1 00:00:00,000 --> 00:00:00,000 2 00:00:08,500 --> 00:00:10,444 Well , good morning everybody just 3 00:00:10,444 --> 00:00:13,579 arrived last night back from NATO . 4 00:00:14,510 --> 00:00:16,621 Two days apart from my battle buddy , 5 00:00:16,621 --> 00:00:18,788 so it's good to see him this morning . 6 00:00:18,788 --> 00:00:20,954 Good to see you , Mr . Chairman , um . 7 00:00:20,954 --> 00:00:23,010 Where there was a historic outcome I 8 00:00:23,010 --> 00:00:25,177 wanna start with that real quick . I , 9 00:00:25,177 --> 00:00:27,399 I think uh there's so much news so many 10 00:00:27,399 --> 00:00:29,454 things happening that oftentimes big 11 00:00:29,920 --> 00:00:32,119 momentous moments get missed . What 12 00:00:32,119 --> 00:00:34,175 President Trump accomplished in NATO 13 00:00:34,175 --> 00:00:36,080 yesterday was game changing and 14 00:00:36,080 --> 00:00:39,560 historic , a shift in burden sharing to 15 00:00:39,560 --> 00:00:42,549 the European responsibility in NATO 16 00:00:42,959 --> 00:00:44,626 that most would have said was 17 00:00:44,626 --> 00:00:46,737 impossible , uh , at the beginning of 18 00:00:46,737 --> 00:00:48,792 his term , but he said NATO needs to 19 00:00:48,792 --> 00:00:51,439 pay up . They started in the 1st term 20 00:00:51,729 --> 00:00:54,049 and here in his 2nd term we've 21 00:00:54,049 --> 00:00:57,270 accelerated that . 32 NATO countries 22 00:00:57,270 --> 00:00:59,381 committed to spending 5% of their GDP 23 00:00:59,381 --> 00:01:02,139 on defense . On actually investing in 24 00:01:02,139 --> 00:01:04,739 the NATO alliance . So I hope with all 25 00:01:04,739 --> 00:01:07,690 the ink spilled . All of your outlets 26 00:01:07,690 --> 00:01:10,639 find the time to properly recognize 27 00:01:11,290 --> 00:01:14,519 this historic change . In continental 28 00:01:14,519 --> 00:01:16,630 security , uh , that other presidents 29 00:01:16,630 --> 00:01:18,630 tried to do other presidents talked 30 00:01:18,630 --> 00:01:20,852 about President Trump accomplished it . 31 00:01:20,852 --> 00:01:23,319 It's a huge deal . I see we're here 32 00:01:23,319 --> 00:01:26,160 this morning because , uh , in hunting 33 00:01:26,160 --> 00:01:28,760 for scandals all the time in trying to 34 00:01:28,760 --> 00:01:32,559 find wedges and and spin stories this 35 00:01:32,559 --> 00:01:35,309 press corps and the press corps , uh , 36 00:01:35,319 --> 00:01:38,000 miss historic moments . You miss 37 00:01:38,000 --> 00:01:40,599 historic moments like 5% . At NATO , 38 00:01:40,639 --> 00:01:42,861 which when you hear I was in the closed 39 00:01:42,861 --> 00:01:45,083 door briefing , I wish there could have 40 00:01:45,083 --> 00:01:44,839 been cameras in there when you heard 41 00:01:44,839 --> 00:01:46,950 the prime ministers and presidents of 42 00:01:46,950 --> 00:01:49,172 other countries to a man and to a woman 43 00:01:49,172 --> 00:01:51,283 looking at President Trump and saying 44 00:01:51,283 --> 00:01:53,450 this never could have happened , never 45 00:01:53,450 --> 00:01:55,672 would have happened seemed impossible 5 46 00:01:55,672 --> 00:01:57,895 years ago , 2 years ago , 8 years ago , 47 00:01:57,895 --> 00:01:59,672 but here we are because of your 48 00:01:59,672 --> 00:02:01,506 leadership . If you ask them the 49 00:02:01,506 --> 00:02:03,561 question . I bet they'd say the same 50 00:02:03,561 --> 00:02:05,728 thing , but searching for scandals you 51 00:02:05,728 --> 00:02:07,839 miss historic moments like recruiting 52 00:02:07,839 --> 00:02:10,080 at the Pentagon , historic levels in 53 00:02:10,080 --> 00:02:12,413 the army , the Air Force , and the navy , 54 00:02:12,413 --> 00:02:14,302 yeah , maybe there'll be a little 55 00:02:14,302 --> 00:02:16,469 mention here or there , but because it 56 00:02:16,469 --> 00:02:18,636 was under President Trump's leadership 57 00:02:18,636 --> 00:02:20,469 because it was because , because 58 00:02:20,469 --> 00:02:22,413 Americans are responding to him as 59 00:02:22,413 --> 00:02:24,469 commander in chief . The press corps 60 00:02:24,469 --> 00:02:26,469 doesn't want to write about it . Or 61 00:02:26,469 --> 00:02:26,119 bring us to the , to the topic of the 62 00:02:26,119 --> 00:02:29,289 moment . The highly successful 63 00:02:29,940 --> 00:02:32,169 strikes in Iran . Let let me read the 64 00:02:32,179 --> 00:02:34,850 the the bottom line here . President 65 00:02:34,850 --> 00:02:37,490 Trump directed the most complex and 66 00:02:37,490 --> 00:02:39,889 secretive military operation in history . 67 00:02:40,679 --> 00:02:42,457 And it was a resounding success 68 00:02:42,457 --> 00:02:45,110 resulting in a ceasefire agreement and 69 00:02:45,110 --> 00:02:49,029 the end of the 12 day war . There's 70 00:02:49,029 --> 00:02:51,029 been a lot of discussion about what 71 00:02:51,029 --> 00:02:53,196 happened and what didn't happen . Step 72 00:02:53,196 --> 00:02:55,307 back for a second because of decisive 73 00:02:55,307 --> 00:02:57,196 military action , President Trump 74 00:02:57,196 --> 00:02:59,418 created the conditions to end the war . 75 00:02:59,610 --> 00:03:01,929 Decimating , choose your word , 76 00:03:02,050 --> 00:03:04,929 obliterating , destroying Iran's 77 00:03:04,929 --> 00:03:08,389 nuclear capabilities . I wanna read 78 00:03:08,669 --> 00:03:10,836 some of the assessments that have been 79 00:03:10,836 --> 00:03:13,229 provided because whether it's fake news 80 00:03:13,229 --> 00:03:16,860 CNN , MSNBC or The New York Times , 81 00:03:17,270 --> 00:03:19,910 there's been fawning coverage of a 82 00:03:19,910 --> 00:03:21,910 preliminary assessment . I've had a 83 00:03:21,910 --> 00:03:23,910 chance to read it all every , every 84 00:03:23,910 --> 00:03:26,021 outlet has breathlessly reported on a 85 00:03:26,021 --> 00:03:28,839 preliminary assessment from DIA . I'm 86 00:03:28,839 --> 00:03:31,509 looking at it right now . Again , it 87 00:03:31,509 --> 00:03:33,676 was preliminary a day and a half after 88 00:03:33,676 --> 00:03:36,570 the actual strike . When it admits 89 00:03:36,570 --> 00:03:38,514 itself in writing that it requires 90 00:03:38,514 --> 00:03:40,681 weeks to accumulate the necessary data 91 00:03:40,681 --> 00:03:42,570 to make such an assessment , it's 92 00:03:42,570 --> 00:03:44,681 preliminary . It points out that it's 93 00:03:44,681 --> 00:03:44,369 not been coordinated with the 94 00:03:44,369 --> 00:03:46,970 intelligence community at all . Uh , 95 00:03:47,059 --> 00:03:48,781 there's low confidence in this 96 00:03:48,781 --> 00:03:50,892 particular report . There's , it says 97 00:03:50,892 --> 00:03:52,892 in the report there are gaps in the 98 00:03:52,892 --> 00:03:55,003 information . It says in the report , 99 00:03:55,003 --> 00:03:57,170 multiple linchpin assumptions are what 100 00:03:57,320 --> 00:03:59,653 this assessment , a linchpin assumption , 101 00:03:59,653 --> 00:04:01,876 you know what that is ? That means your 102 00:04:01,876 --> 00:04:03,764 entire premise is predicated on a 103 00:04:03,764 --> 00:04:05,987 linchpin . If you're wrong , everything 104 00:04:05,987 --> 00:04:08,153 else is wrong and yet and still , this 105 00:04:08,153 --> 00:04:10,320 report acknowledges it's likely severe 106 00:04:10,320 --> 00:04:12,487 damage . Again , this is preliminary , 107 00:04:12,487 --> 00:04:14,487 but leaked . Because someone had an 108 00:04:14,487 --> 00:04:16,598 agenda to try to muddy the waters and 109 00:04:16,598 --> 00:04:18,764 make it look like this historic strike 110 00:04:18,764 --> 00:04:20,987 uh wasn't successful . I'm gonna get to 111 00:04:20,987 --> 00:04:20,359 the chairman in a moment because he's 112 00:04:20,359 --> 00:04:22,750 gonna lay out the particulars for you 113 00:04:23,160 --> 00:04:25,104 based on his professional military 114 00:04:25,104 --> 00:04:27,049 experience , but here's what other 115 00:04:27,049 --> 00:04:29,049 folks are saying . The DIA that put 116 00:04:29,049 --> 00:04:31,160 that report out , says that this is a 117 00:04:31,160 --> 00:04:33,271 preliminary low confidence report and 118 00:04:33,271 --> 00:04:34,993 will continue to be refined as 119 00:04:34,993 --> 00:04:36,771 additional intelligence becomes 120 00:04:37,049 --> 00:04:39,450 available . How about the Israeli 121 00:04:39,450 --> 00:04:41,529 Atomic Energy Commission ? The 122 00:04:41,529 --> 00:04:43,529 devastating US strikes on Fordow 123 00:04:43,529 --> 00:04:45,209 destroyed the site's critical 124 00:04:45,209 --> 00:04:47,089 infrastructure and rendered the 125 00:04:47,089 --> 00:04:50,130 enrichment facility inoperable . Have 126 00:04:50,130 --> 00:04:52,352 any of these quotes made their way into 127 00:04:52,352 --> 00:04:54,408 the New York Times or The Washington 128 00:04:54,408 --> 00:04:57,399 Post , MSNBC ? CNN Any of these quotes ? 129 00:04:57,440 --> 00:04:59,607 How about this one ? This is a new one 130 00:04:59,607 --> 00:05:01,718 from the UN , the United Nations . No 131 00:05:01,718 --> 00:05:03,440 friend of the United States or 132 00:05:03,440 --> 00:05:05,440 certainly Israel often . Here's the 133 00:05:05,440 --> 00:05:07,679 head of the UN Atomic Energy Agency 134 00:05:07,679 --> 00:05:10,760 this morning , Rafael Grossi . US and 135 00:05:10,760 --> 00:05:13,869 Israeli strikes caused enormous damage 136 00:05:14,160 --> 00:05:17,510 to Iran's nuclear sites . Don't take my 137 00:05:17,510 --> 00:05:19,732 word for it . How about the IDF's chief 138 00:05:19,732 --> 00:05:21,677 of staff ? I can say here that the 139 00:05:21,677 --> 00:05:23,790 assessment is that we significantly 140 00:05:23,790 --> 00:05:25,901 damaged the nuclear program , setting 141 00:05:25,901 --> 00:05:28,619 it back by years . I repeat , years , 142 00:05:29,029 --> 00:05:31,510 the Iranian foreign minister . The 143 00:05:31,510 --> 00:05:33,510 spokesman , our nuclear instrations 144 00:05:33,510 --> 00:05:35,566 have been badly damaged , that's for 145 00:05:35,566 --> 00:05:37,010 sure . I'm sure that's an 146 00:05:37,010 --> 00:05:39,559 understatement . John Radcliffe , the 147 00:05:39,559 --> 00:05:41,559 director of the CIA , putting out a 148 00:05:41,559 --> 00:05:43,760 statement just last night . CIA can 149 00:05:43,760 --> 00:05:45,538 confirm that a body of credible 150 00:05:45,538 --> 00:05:47,950 intelligence indicates Iran's nuclear 151 00:05:47,950 --> 00:05:50,239 program has been severely damaged by 152 00:05:50,239 --> 00:05:52,850 recent targeted strikes . This includes 153 00:05:52,850 --> 00:05:55,040 new intelligence from a historically 154 00:05:55,040 --> 00:05:57,049 reliable , very different than 155 00:05:57,049 --> 00:05:59,040 preliminary assessment with low 156 00:05:59,040 --> 00:06:01,049 confidence he's saying historically 157 00:06:01,049 --> 00:06:03,399 reliable and accurate source of method 158 00:06:03,649 --> 00:06:05,482 that several key Iranian nuclear 159 00:06:05,482 --> 00:06:09,190 facilities were destroyed . And would 160 00:06:09,190 --> 00:06:12,029 have to be rebuilt over the course of 161 00:06:12,029 --> 00:06:14,500 years . CIA continues to collect 162 00:06:14,500 --> 00:06:17,859 additional reliably sourced information 163 00:06:18,190 --> 00:06:20,230 to keep appropriate decision makers 164 00:06:20,230 --> 00:06:23,230 fully informed . How about DNI Tulsi 165 00:06:23,230 --> 00:06:26,500 Gabbard yesterday ? She writes , and I 166 00:06:26,500 --> 00:06:28,667 quote , new intelligence confirms what 167 00:06:28,667 --> 00:06:30,556 POTUS has stated numerous times . 168 00:06:30,556 --> 00:06:33,929 Iran's nuclear facilities have been 169 00:06:34,220 --> 00:06:37,829 destroyed . Institute for Science and 170 00:06:37,829 --> 00:06:39,996 International Security President David 171 00:06:39,996 --> 00:06:42,390 Albright overall Israel and US attacks 172 00:06:42,390 --> 00:06:46,309 have effectively destroyed . UN Iran's 173 00:06:46,309 --> 00:06:49,839 centrifuge enrichment program . Time 174 00:06:49,839 --> 00:06:52,459 and time again I can go down the list . 175 00:06:52,750 --> 00:06:55,299 Those that understand those that see , 176 00:06:55,630 --> 00:06:58,109 those that do proper assessments 177 00:06:58,109 --> 00:07:00,220 recognize that what the United States 178 00:07:00,220 --> 00:07:02,679 military did was historic . And again , 179 00:07:02,839 --> 00:07:04,783 before I pass it to the chairman . 180 00:07:06,799 --> 00:07:10,070 Because you and I mean specifically you , 181 00:07:10,160 --> 00:07:12,839 the press , specifically you , the 182 00:07:12,839 --> 00:07:16,089 press corps , because you cheer against 183 00:07:16,089 --> 00:07:19,000 Trump so hard it's like in your DNA and 184 00:07:19,000 --> 00:07:21,109 in your blood to cheer against Trump 185 00:07:21,559 --> 00:07:23,281 because you want him not to be 186 00:07:23,281 --> 00:07:26,320 successful so bad . You have to cheer 187 00:07:26,320 --> 00:07:28,542 against the efficacy of these strikes . 188 00:07:28,542 --> 00:07:30,542 You have to hope maybe they weren't 189 00:07:30,542 --> 00:07:32,589 effective . Maybe the way the Trump 190 00:07:32,589 --> 00:07:34,589 administration is representing them 191 00:07:34,589 --> 00:07:37,149 isn't true . So let's take half truths , 192 00:07:37,480 --> 00:07:40,429 spun information leaked information , 193 00:07:40,640 --> 00:07:43,640 and then spin it , spin it in every way 194 00:07:43,640 --> 00:07:47,079 we can to try to cause doubt . And 195 00:07:47,079 --> 00:07:49,190 manipulate the mind , the public mind 196 00:07:49,190 --> 00:07:51,559 over whether or not our brave pilots . 197 00:07:52,190 --> 00:07:54,329 We're successful . How many stories 198 00:07:54,329 --> 00:07:56,519 have been written about how hard it is 199 00:07:56,519 --> 00:07:58,686 to , I don't know , fly a plane for 36 200 00:07:58,686 --> 00:08:02,399 hours . Has MSNBC done that story as 201 00:08:02,399 --> 00:08:04,510 Fox ? Have we done the story how hard 202 00:08:04,510 --> 00:08:06,677 that is ? Have we done it two or three 203 00:08:06,677 --> 00:08:08,343 times so that American people 204 00:08:08,343 --> 00:08:10,455 understand how about how difficult it 205 00:08:10,455 --> 00:08:12,621 is to shoot a drone from an F-15 or 16 206 00:08:12,621 --> 00:08:14,677 or F-22 or F-35 or what it's like to 207 00:08:14,677 --> 00:08:16,899 man a Patriot battery or how hard it is 208 00:08:16,899 --> 00:08:19,066 to refuel midair , giving the American 209 00:08:19,066 --> 00:08:21,232 people an understanding of how complex 210 00:08:21,232 --> 00:08:23,343 and sophisticated this mission really 211 00:08:23,343 --> 00:08:25,566 was . Uh , there are so many aspects of 212 00:08:25,566 --> 00:08:27,970 what our brave men and women did that 213 00:08:27,970 --> 00:08:29,914 by , because of the hatred of this 214 00:08:29,914 --> 00:08:32,530 press corps are undermined because 215 00:08:32,530 --> 00:08:34,697 you're , people are trying to leak and 216 00:08:34,697 --> 00:08:36,809 spin that it wasn't successful . It's 217 00:08:36,809 --> 00:08:40,650 irresponsible . And folks in this 218 00:08:40,650 --> 00:08:42,989 room are privy to that information 219 00:08:42,989 --> 00:08:45,045 because of the proximity here in the 220 00:08:45,045 --> 00:08:46,656 Pentagon . It's an important 221 00:08:46,656 --> 00:08:48,600 responsibility . And time and time 222 00:08:48,600 --> 00:08:50,489 again , classified information is 223 00:08:50,489 --> 00:08:52,267 leaked or peddled for political 224 00:08:52,267 --> 00:08:54,378 purposes to try to make the president 225 00:08:54,378 --> 00:08:56,600 look bad and what's really happening is 226 00:08:56,600 --> 00:08:58,489 you're undermining the success of 227 00:08:58,489 --> 00:09:00,545 incredible B-2 pilots and incredible 228 00:09:00,545 --> 00:09:02,600 F-35 pilots and incredible refuelers 229 00:09:02,600 --> 00:09:04,433 and incredible air defenders who 230 00:09:04,433 --> 00:09:06,656 accomplished their mission , set back a 231 00:09:06,656 --> 00:09:08,600 nuclear program in ways that other 232 00:09:08,600 --> 00:09:10,600 presidents would have dreamed . How 233 00:09:10,600 --> 00:09:13,020 about we celebrate that ? How about we 234 00:09:13,020 --> 00:09:15,187 talk about how special America is that 235 00:09:15,187 --> 00:09:18,130 we only we have these capabilities . I 236 00:09:18,130 --> 00:09:19,630 think it's too much to ask 237 00:09:19,630 --> 00:09:21,574 unfortunately for the fake news so 238 00:09:21,574 --> 00:09:23,741 we're used to that but we also have an 239 00:09:23,741 --> 00:09:25,908 opportunity to stand at the podium and 240 00:09:25,908 --> 00:09:27,686 read the truth of what's really 241 00:09:27,686 --> 00:09:29,797 happening and the reality is you want 242 00:09:29,797 --> 00:09:31,908 to call it destroyed , you wanna call 243 00:09:31,908 --> 00:09:31,369 it defeated , you wanna call it 244 00:09:31,369 --> 00:09:35,169 obliterated , choose your word . This 245 00:09:35,169 --> 00:09:37,280 was an historically successful attack 246 00:09:37,280 --> 00:09:39,502 we should celebrate it as Americans and 247 00:09:39,502 --> 00:09:41,558 it gives us a chance to have peace , 248 00:09:41,690 --> 00:09:43,301 chance to have a deal and an 249 00:09:43,301 --> 00:09:45,523 opportunity to prevent a nuclear Iran , 250 00:09:45,523 --> 00:09:47,468 which is something President Trump 251 00:09:47,468 --> 00:09:49,634 talked about for 20 years and no other 252 00:09:49,634 --> 00:09:51,801 presidents had the courage to actually 253 00:09:51,801 --> 00:09:53,968 do . So with that I wanna hand it over 254 00:09:53,968 --> 00:09:56,079 to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs . 255 00:09:56,079 --> 00:09:58,412 They've done technical analysis on this , 256 00:09:58,412 --> 00:10:00,468 not just on the strike . But also on 257 00:10:00,468 --> 00:10:02,357 our Patriot defenders and all you 258 00:10:02,357 --> 00:10:04,523 needed , and Mr . Chairman , I'll hand 259 00:10:04,523 --> 00:10:03,690 it over to you . Good morning . Uh , 260 00:10:03,809 --> 00:10:05,976 thank you , Mr . Secretary , and , and 261 00:10:05,976 --> 00:10:08,198 good morning and all of you . Thank you 262 00:10:08,198 --> 00:10:10,309 for , thank you for being here . As a 263 00:10:10,309 --> 00:10:12,365 follow up to my comments on Sunday's 264 00:10:12,365 --> 00:10:14,587 press conference , I wanted to give you 265 00:10:14,587 --> 00:10:16,809 a few updates this morning on something 266 00:10:16,809 --> 00:10:18,920 I'm honored to do as a chairman , and 267 00:10:18,920 --> 00:10:20,976 that's a chance to get to talk about 268 00:10:20,976 --> 00:10:20,729 some of our service members and the 269 00:10:20,729 --> 00:10:23,280 incredible things that they do on 270 00:10:23,280 --> 00:10:25,450 behalf of our nation , and I apologize 271 00:10:25,450 --> 00:10:27,506 ahead of time for the length and the 272 00:10:27,506 --> 00:10:29,672 and the detail . Today I'm gonna brief 273 00:10:29,672 --> 00:10:31,894 you on a couple of things . First , I'm 274 00:10:31,894 --> 00:10:34,006 gonna talk about our air defenders at 275 00:10:34,006 --> 00:10:36,117 LUD , uh , in Qatar and their actions 276 00:10:36,117 --> 00:10:38,117 on Monday . Then I'm gonna walk you 277 00:10:38,117 --> 00:10:37,969 through a little bit about the 278 00:10:37,969 --> 00:10:40,080 academics that went into the attack , 279 00:10:40,169 --> 00:10:42,570 uh , against Fordow , uh , the massive 280 00:10:42,570 --> 00:10:44,792 ordinance penetrator weapon , and we're 281 00:10:44,792 --> 00:10:47,119 gonna show a video , uh , that , uh , 282 00:10:47,130 --> 00:10:49,241 that highlights the effects that that 283 00:10:49,241 --> 00:10:51,241 weapon has . Of course , nobody was 284 00:10:51,241 --> 00:10:53,297 down inside the target , so we don't 285 00:10:53,297 --> 00:10:55,580 have video from the target . First on 286 00:10:55,580 --> 00:10:57,580 Monday , um , as the president has 287 00:10:57,580 --> 00:10:59,747 stated on Monday morning , we began to 288 00:10:59,747 --> 00:11:01,900 receive indications and warnings that 289 00:11:01,900 --> 00:11:05,739 Iran intended to attack US bases in the 290 00:11:05,739 --> 00:11:08,340 region that morning , building on the 291 00:11:08,340 --> 00:11:11,679 work that SENCOM commander Eric Krilla 292 00:11:11,679 --> 00:11:13,599 had done and on the orders of the 293 00:11:13,599 --> 00:11:16,669 president . LU at LUde Air Base in 294 00:11:16,669 --> 00:11:18,836 Qatar and around the region we assumed 295 00:11:18,836 --> 00:11:22,109 a minimum force posture . Most folks 296 00:11:22,109 --> 00:11:24,630 had moved off the base to extend the 297 00:11:24,630 --> 00:11:26,900 security perimeter out away from what 298 00:11:26,900 --> 00:11:29,960 we assessed might be a target zone 299 00:11:30,390 --> 00:11:33,669 except for a very few , uh , army 300 00:11:33,669 --> 00:11:36,750 soldiers at LUD . At that point , only 301 00:11:36,750 --> 00:11:39,979 2 Patriot batteries remained on base , 302 00:11:40,210 --> 00:11:43,500 roughly 44 American soldiers 303 00:11:43,500 --> 00:11:46,070 responsible for defending the entire 304 00:11:46,070 --> 00:11:48,590 base to include CENTCOM's forward 305 00:11:48,590 --> 00:11:51,229 headquarters in the Middle East , an 306 00:11:51,229 --> 00:11:53,869 entire air base and all the US forces 307 00:11:53,869 --> 00:11:57,030 there . The oldest soldier was a 308 00:11:57,030 --> 00:12:00,140 28-year-old captain . The youngest was 309 00:12:00,140 --> 00:12:02,940 a 21 year old private who'd been in the 310 00:12:02,940 --> 00:12:06,229 military for less than 2 years . Um , 311 00:12:06,419 --> 00:12:08,586 so let's put ourselves out there for a 312 00:12:08,586 --> 00:12:10,690 second . Imagine you're that young 313 00:12:10,690 --> 00:12:13,859 first lieutenant , you're 25 or 26 314 00:12:13,859 --> 00:12:16,260 years old , and you've been assigned as 315 00:12:16,260 --> 00:12:18,940 the tactical director inside the 316 00:12:18,940 --> 00:12:21,919 command and control element . You at 317 00:12:21,919 --> 00:12:24,239 that age are the sole person 318 00:12:24,239 --> 00:12:27,640 responsible to defend this base . Um , 319 00:12:27,760 --> 00:12:29,799 listening next to you is your early 320 00:12:29,799 --> 00:12:32,539 warning operator whose job is to notify 321 00:12:32,539 --> 00:12:34,840 you of imminent attack . There's 5 322 00:12:34,840 --> 00:12:38,320 people inside a vehicle and 5 people 323 00:12:38,320 --> 00:12:40,320 outside of a vehicle around these a 324 00:12:40,320 --> 00:12:43,849 total of , as I said , 44 . By the way , 325 00:12:44,099 --> 00:12:46,900 you've sat in the Middle East for years , 326 00:12:46,979 --> 00:12:50,619 deployed over and over again , extended 327 00:12:50,619 --> 00:12:53,739 multiple times , always being prepared 328 00:12:53,739 --> 00:12:56,659 but unsure of when that particular day 329 00:12:56,659 --> 00:12:59,099 will come that you must execute your 330 00:12:59,099 --> 00:13:02,500 mission and not fail at doing it . In 331 00:13:02,500 --> 00:13:04,619 this case , these Patriot crews were 332 00:13:04,619 --> 00:13:07,059 deployed from Korea and Japan as part 333 00:13:07,059 --> 00:13:09,969 of our US forces there . To ensure that 334 00:13:09,969 --> 00:13:12,729 we had the most capable missiles in the 335 00:13:12,729 --> 00:13:16,450 CENCOMM area of responsibility . As the 336 00:13:16,450 --> 00:13:18,630 day continues , you start to hear more 337 00:13:18,630 --> 00:13:20,950 and more chatter in the information 338 00:13:20,950 --> 00:13:23,789 space about an a pending attack . And 339 00:13:23,789 --> 00:13:27,419 as the sun starts to set in the west , 340 00:13:27,429 --> 00:13:29,270 you get orders from your higher 341 00:13:29,270 --> 00:13:31,270 headquarters to make sure that your 342 00:13:31,270 --> 00:13:33,326 missile batteries are pointed to the 343 00:13:33,326 --> 00:13:35,469 north . Um , there are just a few . 344 00:13:35,599 --> 00:13:37,750 Other teammates , it's hot , you're 345 00:13:37,750 --> 00:13:40,150 getting nervous and you expect an 346 00:13:40,150 --> 00:13:43,419 attack . Outside of those Patriot , uh , 347 00:13:43,429 --> 00:13:45,669 vehicles , your hot crew , which is 1 348 00:13:45,669 --> 00:13:48,750 NCO and 4 additional soldiers , turns 349 00:13:48,750 --> 00:13:50,989 the key and relinquishes control of 350 00:13:50,989 --> 00:13:53,260 those missiles to that young lieutenant 351 00:13:53,869 --> 00:13:57,309 inside the vehicle and you wait . You 352 00:13:57,309 --> 00:13:58,950 know that you're gonna have 353 00:13:58,950 --> 00:14:02,429 approximately 2 minutes , 120 seconds 354 00:14:02,429 --> 00:14:06,330 to either succeed or fail . And then at 355 00:14:06,330 --> 00:14:09,479 approximately 12:30 p.m. on Monday , 356 00:14:09,729 --> 00:14:13,690 that's 7:30 p.m. in Qatar as the sun 357 00:14:13,690 --> 00:14:16,770 sets in the west , Iran attacks . 358 00:14:17,809 --> 00:14:20,679 As the targets were detected , round 359 00:14:20,679 --> 00:14:23,450 after round of Patriot missiles are 360 00:14:23,450 --> 00:14:25,770 ejected from their canisters by an 361 00:14:25,770 --> 00:14:28,330 initial launch charge . Then the main 362 00:14:28,330 --> 00:14:30,849 solid rocket motor ignites . You can 363 00:14:30,849 --> 00:14:32,960 feel this in your body if you've ever 364 00:14:32,960 --> 00:14:35,071 been around a Patriot taking a shot , 365 00:14:35,289 --> 00:14:37,289 and round after round goes out and 366 00:14:37,289 --> 00:14:39,345 guides against those missiles coming 367 00:14:39,345 --> 00:14:42,580 inbound . We believe that this is the 368 00:14:42,580 --> 00:14:46,219 largest single Patriot engagement in US 369 00:14:46,219 --> 00:14:49,099 military history , and we were we were 370 00:14:49,099 --> 00:14:51,789 joined in this engagement by the Qatari 371 00:14:51,789 --> 00:14:54,760 Patriot crews . I'm not gonna tell you 372 00:14:54,760 --> 00:14:56,927 how many rounds were shot , but it was 373 00:14:56,927 --> 00:14:58,982 a bunch , um , because of classified 374 00:14:58,982 --> 00:15:01,409 purposes and we're aware that something 375 00:15:01,409 --> 00:15:03,465 there's reports of something getting 376 00:15:03,465 --> 00:15:05,631 through . What we do know is there was 377 00:15:05,631 --> 00:15:07,789 a lot of metal flying around , uh , 378 00:15:08,200 --> 00:15:10,422 between attacking missiles being hit by 379 00:15:10,422 --> 00:15:12,440 Patriots , boosters from attacking 380 00:15:12,440 --> 00:15:15,239 missiles being hit by Patriots , the 381 00:15:15,239 --> 00:15:17,461 Patriots themselves flying around , and 382 00:15:17,461 --> 00:15:19,628 the debris from those Patriots hitting 383 00:15:19,628 --> 00:15:21,739 the ground , there was a lot of metal 384 00:15:21,739 --> 00:15:24,150 flying around . And yet our US air 385 00:15:24,150 --> 00:15:27,190 defenders had only seconds to make 386 00:15:27,190 --> 00:15:29,739 complex decisions with strategic impact . 387 00:15:30,070 --> 00:15:32,559 These awesome humans , along with their 388 00:15:32,559 --> 00:15:35,020 Qatari brothers and sisters in arms , 389 00:15:35,030 --> 00:15:37,789 stood between a salvo of Iranian 390 00:15:37,789 --> 00:15:40,190 missiles and the safety of our deed . 391 00:15:40,570 --> 00:15:43,650 They are the unsung heroes of the 21st 392 00:15:43,650 --> 00:15:46,090 century United States Army , and I know 393 00:15:46,090 --> 00:15:48,010 a lot of you have seen the videos 394 00:15:48,010 --> 00:15:50,250 online and the excitement as those 395 00:15:50,250 --> 00:15:52,609 Patriots departed their launchers and 396 00:15:52,609 --> 00:15:55,359 went up and guided . This really 397 00:15:55,359 --> 00:15:58,440 demonstrates the combat capability and 398 00:15:58,440 --> 00:16:01,229 capacity of our army air defenders , 399 00:16:01,679 --> 00:16:04,880 simply stated , they absolutely crushed 400 00:16:04,880 --> 00:16:08,159 it . If you'd flip this over , thanks . 401 00:16:08,200 --> 00:16:11,640 Let me let me next move to , uh , a 402 00:16:11,640 --> 00:16:15,570 walk through of the GBU 57 , uh , 403 00:16:15,580 --> 00:16:18,599 massive ordnance penetrator weapon and 404 00:16:18,599 --> 00:16:20,710 share a little bit about the planners 405 00:16:20,799 --> 00:16:22,743 who did this and their work on the 406 00:16:22,743 --> 00:16:24,960 weapon . First , let me set the stage 407 00:16:24,960 --> 00:16:28,940 for you . There's an organization in 408 00:16:28,940 --> 00:16:31,260 the US called the Defense Threat 409 00:16:31,260 --> 00:16:34,770 Reduction Agency , DIA . Ditter does a 410 00:16:34,770 --> 00:16:37,609 lot of things for our nation , but 411 00:16:37,609 --> 00:16:40,849 Ditra is the world's leading expert on 412 00:16:40,849 --> 00:16:44,000 deeply buried underground targets . In 413 00:16:44,000 --> 00:16:47,359 2009 , a defense threat reduction 414 00:16:47,359 --> 00:16:50,559 agency officer was brought into a vault 415 00:16:50,559 --> 00:16:53,159 at an undisclosed location and briefed 416 00:16:53,159 --> 00:16:55,960 on something going on in Iran . For 417 00:16:55,960 --> 00:16:58,071 security purposes I'm not gonna share 418 00:16:58,071 --> 00:17:00,640 his name . He was shown some photos and 419 00:17:00,640 --> 00:17:02,807 some highly classified intelligence of 420 00:17:02,807 --> 00:17:04,918 what looked like a major construction 421 00:17:04,918 --> 00:17:07,359 project in the mountains of Iran . He 422 00:17:07,359 --> 00:17:09,510 was tasked to study this facility , 423 00:17:09,800 --> 00:17:12,079 work with the intelligence community to 424 00:17:12,079 --> 00:17:14,246 understand it . And he was soon joined 425 00:17:14,246 --> 00:17:16,540 by an additional teammate . For more 426 00:17:16,540 --> 00:17:19,300 than 15 years , this officer and his 427 00:17:19,300 --> 00:17:22,660 teammate lived and breathed this single 428 00:17:22,660 --> 00:17:25,140 target for Doe , a critical element of 429 00:17:25,140 --> 00:17:28,770 Iran's covert nuclear weapons program . 430 00:17:29,209 --> 00:17:31,431 He studied the geology . He watched the 431 00:17:31,431 --> 00:17:33,510 Iranians dig it out . He watched the 432 00:17:33,510 --> 00:17:35,469 construction , the weather , the 433 00:17:35,469 --> 00:17:37,550 discard material , the geology , the 434 00:17:37,550 --> 00:17:39,790 construction materials , where the 435 00:17:39,790 --> 00:17:41,957 materials came from . He looked at the 436 00:17:41,957 --> 00:17:44,012 vent shaft , the exhaust shaft , the 437 00:17:44,012 --> 00:17:46,179 electrical systems , the environmental 438 00:17:46,179 --> 00:17:48,234 control systems , every nook , every 439 00:17:48,234 --> 00:17:50,457 crater , every piece of equipment going 440 00:17:50,457 --> 00:17:52,679 in . And every piece of equipment going 441 00:17:52,679 --> 00:17:56,010 out they literally dreamed about this 442 00:17:56,010 --> 00:17:58,650 target at night when they slept . They 443 00:17:58,650 --> 00:18:00,872 thought about it driving back and forth 444 00:18:00,872 --> 00:18:03,569 to work and they knew from the very 445 00:18:03,569 --> 00:18:06,530 first days what this was for . You do 446 00:18:06,530 --> 00:18:09,550 not build a multi-layered underground 447 00:18:09,550 --> 00:18:12,560 bunker complex with centrifuges and 448 00:18:12,560 --> 00:18:14,890 other equipment in a mountain for any 449 00:18:14,890 --> 00:18:17,859 peaceful purpose . They weren't able to 450 00:18:17,859 --> 00:18:20,026 discuss this with their family , their 451 00:18:20,026 --> 00:18:22,081 wives , their kids , their friends , 452 00:18:22,081 --> 00:18:24,380 but they just kept grinding it out and 453 00:18:24,380 --> 00:18:26,547 along the way they realized we did not 454 00:18:26,547 --> 00:18:28,859 have a weapon that could adequately 455 00:18:28,859 --> 00:18:31,819 strike and kill this target so they 456 00:18:31,819 --> 00:18:34,099 began a journey to work with industry 457 00:18:34,099 --> 00:18:36,619 and other tacticians to develop the 458 00:18:36,619 --> 00:18:40,209 GBU-57 . They tested it over and 459 00:18:40,209 --> 00:18:42,500 over again , tried different options , 460 00:18:42,699 --> 00:18:44,500 tried more after that . They 461 00:18:44,500 --> 00:18:47,459 accomplished hundreds of test shots and 462 00:18:47,459 --> 00:18:50,819 dropped many full-scale weapons against 463 00:18:50,819 --> 00:18:54,180 extremely realistic targets for a 464 00:18:54,180 --> 00:18:57,219 single purpose . Kill this target at 465 00:18:57,219 --> 00:18:59,859 the time and place of our nation's 466 00:18:59,859 --> 00:19:03,829 choosing . And then on a day in June 467 00:19:03,829 --> 00:19:07,150 of 2025 , more than 15 years after they 468 00:19:07,150 --> 00:19:09,261 started their life's work , the phone 469 00:19:09,261 --> 00:19:11,317 rang and the President of the United 470 00:19:11,317 --> 00:19:13,317 States ordered the B-2 force . Uh , 471 00:19:13,317 --> 00:19:15,483 that you've supported to go strike and 472 00:19:15,483 --> 00:19:17,539 kill this target yesterday I had the 473 00:19:17,539 --> 00:19:19,428 incredible honor and privilege of 474 00:19:19,428 --> 00:19:21,483 spending time with these two defense 475 00:19:21,483 --> 00:19:24,199 threat reduction agency officers who've 476 00:19:24,199 --> 00:19:26,640 given so much . One of them said , 477 00:19:26,719 --> 00:19:28,941 quote , I can't even get my head around 478 00:19:28,941 --> 00:19:32,160 this . My heart is so filled with the 479 00:19:32,160 --> 00:19:34,880 pride of being a part of this team . I 480 00:19:34,880 --> 00:19:37,439 am so honored to be a part of this to 481 00:19:37,439 --> 00:19:40,119 you both , thank you and thank you to 482 00:19:40,119 --> 00:19:43,209 your families . Operation Midnight 483 00:19:43,209 --> 00:19:45,376 Hammer was the culmination of those 15 484 00:19:45,376 --> 00:19:47,320 years of incredible work . The air 485 00:19:47,320 --> 00:19:49,487 crews , the tanker crews , the weapons 486 00:19:49,487 --> 00:19:51,709 crews that built the weapons , the load 487 00:19:51,709 --> 00:19:53,709 crews that loaded it . Before I run 488 00:19:53,709 --> 00:19:55,765 through this video today , I want to 489 00:19:55,765 --> 00:19:57,820 talk a little bit about weaponeering 490 00:19:57,820 --> 00:19:59,709 and what goes into , uh , into an 491 00:19:59,709 --> 00:20:02,270 attack . Weaponeering is the science of 492 00:20:02,270 --> 00:20:04,381 evaluating a target . I mentioned all 493 00:20:04,381 --> 00:20:06,548 of those factors before that these two 494 00:20:06,548 --> 00:20:08,603 ditcher officers had thought about . 495 00:20:08,750 --> 00:20:10,469 Ultimately , weaponeering is 496 00:20:10,469 --> 00:20:13,390 determining the right weapon and fuse 497 00:20:13,390 --> 00:20:16,430 combination to achieve the desired 498 00:20:16,430 --> 00:20:18,652 effects and maximum destruction against 499 00:20:18,652 --> 00:20:22,189 a target in the case of Forde . The 500 00:20:22,189 --> 00:20:24,930 ditcher team understood with a high 501 00:20:24,930 --> 00:20:27,150 degree of confidence the elements of 502 00:20:27,150 --> 00:20:28,928 the target required to kill its 503 00:20:28,928 --> 00:20:31,030 functions , and the weapons were 504 00:20:31,030 --> 00:20:34,310 designed , planned and delivered to 505 00:20:34,310 --> 00:20:36,790 ensure that they achieve the effects in 506 00:20:36,790 --> 00:20:40,560 the mission space , by the way . In the 507 00:20:40,560 --> 00:20:43,359 beginning of its development we had so 508 00:20:43,359 --> 00:20:46,310 many PhDs working on the MOP program 509 00:20:46,680 --> 00:20:49,359 doing modeling and simulation that we 510 00:20:49,359 --> 00:20:52,400 were quietly and in a secret way the 511 00:20:52,400 --> 00:20:55,949 biggest users of supercomputer hours 512 00:20:56,199 --> 00:20:58,310 within the United States of America . 513 00:20:59,280 --> 00:21:01,339 So let me talk about , let me talk 514 00:21:01,339 --> 00:21:03,561 about the graphic , uh , a little bit . 515 00:21:03,561 --> 00:21:05,729 And the GBU 57 , which all of you I 516 00:21:05,729 --> 00:21:08,839 know know , is a 30 30,000 pound weapon , 517 00:21:09,250 --> 00:21:12,030 uh , dropped only by the B2 . It's 518 00:21:12,030 --> 00:21:15,670 comprised of steel , explosive , and a 519 00:21:15,670 --> 00:21:19,430 fuse programmed , uh , bespokely 520 00:21:19,430 --> 00:21:21,829 each weapon to achieve a particular 521 00:21:21,829 --> 00:21:24,819 effect inside the target . Each weapon 522 00:21:25,069 --> 00:21:28,020 had a unique desired impact angle , a 523 00:21:28,020 --> 00:21:31,349 rival , final heading . Uh , in a fuse 524 00:21:31,349 --> 00:21:33,516 setting . The fuse is effectively what 525 00:21:33,516 --> 00:21:36,630 tells the bomb when to function . A 526 00:21:36,630 --> 00:21:39,910 longer delay in a fuse , the deeper the 527 00:21:39,910 --> 00:21:42,430 weapon will penetrate and drive into 528 00:21:42,430 --> 00:21:45,400 the target . So on Fordow , 529 00:21:46,160 --> 00:21:49,510 um , in June of 2008 , you can see , uh , 530 00:21:49,520 --> 00:21:52,119 these three holes uh depicted here as 531 00:21:52,119 --> 00:21:54,479 the main exhaust shaft with two 532 00:21:54,479 --> 00:21:56,701 additional ventilation shafts on either 533 00:21:56,701 --> 00:21:59,290 side . The United States decided to 534 00:21:59,290 --> 00:22:01,739 strike these two ventilation shafts , 535 00:22:01,750 --> 00:22:03,989 seen here on the main graphic as the 536 00:22:03,989 --> 00:22:07,270 primary point of entry into the mission 537 00:22:07,270 --> 00:22:10,540 space . In the days preceding the 538 00:22:10,540 --> 00:22:12,739 attack against Fordaux , the Iranians 539 00:22:12,739 --> 00:22:15,060 attempted to cover the shafts with 540 00:22:15,060 --> 00:22:18,300 concrete , uh , to try to prevent an 541 00:22:18,300 --> 00:22:20,930 attack . I won't share the specific 542 00:22:20,930 --> 00:22:23,239 dimensions of the concrete cap , but 543 00:22:23,239 --> 00:22:25,780 you should know that we know what the 544 00:22:25,780 --> 00:22:28,569 dimensions of those concrete caps were . 545 00:22:28,859 --> 00:22:31,270 The planners had to account for this . 546 00:22:31,660 --> 00:22:34,300 They accounted for everything . The cap 547 00:22:34,300 --> 00:22:37,650 was forcibly removed by the first 548 00:22:37,650 --> 00:22:39,810 weapon , and the main shaft was 549 00:22:39,810 --> 00:22:41,770 uncovered . Weapons 550 00:22:41,770 --> 00:22:45,640 2345 551 00:22:45,890 --> 00:22:48,160 were tasked to enter the main shaft , 552 00:22:48,449 --> 00:22:51,369 move down into the complex at greater 553 00:22:51,369 --> 00:22:54,489 than 1000 ft per second , and explode 554 00:22:54,489 --> 00:22:57,750 in the mission space . Weapon number 6 555 00:22:58,079 --> 00:23:00,400 was designed on each side , so there 556 00:23:00,400 --> 00:23:03,469 were 6 on each side . Weapons number 6 557 00:23:03,469 --> 00:23:06,479 was designed as a flex weapon to allow 558 00:23:06,479 --> 00:23:08,520 us to cover if one of the preceding 559 00:23:08,520 --> 00:23:12,280 jets or one of the preceding weapons uh 560 00:23:12,280 --> 00:23:15,680 did not work . The video I'm about to 561 00:23:15,680 --> 00:23:18,680 show you is a culmination of over 15 562 00:23:18,680 --> 00:23:20,902 years of development and testing , as I 563 00:23:20,902 --> 00:23:23,040 said , hundreds of test shots on 564 00:23:23,040 --> 00:23:26,640 various models , um , uh , this is one 565 00:23:26,640 --> 00:23:29,469 weapon , so if you take a view of this 566 00:23:29,469 --> 00:23:31,719 is , uh , 5 additionals , you'll , 567 00:23:31,800 --> 00:23:33,856 you'll get a sense of , uh , of , of 568 00:23:33,856 --> 00:23:35,967 what this looks like , um , hopefully 569 00:23:35,967 --> 00:23:38,022 you can see it and there's not too , 570 00:23:38,022 --> 00:23:40,140 too much reflection . Uh , Tom , uh , 571 00:23:40,150 --> 00:23:42,261 runs our videos out there . We'll run 572 00:23:42,261 --> 00:23:44,372 it at , at , at full speed so you can 573 00:23:44,372 --> 00:23:46,594 see it and then go back through it . Go 574 00:23:46,594 --> 00:23:46,359 ahead , Tom . 575 00:24:17,380 --> 00:24:19,602 Keep it going for a minute . You'll see 576 00:24:19,602 --> 00:24:21,824 inside the , inside the mission space . 577 00:24:30,520 --> 00:24:33,199 Unlike a normal surface bomb , you 578 00:24:33,199 --> 00:24:35,280 won't see an impact crater because 579 00:24:35,280 --> 00:24:37,359 they're designed to deeply bury and 580 00:24:37,359 --> 00:24:39,470 then function . I know there's been a 581 00:24:39,470 --> 00:24:42,199 lot of questions about that . All 6 582 00:24:42,199 --> 00:24:45,760 weapons at each vent at Fordow 583 00:24:46,119 --> 00:24:48,230 went exactly where they were intended 584 00:24:48,230 --> 00:24:51,560 to go . A bomb has 3 effects that 585 00:24:51,560 --> 00:24:54,709 causes damage blast , fragmentation , 586 00:24:54,920 --> 00:24:57,459 and overpressure . In this case , the 587 00:24:57,459 --> 00:24:59,859 primary kill mechanism in the mission 588 00:24:59,859 --> 00:25:02,380 space was a mix of overpressure and 589 00:25:02,380 --> 00:25:04,619 blast ripping through the open tunnels 590 00:25:04,619 --> 00:25:06,979 and destroying critical hardware . The 591 00:25:06,979 --> 00:25:09,219 majority of the damage we assessed 592 00:25:09,219 --> 00:25:12,339 based on our extensive modeling was a 593 00:25:12,339 --> 00:25:14,849 blast layer combined with the impulse 594 00:25:14,849 --> 00:25:18,060 extending from the shock . Uh , imagine 595 00:25:18,060 --> 00:25:20,900 what this looks like 6 times over . A 596 00:25:20,900 --> 00:25:23,180 point that I want to make here , the 597 00:25:23,180 --> 00:25:27,020 joint force does not do BDA . By 598 00:25:27,020 --> 00:25:28,798 design , we don't grade our own 599 00:25:28,798 --> 00:25:30,909 homework . The intelligence community 600 00:25:30,909 --> 00:25:32,829 does . But here's what we know 601 00:25:32,829 --> 00:25:34,940 following the attacks and the strikes 602 00:25:34,940 --> 00:25:37,670 on Fordow . First , that the weapons 603 00:25:37,670 --> 00:25:40,250 were built , tested , and loaded 604 00:25:40,250 --> 00:25:43,010 properly . Two , the weapons were 605 00:25:43,010 --> 00:25:46,949 released on speed and on parameters . 3 , 606 00:25:47,010 --> 00:25:48,788 the weapons all guided to their 607 00:25:48,788 --> 00:25:50,954 intended targets and to their intended 608 00:25:50,954 --> 00:25:54,239 aim points . For the weapons functioned 609 00:25:54,239 --> 00:25:56,400 as designed , meaning they exploded . 610 00:25:56,520 --> 00:25:59,300 We know this through uh other means , 611 00:25:59,359 --> 00:26:01,415 uh , intelligence means that we have 612 00:26:01,415 --> 00:26:04,560 that were visibly , uh , uh , uh , we 613 00:26:04,560 --> 00:26:07,150 were visibly able to see them . And we 614 00:26:07,150 --> 00:26:09,150 know that the trailing jets saw the 615 00:26:09,150 --> 00:26:11,790 first weapons function and the pilots 616 00:26:11,790 --> 00:26:14,020 stated , quote , this was the brightest 617 00:26:14,020 --> 00:26:16,510 explosion that I've ever seen . It 618 00:26:16,510 --> 00:26:19,640 literally looked like daylight . Let me 619 00:26:19,640 --> 00:26:21,973 now turn to the bomber crews themselves , 620 00:26:21,973 --> 00:26:24,196 give you a few details about them . The 621 00:26:24,196 --> 00:26:26,251 crews that attacked Fordow were from 622 00:26:26,251 --> 00:26:28,140 the active duty Air Force and the 623 00:26:28,140 --> 00:26:30,560 Missouri Air National Guard . The crews 624 00:26:30,560 --> 00:26:33,599 ranked from captain to colonel , and 625 00:26:33,599 --> 00:26:35,959 most were graduates of the Air Force 626 00:26:35,959 --> 00:26:38,126 Weapons School headquartered at Nellis 627 00:26:38,126 --> 00:26:40,959 Air Force Base in Nevada . I will state 628 00:26:40,959 --> 00:26:43,070 for the record that there is no beach 629 00:26:43,070 --> 00:26:46,520 volleyball or football at the Air Force 630 00:26:46,520 --> 00:26:49,150 Weapons School . Uh , they were male 631 00:26:49,150 --> 00:26:51,729 and female aviators on this mission , 632 00:26:52,040 --> 00:26:54,262 and a crew member told me when I talked 633 00:26:54,262 --> 00:26:56,262 to them on video the other day that 634 00:26:56,262 --> 00:26:58,262 this felt like the Super Bowl , the 635 00:26:58,262 --> 00:27:00,429 thousands of scientists , airmen , and 636 00:27:00,429 --> 00:27:02,750 maintainers all coming together . One 637 00:27:02,750 --> 00:27:05,579 last story about people . When the 638 00:27:05,579 --> 00:27:07,579 crews went to work on Friday , they 639 00:27:07,579 --> 00:27:09,690 kissed their loved ones goodbye , not 640 00:27:09,690 --> 00:27:12,849 knowing when or if they'd be home . 641 00:27:13,180 --> 00:27:15,510 Late on Saturday night , their families 642 00:27:15,510 --> 00:27:17,770 became aware of what was happening , 643 00:27:17,979 --> 00:27:21,020 and on Sunday when those jets returned 644 00:27:21,020 --> 00:27:23,189 from Whiteman , their families were 645 00:27:23,189 --> 00:27:26,260 there flags flying and tears flowing . 646 00:27:26,300 --> 00:27:28,680 I have chills literally talking about 647 00:27:28,680 --> 00:27:31,329 this . The jets rejoined into a 648 00:27:31,329 --> 00:27:33,569 formation of 4 airplanes followed by a 649 00:27:33,569 --> 00:27:36,650 formation of 3 and came up overhead 650 00:27:36,650 --> 00:27:39,060 Whiteman . Uh , proudly in the traffic 651 00:27:39,060 --> 00:27:41,739 pattern pitching out to land right over 652 00:27:41,739 --> 00:27:44,540 the base and landing to the incredible 653 00:27:44,540 --> 00:27:47,810 cheers of their families who sacrifice 654 00:27:47,810 --> 00:27:50,979 and serve right alongside their family 655 00:27:50,979 --> 00:27:53,035 members . Like I said , there were a 656 00:27:53,035 --> 00:27:55,300 lot of flags and a lot of tears . One 657 00:27:55,300 --> 00:27:57,780 commander told me this is a moment in 658 00:27:57,780 --> 00:27:59,780 the lives of our families that they 659 00:27:59,780 --> 00:28:02,900 will never forget . That my friends is 660 00:28:02,900 --> 00:28:04,979 what America's Joint Force does . We 661 00:28:04,979 --> 00:28:07,420 think , we develop , we train , we 662 00:28:07,420 --> 00:28:10,420 rehearse , we test , we evaluate every 663 00:28:10,420 --> 00:28:13,060 single day and when the call comes to 664 00:28:13,060 --> 00:28:15,699 deliver , we do so . I could not be 665 00:28:15,699 --> 00:28:18,140 more proud standing up here today of 666 00:28:18,140 --> 00:28:20,029 our joint force . I'm filled with 667 00:28:20,029 --> 00:28:21,973 gratitude that I get to tell their 668 00:28:21,973 --> 00:28:24,719 story . And as we stand here right now , 669 00:28:24,770 --> 00:28:27,890 our forces remain on a high state of 670 00:28:27,890 --> 00:28:29,890 readiness in the region prepared to 671 00:28:29,890 --> 00:28:33,160 defend themselves and one last thing 672 00:28:33,810 --> 00:28:37,329 our adversaries around the world should 673 00:28:37,329 --> 00:28:40,530 know that there are other Ditra team 674 00:28:40,530 --> 00:28:43,530 members out there studying targets for 675 00:28:43,530 --> 00:28:46,130 the same amount of time . And we'll 676 00:28:46,130 --> 00:28:48,463 continue to do so . Thank you very much . 677 00:28:48,463 --> 00:28:50,463 I apologize for the length . I look 678 00:28:50,463 --> 00:28:52,686 forward to your questions . Thank you , 679 00:28:52,686 --> 00:28:54,686 Mr . Chairman . I would just , uh , 680 00:28:54,686 --> 00:28:54,530 thank you , by the way , for that 681 00:28:54,530 --> 00:28:56,849 extensive work , the , the lay down . I 682 00:28:56,849 --> 00:28:58,793 mean , even do you have that laser 683 00:28:58,793 --> 00:29:00,571 pointer ? Yes , sir . Thank you 684 00:29:00,571 --> 00:29:02,780 squaring me away as always . I mean , 685 00:29:02,859 --> 00:29:04,939 even , even in just the public 686 00:29:04,939 --> 00:29:07,106 reporting , if you see the post strike 687 00:29:07,106 --> 00:29:09,106 shaft of the three holes , the vast 688 00:29:09,106 --> 00:29:11,106 majority , and fairly so , the vast 689 00:29:11,106 --> 00:29:13,050 majority of speculation has been , 690 00:29:13,050 --> 00:29:15,050 those are the three strike points . 691 00:29:15,050 --> 00:29:17,161 When in actuality what you realize is 692 00:29:17,161 --> 00:29:19,161 these are the vents , these are the 693 00:29:19,161 --> 00:29:21,328 caps , the first munition took the cap 694 00:29:21,328 --> 00:29:23,217 off and the other 5 went down the 695 00:29:23,217 --> 00:29:25,272 center hole which if you're planning 696 00:29:25,272 --> 00:29:27,439 the target you would want it to be the 697 00:29:27,439 --> 00:29:29,606 direct one going to the bottom . These 698 00:29:29,606 --> 00:29:31,661 are the types of things that go into 699 00:29:31,661 --> 00:29:34,989 the planning for a strike that uh . We 700 00:29:34,989 --> 00:29:36,878 wouldn't . The Pentagon would not 701 00:29:36,878 --> 00:29:39,045 expect the press corps or the American 702 00:29:39,045 --> 00:29:41,045 people to initially understand , so 703 00:29:41,045 --> 00:29:43,322 laying this information out is helpful , 704 00:29:43,322 --> 00:29:45,433 uh , but it's also why we asked for a 705 00:29:45,433 --> 00:29:48,020 beat for a moment , for a day or two , 706 00:29:48,109 --> 00:29:50,589 the opportunity to tell that story 707 00:29:50,589 --> 00:29:52,645 because as the chairman said , these 708 00:29:52,645 --> 00:29:54,756 men and women that did this mission , 709 00:29:54,756 --> 00:29:56,922 they just want to do their job they're 710 00:29:56,922 --> 00:29:56,619 not expecting their story to be told . 711 00:29:56,949 --> 00:29:59,005 uh , they're not expecting the glory 712 00:29:59,005 --> 00:30:01,227 they are grateful for the flags and the 713 00:30:01,227 --> 00:30:03,338 hugs of family that's why they do the 714 00:30:03,338 --> 00:30:05,560 job . Um , but they also know they were 715 00:30:05,560 --> 00:30:07,616 part of something historic . Um , we 716 00:30:07,616 --> 00:30:09,838 know how historic it was . The chairman 717 00:30:09,838 --> 00:30:11,893 does . I know our staffs know , uh , 718 00:30:11,893 --> 00:30:14,020 and so that's why we are and the 719 00:30:14,020 --> 00:30:16,187 president of the United States knows , 720 00:30:16,459 --> 00:30:18,459 and that's why , uh , it's almost 721 00:30:18,459 --> 00:30:21,540 personal when we see the way in which 722 00:30:21,540 --> 00:30:24,060 leaks are used to try to disparage . 723 00:30:24,359 --> 00:30:26,910 The outcome or muddy the waters about 724 00:30:26,910 --> 00:30:28,910 the impact of what happened without 725 00:30:28,910 --> 00:30:31,469 being responsible with information and 726 00:30:31,469 --> 00:30:33,525 allowing the professionals to assess 727 00:30:33,525 --> 00:30:35,691 and provide that information just like 728 00:30:35,691 --> 00:30:37,636 the chairman did so thank you Mr . 729 00:30:37,636 --> 00:30:39,691 Chairman for that information , uh , 730 00:30:39,691 --> 00:30:39,390 and we welcome a few additional 731 00:30:39,390 --> 00:30:42,589 questions . Yes sir . General , um , on 732 00:30:42,589 --> 00:30:44,869 Sunday you said final battle damage 733 00:30:44,869 --> 00:30:47,520 will take some time . And you also said , 734 00:30:47,530 --> 00:30:49,630 I think BDA is still pending and it 735 00:30:49,630 --> 00:30:51,750 would be way too early for me to 736 00:30:51,750 --> 00:30:54,390 comment on what may or may not still be 737 00:30:54,390 --> 00:30:57,420 there at the nuclear facility that was 738 00:30:57,420 --> 00:30:59,364 just over 3 days ago . So what has 739 00:30:59,364 --> 00:31:01,630 changed ? Would you use the term 740 00:31:01,630 --> 00:31:03,963 obliterated as well , sir , like I said , 741 00:31:03,963 --> 00:31:06,019 we don't do BDA . I'll refer that to 742 00:31:06,019 --> 00:31:08,186 the intelligence community and uh with 743 00:31:08,186 --> 00:31:10,186 them . I mean , what changed in the 744 00:31:10,186 --> 00:31:12,352 past 3 days and make you so you know , 745 00:31:12,750 --> 00:31:15,790 I think I I mean I think I explained 746 00:31:15,790 --> 00:31:17,901 what changed . Uh , there was a great 747 00:31:17,901 --> 00:31:21,109 deal of irresponsible reporting based 748 00:31:21,109 --> 00:31:23,220 on leaks , preliminary information in 749 00:31:23,220 --> 00:31:25,331 low confidence . Again , when someone 750 00:31:25,331 --> 00:31:27,387 leaks something . They do it with an 751 00:31:27,387 --> 00:31:29,859 agenda and when you leak a portion of 752 00:31:29,859 --> 00:31:31,970 an intelligence assessment but just a 753 00:31:31,970 --> 00:31:34,137 little portion , just a little portion 754 00:31:34,137 --> 00:31:36,026 that makes it seem like maybe the 755 00:31:36,026 --> 00:31:37,970 strike wasn't effective , then you 756 00:31:37,970 --> 00:31:40,192 start a , a news cycle whether it's the 757 00:31:40,192 --> 00:31:42,303 Washington Post or Fox News or CNN or 758 00:31:42,303 --> 00:31:44,303 MSNBC . You start a news cycle that 759 00:31:44,303 --> 00:31:46,248 starts to call into question the e 760 00:31:46,248 --> 00:31:48,319 ethics , no that that's why . So you 761 00:31:48,319 --> 00:31:50,208 bring the chairman here who's not 762 00:31:50,208 --> 00:31:52,208 involved in politics . He didn't do 763 00:31:52,208 --> 00:31:52,079 politics that's , that's , that's my 764 00:31:52,079 --> 00:31:54,135 lane to understand and translate and 765 00:31:54,135 --> 00:31:56,357 talk about those types of things . So I 766 00:31:56,357 --> 00:31:58,579 can use the word obliterated . He could 767 00:31:58,579 --> 00:32:00,746 use defeat , destroyed , assess all of 768 00:32:00,746 --> 00:32:00,410 those things , but ultimately we're 769 00:32:00,410 --> 00:32:02,577 here to clarify what these weapons are 770 00:32:02,577 --> 00:32:05,055 capable of which anyone . With , uh , 771 00:32:05,064 --> 00:32:07,305 you know , 22 eyes , some ears and a 772 00:32:07,305 --> 00:32:09,185 brain can recognize that kind of 773 00:32:09,185 --> 00:32:11,944 firepower with that specificity at that 774 00:32:11,944 --> 00:32:13,944 location and others is gonna have a 775 00:32:13,944 --> 00:32:15,666 devastating effect . So we all 776 00:32:15,666 --> 00:32:17,833 recognize there will be days and weeks 777 00:32:17,833 --> 00:32:20,000 ahead . That's why yesterday I said if 778 00:32:20,000 --> 00:32:19,734 you want to know what's going on at 779 00:32:19,734 --> 00:32:21,901 Fort O . You better go there and get a 780 00:32:21,901 --> 00:32:24,123 big shovel because no one's under there 781 00:32:24,123 --> 00:32:26,234 right now . No one's under there able 782 00:32:26,234 --> 00:32:27,956 to assess and everyone's using 783 00:32:27,956 --> 00:32:30,178 reflections of what they see and that's 784 00:32:30,178 --> 00:32:32,290 why the Israelis , the Iranians , the 785 00:32:32,290 --> 00:32:34,401 IAEA , the UN to a man and to a woman 786 00:32:34,401 --> 00:32:36,456 who recognize the capability of this 787 00:32:36,456 --> 00:32:36,369 weapon system are acknowledging how 788 00:32:36,369 --> 00:32:38,280 destructive it's been . So that's 789 00:32:38,280 --> 00:32:40,502 what's , that's what's changed . Just 3 790 00:32:40,502 --> 00:32:43,680 or 4 days later , I see this is , this 791 00:32:43,680 --> 00:32:46,280 is a point . This is how difficult it 792 00:32:46,280 --> 00:32:48,719 is to actually manage . You just 793 00:32:48,719 --> 00:32:50,989 watched . A video of what this weapon 794 00:32:50,989 --> 00:32:53,189 is capable of , uh , we , that's where 795 00:32:53,189 --> 00:32:55,356 we find our confidence in the skill of 796 00:32:55,356 --> 00:32:57,578 men and women and the capability of the 797 00:32:57,578 --> 00:32:59,245 systems they employed and the 798 00:32:59,245 --> 00:33:01,411 recognition so far and the reflections 799 00:33:01,411 --> 00:33:01,219 that it was a highly successful mission . 800 00:33:01,469 --> 00:33:03,691 Sure , I think you could , uh , I , I'd 801 00:33:03,691 --> 00:33:05,691 say go out the IC should be able to 802 00:33:05,691 --> 00:33:07,858 help you , uh , answer that question . 803 00:33:07,858 --> 00:33:10,080 They look at a variety as the secretary 804 00:33:10,080 --> 00:33:12,191 has alluded to , we look at a variety 805 00:33:12,191 --> 00:33:14,413 of things . Uh , I don't do that . They 806 00:33:14,413 --> 00:33:16,525 do , uh , all , all different sources 807 00:33:16,525 --> 00:33:18,858 of intel which I'd refer you to them to . 808 00:33:18,858 --> 00:33:21,219 To get clarity on on the the and so 809 00:33:21,219 --> 00:33:23,386 again I go back to the IC whether it's 810 00:33:23,386 --> 00:33:25,275 uh Director Radcliffe or OD and I 811 00:33:25,275 --> 00:33:27,441 Gabbard , I read the statements at the 812 00:33:27,441 --> 00:33:27,060 beginning . They're the ones 813 00:33:27,339 --> 00:33:29,172 aggregating the intelligence and 814 00:33:29,172 --> 00:33:31,339 they're saying nuclear facilities were 815 00:33:31,339 --> 00:33:33,506 destroyed and would have to be rebuilt 816 00:33:33,506 --> 00:33:35,672 over a number of years facilities were 817 00:33:35,672 --> 00:33:37,783 destroyed . Um , what do we got right 818 00:33:37,783 --> 00:33:40,619 here , uh , sir , you cited a body of 819 00:33:40,619 --> 00:33:43,660 credible , uh , intelligence to suggest 820 00:33:43,660 --> 00:33:45,660 that the damage at Fort O and other 821 00:33:45,660 --> 00:33:47,827 places . What is that referring to and 822 00:33:47,827 --> 00:33:50,049 when we see it ? I was reading from the 823 00:33:50,049 --> 00:33:52,271 CIA director's statement which came out 824 00:33:52,271 --> 00:33:54,327 last night . CIA again , they do the 825 00:33:54,327 --> 00:33:57,030 BDA , they do the assessment . CIA can 826 00:33:57,030 --> 00:33:58,808 confirm that a body of credible 827 00:33:58,808 --> 00:34:00,974 intelligence indicates it also goes on 828 00:34:00,974 --> 00:34:02,586 to say new intelligence from 829 00:34:02,586 --> 00:34:04,530 historically reliable and accurate 830 00:34:04,530 --> 00:34:06,419 sources and methods . Now you can 831 00:34:06,419 --> 00:34:08,308 imagine , you can imagine the CIA 832 00:34:08,308 --> 00:34:10,530 director is gonna be very careful about 833 00:34:10,530 --> 00:34:12,697 he how he articulates , uh , things of 834 00:34:12,697 --> 00:34:14,974 that sensitivity classified secret top . 835 00:34:14,974 --> 00:34:17,086 Secret compartmentalized , he's gonna 836 00:34:17,086 --> 00:34:19,252 know things that you're not gonna know 837 00:34:19,252 --> 00:34:21,252 that the press isn't gonna know and 838 00:34:21,252 --> 00:34:23,308 he's reflecting that the the sources 839 00:34:23,308 --> 00:34:25,474 he's seeing are highly credible . uh , 840 00:34:25,474 --> 00:34:27,197 they've they've given credible 841 00:34:27,197 --> 00:34:29,419 intelligence . They are those processes 842 00:34:29,419 --> 00:34:31,530 of given credible intelligence in the 843 00:34:31,530 --> 00:34:33,808 past and that's what he's basing it on . 844 00:34:33,808 --> 00:34:35,974 You think we need to see that ? do you 845 00:34:35,974 --> 00:34:35,594 have a top secret clearance sir ? 846 00:34:36,074 --> 00:34:39,800 Eventually the American public . Yes , 847 00:34:39,879 --> 00:34:42,070 um , Yeah , you , I wanted to , I 848 00:34:42,070 --> 00:34:44,403 wanted to ask , uh , briefly , just not , 849 00:34:44,403 --> 00:34:46,403 not you , checkered shirt . Oh , so 850 00:34:46,403 --> 00:34:48,570 Mike Glenn with the Washington Times . 851 00:34:48,570 --> 00:34:50,292 Uh , anybody who's ever read a 852 00:34:50,292 --> 00:34:52,550 Battalion S2 report after a fight knows 853 00:34:52,550 --> 00:34:54,870 that it's usually the initial report is 854 00:34:54,870 --> 00:34:57,419 usually wrong , sometimes grossly so . 855 00:34:57,629 --> 00:34:59,685 Has this is is what happened in this 856 00:34:59,685 --> 00:35:01,760 incident caused you all to sort of 857 00:35:01,760 --> 00:35:05,580 rethink the intelligence . Process or 858 00:35:05,580 --> 00:35:07,747 the dissemination or do you think it's 859 00:35:07,747 --> 00:35:09,747 just a matter I mean if the process 860 00:35:09,747 --> 00:35:11,524 itself doesn't require any more 861 00:35:11,524 --> 00:35:14,419 adjustment . Well , I could tell you 862 00:35:14,419 --> 00:35:16,530 what the what the chairman told me in 863 00:35:16,530 --> 00:35:18,808 the situation room and reminded us all , 864 00:35:18,808 --> 00:35:21,030 which is alongside what you just said , 865 00:35:21,030 --> 00:35:23,141 sir , is that the 1st 1st reports are 866 00:35:23,141 --> 00:35:22,889 almost always wrong they're almost 867 00:35:22,889 --> 00:35:25,129 always incomplete , right ? You you 868 00:35:25,129 --> 00:35:27,860 anything , uh , whether it's a squad 869 00:35:27,860 --> 00:35:29,916 level operation or a strategic level 870 00:35:29,916 --> 00:35:32,138 operation , the initial reflections you 871 00:35:32,138 --> 00:35:34,360 get are coming at you at at a at a high 872 00:35:34,360 --> 00:35:36,471 rate of speed from a lot of different 873 00:35:36,471 --> 00:35:38,582 sources . So your job is to step back 874 00:35:38,582 --> 00:35:40,638 and assess them and that's why we're 875 00:35:40,638 --> 00:35:42,749 urging caution about . Putting it pre 876 00:35:42,749 --> 00:35:45,540 premising entire stories on biased 877 00:35:45,540 --> 00:35:48,149 leaks to biased publications trying to 878 00:35:48,149 --> 00:35:50,316 make something look bad . How about we 879 00:35:50,316 --> 00:35:52,205 take a beat , recognize first the 880 00:35:52,205 --> 00:35:54,482 success of our warriors , hold them up , 881 00:35:54,482 --> 00:35:56,593 tell their stories , celebrate that , 882 00:35:56,593 --> 00:35:58,593 wave an American flag , be proud of 883 00:35:58,593 --> 00:36:00,371 what we accomplished and in the 884 00:36:00,371 --> 00:36:02,538 meantime I can assure you the chairman 885 00:36:02,538 --> 00:36:04,316 of his staff , the intelligence 886 00:36:04,316 --> 00:36:06,371 community , our staff and others are 887 00:36:06,371 --> 00:36:08,538 doing all the assessments necessary to 888 00:36:08,538 --> 00:36:08,389 make sure that mission was indeed 889 00:36:08,389 --> 00:36:11,340 successful . Yes , right there . Sir , 890 00:36:11,659 --> 00:36:13,826 thank you , Mr . Secretary . um , Iran 891 00:36:13,826 --> 00:36:16,179 has recognized that their nuclear 892 00:36:16,179 --> 00:36:18,290 program was indeed severely damaged , 893 00:36:18,290 --> 00:36:20,500 but they also said that the US strikes 894 00:36:20,500 --> 00:36:22,939 only strengthened their ability and 895 00:36:22,939 --> 00:36:25,050 their determination to complete their 896 00:36:25,050 --> 00:36:27,272 nuclear program . How do you respond to 897 00:36:27,272 --> 00:36:29,495 that , sir ? Is that a provocation from 898 00:36:29,495 --> 00:36:31,729 Iran ? Well , I would say Iran's gonna 899 00:36:31,729 --> 00:36:33,840 have to say a lot of things right now 900 00:36:33,840 --> 00:36:36,060 in order to bolster their image , 901 00:36:36,810 --> 00:36:38,921 especially internally , you know , in 902 00:36:38,921 --> 00:36:41,199 the media there's a lot of things , uh , 903 00:36:41,199 --> 00:36:43,366 they'll say for domestic consumption , 904 00:36:43,366 --> 00:36:45,421 uh , but we're watching very closely 905 00:36:45,421 --> 00:36:47,421 what they do again that's the intel 906 00:36:47,421 --> 00:36:49,643 community . Our job as the chairman , I 907 00:36:49,643 --> 00:36:48,929 mean the chairman laid it out so 908 00:36:48,929 --> 00:36:51,262 beautifully , our job is to be prepared . 909 00:36:51,262 --> 00:36:53,540 And how proud are you ? How proud am I ? 910 00:36:53,540 --> 00:36:55,540 I , I didn't know the full story of 911 00:36:55,540 --> 00:36:57,762 those men and women 15 years ago who've 912 00:36:57,762 --> 00:36:59,762 been pointing at that target . That 913 00:36:59,762 --> 00:36:59,320 makes me proud to be an American . 914 00:36:59,439 --> 00:37:01,661 That's an awesome story . I hope we can 915 00:37:01,661 --> 00:37:03,439 tell more aspects of that in an 916 00:37:03,439 --> 00:37:05,550 unclassified way in the future . Uh , 917 00:37:05,550 --> 00:37:07,772 that , that's , that's a great thing to 918 00:37:07,772 --> 00:37:09,883 know . Our job is to be prepared when 919 00:37:09,883 --> 00:37:11,883 the commander in chief calls , uh , 920 00:37:11,883 --> 00:37:13,828 based on those assessments . So of 921 00:37:13,828 --> 00:37:13,679 course our IC , the intelligence 922 00:37:13,679 --> 00:37:15,679 Committee , will keep watching what 923 00:37:15,679 --> 00:37:17,790 Iran does and pay attention to that , 924 00:37:17,790 --> 00:37:19,679 but the president has created the 925 00:37:19,679 --> 00:37:21,901 contours , the opportunity . For a deal 926 00:37:21,901 --> 00:37:24,068 for peace and something that the world 927 00:37:24,068 --> 00:37:25,901 said was intractable that wasn't 928 00:37:25,901 --> 00:37:28,012 possible , and we got that peace that 929 00:37:28,012 --> 00:37:30,439 ceasefire that option because of 930 00:37:30,439 --> 00:37:32,550 strength , because of his willingness 931 00:37:32,550 --> 00:37:34,717 to use American military might that no 932 00:37:34,717 --> 00:37:36,883 one else on the planet can do with the 933 00:37:36,883 --> 00:37:39,106 kind of planners and operators that the 934 00:37:39,106 --> 00:37:41,050 chairman just laid out . Yes sir , 935 00:37:41,050 --> 00:37:43,217 right there . Yeah , sir . Um , just a 936 00:37:43,217 --> 00:37:45,370 quick question , um , there's public 937 00:37:45,370 --> 00:37:47,669 imagery available saying that highly 938 00:37:47,669 --> 00:37:50,209 enriched uranium was moved out of Fordo 939 00:37:50,209 --> 00:37:52,431 before the strikes . Is that accurate ? 940 00:37:52,431 --> 00:37:54,265 Have you seen that ? And Mr . uh 941 00:37:54,265 --> 00:37:56,320 Chairman , a question for you . Have 942 00:37:56,320 --> 00:37:58,376 you been pressured um to change your 943 00:37:58,376 --> 00:38:00,098 assessment or give a more rosy 944 00:38:00,098 --> 00:38:03,149 intelligence , uh . Assessment to us by 945 00:38:03,149 --> 00:38:05,316 any political factors whether it's the 946 00:38:05,316 --> 00:38:07,427 president or the secretary and if you 947 00:38:07,427 --> 00:38:09,593 were , would you do that ? Yeah , well 948 00:38:09,593 --> 00:38:11,816 that one's easy . No , um no I have not 949 00:38:11,816 --> 00:38:14,510 and no I would not . My job as the 950 00:38:14,510 --> 00:38:17,709 chairman is to offer a range of options 951 00:38:17,709 --> 00:38:19,487 to the president , uh , and the 952 00:38:19,487 --> 00:38:21,669 National Command Authority to deliver 953 00:38:21,669 --> 00:38:24,229 the risks , uh , um , associated with 954 00:38:24,229 --> 00:38:26,590 each of those , uh , and then take the 955 00:38:26,590 --> 00:38:28,312 orders of the National Command 956 00:38:28,312 --> 00:38:30,423 Authority and , and go execute them . 957 00:38:30,423 --> 00:38:32,534 Um , this , I've never been pressured 958 00:38:32,534 --> 00:38:34,757 by the president or the secretary to do 959 00:38:34,757 --> 00:38:36,812 anything other than tell him exactly 960 00:38:36,812 --> 00:38:38,979 what I'm thinking , and that's exactly 961 00:38:38,979 --> 00:38:41,280 what I've done . Uh , there's nothing 962 00:38:41,610 --> 00:38:43,610 that I've seen that suggests , uh , 963 00:38:43,610 --> 00:38:45,832 that what we didn't hit exactly what we 964 00:38:45,832 --> 00:38:48,166 wanted to hit , uh , in those locations . 965 00:38:48,166 --> 00:38:50,610 It's about highly enriched uranium . Do 966 00:38:50,610 --> 00:38:53,429 you have . Certainty that all the 967 00:38:53,429 --> 00:38:55,989 highly enriched uranium was inside the 968 00:38:55,989 --> 00:38:58,100 Fordow mountain or some of it because 969 00:38:58,100 --> 00:39:00,322 there were satellite photos that showed 970 00:39:00,322 --> 00:39:02,545 more than a dozen trucks there two days 971 00:39:02,545 --> 00:39:04,600 in advance . Are you certain none of 972 00:39:04,600 --> 00:39:06,878 that highly enriched uranium was moved ? 973 00:39:06,878 --> 00:39:08,989 Of course we're watching every single 974 00:39:08,989 --> 00:39:10,989 aspect , but Jennifer , you've been 975 00:39:10,989 --> 00:39:12,767 about the worst the the one who 976 00:39:12,767 --> 00:39:14,933 misrepresents the most intentionally . 977 00:39:14,933 --> 00:39:17,045 Uh , what , what the president says , 978 00:39:17,045 --> 00:39:18,989 I'm , I'm , I'm familiar about the 979 00:39:18,989 --> 00:39:21,280 ventilation shafts on Saturday night , 980 00:39:21,570 --> 00:39:24,100 and in fact I was the first to describe 981 00:39:24,100 --> 00:39:27,050 the B-2 bombers , the refueling the 982 00:39:27,050 --> 00:39:29,629 entire mission with great accuracy . So 983 00:39:29,629 --> 00:39:31,351 I , I take issue with that . I 984 00:39:31,351 --> 00:39:33,518 appreciate you acknowledging that this 985 00:39:33,518 --> 00:39:35,185 is the first operate the most 986 00:39:35,185 --> 00:39:37,610 successful , uh , mission based on 987 00:39:37,610 --> 00:39:39,332 operational security that this 988 00:39:39,332 --> 00:39:41,443 department has done since you've been 989 00:39:41,443 --> 00:39:43,666 here , and I appreciate that . So we're 990 00:39:43,666 --> 00:39:45,832 looking at all aspects of intelligence 991 00:39:45,832 --> 00:39:45,409 and making sure we have a sense of what 992 00:39:45,409 --> 00:39:47,576 was where . Why not , um , acknowledge 993 00:39:47,576 --> 00:39:49,131 the female pilots that also 994 00:39:49,131 --> 00:39:51,076 participated in this mission . The 995 00:39:51,076 --> 00:39:53,187 early messages that you sent out only 996 00:39:53,187 --> 00:39:55,489 congratulated the boys . So when I say 997 00:39:55,489 --> 00:39:57,600 something like our boys and bombers , 998 00:39:57,600 --> 00:39:59,822 see this is the kind of thing the press 999 00:39:59,822 --> 00:40:02,045 does , right ? Of course , the chairman 1000 00:40:02,045 --> 00:40:01,699 mentioned a female bomber pilot . 1001 00:40:01,770 --> 00:40:03,826 That's fantastic . She's fantastic . 1002 00:40:03,826 --> 00:40:05,714 She's a hero . I want more female 1003 00:40:05,714 --> 00:40:07,659 bomber pilots . I hope the men and 1004 00:40:07,659 --> 00:40:09,881 women of our country sign up to do such 1005 00:40:09,881 --> 00:40:11,992 brave and audacious things , but when 1006 00:40:11,992 --> 00:40:14,103 you spin it as because I say our boys 1007 00:40:14,103 --> 00:40:16,326 and bombers is a common phrase , I'll , 1008 00:40:16,326 --> 00:40:15,895 I'll keep saying things like that 1009 00:40:15,895 --> 00:40:17,895 whether they're men or women , very 1010 00:40:17,895 --> 00:40:19,951 proud of that female pilot just like 1011 00:40:19,951 --> 00:40:22,062 I'm very proud of those male pilots , 1012 00:40:22,062 --> 00:40:24,117 and I don't care if it's a male or a 1013 00:40:24,117 --> 00:40:25,951 female in that . Cockpit and the 1014 00:40:25,951 --> 00:40:28,173 American people don't care but it's the 1015 00:40:28,173 --> 00:40:30,284 obsession with race and gender , uh , 1016 00:40:30,284 --> 00:40:32,173 in this department that's changed 1017 00:40:32,173 --> 00:40:34,506 priorities and we don't do that anymore . 1018 00:40:34,506 --> 00:40:36,728 We don't play your little games , yes , 1019 00:40:36,728 --> 00:40:38,728 right there the uranium was removed 1020 00:40:38,728 --> 00:40:41,062 from the facility before the B-2 struck . 1021 00:40:41,062 --> 00:40:43,117 So I'm not aware of any intelligence 1022 00:40:43,117 --> 00:40:45,117 that I've reviewed that says things 1023 00:40:45,117 --> 00:40:47,339 were not where they were supposed to be 1024 00:40:47,339 --> 00:40:49,506 moved or otherwise . Yes , Kelly Meyer 1025 00:40:49,506 --> 00:40:51,617 with News Nation and just off the off 1026 00:40:51,617 --> 00:40:51,310 the top when say we're grateful for the 1027 00:40:51,310 --> 00:40:53,421 service of these pilots and everybody 1028 00:40:53,421 --> 00:40:55,709 that serves um I wanted to ask you the 1029 00:40:55,709 --> 00:40:58,189 CIA statement said when possible they 1030 00:40:58,189 --> 00:41:00,411 will provide updates and information to 1031 00:41:00,411 --> 00:41:02,411 the public for transparency , and I 1032 00:41:02,411 --> 00:41:04,522 believe that's what we're looking for 1033 00:41:04,522 --> 00:41:06,411 here . Do you commit to share the 1034 00:41:06,411 --> 00:41:08,633 Defense Intelligence Agency report when 1035 00:41:08,633 --> 00:41:10,578 it is ready , um , so the American 1036 00:41:10,578 --> 00:41:12,745 people can understand more . About the 1037 00:41:12,745 --> 00:41:14,578 intelligence assessment . Well , 1038 00:41:14,578 --> 00:41:16,745 actually the report that was discussed 1039 00:41:16,745 --> 00:41:16,610 this preliminary report was a was 1040 00:41:16,610 --> 00:41:18,721 what's called a re-strike report . So 1041 00:41:18,721 --> 00:41:20,943 it comes to us to give us an assessment 1042 00:41:20,943 --> 00:41:22,832 whether a target would need to be 1043 00:41:22,832 --> 00:41:22,770 re-struck , right ? That's the reason 1044 00:41:22,770 --> 00:41:24,919 why . So it's based on internal 1045 00:41:24,919 --> 00:41:26,975 feedback loop that we're supposed to 1046 00:41:26,975 --> 00:41:29,141 have access to , unfortunately someone 1047 00:41:29,141 --> 00:41:31,030 took advantage of that , uh , but 1048 00:41:31,030 --> 00:41:33,197 whatever is supposed to be made public 1049 00:41:33,197 --> 00:41:32,370 will be , but whatever has to say 1050 00:41:32,370 --> 00:41:35,080 sensitive you know . One of the things 1051 00:41:35,080 --> 00:41:37,302 that that I'm trying to do through this 1052 00:41:37,302 --> 00:41:39,302 journey that we're on together , of 1053 00:41:39,302 --> 00:41:41,358 course , transparency , but also the 1054 00:41:41,358 --> 00:41:43,358 requirement to really protect these 1055 00:41:43,358 --> 00:41:45,524 capabilities , um , I guess the time's 1056 00:41:45,524 --> 00:41:48,590 up , um , uh , but , uh , so , so 1057 00:41:48,590 --> 00:41:50,646 there's a balance in there , right ? 1058 00:41:50,646 --> 00:41:52,590 The , the , we do need to preserve 1059 00:41:52,590 --> 00:41:54,812 options should the nation and the joint 1060 00:41:54,812 --> 00:41:56,757 force be tasked to go do something 1061 00:41:56,757 --> 00:41:58,979 again . So I , I'm confident . Find the 1062 00:41:58,979 --> 00:42:00,923 middle ground , but there are some 1063 00:42:00,923 --> 00:42:03,034 things that that if asked I'd I'd , I 1064 00:42:03,034 --> 00:42:05,449 wanna not release related so we're 1065 00:42:05,449 --> 00:42:07,505 gonna leave it right there . I wanna 1066 00:42:07,505 --> 00:42:09,671 thank the heroism of our men and women 1067 00:42:09,671 --> 00:42:11,393 in in the military . What they 1068 00:42:11,393 --> 00:42:13,505 accomplished is truly historic , uh , 1069 00:42:13,505 --> 00:42:13,399 setting back the Iranian nuclear 1070 00:42:13,399 --> 00:42:15,689 program untold number of years . Uh , 1071 00:42:15,729 --> 00:42:17,562 it was a devastating attack . We 1072 00:42:17,562 --> 00:42:19,729 appreciate you covering it . Thank you 1073 00:42:19,729 --> 00:42:21,785 very much , sir . Thank you a little 1074 00:42:21,785 --> 00:42:22,080 bit more about your role , sir .