46.510
Russia , whether that be debt diplomacy

22:46.510 --> 22:49.630
from China or the corrosive effects of

22:49.630 --> 22:51.797
uh the Africa core previously known as

22:51.797 --> 22:55.020
Wagner , uh , in those societies . Well ,

22:55.390 --> 22:59.150
OK , and so when , when um we have

22:59.150 --> 23:02.979
programs . Such as PEPFAR or , um ,

23:03.579 --> 23:06.599
USAID , um , we

23:07.939 --> 23:10.106
We would like to feel that that really

23:10.106 --> 23:12.410
helps the people there , but we have a ,

23:12.420 --> 23:16.140
uh , a strategic security purpose in

23:16.140 --> 23:19.479
doing that ourselves , do we not ? Yes ,

23:19.560 --> 23:22.750
Senator . OK , and what is that ? Uh ,

23:22.829 --> 23:26.380
Senator , uh , these programs are , uh ,

23:26.750 --> 23:28.861
important as long as they provide for

23:28.861 --> 23:30.806
the security and prosperity of our

23:30.806 --> 23:33.028
nation , and I think as we target those

23:33.028 --> 23:34.861
in key areas they can help build

23:34.861 --> 23:36.972
stability in key regions . If , if we

23:36.972 --> 23:38.861
abandon the playing field in that

23:38.861 --> 23:42.589
regard , um , what would be the

23:42.589 --> 23:46.520
response in Moscow or Beijing ? I think

23:46.520 --> 23:48.798
they'd be celebrating , would they not ?

23:48.798 --> 23:51.020
Um , well , Senator , I know that uh if

23:51.020 --> 23:53.242
there's opportunities , they will seize

23:53.242 --> 23:55.520
them . Yes , um , now , um .

23:57.640 --> 24:01.630
On um on a SOCOM , um . Let

24:01.630 --> 24:03.852
me just say that the SOCOM's budget has

24:03.852 --> 24:07.819
been inadequate . Um There's

24:07.819 --> 24:10.250
been a 35% increase in combatant

24:10.250 --> 24:14.010
command requests for SOCOM support .

24:15.479 --> 24:19.270
Over the last 3 years . Um , in the

24:19.270 --> 24:21.709
last , um , decade , there's been a

24:21.709 --> 24:25.020
200% increase in crisis response

24:25.020 --> 24:28.949
missions executed by SOCOM . 14%

24:28.949 --> 24:32.699
budget cut though in SOCOM , um ,

24:33.069 --> 24:34.989
as I pointed out in my opening

24:34.989 --> 24:37.390
statement since 2019 when adjusted for

24:37.390 --> 24:40.790
inflation . And in raw numbers

24:40.790 --> 24:44.770
4000 . Um , troops cut

24:44.770 --> 24:47.699
from SOCOM , um . And

24:47.699 --> 24:51.239
$757 million in unfunded requirements

24:51.239 --> 24:54.209
for fiscal year 2026 . Now , um .

24:54.859 --> 24:56.930
Admiral , the reconciliation bill

24:56.930 --> 25:00.250
included $1.64 billion to support

25:00.250 --> 25:03.810
SOCOM's readiness and modernization

25:03.810 --> 25:07.170
priorities . Um , do you agree with me

25:07.170 --> 25:09.226
that SOCOM's budget is inadequate to

25:09.226 --> 25:12.449
meet global , a growing global demands ?

25:13.189 --> 25:15.356
Senator , as you , as you've described

25:15.356 --> 25:17.356
it , uh , I've heard General Fenton

25:17.356 --> 25:19.411
make a compelling case with the same

25:19.411 --> 25:21.745
statistics and believe those to be true .

25:21.849 --> 25:24.979
And , um , uh , let me just point out

25:24.979 --> 25:27.229
to you and make sure you agree .

25:27.339 --> 25:30.459
Reconciliation . was always meant to be

25:30.459 --> 25:32.859
additive to , not a replacement for the

25:32.859 --> 25:35.369
core budget . Absent real growth in

25:35.369 --> 25:39.079
SOCOM's future budget request . Your

25:39.079 --> 25:41.359
command will face significant resource

25:41.359 --> 25:43.780
challenges , is that correct ? Senator ,

25:43.859 --> 25:46.180
we will , we will absolutely use the

25:46.180 --> 25:48.540
resources that are provided to us with

25:48.540 --> 25:51.219
ruthless prioritization to go down

25:51.219 --> 25:53.497
through the tasks that are given to us .

25:53.780 --> 25:56.770
Inevitably though , with the current

25:56.770 --> 25:59.959
operations commitment that exists ,

26:00.290 --> 26:02.290
that will mean that we will have to

26:02.290 --> 26:04.234
mortgage some of our modernization

26:04.234 --> 26:06.457
initiatives to be able to pay for those

26:06.457 --> 26:08.457
for that readiness to sustain those

26:08.457 --> 26:10.679
current operations . Well , listen , we

26:10.679 --> 26:12.890
will not be able to be generous . With

26:12.890 --> 26:16.229
either of you But , but we

26:16.229 --> 26:19.510
do , uh , we do want to hear what you

26:19.510 --> 26:22.109
really , really need , and , and we're

26:22.109 --> 26:24.510
gonna be depending on , on the two of

26:24.510 --> 26:27.510
you and your teams to let us know that

26:27.510 --> 26:29.910
because if something goes wrong and you

26:29.910 --> 26:32.420
didn't have the capacity to cover it ,

26:32.910 --> 26:36.189
then , uh , uh , they shouldn't look to

26:36.189 --> 26:39.609
you , uh , if . This body hasn't

26:39.609 --> 26:41.665
provided you with the resources , so

26:41.665 --> 26:43.720
thank you very much , Senator Reid .

26:43.720 --> 26:45.720
You are recognized . Thank you very

26:45.720 --> 26:47.553
much , Mr . Chairman . Uh , when

26:47.553 --> 26:49.553
General Fenton , uh , delivered the

26:49.553 --> 26:51.776
partial statement last year , he said ,

26:51.776 --> 26:53.942
I quote , Our interagency efforts also

26:53.942 --> 26:55.998
have included close cooperation with

26:55.998 --> 26:58.109
the Department of State and US Agency

26:58.109 --> 27:00.276
for International Development with the

27:00.276 --> 27:02.680
implementation of the Global Fragility

27:02.680 --> 27:04.770
Act in coastal West Africa .

27:05.189 --> 27:07.189
Fundamentally focused on preventing

27:07.189 --> 27:09.540
crisis in failed states before they can

27:09.540 --> 27:12.420
occur , similarly , AFRICO commander

27:12.420 --> 27:15.260
General Langley testified US investment

27:15.260 --> 27:17.380
focused on stabilization , conflict

27:17.380 --> 27:19.158
prevention and peace building ,

27:19.180 --> 27:21.069
democracy , governance , economic

27:21.069 --> 27:23.339
growth , and public health attacked the

27:23.339 --> 27:26.060
roots of terrorism and tyranny more

27:26.060 --> 27:28.540
than bullets and air strikes ever will .

27:29.339 --> 27:31.395
For for both of you gentlemen , uh ,

27:31.979 --> 27:35.420
why are such efforts , uh , in our

27:35.420 --> 27:38.300
vital national security interests and

27:38.300 --> 27:42.020
not just humanitarian good deeds , and

27:42.020 --> 27:44.131
what are we risk by walking away from

27:44.131 --> 27:46.242
these investments , Admiral Bradley ,

27:46.819 --> 27:49.359
Senator , thank you . Um , in my 34

27:49.359 --> 27:51.699
years I've had the opportunity , uh ,

27:51.739 --> 27:53.961
on many continents to work closely with

27:53.961 --> 27:56.310
our , uh , our humanitarian , our AID ,

27:56.500 --> 27:59.280
our , uh , diplomats . And I've seen ,

27:59.339 --> 28:01.589
uh , the executors even at the

28:01.589 --> 28:04.199
non-governmental organization level uh

28:04.199 --> 28:06.421
provide important uh capability for the

28:06.421 --> 28:09.000
US . Uh , I also recognize , however ,

28:09.040 --> 28:11.151
that , uh , there are many priorities

28:11.151 --> 28:13.373
as we just talked about , and the , and

28:13.373 --> 28:15.596
the prioritization of the budget across

28:15.596 --> 28:17.762
those is a , uh , is a difficult thing

28:17.762 --> 28:19.929
to to balance and to manage . Um , I ,

28:19.929 --> 28:22.040
I pledge and I , and I believe that ,

28:22.040 --> 28:24.040
uh , throughout time we have always

28:24.040 --> 28:26.520
worked as an integrated inter agency to

28:26.520 --> 28:28.742
be able to bring the multiple levers of

28:28.742 --> 28:30.853
influence and power that the US needs

28:30.853 --> 28:33.020
to achieve its policy objectives and ,

28:33.020 --> 28:35.076
and if confirmed , I would pledge to

28:35.076 --> 28:37.390
continue that . Uh , General Anderson .

28:38.380 --> 28:40.689
Particularly in Africa . Yes , Senator ,

28:40.880 --> 28:42.890
uh , from my time in South Africa ,

28:42.920 --> 28:45.142
much like Admiral Bradley , I've worked

28:45.142 --> 28:47.364
extensively with the State Department ,

28:47.364 --> 28:49.587
USAID , and NGOs across the continent ,

28:49.760 --> 28:52.229
uh , to meet , uh , requirements . Uh ,

28:52.479 --> 28:54.368
Africa is very much an economy of

28:54.368 --> 28:56.590
Forest theater , so we have to maximize

28:56.590 --> 28:58.535
the limited resources we have . So

28:58.535 --> 29:00.590
going forward we'll look at where we

29:00.590 --> 29:02.757
can find those opportunities , whether

29:02.757 --> 29:04.868
it's , uh , with State Department and

29:04.868 --> 29:06.923
the aid that they can provide , uh ,

29:06.923 --> 29:06.760
bringing and working with the

29:06.760 --> 29:08.816
non-governmental organizations we've

29:08.816 --> 29:11.038
worked closely with several in Africa ,

29:11.038 --> 29:13.204
also looking at opportunities with the

29:13.204 --> 29:15.204
Office of Street Capital or private

29:15.204 --> 29:17.371
equity as private firms may be able to

29:17.371 --> 29:19.427
invest and help , uh . Some of these

29:19.427 --> 29:21.593
areas as well , and I think one of the

29:21.593 --> 29:23.704
things that AFRICO is positioned well

29:23.704 --> 29:25.649
to do is to convene people to have

29:25.649 --> 29:27.704
these discussions , understanding we

29:27.704 --> 29:29.871
provide the military aspect of it , we

29:29.871 --> 29:31.816
can provide a venue to bring folks

29:31.816 --> 29:31.295
together to look at the security

29:31.295 --> 29:33.625
implications of these investments ,

29:34.094 --> 29:36.405
given the current situation in which

29:36.405 --> 29:38.572
the State Department is being hollowed

29:38.572 --> 29:41.094
out and the USAID is being effectively

29:41.094 --> 29:43.224
abolished , have you lost a valuable

29:43.224 --> 29:46.300
strategic tool ? Uh , Senator , I

29:46.300 --> 29:48.356
understand that's still under review

29:48.356 --> 29:50.356
for the foreign assistance and that

29:50.356 --> 29:52.356
much of that's being transferred to

29:52.356 --> 29:54.356
state . So I , if I'm confirmed , I

29:54.356 --> 29:56.467
would have to assess what's available

29:56.467 --> 29:58.522
and how we can best use that for our

29:58.522 --> 30:00.689
national interests . Admiral Bradley ,

30:00.689 --> 30:02.744
the same question . Are you losing a

30:02.744 --> 30:04.856
very . Senator , I , I'm , I'm , uh ,

30:04.856 --> 30:07.133
I'm very confident that , uh , however ,

30:07.133 --> 30:09.133
the distribution of those tasks and

30:09.133 --> 30:11.467
those efforts are , are , uh , are made ,

30:11.467 --> 30:13.411
we will continue to work with them

30:13.411 --> 30:15.578
closely to make sure we bring the best

30:15.578 --> 30:17.800
combination of those levers and tools ,

30:17.800 --> 30:19.967
uh , to bear . And Bradley , uh , what

30:19.967 --> 30:22.078
are your modernization priorities for

30:22.078 --> 30:25.969
SOCOM ? Senator , thank you . Um , as ,

30:26.099 --> 30:27.877
as we look to the future of the

30:27.877 --> 30:30.010
conflict that , uh , SOCOM might be ,

30:30.140 --> 30:32.599
uh , called to participate in , um ,

30:32.660 --> 30:34.716
I've had the opportunity this last 3

30:34.716 --> 30:36.882
years to participate in , uh , General

30:36.882 --> 30:39.280
Fenton's , uh , leadership team as a

30:39.280 --> 30:41.447
member of the board of directors . And

30:41.447 --> 30:43.558
we focused , uh , as , as you've seen

30:43.558 --> 30:46.719
in his testimony , uh , on how to

30:46.719 --> 30:49.079
penetrate and power project in

30:49.079 --> 30:51.520
contested environments . We see that

30:51.520 --> 30:53.464
through the lessons learned on the

30:53.464 --> 30:55.464
battlefields of Ukraine , uh , even

30:55.464 --> 30:57.760
into the Red Sea and certainly as we

30:57.760 --> 30:59.982
contemplate what a future fight against

30:59.982 --> 31:02.199
China might look like . So contested

31:02.199 --> 31:04.310
environments and being able to arrive

31:04.310 --> 31:06.255
with the element of surprise are a

31:06.255 --> 31:08.532
critical component . A second priority ,

31:08.532 --> 31:10.477
uh , though is also the ability to

31:10.477 --> 31:12.810
operate within the ubiquitous technical

31:12.810 --> 31:14.643
surveillance environment that is

31:14.643 --> 31:17.760
evolving around us today . It provides ,

31:17.770 --> 31:19.603
uh , certainly challenges to our

31:19.603 --> 31:21.492
ability to again arrive with that

31:21.492 --> 31:23.214
element of surprise , but also

31:23.214 --> 31:24.826
opportunities . And here the

31:24.826 --> 31:26.770
partnership with Cybercom , with

31:26.770 --> 31:28.930
SpaceCom , and with your special

31:28.930 --> 31:31.250
operators is particularly important and

31:31.250 --> 31:33.675
so those strategic . Uh , partnerships

31:33.675 --> 31:36.155
and relationships and modernization of

31:36.155 --> 31:38.433
that partnership , I think is critical .

31:38.433 --> 31:40.711
Thank you . Finally , General Anderson ,

31:40.711 --> 31:43.515
if I may , uh , you've had valuable

31:43.515 --> 31:45.515
experience on the ground already as

31:45.515 --> 31:47.682
commander of special , uh , operations

31:47.682 --> 31:51.589
in Africom , uh . With respect to

31:51.589 --> 31:53.709
Somalia , do you think a a continuous

31:53.709 --> 31:56.150
presence is essential ? I'm sorry ,

31:56.199 --> 31:59.030
sorry , I miss uh where in Somalia , in

31:59.030 --> 32:01.739
Somalia . Uh , Senator , as you know ,

32:01.819 --> 32:04.060
we've had , uh , presence there for

32:04.060 --> 32:06.260
quite some time . Uh , we have seen

32:06.260 --> 32:08.579
some limited success there in training

32:08.579 --> 32:10.801
their , uh , forces , the Dannaab Force

32:10.801 --> 32:14.150
is a capable counterterrorism force . I

32:14.150 --> 32:16.579
do believe that that area is volatile .

32:16.709 --> 32:20.030
Al-Shabaab has shown the desire and and

32:20.030 --> 32:22.229
will to attack the United States and

32:22.229 --> 32:24.396
the United States' interests . There's

32:24.396 --> 32:26.729
increasing cooperation with the Houthis ,

32:26.729 --> 32:29.062
so I think it's in our interest to , uh ,

32:29.062 --> 32:31.285
have some level of engagement , uh , in

32:31.285 --> 32:33.451
that region , uh , whether that's with

32:33.451 --> 32:35.507
the federal government or the member

32:35.507 --> 32:37.507
states . I think that's something I

32:37.507 --> 32:37.030
would have to assess if confirmed .

32:37.310 --> 32:40.520
Thank you . Thank you , Senator ,

32:40.719 --> 32:43.170
Senator Fisher . Thank you , Mr .

32:43.180 --> 32:46.339
Chairman and thank you gentlemen , to

32:46.339 --> 32:48.450
both of you and to both your families

32:48.450 --> 32:50.617
as well for your many years of service

32:50.617 --> 32:54.479
and sacrifice . Countering China

32:54.479 --> 32:56.810
has been and will continue to be an

32:56.810 --> 32:59.319
important mission for both SOCOM and

32:59.319 --> 33:02.959
AFRO . The Indo-Pacific region , one of

33:02.959 --> 33:04.792
the most strategically vital and

33:04.792 --> 33:07.239
geographically expansive regions in the

33:07.239 --> 33:10.719
world , we have SOCOM , and SOCOM

33:10.719 --> 33:14.439
must be able to rapidly engage where

33:14.439 --> 33:17.069
the need is paramount over an immense

33:17.069 --> 33:20.050
expanse of land , sea , and airspace ,

33:20.680 --> 33:23.520
Admiral Bradley . As the United States

33:23.520 --> 33:25.920
military prepares for a potential war

33:25.920 --> 33:28.229
with China , what do you envision ?

33:28.839 --> 33:31.520
Special operations forces , uh , what

33:31.520 --> 33:33.576
kind of role will they be playing in

33:33.576 --> 33:35.760
the Indo-Pacific and how will you be

33:35.760 --> 33:38.280
able to balance that with other soft

33:38.280 --> 33:41.219
responsibilities ? Senator , thank you .

33:41.349 --> 33:43.910
Um , I would , uh , I believe that the

33:43.910 --> 33:46.229
role that , uh , SOF has played over

33:46.229 --> 33:48.310
its history has been founded on a

33:48.310 --> 33:50.532
critical value proposition that will be

33:50.532 --> 33:52.366
really very relevant , even more

33:52.366 --> 33:54.421
relevant against China , and that is

33:54.421 --> 33:56.069
our ability to build strong

33:56.069 --> 33:58.291
relationships , to partner and to build

33:58.291 --> 34:00.347
capacity , essentially to be a force

34:00.347 --> 34:02.910
multiplier across a strong alliance and

34:02.910 --> 34:04.966
to strengthen that alliance by doing

34:04.966 --> 34:07.180
such . In fact , the credibility we've

34:07.180 --> 34:09.402
generated over these last 2+ decades in

34:09.402 --> 34:11.500
the counterterrorism fight give us

34:11.500 --> 34:13.333
great ability to be able to help

34:13.333 --> 34:15.300
sustain and extrapolate that

34:15.300 --> 34:17.860
credibility into the Indo-Pacific where

34:17.860 --> 34:20.139
building partnerships with our allies

34:20.139 --> 34:22.648
will be very critical . That will allow

34:22.648 --> 34:25.009
us placement and access to then help

34:25.009 --> 34:27.249
develop enhanced understanding of our

34:27.249 --> 34:29.648
adversaries' actions that might be

34:29.648 --> 34:32.208
against us . And then if cascades

34:32.208 --> 34:34.152
deterrence fails and we cascade to

34:34.152 --> 34:36.152
crisis or conflict will give us the

34:36.152 --> 34:38.319
ability to leverage that placement and

34:38.319 --> 34:40.375
access for the delivery of irregular

34:40.375 --> 34:43.699
kinetic and non-kinetic effects . Thank

34:43.699 --> 34:46.899
you . Uh , General Anderson , uh , we

34:46.899 --> 34:49.010
talked a little bit yesterday about ,

34:49.010 --> 34:51.850
uh , the growing influence of China ,

34:52.040 --> 34:55.510
uh , on the continent . And uh talked

34:55.510 --> 34:58.280
about um that influence that they have

34:58.280 --> 35:00.336
and the threats that they're they're

35:00.336 --> 35:02.729
posing . What do you think are the

35:02.729 --> 35:06.129
greatest areas of threats that you're

35:06.129 --> 35:08.185
going to have to focus on if you are

35:08.185 --> 35:10.330
confirmed ? Uh yes , Senator , and I

35:10.330 --> 35:12.441
appreciate the discussion that we had

35:12.441 --> 35:14.608
on this . Um , I think China does pose

35:14.608 --> 35:16.830
a significant threat to US interests on

35:16.830 --> 35:18.941
the continent . Uh , we have seen how

35:18.941 --> 35:20.774
they have used the Belt and Road

35:20.774 --> 35:22.886
Initiative to be a primarily economic

35:22.886 --> 35:25.052
focus in the past . Uh , we are seeing

35:25.052 --> 35:27.052
them expand . Into more information

35:27.052 --> 35:28.997
operations on the continent , uh ,

35:28.997 --> 35:30.719
providing , uh , the communist

35:30.719 --> 35:32.941
propaganda that is the continent , uh ,

35:32.941 --> 35:35.052
we're also seeing them engage in more

35:35.052 --> 35:37.274
military to military engagements , uh ,

35:37.274 --> 35:39.108
which is concerning . We're also

35:39.108 --> 35:41.219
looking at some of the infrastructure

35:41.219 --> 35:41.050
they're looking to develop in ports

35:41.050 --> 35:42.939
that could become dual use are of

35:42.939 --> 35:44.994
concern , especially if we they have

35:44.994 --> 35:46.828
something on the Atlantic . Uh ,

35:46.828 --> 35:49.580
Atlantic base of sea-based , uh ,

35:49.620 --> 35:52.739
Chinese , uh , ships would greatly

35:52.739 --> 35:55.100
complicate our security picture writ

35:55.100 --> 35:57.739
large . So working across Africa , I

35:57.739 --> 36:00.810
think to identify where China is , uh ,

36:00.820 --> 36:03.159
not working in in everyone's interest

36:03.379 --> 36:05.260
is important , and I think also

36:05.260 --> 36:07.860
engaging in the information domain to

36:07.860 --> 36:09.749
highlight some of these uh malign

36:09.749 --> 36:11.804
activities is important as well . We

36:11.804 --> 36:14.060
also spoke a little bit about um .

36:14.989 --> 36:17.639
Losing some of our nation partners , uh ,

36:17.649 --> 36:20.209
who have been a great help to us on the

36:20.209 --> 36:22.879
continent , and we talked about , uh ,

36:22.889 --> 36:25.350
looking at National Guard . And the

36:25.350 --> 36:27.790
partnerships that they have uh in

36:27.790 --> 36:30.310
various countries and not just in

36:30.310 --> 36:33.580
Africa but also around the world

36:33.870 --> 36:37.149
um just briefly , could you um kind of

36:37.149 --> 36:39.189
hit on the importance of developing

36:39.189 --> 36:42.520
those or using those partnerships as

36:42.520 --> 36:44.459
tools to help develop good

36:44.459 --> 36:46.626
relationships ? Absolutely , Senator .

36:46.626 --> 36:48.737
I think the state partnership program

36:48.737 --> 36:50.737
is one of the best programs we have

36:50.737 --> 36:52.903
within our department . It establishes

36:52.903 --> 36:54.903
long-term relationships . It allows

36:54.903 --> 36:56.899
engagement and uh builds uh uh

36:56.899 --> 36:59.121
capability and readiness for our forces

36:59.121 --> 37:01.177
as well as theirs . I think what you

37:01.177 --> 37:03.232
brought up is an interesting point ,

37:03.232 --> 37:05.066
especially Nebraska , who has uh

37:05.066 --> 37:05.020
partners on the continent , but also

37:05.020 --> 37:07.076
with the Czech Republic . Is there's

37:07.076 --> 37:08.687
opportunities that the state

37:08.687 --> 37:10.687
partnership program can bring these

37:10.687 --> 37:12.909
partners together and help burden share

37:12.909 --> 37:15.076
some of the informa uh that effort and

37:15.076 --> 37:17.242
so that we can use the expertise . The

37:17.242 --> 37:17.219
checks bring great expertise and

37:17.219 --> 37:19.580
capabilities to help train our African

37:19.580 --> 37:21.636
partners and combined with the state

37:21.636 --> 37:23.858
partnership program . I think there are

37:23.858 --> 37:25.802
some opportunities there without a

37:25.802 --> 37:27.969
doubt . And Admiral Bradley . Question

37:27.969 --> 37:30.024
Mr . Chairman , please , uh , what's

37:30.024 --> 37:31.969
your view on the importance of the

37:31.969 --> 37:33.969
space domain with regards to , uh ,

37:33.969 --> 37:36.939
special operation forces and how would

37:36.939 --> 37:39.300
you leverage that new command if you

37:39.300 --> 37:41.580
would take that for a question for the

37:41.580 --> 37:43.659
record , the chairman's anxious to

37:43.659 --> 37:46.310
gavel me out . Senator , I will . Thank

37:46.310 --> 37:49.729
you very much . A very , very fine

37:50.159 --> 37:52.215
question , Senator Fisher , which is

37:52.215 --> 37:55.100
going to require a , a lengthy uh

37:55.100 --> 37:57.929
response on the record . Um , Senator

37:57.929 --> 38:00.000
Kaine , thank you , Mr . Chair , and

38:00.000 --> 38:02.979
congratulations to , um , Both of you

38:02.979 --> 38:04.923
for your nominations , um , I just

38:04.923 --> 38:06.923
noticed in looking at your bios you

38:06.923 --> 38:08.868
both have had in your professional

38:08.868 --> 38:11.790
career some significant experience in

38:11.790 --> 38:13.949
programs kind of with international

38:13.949 --> 38:16.330
partners . So Admiral Bradley , you're ,

38:16.429 --> 38:19.330
uh , posting to the Italian equivalent

38:19.330 --> 38:21.870
of their sort of seals , the incursori

38:21.870 --> 38:24.550
and General Anderson , your re uh

38:24.550 --> 38:26.772
reception of the Olmstead scholarship .

38:26.772 --> 38:29.590
Talk about how in each instance this

38:29.590 --> 38:31.534
was important to your professional

38:31.534 --> 38:33.850
development . Senator , thank you . um ,

38:33.939 --> 38:36.979
uh , I think , uh , I was most

38:36.979 --> 38:39.409
surprised and rewarded with being able

38:39.409 --> 38:41.576
to see the world through the eyes of a

38:41.576 --> 38:43.860
different culture and as close even as

38:43.860 --> 38:46.100
the Italian culture is to America , in

38:46.100 --> 38:48.211
fact , uh , many immigrants , a large

38:48.211 --> 38:50.489
portion of the country here , but , uh ,

38:50.489 --> 38:52.656
they could still see the same event in

38:52.656 --> 38:54.979
a , in a decidedly different way . I

38:54.979 --> 38:57.350
believe that experience , uh , both

38:57.350 --> 38:59.689
deepened my family's , uh , closeness ,

39:00.020 --> 39:02.169
uh , and appreciation for , uh , for

39:02.169 --> 39:04.391
the rest of the world , but also helped

39:04.391 --> 39:06.659
to deepen my own empathy to be able to

39:06.659 --> 39:08.826
understand , uh , the way other people

39:08.826 --> 39:11.209
might see things . So , so you clearly

39:11.419 --> 39:13.820
conveyed a benefit to these Italian

39:13.820 --> 39:16.449
allies by being posted there but also

39:17.020 --> 39:19.131
received a benefit in return that has

39:19.131 --> 39:21.409
helped you in the leader you are today .

39:21.409 --> 39:23.464
General Anderson , tell us about the

39:23.464 --> 39:25.576
Olmstead program . Yes , Senator , it

39:25.576 --> 39:27.242
was a , uh , in hindsight , a

39:27.242 --> 39:29.298
transformative program to be able to

39:29.298 --> 39:31.464
study abroad and to be immersed in the

39:31.464 --> 39:33.353
culture . Uh , like I said in the

39:33.353 --> 39:35.353
opening statement , uh , when I was

39:35.353 --> 39:37.409
there after 9/11 , you couldn't walk

39:37.409 --> 39:39.576
through any town square without seeing

39:39.576 --> 39:39.449
a memorial to the United States and to

39:39.449 --> 39:41.560
the Americans that were lost . Matter

39:41.560 --> 39:43.838
of fact , uh , when I walked to school ,

39:43.838 --> 39:45.949
uh , that morning on September 12th ,

39:46.010 --> 39:48.159
uh , there's a statue of Thomas Gerri

39:48.159 --> 39:50.381
Mazarik , the first , uh , president of

39:50.381 --> 39:52.790
the Czech Republic . Uh , on that

39:52.790 --> 39:54.790
square you couldn't walk through it

39:54.790 --> 39:57.012
because it was covered with flowers and

39:57.012 --> 39:59.012
candles and across the chest of the

39:59.012 --> 40:01.639
statue was a in check a banner that

40:01.639 --> 40:03.989
said we stand with you for democracy .

40:04.280 --> 40:06.336
It was a pretty powerful reminder of

40:06.336 --> 40:08.502
what those relations mean and what the

40:08.502 --> 40:10.502
American way of life and our values

40:10.502 --> 40:12.724
stand for to many people , and this was

40:12.724 --> 40:14.947
a number of years ago at a time when it

40:14.947 --> 40:16.780
probably would have been hard to

40:16.780 --> 40:18.947
imagine a land war in Europe , but the

40:18.947 --> 40:21.113
relationship the United States has had

40:21.113 --> 40:23.280
with the Czech Republic . Including in

40:23.280 --> 40:25.447
the current conflict in in Ukraine has

40:25.447 --> 40:27.447
been a very important one . We also

40:27.447 --> 40:29.558
have a lot of programs where we bring

40:29.558 --> 40:31.724
military leaders from other nations to

40:31.724 --> 40:33.724
the United States to participate in

40:33.724 --> 40:33.320
programs at the Naval War College , the

40:33.320 --> 40:36.239
Army War College , and others if you

40:36.239 --> 40:38.350
benefited from the experiences in the

40:38.350 --> 40:41.360
Czech Republic and in Italy , I , I

40:41.360 --> 40:43.471
believe from my own observation these

40:43.471 --> 40:45.582
programs are also pretty important to

40:45.582 --> 40:47.582
building relationships with foreign

40:47.582 --> 40:49.804
military leaders who come to the United

40:49.804 --> 40:52.082
States . You share that view ? Senator ,

40:52.082 --> 40:54.360
I do . the reason I asked the question ,

40:54.360 --> 40:56.471
just I was , you know , interested in

40:56.471 --> 40:58.638
the commonality in your , uh , resumes

40:58.638 --> 41:01.030
in this way is , um , I'm very , very

41:01.030 --> 41:03.949
worried about the budget that the

41:03.949 --> 41:06.005
administration has submitted and the

41:06.005 --> 41:07.949
rescissions package we voted on is

41:07.949 --> 41:09.727
dramatically undercutting these

41:09.727 --> 41:12.949
exchange programs . I haven't yet seen

41:12.949 --> 41:16.770
the effect , uh , in the DOD , but . In

41:16.770 --> 41:19.510
the rescission package that we passed

41:19.510 --> 41:22.540
last week , it was very not specific

41:22.540 --> 41:24.870
about details , but you can tell a

41:24.870 --> 41:26.989
little bit from how these rescissions

41:26.989 --> 41:29.156
will be used in the state from looking

41:29.156 --> 41:31.045
at the administration's submitted

41:31.045 --> 41:33.090
budget . Um , the administration's

41:33.090 --> 41:35.719
submitted budget for 2026

41:36.449 --> 41:39.649
basically eliminates , uh , a lot of

41:39.649 --> 41:41.538
funding that goes into this . The

41:41.538 --> 41:43.371
Bureau of Education and Cultural

41:43.371 --> 41:45.316
Affairs and the State Department ,

41:45.316 --> 41:47.149
which handles these programs for

41:47.149 --> 41:49.316
diplomats . The recommendation is that

41:49.316 --> 41:51.260
it be cut by 93% , and many of the

41:51.260 --> 41:53.093
rifts that were done a couple of

41:53.093 --> 41:55.093
Fridays ago in the State Department

41:55.093 --> 41:55.000
laying off people who do this work .

41:55.449 --> 41:57.929
This is the Fulbright program , and

41:57.929 --> 42:00.209
this is other exchange programs . These

42:00.209 --> 42:02.376
programs that the US has funded . Uh ,

42:02.376 --> 42:04.870
have educated more than 600 current or

42:04.870 --> 42:07.110
former heads of other nations . They've

42:07.110 --> 42:09.166
come to the United States and gained

42:09.166 --> 42:11.149
experience here . 88 Nobel Prize

42:11.149 --> 42:13.899
winners are alumni of these exchanges ,

42:13.909 --> 42:16.076
and the administration proposes to cut

42:16.076 --> 42:18.131
the budget by 93% . I'm very worried

42:18.131 --> 42:20.020
about that . Let me ask one other

42:20.020 --> 42:22.187
question . How important is it in your

42:22.187 --> 42:24.409
work in AFRO or uh special forces going

42:24.409 --> 42:26.187
forward that the US be a strong

42:26.187 --> 42:28.353
competitor in the information domain ?

42:30.219 --> 42:32.219
Senator , I'll , I'll start there .

42:32.219 --> 42:34.699
It's critical in the competition , the

42:34.699 --> 42:36.889
information domain , Truth is the high

42:36.889 --> 42:39.689
ground . Uh , we in the United States

42:39.689 --> 42:42.040
have a history of leveraging the truth ,

42:42.370 --> 42:44.537
telling the truth , and I think that's

42:44.537 --> 42:46.759
powerful . General Anderson , Senator ,

42:46.759 --> 42:48.981
I think it's absolutely critical across

42:48.981 --> 42:50.814
the continent , and I agree with

42:50.814 --> 42:53.037
Admiral Bradley . The fact that we have

42:53.037 --> 42:55.259
a credible news source and that we tell

42:55.259 --> 42:56.870
the truth is a very powerful

42:56.870 --> 42:58.426
information operation . The

42:58.426 --> 42:58.399
administration's proposed budget for

42:58.399 --> 43:01.590
2026 slashes the US Agency for Global

43:01.590 --> 43:05.350
Media's budget by 82% . Um , the

43:05.350 --> 43:07.294
Voice of America , the Middle East

43:07.294 --> 43:09.979
Broadcasting Network , VOA Persian ,

43:10.310 --> 43:12.310
all of these are being dramatically

43:12.550 --> 43:14.772
reduced , and I think many of the rifts

43:14.772 --> 43:16.883
that happened at the State Department

43:16.883 --> 43:16.669
are in that space , Mr . Chair . I'd

43:16.669 --> 43:18.780
conclude , I'd like to just introduce

43:18.780 --> 43:20.669
in the record an article from the

43:20.669 --> 43:22.558
Washington Institute of Near East

43:22.558 --> 43:24.613
Policy . Here's how State Department

43:24.613 --> 43:27.219
cuts would impede US policy . July 3 ,

43:27.300 --> 43:29.620
2025 . Is there objection ? Without

43:29.620 --> 43:31.842
objection , so ordered . Thank you very

43:31.842 --> 43:34.064
much , Senator Kaine . Senator Cotton .

43:34.179 --> 43:36.401
Gentlemen , welcome . Congratulations .

43:36.401 --> 43:38.568
Thank you for your continued service .

43:38.568 --> 43:38.179
Thanks to your families for their

43:38.179 --> 43:40.860
service and sacrifice as well . Admiral

43:40.860 --> 43:43.027
Bradley , Special forces were targeted

43:43.027 --> 43:45.340
for reductions in forces and funding ,

43:45.659 --> 43:47.492
uh , in recent years by the past

43:47.492 --> 43:50.100
administration . Could you explain what

43:50.100 --> 43:53.659
it takes to turn a conventional soldier ,

43:53.669 --> 43:56.050
sailor , airman , or marine into a

43:56.320 --> 43:58.487
special operator ? How many years does

43:58.487 --> 44:00.739
it take to build that kind of expertise

44:01.320 --> 44:03.750
and ability ? Senator , thank you . uh ,

44:03.889 --> 44:06.479
first I have to say , uh , we have the

44:06.479 --> 44:08.646
benefit of being able to draw from the

44:08.646 --> 44:10.701
best and the brightest across , uh ,

44:10.701 --> 44:12.590
this great population of , of the

44:12.590 --> 44:14.679
United States . Um , our services do

44:14.679 --> 44:16.735
the principal recruiting and we have

44:16.735 --> 44:18.957
the opportunity to be able to draw from

44:18.957 --> 44:20.957
within those recruits , but special

44:20.957 --> 44:22.846
operations provides a very , very

44:22.846 --> 44:24.790
valuable recruiting tool for those

44:24.790 --> 44:27.745
services as well , um , one . a

44:27.745 --> 44:30.784
candidate assesses into a service and

44:30.784 --> 44:34.054
has the initiative to want to volunteer

44:34.324 --> 44:36.102
to come to one of our selection

44:36.102 --> 44:37.935
assessment programs , a rigorous

44:37.935 --> 44:40.824
process both of their resume , of their

44:40.824 --> 44:42.824
psychological resilience , of their

44:42.824 --> 44:45.185
physical capabilities begins , followed

44:45.185 --> 44:48.945
by some amount of training and uh and

44:48.945 --> 44:51.239
really grit determination . On the

44:51.239 --> 44:53.560
backside of that , that may take uh

44:53.560 --> 44:55.616
anywhere up to a year depending upon

44:55.616 --> 44:58.560
the program then uh additional uh

44:58.560 --> 45:00.860
advanced training will will continue

45:01.040 --> 45:03.320
and then finally uh the operator , the

45:03.320 --> 45:06.320
member will uh assign be assigned to an .

45:06.435 --> 45:09.385
Operational unit where frankly another

45:09.385 --> 45:11.784
amount of apprentice to master

45:11.784 --> 45:14.584
progression begins and so for a fully

45:14.584 --> 45:17.784
up and round operator to reach

45:17.784 --> 45:20.185
leadership status it's not uncommon for

45:20.185 --> 45:23.465
that to take 6 or 7 years . So if

45:23.465 --> 45:25.985
special operations forces were to face

45:25.985 --> 45:28.207
cuts , you don't just lose capability ,

45:28.207 --> 45:30.429
you lose a lot of time as well . That's

45:30.429 --> 45:32.949
correct . It does take time to build

45:32.949 --> 45:35.005
that operator . Yes , Senator versus

45:35.005 --> 45:37.116
say just for the sake of comparison ,

45:37.116 --> 45:40.169
the army can send someone from The

45:40.169 --> 45:42.360
first day of basic training through

45:42.810 --> 45:45.649
infantry training to an infantry

45:45.649 --> 45:48.040
platoon and maybe 6 months .

45:50.010 --> 45:52.010
Obviously they're brand new private

45:52.010 --> 45:54.010
just out of training , but 6 months

45:54.010 --> 45:56.177
versus many years I think we should be

45:56.177 --> 45:59.229
mindful of that contrast . Um , what's

45:59.229 --> 46:01.118
your assessment on how drones are

46:01.118 --> 46:03.860
changing the modern battlefield , uh ,

46:03.909 --> 46:06.030
every day there's new reports of new

46:06.030 --> 46:07.863
developments in drone warfare in

46:07.863 --> 46:10.086
Ukraine . We saw a couple of months ago

46:10.086 --> 46:12.510
Ukraine launched audacious attacks from

46:12.510 --> 46:14.510
inside of Russia with prepositioned

46:14.510 --> 46:16.510
drones . It appears that Israel may

46:16.510 --> 46:18.621
have done something similar inside of

46:18.621 --> 46:20.566
Iran . um , I know you've probably

46:20.566 --> 46:20.229
given this a lot of thought in your

46:20.229 --> 46:22.340
current job and looking ahead to your

46:22.340 --> 46:25.290
future job . Senator , I , I , I don't

46:25.290 --> 46:27.330
think it's unfair to call this a

46:27.330 --> 46:30.169
revolution in military affairs , um ,

46:30.250 --> 46:33.370
the , the changing accelerating pace of

46:33.370 --> 46:35.592
technology , the ubiquitous information

46:35.592 --> 46:38.050
environment , and the advent of

46:38.050 --> 46:40.689
man-machine teamed autonomy on the

46:40.689 --> 46:42.689
battlefields of the world today are

46:42.689 --> 46:44.745
absolutely changing the character of

46:44.745 --> 46:47.590
warfare in our , in our very eyes . Um ,

46:47.679 --> 46:49.901
within special operations and I believe

46:49.901 --> 46:52.012
the initiatives , frankly that uh you

46:52.012 --> 46:54.346
have initiated here with the forged Act ,

46:54.346 --> 46:56.790
the SE Act across the way , and the ,

46:56.840 --> 46:58.729
the president and the secretary's

46:58.729 --> 47:00.896
initiatives to drive innovation within

47:00.896 --> 47:03.118
the department are critical to allowing

47:03.118 --> 47:05.340
us to , to use the innovative spirit of

47:05.340 --> 47:07.340
our operators to be able to capture

47:07.340 --> 47:09.562
those problems and opportunities we see

47:09.562 --> 47:11.673
on the battlefield and turn them into

47:11.673 --> 47:13.800
new man machine teamed approaches .

47:14.469 --> 47:16.525
Thank you , General Anderson , given

47:16.525 --> 47:18.636
your current role and also the threat

47:18.636 --> 47:21.060
of drone attacks from terrorist groups ,

47:21.080 --> 47:23.080
uh , in your future role , what are

47:23.080 --> 47:25.358
your thoughts ? On this question , yes ,

47:25.358 --> 47:27.358
Senator , I appreciate that . It is

47:27.358 --> 47:29.469
transforming the battlefield . We are

47:29.469 --> 47:31.358
at a critical inflection point in

47:31.358 --> 47:33.524
history , much like the industrial age

47:33.524 --> 47:32.989
matured in the early 20th century . The

47:32.989 --> 47:35.909
digital age is maturing now . Uh , as

47:35.909 --> 47:37.965
Admiral Bradley mentioned , it's not

47:37.965 --> 47:39.965
just the drones we see today . It's

47:39.965 --> 47:42.187
what does it mean when we have autonomy

47:42.187 --> 47:44.353
and AI behind those drones and we have

47:44.353 --> 47:46.298
swarm attacks . That is not , uh ,

47:46.298 --> 47:48.465
necessarily science fiction that is in

47:48.465 --> 47:50.520
the future . Uh , so we have to take

47:50.520 --> 47:52.631
this very seriously , not just , uh ,

47:52.631 --> 47:54.687
taking on the drone operations , but

47:54.687 --> 47:56.853
also what do we do to counter them and

47:56.853 --> 47:58.965
defend against them . This is a grave

47:58.965 --> 48:01.131
concern , uh , for me as I look at the

48:01.131 --> 48:01.020
African continent as there are

48:01.020 --> 48:03.050
vulnerabilities out there for our

48:03.050 --> 48:05.217
forces , but it's also a vulnerability

48:05.217 --> 48:07.469
for our partners as well , and I guess

48:07.469 --> 48:09.525
I should say it's not just potential

48:09.525 --> 48:11.691
terrorist groups , it's also potential

48:11.691 --> 48:13.913
insurgencies , uprisings clashes of the

48:13.913 --> 48:15.989
kind that we see . With unfortunate

48:15.989 --> 48:18.689
frequency in Africa as well , um , OK ,

48:18.850 --> 48:20.739
thank you gentlemen . Thank you ,

48:20.739 --> 48:22.517
Senator Cotton , Senator King .

48:24.909 --> 48:27.020
Mr . Chairman , first I wanna welcome

48:27.020 --> 48:29.187
both of you , congratulate you on your

48:29.187 --> 48:31.353
nominations , and , uh , acknowledge ,

48:31.353 --> 48:33.131
uh , Liz in the audience , uh ,

48:33.131 --> 48:35.076
resident of Maine , as you noted ,

48:35.076 --> 48:37.131
General Anderson , proud graduate of

48:37.131 --> 48:36.659
the University of Maine . I hope Liz ,

48:36.889 --> 48:39.000
you'll convey to your family in Maine

48:39.000 --> 48:41.679
that you saw me working , OK , uh .

48:42.590 --> 48:44.923
I appreciate your being here today , Mr .

48:44.923 --> 48:48.020
Chairman . I have a statement from our ,

48:48.030 --> 48:50.830
uh , brother Jim Inhofe , uh , on the

48:50.830 --> 48:54.189
ARCO legislation from 2008 when it was

48:54.189 --> 48:56.245
first adopted and I wanna , I'd like

48:56.245 --> 48:58.411
unanimous consent to enter it into the

48:58.411 --> 49:00.245
record of this hearing . Without

49:00.245 --> 49:02.356
objection , it is so ordered . As all

49:02.356 --> 49:04.689
of us know , Senator Inhofe was a great ,

49:04.689 --> 49:06.578
uh , champion of our interests in

49:06.578 --> 49:08.745
Africa , probably the greatest in , in

49:08.745 --> 49:10.689
the Senate . I note in a statement

49:10.689 --> 49:12.899
again from 2008 , my resolution

49:12.899 --> 49:15.066
recognizes the strategic importance of

49:15.066 --> 49:17.121
the African continent and encourages

49:17.121 --> 49:19.232
the Department of Defense , the State

49:19.232 --> 49:20.955
Department , and USAID to work

49:20.955 --> 49:23.177
cooperatively together with our African

49:23.177 --> 49:25.399
allies to bring hope to the continent ,

49:25.459 --> 49:28.489
um . We've sort of been talking around

49:28.489 --> 49:30.570
this today . We just made one of the

49:30.570 --> 49:32.626
greatest geopolitical mistakes in my

49:32.626 --> 49:34.860
lifetime in the last several weeks by

49:34.860 --> 49:37.939
essentially abolishing USAID . And I

49:37.939 --> 49:39.995
don't expect either of you to answer

49:39.995 --> 49:42.106
questions directly about that because

49:42.106 --> 49:45.409
it could jeopardize your , your , uh ,

49:45.459 --> 49:48.139
your appointment . Uh , but I , I , I ,

49:48.419 --> 49:50.641
there's just no question the , the term

49:50.641 --> 49:52.620
soft power is kind of unfortunate

49:52.620 --> 49:54.731
because the word , the emphasis is on

49:54.731 --> 49:56.898
soft , but it's power . And as both of

49:56.898 --> 49:59.064
you have testified , communications is

49:59.064 --> 50:00.898
important relationships with the

50:00.898 --> 50:02.510
country's stabilization ,

50:02.719 --> 50:05.040
anti-terrorism , developing good

50:05.040 --> 50:07.110
relationships , the , the PEPFAR

50:07.110 --> 50:08.888
program , the malaria program ,

50:09.159 --> 50:10.881
education programs , democracy

50:10.881 --> 50:13.510
promotion programs are essentially are

50:13.520 --> 50:16.919
are essential to our ability to .

50:17.729 --> 50:19.562
Compete with the Chinese and the

50:19.562 --> 50:21.770
Russians in the in the uh African

50:21.770 --> 50:25.649
continent uh in talking to some friends

50:25.649 --> 50:27.760
who have , have been deployed there ,

50:27.899 --> 50:30.010
uh , their view was that we just made

50:30.010 --> 50:32.610
an enormous gift , uh , particularly to

50:32.610 --> 50:35.010
the Chinese , uh , and as , as the

50:35.010 --> 50:36.929
chairman suggested , uh , in his

50:36.929 --> 50:39.169
opening statement and questions . Uh ,

50:39.239 --> 50:41.461
there's no question in my mind that our

50:41.461 --> 50:43.128
recent actions in essentially

50:43.128 --> 50:45.750
dismantling and abolishing AID has met

50:45.750 --> 50:49.209
with celebration and uh uh uh

50:49.209 --> 50:53.040
approbation in Russia and China .

50:53.489 --> 50:57.219
Um . General Anderson , one of the

50:57.219 --> 51:00.010
things that concerns me , uh , and it

51:00.010 --> 51:02.177
relates somewhat to the AID question ,

51:02.177 --> 51:04.820
but more generally is the rise of

51:04.820 --> 51:07.659
terrorism , and you mentioned September

51:07.659 --> 51:11.300
11th , uh , that was 19 people and

51:11.300 --> 51:13.580
my concern is with our so-called pivot

51:13.580 --> 51:16.459
to the , uh , Indo-Pacific , we're

51:16.459 --> 51:18.681
taking our eye off the terrorism ball .

51:18.681 --> 51:20.737
Could you share with us the thoughts

51:20.737 --> 51:22.580
about the , the , uh , status of

51:22.580 --> 51:26.070
al-Qaeda and ISIS in Africa and . Uh ,

51:26.320 --> 51:28.510
what we should be watching out for and

51:28.520 --> 51:31.780
and being concerned of . Yes , Senator ,

51:32.100 --> 51:34.044
I appreciate that concern , and if

51:34.044 --> 51:36.267
confirmed , I will definitely make this

51:36.267 --> 51:38.267
a priority to assess as it's been 4

51:38.267 --> 51:40.469
years since I was at SOC Africa . Uh ,

51:40.510 --> 51:42.566
with that said though , we have seen

51:42.566 --> 51:44.788
the terrorist groups move much of their

51:44.788 --> 51:46.899
operations into the ungoverned spaces

51:46.899 --> 51:50.219
of Africa , both ISIS and al-Qaeda . Uh ,

51:50.229 --> 51:52.173
we're seeing ISIS , uh , active in

51:52.173 --> 51:54.173
Somalia as well as in West Africa ,

51:54.189 --> 51:57.909
ISIS West Africa . Uh , AQIM and their

51:57.909 --> 51:59.965
affiliate JM are also very active in

51:59.965 --> 52:03.020
the Sahel , both with intent to attack

52:03.020 --> 52:05.242
US interests . Uh , whether or not they

52:05.242 --> 52:07.464
have that capability is not clear . And

52:07.464 --> 52:10.100
so to your 0.1 of the greatest concerns

52:10.100 --> 52:13.550
we have . Having the enough

52:13.550 --> 52:16.110
resources uh and enough relationships

52:16.110 --> 52:18.054
to be able to understand how these

52:18.054 --> 52:20.110
threats are progressing , so we have

52:20.110 --> 52:22.221
the adequate amount of indicators and

52:22.221 --> 52:24.443
warnings and we know what the threat to

52:24.443 --> 52:26.610
the United States could be so we could

52:26.610 --> 52:28.443
take action . The access is also

52:28.443 --> 52:30.870
critical uh with our partners to

52:30.870 --> 52:33.037
understand what's happening with these

52:33.037 --> 52:35.203
threats , and I would also say what is

52:35.203 --> 52:37.426
happening with some of the other powers

52:37.426 --> 52:39.592
there and how they may be working with

52:39.592 --> 52:42.090
them or um . Maybe not acting in our

52:42.090 --> 52:44.090
interests so that we can understand

52:44.090 --> 52:46.146
what what the threat landscape is on

52:46.146 --> 52:48.257
the continent . Well , I think one of

52:48.257 --> 52:50.257
the , uh , one of the new duties of

52:50.257 --> 52:52.312
your of your job as you take this on

52:52.312 --> 52:54.479
since State Department and USA idea is

52:54.479 --> 52:56.590
essentially retreating , you're gonna

52:56.590 --> 52:58.646
have diplomatic duty whether whether

52:58.646 --> 53:00.646
you signed up for that or not , but

53:00.646 --> 53:00.209
you're gonna have to build

53:00.209 --> 53:02.600
relationships , not necessarily

53:02.600 --> 53:04.850
strictly military but with the with the

53:04.850 --> 53:06.628
local governments and the local

53:06.628 --> 53:08.794
leadership . Do you see that as a as a

53:08.794 --> 53:11.159
priority ? Uh , Senator , where those

53:11.159 --> 53:13.381
areas where we prioritize those areas ,

53:13.381 --> 53:15.300
we have the best return on our

53:15.300 --> 53:17.399
investment . I think , uh , it is

53:17.399 --> 53:19.066
important to , to build those

53:19.066 --> 53:21.232
relationships . I think it's important

53:21.232 --> 53:23.121
to look at creative ways as we go

53:23.121 --> 53:25.066
forward . Uh , one of the greatest

53:25.066 --> 53:27.177
powers the United States bring is our

53:27.177 --> 53:29.177
economy that's largely done through

53:29.177 --> 53:29.040
private investment . So finding

53:29.040 --> 53:31.159
opportunities in the continent as it

53:31.159 --> 53:32.937
continues to expand and grow in

53:32.937 --> 53:35.469
population , I think is an opportunity

53:35.469 --> 53:38.469
and then working with uh . NGOs to

53:38.469 --> 53:40.636
identify some of these , uh , I , I've

53:40.636 --> 53:42.858
worked with uh several in the past that

53:42.858 --> 53:44.691
have been very uh productive and

53:44.691 --> 53:46.747
engaging in some of those areas that

53:46.747 --> 53:48.747
you're talking about , uh , that we

53:48.747 --> 53:50.469
help them understand the , the

53:50.469 --> 53:52.580
environment and then they are able to

53:52.580 --> 53:54.580
execute the actual uh engagements .

53:54.580 --> 53:56.358
Thank you very much , uh , Mr .

53:56.358 --> 53:58.580
Chairman . I'll have a question for the

53:58.580 --> 54:00.691
record with for Admiral Bradley about

54:00.691 --> 54:02.636
brain health and protecting of our

54:02.636 --> 54:04.691
troops from traumatic brain injury .

54:04.691 --> 54:04.479
I'll follow up on the record . Thank

54:04.479 --> 54:06.590
you very much , gentlemen . Thank you

54:06.590 --> 54:08.590
for your interest in that , Senator

54:08.590 --> 54:10.868
King . Senator Rounds . Thank you , Mr .

54:10.868 --> 54:12.979
Chairman , gentlemen , first of all ,

54:12.979 --> 54:12.840
thank you for your service to our

54:12.840 --> 54:15.629
country , uh , to your families also .

54:15.689 --> 54:18.610
I just wanna say thank you because . Uh ,

54:18.729 --> 54:21.969
you sacrifice a lot as well , and we

54:21.969 --> 54:24.659
most certainly recognize that and we

54:24.659 --> 54:26.969
appreciate what you do to help both of

54:26.969 --> 54:29.136
these gentlemen be successful in their

54:29.136 --> 54:31.770
careers , gentlemen , I've heard from

54:31.770 --> 54:34.370
at least now from 29 senior department

54:34.370 --> 54:36.729
officials , including every service

54:36.729 --> 54:39.000
chief and 8 combatant commanders that

54:39.000 --> 54:42.729
vacating the 3.1 to 3.45

54:42.729 --> 54:46.449
gigahertz and 7.7 to 8 gigahertz

54:46.449 --> 54:48.810
bands of the spectrum . Would have

54:48.810 --> 54:51.620
negative consequences for our war

54:51.620 --> 54:54.340
fighting capabilities . Being forced to

54:54.340 --> 54:56.229
share these bands with commercial

54:56.229 --> 54:58.284
interests in a non-optimal way would

54:58.284 --> 55:01.330
have the same impact . Admiral Bradley ,

55:01.780 --> 55:03.947
does the special operations force have

55:03.947 --> 55:07.219
capabilities operating on the 3.1 to

55:07.219 --> 55:10.459
3.45 band and the 7 and 8 bands of

55:10.459 --> 55:13.199
spectrum which would be used in a

55:13.199 --> 55:16.149
conflict with China . Senator , thank

55:16.149 --> 55:18.371
you . I , I , um , I have to say that ,

55:18.371 --> 55:20.909
um , not , uh , I , I am not intimately

55:20.909 --> 55:22.853
aware of all of the systems across

55:22.853 --> 55:25.070
SOCOM . I can speak to my personal

55:25.070 --> 55:27.292
experience in these last 3 years , uh ,

55:27.292 --> 55:30.340
and I do agree that both directly , uh ,

55:30.469 --> 55:32.525
some of our systems operate in those

55:32.525 --> 55:34.580
bands that we rely upon for critical

55:34.580 --> 55:36.302
tactical capability , but also

55:36.302 --> 55:38.302
indirectly the service systems that

55:38.302 --> 55:40.429
operate on those bands are very

55:40.429 --> 55:42.540
important for us as we integrate with

55:42.540 --> 55:45.719
the joint force . Thank you . Um ,

55:47.149 --> 55:49.316
Would those capabilities be negatively

55:49.316 --> 55:51.371
impacted if DOD were forced to share

55:51.371 --> 55:53.709
those bands ? Senator , I believe they

55:53.709 --> 55:55.876
would . Thank you , General Anderson .

55:55.876 --> 55:58.042
Same question . Does AFRCO make use of

55:58.042 --> 56:00.098
capabilities which reside on or make

56:00.098 --> 56:02.790
use of those bands of the spectrum ? Uh ,

56:02.870 --> 56:05.350
Senator , we , uh , in being Africa

56:05.350 --> 56:07.350
being a remote location , we depend

56:07.350 --> 56:09.517
upon satellite communications that use

56:09.517 --> 56:11.683
some of those bands as well as the air

56:11.683 --> 56:13.906
missile defense systems that are on the

56:13.906 --> 56:15.850
continent . Thank you , sir . Uh ,

56:15.850 --> 56:17.794
Admiral Bradley , your predecessor

56:17.794 --> 56:19.961
testified earlier this year that SOCOM

56:19.961 --> 56:22.459
makes up 3% of DOD's forces . And less

56:22.459 --> 56:24.860
than 2% of the budget , all while

56:24.860 --> 56:28.659
emissions have increased by over 170%

56:28.659 --> 56:31.570
compared to the last decade . Is it

56:31.570 --> 56:33.514
fair to say that if we're going to

56:33.514 --> 56:35.570
continue to ask more of SOCOM , more

56:35.570 --> 56:37.514
resources will be needed to enable

56:37.514 --> 56:40.280
those increased missions ? Senator ,

56:40.360 --> 56:42.239
thank you . um , as I've watched

56:42.239 --> 56:44.520
General Fenton make the compelling case

56:44.520 --> 56:47.110
about that exact equation you described ,

56:47.360 --> 56:49.638
I think that is a conclusion that , uh ,

56:49.638 --> 56:52.169
that comes out . Uh , an alternative is ,

56:52.199 --> 56:54.520
uh , we just do less , we do fewer

56:54.520 --> 56:56.853
missions . We have to say no more times .

56:56.929 --> 56:59.320
You're the tip of the spear seems to me

56:59.320 --> 57:01.264
that we should be doing everything

57:01.264 --> 57:03.431
possible to make sure that those young

57:03.431 --> 57:05.653
men and women have the best and capable

57:05.653 --> 57:07.431
technologies and weapon systems

57:07.431 --> 57:09.598
available to them . General Anderson ,

57:09.598 --> 57:11.431
how do you assess ARCO's role in

57:11.431 --> 57:13.153
countering Chinese and Russian

57:13.153 --> 57:15.264
influence in Africa , particularly in

57:15.264 --> 57:17.209
regions where entities such as the

57:17.209 --> 57:19.153
Wagner Group or the PRC affiliated

57:19.153 --> 57:21.098
commercial ventures are exploiting

57:21.098 --> 57:23.042
governance or security gaps ? What

57:23.042 --> 57:24.987
strategies do you believe are most

57:24.987 --> 57:26.653
effective in addressing these

57:26.653 --> 57:28.520
challenges ? Uh , Senator , I

57:28.520 --> 57:30.742
appreciate that question . I think that

57:30.742 --> 57:32.576
is a a critical area . How do we

57:32.576 --> 57:34.742
counter what these powers are doing on

57:34.742 --> 57:36.909
the continent when they run counter to

57:36.909 --> 57:39.076
US interests ? One of the areas when I

57:39.076 --> 57:40.964
was at SAC Africa that was , uh ,

57:40.964 --> 57:43.076
useful was engaging with the partners

57:43.076 --> 57:45.298
and explaining to them what those risks

57:45.298 --> 57:47.464
were when they were working with these

57:47.464 --> 57:49.576
partners , especially when Wagner was

57:49.576 --> 57:51.742
trying to expand into the Sahel , uh ,

57:51.742 --> 57:53.798
while they did have , uh , they have

57:53.798 --> 57:56.076
gotten a foothold there . Uh , we have ,

57:56.076 --> 57:58.131
uh , we were able to explain to them

57:58.131 --> 58:00.298
the risks that that would entail , the

58:00.298 --> 58:02.520
corrosive nature of those engagements ,

58:02.520 --> 58:02.429
the lack of human rights , uh , that

58:02.429 --> 58:04.949
those , uh , nations bring , and so I

58:04.949 --> 58:07.270
that was helpful in buffering . Uh , it

58:07.270 --> 58:09.103
also helped in some of the other

58:09.103 --> 58:11.214
coastal West African states as well .

58:11.214 --> 58:13.548
As far as China , I would say it's , uh ,

58:13.548 --> 58:15.270
similar of , uh , engaging and

58:15.270 --> 58:16.992
countering some of the line in

58:16.992 --> 58:19.326
influence operations that are out there .

58:19.326 --> 58:21.326
Um , we saw across the Sahel , uh ,

58:21.326 --> 58:23.919
counter Western counterre , counter US

58:23.919 --> 58:26.129
propaganda take hold , and that then

58:26.129 --> 58:28.409
turns the populations , uh , against

58:28.409 --> 58:30.889
our interests . I wanna be fair to say

58:30.889 --> 58:32.889
that there is a combination of hard

58:32.889 --> 58:35.129
power , military power , but there's

58:35.129 --> 58:38.090
also the desire to have not just that

58:38.090 --> 58:41.209
stick , but , uh , the , the ability to

58:41.209 --> 58:44.560
offer . Uh , other capabilities as well .

58:44.639 --> 58:46.750
Can you give me some examples of what

58:46.750 --> 58:48.917
we would call soft power that might be

58:48.917 --> 58:51.028
available or be very helpful to you ,

58:51.028 --> 58:53.195
uh , based upon our current situations

58:53.195 --> 58:56.820
in Africa . Yes , Senator , there

58:56.820 --> 58:58.931
across the breadth of what our nation

58:58.931 --> 59:00.876
brings is important , uh , whether

59:00.876 --> 59:03.153
that's called hard power or soft power ,

59:03.153 --> 59:05.320
it's influence , and how can we engage

59:05.320 --> 59:07.487
constructively with them . Uh , can we

59:07.487 --> 59:09.790
encourage , uh , investment ? Can we

59:09.790 --> 59:11.629
open , uh , sources of critical

59:11.629 --> 59:13.685
minerals ? Can we partner with the ,

59:13.685 --> 59:15.740
the nations that are in our interest

59:15.740 --> 59:18.110
that also benefit them as well ? Those

59:18.110 --> 59:20.429
are opportunities as well that are

59:20.429 --> 59:22.485
slightly outside the military lane ,

59:22.485 --> 59:24.096
but I do believe we have the

59:24.096 --> 59:26.040
opportunity to convene some of the

59:26.040 --> 59:27.985
right folks to have these types of

59:27.985 --> 59:30.096
discussions , and then , uh , again .

59:30.096 --> 59:31.929
Engagement and building trust in

59:31.929 --> 59:34.096
partnership is critical as we found in

59:34.096 --> 59:34.080
the past . Thank you . Thank you ,

59:34.120 --> 59:36.342
gentlemen . Thank you , Senator Senator

59:36.342 --> 59:40.120
Ernst . Thank you Mr . Chair and and

59:40.120 --> 59:42.669
thank you gentlemen both for being here

59:42.669 --> 59:44.891
today and your continued service to our

59:44.891 --> 59:47.058
great United States , your families as

59:47.058 --> 59:49.610
well . We appreciate their selfless

59:49.610 --> 59:52.270
service and sacrifice on your behalf as

59:52.270 --> 59:54.600
well . Um , so General Anderson , we'll

59:54.600 --> 59:57.760
start with you , um , and we'll

59:57.760 --> 59:59.760
continue to build upon what Senator

59:59.760 --> 01:00:01.909
Rounds was discussing . History has

01:00:01.909 --> 01:00:04.090
shown that when America reduces her

01:00:04.090 --> 01:00:07.110
presence , our adversaries are quickly

01:00:07.110 --> 01:00:11.030
seeking to fill the void . So sustained

01:00:11.030 --> 01:00:13.370
US leadership is essential to deterring

01:00:13.370 --> 01:00:16.139
those threats and preserving stability .

01:00:16.429 --> 01:00:18.651
This is something we talked about in my

01:00:18.651 --> 01:00:20.989
office that I firmly believe that

01:00:20.989 --> 01:00:23.870
presence is power , especially when .

01:00:23.969 --> 01:00:26.659
Comes to the forward posture of our

01:00:26.659 --> 01:00:29.340
American service members . So General

01:00:29.340 --> 01:00:31.439
Anderson , can you speak to why

01:00:31.439 --> 01:00:34.030
continued American leadership around

01:00:34.030 --> 01:00:37.080
the globe is essential , um , and in

01:00:37.080 --> 01:00:39.719
your particular case in Africa , why it

01:00:39.719 --> 01:00:42.840
is essential that we maintain a

01:00:42.840 --> 01:00:45.479
presence and how it is in America's

01:00:45.479 --> 01:00:49.469
best interests . Uh , Senator ,

01:00:49.489 --> 01:00:51.433
I appreciate the question and uh I

01:00:51.433 --> 01:00:53.429
agree that that engagement is

01:00:53.429 --> 01:00:56.310
absolutely vital . Um , having the that

01:00:56.310 --> 01:00:58.532
access and that engagement and building

01:00:58.532 --> 01:01:00.754
of trust , um , makes a difference when

01:01:00.754 --> 01:01:02.921
we when times of crisis or in times of

01:01:02.921 --> 01:01:04.977
need , when we call in the middle of

01:01:04.977 --> 01:01:07.199
the night , our uh we want our partners

01:01:07.199 --> 01:01:09.532
to answer and we want them to help . Uh ,

01:01:09.532 --> 01:01:11.699
at the same time it needs to be in our

01:01:11.699 --> 01:01:13.643
mutual interest . Um , one thing I

01:01:13.643 --> 01:01:15.588
found is you talked about in South

01:01:15.588 --> 01:01:17.699
Africa . Is that we could often bring

01:01:17.699 --> 01:01:19.754
parties together that normally would

01:01:19.754 --> 01:01:18.959
not . We could bring some of the

01:01:18.959 --> 01:01:21.040
European partners together with the

01:01:21.360 --> 01:01:23.889
African partners and create a dialogue

01:01:23.889 --> 01:01:25.722
and sometimes gets that American

01:01:25.722 --> 01:01:27.778
presence as a trusted partner , open

01:01:27.778 --> 01:01:29.889
that door uh to be more effective . I

01:01:29.889 --> 01:01:32.222
would also say , as you , you mentioned ,

01:01:32.222 --> 01:01:34.333
uh , small investment and small teams

01:01:34.333 --> 01:01:36.222
go a long way on the continent in

01:01:36.222 --> 01:01:38.389
working with our African partners . As

01:01:38.389 --> 01:01:40.445
an example , I was the first general

01:01:40.445 --> 01:01:42.667
officer to go back to Cote d'arre after

01:01:42.667 --> 01:01:44.722
19 years . The very first person who

01:01:44.722 --> 01:01:46.889
met me was the chief of the army , and

01:01:46.889 --> 01:01:49.000
the first thing he told me was how he

01:01:49.000 --> 01:01:50.945
thanked me for the training that a

01:01:50.945 --> 01:01:53.111
special forces team had given him as a

01:01:53.111 --> 01:01:55.222
captain 19 years before , and he said

01:01:55.222 --> 01:01:57.389
it was the best training he ever had ,

01:01:57.389 --> 01:01:59.445
and he was very excited that we were

01:01:59.445 --> 01:02:01.445
able to restore relationship , uh ,

01:02:01.445 --> 01:02:03.611
because it was the best training he he

01:02:03.611 --> 01:02:05.722
had received , and he was looking for

01:02:05.722 --> 01:02:07.889
that for his army and it didn't take a

01:02:07.889 --> 01:02:09.833
persistent presence . It took some

01:02:09.833 --> 01:02:11.778
episodic engagements and continued

01:02:11.778 --> 01:02:13.945
investment in that partner . Uh , what

01:02:13.945 --> 01:02:16.167
I have found in Africa is many of those

01:02:16.167 --> 01:02:17.889
partners that we work with are

01:02:17.889 --> 01:02:20.111
incredibly good partners . Uh , they're

01:02:20.111 --> 01:02:22.111
not looking for a handout . They're

01:02:22.111 --> 01:02:24.278
looking for a helping hand , and if we

01:02:24.278 --> 01:02:26.278
can help them build that capacity ,

01:02:26.278 --> 01:02:25.810
they're willing to try to stand on

01:02:25.810 --> 01:02:27.921
their own . That is amazing and , and

01:02:27.921 --> 01:02:30.760
thank you for reaffirming , um , what I

01:02:30.760 --> 01:02:33.409
have always believed as well is that

01:02:33.409 --> 01:02:36.760
relationships matter , uh , and , uh .

01:02:36.865 --> 01:02:40.045
Our friends will never forget that

01:02:40.045 --> 01:02:43.285
neither will our enemies , um , so

01:02:43.285 --> 01:02:45.766
we'll continue on . um , we could talk

01:02:45.766 --> 01:02:47.926
more about uh China's presence . I

01:02:47.926 --> 01:02:50.148
think a number of our colleagues have ,

01:02:50.148 --> 01:02:52.148
have covered down on that , um , so

01:02:52.148 --> 01:02:54.766
we'll go ahead and turn to SOCOM and

01:02:54.766 --> 01:02:56.988
Admiral Bradley . Thank you so much for

01:02:56.988 --> 01:02:59.285
your continued leadership within the

01:02:59.285 --> 01:03:01.961
organization , um . And we've already

01:03:01.961 --> 01:03:04.562
talked a little bit about uh the , the

01:03:04.562 --> 01:03:07.271
fact that SOCOM , you've earned the

01:03:07.271 --> 01:03:10.882
reputation , um , that the command can

01:03:10.882 --> 01:03:14.031
do more with less , and I have heard

01:03:14.031 --> 01:03:16.322
SOCOM commander after SOCOM commander

01:03:16.322 --> 01:03:18.266
come in front of the committee and

01:03:18.266 --> 01:03:20.378
state it , it really doesn't matter ,

01:03:20.378 --> 01:03:22.721
we'll just , we'll salute smartly and

01:03:22.721 --> 01:03:25.330
move out and execute our mission . But

01:03:25.330 --> 01:03:27.969
we are reaching a point where as you

01:03:27.969 --> 01:03:30.969
have very clearly stated today that if

01:03:30.969 --> 01:03:33.159
you don't continue to see growth ,

01:03:33.370 --> 01:03:35.889
especially just for inflation within

01:03:35.889 --> 01:03:38.760
the department that you will have to do

01:03:39.090 --> 01:03:41.479
less , you will have to dig in . Deeper ,

01:03:41.780 --> 01:03:45.280
um , and make the necessary cuts so

01:03:45.330 --> 01:03:47.929
we are in an era of heightened threats

01:03:47.929 --> 01:03:50.889
and expanding mission demands . uh , I

01:03:50.889 --> 01:03:53.120
believe that do more with less mindset

01:03:53.330 --> 01:03:55.770
can no longer be sustainable . Do you

01:03:55.770 --> 01:03:58.320
agree with that ? Senator , I do

01:04:00.010 --> 01:04:02.570
In fact , we've adopted the term less

01:04:02.570 --> 01:04:04.879
with less to ensure we apply the

01:04:04.879 --> 01:04:08.280
ruthless prioritization to achieve the

01:04:08.280 --> 01:04:10.399
highest priority of those missions .

01:04:10.810 --> 01:04:13.520
And given the increasingly complex

01:04:13.520 --> 01:04:15.760
threat environment , we need to be able

01:04:15.760 --> 01:04:18.669
to strengthen SOCOM's capacity to deter

01:04:18.669 --> 01:04:21.540
our near peer adversaries , so that

01:04:21.540 --> 01:04:23.570
does require us moving beyond a

01:04:23.570 --> 01:04:26.399
stagnant budget . So if confirmed to

01:04:26.399 --> 01:04:28.760
Admiral Bradley , then what is the

01:04:28.760 --> 01:04:31.719
vision for SOCOM and how do you do that

01:04:31.719 --> 01:04:35.149
ruthless prioritization ? Senator ,

01:04:35.229 --> 01:04:37.709
thank you . If confirmed , uh , our

01:04:37.709 --> 01:04:39.765
priorities are the priorities of the

01:04:39.765 --> 01:04:41.709
department . Defend the homeland ,

01:04:41.709 --> 01:04:43.931
ensure that we deter , uh , China , and

01:04:43.931 --> 01:04:46.260
ensure that our forced multiplication

01:04:46.469 --> 01:04:48.550
of an already strong alliance is

01:04:48.550 --> 01:04:50.661
strengthened even further . Thank you

01:04:50.661 --> 01:04:52.850
gentlemen very much and again to your

01:04:52.850 --> 01:04:55.072
families , thank you for your sacrifice

01:04:55.072 --> 01:04:57.128
as well . Thank you . Thank you very

01:04:57.128 --> 01:04:59.406
much , Senator Ernst , Senator Schmidt .

01:04:59.406 --> 01:04:59.340
Thank you , Mr . Chairman . Actually ,

01:04:59.540 --> 01:05:01.596
um , Admiral , I'm I'm glad that you

01:05:01.596 --> 01:05:03.762
ended that way because that those sort

01:05:03.762 --> 01:05:05.929
of prioritizations of the of America ,

01:05:05.929 --> 01:05:08.500
which is , uh , defend the homeland and

01:05:08.500 --> 01:05:10.611
really this pivot to the Indo-Pacific

01:05:10.611 --> 01:05:12.389
has been absent in a lot of the

01:05:12.389 --> 01:05:14.611
questions that have been asked a lot of

01:05:14.611 --> 01:05:13.689
the questions that have been asked , I

01:05:13.689 --> 01:05:15.911
feel like I've been teleported into the

01:05:15.911 --> 01:05:18.229
Foreign Relations Committee . Uh , and

01:05:18.229 --> 01:05:20.669
I wanna ask you , since we're , since

01:05:20.669 --> 01:05:22.750
it was brought up , I had no plan to

01:05:22.750 --> 01:05:24.861
talk about this . I'm gonna just read

01:05:24.861 --> 01:05:26.750
off a few things a half a million

01:05:26.750 --> 01:05:28.917
dollars for electric buses in Rwanda ,

01:05:28.917 --> 01:05:30.989
$3.3 million for civic engagement

01:05:30.989 --> 01:05:33.429
engagement in in , uh , Zimbabwe ,

01:05:33.590 --> 01:05:36.300
$300,000 hold the pride parade and . Uh ,

01:05:36.379 --> 01:05:38.979
Lesotho , almost $900,000 for

01:05:38.979 --> 01:05:41.146
electrical reforms and voter education

01:05:41.146 --> 01:05:42.979
in Kenya , $1.2 million for

01:05:42.979 --> 01:05:45.090
AfroBarometer public opinion survey ,

01:05:45.090 --> 01:05:47.620
$116,000 for media strengthening

01:05:47.620 --> 01:05:50.100
activity in Liberia , $8000 for

01:05:50.100 --> 01:05:52.129
promoting vegan food in Zambia .

01:05:52.300 --> 01:05:54.340
African hive camping and tours to

01:05:54.340 --> 01:05:56.618
create adventure camps for backpackers ,

01:05:56.618 --> 01:05:59.129
graphic design training in Nigeria . Uh ,

01:05:59.169 --> 01:06:01.113
do you think these are in the best

01:06:01.113 --> 01:06:02.947
interest of the United States of

01:06:02.947 --> 01:06:05.169
America given the and the scarcity that

01:06:05.169 --> 01:06:07.225
we have ? Senator , I , I know there

01:06:07.225 --> 01:06:09.447
are a lot of priorities that have to be

01:06:09.447 --> 01:06:11.391
balanced , um , through the budget

01:06:11.391 --> 01:06:13.280
process . I know that and , and I

01:06:13.280 --> 01:06:15.391
appreciate your story . You were very

01:06:15.391 --> 01:06:17.391
willing to opine about other things

01:06:17.391 --> 01:06:19.558
that were sort of policy matters in my

01:06:19.558 --> 01:06:21.669
view . These are policy matters and I

01:06:21.669 --> 01:06:24.219
think that um when we do this stuff ,

01:06:24.669 --> 01:06:26.830
it totally undermines the desire to

01:06:26.830 --> 01:06:28.830
have real soft power . Like I'm not

01:06:28.830 --> 01:06:30.774
disputing the idea that soft power

01:06:30.774 --> 01:06:33.040
exists . My contention is that all of

01:06:33.040 --> 01:06:35.639
this nonsense that continues to be

01:06:35.639 --> 01:06:38.199
defended in many ways inhibits the

01:06:38.199 --> 01:06:40.088
ability to do exactly what you're

01:06:40.088 --> 01:06:42.310
articulating , which is there are smart

01:06:42.310 --> 01:06:44.310
things to do that aren't just about

01:06:44.310 --> 01:06:46.477
blowing things up and killing people ,

01:06:46.477 --> 01:06:48.919
but that has been crowded out with a uh

01:06:48.919 --> 01:06:51.159
a mission creep in this wandering

01:06:51.159 --> 01:06:53.326
foreign policy that just believes that

01:06:53.326 --> 01:06:55.270
we can just do all this do-gooding

01:06:55.270 --> 01:06:57.492
stuff around the world and getting back

01:06:57.492 --> 01:06:59.492
to what you said at the end of your

01:06:59.492 --> 01:07:01.437
last statement which is defend the

01:07:01.437 --> 01:07:03.381
homeland . And understand that our

01:07:03.381 --> 01:07:05.548
chief threat is in China . That's what

01:07:05.548 --> 01:07:07.715
I wanted to ask your questions about ,

01:07:07.715 --> 01:07:07.610
but , uh , and I'm going to , but I

01:07:07.610 --> 01:07:10.040
can't let this go on just without being

01:07:10.040 --> 01:07:12.159
responded to . Like we're moving away

01:07:12.159 --> 01:07:14.570
from this stuff , whether people like

01:07:14.570 --> 01:07:16.699
it or not , like the American people

01:07:16.699 --> 01:07:18.366
don't support it . We have an

01:07:18.366 --> 01:07:20.532
administration that wants to move away

01:07:20.532 --> 01:07:22.699
from this stuff . And that , and I'm ,

01:07:22.699 --> 01:07:22.590
I applaud it . I might be in a minority

01:07:22.590 --> 01:07:24.701
on this committee . I don't , I don't

01:07:24.701 --> 01:07:26.590
really know . I don't really care

01:07:26.590 --> 01:07:28.812
because I think that that's in the best

01:07:28.812 --> 01:07:27.989
interest of the United States and we

01:07:27.989 --> 01:07:30.267
can have a robust debate about it , uh ,

01:07:30.267 --> 01:07:32.378
but I do wanna ask you , um , because

01:07:32.378 --> 01:07:34.656
we're in this great powers competition .

01:07:34.959 --> 01:07:38.919
Um , how do you , um , how does SOCOM

01:07:38.919 --> 01:07:41.280
assess the right balance between sort

01:07:41.280 --> 01:07:44.560
of the counterterrorism mission , um ,

01:07:44.639 --> 01:07:46.861
that's , that's existed for a long time

01:07:46.861 --> 01:07:49.083
and isn't necessarily going away versus

01:07:49.083 --> 01:07:51.195
this kind of direct action , um , and

01:07:51.195 --> 01:07:53.306
especially as it relates to irregular

01:07:53.306 --> 01:07:55.361
deterrence and the kind of this gray

01:07:55.361 --> 01:07:57.472
zone activity that's happening in the

01:07:57.472 --> 01:07:59.472
South China Sea in places where our

01:07:59.472 --> 01:08:01.361
allies are really uh real in real

01:08:01.361 --> 01:08:01.120
threat we're not , you know , we're not

01:08:01.120 --> 01:08:03.398
talking about electric buses in Rwanda ,

01:08:03.398 --> 01:08:05.231
we're talking about . You know ,

01:08:05.231 --> 01:08:07.398
communist China here . Senator , thank

01:08:07.398 --> 01:08:09.610
you . Um , uh , having had the

01:08:09.610 --> 01:08:11.388
opportunity to be a part of our

01:08:11.388 --> 01:08:13.554
counterterrorism operations , uh , you

01:08:13.554 --> 01:08:16.049
know , since 9/11 , I've seen us

01:08:16.049 --> 01:08:17.827
achieve some great successes to

01:08:17.827 --> 01:08:19.605
diminish the threat against the

01:08:19.605 --> 01:08:21.660
homeland . Uh , the credibility that

01:08:21.660 --> 01:08:24.209
has come from that gives us a very

01:08:24.209 --> 01:08:26.729
powerful entree with the alliance

01:08:26.729 --> 01:08:29.509
members in the Indo-Pacific . Um , all

01:08:29.509 --> 01:08:31.453
of our national defense strategies

01:08:31.453 --> 01:08:35.180
since 2018 , the INDSG , uh , all , uh ,

01:08:35.189 --> 01:08:37.078
illuminate the importance of that

01:08:37.078 --> 01:08:38.856
alliance . I believe that force

01:08:38.856 --> 01:08:40.633
multiplication effort is , is a

01:08:40.633 --> 01:08:43.040
critical capability . As , as you know ,

01:08:43.169 --> 01:08:45.391
uh , General Fenton is the coordinating

01:08:45.391 --> 01:08:47.280
authority for counter VEO as well

01:08:47.280 --> 01:08:49.502
within the Department of Defense and so

01:08:49.502 --> 01:08:51.058
still maintains a principal

01:08:51.058 --> 01:08:53.200
responsibility to be able to oversee

01:08:53.200 --> 01:08:55.850
and , uh , and advise the secretary on

01:08:55.850 --> 01:08:58.200
the approach for counterterrorism . The

01:08:58.200 --> 01:09:00.319
most acute of those threats , those ,

01:09:00.450 --> 01:09:03.386
uh , VEOs with external . Operations ,

01:09:03.655 --> 01:09:06.666
aspiration , and capability are the top

01:09:06.666 --> 01:09:10.105
priority threats that we as a whole

01:09:10.105 --> 01:09:12.545
integrated inter agency orient our

01:09:12.545 --> 01:09:14.755
priorities against , and I believe in

01:09:14.755 --> 01:09:16.533
many cases , in one instance in

01:09:16.533 --> 01:09:18.144
particular , the case of the

01:09:18.144 --> 01:09:20.226
Philippines is a great example that

01:09:20.226 --> 01:09:23.065
where our work with the Filipinos over

01:09:23.065 --> 01:09:25.591
the last two decades has allowed them

01:09:25.591 --> 01:09:27.480
to be able to keep that terrorist

01:09:27.480 --> 01:09:30.041
threat at bay and frankly allowed us to

01:09:30.041 --> 01:09:33.191
weather a very difficult diplomatic

01:09:33.191 --> 01:09:35.642
season with a with a particular leader

01:09:35.642 --> 01:09:38.071
there and now come out an even stronger

01:09:38.071 --> 01:09:40.293
ally . I think I agree . I think that's

01:09:40.293 --> 01:09:42.293
a great example which leads sort of

01:09:42.293 --> 01:09:44.127
like the last question I have in

01:09:44.127 --> 01:09:46.127
limited time . Do you feel like our

01:09:46.127 --> 01:09:48.127
other really important allies uh in

01:09:48.127 --> 01:09:51.029
that region , say Australia and Japan

01:09:51.439 --> 01:09:54.509
are prepared or uh sufficiently ready

01:09:54.509 --> 01:09:56.731
to work alongside us , alongside us the

01:09:56.731 --> 01:09:59.069
way the Philippines has ? Sir , I , I

01:09:59.069 --> 01:10:01.347
absolutely believe the Australians are ,

01:10:01.347 --> 01:10:03.291
and I believe our other allies are

01:10:03.291 --> 01:10:05.513
working to come to that place as well .

01:10:05.513 --> 01:10:07.125
OK , thank you . Good luck .

01:10:07.125 --> 01:10:09.347
Congratulations . Thank you very much ,

01:10:09.347 --> 01:10:11.370
Senator Schmidt . Senator Warren ,

01:10:11.910 --> 01:10:13.649
thank you Mr . Chairman and

01:10:13.649 --> 01:10:15.816
congratulations to both of you on your

01:10:15.816 --> 01:10:18.680
nominations . So the American military

01:10:18.680 --> 01:10:21.770
is built to defeat our enemies , not to

01:10:21.770 --> 01:10:24.970
create more of them , and that is why

01:10:24.970 --> 01:10:27.020
Republican and Democratic

01:10:27.020 --> 01:10:29.729
administrations have worked to reduce

01:10:29.729 --> 01:10:32.609
risks to innocent civilians as part of

01:10:32.609 --> 01:10:35.250
military operations . In fact , the

01:10:35.250 --> 01:10:38.330
last Trump administration issued DOD's

01:10:38.330 --> 01:10:41.089
first instruction . To establish

01:10:41.089 --> 01:10:43.569
policies to mitigate civilian harm

01:10:43.569 --> 01:10:46.310
after concerns grew about civilian

01:10:46.310 --> 01:10:49.799
casualties in the campaign against ISIS .

01:10:50.209 --> 01:10:52.569
Now one of the tools that commanders

01:10:52.569 --> 01:10:54.680
now have in the tool kit is working .

01:10:55.240 --> 01:10:58.319
With civilian harm and mitigation

01:10:58.319 --> 01:11:01.439
response advisors from refining war

01:11:01.439 --> 01:11:03.669
games to real attack planning in the

01:11:03.669 --> 01:11:07.240
Middle East and Africa operations and

01:11:07.240 --> 01:11:09.879
more , Vice Admiral Bradley , your

01:11:09.879 --> 01:11:12.040
predecessor at Special Operations

01:11:12.040 --> 01:11:13.873
Command recently said that these

01:11:13.873 --> 01:11:17.200
experts quote assisted commanders and

01:11:17.200 --> 01:11:19.240
their staffs in mitigating civilian

01:11:19.240 --> 01:11:22.879
harm without compromising lethality .

01:11:23.350 --> 01:11:25.700
What's more , their knowledge quote

01:11:25.700 --> 01:11:28.509
enhanced precision , preserving

01:11:28.509 --> 01:11:31.580
legitimacy and enabling Michigan

01:11:31.580 --> 01:11:34.189
success . So Vice Admiral Bradley , if

01:11:34.189 --> 01:11:36.859
you are confirmed , will you commit to

01:11:36.859 --> 01:11:39.629
keeping civilian harm prevention

01:11:39.629 --> 01:11:43.319
experts at SOCOM to advise you and your

01:11:43.319 --> 01:11:45.910
team ? Senator , first , um , just to

01:11:45.910 --> 01:11:48.589
resonate , it is not only an obligation

01:11:48.589 --> 01:11:50.756
to adhere to the law of armed conflict

01:11:50.756 --> 01:11:52.867
to protect civilians , it is critical

01:11:52.867 --> 01:11:55.069
to our success and competition to

01:11:55.069 --> 01:11:57.180
represent our values . I believe that

01:11:57.180 --> 01:11:59.799
every uniformed , every civilian , and

01:11:59.799 --> 01:12:02.021
every contractor that is employed or in

01:12:02.021 --> 01:12:04.459
oversight of the use of lethal force

01:12:04.459 --> 01:12:06.870
has a critical obligation to be able to

01:12:06.870 --> 01:12:09.259
do that , and I do commit to keeping

01:12:09.259 --> 01:12:11.470
that as a focus for our command if

01:12:11.470 --> 01:12:13.637
confirmed . That is a that is a strong

01:12:13.637 --> 01:12:15.970
answer , and I appreciate it . You know ,

01:12:15.970 --> 01:12:18.026
other tools in the toolkitt here are

01:12:18.026 --> 01:12:19.859
the civilian harm mitigation and

01:12:19.859 --> 01:12:22.419
response action plan and DOD's policy

01:12:22.419 --> 01:12:24.979
instruction on civilian harm which

01:12:24.979 --> 01:12:27.979
outline DOD's plans and policies to

01:12:27.979 --> 01:12:31.180
reduce civilian harm risks . AFRICO has

01:12:31.180 --> 01:12:33.180
made progress in implementing these

01:12:33.180 --> 01:12:35.291
policies . Including through training

01:12:35.291 --> 01:12:38.225
allies and partners on how to reduce

01:12:38.225 --> 01:12:41.015
risks to innocent civilians , we are

01:12:41.015 --> 01:12:43.875
serving as a model that our other

01:12:43.875 --> 01:12:46.495
partners are now beginning to adopt .

01:12:46.865 --> 01:12:48.854
In May , the Nigerian Air Force

01:12:48.854 --> 01:12:51.345
announced its own civilian harm

01:12:51.345 --> 01:12:54.254
prevention plan . These are efforts

01:12:54.424 --> 01:12:57.194
that save innocent lives . Lieutenant

01:12:57.194 --> 01:12:59.472
General Anderson , if you're confirmed .

01:12:59.549 --> 01:13:02.149
Will you carry forward these efforts to

01:13:02.149 --> 01:13:04.149
integrate civilian harm mitigation

01:13:04.149 --> 01:13:07.709
planning into AFRICO operations and

01:13:07.709 --> 01:13:10.390
train allies in the region to help them

01:13:10.390 --> 01:13:14.229
do the same ? Senator , to , uh , echo

01:13:14.229 --> 01:13:16.285
Vice Admiral Bradley's importance of

01:13:16.285 --> 01:13:18.118
this , uh , this is a critically

01:13:18.118 --> 01:13:20.580
important reason , uh , uh , show of

01:13:20.580 --> 01:13:23.020
our values . Uh , it's also important

01:13:23.020 --> 01:13:24.964
that we maintain the laws of armed

01:13:24.964 --> 01:13:27.020
conflict and when we engage with our

01:13:27.020 --> 01:13:29.187
partners that we help them educate and

01:13:29.187 --> 01:13:31.353
that we model this , and this has been

01:13:31.353 --> 01:13:33.409
something that when I was at Special

01:13:33.409 --> 01:13:35.631
Operations Command Africa we did . Uh ,

01:13:35.631 --> 01:13:37.742
we work with partners and when we saw

01:13:37.742 --> 01:13:39.742
things or heard of things that were

01:13:39.742 --> 01:13:41.576
credible , we encouraged them to

01:13:41.576 --> 01:13:43.687
investigate and to look into this and

01:13:43.687 --> 01:13:45.853
then we gave them assistance as needed

01:13:45.853 --> 01:13:48.020
in order for them to conduct their own

01:13:48.020 --> 01:13:50.131
investigation . So I will continue if

01:13:50.131 --> 01:13:52.353
confirmed to take that on at AFRICO . I

01:13:52.353 --> 01:13:54.353
appreciate that . I want to get one

01:13:54.353 --> 01:13:56.680
other point here because we also need

01:13:56.680 --> 01:13:59.189
to reduce harm to our own special

01:13:59.189 --> 01:14:01.569
operators . I've worked with Senator

01:14:01.569 --> 01:14:03.736
Ernst and others on this committee for

01:14:03.736 --> 01:14:06.189
years to address high levels of brain

01:14:06.189 --> 01:14:08.810
injury caused by blast overpressure .

01:14:09.250 --> 01:14:11.529
Exposed service members have reported

01:14:11.529 --> 01:14:14.370
debilitating symptoms from seizures to

01:14:14.370 --> 01:14:18.359
depression to suicidality . Uh ,

01:14:18.450 --> 01:14:20.672
and now preliminary research is showing

01:14:20.672 --> 01:14:22.783
high rates of heart disease , chronic

01:14:22.783 --> 01:14:25.169
pain , hypertension , even links to

01:14:25.169 --> 01:14:27.970
brain cancer and neurodegenerative

01:14:27.970 --> 01:14:30.819
diseases . Clearly we have a lot more

01:14:30.819 --> 01:14:33.060
we need to learn . So let me ask Vice

01:14:33.060 --> 01:14:35.580
Admiral Bradley , if confirmed , you'll

01:14:35.580 --> 01:14:38.609
oversee tens of thousands of special

01:14:38.609 --> 01:14:41.819
operations personnel . Do you support

01:14:41.819 --> 01:14:45.660
DOD partnering with outside experts to

01:14:45.660 --> 01:14:48.259
study the long-term effects of blast

01:14:48.259 --> 01:14:51.850
overpressure ? Senator , I do , uh , I

01:14:51.850 --> 01:14:53.683
have seen great benefit from our

01:14:53.683 --> 01:14:56.040
partnerships with academia and other

01:14:56.040 --> 01:14:58.096
organizations that are studying this

01:14:58.096 --> 01:15:00.096
problem critically . Our number one

01:15:00.096 --> 01:15:02.040
soft truth is that people are more

01:15:02.040 --> 01:15:03.929
important than hardware , and the

01:15:03.929 --> 01:15:05.984
critical part of those people is the

01:15:05.984 --> 01:15:08.262
intellectual capacity . Of course that ,

01:15:08.262 --> 01:15:10.596
uh , is in is jeopardized by these , uh ,

01:15:10.596 --> 01:15:12.707
by these brain health issues , and we

01:15:12.707 --> 01:15:14.873
see them as a critical contract . With

01:15:14.873 --> 01:15:16.707
our operators and our operators'

01:15:16.707 --> 01:15:18.762
families to ensure that we keep them

01:15:18.762 --> 01:15:21.234
sustainable . I appreciate that very ,

01:15:21.345 --> 01:15:23.512
very much . If you're confirmed , I'll

01:15:23.512 --> 01:15:25.789
be calling on you to help us with that .

01:15:25.825 --> 01:15:27.992
There's language in both the House and

01:15:27.992 --> 01:15:30.810
the Senate NDAA . That would help us

01:15:30.810 --> 01:15:32.977
get this study , and there are lots of

01:15:32.977 --> 01:15:34.588
organizations like Home Base

01:15:34.588 --> 01:15:37.089
Massachusetts who have the expertise to

01:15:37.089 --> 01:15:39.370
help us get these answers . We owe this

01:15:39.370 --> 01:15:41.426
to our service members . Thank you .

01:15:41.426 --> 01:15:43.648
Thank you , Mr . Chairman . Thank you ,

01:15:43.648 --> 01:15:45.759
Senator Warren . Senator Tuberville ,

01:15:45.759 --> 01:15:47.592
thank you , Mr . Chairman . Good

01:15:47.592 --> 01:15:47.439
morning . Thanks for both of you .

01:15:47.450 --> 01:15:49.617
Thank you for what you've done for our

01:15:49.617 --> 01:15:51.839
country over the your careers , you and

01:15:51.839 --> 01:15:53.839
your family . What a sacrifice it's

01:15:53.839 --> 01:15:55.894
been , but done an outstanding job ,

01:15:56.129 --> 01:15:59.009
Admiral , I , I think . Far too long we

01:15:59.060 --> 01:16:01.299
we've had our eyes on other things and

01:16:01.299 --> 01:16:03.979
not on our hemisphere uh whether it's

01:16:03.979 --> 01:16:07.330
illegal migrants , drugs , or both , uh ,

01:16:07.339 --> 01:16:10.140
so what is special operations community

01:16:10.470 --> 01:16:12.414
doing to assist the militaries and

01:16:12.414 --> 01:16:14.359
governments in our hemisphere like

01:16:14.359 --> 01:16:16.419
Panama to combat narco-terrorist ?

01:16:18.140 --> 01:16:20.362
Senator , uh , in my current capacity ,

01:16:20.640 --> 01:16:22.950
I'm , uh , I'm not privy to all of the ,

01:16:22.959 --> 01:16:25.439
uh , the , uh , activities that SOCOM

01:16:25.439 --> 01:16:27.661
is , uh , is engaged in in the , in the

01:16:27.661 --> 01:16:29.819
southern hemisphere . Um , but , uh ,

01:16:29.830 --> 01:16:31.941
but in listening and watching General

01:16:31.941 --> 01:16:33.997
Fenton and his leadership over these

01:16:33.997 --> 01:16:35.719
last 3 years , I know that the

01:16:35.719 --> 01:16:37.709
partnerships that , uh , our , our

01:16:37.709 --> 01:16:40.259
teams have been have been engaging in

01:16:40.259 --> 01:16:42.549
and developing remain critical to being

01:16:42.549 --> 01:16:44.970
able to help them build capacity to be

01:16:44.970 --> 01:16:48.069
able to defend themselves , but also to

01:16:48.069 --> 01:16:50.589
provide security locally , which of

01:16:50.589 --> 01:16:53.589
course helps to prevent and secure our

01:16:53.589 --> 01:16:55.922
southern border as well . Yeah , you're ,

01:16:55.922 --> 01:16:58.033
you're very , I'm , I'm sure you're .

01:16:58.033 --> 01:17:00.450
Up on the point of the daring gap and

01:17:00.450 --> 01:17:02.672
the problems it's caused over the years

01:17:02.709 --> 01:17:04.790
and uh relationship with our special

01:17:04.790 --> 01:17:06.890
ops down in that area training ,

01:17:07.069 --> 01:17:09.236
training people uh that'll probably be

01:17:09.236 --> 01:17:11.750
in your forte going going forward .

01:17:11.830 --> 01:17:13.870
What's your thoughts about uh

01:17:13.870 --> 01:17:15.759
cooperation activities with Latin

01:17:15.759 --> 01:17:18.450
America is going into this job ? Yes

01:17:18.450 --> 01:17:20.770
sir , I think um uh as as the

01:17:20.770 --> 01:17:23.479
counterterrorism fight informs us , um ,

01:17:23.490 --> 01:17:25.649
it is far better to find the root of

01:17:25.649 --> 01:17:27.816
the problem well away from our borders

01:17:27.816 --> 01:17:29.705
than it is to have to defend them

01:17:29.705 --> 01:17:32.089
internal to the United States and so

01:17:32.089 --> 01:17:34.033
we've confirmed , uh , making it a

01:17:34.033 --> 01:17:36.145
priority to provide assistance to all

01:17:36.145 --> 01:17:38.200
of our combatant . Commanders as far

01:17:38.200 --> 01:17:40.790
forward as possible and with their , uh ,

01:17:40.799 --> 01:17:43.040
with those partnered forces to help

01:17:43.040 --> 01:17:45.040
them to be able to secure their own

01:17:45.040 --> 01:17:47.040
territory . Yeah , we , and we have

01:17:47.040 --> 01:17:49.151
problems all all over the world , but

01:17:49.151 --> 01:17:51.318
if we don't watch our back door , then

01:17:51.318 --> 01:17:51.200
we're , we're gonna have really

01:17:51.200 --> 01:17:53.367
problems within our country , which we

01:17:53.367 --> 01:17:55.533
already have . General , I , I think ,

01:17:55.533 --> 01:17:57.478
uh . We need to be reinforcing our

01:17:57.478 --> 01:17:59.144
military presence in Africa .

01:17:59.144 --> 01:18:01.089
Unfortunately , under the previous

01:18:01.089 --> 01:18:03.256
administration , we seemed like , uh ,

01:18:03.256 --> 01:18:03.129
we , we were doing just the opposite ,

01:18:03.180 --> 01:18:05.529
uh , uh , you and I talked about this

01:18:05.529 --> 01:18:08.089
in , in a meeting in my office , uh ,

01:18:08.620 --> 01:18:11.060
the vacuum , uh , that , that was

01:18:11.060 --> 01:18:13.549
caused there , China , Russia , Iran ,

01:18:13.939 --> 01:18:16.106
we're all too happy to feel the things

01:18:16.106 --> 01:18:18.272
that we , we were doing there . What's

01:18:18.272 --> 01:18:20.439
your assessment of our withdrawal from

01:18:20.439 --> 01:18:22.272
Air Base 201 ? And are , have we

01:18:22.272 --> 01:18:24.495
learned from these lessons , uh , and ,

01:18:24.495 --> 01:18:26.383
and your thoughts about maybe the

01:18:26.383 --> 01:18:29.430
future there ? Uh , Senator , I

01:18:29.430 --> 01:18:31.486
appreciate that question , and there

01:18:31.486 --> 01:18:33.652
was a significant investment that went

01:18:33.652 --> 01:18:35.708
into that airbase . Uh , it was in a

01:18:35.708 --> 01:18:37.819
key area for us to be able to monitor

01:18:37.819 --> 01:18:40.109
the threat , so the loss of that is one

01:18:40.109 --> 01:18:42.620
that we have to find creative ways to

01:18:42.629 --> 01:18:44.573
continue to get the indicators and

01:18:44.573 --> 01:18:46.573
warnings of what the terrorists are

01:18:46.573 --> 01:18:48.740
doing in that area . I think we , um ,

01:18:48.740 --> 01:18:50.851
also have to understand that there is

01:18:50.851 --> 01:18:53.018
some volatility across the continent ,

01:18:53.018 --> 01:18:55.018
so how do we make smart investments

01:18:55.018 --> 01:18:56.851
with the partners uh that we can

01:18:56.851 --> 01:18:59.060
continue to sustain . Uh , I will say

01:18:59.060 --> 01:19:01.171
that the , uh , relationships that we

01:19:01.171 --> 01:19:03.549
built in with the military over several

01:19:03.549 --> 01:19:06.629
decades , uh , are still there . Um ,

01:19:07.029 --> 01:19:09.089
there's when the time is right , I

01:19:09.089 --> 01:19:11.256
believe there will be an opportunity ,

01:19:11.256 --> 01:19:13.256
but that time was , will have to be

01:19:13.256 --> 01:19:15.311
determined and if confirmed , I'll ,

01:19:15.311 --> 01:19:17.256
I'll look at what that is . Yeah ,

01:19:17.256 --> 01:19:19.311
after your confirmation , I guess by

01:19:19.311 --> 01:19:21.256
telling the comedian , people even

01:19:21.256 --> 01:19:23.311
watching at home , why do we need to

01:19:23.311 --> 01:19:25.478
have presence in Africa ? What is your

01:19:25.478 --> 01:19:29.250
thoughts ? So , uh . Africa is the key

01:19:29.250 --> 01:19:31.930
to , uh , any strategy . It sits on

01:19:31.930 --> 01:19:34.097
strategic terrain , just the waterways

01:19:34.097 --> 01:19:35.930
that , uh , it forms between the

01:19:35.930 --> 01:19:38.041
Straits of Gibraltar all the way down

01:19:38.041 --> 01:19:40.319
through the Suez Canal and the Red Sea .

01:19:40.319 --> 01:19:42.152
Uh , it is critical minerals and

01:19:42.152 --> 01:19:44.152
resources that are on the continent

01:19:44.152 --> 01:19:46.263
that , uh , we need for uh the future

01:19:46.263 --> 01:19:48.319
economy . Uh , both China and Russia

01:19:48.319 --> 01:19:50.486
see their strategies going through the

01:19:50.486 --> 01:19:52.374
continent , and they are going to

01:19:52.374 --> 01:19:54.374
engage there and so we can see that

01:19:54.374 --> 01:19:56.708
ground or we can compete in that ground ,

01:19:56.708 --> 01:19:58.708
and I think we have a very powerful

01:19:58.708 --> 01:20:00.597
tool to compete with , as Admiral

01:20:00.597 --> 01:20:02.850
Bradley mentioned nobody brings more

01:20:02.850 --> 01:20:04.850
credibility to the counterterrorism

01:20:04.850 --> 01:20:07.072
fight than the US , uh , as a matter of

01:20:07.072 --> 01:20:09.017
fact , when we rescued that , uh ,

01:20:09.017 --> 01:20:12.270
hostage in , the next morning was a

01:20:12.270 --> 01:20:14.759
influential blogger that posted . The

01:20:14.759 --> 01:20:16.759
Americans came like the lion in the

01:20:16.759 --> 01:20:18.870
night . They killed their enemies and

01:20:18.870 --> 01:20:21.037
rescued their own . No other nation on

01:20:21.037 --> 01:20:23.037
earth could do that . And that is a

01:20:23.037 --> 01:20:25.129
powerful symbol across the continent

01:20:25.129 --> 01:20:26.962
and around the world of what our

01:20:26.962 --> 01:20:29.129
military and what the United States is

01:20:29.129 --> 01:20:31.129
capable of and I do think that some

01:20:31.129 --> 01:20:33.073
level of engagement in Africa does

01:20:33.073 --> 01:20:35.073
matter . I agree it's an economy of

01:20:35.073 --> 01:20:37.185
force , but a small investment goes a

01:20:37.185 --> 01:20:38.907
long way so that we don't have

01:20:38.907 --> 01:20:41.290
strategic surprise that then distracts

01:20:41.290 --> 01:20:43.457
the United States from focusing on the

01:20:43.457 --> 01:20:45.679
rising threats in the Pacific and other

01:20:45.679 --> 01:20:47.457
areas . Thank you , thanks Mr .

01:20:47.457 --> 01:20:49.179
Chairman . Thank you , Senator

01:20:49.179 --> 01:20:51.123
Tuberville and well said , General

01:20:51.123 --> 01:20:53.959
Anderson . Senator Sheehy Thank you ,

01:20:53.970 --> 01:20:56.192
Chairman , uh , general , I wanna thank

01:20:56.192 --> 01:20:58.026
you for what you just said there

01:20:58.026 --> 01:21:00.192
because we've been hearing a lot today

01:21:00.192 --> 01:21:02.248
about how pulling back investment in

01:21:02.248 --> 01:21:04.470
certain programs in Africa is gonna end

01:21:04.470 --> 01:21:06.526
the world and see the the the entire

01:21:06.526 --> 01:21:08.637
dominance of China . Uh , the reality

01:21:08.637 --> 01:21:10.803
is what you just said is what the real

01:21:10.803 --> 01:21:10.689
power projection is when we can display

01:21:10.689 --> 01:21:12.578
to the world that we are going to

01:21:12.578 --> 01:21:14.633
protect our interests and our people

01:21:14.633 --> 01:21:16.745
ruthlessly , no matter what , that is

01:21:16.745 --> 01:21:18.856
what the real power projection of the

01:21:18.856 --> 01:21:20.967
US military is about . The soft stuff

01:21:20.967 --> 01:21:23.189
is absolutely important , being able to

01:21:23.189 --> 01:21:22.770
project economic power and stability is

01:21:22.770 --> 01:21:24.659
important . But nothing will ever

01:21:24.839 --> 01:21:26.728
supersede what you just said , so

01:21:26.728 --> 01:21:28.950
thanks for saying that . Uh , thanks to

01:21:28.950 --> 01:21:28.560
both of you and your families for what

01:21:28.560 --> 01:21:30.393
you've done for this country and

01:21:30.393 --> 01:21:32.616
continue to do . Uh , Admiral , over to

01:21:32.616 --> 01:21:34.338
you , um , we're facing a very

01:21:34.338 --> 01:21:36.393
challenging naval atmosphere against

01:21:36.393 --> 01:21:38.504
China . They're building ships faster

01:21:38.504 --> 01:21:40.671
than we can , 230 times faster than we

01:21:40.671 --> 01:21:42.560
do as a matter of fact . So if we

01:21:42.560 --> 01:21:44.671
should face a maritime conflict . Our

01:21:44.671 --> 01:21:46.727
most asymmetic advantage is gonna be

01:21:46.727 --> 01:21:48.504
our undersea special operations

01:21:48.504 --> 01:21:50.560
capability , how we can project that

01:21:50.560 --> 01:21:52.727
power manned and unmanned . Uh , would

01:21:52.727 --> 01:21:54.893
you take a moment here and just , uh ,

01:21:54.893 --> 01:21:54.439
explain to me your commitment to that

01:21:54.439 --> 01:21:56.550
program and how we're gonna make sure

01:21:56.550 --> 01:21:58.606
it remains dominant . Senator , uh ,

01:21:58.606 --> 01:22:00.717
thank you and thanks for your service

01:22:00.717 --> 01:22:02.870
in that community as well . Um , I

01:22:02.870 --> 01:22:04.981
believe , uh , from my time serving ,

01:22:04.981 --> 01:22:07.203
uh , in our undersea community that the

01:22:07.203 --> 01:22:09.370
partnership between special operations

01:22:09.370 --> 01:22:11.830
and the navy in this regard is singular ,

01:22:12.109 --> 01:22:14.509
uh , in the world in its sophistication .

01:22:15.049 --> 01:22:17.709
Um , the ability to , uh , to arrive

01:22:17.709 --> 01:22:19.487
with the element of surprise is

01:22:19.487 --> 01:22:21.709
unparalleled through this approach . It

01:22:21.709 --> 01:22:23.709
gives us advantage , asymmetric

01:22:23.709 --> 01:22:26.149
advantage , not just in war fighting ,

01:22:26.229 --> 01:22:28.350
but also in the ability , uh , in

01:22:28.350 --> 01:22:31.640
competition and in crisis . Um , the

01:22:31.640 --> 01:22:33.649
special operations community has a

01:22:33.649 --> 01:22:36.600
unique and growing and deep , deepening

01:22:36.600 --> 01:22:38.600
relationship with the United States

01:22:38.600 --> 01:22:40.878
Navy in this regard , and if confirmed ,

01:22:40.878 --> 01:22:42.767
I would very much look forward to

01:22:42.767 --> 01:22:44.989
advancing that and continuing to , uh ,

01:22:44.989 --> 01:22:47.100
maintain that asymmetry . Thank you .

01:22:47.100 --> 01:22:49.459
And for both of you , um , a similar

01:22:49.459 --> 01:22:51.681
question . Last time we fought a war in

01:22:51.681 --> 01:22:54.370
Indopecom we had about 5000 seaplanes

01:22:54.580 --> 01:22:56.413
that were a critical part of our

01:22:56.413 --> 01:22:58.580
logistical and tactical network across

01:22:58.580 --> 01:23:00.747
the region , from moving insurgents to

01:23:00.747 --> 01:23:02.858
spies , uh , to supplies to logistics

01:23:02.858 --> 01:23:04.747
to rescuing ships , crew and down

01:23:04.747 --> 01:23:06.969
airmen in areas that that at the time ,

01:23:06.969 --> 01:23:09.191
uh , were out of range . Uh , right now

01:23:09.191 --> 01:23:11.191
we have precisely 0 planes that can

01:23:11.191 --> 01:23:13.302
land or any aircraft that can land on

01:23:13.302 --> 01:23:15.247
water in the entire US military in

01:23:15.247 --> 01:23:14.540
general with your background in

01:23:14.540 --> 01:23:16.950
non-standard aviation . Uh , as I do

01:23:16.950 --> 01:23:18.839
too , I used to fly seaplanes and

01:23:18.839 --> 01:23:20.750
PC-12s like you . Uh , this is a

01:23:20.750 --> 01:23:22.583
capability that , that as we are

01:23:22.583 --> 01:23:24.472
entering a new era of great power

01:23:24.472 --> 01:23:26.694
competition . Uh , I believe we need to

01:23:26.694 --> 01:23:28.917
reinvest in and SOCO will be the tip of

01:23:28.917 --> 01:23:31.083
that spear . Um , so I recently worked

01:23:31.083 --> 01:23:33.306
with Indo Paycom to try to reinvigorate

01:23:33.306 --> 01:23:35.306
the ability for them to access this

01:23:35.306 --> 01:23:37.417
capability . Uh , would either of you

01:23:37.417 --> 01:23:39.583
care to comment on , on what you think

01:23:39.583 --> 01:23:39.509
amphibious aviation could mean for our

01:23:39.509 --> 01:23:41.509
ability to project power , um , all

01:23:41.509 --> 01:23:43.890
over the world ? Uh , Senator , I

01:23:43.890 --> 01:23:45.834
appreciate the question . I , I do

01:23:45.834 --> 01:23:47.779
think there's several types of new

01:23:47.779 --> 01:23:50.001
technologies , emerging technologies we

01:23:50.001 --> 01:23:52.168
need to invest in that allow different

01:23:52.168 --> 01:23:54.334
types of logistics and different types

01:23:54.334 --> 01:23:56.390
of support . Uh , seaplanes could be

01:23:56.390 --> 01:23:58.723
part of that . I think unmanned systems ,

01:23:58.723 --> 01:24:00.834
semi-submersibles , but a plethora of

01:24:00.834 --> 01:24:02.668
of capabilities that allow us to

01:24:02.668 --> 01:24:04.890
operate in a contested environment with

01:24:04.890 --> 01:24:06.946
unmanned and a combination of manned

01:24:06.946 --> 01:24:09.168
and unmanned systems is , is critical ,

01:24:09.168 --> 01:24:11.390
and the Indo-Pacific , there's a lot of

01:24:11.390 --> 01:24:13.557
water across that area . So having the

01:24:13.557 --> 01:24:15.668
ability to operate in those areas and

01:24:15.668 --> 01:24:17.668
uh be able to resupply , uh , small

01:24:17.668 --> 01:24:19.390
islands , I think will be very

01:24:19.390 --> 01:24:21.668
important to a potential Pacific fight .

01:24:22.330 --> 01:24:24.330
Yeah , I would say in an AO that in

01:24:24.330 --> 01:24:26.479
some cases is over 90% water , uh ,

01:24:26.520 --> 01:24:28.959
having the entire AO be a runway seems

01:24:28.959 --> 01:24:31.890
like a pretty good idea . I was

01:24:31.890 --> 01:24:34.057
recently in Kenya , Djibouti , Egypt .

01:24:34.057 --> 01:24:36.168
Um , I went over there for a reason .

01:24:36.168 --> 01:24:38.223
Uh , we all served many years in the

01:24:38.223 --> 01:24:40.390
Middle East , but , um , Africa is now

01:24:40.390 --> 01:24:42.446
gonna have 2.5 billion people become

01:24:42.446 --> 01:24:44.390
the most populous continent in the

01:24:44.390 --> 01:24:46.334
world here potentially in the next

01:24:46.334 --> 01:24:48.334
decade , and it's very possible the

01:24:48.334 --> 01:24:48.290
21st century could be an African

01:24:48.290 --> 01:24:50.850
century . And as that 2.5 billion

01:24:50.850 --> 01:24:52.961
people plug into the global economy ,

01:24:52.961 --> 01:24:55.072
as they become global citizens active

01:24:55.072 --> 01:24:57.406
on the internet , as they become banked ,

01:24:57.406 --> 01:24:59.517
as they become crypto citizens . Uh ,

01:24:59.517 --> 01:25:01.990
we are going to have to reckon with the

01:25:01.990 --> 01:25:03.712
great power competition that's

01:25:03.712 --> 01:25:05.934
happening there . And as I look at some

01:25:05.934 --> 01:25:08.101
of our engagement across , um , across

01:25:08.101 --> 01:25:10.101
the Horn of Africa , uh , and , and

01:25:10.101 --> 01:25:12.101
through all of Africa really , uh ,

01:25:12.101 --> 01:25:13.879
what do you see as your biggest

01:25:13.879 --> 01:25:13.430
challenge is gonna be ? What are your

01:25:13.430 --> 01:25:15.709
1st 90 , 120 days look like as you try

01:25:15.709 --> 01:25:18.042
to grapple with the fact that we have a ,

01:25:18.042 --> 01:25:20.299
a , a massive geopolitical , uh ,

01:25:20.310 --> 01:25:24.080
battlefield emerging . Senator , I

01:25:24.080 --> 01:25:26.191
appreciate those comments and I agree

01:25:26.191 --> 01:25:28.191
that uh Africa is growing rapidly .

01:25:28.319 --> 01:25:30.430
There's a large youth population that

01:25:30.430 --> 01:25:32.263
youth can either be channeled to

01:25:32.263 --> 01:25:34.263
contribute to the global economy or

01:25:34.263 --> 01:25:36.549
they could become terrorists or other

01:25:36.879 --> 01:25:40.450
uh uh nefarious actions . What I would

01:25:40.450 --> 01:25:43.040
uh say to that is that , uh , the first

01:25:43.040 --> 01:25:45.262
thing I would look at is do we have the

01:25:45.262 --> 01:25:47.429
right access and placement in order to

01:25:47.429 --> 01:25:49.429
have the indicators and warnings to

01:25:49.429 --> 01:25:51.540
prevent that strategic surprise . And

01:25:51.540 --> 01:25:51.540
to your point earlier , I think it's a

01:25:51.540 --> 01:25:53.740
combination of hard power and soft

01:25:53.740 --> 01:25:56.009
power , as you put it , but having the

01:25:56.009 --> 01:25:58.231
relationships and the trust to have the

01:25:58.231 --> 01:26:00.398
access when needed in order to project

01:26:00.398 --> 01:26:02.770
power to be able to counter terrorism ,

01:26:02.879 --> 01:26:04.768
to be able to respond to a crisis

01:26:04.768 --> 01:26:06.879
somewhere on the continent . Uh , and

01:26:06.879 --> 01:26:08.823
then also to understand what other

01:26:08.823 --> 01:26:11.046
powers are doing . So my , uh , first ,

01:26:11.046 --> 01:26:13.268
uh , few days , if confirmed , would be

01:26:13.268 --> 01:26:15.268
focused on assessing that and do we

01:26:15.268 --> 01:26:17.323
have the right posture and footprint

01:26:17.323 --> 01:26:19.379
and can , what can we do to maximize

01:26:19.379 --> 01:26:21.712
the indicators and warnings . Thank you .

01:26:21.712 --> 01:26:23.657
I'm out of time , but I would also

01:26:23.657 --> 01:26:23.100
encourage you to take a look at Camp

01:26:23.100 --> 01:26:25.322
Simba and the upgrades required there .

01:26:25.322 --> 01:26:26.989
It's a key point , uh , power

01:26:26.989 --> 01:26:26.700
projection for us in that region .

01:26:26.859 --> 01:26:30.439
Thank you . Thank you , Senator Sheehy .

01:26:30.540 --> 01:26:33.819
Let me ask , um , both of you , uh ,

01:26:33.879 --> 01:26:36.279
with regard to the first set of

01:26:36.279 --> 01:26:38.279
questions Senator Sheehy brought up

01:26:38.279 --> 01:26:40.919
about seaplanes , uh , uh , and that

01:26:40.919 --> 01:26:43.141
sort of capacity , is there anything on

01:26:43.141 --> 01:26:46.950
the horizon in that regard ? Uh ,

01:26:47.049 --> 01:26:49.479
so , Senator , there are a few , uh ,

01:26:49.490 --> 01:26:51.434
developed out there that are being

01:26:51.434 --> 01:26:53.601
developed . I know DARPA is working on

01:26:53.601 --> 01:26:55.823
a project . Uh , there are some other ,

01:26:55.823 --> 01:26:58.046
uh , uh , companies that are looking at

01:26:58.046 --> 01:27:00.046
seaplanes and unmanned seaplanes as

01:27:00.046 --> 01:27:02.140
well . And Senator , across , uh ,

01:27:02.189 --> 01:27:04.300
special operations there have been uh

01:27:04.300 --> 01:27:05.967
experiments with that kind of

01:27:05.967 --> 01:27:09.209
capability . Um , thank you , thank you

01:27:09.209 --> 01:27:11.320
very much . We , uh , Senator Kelly .

01:27:11.490 --> 01:27:13.490
Thank you , Mr . Chairman , Admiral

01:27:13.490 --> 01:27:15.657
Bradley , General Anderson , thank you

01:27:15.657 --> 01:27:18.680
for being here and for continuing to

01:27:18.680 --> 01:27:21.040
volunteer to serve our nation . Uh ,

01:27:21.109 --> 01:27:24.270
SOCOM and ARCO both leverage economies

01:27:24.270 --> 01:27:26.799
of Bose principles , so applying

01:27:26.799 --> 01:27:29.439
limited resources for having an

01:27:29.439 --> 01:27:32.799
outsized impact , and this requires

01:27:32.799 --> 01:27:35.640
some careful planning and using the

01:27:35.640 --> 01:27:38.069
right assets against the right problem .

01:27:38.919 --> 01:27:41.120
Uh , within this economy of force

01:27:41.120 --> 01:27:43.160
principle , how important are

01:27:43.160 --> 01:27:46.240
inter-agency partners like the

01:27:46.240 --> 01:27:48.970
Department of State , uh , for SOCOM

01:27:48.970 --> 01:27:51.600
and AFRA's , uh , campaign plan ?

01:27:53.879 --> 01:27:56.270
Senator , um , I'll , I'll start , uh ,

01:27:56.279 --> 01:27:58.509
across the special operations community

01:27:58.509 --> 01:28:00.600
our partnership with the integrated

01:28:00.600 --> 01:28:03.120
inter agency , um , also our law

01:28:03.120 --> 01:28:05.040
enforcement , uh , federal , and

01:28:05.040 --> 01:28:07.419
frankly even our local law enforcement

01:28:07.640 --> 01:28:09.751
partnerships have been critical to us

01:28:09.751 --> 01:28:12.069
over these last 25 years . And , and I

01:28:12.069 --> 01:28:14.750
see that uh as nothing but growing in

01:28:14.750 --> 01:28:16.939
the future . If confirmed as a SOCOM

01:28:16.939 --> 01:28:19.430
commander , the relationships that we

01:28:19.430 --> 01:28:22.299
have inside our integrated inter agency ,

01:28:22.500 --> 01:28:24.722
cultivating those and sustaining them ,

01:28:24.750 --> 01:28:26.917
I think would be a , uh , would have .

01:28:26.917 --> 01:28:29.028
To be a top priority , I can tell you

01:28:29.028 --> 01:28:30.694
that today the state of those

01:28:30.694 --> 01:28:32.806
relationships from my from my current

01:28:32.806 --> 01:28:35.139
experience is frankly a high water mark ,

01:28:35.139 --> 01:28:37.950
uh , certainly of my 34 years and I

01:28:37.950 --> 01:28:40.117
suspect , uh , even longer than that .

01:28:40.117 --> 01:28:42.283
And general , do you share that view ?

01:28:42.459 --> 01:28:44.779
Uh , Senator , I agree that we have

01:28:44.779 --> 01:28:46.890
very limited resources and so we have

01:28:46.890 --> 01:28:48.723
to partner across all government

01:28:48.723 --> 01:28:51.020
agencies to maximize those resources

01:28:51.020 --> 01:28:53.020
and to find where we can complement

01:28:53.020 --> 01:28:55.187
each other . Uh , we would provide the

01:28:55.187 --> 01:28:57.409
military piece of that , but to Admiral

01:28:57.409 --> 01:28:59.970
Bradley's point . Uh , my entire career

01:28:59.970 --> 01:29:01.803
with special operations has been

01:29:01.803 --> 01:29:03.581
working with multiple different

01:29:03.581 --> 01:29:05.637
agencies in order to maximize that ,

01:29:05.637 --> 01:29:07.803
whether that's the FBI and using legal

01:29:07.803 --> 01:29:09.914
authorities in different parts of the

01:29:09.914 --> 01:29:12.026
world , working with our intelligence

01:29:12.026 --> 01:29:11.810
community or with State Department and

01:29:11.810 --> 01:29:13.810
others to make sure we leverage the

01:29:13.810 --> 01:29:15.866
full authorities and capabilities of

01:29:15.866 --> 01:29:17.879
our nation . One of my big concerns

01:29:18.129 --> 01:29:22.109
here is the , um . The

01:29:22.109 --> 01:29:24.790
impact that the cuts to USAID within

01:29:24.790 --> 01:29:26.901
the State Department is going to have

01:29:26.901 --> 01:29:29.123
on our ability to build some trust with

01:29:29.123 --> 01:29:31.234
partner nations . That's a concern of

01:29:31.234 --> 01:29:33.234
mine . I'm not gonna put you on the

01:29:33.234 --> 01:29:35.401
spot here , uh , on that topic , but ,

01:29:35.401 --> 01:29:37.457
uh , I think it is something that we

01:29:37.457 --> 01:29:39.734
that I hope the two of you think about ,

01:29:39.734 --> 01:29:41.846
uh , Admiral Bradley . Uh , China and

01:29:41.846 --> 01:29:43.957
Russia currently raging , uh , waging

01:29:43.957 --> 01:29:46.220
some regular warfare campaigns against

01:29:46.220 --> 01:29:48.442
us and our allies in a lot of different

01:29:48.442 --> 01:29:50.740
places . PRC is using violence to

01:29:50.740 --> 01:29:52.796
impose their will on the Philippines

01:29:52.796 --> 01:29:54.910
and the second Thomas Shoal . And

01:29:54.910 --> 01:29:57.700
Russia has a long history of using a

01:29:57.700 --> 01:30:00.299
regular warfare , most recently in

01:30:00.299 --> 01:30:03.299
Ukraine , and leveraging your most

01:30:03.299 --> 01:30:05.410
recent experience as the commander of

01:30:05.410 --> 01:30:08.979
JSOC . How does the US effectively wage

01:30:08.979 --> 01:30:12.180
a regular warfare to compete and win

01:30:12.180 --> 01:30:14.458
with Russia and China in the gray zone ?

01:30:15.259 --> 01:30:17.689
Senator , thank you . Um , in my last 3

01:30:17.689 --> 01:30:19.800
years I've had the opportunity , uh ,

01:30:19.970 --> 01:30:22.026
to be a member of the SOCOM board of

01:30:22.026 --> 01:30:24.192
directors and really watch our theater

01:30:24.192 --> 01:30:26.192
special operations commands who are

01:30:26.192 --> 01:30:28.209
responsible for operations for the

01:30:28.209 --> 01:30:30.850
joint soft community inside those areas ,

01:30:30.890 --> 01:30:33.001
and I can tell you that our principal

01:30:33.001 --> 01:30:34.890
advantage that the the soft value

01:30:34.890 --> 01:30:37.810
proposition brings is understanding and

01:30:37.810 --> 01:30:39.588
enhanced understanding of those

01:30:39.588 --> 01:30:41.770
insidious actions . Which are really

01:30:41.779 --> 01:30:43.779
preying on our alliance structure ,

01:30:43.939 --> 01:30:46.220
being able to illuminate that predatory

01:30:46.220 --> 01:30:49.450
activity gives our diplomats and our

01:30:49.450 --> 01:30:51.394
whole of government and our allies

01:30:51.620 --> 01:30:53.859
power to be able to stand against it

01:30:53.859 --> 01:30:56.620
and be resilient to it . That in turn

01:30:56.620 --> 01:30:58.740
strengthens our alliance and deepens

01:30:58.740 --> 01:31:00.962
our credibility when we want to partner

01:31:00.962 --> 01:31:03.184
and build capacity there , right , well

01:31:03.184 --> 01:31:05.184
thank , thank you and finally in my

01:31:05.184 --> 01:31:07.296
last minute here , General Anderson ,

01:31:07.296 --> 01:31:10.180
um . I traveled , it's been about a

01:31:10.180 --> 01:31:12.500
year and a half now , but , uh , in the

01:31:12.500 --> 01:31:16.259
Sahel and , you know , just uh uh parts

01:31:16.259 --> 01:31:19.709
of Africa where Wagner is pretty active ,

01:31:19.979 --> 01:31:22.270
uh , especially on social media to

01:31:22.700 --> 01:31:25.029
exploit coups in western Africa ,

01:31:25.180 --> 01:31:28.410
commit human rights abuses , and when

01:31:28.410 --> 01:31:30.930
the Russians gain a foothold in these

01:31:31.100 --> 01:31:33.700
countries , they use a significant

01:31:33.700 --> 01:31:35.867
amount of disinformation to intimidate

01:31:35.867 --> 01:31:38.379
the local population . stifling

01:31:38.379 --> 01:31:41.220
opposing views while they claim to

01:31:41.220 --> 01:31:43.439
provide security . So general , how

01:31:43.439 --> 01:31:45.439
does Russia , Russia's social media

01:31:45.439 --> 01:31:48.370
activity impact security and stability

01:31:48.459 --> 01:31:51.910
in Africa ? Senator , I think that is

01:31:51.910 --> 01:31:54.021
one of Russia's greatest weapons that

01:31:54.021 --> 01:31:56.299
they're employing across the continent .

01:31:56.299 --> 01:31:58.410
Uh , one of the things they use quite

01:31:58.410 --> 01:32:00.688
often is disinformation . They play on ,

01:32:00.688 --> 01:32:02.819
uh , historic grievances , uh ,

01:32:02.859 --> 01:32:05.540
historic , uh , colonial , uh , issues ,

01:32:05.720 --> 01:32:07.899
uh , fears of sovereignty , and they

01:32:07.899 --> 01:32:10.169
play that up into an anti-democratic ,

01:32:10.259 --> 01:32:13.299
anti-Western that then has impacts to

01:32:13.299 --> 01:32:15.770
US support . I believe that the , uh ,

01:32:15.779 --> 01:32:17.660
Russian influence , uh , in the

01:32:17.660 --> 01:32:20.020
information operations were critical in

01:32:20.020 --> 01:32:22.187
turning populations against the French

01:32:22.187 --> 01:32:24.459
in the Sahel . Uh , I think it is very

01:32:24.459 --> 01:32:27.140
much uh not in our interest , uh , with

01:32:27.140 --> 01:32:29.084
what the Russians are doing in the

01:32:29.084 --> 01:32:31.418
information domain . Not only in Africa ,

01:32:31.418 --> 01:32:31.259
but , uh , if I could just take a

01:32:31.259 --> 01:32:33.426
couple more seconds , do you feel like

01:32:33.426 --> 01:32:35.537
we're losing this information warfare

01:32:35.537 --> 01:32:37.815
with the Russians , Chinese , Iranians ?

01:32:38.830 --> 01:32:41.129
Uh , Senator , to refer to what we

01:32:41.129 --> 01:32:43.240
discussed earlier , uh , the truth is

01:32:43.240 --> 01:32:45.410
incredibly powerful . We have that

01:32:45.410 --> 01:32:47.529
still we are still a very credible

01:32:47.529 --> 01:32:49.950
source of information . Uh , we can ,

01:32:49.970 --> 01:32:52.081
we need to leverage that . I think we

01:32:52.081 --> 01:32:54.192
need to be more aggressive about that

01:32:54.192 --> 01:32:56.192
in this domain , but I wouldn't say

01:32:56.192 --> 01:32:58.414
we're necessarily losing it . But if we

01:32:58.414 --> 01:33:00.414
do not engage , we risk losing it .

01:33:00.414 --> 01:33:02.303
Thank you . Thank you very much ,

01:33:02.303 --> 01:33:04.470
Senator Scott . Thank you , Chairman .

01:33:05.069 --> 01:33:07.236
Admiral Bradley , uh , Joe Henderson ,

01:33:07.236 --> 01:33:09.291
congratulations . First off , thanks

01:33:09.291 --> 01:33:11.236
for your service . Uh , thank your

01:33:11.236 --> 01:33:13.458
family for being here . Thank you for ,

01:33:13.458 --> 01:33:12.779
uh , their sacrifice while you've

01:33:12.779 --> 01:33:14.946
served . Uh , you both are gonna do an

01:33:14.946 --> 01:33:17.490
outstanding job . Number one , do you

01:33:17.490 --> 01:33:19.546
believe that the government of China

01:33:19.546 --> 01:33:21.490
has decided to be your adversary ?

01:33:21.870 --> 01:33:25.529
Senator , I do . Senator , I concur .

01:33:26.620 --> 01:33:28.830
So we put this committee has put a lot

01:33:28.830 --> 01:33:30.941
of effort into getting rid of Chinese

01:33:30.941 --> 01:33:32.997
drones , um , in the military and in

01:33:32.997 --> 01:33:35.052
our , in our country , and we made a

01:33:35.052 --> 01:33:37.386
lot of , we made a lot of progress , uh ,

01:33:37.386 --> 01:33:39.274
as you know we we're seeing drone

01:33:39.274 --> 01:33:41.219
warfare , uh , increase around the

01:33:41.219 --> 01:33:43.330
world . We've watched what's happened

01:33:43.330 --> 01:33:45.108
in uh Ukraine we watched what's

01:33:45.108 --> 01:33:47.441
happened in uh the Red Sea . We watched ,

01:33:47.441 --> 01:33:47.339
uh , what the Houthis have been doing

01:33:47.339 --> 01:33:49.750
to shoot down ships , uh , so do you

01:33:49.750 --> 01:33:51.806
believe drone technology is gonna be

01:33:51.806 --> 01:33:53.861
important in warfare going forward ,

01:33:53.861 --> 01:33:56.850
Senator , I do . Absolutely , Senator .

01:33:57.120 --> 01:33:59.231
So do you think it's really important

01:33:59.231 --> 01:34:01.342
to make sure that we don't have , you

01:34:01.342 --> 01:34:03.231
know , Chinese products uh in our

01:34:03.231 --> 01:34:05.950
military such as drones ? Senator , I

01:34:05.950 --> 01:34:08.310
know that uh there are nefarious

01:34:08.310 --> 01:34:10.421
aspects to Chinese products that come

01:34:10.421 --> 01:34:12.588
out and we , we must be careful not to

01:34:12.588 --> 01:34:15.640
include any of those . So I would , I

01:34:15.640 --> 01:34:17.751
would agree that we need to make sure

01:34:17.751 --> 01:34:19.751
that we don't open uh back doors or

01:34:19.751 --> 01:34:23.359
other vulnerabilities by uh we need to

01:34:23.359 --> 01:34:25.526
understand what products we're using .

01:34:25.526 --> 01:34:27.748
So whether it's , uh , Chinese drones ,

01:34:27.748 --> 01:34:30.026
uh , computers , printers , drugs , uh ,

01:34:30.026 --> 01:34:32.192
products like garlic that's grown in ,

01:34:32.192 --> 01:34:34.026
uh , raw sewage , you think it's

01:34:34.026 --> 01:34:36.026
important that we make sure none of

01:34:36.026 --> 01:34:37.970
that , none of that is used by our

01:34:37.970 --> 01:34:40.192
military , and we're never dependent on

01:34:40.192 --> 01:34:43.560
any of it . Senator , I , I , I do

01:34:43.560 --> 01:34:45.689
resonate with those thoughts and uh

01:34:45.689 --> 01:34:48.022
though I can't speak to all the details ,

01:34:48.022 --> 01:34:50.133
uh , certainly we must be cautious of

01:34:50.133 --> 01:34:52.133
anything that comes from China that

01:34:52.133 --> 01:34:54.250
would be part of our uh kill chain or

01:34:54.250 --> 01:34:56.770
part of a military chain of production .

01:34:58.310 --> 01:35:00.032
Yes , Senator , I think that's

01:35:00.032 --> 01:35:02.032
something that we need to assess is

01:35:02.032 --> 01:35:01.839
where are those critical

01:35:01.839 --> 01:35:04.169
vulnerabilities and where do we need to

01:35:04.169 --> 01:35:06.447
ensure we have alternate supply chains ,

01:35:06.649 --> 01:35:08.649
uh , as we look at the future . How

01:35:08.649 --> 01:35:10.816
about drugs ? You think we ought to be

01:35:10.816 --> 01:35:12.927
buying Chinese drugs for servicemen ,

01:35:12.927 --> 01:35:15.319
servicewomen . Senator , I , I , I have

01:35:15.319 --> 01:35:17.541
to say I , I can't speak to the details

01:35:17.541 --> 01:35:19.819
of , uh , of our drug production chain .

01:35:19.819 --> 01:35:23.000
I'm sorry . So I'm not familiar with

01:35:23.000 --> 01:35:25.056
the details of that either . Off the

01:35:25.056 --> 01:35:27.000
top of your head , do you think we

01:35:27.000 --> 01:35:26.640
ought to have Chinese drugs in our

01:35:26.640 --> 01:35:28.959
bodies ? We ought to be relying on them

01:35:28.959 --> 01:35:31.070
when when we go to war . Do you think

01:35:31.070 --> 01:35:33.810
they might hold them back ? Senator ,

01:35:33.859 --> 01:35:36.250
that could be a , a risk at any time we

01:35:36.250 --> 01:35:38.472
become dependent on a sole source and ,

01:35:38.472 --> 01:35:40.870
uh , I have full faith in , in the

01:35:40.870 --> 01:35:42.814
American system and I would prefer

01:35:42.814 --> 01:35:46.310
American-made medicines . It's I've

01:35:46.310 --> 01:35:48.421
been encouraged to see Secretary Hesa

01:35:48.421 --> 01:35:50.477
announced last week that is removing

01:35:50.477 --> 01:35:52.959
CCP cloud services out of the DOD which

01:35:52.959 --> 01:35:55.070
um was added unfortunately during the

01:35:55.070 --> 01:35:58.540
Obama era uh initiative . So just , um ,

01:35:58.549 --> 01:36:00.438
last question , do you think it's

01:36:00.438 --> 01:36:02.660
really important that we continue to do

01:36:02.660 --> 01:36:04.716
everything we can to get all Chinese

01:36:04.716 --> 01:36:06.382
products , all Chinese apps ,

01:36:06.382 --> 01:36:08.160
everything drones , computers ,

01:36:08.160 --> 01:36:10.330
printers , drugs , everything as much

01:36:10.330 --> 01:36:12.441
as we can out of our supply chain for

01:36:12.441 --> 01:36:14.549
our military . Senator , I do agree

01:36:14.549 --> 01:36:17.470
with that . Yes , Senator , I agree we

01:36:17.470 --> 01:36:19.081
should eliminate all as many

01:36:19.081 --> 01:36:21.137
vulnerabilities as we possibly can .

01:36:21.137 --> 01:36:23.839
Thank you . Thank you very much ,

01:36:23.959 --> 01:36:26.850
Senator Scott . Senator Rosen . Uh ,

01:36:26.930 --> 01:36:28.986
well , thank you , Chairman Wicker ,

01:36:28.986 --> 01:36:31.041
ranking member Reed for holding this

01:36:31.041 --> 01:36:32.819
hearing , and I wanna thank our

01:36:32.819 --> 01:36:35.097
nominees and your families , of course ,

01:36:35.097 --> 01:36:37.152
for your service . It takes , uh , a

01:36:37.152 --> 01:36:39.152
whole family when you , uh , give a

01:36:39.152 --> 01:36:41.319
lifetime of service and of course your

01:36:41.319 --> 01:36:43.374
willingness to continue to serve and

01:36:43.374 --> 01:36:45.597
congratulations on your nominations and

01:36:45.597 --> 01:36:47.763
um I'm gonna go right into the Houthis

01:36:47.763 --> 01:36:50.041
and uh their relations with Al-Shabaab .

01:36:50.041 --> 01:36:52.208
Because the Iranian-backed Houthis are

01:36:52.208 --> 01:36:53.763
diversifying their military

01:36:53.763 --> 01:36:55.819
capabilities and leveraging regional

01:36:55.819 --> 01:36:57.930
conflicts to expand their influence ,

01:36:57.930 --> 01:37:00.041
US intelligence reports indicate that

01:37:00.041 --> 01:37:01.986
the Houthis are working to provide

01:37:01.986 --> 01:37:03.597
weapons to al-Shabaab . This

01:37:03.597 --> 01:37:05.763
development is incredibly concerning ,

01:37:05.763 --> 01:37:07.597
as al-Shabaab could utilize more

01:37:07.597 --> 01:37:09.763
sophisticated Houthi weapons to target

01:37:09.763 --> 01:37:11.763
US equities in the Horn of Africa ,

01:37:11.763 --> 01:37:14.109
such as our base in Djibouti . So to

01:37:14.109 --> 01:37:16.430
both general and Admiral , please , to

01:37:16.430 --> 01:37:18.430
the extent that you're able in this

01:37:18.430 --> 01:37:20.652
open setting , can you share more about

01:37:20.652 --> 01:37:22.652
the growing partnership between the

01:37:22.652 --> 01:37:24.874
Houthis and al-Shababs , the risks that

01:37:24.874 --> 01:37:26.930
it poses not only to the US equities

01:37:26.930 --> 01:37:28.986
but personnel in the region , global

01:37:28.986 --> 01:37:31.097
shipping in the Red Sea , the Gulf of

01:37:31.097 --> 01:37:33.152
Aden , um , how are we gonna address

01:37:33.152 --> 01:37:35.263
this challenge , I guess I'll , since

01:37:35.263 --> 01:37:37.430
your closest admiral , and we'll start

01:37:37.430 --> 01:37:39.541
with you . Senator , thank you . um ,

01:37:39.541 --> 01:37:41.708
the Houthi militia , an Iranian , uh ,

01:37:41.708 --> 01:37:44.549
supported , uh , renegade element

01:37:44.549 --> 01:37:46.759
inside Yemen , uh , has been a

01:37:46.759 --> 01:37:49.439
destabilizing , uh , force in the

01:37:49.439 --> 01:37:52.160
southern Arabian Peninsula and across

01:37:52.160 --> 01:37:54.850
the Horn , uh , for some time , uh ,

01:37:54.870 --> 01:37:57.470
and continues to , uh , to act , uh ,

01:37:57.479 --> 01:38:00.029
belligerently . Any connection that

01:38:00.029 --> 01:38:02.549
they might make as an outreach to

01:38:02.549 --> 01:38:04.669
another , uh , to a , to a violent

01:38:04.669 --> 01:38:07.060
extremist organization like Al-Shabaab

01:38:07.060 --> 01:38:09.419
and al Qaeda affiliate , uh ,

01:38:09.430 --> 01:38:13.330
definitely bears uh close concern and

01:38:13.330 --> 01:38:15.919
frankly interdiction . The uh the

01:38:15.919 --> 01:38:19.229
potential for them to partner is , uh ,

01:38:19.240 --> 01:38:21.919
would we would see , uh , with grave

01:38:21.919 --> 01:38:24.509
concern if confirmed as a SOCOM

01:38:24.509 --> 01:38:26.120
commander , I would have the

01:38:26.120 --> 01:38:28.569
responsibility as a coordinating

01:38:28.569 --> 01:38:30.759
authority for an adviser to the

01:38:30.759 --> 01:38:33.680
secretary on counter violent extremist

01:38:33.680 --> 01:38:35.879
organization , and a combination of

01:38:35.879 --> 01:38:38.180
those two actors would be , uh , would

01:38:38.180 --> 01:38:40.402
be a serious , uh , a serious measure .

01:38:40.520 --> 01:38:42.970
Thank you , General . Yes , Senator , I

01:38:42.970 --> 01:38:45.370
appreciate that question . The has been

01:38:45.370 --> 01:38:47.537
the commander of uh Special Operations

01:38:47.537 --> 01:38:49.759
Command Africa , well aware that , uh ,

01:38:49.759 --> 01:38:51.926
the al Qaeda affiliate that Al-Shabaab

01:38:51.926 --> 01:38:54.148
is is fully intent , has full intent to

01:38:54.148 --> 01:38:56.620
attack US interests in the US uh

01:38:56.620 --> 01:38:58.500
homeland . If they can build the

01:38:58.500 --> 01:39:00.459
capability , the concern is that

01:39:00.459 --> 01:39:02.979
cooperation now across the Red Sea with

01:39:02.979 --> 01:39:04.868
the Houthis who are backed by the

01:39:04.868 --> 01:39:06.979
Iranians and what that could mean and

01:39:06.979 --> 01:39:09.146
give them the capability not just have

01:39:09.146 --> 01:39:11.220
the will but now the capability to

01:39:11.220 --> 01:39:13.442
attack the US or US interests in a more

01:39:13.442 --> 01:39:15.450
robust way . And again , uh , the

01:39:15.450 --> 01:39:17.939
Houthis and the uh and al-Shabaab

01:39:17.939 --> 01:39:19.939
operate in critical terrain for the

01:39:19.939 --> 01:39:22.161
United States and for global shipping .

01:39:22.161 --> 01:39:24.383
And so they're uh the means for them to

01:39:24.383 --> 01:39:26.383
disrupt that and have impact on our

01:39:26.383 --> 01:39:28.495
interests is significant . So we need

01:39:28.495 --> 01:39:30.550
to do everything we can to stop that

01:39:30.550 --> 01:39:32.700
partnership . I'm gonna move on to

01:39:32.700 --> 01:39:34.979
talking about our ISR strategy in the

01:39:34.979 --> 01:39:37.100
Sahel . We know that Senator Kelly is

01:39:37.100 --> 01:39:39.267
talking about the Sahel a little bit ,

01:39:39.267 --> 01:39:41.211
but uh . I want to go a little bit

01:39:41.211 --> 01:39:43.267
further because since our withdrawal

01:39:43.267 --> 01:39:45.433
from the two air bases in last year at

01:39:45.433 --> 01:39:47.433
the behest of the host nation , our

01:39:47.433 --> 01:39:49.656
ability to conduct ISR within the Sahel

01:39:49.656 --> 01:39:51.711
throughout the African continent has

01:39:51.711 --> 01:39:53.822
been severely degraded . This is also

01:39:53.822 --> 01:39:56.044
hurts , um , other activities as well .

01:39:56.100 --> 01:39:58.259
So to both of you , can you speak to

01:39:58.259 --> 01:40:00.481
the challenges of our withdrawal from ,

01:40:01.020 --> 01:40:03.729
the loss of our ISR . Uh , the loss of

01:40:03.729 --> 01:40:06.200
the ISR what it poses to countering

01:40:06.200 --> 01:40:08.367
this violent extremism in the region ,

01:40:08.367 --> 01:40:10.644
these partnerships between the Houthis ,

01:40:10.644 --> 01:40:12.867
al-Shabab , and , and , um , what other

01:40:12.867 --> 01:40:14.922
things and , uh , any other groups ,

01:40:14.922 --> 01:40:16.867
and what are the latest updates to

01:40:16.867 --> 01:40:19.729
establishing ISR basing elsewhere um in

01:40:19.729 --> 01:40:23.669
Africa . Uh , Senator , I

01:40:23.669 --> 01:40:25.780
appreciate that question , and , uh ,

01:40:26.029 --> 01:40:28.470
we did use the ISR coming out of

01:40:28.950 --> 01:40:31.189
extensively . Uh , the loss of that

01:40:31.189 --> 01:40:33.319
does make it more difficult . Uh ,

01:40:33.350 --> 01:40:35.239
there is never enough ISR to meet

01:40:35.239 --> 01:40:37.350
global demand , as I understand , and

01:40:37.350 --> 01:40:39.350
that , uh , Africa as an economy of

01:40:39.350 --> 01:40:41.517
force theater , uh , will have limited

01:40:41.517 --> 01:40:43.294
assets available . I think it's

01:40:43.294 --> 01:40:45.517
important that we balance the exquisite

01:40:45.517 --> 01:40:47.572
high-end ISR capabilities where most

01:40:47.572 --> 01:40:49.628
needed and then look at investing in

01:40:49.628 --> 01:40:51.572
other capabilities whether it be .

01:40:51.572 --> 01:40:53.628
emerging technologies that can allow

01:40:53.628 --> 01:40:55.628
some surveillance , uh , partnering

01:40:55.628 --> 01:40:57.628
with key partners within the area ,

01:40:57.628 --> 01:40:59.850
having intel sharing agreements so that

01:40:59.850 --> 01:41:02.017
we can gain understanding from them on

01:41:02.017 --> 01:41:03.961
the ground . I think those are all

01:41:03.961 --> 01:41:06.128
critical areas as we look at balancing

01:41:06.128 --> 01:41:08.239
the ISR demand across the continent .

01:41:08.239 --> 01:41:10.350
Uh , as to where they could be in the

01:41:10.350 --> 01:41:12.406
future , uh , if confirmed , I would

01:41:12.406 --> 01:41:14.628
look into that . I'm not privy to those

01:41:14.628 --> 01:41:14.330
plans right now . Thank you , Admiral

01:41:14.330 --> 01:41:17.149
and Senator , just quickly , um , the

01:41:17.149 --> 01:41:19.149
evolving ubiquitous information

01:41:19.149 --> 01:41:21.316
environment provides us an opportunity

01:41:21.316 --> 01:41:24.125
here . The space . Of cyber triad ,

01:41:24.854 --> 01:41:26.965
an opportunity to be able to leverage

01:41:26.965 --> 01:41:29.245
what we call horizontal ISR to be able

01:41:29.245 --> 01:41:31.575
to leverage the more and more

01:41:31.575 --> 01:41:33.575
information available publicly that

01:41:33.575 --> 01:41:35.853
people are freely giving through their ,

01:41:36.055 --> 01:41:38.055
through their use of social media .

01:41:38.294 --> 01:41:40.516
Thank you . Thank you , Mr . Chairman .

01:41:40.516 --> 01:41:42.516
Thank you , Senator Rosen . Senator

01:41:42.516 --> 01:41:44.461
Budd . Thank you Mr . Chairman and

01:41:44.461 --> 01:41:46.350
thank you both for being here . I

01:41:46.350 --> 01:41:48.461
enjoyed our meetings last week in the

01:41:48.461 --> 01:41:50.183
office . uh , congrats on your

01:41:50.183 --> 01:41:52.127
nominations and thank you for your

01:41:52.127 --> 01:41:54.294
service and your sacrifice and that of

01:41:54.294 --> 01:41:56.127
your families and as well , uh ,

01:41:56.127 --> 01:41:58.294
Admiral Bradley , and our conversation

01:41:58.294 --> 01:42:00.405
last week and I've said it publicly ,

01:42:00.405 --> 01:42:02.405
uh , in this room many times , uh ,

01:42:02.405 --> 01:42:04.770
before this hearing , uh , we need more

01:42:05.100 --> 01:42:07.899
and not fewer special operations forces .

01:42:08.990 --> 01:42:10.934
A large reason is because of their

01:42:10.934 --> 01:42:13.160
ability to help train our foreign

01:42:13.160 --> 01:42:16.589
partners . And you highlighted in your

01:42:16.589 --> 01:42:18.756
advanced policy questions that SOF are

01:42:18.756 --> 01:42:21.149
uniquely suited for building partner

01:42:21.149 --> 01:42:23.830
capacity in contested and sensitive

01:42:23.830 --> 01:42:27.089
areas . So how is SOCOM building

01:42:27.089 --> 01:42:29.569
partner capacity , particularly in the

01:42:29.569 --> 01:42:32.930
Indo-Pacific , and what is the joint

01:42:32.930 --> 01:42:34.819
force getting in return for those

01:42:34.819 --> 01:42:37.609
efforts ? Senator Budd , thank you . um ,

01:42:37.729 --> 01:42:39.951
I , I very much appreciated the time to

01:42:39.951 --> 01:42:42.062
visit with you and thank you for your

01:42:42.062 --> 01:42:44.285
great support for , uh , for all of our

01:42:44.285 --> 01:42:46.451
bases , my current , uh , headquarters

01:42:46.451 --> 01:42:48.396
there , uh , in the great state of

01:42:48.396 --> 01:42:50.562
North Carolina . Um , sir , the , uh ,

01:42:50.562 --> 01:42:52.229
I think the example that best

01:42:52.229 --> 01:42:54.340
illustrates , uh , that , that , uh ,

01:42:54.340 --> 01:42:56.689
the essence is the Philippines where

01:42:56.689 --> 01:42:59.919
over a period of 20 years our , well ,

01:43:00.009 --> 01:43:02.580
for over 100 years our strong societal

01:43:02.930 --> 01:43:04.763
relationship with the Philippine

01:43:04.763 --> 01:43:07.029
society has been strong , but . Within

01:43:07.029 --> 01:43:09.669
these last 20 , our ability to help

01:43:09.669 --> 01:43:12.750
train , advise , assist the Philippines

01:43:12.750 --> 01:43:15.350
to counter the counter the terrorism

01:43:15.350 --> 01:43:17.750
threat in their country has deepened

01:43:17.750 --> 01:43:19.861
that relationship and in fact help us

01:43:19.861 --> 01:43:22.509
to withstand a very troubled period

01:43:22.509 --> 01:43:24.990
diplomatically during the Duterte

01:43:24.990 --> 01:43:27.950
regime . And now on the backside , we

01:43:27.950 --> 01:43:31.049
have an even stronger alliance uh with

01:43:31.049 --> 01:43:33.271
the , with the Philippines , which will

01:43:33.271 --> 01:43:35.520
be critical as uh as we look at any

01:43:35.520 --> 01:43:37.250
action of deterrence in the

01:43:37.250 --> 01:43:40.169
Indo-Pacific . Um , I certainly

01:43:40.169 --> 01:43:42.113
wouldn't want to speak for Admiral

01:43:42.113 --> 01:43:44.336
Paparo to talk about , uh , the overall

01:43:44.336 --> 01:43:46.558
region and and where this fits relative

01:43:46.558 --> 01:43:48.613
to his other priorities , but I know

01:43:48.613 --> 01:43:50.169
from a soft perspective our

01:43:50.169 --> 01:43:52.959
contribution to partnerships throughout

01:43:52.959 --> 01:43:55.569
the region are important , um , and we

01:43:55.569 --> 01:43:57.810
really bring that credibility from the

01:43:57.810 --> 01:44:00.209
counterterrorism fight to help liven

01:44:00.209 --> 01:44:02.939
and uh and deepen those . Thank you

01:44:02.939 --> 01:44:05.290
very much , uh , General Anderson , uh ,

01:44:05.419 --> 01:44:07.580
I want to read you a quote from the

01:44:07.580 --> 01:44:10.740
DOD's 2024 annual report to Congress on

01:44:10.740 --> 01:44:12.684
military and security developments

01:44:12.684 --> 01:44:14.899
involving the PRC . So I'll tee it up

01:44:14.899 --> 01:44:17.010
with this and I'll ask you a question

01:44:17.010 --> 01:44:19.121
about it . It says some of PRC's Belt

01:44:19.121 --> 01:44:21.066
and Road Initiative projects could

01:44:21.066 --> 01:44:23.459
create potential military advantages

01:44:23.459 --> 01:44:26.140
such as PLA access to select foreign

01:44:26.140 --> 01:44:28.500
ports to preposition necessary

01:44:28.500 --> 01:44:30.799
logistics to sustain naval developments

01:44:30.799 --> 01:44:33.459
or deployments in water . Such as

01:44:33.459 --> 01:44:35.348
distant as the Indian Ocean , the

01:44:35.348 --> 01:44:37.403
Mediterranean Sea , and the Atlantic

01:44:37.403 --> 01:44:40.410
Ocean . So here's my concern . Uh , I'm

01:44:40.410 --> 01:44:43.149
concerned that the PRA PRC's access to

01:44:43.149 --> 01:44:45.850
ports and the potential military

01:44:45.850 --> 01:44:47.961
advantage that this could give them .

01:44:47.961 --> 01:44:50.279
So alongside Senators Kelly and Scott ,

01:44:50.330 --> 01:44:52.163
I introduced the Strategic Ports

01:44:52.163 --> 01:44:54.720
Reporting Act . It's a bill to require

01:44:54.720 --> 01:44:57.660
monitoring of the PRC's access to

01:44:57.660 --> 01:45:00.319
foreign ports . Uh , so if confirmed ,

01:45:00.770 --> 01:45:02.937
uh , do you commit to looking into the

01:45:02.937 --> 01:45:05.410
PRC's access to foreign ports in your

01:45:05.410 --> 01:45:08.149
area of responsibility ? Uh , Senator ,

01:45:08.160 --> 01:45:10.216
if confirmed , I will look into that

01:45:10.216 --> 01:45:12.382
definitely . Thank you . And would you

01:45:12.382 --> 01:45:14.382
be willing to share with us some of

01:45:14.382 --> 01:45:16.271
your concerns in that area , uh ,

01:45:16.271 --> 01:45:18.438
particularly with , uh , PRC access to

01:45:18.438 --> 01:45:20.716
foreign ports ? Uh , Senator , I think ,

01:45:20.716 --> 01:45:22.771
uh , as we've seen across the Indian

01:45:22.771 --> 01:45:25.689
Ocean and to the African area AOR into

01:45:25.689 --> 01:45:27.467
the Atlantic and , and even the

01:45:27.467 --> 01:45:29.578
Mediterranean , China is investing in

01:45:29.578 --> 01:45:31.800
ports globally . I think that should be

01:45:31.800 --> 01:45:34.022
concerning to us . I think it should be

01:45:34.022 --> 01:45:36.022
concerning to us not only that they

01:45:36.022 --> 01:45:38.245
could potentially use those as dual use

01:45:38.245 --> 01:45:40.300
military ports , but what access can

01:45:40.300 --> 01:45:42.919
they deny US forces or US commerce is

01:45:42.919 --> 01:45:45.086
necessary in time of conflict . And so

01:45:45.086 --> 01:45:47.308
I think that is a , this is an absolute

01:45:47.308 --> 01:45:48.975
critical area that we need to

01:45:48.975 --> 01:45:51.197
understand the vulnerabilities that may

01:45:51.197 --> 01:45:53.419
be posed by this . It doesn't mean that

01:45:53.419 --> 01:45:55.475
uh we don't believe in free commerce

01:45:55.475 --> 01:45:57.697
and economics , but at the same time we

01:45:57.697 --> 01:45:56.970
need to understand our national

01:45:56.970 --> 01:45:59.081
security interests and what these may

01:45:59.081 --> 01:46:01.081
entail . Thank you very much , uh .

01:46:01.700 --> 01:46:03.589
Question about the North Carolina

01:46:03.589 --> 01:46:05.367
National Guard and we have , in

01:46:05.367 --> 01:46:07.533
particular , we have state partners in

01:46:07.533 --> 01:46:10.919
the AFRICO AOR uh it's Malawi , Zambia

01:46:10.919 --> 01:46:14.319
and Botswana . So general , how do you

01:46:14.319 --> 01:46:15.930
view the future of the state

01:46:15.930 --> 01:46:18.097
partnership program and its ability to

01:46:18.097 --> 01:46:19.930
strengthen , strengthen regional

01:46:19.930 --> 01:46:22.370
stability in Africa ? Uh , Senator , I

01:46:22.370 --> 01:46:24.537
think the state partnership program is

01:46:24.537 --> 01:46:26.314
one of the greatest , uh , uh ,

01:46:26.314 --> 01:46:28.592
programs we have within the department .

01:46:28.592 --> 01:46:30.814
It builds long term relationships . The

01:46:30.814 --> 01:46:33.037
nice thing about the National Guard and

01:46:33.037 --> 01:46:35.259
the partner nation is those same people

01:46:35.259 --> 01:46:37.592
will see each other decade after decade ,

01:46:37.592 --> 01:46:39.870
and that builds a really powerful , uh ,

01:46:39.870 --> 01:46:41.981
relationship that I think that we , I

01:46:41.981 --> 01:46:44.203
know we can build upon . As a matter of

01:46:44.203 --> 01:46:46.314
fact , it was the California National

01:46:46.314 --> 01:46:45.810
Guard that we called upon to get the

01:46:45.810 --> 01:46:47.866
first information in Ukraine because

01:46:47.866 --> 01:46:49.921
they had long standing relationships

01:46:49.921 --> 01:46:51.921
with that state partnership program

01:46:51.921 --> 01:46:53.977
there . The same thing can happen in

01:46:53.977 --> 01:46:55.977
Africa where a small investment can

01:46:55.977 --> 01:46:57.866
have a great return for us in the

01:46:57.866 --> 01:47:00.169
future . Thank you both , Chairman .

01:47:01.830 --> 01:47:04.149
Thank you , um , further questions .

01:47:05.069 --> 01:47:08.600
We're told that Senator Shaheen is on

01:47:08.600 --> 01:47:11.640
her way . Does um . I can fill a little

01:47:11.640 --> 01:47:14.439
time , Mr . Chair . And there's a vote

01:47:14.439 --> 01:47:17.950
going on also , but yes , I , I , I was

01:47:17.950 --> 01:47:20.479
struck by , uh , the admiral's comment

01:47:20.479 --> 01:47:22.479
that they'd moved 27 times in their

01:47:22.479 --> 01:47:24.359
career . My first job was moving

01:47:24.359 --> 01:47:26.526
furniture for Allied van lines in this

01:47:26.526 --> 01:47:28.600
area . Most of our customers were

01:47:28.600 --> 01:47:30.720
military families , and I'll never

01:47:30.720 --> 01:47:32.680
forget a military spouse saying in

01:47:32.680 --> 01:47:35.310
terms of damage to the furniture . 7

01:47:35.310 --> 01:47:36.819
moves equals a fire .

01:47:39.229 --> 01:47:41.189
So congratulations on surviving

01:47:41.189 --> 01:47:44.490
multiple fires . Thank you , Senator

01:47:45.549 --> 01:47:49.459
Senator King , I , I , um . Uh , I'm

01:47:49.459 --> 01:47:52.500
a veteran myself and , and , um , I , I

01:47:52.500 --> 01:47:56.259
only served 4 years active duty . Um ,

01:47:57.459 --> 01:47:59.570
It , it seems to me that those , uh ,

01:47:59.570 --> 01:48:01.709
people who've made 20 moves have been

01:48:01.709 --> 01:48:04.042
able to throw away a lot of things that ,

01:48:04.042 --> 01:48:06.470
uh , my children and grandchildren may

01:48:06.470 --> 01:48:09.229
have to deal with since I haven't moved

01:48:09.229 --> 01:48:12.979
now in , uh , uh , over 30 years . Um ,

01:48:15.589 --> 01:48:19.589
We think within 10 seconds

01:48:20.140 --> 01:48:22.209
Senator Shaheen will materialize .

01:48:22.379 --> 01:48:24.268
There's a vote going on and we're

01:48:24.268 --> 01:48:27.410
trying to do our best . Thank you very

01:48:27.410 --> 01:48:27.750
much

01:48:34.419 --> 01:48:37.419
Um , I don't believe we'll be able to

01:48:37.419 --> 01:48:39.530
go on with our hearing . So I want to

01:48:39.530 --> 01:48:41.863
thank our witnesses for their testimony ,

01:48:41.863 --> 01:48:43.919
and there will be an opportunity for

01:48:43.919 --> 01:48:46.086
questions on the record . And , and so

01:48:46.086 --> 01:48:48.086
I would remind , uh , member , or I

01:48:48.086 --> 01:48:50.308
would inform members that questions for

01:48:50.308 --> 01:48:52.530
the record be due to the committee by 5

01:48:52.530 --> 01:48:54.530
p.m. today . And with that , we are

01:48:54.530 --> 01:48:54.620
adjourned .