WEBVTT

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I want to welcome our witnesses and uh

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thank you all for your service to our

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great country . Uh , we are here today ,

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uh , to hear from the Department of the

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Air Force on its FY26 budget

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request . Unfortunately , we still not

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received , uh , information on the Air

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Force's budget request , which makes

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today's hearing a little difficult . Uh ,

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we'll need that budget in order to

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fully evaluate how Congress can best

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support our airmen and guardians .

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We're facing the most complex threat

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environment , uh , in history , complex

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threat environment in history . China

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is moving forward on 6th generation

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fighter jets and sophisticated air

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defense systems . Uh , they are

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expanding their nuclear arsenal at an

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alarming rate . And they're deploying

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advanced hypersonic weapons and long

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range cruise missiles capable of

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hitting our homeland . That's why it's

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never been more important to invest in

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modern systems that will deter and

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defeat threats against our nation .

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Fortunately , the House passed

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reconciliation bill makes generational

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investments in our national security .

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The bill provides over $7 billion to

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support air superiority , including

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funds to acquire the F-47 , the most

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advanced and lethal aircraft ever built .

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It provides 13 billion to modernize our

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nuclear deterrent and rebuild related

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infrastructure and it invests over $25

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billion in Golden Dome layered missile

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defense system . But 6th generation

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fighters , nuclear modernization and

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Golden Dome are all big ticket items

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that will take years to fully develop .

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And the funding in our reconciliation

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bill will not be enough to fully

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support those initiatives . That's why

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it's so important for defense spending

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to grow in the out years .

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Reconciliation . It is a one time

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investment . We've got to do more . It

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must be followed by healthy increases

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in the base budget so we can afford to

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fill these critical capabilities

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without cuts to readiness . While I'm

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supportive of much of the Air Force's

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work , I do have concerns with some of

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the ongoing projects . Nuclear

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deterrence is vital to our national

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security , and I'm concerned that the

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Air Force is not adequately

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prioritizing it . Specifically , I'm

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troubled by past mismanagement of the

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Sentinel program . We must ensure

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Sentinel is ready in time to replace

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the current ICBMs before they reach

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their end of life . Congress has been

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explicit about the need to address

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Sentinel's cost and schedule overruns .

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We have prioritized and appropriated

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funding to fix these problems , and yet

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the Air Force has taken 1.2 billion out

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of Sentinel funds and used them instead

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to meet our other priorities in FY 25 .

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I want to be very clear . The Sentinel

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program is vital to modernizing our

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triad and ensuring nuclear deterrence .

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Senior Air Force leaders have made

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frequent statements agreeing that the

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service must prioritize nuclear

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deterrence . It's time to start walking

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the walk . I look forward to working

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with you to get , uh , this program

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back on track . I'm also concerned with

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our ability to fight and win in space .

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Specifically , I worry that when we see

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the budget , it may not adequately fund

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the space force . This is one reason

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why we need budget details so we can

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evaluate whether the funding is in line

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with our priorities within the space

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force . I want to be sure we don't lose

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sight of our mission . Space Force got

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its start in this committee , driven by

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a desire to improve the way we buy

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things for space . Winning the fight in

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space requires us to quickly develop

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advanced systems and platforms . Doing

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so starts with highly trained

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acquisition professionals . Every

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guardian supports the war fighting

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mission , so I encourage you to ensure

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that in in the space force operators ,

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acquisition , intel , and cyber

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professionals are all on equal footing .

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Finally , as the department starts

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rebalancing the general officer corps ,

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I strongly encourage you to ensure that

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the Space Force receives additional

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billets to address its unique needs as

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a new and growing service . I look

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forward to working with you to ensure

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our American , our , our airmen and

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guardians have the resources they need

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to successfully carry out their

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critical missions or that I yield to my

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friend , the ranking member for any

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opening statement he may have . Thank

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you Mr . Chairman and as as is usually

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the case , I agree uh substantially

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with your assessment and and the budget

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certainly is where the problem starts .

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I mean , first of all , we don't have

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one , this is the latest we've gone ,

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um , in history I believe without

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getting a budget is very important . I

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know you gentlemen are not in charge of

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that , but to the extent that you have

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influence , um , if we could encourage

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the White House to get this process

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moving . That would be enormously

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helpful . It's difficult for Congress

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to do its job and adequately fund our

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needs without having the starting point

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of the president's budget , but the

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second problem is what the chairman

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alluded to , um , within the needs that

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we know that we're looking at , um , in

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the Air Force's area , there's a lot to

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cram in there and it does not appear

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like it's going to all fit , so I'm

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particularly curious as you're trying

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to balance , you know , as we move

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towards the F-47 , um , the former NGAD .

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We try to upgrade the nuclear triad ,

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you know , meet our fighter attack

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needs , um , deal with the UAVs , um ,

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all of that space . How does that come

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together and fit into a budget that

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makes sense because it seems like , you

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know , we are starting a lot of

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programs that ultimately we're not

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going to be afford to be able to afford

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to fund all of them . So it'd be better

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if we made choices up front so you have

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a lot of questions about how does that

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work ? How does all these programs go

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forward and we still wind up with the

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budget that we need in space . I am

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encouraged by the improvements um that

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have been made on building a resilient

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architecture space is so central to

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everything we do in terms of secure

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communications dealing with contested

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logistics um we've made a lot of .

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Progress and I wanna , wanna thank the

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chairman and in absentia I thank Mr .

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Cooper , a former member , uh , it was ,

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uh , the chairman and Mr . Cooper who

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had the vision to create the space

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force in the first place . I think

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that's enormously important , but we'd

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like to get further updates on how that

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architecture is being updated to make

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it more resilient and meet all of those

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very difficult needs . Lastly , as I'm

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sure you've heard , acquisition reform

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is an enormous priority uh for . This

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committee and for Congress we're gonna

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take a big swing at it this year . Uh

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we would be curious to hear your

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thoughts about what that looks like um ,

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sadly within your department between

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the tanker , the F-35 and the Sentinel ,

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we have a lot of experience with

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programs that went way over budget . Uh ,

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what have we learned ? How can we do

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that better and then connected to that

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as well , something we talked about

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yesterday , taking advantage of a lot

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of . In many cases smaller innovative

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companies that are building crucial

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things around missiles , satellites ,

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UAVs , um , that are much cheaper , um ,

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and much more effective in many

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instances , how do we integrate those

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new innovative companies into the

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defense , um , department so we can

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take advantage of the technologies and

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the equipment that they're building ,

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uh , with that , I look forward to your

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testimony and I yield back . I

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thank the ranking member . Uh , now I'd

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like to introduce our witnesses . The

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Honorable Troy Mink is the secretary of

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the Air Force . Congratulations and

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welcome . Uh , General Chance Saltzman ,

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Chief of Space Operations , welcome

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back . And General David Alvin is chief

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of , uh , staff of the Air Force .

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Welcome back , General . Um , I want to

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start with you , Mr . Mink . You're

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recognized for 5 minutes . Uh , thank

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you , Mr . Chairman . So Chairman

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Rogers , Ranking Member Smith , and

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distinguished members of the committee ,

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uh , General Alvin , General Saltzman ,

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and I thank you for the opportunity to

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testify , uh , here today . We're

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looking forward to it . Uh , the

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Department of the Air Force , uh , is

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at an inflection point . Uh , we are

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engaging in a fast-paced race for

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technology superiority against a

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well-resourced strategic opponent .

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However , we simultaneously face , uh ,

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personnel and platform challenges

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affecting our immediate readiness . We

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must balance our requirements to

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generate readiness and project power

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today with imperative to rebuild our

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military and develop capabilities so

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that we can continue to deter our

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adversaries tomorrow . Our fiscal

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priorities are focused on addressing

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the balance between these realities and

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supporting national security objectives

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as outlined in the interim national

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defense guidance . The scope and

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severity of the threat to our homeland

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and national interests are significant

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and increasing , and we are now facing

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one of the most dangerous security

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environments in our history . The

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Department of the Air Force has

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structured our long term strategy

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around the belief that China is our

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facing threat and this reality directly

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influences the department's fiscal

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priorities . China's defense budget has

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nearly doubled during the past 11 years ,

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growing 6% annually on average . US

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defense spending has seen around 3%

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growth over the same period ,

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increasing below the rate of inflation

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over the last 5 years , and many of our

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allies and partners , uh , defense

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spending rates are even lower than ours .

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These limitations have allowed China to

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start closing the gap . Defending the

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homeland is the Department of the Air

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Force's top priority . We will we will

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be continuing to do so by modernizing

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our nuclear force , especially to the

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Sentinel , the B-21 , long range

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standoff weapons , as well as the

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nuclear command and control and

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communication that supports these

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systems . We're also eagle earr to

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support the president's golden dome for

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America . While still in a conceptual

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stage , there's no question that the

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Department of the Air Force will have a

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significant role in this project . Our

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next priority is to deter China . We

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will do this through investments in our

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people , our readiness , and our

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posture within the Indo-Pacific region .

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We believe that our people are and will

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continue to be one of the nation's key

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competitive advantages . We're working

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to train our airmen and guardians to

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confront the brutal challenges that

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warfare without sanctuary presents .

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We're emphasizing readiness by creating

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new inspections , assessments and

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exercises geared towards preparing our

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personnel for this environment .

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Finally , we are strengthening our

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posture with an Indo-Pacific region ,

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conducting high level operational

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exercises that will test our ability to

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deploy and operate in austere

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environments . Lastly , the Department

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of the Air Force is prepared to provide

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critical capabilities and forces to the

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joint war fighter in order to defeat

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our adversaries if deterrence fails .

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We will concentrate ours , our efforts

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in two areas . First , in our ability

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to fight today , and second , in our

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ability to fight in the future .

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Through our current and future

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investments , the department aims to

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establish a balance of high and low mix

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of combat capabilities optimized to

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project power both from within and

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outside the adversaries' threat

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environment . The Department of the Air

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Force is also looking to streamline our

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forces whenever possible . This

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includes finding creative ways to

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remove excess infrastructure and retire

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obsolete inventory . We also recognize

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our need and responsibility to pass an

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audit as soon as possible , and we are

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working to make that a reality . The

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Department of the Air Force is

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extremely proud of all of our airmen

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and guardians defending our great

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nation and its interest every hour of

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every day . We commit to working with

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this committee to secure the FY26

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budget request which will directly

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support our airmen and guardians and

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their uncompromising mission . We thank

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you for your time and look forward to

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your questions . Thank you , Mr .

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Secretary . uh General Saltzman ,

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you're recognized . Thank you Mr .

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Chairman . Chairman Rogers , Ranking

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Member Smith , distinguished members of

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the committee , thank you for your

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continued support and for the

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opportunity to testify on the Space

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Force's posture for FY 26 . Never

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before in our history has space been

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more critical to the future of our

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nation . No more than ever , satellites

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underpin our economic prosperity ,

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enabling everything from transportation ,

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communication to agriculture and

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finance . Space has likewise become the

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backbone of national security , and

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today's joint force is built around the

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assumption that space power will be

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there when needed . GPS allows our

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forces to mass and maneuver fires with

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unprecedented accuracy and efficiency .

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Satellite communications ensure command

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and control of operations around the

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world in real time . And today's

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cutting edge satellites provide the

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warfighter with constant and detailed

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battlefield awareness , alerting

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America's forces of missile launches

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and threatening adversarial activity .

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All of these effects and more are

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provided by your space force at a cost

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of only about 3% of the larger DOD

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budget and with less than 1% of the

12:52.619 --> 12:54.619
personnel . There's no question our

12:54.619 --> 12:56.730
nation's space force is a great value

12:56.730 --> 12:58.841
proposition for the department and an

12:58.841 --> 13:01.063
indispensable national asset for modern

13:01.063 --> 13:03.063
power projection . It is imperative

13:03.063 --> 13:05.008
that we match the dramatic rise in

13:05.008 --> 13:07.063
threats and increasing importance of

13:07.063 --> 13:09.175
space with resources to arm the space

13:09.175 --> 13:11.397
force effectively . The space force has

13:11.397 --> 13:12.786
been asked to accept new

13:12.786 --> 13:14.786
responsibilities and new missions .

13:14.786 --> 13:16.508
These new missions require new

13:16.508 --> 13:18.730
resources or we will face tough choices

13:18.730 --> 13:20.730
between delayed readiness , reduced

13:20.730 --> 13:22.175
capacity , or unaddressed

13:22.175 --> 13:24.119
vulnerabilities . To illustrate my

13:24.119 --> 13:26.341
point , in the past 3 years , the space

13:26.341 --> 13:28.119
force has been asked to take on

13:28.119 --> 13:30.230
critical new missions like ground and

13:30.230 --> 13:32.397
air moving target indications . Adding

13:32.397 --> 13:34.230
new space control capabilities ,

13:34.230 --> 13:36.397
advanced training requirements , and a

13:36.397 --> 13:38.508
threefold increase in launch tempo at

13:38.508 --> 13:38.409
our national space ports . The most

13:38.409 --> 13:40.520
recent addition to our mission set is

13:40.520 --> 13:42.631
the space-based technology associated

13:42.631 --> 13:44.687
with the Golden Dome program . These

13:44.687 --> 13:46.909
are not modernization efforts or shifts

13:46.909 --> 13:48.965
from legacy mission . They represent

13:48.965 --> 13:51.187
new requirements for missions that have

13:51.187 --> 13:53.187
never been accomplished by military

13:53.187 --> 13:55.298
space organization . By FY 26 we will

13:55.298 --> 13:57.409
have laid the foundational groundwork

13:57.409 --> 13:59.576
to continue these efforts in earnest .

13:59.576 --> 13:59.219
Our acquisition efforts are fully

13:59.219 --> 14:01.108
leveraging expanded authorities ,

14:01.210 --> 14:03.409
enhanced contracting mechanisms , and

14:03.409 --> 14:05.187
new processes like the software

14:05.187 --> 14:07.353
acquisition pathway . If the resources

14:07.353 --> 14:09.409
are made available , the space force

14:09.409 --> 14:11.020
will be postured to use them

14:11.020 --> 14:12.798
effectively in pursuit of these

14:12.798 --> 14:15.020
critical priority missions at a time of

14:15.020 --> 14:17.076
increasing adversarial challenges in

14:17.076 --> 14:19.242
the space domain . To be successful in

14:19.242 --> 14:21.298
our expanding mission portfolio , we

14:21.298 --> 14:23.187
must be able to control the space

14:23.187 --> 14:25.409
domain , protecting our capabilities in

14:25.409 --> 14:27.465
space while denying an adversary the

14:27.465 --> 14:29.520
ability to use space against us . In

14:29.520 --> 14:31.465
pursuit of our critical missions ,

14:31.465 --> 14:31.369
Space Force priorities have remained

14:31.369 --> 14:33.929
consistent build comprehensive domain

14:33.929 --> 14:35.985
awareness , deploy resilient mission

14:35.985 --> 14:37.762
architectures , and develop the

14:37.762 --> 14:39.762
capacity to hold an adversary space

14:39.762 --> 14:41.890
assets at risk . To that end , we are

14:41.890 --> 14:43.969
developing cutting edge sensors and

14:43.969 --> 14:45.580
networks to provide critical

14:45.580 --> 14:47.747
information to decision makers . We're

14:47.747 --> 14:49.802
bolstering our launch infrastructure

14:49.802 --> 14:51.247
and deployed proliferates

14:51.247 --> 14:53.413
constellations that are more resilient

14:53.413 --> 14:55.636
to attack . We are developing a host of

14:55.636 --> 14:55.130
innovative means to protect our

14:55.130 --> 14:57.239
satellites and networks . And we are

14:57.239 --> 14:59.128
investing in robust counter space

14:59.128 --> 15:01.350
systems to defeat space enabled threats

15:01.350 --> 15:03.350
to our forces and to our homeland .

15:03.619 --> 15:05.730
Driving a cultural change to increase

15:05.730 --> 15:07.452
the speed and effectiveness of

15:07.452 --> 15:09.452
acquiring these new systems will be

15:09.452 --> 15:11.452
critical to our success . In fact ,

15:11.452 --> 15:13.619
this is part of the Guardian DNA since

15:13.619 --> 15:15.619
improving acquisition was a driving

15:15.619 --> 15:17.786
force behind the creation of the Space

15:17.786 --> 15:19.841
Force from day one . Our acquisition

15:19.841 --> 15:19.330
professionals understand the unique

15:19.330 --> 15:21.330
needs of the warfighter , and these

15:21.330 --> 15:23.274
guardians have driven efficiencies

15:23.274 --> 15:25.108
across all missionaries , saving

15:25.108 --> 15:27.052
hundreds of millions of dollars on

15:27.052 --> 15:28.997
launch services , leveraging novel

15:28.997 --> 15:31.219
contracting authorities to shave months

15:31.219 --> 15:33.441
off contracting timelines , and setting

15:33.441 --> 15:35.608
a new record for tactically responsive

15:35.608 --> 15:37.719
space just last year . All this while

15:37.719 --> 15:39.774
embracing a number of changes to our

15:39.774 --> 15:41.608
institutional culture to support

15:41.608 --> 15:43.663
improved acquisition readiness , and

15:43.663 --> 15:45.663
sustainment , including standing up

15:45.663 --> 15:47.774
integrated units with sustainment and

15:47.774 --> 15:47.330
operations side by side and

15:47.330 --> 15:49.219
establishing enhanced acquisition

15:49.219 --> 15:51.441
training at all levels to ensure a firm

15:51.441 --> 15:53.552
understanding of how acquisitions and

15:53.552 --> 15:56.169
operations combine to to create combat

15:56.169 --> 15:58.830
ready forces . We must institutionalize

15:58.830 --> 16:01.052
these early winds to ensure the complex

16:01.052 --> 16:03.510
ecosystems of acquisition budget and

16:03.510 --> 16:05.669
requirements continues to rapidly

16:05.669 --> 16:07.836
produce the equipment our war fighters

16:07.836 --> 16:10.002
need to win in space . Today with your

16:10.002 --> 16:12.058
support , our nation's guardians are

16:12.058 --> 16:13.891
poised to ensure we maintain our

16:13.891 --> 16:16.058
national advantage in space . So again

16:16.058 --> 16:15.650
thank you to the committee for

16:15.650 --> 16:17.650
providing the support to make these

16:17.650 --> 16:19.817
successes possible and I thank you for

16:19.817 --> 16:21.650
the opportunity to highlight the

16:21.650 --> 16:23.817
tremendous work that our guardians are

16:23.817 --> 16:25.983
doing to secure our nation's interests

16:25.983 --> 16:28.094
in from and to space . I look forward

16:28.094 --> 16:27.780
to your questions . Thank you , General

16:27.780 --> 16:29.669
Saltzman . General Alvin , you're

16:29.669 --> 16:31.724
recognized . Good morning , Chairman

16:31.724 --> 16:33.724
Rogers , ranking member Smith , and

16:33.724 --> 16:36.058
distinguished members of this committee .

16:36.058 --> 16:38.002
I'm proud to represent the 677,000

16:38.002 --> 16:40.224
total force airmen serving our nation .

16:40.224 --> 16:42.336
Thank you for your support , not only

16:42.336 --> 16:44.558
to those airmen , but to their families

16:44.558 --> 16:44.150
as well . I'd like to open by

16:44.150 --> 16:46.094
expressing my immense pride in the

16:46.094 --> 16:48.261
exemplary performance of our airmen in

16:48.261 --> 16:50.206
securing our homeland and deployed

16:50.206 --> 16:52.261
worldwide . From the Indo-Pacific to

16:52.261 --> 16:54.539
the Middle East to our southern border ,

16:54.539 --> 16:54.229
they're working around the clock to

16:54.229 --> 16:56.396
deliver air power anytime , anywhere .

16:57.000 --> 16:59.000
The strategic landscape has shifted

16:59.000 --> 17:00.944
dramatically . We now operate in a

17:00.944 --> 17:03.167
world where the PRC is not only rapidly

17:03.167 --> 17:05.389
modernizing its military , but is doing

17:05.389 --> 17:07.556
so with the clear intent to coerce its

17:07.556 --> 17:09.778
neighbors and reshape the international

17:09.778 --> 17:12.000
order to include a PRC nuclear breakout

17:12.000 --> 17:11.829
that demands unmatched deterrence

17:11.829 --> 17:13.790
capabilities . In parallel , we're

17:13.790 --> 17:15.790
seeing unprecedented threats to our

17:15.790 --> 17:17.568
homeland . Our mission is clear

17:17.568 --> 17:19.346
maintain air power dominance to

17:19.346 --> 17:21.068
safeguard our security , deter

17:21.068 --> 17:23.234
aggression , and prevail in conflict .

17:23.234 --> 17:25.401
To achieve peace through strength , we

17:25.401 --> 17:27.512
must adapt and evolve . Reinforced by

17:27.512 --> 17:29.346
our most recent interim national

17:29.346 --> 17:31.401
defense strategic guidance , our Air

17:31.401 --> 17:33.734
Force has 3 enduring priorities . First ,

17:33.734 --> 17:35.846
we must defend the homeland . Air and

17:35.846 --> 17:35.780
missile threats are evolving in both

17:35.780 --> 17:37.724
speed and sophistication , and the

17:37.724 --> 17:39.891
ability to detect , track , and defeat

17:39.891 --> 17:41.558
those threats in real time is

17:41.558 --> 17:43.613
foundational to our national defense

17:43.613 --> 17:45.891
and is non-negotiable . Simultaneously ,

17:45.891 --> 17:47.947
the United States Air Force provides

17:47.947 --> 17:50.058
reliable , effective and safe nuclear

17:50.058 --> 17:51.947
deterrent that is the backbone of

17:51.947 --> 17:54.113
strategic stability . These priorities

17:54.113 --> 17:56.280
are paramount , cannot fail , and must

17:56.280 --> 17:58.336
be given equal weight . Finally , we

17:58.336 --> 18:00.280
must project power globally either

18:00.280 --> 18:02.391
independently or as part of the joint

18:02.391 --> 18:04.447
force to rapidly respond anywhere to

18:04.447 --> 18:06.669
deter aggression and win . This is what

18:06.669 --> 18:08.836
makes our Air Force unique , and it is

18:08.836 --> 18:10.891
needed now more than ever to achieve

18:10.891 --> 18:12.891
these priorities , we're asking for

18:12.891 --> 18:12.670
sustained support for modernization and

18:12.670 --> 18:14.781
the development of new capabilities .

18:14.781 --> 18:16.948
The FI26 budget request is designed to

18:16.948 --> 18:18.892
build a force aligned with today's

18:18.892 --> 18:20.837
operational realities . This means

18:20.837 --> 18:22.670
preserving current readiness and

18:22.670 --> 18:24.892
optimizing our force tailored to design

18:24.892 --> 18:26.948
for for contested environments , one

18:26.948 --> 18:29.114
that blends next generation aircraft ,

18:29.114 --> 18:31.059
autonomous systems , and resilient

18:31.059 --> 18:33.281
command and control . Our modernization

18:33.281 --> 18:35.503
efforts to rebuild our military include

18:35.503 --> 18:37.726
the continued development of the F-47 ,

18:37.726 --> 18:39.948
the integration of collaborative combat

18:39.948 --> 18:42.059
aircraft , and other possibilities to

18:42.059 --> 18:44.003
expand combat mass at lower cost .

18:44.003 --> 18:46.281
We're also upgrading the F-35 and F-15 .

18:46.281 --> 18:48.448
These platforms are critical to retain

18:48.448 --> 18:50.614
the edge of our war fighters need . At

18:50.614 --> 18:52.670
the same time , we're recapitalizing

18:52.670 --> 18:54.837
aging fleets essential for maintaining

18:54.837 --> 18:56.948
power projection in the interim . Our

18:56.948 --> 18:56.849
investment in nuclear modernization

18:56.849 --> 18:58.920
remains a top priority with funding

18:58.920 --> 19:00.920
directed towards Sentinel program ,

19:00.920 --> 19:03.339
B-21 radar , and the revitalized B-52

19:03.339 --> 19:05.619
fleet . These systems will anchor our

19:05.619 --> 19:07.952
strategic deterrent for decades to come .

19:08.310 --> 19:10.477
Equally important is the investment in

19:10.477 --> 19:12.810
our airmen . We're enhancing recruiting ,

19:12.810 --> 19:14.977
expanding training opportunities , and

19:14.977 --> 19:16.810
strengthening family structure ,

19:16.810 --> 19:18.643
support structures . We suffered

19:18.643 --> 19:20.866
recruiting setback due to the year-long

19:20.866 --> 19:22.921
continuing resolution and subsequent

19:22.921 --> 19:22.430
reduction of nearly half a billion

19:22.430 --> 19:24.390
dollars in our military personnel

19:24.390 --> 19:26.310
account . This will result in our

19:26.310 --> 19:28.366
inability to fund the recruitment of

19:28.366 --> 19:30.630
3000 Americans who want to join our Air

19:30.630 --> 19:33.390
Force . Furthermore , the reduced FY 25

19:33.390 --> 19:35.279
budget triggered triggered by the

19:35.279 --> 19:37.501
continuing resolution led to a decrease

19:37.501 --> 19:39.223
in facilities sustainment rest

19:39.510 --> 19:42.650
restoration and modernization by $642

19:42.650 --> 19:44.872
million directly affecting our airmen's

19:44.872 --> 19:47.094
quality of life . We must find a better

19:47.094 --> 19:49.510
way . Investing means ruthlessly

19:49.510 --> 19:51.677
prioritizing in the right capabilities

19:51.677 --> 19:53.899
and projects while divesting from aging

19:53.899 --> 19:56.066
systems and unused infrastructure . In

19:56.066 --> 19:58.390
January 2025 , we reported 23% in

19:58.390 --> 20:01.390
excess facilities and 60% in excess

20:01.390 --> 20:03.270
parking aprons and ramps . This

20:03.270 --> 20:05.492
inefficient lay down of force structure

20:05.492 --> 20:07.659
across our installations suggest there

20:07.659 --> 20:09.770
are opportunities for consolidation .

20:09.770 --> 20:11.881
Innovation or to divest and focus our

20:11.881 --> 20:13.992
limited resources where they are most

20:13.992 --> 20:16.159
needed with your support we will focus

20:16.159 --> 20:18.214
on utilizing existing authorities to

20:18.214 --> 20:20.326
reduce infrastructure , identify cost

20:20.326 --> 20:22.159
reduction and revenue generating

20:22.159 --> 20:23.992
opportunities and right size our

20:23.992 --> 20:25.992
infrastructure to achieve long term

20:25.992 --> 20:28.159
efficiencies . We don't just need more

20:28.159 --> 20:30.326
air force we need a more capable one .

20:30.326 --> 20:32.270
We need more tooth , less tail , a

20:32.270 --> 20:34.381
force that can deliver rapid decisive

20:34.381 --> 20:36.780
blows and reposition quickly . That

20:36.780 --> 20:39.002
means investing in platforms and people

20:39.002 --> 20:41.280
that enhance our war fighting capacity .

20:41.280 --> 20:43.447
More means more options for our nation

20:43.447 --> 20:45.613
enhanced homeland defense , strengthen

20:45.613 --> 20:47.336
deterrence and unmatched power

20:47.336 --> 20:49.558
projection . One strategically postured

20:49.558 --> 20:51.724
to deny adversaries , no other service

20:51.724 --> 20:53.910
can match what the Air Force delivers

20:53.910 --> 20:55.966
affects anywhere on the globe at any

20:55.966 --> 20:58.589
scale on minimal notice . Our airmen

20:58.589 --> 21:00.756
are the best in the world ready to win

21:01.180 --> 21:03.347
today and build the enduring force for

21:03.347 --> 21:05.347
tomorrow . With your support we can

21:05.347 --> 21:07.180
ensure the Air Force remains the

21:07.180 --> 21:09.291
cornerstone of American power through

21:09.291 --> 21:11.513
the 21st century . Thank you and I look

21:11.513 --> 21:13.736
forward to your questions . Thank you ,

21:13.736 --> 21:15.958
uh , General Alvin , thank all of you .

21:15.958 --> 21:15.829
I'd like to recognize myself first for

21:15.829 --> 21:18.750
questions . Uh , Mr . Secretary , as

21:18.750 --> 21:21.780
the space force works to develop , uh ,

21:21.790 --> 21:24.359
the culture of war fighting in space ,

21:24.709 --> 21:26.542
I wanna make sure that we aren't

21:26.542 --> 21:28.265
leaving behind our acquisition

21:28.265 --> 21:30.487
guardians . Uh , General Saltzman and I

21:30.487 --> 21:32.709
have talked about this at length . Uh ,

21:32.709 --> 21:34.876
can I get your commitment to make sure

21:34.876 --> 21:36.987
that , uh , we aren't gonna see their

21:36.987 --> 21:36.780
promotion rates falling behind , uh ,

21:36.790 --> 21:38.795
the average . Motion rates of space

21:38.795 --> 21:40.906
force officers and other categories .

21:40.906 --> 21:43.128
Uh , yes , Mr . Chairman , I , I commit

21:43.128 --> 21:45.474
to that . Thank you . And , uh , as you

21:45.474 --> 21:47.641
are probably , uh , we , I hope you're

21:47.641 --> 21:49.696
aware that , that , um , our current

21:49.696 --> 21:51.752
defense , and some of you referenced

21:51.752 --> 21:53.918
this , our current defense acquisition

21:53.918 --> 21:56.141
system is failing us . Uh , the ranking

21:56.141 --> 21:58.141
member and I have made it our focus

21:58.141 --> 22:00.363
this year , uh , to address that . Uh ,

22:00.395 --> 22:03.234
what specific authorities or support

22:03.234 --> 22:06.555
can we provide you , um , to fix this ?

22:07.819 --> 22:09.819
Uh , I think you actually you , you

22:09.819 --> 22:11.986
highlighted out right away with , uh ,

22:11.986 --> 22:13.930
making sure that we have the right

22:13.930 --> 22:15.819
workforce and promoting the right

22:15.819 --> 22:18.152
officers with the acquisition workforce .

22:18.152 --> 22:20.319
Uh , the experience I've had is if you

22:20.319 --> 22:22.430
don't have the right team , the right

22:22.430 --> 22:24.541
experience , uh , and educated team ,

22:24.541 --> 22:26.652
you're , you're at that can structure

22:26.652 --> 22:26.170
the program will execute the program .

22:26.420 --> 22:28.642
No matter what else you do , you're not

22:28.642 --> 22:30.698
gonna be successful so that that's ,

22:30.698 --> 22:32.864
that's a starting and then you have to

22:32.864 --> 22:32.560
give the , then you have to give the ,

22:32.569 --> 22:34.569
uh , the , the team the authorities

22:34.569 --> 22:36.625
right all the way from being able to

22:36.625 --> 22:38.847
manage , maybe not the high level , the

22:38.847 --> 22:41.125
lower level requirements , the funding ,

22:41.125 --> 22:42.791
the all the LEDs that go on .

22:42.791 --> 22:44.847
Delivering these systems you have to

22:44.847 --> 22:47.069
make sure that they have that authority

22:47.069 --> 22:49.236
to do so , um , and to be able to have

22:49.236 --> 22:49.119
that authority that they execute

22:49.119 --> 22:51.286
quickly and in a streamlined fashion .

22:51.286 --> 22:53.397
I think it's one of the problems that

22:53.397 --> 22:55.619
we have is in many cases technically we

22:55.619 --> 22:55.099
have a lot of authorities to do these

22:55.099 --> 22:57.043
things . It's just there's so much

22:57.043 --> 22:59.266
bureaucracy tied up in them , uh , that

22:59.266 --> 23:01.432
it takes too long . So that's the kind

23:01.432 --> 23:01.239
of things that's what we're trying to ,

23:01.310 --> 23:04.339
to , to weed out . So if your staff is

23:04.339 --> 23:06.561
already not doing so , I hope that they

23:06.561 --> 23:08.810
will stay in touch with . The HA staff

23:08.810 --> 23:10.866
and the SA staff because this is not

23:10.866 --> 23:12.977
just bipartisan , this is bicameral ,

23:13.319 --> 23:15.375
uh , and make sure that the language

23:15.375 --> 23:17.689
we're putting in this year's NDAA gets

23:17.689 --> 23:20.930
after the problems you just described ,

23:21.369 --> 23:23.425
uh , because we're all gonna have to

23:23.425 --> 23:25.591
live with what we , what we enact this

23:25.591 --> 23:27.758
year and , and go ahead , Chairman , I

23:27.758 --> 23:29.869
would be happy to personally sit down

23:29.869 --> 23:31.758
and walk through that with you if

23:31.758 --> 23:33.702
you're interested , well . We look

23:33.702 --> 23:35.869
forward to that . Uh , and also , it's

23:35.869 --> 23:38.091
my understanding that our newest KC 46s

23:38.091 --> 23:40.202
are coming off the line hovering at a

23:40.202 --> 23:42.258
fully mission cap capability rate of

23:42.258 --> 23:44.480
only 60% . We talked a little bit about

23:44.480 --> 23:46.702
this in the SIP yesterday . I just urge

23:46.702 --> 23:48.647
you to get after that . 60% is not

23:48.647 --> 23:51.900
acceptable , um . The you made

23:51.900 --> 23:54.067
reference to and , and , uh , and it's

23:54.067 --> 23:56.500
accurate , uh , that , uh , China's

23:56.500 --> 23:58.556
defense budget has doubled in recent

23:58.556 --> 24:00.389
years . In fact , I think it was

24:00.389 --> 24:02.722
General Alvin that brought this up . Uh ,

24:02.722 --> 24:04.667
we have got to address our defense

24:04.667 --> 24:06.722
spending in this country . We are at

24:06.722 --> 24:08.944
the lowest level of defense spending as

24:08.944 --> 24:11.111
a percentage of GDP since before World

24:11.111 --> 24:12.778
War II , uh , and it's , it's

24:12.819 --> 24:15.041
unacceptable . Uh , we're gonna have to

24:15.041 --> 24:17.097
deal with it . The president has set

24:17.097 --> 24:19.097
the goal . He , he told , uh , went

24:19.097 --> 24:21.152
over to Europe and . Uh , told every

24:21.152 --> 24:23.319
member of NATO , uh , that we all need

24:23.319 --> 24:25.541
to be getting the 5% of GDP and defense

24:25.541 --> 24:27.541
spending . I fully agree with him .

24:27.541 --> 24:29.708
General Saltzman talked about the need

24:29.708 --> 24:31.875
for his , uh , department to , to have

24:31.875 --> 24:34.041
budget relief , as did General Alvin .

24:34.041 --> 24:36.375
Uh , we can't do it at the current rate .

24:36.375 --> 24:38.540
this , this reconciliation bill is

24:38.540 --> 24:41.069
gonna be a , a nice bump , a one year

24:41.069 --> 24:43.660
bump , but to get after the issues we

24:43.660 --> 24:45.604
talked about , uh , in our opening

24:45.604 --> 24:47.771
statements and as y'all just described

24:47.771 --> 24:49.660
is gonna require sustained . Uh ,

24:49.660 --> 24:52.250
increases in defense spending and , uh ,

24:52.380 --> 24:54.547
I assure you that , that we're working

24:54.819 --> 24:57.041
to try to get there , but it's gonna be

24:57.041 --> 24:59.041
important that you continue to talk

24:59.041 --> 25:01.208
about it . Uh , the fact is the public

25:01.208 --> 25:03.152
doesn't just need to hear from the

25:03.152 --> 25:05.869
president and us . You need to be

25:05.869 --> 25:07.980
talking about it because you're the ,

25:07.980 --> 25:10.091
the tip of the spear and they need to

25:10.091 --> 25:12.202
hear from you what the challenges are

25:12.202 --> 25:14.313
for you to meet the threats given the

25:14.313 --> 25:16.480
constraints of , of your fiscal , uh ,

25:16.480 --> 25:18.813
support at this point in time . So . Uh ,

25:18.813 --> 25:20.980
with that , I will , uh , yield to the

25:20.980 --> 25:20.500
ranking member for any questions he may

25:20.500 --> 25:23.770
have . Thank you . Uh , excuse me ,

25:23.790 --> 25:25.957
just curious , um , it's been a lot in

25:25.957 --> 25:28.012
the news . Ukraine's drone strikes ,

25:28.012 --> 25:29.790
their effectiveness , ability ,

25:29.790 --> 25:31.734
basically tiny cheap , um , drones

25:31.734 --> 25:33.846
taking a billion dollars worth of big

25:33.846 --> 25:36.609
heavy equipment . How has that . has it

25:36.609 --> 25:38.831
changed your thinking at all about what

25:38.831 --> 25:40.942
our needs are going forward , uh , in

25:40.942 --> 25:43.053
terms of having more of those cheaper

25:43.053 --> 25:45.220
uh tradeable unmanned systems and also

25:45.220 --> 25:47.165
the vulnerabilities of some of the

25:47.165 --> 25:49.220
larger systems that we're building ,

25:49.220 --> 25:51.165
how does that change your planning

25:51.165 --> 25:53.331
going forward , um , or is the Ukraine

25:53.331 --> 25:55.220
Russia war sort of unique and not

25:55.220 --> 25:57.109
applicable to some of these other

25:57.109 --> 26:00.959
lessons ? Uh , I can , I

26:00.959 --> 26:03.015
can start , uh , Congressman , and ,

26:03.015 --> 26:05.070
and , and , and then turn it over to

26:05.070 --> 26:07.237
General Albin , but to be honest , I ,

26:07.237 --> 26:09.459
I , I don't think it changed my opinion

26:09.459 --> 26:11.570
at all . I've , I've been very , very

26:11.570 --> 26:13.681
concerned , uh , with that threat for

26:13.681 --> 26:15.792
years now . Um , we've seen it within

26:15.792 --> 26:15.520
the US against many of our

26:15.520 --> 26:17.742
installations and our inability to , to

26:17.742 --> 26:20.510
deal with those actually probably lower

26:20.880 --> 26:22.880
threat than obviously what happened

26:22.880 --> 26:24.880
within Russia , but that's , that's

26:24.880 --> 26:26.824
been an ongoing threat that that I

26:26.824 --> 26:26.800
think we've been thinking about for a

26:26.800 --> 26:29.000
long time . And and it's gonna take a

26:29.000 --> 26:31.056
whole of government approach to deal

26:31.056 --> 26:32.833
with in the US , um , it's very

26:32.833 --> 26:34.944
difficult to defend against that sort

26:34.944 --> 26:37.111
of thing if you're , you're restricted

26:37.111 --> 26:39.278
to only operating within your , your ,

26:39.278 --> 26:41.278
your the geography of your base . I

26:41.278 --> 26:40.560
think we have to work with the whole

26:40.560 --> 26:42.782
government to make sure that we have an

26:42.782 --> 26:44.949
approach to , to deal with that threat

26:44.949 --> 26:47.116
because it is , it is huge specific on

26:47.116 --> 26:49.004
that in terms of , ah , this is a

26:49.004 --> 26:49.000
system that we've been looking at that

26:49.000 --> 26:51.390
we desperately need now because of that ,

26:51.520 --> 26:53.742
whereas maybe we shouldn't build all of

26:53.742 --> 26:55.909
this because it's really expensive and

26:55.909 --> 26:58.020
really vulnerable . Uh , if I could ,

26:58.020 --> 27:00.187
I'll turn to Alvin maybe take a couple

27:00.187 --> 27:02.298
of those . Thanks , and Congressman ,

27:02.298 --> 27:04.631
you , you make the right point where we ,

27:04.631 --> 27:04.599
we shouldn't learn too much and we

27:04.599 --> 27:06.488
shouldn't ignore what happened in

27:06.488 --> 27:08.321
Ukraine because there are , uh ,

27:08.321 --> 27:10.655
geography dependent , context dependent ,

27:10.655 --> 27:12.377
but . I would say that uh when

27:12.377 --> 27:14.432
something like this happens it turns

27:14.432 --> 27:16.655
the idea of uh small and less expensive

27:16.655 --> 27:20.339
uh um capabilities from an academic

27:20.339 --> 27:22.339
conversation to a real conversation

27:22.339 --> 27:23.950
because we've seen it and so

27:23.950 --> 27:26.117
understanding the context that made it

27:26.117 --> 27:26.020
successful and those which might be

27:26.020 --> 27:28.099
limitations is important but to

27:28.099 --> 27:30.099
Secretary Menk's point , we sort of

27:30.099 --> 27:32.099
always knew this in the back of our

27:32.099 --> 27:34.321
mind . So when we're looking at it from

27:34.321 --> 27:34.060
two directions , first of all , to your

27:34.060 --> 27:36.339
point of where are our exquisite

27:36.339 --> 27:38.506
systems and what are the v . Abilities

27:38.506 --> 27:40.617
we hadn't considered before and which

27:40.617 --> 27:42.783
might be most vulnerable to those that

27:42.783 --> 27:44.895
might have to cross an ocean and part

27:44.895 --> 27:44.373
of our continent rather than just the

27:44.392 --> 27:46.662
the geography of Central Europe

27:46.662 --> 27:48.713
understanding those nuances but

27:48.713 --> 27:50.824
understanding also that there are the

27:50.824 --> 27:52.602
more the more sophisticated and

27:52.602 --> 27:54.602
dependent we are on those exquisite

27:54.602 --> 27:56.546
capabilities , the higher level of

27:56.546 --> 27:58.713
defense we need to have for them . The

27:58.713 --> 28:00.935
flip side that I like to bring up is is

28:00.935 --> 28:03.046
something that solves another problem

28:03.046 --> 28:05.324
when we see how effective these can be ,

28:05.324 --> 28:04.985
we need to think about . Putting them

28:04.985 --> 28:07.096
into our offensive arsenal and that's

28:07.096 --> 28:09.318
what we're looking at the United States

28:09.318 --> 28:09.166
Air Forces are changed and our new

28:09.166 --> 28:11.776
force design understands this , this

28:11.776 --> 28:13.885
sort of range of capabilities to

28:13.885 --> 28:15.718
include those when they could be

28:15.718 --> 28:17.385
responsive at low cost and be

28:17.385 --> 28:19.441
disruptive . So there's an offensive

28:19.441 --> 28:21.496
thing we need to consider on this as

28:21.496 --> 28:21.005
well , somewhat connected to that is

28:21.005 --> 28:23.116
the whole golden dome concept , and I

28:23.116 --> 28:25.116
have a number of different concerns

28:25.116 --> 28:27.227
about it . Um , it reminds me vaguely

28:27.227 --> 28:29.286
of the , um , future combat systems

28:29.286 --> 28:31.397
that the army cranked up 30 years ago

28:31.397 --> 28:33.619
where it was like . We know we gotta do

28:33.619 --> 28:35.786
a lot , so let's just put a name on it

28:35.786 --> 28:37.897
and say we're gonna do everything and

28:37.897 --> 28:40.119
it's all gonna work . It was a complete

28:40.119 --> 28:42.119
disaster , um , and the Golden Dome

28:42.119 --> 28:44.119
idea that there's one system that's

28:44.119 --> 28:46.008
going to protect it is a lot more

28:46.008 --> 28:48.380
complicated than that , so I'm . Don't

28:48.380 --> 28:50.436
have that much time so I'm gonna put

28:50.436 --> 28:52.547
both my questions at you and then see

28:52.547 --> 28:54.713
so number one , are we really going to

28:54.713 --> 28:56.769
make smart investments about systems

28:56.769 --> 28:58.769
that have real world application as

28:58.769 --> 29:00.769
opposed to engaging in some fantasy

29:00.769 --> 29:02.713
about some perfect system how much

29:02.713 --> 29:04.713
money could we potentially waste on

29:04.713 --> 29:06.547
that . Number 2 , I haven't seen

29:06.547 --> 29:08.602
anybody , um , in the White House or

29:08.602 --> 29:10.969
around this system talking about the

29:10.969 --> 29:12.580
implications in terms of how

29:12.580 --> 29:15.209
destabilizing it can be in the long

29:15.209 --> 29:17.431
running understanding of how to prevent

29:17.431 --> 29:19.542
nuclear war , um , which is that it's

29:19.542 --> 29:21.709
not winnable , uh , both sides need to

29:21.709 --> 29:23.820
be vulnerable . The message starts to

29:23.820 --> 29:25.709
get out there we're gonna build a

29:25.709 --> 29:27.876
golden dome so we can be protected and

29:27.876 --> 29:29.987
we might win . That can be incredibly

29:29.987 --> 29:29.699
destabilizing . Now there's probably

29:29.699 --> 29:31.810
ways to manage it , but the fact that

29:31.810 --> 29:33.977
nobody working on this is even talking

29:33.977 --> 29:36.088
about what we say to the Russians and

29:36.088 --> 29:38.255
the Chinese about this is a little bit

29:38.255 --> 29:40.477
concerning . So in 44 seconds , can you

29:40.477 --> 29:42.810
hit those two points , uh , Congressman ,

29:42.810 --> 29:44.977
I'll do my best to , to the first part

29:44.977 --> 29:47.088
about the capabilities . I think we ,

29:47.088 --> 29:49.310
uh , I have confidence that at least in

29:49.310 --> 29:49.030
the air domain in the United States Air

29:49.030 --> 29:50.863
Force , the capabilities that we

29:50.863 --> 29:52.974
imagine will be integrated as part of

29:52.974 --> 29:55.030
the Golden Dome are not just bespoke

29:55.030 --> 29:57.141
boutique capabilities for that . Uh ,

29:57.141 --> 29:59.030
you know , domain awareness , the

29:59.030 --> 30:00.863
ability to , to intercept , uh ,

30:00.863 --> 30:02.863
hypersonics and cruise missiles and

30:02.863 --> 30:02.750
those sort of things that those are

30:02.750 --> 30:04.972
applicable globally . So we will ensure

30:04.972 --> 30:07.028
that that that that's what it that's

30:07.028 --> 30:09.139
what it better be . I'm not confident

30:09.139 --> 30:08.869
that we're there . We better take a

30:08.869 --> 30:10.925
look at it just quickly on the other

30:10.925 --> 30:12.702
about the strategic stability ,

30:12.702 --> 30:14.869
Congressman , very quickly I would say

30:14.869 --> 30:17.091
what we need to focus on as a nation is

30:17.091 --> 30:19.369
re-getting our , our intellectual , uh ,

30:19.369 --> 30:21.202
capacity to understand strategic

30:21.202 --> 30:23.313
deterrence and now like we did in the

30:23.313 --> 30:25.647
Cold War , but understand it now with 3 .

30:25.647 --> 30:27.813
Capables which is different . It's not

30:27.813 --> 30:29.591
just an algebra equation . It's

30:29.591 --> 30:31.702
different when you have three , great

30:31.702 --> 30:33.758
powers or aspiring great powers with

30:33.758 --> 30:35.925
nuclear capabilities . It's a , it's a

30:35.925 --> 30:35.050
different equation we need to sort out

30:35.050 --> 30:37.217
to understand the risks . Absolutely .

30:37.217 --> 30:39.383
I just , I just hope we , we seriously

30:39.383 --> 30:41.550
consider . Thank you , Mr . Chairman .

30:41.550 --> 30:43.772
You're back . Thank the gentleman chair

30:43.772 --> 30:45.883
and I recognized gentleman from South

30:45.883 --> 30:48.106
Carolina , not California , wouldn't do

30:48.106 --> 30:50.050
that to you . South Carolina , Joe

30:50.050 --> 30:52.106
Wilson . And uh thank you , Chairman

30:52.106 --> 30:54.383
Mike Rogers for your proven leadership ,

30:54.383 --> 30:56.272
positive leadership in correcting

30:56.272 --> 30:58.430
states correctly too . OK , uh , we ,

30:58.619 --> 31:00.730
we appreciate all of your service and

31:00.730 --> 31:02.619
uh for a strong America for peace

31:02.619 --> 31:04.841
through strength . Uh , we're in a Cold

31:04.841 --> 31:06.952
War . Didn't choose between dictators

31:06.952 --> 31:09.063
with rule of gun invading democracies

31:09.063 --> 31:11.175
with rule of law . War criminal Putin

31:11.175 --> 31:12.952
and the Chinese Communist Party

31:12.952 --> 31:15.175
continued to expand and modernize their

31:15.175 --> 31:17.286
capabilities and rapidly expand while

31:17.286 --> 31:19.508
we're forced to react to changes in the

31:19.508 --> 31:21.730
battlefield . President Donald Trump is

31:21.730 --> 31:23.897
correct . Iran must not have a nuclear

31:23.897 --> 31:26.525
bomb to achieve their goal of death to

31:26.525 --> 31:29.410
Israel and death to America . The US

31:29.410 --> 31:32.609
must remain ahead of our adversaries to

31:32.609 --> 31:35.089
ensure we do not fall behind again to

31:35.089 --> 31:37.256
maintain peace through strength . With

31:37.256 --> 31:39.589
that in mind , uh , Secretary Mink , uh ,

31:40.810 --> 31:44.089
we are really grateful that the

31:44.089 --> 31:46.569
courageous patriots of Ukraine caused

31:46.569 --> 31:50.099
devastating historic damage to Russia's

31:50.099 --> 31:52.266
strategic bombers with a sophisticated

31:52.266 --> 31:55.729
drone attack . Ranking member Smith is

31:55.729 --> 31:57.660
correct . As he just recognized

31:57.660 --> 32:00.459
bipartisan support of our Ukrainian

32:00.459 --> 32:02.681
allies and the courage of the people of

32:02.681 --> 32:05.500
Ukraine , with that in mind , ever

32:05.500 --> 32:08.170
since war criminal Putin has invaded

32:08.540 --> 32:11.219
Ukraine , we're seeing drones take a

32:11.219 --> 32:13.349
larger role in conventional warfare .

32:13.619 --> 32:15.540
The most recent attack once again

32:15.540 --> 32:17.651
demonstrates the damage that low cost

32:17.651 --> 32:19.699
weapon systems can have to a

32:19.699 --> 32:21.719
battlefield . Does the Air Force

32:21.719 --> 32:24.119
currently possess the capability to

32:24.119 --> 32:26.839
protect its bases from such attacks in

32:26.839 --> 32:29.270
the United States and abroad ? If not ,

32:29.319 --> 32:31.430
what is the Air Force doing to ensure

32:31.430 --> 32:33.263
that we're able to counter these

32:33.263 --> 32:34.875
threats in a timely manner ?

32:37.650 --> 32:39.817
So I , I think currently it's , it's a

32:39.817 --> 32:42.094
very challenging , uh , as I mentioned ,

32:42.094 --> 32:44.150
we have a technical challenge , uh ,

32:44.150 --> 32:46.317
that we're addressing as quickly as we

32:46.317 --> 32:48.039
can with counter counter drone

32:48.039 --> 32:49.983
capability , uh , but I also think

32:49.983 --> 32:52.317
there is a , there is a there is a , uh ,

32:52.317 --> 32:54.150
basically an operating operating

32:54.150 --> 32:56.428
conditions challenge that we have , uh ,

32:56.428 --> 32:58.650
with , and it really is gonna require a

32:58.650 --> 33:00.928
whole government , um , as I mentioned ,

33:00.928 --> 33:03.150
uh , trying to defend against that sort

33:03.150 --> 33:05.317
of attack when , when we're limited to

33:05.317 --> 33:05.199
just operating within our geographic

33:05.199 --> 33:07.032
constraint . Of our base is very

33:07.032 --> 33:09.088
challenging . You have to be able to

33:09.088 --> 33:11.199
address these issues in a much , much

33:11.199 --> 33:13.421
broader perspective , uh , working with

33:13.421 --> 33:15.775
FAA , um , uh , local law enforcement ,

33:15.875 --> 33:18.005
the whole that that all has to be

33:18.005 --> 33:20.116
addressed , or I think we're gonna be

33:20.116 --> 33:22.227
continue to be very , very challenged

33:22.227 --> 33:22.204
to address to address that threat

33:22.204 --> 33:24.844
within the US or overseas . I , I can

33:24.844 --> 33:26.900
see the challenge . I grew up in the

33:26.900 --> 33:29.122
holy city of Charleston and so you have

33:29.122 --> 33:30.964
the uh Air Force base and the uh

33:30.964 --> 33:33.364
civilian air base uh airport next door .

33:33.444 --> 33:35.880
Good luck . Uh , also , Mr . Secretary ,

33:35.989 --> 33:38.156
the United States is known to have the

33:38.156 --> 33:40.322
most powerful air force in the world .

33:40.322 --> 33:42.656
However , we can't take for granted our ,

33:42.829 --> 33:45.119
especially China , as they continue to

33:45.119 --> 33:47.900
modernize , and I especially appreciate

33:47.900 --> 33:49.989
the issue as my father served in the

33:50.959 --> 33:53.770
14th Air Force , the Flying Tigers , uh ,

33:53.910 --> 33:56.132
in China during World War II , Kun Meng

33:56.132 --> 33:59.729
Chengdu Xian . Does the US currently

33:59.729 --> 34:01.849
have the capability to deter our

34:01.849 --> 34:03.349
enemies on multiple fronts

34:03.349 --> 34:04.349
simultaneously ?

34:07.160 --> 34:09.438
Congressman , I'll take a shot at that .

34:09.438 --> 34:11.660
I , I certainly , you know , as we look

34:11.660 --> 34:13.827
to , uh , size our air force , we also

34:13.827 --> 34:12.979
need to look at shaping it to your

34:12.979 --> 34:15.250
point of being able to project power

34:15.580 --> 34:17.802
anytime anywhere and be able to deter ,

34:17.820 --> 34:19.931
you know , we have , uh , uh , within

34:19.931 --> 34:22.153
the limited capacity we have a range of

34:22.153 --> 34:24.264
capabilities from high end to low end

34:24.264 --> 34:26.209
and , and as I mentioned about our

34:26.209 --> 34:28.169
reimagination of our force design

34:28.169 --> 34:30.336
understanding when we're learning from

34:30.336 --> 34:32.391
things in the Middle East that we're

34:32.391 --> 34:32.300
seeing that there are there are low

34:32.300 --> 34:34.300
cost capabilities we're starting to

34:34.300 --> 34:36.522
develop some . Low cost capabilities of

34:36.522 --> 34:38.689
our own so we're not on the wrong side

34:38.689 --> 34:40.800
of the cost curve when we're engaging

34:40.800 --> 34:42.911
with uh the the the Houthis and etc .

34:42.911 --> 34:44.578
etc . So as we do that we are

34:44.578 --> 34:46.467
preserving the force for the most

34:46.467 --> 34:48.689
pacing threat that our national defense

34:48.689 --> 34:48.639
strategy is basically set over the past

34:48.639 --> 34:50.929
near decade for the pacing threat of

34:50.929 --> 34:53.040
China . However , we retained through

34:53.040 --> 34:55.151
our capacity and capabilities and our

34:55.151 --> 34:56.985
interactions with our allies and

34:56.985 --> 34:59.207
partners the ability to uh deter across

34:59.207 --> 35:01.318
the rest of the . And in general , in

35:01.318 --> 35:03.540
regards to the A-10 fleet , we see that

35:03.540 --> 35:05.651
they're getting ready to be retired ,

35:05.651 --> 35:07.707
but it's just , uh , they've been so

35:07.707 --> 35:09.929
successful and important . Is there any

35:09.929 --> 35:09.610
way that instead of retiring them that

35:09.610 --> 35:11.721
we could provide them to our allies ,

35:11.721 --> 35:14.689
uh , such as Jordan , uh , to , um , to

35:14.689 --> 35:16.800
deter aggression ? The challenge with

35:16.800 --> 35:19.022
that congressman is the cost . It seems

35:19.022 --> 35:21.189
like it's cheap , it's not cheap . You

35:21.189 --> 35:21.050
have to have the ability to maintain

35:21.050 --> 35:23.050
them the depot structure to sustain

35:23.050 --> 35:25.800
them . The pilot , uh , uh , training

35:25.800 --> 35:28.022
institutional , the actual overall cost

35:28.022 --> 35:30.244
versus the value is more expensive than

35:30.379 --> 35:32.546
our allies could really afford or want

35:32.546 --> 35:34.601
to pay and for us we can't afford it

35:34.601 --> 35:36.379
within our budget to be able to

35:36.379 --> 35:38.490
privilege the higher end capabilities

35:38.490 --> 35:38.399
we need against the pacing threat .

35:38.580 --> 35:40.802
Well , we , we have your , uh , trust ,

35:40.802 --> 35:42.969
uh , in what you're doing , but , uh ,

35:42.969 --> 35:45.247
any way we can protect our allies , uh ,

35:45.247 --> 35:47.413
such as Jordan . Thank you very much .

35:47.413 --> 35:49.580
Thank you . Gentlemen , yous back here

35:49.580 --> 35:49.510
and I recognize the gentleman from

35:49.510 --> 35:51.709
Massachusetts , Mr . Moulton . Thank

35:51.709 --> 35:53.780
you very much , Mr . Chairman . Uh ,

35:53.909 --> 35:55.965
Secretary , may , congratulations on

35:55.965 --> 35:57.909
your recent confirmation . Uh , as

35:57.909 --> 35:59.742
Secretary of the Air Force , you

35:59.742 --> 36:01.742
oversee 2/3 of the nuclear triad as

36:01.742 --> 36:03.965
well as the space force . So , um , I ,

36:03.965 --> 36:06.076
I just want to pick up on some of the

36:06.076 --> 36:08.298
questions from the ranking member about

36:08.298 --> 36:10.353
the implications strategically for ,

36:10.353 --> 36:12.409
for Golden Dome . There are a lot of

36:12.409 --> 36:14.465
things that that are parts of Golden

36:14.465 --> 36:16.576
Dome that we clearly need to do . The

36:16.576 --> 36:18.742
Ukrainian attack on the Russian bomber

36:18.742 --> 36:20.909
fleet highlighted the vulnerability of

36:20.909 --> 36:23.020
bases , and that's a vulnerability we

36:23.020 --> 36:25.187
face as well . And you said that we've

36:25.187 --> 36:27.409
been working on addressing it . There's

36:27.409 --> 36:27.310
also bipartisan agreement on the need

36:27.310 --> 36:29.659
for better domain awareness so that if ,

36:29.909 --> 36:32.229
uh , we get attacked by hypersonics or

36:32.229 --> 36:35.219
other uh uh missiles coming our way ,

36:35.239 --> 36:37.580
we know , uh , in time to respond .

36:38.479 --> 36:40.879
Both of these things would increase

36:40.879 --> 36:43.580
strategic stability because we and our

36:43.580 --> 36:46.739
adversaries know that our nuclear

36:46.739 --> 36:48.683
deterrent is safe , reliable , and

36:48.683 --> 36:50.906
effective . So in other words , if they

36:50.906 --> 36:52.628
attack us , we'll know they're

36:52.628 --> 36:54.461
attacking and we will be able to

36:54.461 --> 36:56.628
respond and what establishes strategic

36:56.628 --> 36:58.406
stability for the world and has

36:58.406 --> 37:00.406
prevented a nuclear exchange for 70

37:00.406 --> 37:02.572
years is the fact that both sides know

37:02.572 --> 37:04.739
that . So how do you expect Russia and

37:04.739 --> 37:06.961
China to respond to the idea that their

37:06.961 --> 37:09.679
nuclear deterrent is not effective

37:09.679 --> 37:11.901
because Golden Dome will shoot down all

37:11.901 --> 37:13.346
their incoming missiles ?

37:17.530 --> 37:19.419
Uh , you thank you thanks for the

37:19.419 --> 37:22.330
question , uh , Congressman , you know

37:22.330 --> 37:24.386
that when we go to deterrence , uh ,

37:24.386 --> 37:26.108
you're exactly right . There's

37:26.108 --> 37:28.330
something , you know , started with mad

37:28.330 --> 37:30.163
many , many years ago , mutually

37:30.163 --> 37:32.497
assured destruction . I , I think as we ,

37:32.497 --> 37:34.663
the world we're in right now is , is a

37:34.663 --> 37:34.370
little bit different . You have a high

37:34.370 --> 37:36.537
level of strategic deterrence you need

37:36.537 --> 37:38.314
to do . Um , but there's also a

37:38.314 --> 37:40.530
significant threat , um , of , of a ,

37:40.600 --> 37:43.520
of a smaller scale attack , um , that

37:43.520 --> 37:45.870
is less than a full strategic kind of

37:45.870 --> 37:48.360
engagement but is still , but my

37:48.360 --> 37:50.416
question is you have to balance that

37:50.416 --> 37:52.969
Russia and China to respond to the idea

37:52.969 --> 37:55.040
as the president has stated that we

37:55.040 --> 37:57.151
will shoot down all of their incoming

37:57.151 --> 38:00.929
missiles . Uh , well , I , I would hope

38:00.929 --> 38:02.985
that the response would be that that

38:02.985 --> 38:05.207
they would , they would be more open to

38:05.207 --> 38:07.040
negotiation to ensure that those

38:07.040 --> 38:09.262
engagements never happened in the first

38:09.262 --> 38:11.318
place . Uh , in the end , you know ,

38:11.318 --> 38:13.429
peace through strength , right ? Make

38:13.429 --> 38:13.290
sure that we can protect ourselves ,

38:13.659 --> 38:15.899
and then , and then it , it opens a lot

38:15.899 --> 38:17.843
more opportunity for negotiation .

38:19.969 --> 38:22.136
That's my hope is not a strategy . And

38:22.136 --> 38:24.191
it would be helpful to know if we're

38:24.191 --> 38:26.413
going to spend . What the CBO estimates

38:26.413 --> 38:28.959
could be about $500 billion taxpayer

38:28.959 --> 38:31.320
dollars that we understand how our

38:31.320 --> 38:33.153
adversaries are going to respond

38:33.840 --> 38:35.951
because a more logical response would

38:35.951 --> 38:37.896
be for them to develop ways to get

38:37.896 --> 38:40.120
around Golden Dome . That's exactly

38:40.120 --> 38:42.287
what they've done ever since President

38:42.287 --> 38:44.398
Bush pulled out of the anti-ballistic

38:44.398 --> 38:46.398
missile treaty in the early 2000s .

38:46.398 --> 38:45.649
That's why they've developed

38:45.649 --> 38:48.120
hypersonics to get around those

38:48.120 --> 38:50.899
defensive capabilities . So if we're

38:50.899 --> 38:53.010
gonna put something up in the sky for

38:53.010 --> 38:55.620
$500 billion and it just starts an arms

38:55.620 --> 38:58.729
race . And then it doesn't work because

38:58.729 --> 39:00.896
they can get around it , then that's a

39:00.896 --> 39:03.118
massive waste of taxpayer dollars , but

39:03.118 --> 39:05.689
even more concerning , it decreases to

39:05.689 --> 39:07.856
treat strategic stability and it makes

39:07.856 --> 39:09.689
it more likely we have a nuclear

39:09.689 --> 39:11.610
exchange . But what is the

39:11.610 --> 39:13.777
administration doing to just unders to

39:13.777 --> 39:16.419
to develop a philosophy , a plan , a

39:16.419 --> 39:18.850
strategy for how this thing is going to

39:18.850 --> 39:21.560
work ? The enemy gets a vote here . The

39:21.560 --> 39:23.790
enemy does get a vote , and , and I

39:23.790 --> 39:25.979
would say two things , uh . Yeah ,

39:26.139 --> 39:29.290
first off , we've , there's really ,

39:29.659 --> 39:31.659
there's been an on race , arms race

39:31.659 --> 39:33.770
ongoing already . To be honest , what

39:33.770 --> 39:35.937
we're doing is responding , responding

39:35.937 --> 39:38.103
to the arms race , both from the space

39:38.103 --> 39:40.048
perspective , not just the for the

39:40.048 --> 39:42.326
nuclear perspective but from the , the ,

39:42.326 --> 39:44.103
the counter space space control

39:44.103 --> 39:46.103
perspective , um , the . The US has

39:46.103 --> 39:48.215
actually sat idle for quite some time

39:48.215 --> 39:50.270
and allowed the Chinese to make huge

39:50.270 --> 39:52.437
advances and really in some cases gain

39:52.437 --> 39:54.603
the high ground in that area . So , so

39:54.603 --> 39:56.548
sitting back and and and not doing

39:56.548 --> 39:58.659
what's necessary to the high the high

39:58.659 --> 40:00.659
ground in what area ? Well , well ,

40:00.659 --> 40:02.937
actually , unfortunately , Congressman ,

40:02.937 --> 40:05.159
they've made , they've made significant

40:05.159 --> 40:08.030
advances both in space . Air maritime

40:08.030 --> 40:10.141
across the board advantages where the

40:10.141 --> 40:08.939
advantaged

40:22.939 --> 40:25.106
their capabilities ? I think I , I , I

40:25.106 --> 40:24.800
wouldn't underestimate . I wouldn't

40:24.800 --> 40:27.133
underestimate . I'm running out of time ,

40:27.133 --> 40:29.356
but I agree that space is where they've

40:29.356 --> 40:31.300
expanded the most . So why are you

40:31.300 --> 40:33.133
cutting the budget ? Why are you

40:33.133 --> 40:35.467
cutting our space budget ? So the , the ,

40:35.467 --> 40:37.578
the final total budgets have have not

40:37.578 --> 40:39.744
been released , but we know we have we

40:39.744 --> 40:42.639
have talk about it . But , but what we

40:42.639 --> 40:44.750
know right now is the space budget is

40:44.750 --> 40:46.972
going to be cut . So you have no theory

40:46.972 --> 40:49.195
for how Golden Dome is gonna work , but

40:49.195 --> 40:48.800
we're doing it because China is

40:48.800 --> 40:50.911
increasing in space and you have no ,

40:50.911 --> 40:53.022
and you , you plan to cut this uh the

40:53.022 --> 40:55.022
space budget . Doesn't sound like a

40:55.022 --> 40:57.133
good plan . Uh we do have a , I think

40:57.133 --> 40:56.899
we have some pretty good ideas of how

40:56.899 --> 40:59.066
Golden Dome would be developed , and I

40:59.066 --> 41:02.500
think the gentleman's recognizes the

41:02.500 --> 41:05.060
gentleman from , uh , Virginia , Mr .

41:05.139 --> 41:07.028
Whitman . Well , thank you , Mr .

41:07.028 --> 41:08.861
Chairman . I'd like to thank our

41:08.861 --> 41:08.389
witnesses for joining us . General

41:08.389 --> 41:10.111
Saltzman , I was , uh , really

41:10.111 --> 41:11.889
encouraged by our conversations

41:11.889 --> 41:14.111
yesterday , and I'm glad that you share

41:14.111 --> 41:16.278
my sense that we need , uh , extensive

41:16.278 --> 41:18.111
launch capability across all the

41:18.111 --> 41:20.278
different spectrums , especially small

41:20.278 --> 41:22.222
and medium launch . We know . That

41:22.222 --> 41:24.445
we're quickly getting to capacity there

41:24.445 --> 41:26.989
at Canaveral and at um uh and there in

41:26.989 --> 41:29.100
California we we wanna make sure that

41:29.100 --> 41:31.669
we're using the other areas uh to the

41:31.669 --> 41:33.891
same extent that we're using Vandenberg

41:33.891 --> 41:36.169
and Canaveral uh from your perspective ,

41:36.169 --> 41:38.225
um , give me your thoughts about the

41:38.225 --> 41:40.058
value of small and medium launch

41:40.058 --> 41:42.225
capability , especially in the context

41:42.225 --> 41:44.336
of the National Security space launch

41:44.336 --> 41:46.280
program phase 3 lane one . And the

41:46.280 --> 41:48.447
rocket systems launch program , all of

41:48.447 --> 41:50.280
those integrated to make sure we

41:50.280 --> 41:52.447
continue to build that capacity we are

41:52.447 --> 41:54.669
still ahead of the Chinese there but we

41:54.669 --> 41:56.780
know what they're doing to to quickly

41:56.780 --> 41:58.836
catch up our existing facilities are

41:58.836 --> 42:01.058
getting at capacity pretty quickly . Uh

42:01.058 --> 42:03.225
thank you , sir . I , I agree with you

42:03.225 --> 42:05.336
completely . Capacity is an important

42:05.336 --> 42:05.169
issue with regards to our launch

42:05.169 --> 42:07.225
infrastructure . Uh , if we're gonna

42:07.225 --> 42:09.336
continue on the pace of growth , uh ,

42:09.336 --> 42:11.669
that we've seen over the last few years ,

42:11.669 --> 42:10.770
we're gonna have to increase that

42:10.770 --> 42:12.881
capacity . Uh , with regards to small

42:12.881 --> 42:14.992
and medium launch capabilities , this

42:14.992 --> 42:16.826
is an important area in terms of

42:16.826 --> 42:19.048
putting up experimentation , putting up

42:19.048 --> 42:21.326
prototypes , putting up demonstrations .

42:21.326 --> 42:23.326
This is all a campaign that reduces

42:23.326 --> 42:25.840
risk in programs that matures

42:25.840 --> 42:27.784
technology and rather than a large

42:27.784 --> 42:29.951
satellite or a large investment with a

42:29.951 --> 42:32.173
with a high end satellite , the ability

42:32.173 --> 42:34.489
to test payloads at smaller scale uh

42:34.489 --> 42:36.600
using small and medium launch will be

42:36.600 --> 42:38.711
important , uh , going forward . What

42:38.711 --> 42:41.045
I'd like to formally invite you to join ,

42:41.045 --> 42:43.211
uh , Representative Kiggins and myself

42:43.211 --> 42:45.433
at the Mid Mid-Atlantic Regional launch

42:45.433 --> 42:45.250
facility there . I hope that your staff

42:45.250 --> 42:47.361
will work with ours to set a date for

42:47.361 --> 42:49.472
us to go there and visit and continue

42:49.472 --> 42:51.306
this conversation . I think it's

42:51.306 --> 42:53.417
incredibly important . I also want to

42:53.417 --> 42:57.340
um talk about the space force's effort

42:57.629 --> 42:59.740
to have a tactically responsive space

42:59.740 --> 43:01.851
mission . I mean , we , we talk about

43:01.851 --> 43:03.962
the threats in space . Those continue

43:03.962 --> 43:06.129
to grow . We have to be able to do the

43:06.129 --> 43:08.018
the launch of a satellite 24 hour

43:08.018 --> 43:10.018
scenario . And that requires things

43:10.018 --> 43:12.185
across the spectrum . I think capacity

43:12.185 --> 43:14.351
at our at our launch , uh , facilities

43:14.351 --> 43:16.462
and the cadence that they can provide

43:16.462 --> 43:16.209
is there . The challenge is is how do

43:16.209 --> 43:18.600
we bring our partners in that produce ,

43:18.850 --> 43:20.961
uh , the space launch platforms , the

43:20.961 --> 43:23.183
constellations , the interfaces , those

43:23.183 --> 43:25.406
kinds of things . So wanted to get your

43:25.406 --> 43:27.517
perspective . uh , you know , we know

43:27.517 --> 43:29.572
we have the CAR program that has now

43:29.572 --> 43:31.517
been ramped up to where we can use

43:31.517 --> 43:33.628
existing . Uh , assets in space , but

43:33.628 --> 43:35.794
there are gonna be instances where our

43:35.794 --> 43:35.689
adversaries are gonna look to take out

43:35.689 --> 43:38.449
key assets and we can't find layering

43:38.449 --> 43:40.616
opportunities there . We're gonna have

43:40.616 --> 43:42.727
to be able to launch , uh , literally

43:42.727 --> 43:44.616
on a , on a moment's notice . I'm

43:44.616 --> 43:46.616
interesting in , uh , interested in

43:46.616 --> 43:48.838
your thoughts about how can we leverage

43:48.838 --> 43:51.005
commercial space launch capabilities ,

43:51.005 --> 43:53.227
not just the launch itself but also the

43:53.227 --> 43:55.227
interfaces and the satellites to go

43:55.227 --> 43:57.227
along with it . And can we use that

43:57.227 --> 43:59.780
capacity for testing training

43:59.780 --> 44:02.409
activities that can actually uh provide

44:02.409 --> 44:05.340
us opportunities to exercise and

44:05.340 --> 44:07.580
develop a capability if necessary to go

44:07.580 --> 44:10.050
at a moment's notice . Thank you , sir .

44:10.080 --> 44:12.247
I , I thanks for that question because

44:12.247 --> 44:14.413
I agree completely . Uh , first , uh ,

44:14.413 --> 44:16.580
I'm very proud of what our acquisition

44:16.580 --> 44:16.520
corps has been able to do in terms of

44:16.520 --> 44:19.199
reducing the timeline associated with

44:19.199 --> 44:20.866
what we're calling tactically

44:20.866 --> 44:23.088
responsive space . Uh , we were able to

44:23.088 --> 44:25.199
take a satellite from a warehouse and

44:25.199 --> 44:27.310
put it on orbit and operationalize in

44:27.310 --> 44:29.532
less than 90 hours . Uh , we were gonna

44:29.532 --> 44:31.810
beat the 24 hour launch order to orbit .

44:31.810 --> 44:33.977
Uh , 3 hours of weather kind of got in

44:33.977 --> 44:36.143
the way we did in 27 hours . We really

44:36.143 --> 44:38.255
reduced all of those , uh , to really

44:38.255 --> 44:40.421
provide a real capability . Your point

44:40.421 --> 44:39.969
about tests and training is spot on ,

44:39.979 --> 44:42.935
sir . The ability to buy . Capability

44:42.935 --> 44:44.713
and and maybe it's there for an

44:44.713 --> 44:46.945
insurance policy , but because we can't

44:46.945 --> 44:49.145
just have pay hundreds of millions of

44:49.145 --> 44:51.312
dollars for an insurance policy to use

44:51.312 --> 44:53.423
it on a routine basis to add test and

44:53.423 --> 44:56.264
training capability on orbit and then

44:56.264 --> 44:58.320
replenish that with the next reserve

44:58.320 --> 45:00.320
launch capability I think is a good

45:00.320 --> 45:02.542
strategy that we're exploring very good

45:02.542 --> 45:04.597
thank you . General Alvin , uh , you

45:04.597 --> 45:06.708
have a pretty complex , uh , calculus

45:06.708 --> 45:08.931
problem in front of you to go ahead and

45:08.931 --> 45:11.153
modernize tactical aircraft , strategic

45:11.153 --> 45:13.431
aircraft , all the different , uh , uh ,

45:13.431 --> 45:15.597
elements there , modernizing our , our

45:15.597 --> 45:15.350
nuclear deterrent , both , both the

45:15.350 --> 45:17.461
aircraft and with missile platforms .

45:17.649 --> 45:19.760
Give me your perspective on on how do

45:19.760 --> 45:21.927
you how do you do that ? How do you do

45:21.927 --> 45:23.982
that too in a in a realm where there

45:23.982 --> 45:26.093
may be a little infusion of resources

45:26.093 --> 45:28.260
but if you look longer down the road ,

45:28.260 --> 45:30.427
you know we're gonna have to find ways

45:30.427 --> 45:32.593
I think internally to make best use of

45:32.593 --> 45:34.705
the resource that we already have and

45:34.705 --> 45:36.649
then you talked a little bit about

45:36.649 --> 45:38.871
maybe redirecting resources . And being

45:38.871 --> 45:41.395
able to to maximize efficiency of what

45:41.395 --> 45:43.673
happens within the Air Force structure .

45:43.673 --> 45:45.839
So just give me a quick , quick , um ,

45:45.839 --> 45:45.835
viewpoint on that . Thank you ,

45:46.006 --> 45:48.117
Congressman . I say very quickly it's

45:48.117 --> 45:50.339
two parts . The first of all is do what

45:50.339 --> 45:52.562
we , we have been doing more recently ,

45:52.562 --> 45:54.784
which is more clearly articulating what

45:54.784 --> 45:54.156
we think the value of air power is to

45:54.156 --> 45:55.878
the nation , and that lets the

45:55.878 --> 45:57.712
department , the president , the

45:57.712 --> 45:59.767
Congress decide how . Air Force that

45:59.767 --> 46:01.934
they're willing to resource so we , we

46:01.934 --> 46:01.771
want to prove that but the other part

46:01.771 --> 46:03.882
is internally we're making sure every

46:03.882 --> 46:05.938
dollar goes to the maximum lethality

46:05.938 --> 46:07.771
but also solving fragility , not

46:07.771 --> 46:09.660
putting ourselves in into capital

46:09.660 --> 46:11.715
investments that we won't be able to

46:11.715 --> 46:13.938
adapt to the future , ingest disruptive

46:13.938 --> 46:16.104
technologies , etc . etc . gentleman's

46:16.104 --> 46:18.215
expired , and I recognize gentle lady

46:18.215 --> 46:20.327
from Pennsylvania , Ms . Hola . Thank

46:20.327 --> 46:22.438
you Mr . Chair . I'm gonna do my very

46:22.438 --> 46:24.604
best to ask two pretty wonky questions

46:24.604 --> 46:26.549
in my 5 minutes . I was in the Air

46:26.549 --> 46:28.715
Force as an acquisition officer and in

46:28.715 --> 46:30.882
keeping with this committee's emphasis

46:30.882 --> 46:32.993
on procurement and acquisition , uh ,

46:32.993 --> 46:35.090
modernization . Mr . Secretary , my

46:35.270 --> 46:37.469
first question is to you . Uh , we've

46:37.469 --> 46:39.469
long , uh , long been supportive on

46:39.469 --> 46:41.358
this committee of the Air Force's

46:41.358 --> 46:43.525
innovation efforts , uh , particularly

46:43.525 --> 46:45.691
through AF works and the Agility Prime

46:45.691 --> 46:47.747
program . Uh , I'm concerned by very

46:47.747 --> 46:49.580
recent reports that the vertical

46:49.580 --> 46:51.802
takeoff and landing or VTA portfolio is

46:51.802 --> 46:54.080
being de-scoped and terminated not due

46:54.080 --> 46:56.302
to contractor performance , but because

46:56.302 --> 46:58.413
of budget constraints and contracting

46:58.413 --> 47:00.136
shortfalls . These actions are

47:00.136 --> 47:02.358
obviously very risky because they waste

47:02.358 --> 47:04.358
taxpayer dollars and private sector

47:04.358 --> 47:06.685
dollars , and they also delay or . All

47:06.685 --> 47:08.907
capabilities that our military urgently

47:08.907 --> 47:11.395
needs . So my first question , and

47:11.395 --> 47:13.395
there are many , is , are there any

47:13.395 --> 47:15.395
transition plans in place to ensure

47:15.395 --> 47:17.284
that there would be continuity or

47:17.284 --> 47:19.354
orderly transition , uh , of the

47:19.354 --> 47:21.465
contract that's being administered by

47:21.465 --> 47:24.155
Afors and Vital contracts ? Is there a

47:24.155 --> 47:26.211
standard uh transition protocol that

47:26.211 --> 47:29.270
you're aware of ? Uh , I'm not aware ,

47:29.439 --> 47:31.600
uh , Congressman , uh , John Alvin ,

47:31.639 --> 47:34.040
are you aware of that issue ? One ,

47:34.800 --> 47:36.967
Congresswoman , one of the reasons why

47:36.967 --> 47:39.133
we had , uh , we looked to de-scope is

47:39.133 --> 47:41.411
again with the limited capacity budget .

47:41.411 --> 47:41.239
We're looking to find ones who did have

47:41.239 --> 47:43.350
a transition partner . So it's really

47:43.350 --> 47:45.517
about making sure we look at the force

47:45.517 --> 47:47.628
design and see how these capabilities

47:47.628 --> 47:49.461
can find their way into actually

47:49.461 --> 47:51.295
delivering capability to the war

47:51.295 --> 47:51.290
fighter . And so as we look at that ,

47:51.300 --> 47:53.159
we are , we are transforming our

47:53.159 --> 47:54.992
organizational structure to move

47:54.992 --> 47:57.159
towards . A more integrated capability

47:57.159 --> 47:59.048
command that can take those great

47:59.048 --> 48:01.048
innovative ideas but be able to see

48:01.048 --> 48:03.270
more clearly their value proposition so

48:03.270 --> 48:05.492
I appreciate that and this is where I'm

48:05.492 --> 48:07.715
trying to tease this out . When I was a

48:07.715 --> 48:09.603
while ago looking at my phone and

48:09.603 --> 48:11.715
realizing all of a sudden there was a

48:11.715 --> 48:13.826
capability to text or voice to text ,

48:13.826 --> 48:13.379
my first thoughts were , why would I

48:13.379 --> 48:15.580
ever need that . Um , I think the

48:15.580 --> 48:17.636
problem that I Struggling with right

48:17.636 --> 48:19.636
now is that these are technological

48:19.636 --> 48:21.469
ideas and innovations that don't

48:21.469 --> 48:23.580
necessarily have a natural transition

48:23.580 --> 48:25.636
because why would I ever need such a

48:25.636 --> 48:27.691
thing ? Um , I think that that's our

48:27.691 --> 48:29.747
problem in acquisition is that we're

48:29.747 --> 48:31.858
not being innovative enough and we're

48:31.858 --> 48:33.969
looking for traditional pathways that

48:33.969 --> 48:36.136
we used to have in acquisitions rather

48:36.136 --> 48:38.358
than being thoughtful about our our our

48:38.358 --> 48:40.413
transitions . I think that's correct

48:40.413 --> 48:42.636
and it's also a matter of tho those are

48:42.636 --> 48:44.858
the art of the possible that are always

48:44.858 --> 48:44.770
competing with the art of the known

48:45.060 --> 48:47.171
with respect to the readiness and the

48:47.171 --> 48:49.282
modernization challenges that we know

48:49.282 --> 48:49.260
of . So that's a constant tension that

48:49.260 --> 48:51.260
we have , but I , I take your point

48:51.260 --> 48:52.760
that we don't want to pass

48:52.760 --> 48:54.816
opportunities up just by focusing on

48:54.816 --> 48:56.704
the known risks . I would love to

48:56.704 --> 48:58.982
continue to follow up with you on this .

48:58.982 --> 48:58.750
Um , I also have understood . That

48:58.750 --> 49:01.389
there is conversation or report

49:01.389 --> 49:03.500
suggesting that the Air Force doesn't

49:03.500 --> 49:05.445
have enough people to manage these

49:05.445 --> 49:07.611
kinds of contracts , is this something

49:07.611 --> 49:09.833
that's true ? Uh , what is the basis if

49:09.833 --> 49:12.056
that's true for this shortage ? Is this

49:12.056 --> 49:14.111
happening because of doge cuts or or

49:14.111 --> 49:13.659
perhaps early retirements or

49:13.659 --> 49:16.620
resignations or perhaps in my case

49:16.620 --> 49:18.620
because we didn't see a pathway for

49:18.620 --> 49:21.969
promotion . So I , I made you over

49:21.969 --> 49:24.025
there . I , I , I don't think it's a

49:24.025 --> 49:26.489
numbers games , congresswoman . I , I ,

49:26.570 --> 49:28.737
I think it's what you hit on the end .

49:28.737 --> 49:30.848
I , I think we need to make sure that

49:30.848 --> 49:32.737
that we are , we are training and

49:32.737 --> 49:34.903
properly incentivizing the acquisition

49:34.903 --> 49:37.014
workforce to ensure that we have that

49:37.014 --> 49:38.959
that skill mix from the very entry

49:38.959 --> 49:41.181
level all the way up through the senior

49:41.181 --> 49:40.729
general officers . And that is

49:40.729 --> 49:42.959
something I will be focusing on because

49:42.959 --> 49:45.449
back to my earlier comment is the most

49:45.449 --> 49:47.810
important thing in acquisition love to

49:47.810 --> 49:50.032
talk more about a congressman , woman ,

49:50.032 --> 49:52.143
but the , the most important thing in

49:52.143 --> 49:54.199
acquisition is have a skilled , uh ,

49:54.199 --> 49:56.421
well educated team . Otherwise you have

49:56.421 --> 49:56.060
no , have no hope , and it's not just

49:56.330 --> 49:58.552
innovation . We have to be innovative ,

49:58.552 --> 50:00.719
but we also have to innovate faster

50:00.979 --> 50:02.812
than a potential adversary , and

50:02.812 --> 50:05.090
they're innovating very fast . So it's ,

50:05.090 --> 50:07.312
it's a combination of just innovation ,

50:07.312 --> 50:09.479
but you have to innovate quickly . And

50:09.479 --> 50:11.535
in the of the time that I have , the

50:11.535 --> 50:13.757
other thing that I remember very , uh ,

50:13.757 --> 50:15.701
acutely is that this is not just a

50:15.701 --> 50:17.868
force of uniformed personnel . There's

50:17.868 --> 50:19.812
a significant force of uh civilian

50:19.812 --> 50:21.923
personnel as well that we rely upon .

50:21.923 --> 50:24.090
Um , and my real concern is that we're

50:24.090 --> 50:25.646
doging these people without

50:25.646 --> 50:27.646
understanding why they're important

50:27.646 --> 50:29.479
because they are critical to our

50:29.479 --> 50:33.000
mission . I , I came through most of my

50:33.000 --> 50:35.167
career has been a civilian acquisition

50:35.167 --> 50:37.333
person in both the IC and the DOD , so

50:37.333 --> 50:39.444
I agree with the congresswoman , uh ,

50:39.444 --> 50:41.667
and that will be a priority to not only

50:41.667 --> 50:43.778
in the military side of the house but

50:43.778 --> 50:42.719
in the civilian side of the house to

50:42.719 --> 50:45.219
make sure we're recruiting . And and

50:45.219 --> 50:47.419
quality of service that's key to not

50:47.419 --> 50:49.308
just quality of life , quality of

50:49.308 --> 50:51.475
service across the board . Yes , and I

50:51.475 --> 50:53.308
only have 30 seconds left , so I

50:53.308 --> 50:55.419
probably will submit the bulk of this

50:55.419 --> 50:57.586
question for the record , but my other

50:57.586 --> 50:57.060
concern is with the Space Force ,

50:57.179 --> 50:59.179
general , uh , whether or not we're

50:59.179 --> 51:01.179
continuing to be very thoughtful of

51:01.179 --> 51:02.901
taking advantage of commercial

51:02.901 --> 51:05.123
capabilities that are already available

51:05.123 --> 51:07.290
to us rather than reinventing them . I

51:07.290 --> 51:09.457
remember the not invented here problem

51:09.457 --> 51:11.623
and would love to make sure that we're

51:11.623 --> 51:13.623
following . I follow up with you on

51:13.623 --> 51:15.790
that concern as well . Thank you , and

51:15.790 --> 51:18.012
I yield back . gentle yields back , and

51:18.012 --> 51:20.179
I recognize gentleman from Ohio , Mr .

51:20.179 --> 51:22.346
Turner . Thank you , Mr . Chairman Joe

51:22.346 --> 51:21.770
Saltzman , thank you for your

51:21.770 --> 51:24.379
leadership , not just for the , um ,

51:24.409 --> 51:26.409
amazing , uh , way in which you are

51:26.409 --> 51:28.298
rising to the threats that we are

51:28.298 --> 51:30.290
facing , but also your , um , your

51:30.290 --> 51:32.729
leadership in shaping the organization

51:32.729 --> 51:35.760
that is , is new and is rising , uh ,

51:35.770 --> 51:38.139
to the , the needs that we have . Um ,

51:38.310 --> 51:40.477
the , the topic I'm gonna discuss with

51:40.477 --> 51:42.532
you is not going to be a surprise to

51:42.532 --> 51:44.810
you , um , the , and that is what , um ,

51:44.810 --> 51:46.921
I believe is the Cuban missile crisis

51:46.921 --> 51:49.088
in space and that the fact that we are

51:49.088 --> 51:52.550
facing the prospects that Russia might

51:52.550 --> 51:54.790
place in space an anti-satellite

51:54.790 --> 51:57.012
nuclear weapon , uh , Secretary General

51:57.012 --> 52:00.989
of NATO . Rute um recently just said

52:00.989 --> 52:03.540
that uh as early as this year , uh ,

52:03.550 --> 52:05.606
Russia might place an anti-satellite

52:05.606 --> 52:07.439
nuclear weapon in space . Uh , I

52:07.439 --> 52:09.717
believe , as do many on this committee ,

52:09.717 --> 52:11.661
that that that that anti-satellite

52:11.661 --> 52:11.469
nuclear weapon should never be

52:11.469 --> 52:14.979
permitted to be put in space . Uh , you ,

52:14.989 --> 52:17.110
I believe , coined the , the best

52:17.110 --> 52:19.340
phrase ever , and that was you said if

52:19.340 --> 52:21.507
that went into space , it would be day

52:21.507 --> 52:25.070
zero , and many people think of that if

52:25.070 --> 52:27.181
it was , if an anti-satellite nuclear

52:27.181 --> 52:29.292
weapon was in space and was detonated

52:29.292 --> 52:31.514
that that would be day zero , but you .

52:31.514 --> 52:33.919
Uh , identified it's it being placed in

52:33.919 --> 52:36.219
space as day zero because you said that

52:36.219 --> 52:38.441
would be the day from which we would no

52:38.441 --> 52:40.330
longer be able to depend on space

52:40.330 --> 52:42.441
because the very next day it would be

52:42.441 --> 52:44.360
irresponsible to depend on space

52:44.760 --> 52:46.871
because if it was detonated as Doctor

52:46.871 --> 52:49.709
Plumb has said here , um , that , um ,

52:49.719 --> 52:51.719
it would wipe out everything in low

52:51.719 --> 52:53.830
Earth orbit and it would in low Earth

52:53.830 --> 52:56.280
orbit would be unhabitable , um , for

52:56.280 --> 52:58.679
up to a year . And it would take

52:58.679 --> 53:00.901
trillions of dollars in technology that

53:00.901 --> 53:03.120
we don't have , uh , in order to be

53:03.120 --> 53:06.000
able to respond to that loss . So since

53:06.000 --> 53:07.944
this is a budgetary hearing , Jill

53:07.944 --> 53:10.719
Saltzman , um , if that , uh , if day

53:10.719 --> 53:13.280
zero happened . How would it affect

53:14.290 --> 53:16.770
Your budget , the budget of DOD , the

53:16.770 --> 53:18.992
budget of the Air Force , if we were at

53:18.992 --> 53:21.570
day zero , and that anti-satellite

53:21.570 --> 53:23.681
nuclear weapon was permitted to be in

53:23.681 --> 53:25.850
space and we had to suddenly face that

53:25.850 --> 53:28.850
it would be irresponsible to count on

53:28.850 --> 53:32.090
space the next day . Well thank you for

53:32.090 --> 53:34.090
that and obviously I agree with you

53:34.090 --> 53:36.312
that this is a a tremendous threat that

53:36.312 --> 53:38.368
we have to think through in terms of

53:38.368 --> 53:40.840
contingency planning um a detonation on

53:40.840 --> 53:43.330
orbit would be catastrophic across a

53:43.330 --> 53:45.810
number of mission areas . It would foul

53:45.810 --> 53:48.889
the the domain , uh , it would foul

53:48.889 --> 53:50.556
certainly low Earth orbit and

53:50.556 --> 53:52.667
potentially middle Earth orbit for an

53:52.667 --> 53:54.778
extended period of time , so it would

53:54.778 --> 53:56.889
make replenishment and reconstitution

53:56.889 --> 53:59.000
extremely difficult . It would put at

53:59.000 --> 54:01.111
risk the lives of the astronauts that

54:01.111 --> 54:00.850
are currently on orbit . Um ,

54:01.340 --> 54:03.562
catastrophic . And so when you asked me

54:03.562 --> 54:05.673
how would it affect our budget , if ,

54:05.673 --> 54:07.840
if this was , if this came to pass and

54:07.840 --> 54:10.007
it became a real threat that we had to

54:10.007 --> 54:12.739
invest in to mitigate , uh , we've run

54:12.739 --> 54:14.850
some , some basic numbers in terms of

54:14.850 --> 54:16.961
trying to harden satellites and , and

54:16.961 --> 54:18.961
trying to position them in a way so

54:18.961 --> 54:20.961
that there's redundancies should we

54:20.961 --> 54:23.072
lose any portion of the constellation

54:23.072 --> 54:25.239
where we have redundancies and I can't

54:25.239 --> 54:27.295
get to a a cost reasonable number to

54:27.295 --> 54:30.989
say . With $3 trillion I can fix this .

54:31.229 --> 54:33.396
I just can't come up with a reasonable

54:33.396 --> 54:35.562
number and , and so that's why I , I ,

54:35.562 --> 54:37.673
I try to , I'm , I'm trying not to be

54:37.673 --> 54:39.785
too alarmist , but day zero really is

54:39.785 --> 54:39.570
that we just can't count on space

54:39.570 --> 54:41.737
because I don't know how to create the

54:41.737 --> 54:43.959
replenishment and the reconstitution to

54:43.959 --> 54:45.903
overcome that kind of a detonation

54:45.903 --> 54:48.070
should never be permitted to be , uh ,

54:48.070 --> 54:50.126
placed in , in space . Joe Sulzman ,

54:50.126 --> 54:52.403
thank you for the clarity of , of , uh ,

54:52.403 --> 54:54.570
your description of the threat if that

54:54.570 --> 54:56.848
is in space . Uh , Mr . Secretary , um ,

54:56.848 --> 54:58.848
you have some of our most important

54:58.848 --> 55:00.903
advances that need to be made , uh ,

55:00.903 --> 55:03.179
for our being able to , uh , address

55:03.179 --> 55:05.346
the advances that our adversaries have

55:05.346 --> 55:07.457
made . You have missile defense , you

55:07.457 --> 55:09.457
have hypersonics , you have nuclear

55:09.457 --> 55:09.189
deterrents , you have our new .

55:09.520 --> 55:11.742
Advances in weapon systems you have our

55:11.742 --> 55:14.070
advances in air , uh both manned and

55:14.070 --> 55:16.270
unmanned systems . Our adversaries are

55:16.270 --> 55:18.719
currently doing some things that we

55:18.719 --> 55:21.229
can't do , and you are the one who's

55:21.229 --> 55:23.629
supposed to close that gap . CRs have

55:23.629 --> 55:25.709
an impact on that . Uh , how are you

55:25.709 --> 55:27.598
gonna close the gap and could you

55:27.598 --> 55:29.542
please give a commercial as to why

55:29.542 --> 55:31.542
Congress should stop giving you the

55:31.542 --> 55:34.110
impediment of of continuing resolutions

55:34.429 --> 55:36.596
that affect your ability to close that

55:36.596 --> 55:40.530
gap . Uh , yeah , well ,

55:41.409 --> 55:43.742
yeah , continuing resolutions are , are ,

55:43.742 --> 55:45.965
are very , very challenging . Uh , they

55:45.965 --> 55:48.131
have implications , as was mentioned ,

55:48.131 --> 55:50.409
just from a personnel perspective , uh ,

55:50.409 --> 55:52.631
the personnel budget , um , it has also

55:52.631 --> 55:54.631
a , a significant in , in , in some

55:54.631 --> 55:56.853
ways and , uh , an outweighed effect on

55:56.853 --> 55:58.576
acquisitions , um , how you do

55:58.576 --> 56:00.742
acquisitions , how you start , how you

56:00.742 --> 56:02.965
be innovative as our last discussion is

56:02.965 --> 56:05.076
heavily infected by , by particularly

56:05.076 --> 56:07.020
with a year-long CR , um , it , it

56:07.020 --> 56:08.965
stops a lot of that or at the very

56:08.965 --> 56:11.131
least . Makes it much more challenging

56:11.131 --> 56:13.298
to get to get approved . So , so yes ,

56:13.298 --> 56:15.520
it , it has a huge impact , uh , on our

56:15.520 --> 56:17.353
ability to innovate and innovate

56:17.353 --> 56:19.465
quickly as well as , uh , making sure

56:19.465 --> 56:19.439
we have the personnel that can execute

56:19.439 --> 56:21.606
those programs . Uh , yeah , the , the

56:21.606 --> 56:23.717
Chinese have made , uh , I'd be happy

56:23.717 --> 56:25.883
to talk about it in a different , uh ,

56:25.883 --> 56:25.679
uh , a different form in more detail ,

56:25.760 --> 56:27.620
but they've made phenomenal

56:27.620 --> 56:30.080
advancements we have to be fired . I

56:30.080 --> 56:31.858
recognize gentleman from , uh ,

56:31.858 --> 56:33.802
Connecticut , Mr . Courtney . Uh ,

56:33.802 --> 56:35.747
thank you , uh , Mr . Chairman and

56:35.747 --> 56:37.858
thank you to the witnesses , uh , for

56:37.858 --> 56:39.969
your testimony , uh , today . Again ,

56:39.969 --> 56:41.969
at the outset , I just wanna , uh ,

56:41.969 --> 56:41.719
associate myself with , uh , the

56:41.719 --> 56:43.941
remarks of the chair and ranking member

56:43.941 --> 56:45.886
about the lateness of the budget .

56:45.886 --> 56:48.052
We're less than 4 months away from the

56:48.052 --> 56:50.052
start of the fiscal year . Uh , and

56:50.052 --> 56:52.108
we're now being told that the actual

56:52.108 --> 56:51.610
budget document won't be over here

56:51.610 --> 56:53.777
until the end of the month , last week

56:53.777 --> 56:56.110
of the month , um , and , uh , you know ,

56:56.110 --> 56:58.054
I certainly agree with Mr . Turner

56:58.054 --> 57:00.277
about the harm of CRs and the testimony

57:00.277 --> 57:02.054
of the secretary , but having a

57:02.054 --> 57:04.166
delivery date of the budget with less

57:04.166 --> 57:06.277
than 3 months to go , uh , before the

57:06.277 --> 57:08.610
start of the fiscal year , uh , I think ,

57:08.610 --> 57:10.832
you know , we're this process is doomed

57:10.832 --> 57:13.166
in terms of trying to avoid , uh , a CR .

57:13.166 --> 57:15.499
This , this place is not a rubber stamp .

57:15.499 --> 57:15.429
Um , Article 1 of the Constitution

57:15.429 --> 57:17.651
makes it pretty clear . Uh , you know ,

57:17.651 --> 57:19.707
who's the decision maker in terms of

57:19.707 --> 57:21.873
both appropriations and authorizations

57:21.959 --> 57:24.181
and the lateness of the delivery of the

57:24.181 --> 57:26.126
budget is the real impediment that

57:26.126 --> 57:28.070
we're facing , uh , right now . So

57:28.070 --> 57:30.181
again , um , the sooner the better in

57:30.181 --> 57:32.360
terms of it coming over on page 11 of

57:32.360 --> 57:34.610
your testimony , um , paragraph special

57:34.610 --> 57:37.030
mission aircraft . Um , there's a

57:37.030 --> 57:39.252
discussion about the replacement of Air

57:39.252 --> 57:42.110
Force One , program . Uh , again , I

57:42.110 --> 57:44.332
serve on the , uh , committee with Mr .

57:44.332 --> 57:46.166
Kelly that has jurisdiction over

57:46.166 --> 57:48.310
executive airlift . Uh , we had a

57:48.310 --> 57:50.429
hearing a couple weeks ago where

57:50.429 --> 57:52.485
Barbara Costello , the acting , uh ,

57:52.709 --> 57:54.876
secretary , assistant secretary of the

57:54.876 --> 57:56.931
Air Force , testified that there was

57:56.931 --> 57:59.189
actually some progress being made as

57:59.189 --> 58:02.030
far as the , the recapitalization of

58:02.030 --> 58:04.086
the two aircraft that were purchased

58:04.086 --> 58:06.252
back in 2018 . And she actually talked

58:06.252 --> 58:08.649
about possible delivery date , um ,

58:08.659 --> 58:10.715
sometime during the calendar year of

58:10.715 --> 58:13.159
2027 . Mr . Secretary , can you , uh ,

58:13.209 --> 58:15.889
sort of give us , uh , your , uh , uh

58:15.889 --> 58:19.820
view of that testimony ? Uh , I ,

58:20.000 --> 58:22.333
uh , yeah , yes , Congressman , we have ,

58:22.333 --> 58:24.444
and thanks for the question . We have

58:24.444 --> 58:26.500
been , uh , working closely with the

58:26.500 --> 58:28.611
contractor , uh , Boeing in this case

58:28.611 --> 58:30.667
to accelerate that program . Uh , as

58:30.667 --> 58:32.611
you know , it , it has experienced

58:32.611 --> 58:35.000
significant delays . Um , is it gonna

58:35.000 --> 58:36.833
get back into the 27 ? I , I , I

58:36.833 --> 58:39.056
couldn't guarantee that , Congressman ,

58:39.056 --> 58:41.167
but , but we're doing whatever we can

58:41.167 --> 58:43.444
to pull it back to , I think it was in .

58:43.444 --> 58:45.611
Before they started working to pull it

58:45.611 --> 58:47.778
back , it was in the 30s , I believe ,

58:47.778 --> 58:50.000
uh , so it's , it's tough to do and but

58:50.000 --> 58:49.510
we're working with the contractor to

58:49.510 --> 58:51.621
pull it back . I think 27 is gonna be

58:51.621 --> 58:53.621
really tough though . Yeah , it was

58:53.621 --> 58:55.843
actually 29 , I think was the last sort

58:55.843 --> 58:57.732
of guesstimate that was there and

58:57.732 --> 58:59.621
certainly , um , yes , we've been

58:59.621 --> 59:01.677
tracking this from day one . can you

59:01.677 --> 59:03.510
give us the cost estimate of the

59:03.510 --> 59:05.621
retrofit of the Qatar uh plane that ,

59:05.621 --> 59:09.020
uh , is all over the news ? I , I think

59:09.020 --> 59:10.964
it would be , uh , I think it'd be

59:10.964 --> 59:13.131
difficult for me to give you the exact

59:13.131 --> 59:12.939
details here , but we'd be actually

59:12.939 --> 59:14.828
happy to talk about some of those

59:14.828 --> 59:17.106
specifics in , in a different form . I ,

59:17.106 --> 59:19.161
I think there's been a number thrown

59:19.161 --> 59:21.328
around on of a billion dollars , but a

59:21.328 --> 59:23.550
lot of those costs associated with that

59:23.550 --> 59:22.979
are , are costs that we'd have

59:22.979 --> 59:25.201
experienced anyway . We've just said we

59:25.201 --> 59:27.090
will experience some early , uh ,

59:27.090 --> 59:28.868
buying additional platforms for

59:28.868 --> 59:31.035
training for spares , uh , things like

59:31.035 --> 59:33.312
that are actually the majority of that ,

59:33.312 --> 59:35.479
uh , majority of that of that amount ,

59:35.479 --> 59:35.300
so it wouldn't . anywhere near that ,

59:35.320 --> 59:37.153
but we can talk in details about

59:37.153 --> 59:38.876
exactly what we're buying in a

59:38.876 --> 59:40.709
different form and what the cost

59:40.709 --> 59:40.399
drivers are , but it's nowhere near

59:40.399 --> 59:42.621
that much . So I , I think , you know ,

59:42.621 --> 59:44.677
it's unfortunate that again and when

59:44.677 --> 59:46.843
we're hearing about all the challenges

59:46.843 --> 59:48.955
the Air Force faces that what I think

59:48.955 --> 59:51.010
is gonna be a pretty big ticket item

59:51.010 --> 59:53.177
can't be sort of uh discussed publicly

59:53.177 --> 59:52.520
because I think people need to know

59:52.520 --> 59:54.687
that . Um , and I would just say based

59:54.687 --> 59:57.409
on the experience of the 2018 planes ,

59:57.669 --> 59:59.613
uh , we know that the contract for

59:59.613 --> 01:00:02.290
retrofit was , uh , $3.9 billion .

01:00:02.379 --> 01:00:04.435
Again , some of that was purchase of

01:00:04.435 --> 01:00:06.601
the planes from Boeing , roughly about

01:00:06.601 --> 01:00:08.823
$800 million but again , if you just do

01:00:08.823 --> 01:00:11.046
the math , it was about . 3 billion for

01:00:11.046 --> 01:00:13.157
retrofit there's been cost overruns .

01:00:13.157 --> 01:00:15.157
They had to strip those planes that

01:00:15.157 --> 01:00:17.323
were built for another purpose down to

01:00:17.323 --> 01:00:19.490
the studs and as you said there's been

01:00:19.490 --> 01:00:19.320
issues . The contractor who was doing

01:00:19.320 --> 01:00:21.487
the interior work went out of business

01:00:21.487 --> 01:00:23.542
and Boeing has had to kind of figure

01:00:23.542 --> 01:00:25.709
out a plan to do the . The fitting out

01:00:25.709 --> 01:00:27.653
of the interior of the plane , but

01:00:27.653 --> 01:00:29.629
again just using that as an

01:00:29.629 --> 01:00:31.740
extrapolating from that . I mean it's

01:00:31.740 --> 01:00:34.469
clear that this new third plane is

01:00:34.469 --> 01:00:36.747
gonna cost well over a billion dollars .

01:00:36.747 --> 01:00:38.858
I mean it's just you can't retrofit a

01:00:38.858 --> 01:00:41.025
plane that's built for another purpose

01:00:41.025 --> 01:00:43.790
for Air Force One . And expected to to

01:00:43.790 --> 01:00:46.110
be a free plane , um , you've got , you

01:00:46.110 --> 01:00:48.620
know , install encrypted communication

01:00:48.620 --> 01:00:50.509
technology you have to harden the

01:00:50.509 --> 01:00:51.898
defenses you have to put

01:00:51.898 --> 01:00:54.064
countermeasures in there obviously you

01:00:54.064 --> 01:00:56.064
need to have all the , the , it's a

01:00:56.064 --> 01:00:58.064
flying situation room , um , that's

01:00:58.064 --> 01:01:00.176
there and uh the notion that we can't

01:01:00.176 --> 01:01:02.287
find out when we're about to be , you

01:01:02.287 --> 01:01:04.564
know , take up a very difficult budget .

01:01:04.564 --> 01:01:06.509
And and based on the experience we

01:01:06.509 --> 01:01:06.479
already have gone through with

01:01:06.479 --> 01:01:09.909
retrofitting , uh , planes that 747s ,

01:01:10.199 --> 01:01:12.840
um , it's clear that this is gonna be a

01:01:12.840 --> 01:01:14.951
drain on the Air Force's budget and ,

01:01:14.959 --> 01:01:17.000
and I think that the sooner we just

01:01:17.000 --> 01:01:19.056
sort of rip the band-aid off and get

01:01:19.056 --> 01:01:21.167
that information out there , it would

01:01:21.167 --> 01:01:23.333
be helpful for us in terms of deciding

01:01:23.333 --> 01:01:25.500
whether this is a a a smart path to go

01:01:25.500 --> 01:01:27.722
down without that oh go ahead thank you

01:01:27.722 --> 01:01:29.889
Congressman we we'd be happy to . Come

01:01:29.889 --> 01:01:29.524
down and talk to you in detail about it

01:01:29.524 --> 01:01:31.302
in a different environment . Uh

01:01:31.302 --> 01:01:33.468
unfortunately some of the particularly

01:01:33.468 --> 01:01:33.155
some of the things you're talking about

01:01:33.155 --> 01:01:35.554
what the what those costs are , are

01:01:35.554 --> 01:01:37.610
those are classified , uh , sense of

01:01:37.610 --> 01:01:39.387
capabilities that we put on the

01:01:39.387 --> 01:01:41.387
platform . So we'd be happy to come

01:01:41.387 --> 01:01:40.594
down and talk to you about the

01:01:40.594 --> 01:01:42.816
specifics , but I , I , uh , again I'll

01:01:42.816 --> 01:01:45.038
restate that that we believe the actual

01:01:45.038 --> 01:01:47.038
retrofit of that aircraft , uh , is

01:01:47.038 --> 01:01:49.261
actually significant it's , it's , it's

01:01:49.261 --> 01:01:51.205
probably less than $400 million to

01:01:51.205 --> 01:01:53.427
retrofit that aircraft . We'll be happy

01:01:53.427 --> 01:01:55.427
to come talk to you about it . Uh ,

01:01:55.427 --> 01:01:57.650
Jim's time expired . I , I just want to

01:01:57.650 --> 01:01:59.427
emphasize the point that , uh ,

01:01:59.427 --> 01:02:01.650
Representative Courtney just made , and

01:02:01.650 --> 01:02:04.129
I'm not blaming you , uh , but Congress

01:02:04.129 --> 01:02:06.409
is going to decide what we do and don't

01:02:06.409 --> 01:02:09.840
spend , uh , The administration ,

01:02:09.949 --> 01:02:12.389
OMB in particular , not giving us a

01:02:12.389 --> 01:02:14.550
budget is not going to compel us to

01:02:14.550 --> 01:02:16.989
comply with what they give us late . So

01:02:16.989 --> 01:02:18.989
whoever's listening to this hearing

01:02:18.989 --> 01:02:21.750
from OMB needs to understand . We want

01:02:21.750 --> 01:02:23.528
to have a healthy dialogue with

01:02:23.528 --> 01:02:25.694
military professionals like this about

01:02:25.694 --> 01:02:27.806
what we need to spend to get us where

01:02:27.806 --> 01:02:29.806
we need to be . We need a budget to

01:02:29.806 --> 01:02:32.110
help inform that dialogue , but if we

01:02:32.110 --> 01:02:34.110
don't get it , we're gonna write it

01:02:34.110 --> 01:02:36.332
without it . Uh , we've gotten a skinny

01:02:36.332 --> 01:02:38.221
budget which legally allows us to

01:02:38.221 --> 01:02:40.221
comply with the requirement that we

01:02:40.221 --> 01:02:42.443
receive a budget . So there's no reason

01:02:42.443 --> 01:02:44.554
not to get us , uh , some , uh , some

01:02:44.554 --> 01:02:46.777
information , but I think Mr . Courtney

01:02:46.777 --> 01:02:48.999
is right and we all need to acknowledge

01:02:48.999 --> 01:02:51.620
the fact that being uh . Uh , delayed

01:02:51.709 --> 01:02:53.931
with that presentation is not helpful .

01:02:54.110 --> 01:02:55.943
With that , I will recognize the

01:02:55.943 --> 01:02:57.832
gentleman from Tennessee , Doctor

01:02:57.832 --> 01:02:59.721
DesJarlais . Thank you , Chairman

01:02:59.721 --> 01:03:01.499
Rogers . General Alvin , uh , I

01:03:01.499 --> 01:03:03.666
appreciate our meeting yesterday and ,

01:03:03.666 --> 01:03:05.666
uh , also your comments about doing

01:03:05.666 --> 01:03:07.443
everything we can to accelerate

01:03:07.443 --> 01:03:09.777
Sentinel , as I noted to you and as our ,

01:03:09.790 --> 01:03:12.389
uh , chairman made abundantly clear in

01:03:12.389 --> 01:03:14.500
his opening statement , I'm concerned

01:03:14.500 --> 01:03:16.556
that the Air Force's decision to cut

01:03:16.556 --> 01:03:19.310
funding for FY25 adds risks to the

01:03:19.310 --> 01:03:21.729
program . Uh , the Sentinel program ,

01:03:21.929 --> 01:03:25.330
particularly if , uh , we begin FY 26

01:03:25.330 --> 01:03:27.590
on a continuing resolution , uh ,

01:03:27.929 --> 01:03:30.290
Secretary Mink , I'd like to ask you a

01:03:30.290 --> 01:03:32.457
question I raised with General Alvin .

01:03:32.729 --> 01:03:34.618
Will the Air Force be prepared to

01:03:34.618 --> 01:03:37.239
submit an anomaly request for Sentinel

01:03:37.239 --> 01:03:39.969
or reprogram additional resources to

01:03:39.969 --> 01:03:42.370
the program to avoid disruption ? Is

01:03:42.370 --> 01:03:44.481
that something you'll consider if the

01:03:44.481 --> 01:03:46.780
circumstances warrant ? Uh , so

01:03:46.780 --> 01:03:50.169
Congressman , Sentinel is , if not

01:03:50.780 --> 01:03:53.060
the number one priority for me , it is

01:03:53.060 --> 01:03:55.820
definitely in the top 32 or 3 . we will

01:03:55.820 --> 01:03:57.876
do whatever it takes to , to deliver

01:03:57.876 --> 01:03:59.987
that program as quickly as possible .

01:03:59.987 --> 01:04:01.987
It's nuclear deterrence at national

01:04:01.987 --> 01:04:04.042
security . We , we will , we will do

01:04:04.042 --> 01:04:06.098
whatever is necessary to ensure that

01:04:06.098 --> 01:04:08.264
that program is properly funded . Uh ,

01:04:08.264 --> 01:04:10.487
I , I , I expect you probably know it's

01:04:10.487 --> 01:04:10.340
in the middle of a numbercurity , so

01:04:10.340 --> 01:04:12.451
some of the work has been slowed down

01:04:12.451 --> 01:04:14.562
which which required a rephasing of .

01:04:14.562 --> 01:04:16.729
The Resources , but we are making sure

01:04:16.729 --> 01:04:18.896
the resources are there and that we're

01:04:18.896 --> 01:04:21.062
taking the appropriate recommendations

01:04:21.062 --> 01:04:23.173
out of democurity restructure and and

01:04:23.173 --> 01:04:22.879
move forward with that program . It has

01:04:22.879 --> 01:04:25.046
my highest prior . It's the thing I've

01:04:25.046 --> 01:04:27.212
spent the most time on since I've been

01:04:27.212 --> 01:04:29.490
in this job . It's only been 2.5 weeks ,

01:04:29.490 --> 01:04:31.601
but it is , it is the program I spent

01:04:31.601 --> 01:04:31.040
the most time on . OK , and by the way ,

01:04:31.120 --> 01:04:33.600
congratulations . Uh , I wanted to talk

01:04:33.600 --> 01:04:36.290
just for a second about , uh , Arnold

01:04:36.290 --> 01:04:38.457
Engineering Development Complex . Um ,

01:04:38.649 --> 01:04:40.871
first , General Alvin , I , I thank you

01:04:40.871 --> 01:04:42.982
yesterday . I want to thank you again

01:04:42.982 --> 01:04:45.205
for taking time to meet with the Arnold

01:04:45.205 --> 01:04:47.482
Community Council from AEDC last month .

01:04:47.482 --> 01:04:49.093
That , that visit was deeply

01:04:49.093 --> 01:04:50.982
appreciated not just by the local

01:04:50.982 --> 01:04:52.982
community , but by also the broader

01:04:52.982 --> 01:04:55.316
Tennessee congressional delegation , uh ,

01:04:55.316 --> 01:04:57.538
and Secretary Mink , we look forward to

01:04:57.538 --> 01:04:59.705
hosting you at Arnold at your earliest

01:04:59.705 --> 01:05:01.927
convenience . Uh , as you know , as you

01:05:01.927 --> 01:05:04.038
know , Arnold Engineering Development

01:05:04.038 --> 01:05:03.919
Complex plays a central role in testing

01:05:03.919 --> 01:05:06.040
for hypersonics , next generation

01:05:06.040 --> 01:05:08.330
aircraft , and potentially an expanded

01:05:08.330 --> 01:05:10.600
mission in the space testing depending

01:05:10.600 --> 01:05:12.378
on what happens with the basing

01:05:12.378 --> 01:05:14.810
decision for Space command . Um , but

01:05:14.810 --> 01:05:16.977
based on what we've seen , the current

01:05:16.977 --> 01:05:19.032
funding model doesn't appear to keep

01:05:19.032 --> 01:05:21.088
pace with the scale or complexity of

01:05:21.088 --> 01:05:23.254
those demands . Do you believe there's

01:05:23.254 --> 01:05:25.366
a need to rethink how we resource and

01:05:25.366 --> 01:05:27.588
manage test infrastructure like AEDC to

01:05:27.588 --> 01:05:29.754
ensure it's aligned with the Air Force

01:05:29.754 --> 01:05:31.810
and the broader mission , uh , where

01:05:31.810 --> 01:05:33.639
it's headed ? Yeah thank you

01:05:33.639 --> 01:05:35.861
Congressman for that question . I think

01:05:35.861 --> 01:05:38.083
it's , it's very important and as uh as

01:05:38.083 --> 01:05:40.139
I was mentioning before , we need to

01:05:40.139 --> 01:05:42.195
make sure we're getting every bit of

01:05:42.195 --> 01:05:44.306
capability out of every dollar we put

01:05:44.306 --> 01:05:46.417
in to the United States Air Force and

01:05:46.417 --> 01:05:45.989
so the manner in which we're sort of

01:05:45.989 --> 01:05:47.711
reimagining the way we develop

01:05:47.711 --> 01:05:49.933
capabilities in an integrated fashion ,

01:05:50.040 --> 01:05:52.151
uh , different from the past where we

01:05:52.151 --> 01:05:54.096
might look at developing a fighter

01:05:54.096 --> 01:05:56.262
system and over here a mobility system

01:05:56.262 --> 01:05:58.262
and here in a uh , you know , an IT

01:05:58.262 --> 01:06:00.373
system . Looking at it from an entire

01:06:00.373 --> 01:06:02.540
we call mission thread , what it takes

01:06:02.540 --> 01:06:04.596
to do everything from the concept to

01:06:04.596 --> 01:06:06.762
developing an entire capability . Uh ,

01:06:06.762 --> 01:06:08.707
that will allow us to to shed more

01:06:08.707 --> 01:06:10.707
light on some of those critical but

01:06:10.707 --> 01:06:12.262
maybe not headline grabbing

01:06:12.262 --> 01:06:14.484
capabilities , much like AEDC and those

01:06:14.484 --> 01:06:16.540
things that require the testing that

01:06:16.540 --> 01:06:18.762
that if you don't fund them , they will

01:06:18.762 --> 01:06:18.610
find their , uh , themselves the cause

01:06:18.610 --> 01:06:20.832
of slowing down of a program . So as we

01:06:20.832 --> 01:06:22.999
look at it through more of that lens ,

01:06:22.999 --> 01:06:24.721
I think we're gonna be able to

01:06:24.721 --> 01:06:26.832
highlight and advocate more for those

01:06:26.832 --> 01:06:28.999
critical but less popular , uh , parts

01:06:28.999 --> 01:06:31.054
of the entire capability development

01:06:31.054 --> 01:06:33.277
portfolio . And Secretary Min , did you

01:06:33.277 --> 01:06:35.277
have anything to add to that ? Uh ,

01:06:35.459 --> 01:06:38.179
just , uh , wholehearted agreement that

01:06:38.179 --> 01:06:40.401
the , the testing infrastructure across

01:06:40.401 --> 01:06:42.629
the board is just critical . Uh , for

01:06:42.629 --> 01:06:45.500
us to be able to train in in against ,

01:06:45.550 --> 01:06:47.661
uh , train against the representative

01:06:47.661 --> 01:06:49.883
threats of what we are almost assuredly

01:06:49.883 --> 01:06:51.994
gonna see overseas . Well , thank you

01:06:51.994 --> 01:06:54.161
both for that , and I'll just note for

01:06:54.161 --> 01:06:56.669
the record that OSD's ONE requirements

01:06:56.669 --> 01:06:58.780
are placing a real burden on the work

01:06:58.780 --> 01:07:00.613
being done to modernize Arnold .

01:07:00.709 --> 01:07:03.669
Director Wilcox , who oversees uh TNE ,

01:07:03.699 --> 01:07:05.949
has been a strong advocate for Arnold's

01:07:05.949 --> 01:07:08.850
unique mission . But as far as we're

01:07:08.850 --> 01:07:10.683
aware , there's no clear path to

01:07:10.683 --> 01:07:13.129
address this through NDAA , uh , only

01:07:13.129 --> 01:07:16.239
through OSD's internal policy direction .

01:07:16.489 --> 01:07:18.600
So I plan to raise this directly with

01:07:18.600 --> 01:07:20.711
Secretary Hegseth in the coming weeks

01:07:20.711 --> 01:07:22.933
and hope I can count on your support as

01:07:22.933 --> 01:07:24.822
we look to accelerate our testing

01:07:24.822 --> 01:07:27.045
enterprise . And with that , Chairman ,

01:07:27.045 --> 01:07:29.322
I yield back . Gentlemen , yields back ,

01:07:29.322 --> 01:07:31.489
chair , and I recognize gentleman from

01:07:31.489 --> 01:07:31.169
Colorado , Mr . Crow . Thank you ,

01:07:31.209 --> 01:07:33.431
Chairman . Uh , General Saltzman , what

01:07:33.431 --> 01:07:35.153
is your most important asset ?

01:07:38.540 --> 01:07:40.873
Talking about the on orbit capabilities ,

01:07:40.873 --> 01:07:43.040
uh , I hope you say it's your people .

01:07:43.040 --> 01:07:44.984
Well , of course I mean there's no

01:07:44.984 --> 01:07:46.707
doubt that the acquisition and

01:07:46.707 --> 01:07:48.762
operators and intelligence persons ,

01:07:48.762 --> 01:07:50.651
it's the guardians do they have a

01:07:50.651 --> 01:07:52.596
unique skill set and and technical

01:07:52.596 --> 01:07:55.929
capability ? Yes . Uh , do you rely on

01:07:55.929 --> 01:07:59.709
a large civilian workforce ? Uh , in

01:07:59.709 --> 01:08:01.709
relative comparison , probably it's

01:08:01.709 --> 01:08:03.931
about 5000 civilians in the space force

01:08:03.931 --> 01:08:06.153
of our total less than 15,000 , uh , so

01:08:06.153 --> 01:08:08.431
about a , about a third , over a third ,

01:08:08.431 --> 01:08:10.487
which is larger proportion than most

01:08:10.487 --> 01:08:14.379
services , sir , um . Secretary

01:08:14.379 --> 01:08:16.212
Mink , uh , would you share that

01:08:16.212 --> 01:08:18.212
assessment that your most important

01:08:18.212 --> 01:08:19.879
asset is your people ? Yeah ,

01:08:19.879 --> 01:08:21.879
definitely , Congressman . And that

01:08:21.879 --> 01:08:23.823
your people have unique skills and

01:08:23.823 --> 01:08:26.046
capabilities . Yes , they do . And that

01:08:26.046 --> 01:08:28.212
the civilian workforce is an essential

01:08:28.212 --> 01:08:30.157
element to your mission ? Uh yes ,

01:08:30.157 --> 01:08:32.379
across the entire department . Um , can

01:08:32.379 --> 01:08:34.490
General Saltzman , can you force your

01:08:34.490 --> 01:08:37.789
civilian workforce to move ? Uh , not

01:08:37.789 --> 01:08:40.389
most of them . Guardians , active duty

01:08:40.389 --> 01:08:42.548
service members , you , you can , you

01:08:42.548 --> 01:08:44.659
can compelled to move , but you can't

01:08:44.659 --> 01:08:46.715
go to a civilian and say you have to

01:08:46.715 --> 01:08:48.881
relocate you and your family with very

01:08:48.881 --> 01:08:51.104
few exceptions . They , they can , they

01:08:51.104 --> 01:08:50.628
can actually leave employment if you do

01:08:50.628 --> 01:08:53.139
that . What would happen if you lost

01:08:53.909 --> 01:08:56.429
half of your of your civilian workforce

01:08:56.429 --> 01:08:59.930
for a major unit or capability ? It

01:08:59.930 --> 01:09:02.108
would The , that unit would be

01:09:02.108 --> 01:09:04.469
underperforming . Uh , is China moving

01:09:04.469 --> 01:09:07.668
really fast ? Yes , sir . Uh , are they ,

01:09:07.789 --> 01:09:09.956
are they moving faster than us in some

01:09:09.956 --> 01:09:13.680
capability in some technologies ? Uh ,

01:09:13.790 --> 01:09:15.790
I , I , I don't know how to measure

01:09:15.879 --> 01:09:17.935
speed of , of certain capabilities ,

01:09:17.935 --> 01:09:20.101
but they are definitely moving fast in

01:09:20.101 --> 01:09:22.212
counter space capabilities . So if we

01:09:22.212 --> 01:09:24.870
slow down . One of our capabilities ,

01:09:25.040 --> 01:09:26.873
would that put us at a strategic

01:09:26.873 --> 01:09:28.929
disadvantage ? I do not want to slow

01:09:28.929 --> 01:09:30.651
down development of any of our

01:09:30.651 --> 01:09:34.580
capabilities . Secretary Mink , um , US

01:09:34.580 --> 01:09:36.469
Space Command is headquartered in

01:09:36.469 --> 01:09:38.609
Colorado . Uh , it's at full

01:09:38.609 --> 01:09:40.665
operational capability and it relies

01:09:40.665 --> 01:09:42.998
substantially on the civilian workforce ,

01:09:42.998 --> 01:09:46.419
correct ? That's correct . Um ,

01:09:46.910 --> 01:09:48.799
are you familiar with some of the

01:09:48.799 --> 01:09:50.966
surveys that were done of the civilian

01:09:50.966 --> 01:09:53.077
workforce that if it were to be moved

01:09:53.077 --> 01:09:55.299
out of Colorado , a substantial portion

01:09:55.299 --> 01:09:57.521
of that civilian workforce would refuse

01:09:57.521 --> 01:09:59.799
to move ? Uh , yes , Congressman , I'm ,

01:09:59.799 --> 01:10:02.021
I'm aware that that we would , we would

01:10:02.021 --> 01:10:04.021
have attrition and it would be very

01:10:04.021 --> 01:10:06.077
important that we manage that , that

01:10:06.077 --> 01:10:08.299
move over over a period of time if that

01:10:08.299 --> 01:10:10.521
occurs . Would it , would it , would it

01:10:10.521 --> 01:10:10.359
with what General Saltzman just said

01:10:10.359 --> 01:10:12.669
would it slow us down though relative

01:10:12.669 --> 01:10:16.430
to the speed of China ? I , I , I think

01:10:16.430 --> 01:10:18.310
it would be our job to , to do

01:10:18.310 --> 01:10:20.143
everything we can to ensure that

01:10:20.143 --> 01:10:22.199
doesn't happen . Well , of course it

01:10:22.199 --> 01:10:24.143
would be your job , but it is true

01:10:24.149 --> 01:10:26.299
those civilian workers , many of whom

01:10:26.299 --> 01:10:28.521
have said outright they will not move ,

01:10:28.521 --> 01:10:30.743
and that's why it's unacceptable , uh ,

01:10:30.743 --> 01:10:32.799
in a , in a very important command a

01:10:32.799 --> 01:10:34.855
mission that that we move it at this

01:10:34.855 --> 01:10:36.743
time , uh , or ever . It's , it's

01:10:36.743 --> 01:10:39.270
working , it's built out and we owe it

01:10:39.270 --> 01:10:41.492
to America and our national security to

01:10:41.492 --> 01:10:44.149
invest in it in Colorado . Uh , and

01:10:44.149 --> 01:10:46.371
there's a lot of folks in , in Congress

01:10:46.371 --> 01:10:49.020
who , um , believe that is an important

01:10:49.020 --> 01:10:51.353
part of our mission in national defense .

01:10:51.430 --> 01:10:53.263
General Alvin , to you , are you

01:10:53.263 --> 01:10:55.208
familiar with our national defense

01:10:55.208 --> 01:10:57.100
strategy ? I'm familiar with the

01:10:57.100 --> 01:10:59.100
current one as well as the national

01:10:59.100 --> 01:11:01.211
defense strategic guidance here . And

01:11:01.211 --> 01:11:00.939
what's the number one goal of the

01:11:00.939 --> 01:11:02.995
national defense strategy defend the

01:11:02.995 --> 01:11:04.883
homeland , uh , and do we have an

01:11:04.883 --> 01:11:06.939
integrated fully capable air defense

01:11:06.939 --> 01:11:09.050
system , uh , that , that can operate

01:11:09.050 --> 01:11:11.217
without fixed wing aircraft to do that

01:11:11.217 --> 01:11:13.328
job ? Could you repeat the question ?

01:11:13.339 --> 01:11:15.450
Do we have a , can we do that without

01:11:15.450 --> 01:11:17.899
fighter jets in the United States ? Not

01:11:17.899 --> 01:11:21.100
currently . No , not in the next 8

01:11:21.100 --> 01:11:22.933
years , could we do that without

01:11:22.933 --> 01:11:24.989
fighter jets ? Hard to predict if we

01:11:24.989 --> 01:11:27.267
have our collaborative combat aircraft .

01:11:27.267 --> 01:11:29.509
It's unlikely , isn't it ? Given our

01:11:29.509 --> 01:11:31.565
current inventory , are you familiar

01:11:31.565 --> 01:11:33.453
with the , the , the commander of

01:11:33.453 --> 01:11:35.676
Northcom came before this committee and

01:11:35.676 --> 01:11:38.500
just last year testified that It is

01:11:38.500 --> 01:11:41.529
essential for his capability to protect

01:11:41.529 --> 01:11:44.810
the homeland that there be fighter jets

01:11:45.180 --> 01:11:48.700
in Colorado on mission ready status to

01:11:48.700 --> 01:11:50.811
conduct to protect the western United

01:11:50.811 --> 01:11:52.811
States . Are you familiar with that

01:11:52.811 --> 01:11:52.299
testimony ? I'm not familiar with his

01:11:52.299 --> 01:11:54.355
testimony , but I trust Young Guyo ,

01:11:54.355 --> 01:11:56.577
and I trust that if he said that , uh ,

01:11:56.577 --> 01:11:58.466
he did that under his predecessor

01:11:58.466 --> 01:12:00.632
authority as , uh , the responsibility

01:12:00.632 --> 01:12:00.580
for NoA Northcom . Why represent

01:12:00.580 --> 01:12:02.580
Buckley Space Force Base where that

01:12:02.580 --> 01:12:04.691
mission is located ? Uh , there are ,

01:12:04.691 --> 01:12:06.747
there are , there's an F-16 squadron

01:12:06.747 --> 01:12:08.858
there that actually does that mission

01:12:08.858 --> 01:12:11.191
of protecting the western United States .

01:12:11.191 --> 01:12:13.870
There is no integrated , fully capable

01:12:13.870 --> 01:12:15.926
missile defense system in the United

01:12:15.926 --> 01:12:19.229
States . We need a plan to recapitalize

01:12:19.229 --> 01:12:21.029
that fighter wing to keep that

01:12:21.029 --> 01:12:23.140
capability and protect the homeland .

01:12:23.140 --> 01:12:25.085
We all want to invest in long term

01:12:25.085 --> 01:12:27.307
capabilities , but that is a ways out .

01:12:27.307 --> 01:12:28.973
We need to make those interim

01:12:28.973 --> 01:12:31.085
investments today to make sure we can

01:12:31.085 --> 01:12:33.140
accomplish that mission . Ayy back .

01:12:33.140 --> 01:12:35.399
Gentlemany's back . Cheer now

01:12:35.399 --> 01:12:37.510
recognizes as general from Nebraska ,

01:12:37.510 --> 01:12:39.343
General Bacon . Thank you , Mr .

01:12:39.343 --> 01:12:41.455
Chairman , and thank you to all three

01:12:41.455 --> 01:12:43.455
of you for being here today , and I

01:12:43.455 --> 01:12:45.621
enjoyed seeing all three of you at the

01:12:45.621 --> 01:12:47.732
Air Force Academy graduation . What a

01:12:47.732 --> 01:12:47.200
moving ceremony . I gotta tell you

01:12:47.200 --> 01:12:48.978
there's nothing like seeing the

01:12:48.978 --> 01:12:50.922
graduating class march out on that

01:12:50.922 --> 01:12:53.256
field , uh , with the music , so it was ,

01:12:53.256 --> 01:12:55.609
uh , incredible sight to see . I am

01:12:55.609 --> 01:12:57.720
concerned about what we're hearing on

01:12:57.720 --> 01:12:59.831
the president's budget . It , it , it

01:12:59.831 --> 01:13:02.390
appears he's proposing a minor increase

01:13:02.390 --> 01:13:04.709
for the Air Force and a decrease for

01:13:04.709 --> 01:13:07.339
the space force . If that is true ,

01:13:08.169 --> 01:13:10.479
It's hard to put that up with the fact

01:13:10.479 --> 01:13:12.423
that we're trying to counter China

01:13:12.423 --> 01:13:14.368
because both the Air Force and the

01:13:14.368 --> 01:13:16.590
space force will be front and center in

01:13:16.590 --> 01:13:18.590
any fight in the Far East . I would

01:13:18.590 --> 01:13:20.590
anticipate if we were serious about

01:13:20.680 --> 01:13:22.847
countering China that we'd be seeing a

01:13:22.847 --> 01:13:24.902
sizable increase in both the the Air

01:13:24.902 --> 01:13:27.069
Force and the space force uh budgets .

01:13:28.060 --> 01:13:30.060
I also want to just remind folks in

01:13:30.060 --> 01:13:32.227
this room and those listening that 20%

01:13:32.227 --> 01:13:34.171
of the budget that goes to the Air

01:13:34.171 --> 01:13:36.393
Force and Space Force is passed through

01:13:36.393 --> 01:13:38.504
money . It doesn't even go to the Air

01:13:38.504 --> 01:13:40.616
Force or Space Force . It goes to DOD

01:13:40.616 --> 01:13:42.782
agencies . So if you look at the share

01:13:42.782 --> 01:13:44.838
of the pie of what the Air Force and

01:13:44.838 --> 01:13:46.949
Space Force is getting , it's quite a

01:13:46.949 --> 01:13:49.227
bit smaller than the Army and the Navy ,

01:13:49.227 --> 01:13:49.100
and I just think we need to readdress

01:13:49.100 --> 01:13:51.779
this , uh , in the in this committee

01:13:51.779 --> 01:13:54.759
but also in the Pentagon . I have my

01:13:54.759 --> 01:13:56.926
first question is to the secretary . I

01:13:56.926 --> 01:13:59.092
really enjoyed chatting with you about

01:13:59.092 --> 01:14:01.315
the Looking Glass mission . I'm excited

01:14:01.315 --> 01:14:03.537
that you understand that mission better

01:14:03.537 --> 01:14:03.479
than most . Uh , could you give us an

01:14:03.479 --> 01:14:05.590
update with what you know is going on

01:14:05.590 --> 01:14:07.812
there ? For those who are familiar with

01:14:07.812 --> 01:14:09.535
the Looking Glass gives us the

01:14:09.535 --> 01:14:11.479
capability to command our ICBMs or

01:14:11.479 --> 01:14:13.423
bombers or submarines if the White

01:14:13.423 --> 01:14:15.590
House is hit , the Pentagon's hit , if

01:14:15.590 --> 01:14:17.757
Stratcom is hit . We used to have a 24

01:14:17.757 --> 01:14:19.590
hour a day airborne mission . We

01:14:19.590 --> 01:14:21.646
stopped doing that when the Cold War

01:14:21.646 --> 01:14:23.757
ended . However , I think we're going

01:14:23.757 --> 01:14:25.812
back to the threats where where this

01:14:25.812 --> 01:14:27.812
capability is needed again , and we

01:14:27.812 --> 01:14:29.979
know the Navy is at some point walking

01:14:29.979 --> 01:14:32.201
away from this mission . So I'd love to

01:14:32.201 --> 01:14:34.312
get your update , Mr . Secretary , on

01:14:34.312 --> 01:14:36.312
this important mission . If I could

01:14:36.312 --> 01:14:38.479
congressman , I , I would just say I ,

01:14:38.479 --> 01:14:40.368
I , I , I agree and thank you for

01:14:40.368 --> 01:14:42.590
coming out to the academy graduation uh

01:14:42.680 --> 01:14:44.680
just under 3 weeks I've been here .

01:14:44.680 --> 01:14:46.680
That was that was the funnest thing

01:14:46.680 --> 01:14:46.410
that I've done and it's , it's

01:14:46.410 --> 01:14:48.521
impossible to not get kind of excited

01:14:48.521 --> 01:14:50.688
when you have 900 cadets . The keynote

01:14:50.688 --> 01:14:52.854
speaker must have got you come through

01:14:52.854 --> 01:14:54.966
the , yeah , come , come up there all

01:14:54.966 --> 01:14:56.966
excited . My hand got a little sore

01:14:56.966 --> 01:14:59.188
after 900 cadets , but it was , uh , it

01:14:59.188 --> 01:14:58.970
was , it was great . Uh , yeah , yeah ,

01:14:59.089 --> 01:15:01.620
so the , the specific your question .

01:15:01.919 --> 01:15:03.979
Yeah , and looking glass there there

01:15:03.979 --> 01:15:06.146
for us is postured to support our role

01:15:06.146 --> 01:15:08.479
in that , and we will continue to do so ,

01:15:08.479 --> 01:15:10.549
um , as you've alluded to , there's

01:15:10.549 --> 01:15:12.790
discussion going on about the future of

01:15:12.790 --> 01:15:14.901
the mission , and we will , we will ,

01:15:14.901 --> 01:15:17.123
we will continue to participate in that

01:15:17.123 --> 01:15:19.290
and , and , and we'll take on whatever

01:15:19.290 --> 01:15:21.512
role , uh , that the department assigns

01:15:21.512 --> 01:15:20.790
to us , uh , General Oen , if you have

01:15:20.790 --> 01:15:23.120
anything else . No , I just , uh , and

01:15:23.120 --> 01:15:25.189
the Navy is , is , uh , agreed to

01:15:25.189 --> 01:15:27.356
continue that until they're relieved ,

01:15:27.356 --> 01:15:29.578
but when they're relieved , uh , if the

01:15:29.578 --> 01:15:29.490
mission comes just , we'll take it . We ,

01:15:29.500 --> 01:15:31.333
we would ask to be appropriately

01:15:31.333 --> 01:15:33.500
resourced for it , but as long as that

01:15:33.500 --> 01:15:35.722
mission is required , we'll ensure that

01:15:35.722 --> 01:15:37.944
between us and our other services we're

01:15:37.944 --> 01:15:36.959
able to support the nation that

01:15:36.959 --> 01:15:39.359
critical mission . I submit to you it's

01:15:39.359 --> 01:15:41.620
critical with a 15 minute . Warning

01:15:41.620 --> 01:15:43.787
times with some of the nuclear weapons

01:15:43.787 --> 01:15:45.953
that Russia and China can deliver here

01:15:45.953 --> 01:15:48.120
with hypersonics , we need to have the

01:15:48.120 --> 01:15:50.120
survivable thinking and it's , it's

01:15:50.120 --> 01:15:52.342
important for deterrents . They need to

01:15:52.342 --> 01:15:54.564
know that no matter what they do , they

01:15:54.564 --> 01:15:56.731
can't decapitate us , that we have the

01:15:56.731 --> 01:15:58.898
ability to respond . Uh , Alvin , uh ,

01:15:58.898 --> 01:16:01.176
I put out a two time classmate with me .

01:16:02.189 --> 01:16:04.189
The air combat command says we need

01:16:04.189 --> 01:16:06.919
over 20 CA call aircraft , yet the the

01:16:06.919 --> 01:16:09.399
programmer record is at 10 . Could you

01:16:09.399 --> 01:16:11.879
give us a , uh , your mind on what we

01:16:11.879 --> 01:16:14.101
should be doing with us in the future ?

01:16:14.290 --> 01:16:16.290
Uh , congressman , and , and , uh ,

01:16:16.310 --> 01:16:18.532
correctly so we're understanding that ,

01:16:18.532 --> 01:16:20.643
you know , uh , electronic warfare is

01:16:20.643 --> 01:16:22.866
sort of drifted in the back of our mind

01:16:22.866 --> 01:16:25.088
is now back in the front of our mind as

01:16:25.088 --> 01:16:27.199
we see the criticality of that . Uh ,

01:16:27.199 --> 01:16:29.421
the great thing about the EA 37 is once

01:16:29.421 --> 01:16:31.477
we put this , you know , once we put

01:16:31.477 --> 01:16:31.060
the operators in the back of them , uh ,

01:16:31.189 --> 01:16:33.245
those things , they are creating new

01:16:33.245 --> 01:16:35.189
and interesting ways to really put

01:16:35.189 --> 01:16:37.189
dilemmas on the in the minds of the

01:16:37.189 --> 01:16:39.078
enemy . So that , that , uh , the

01:16:39.078 --> 01:16:41.189
program of record right now is 10 and

01:16:41.189 --> 01:16:43.356
understand those . Uh , ACC has puts a

01:16:43.356 --> 01:16:45.245
requirement is higher . This is a

01:16:45.245 --> 01:16:47.245
matter of resources . Is it , is it

01:16:47.245 --> 01:16:47.134
this or munitions ? Is it this or

01:16:47.134 --> 01:16:49.301
tankers ? Is it this or other things ?

01:16:49.301 --> 01:16:51.467
All of the things we need , but I will

01:16:51.467 --> 01:16:53.523
tell you we are , uh , understanding

01:16:53.523 --> 01:16:53.424
how we can squeeze every ounce of

01:16:53.424 --> 01:16:55.535
capability out of every platform that

01:16:55.535 --> 01:16:57.646
we get , and they all go into the big

01:16:57.646 --> 01:16:59.813
prioritization . Grill Saltzman , what

01:16:59.813 --> 01:17:02.035
are the one or two things you think you

01:17:02.035 --> 01:17:04.202
need to do first , uh , to posture the

01:17:04.202 --> 01:17:08.169
space for the Golden Dome . Well ,

01:17:08.290 --> 01:17:10.179
I , I think as we look across the

01:17:10.179 --> 01:17:12.179
portfolio of things that we already

01:17:12.179 --> 01:17:14.346
bring to bear , whether it's sensors ,

01:17:14.346 --> 01:17:14.169
whether it's the data networks that

01:17:14.169 --> 01:17:16.225
have to move the data quickly , uh ,

01:17:16.225 --> 01:17:18.002
the software that enables rapid

01:17:18.002 --> 01:17:20.113
decision making . Uh , even before we

01:17:20.113 --> 01:17:22.280
get to the effectors that actually can

01:17:22.280 --> 01:17:24.447
mitigate the threats , that all has to

01:17:24.447 --> 01:17:26.558
be stitched together . So we're doing

01:17:26.558 --> 01:17:25.919
the mission analysis , and I think

01:17:25.919 --> 01:17:28.030
that's the first thing that has to be

01:17:28.030 --> 01:17:30.197
done which systems are required to put

01:17:30.197 --> 01:17:32.197
together so we can move data to the

01:17:32.197 --> 01:17:34.086
right places and most effectively

01:17:34.086 --> 01:17:36.363
orchestrate a very complex mission set .

01:17:36.363 --> 01:17:38.363
So we gotta do the mission planning

01:17:38.363 --> 01:17:40.530
first . OK , uh thank you for that . I

01:17:40.530 --> 01:17:39.879
got 1 2nd left . I'll give it back to

01:17:39.879 --> 01:17:43.720
the chairman . Thank you , chair now

01:17:43.720 --> 01:17:45.609
recognizes a gentle lady from New

01:17:45.609 --> 01:17:47.276
Hampshire , Ms . Goodlander .

01:17:49.549 --> 01:17:51.660
Thank you Mr . Chairman and thank you

01:17:51.660 --> 01:17:53.882
to our witnesses for being here today .

01:17:53.882 --> 01:17:55.605
I really appreciate it . I , I

01:17:55.605 --> 01:17:57.827
appreciate your testimony at the outset

01:17:57.827 --> 01:18:00.049
about the importance of an audit . It's

01:18:00.049 --> 01:18:02.105
something I care about deeply . uh ,

01:18:02.105 --> 01:18:02.029
it's something that's important to my

01:18:02.029 --> 01:18:04.229
constituents and their public trust in

01:18:04.229 --> 01:18:06.507
our military , and I wanted to ask you ,

01:18:06.507 --> 01:18:08.618
Mr . Secretary , if you could tell us

01:18:08.618 --> 01:18:10.673
more about the concrete steps you're

01:18:10.673 --> 01:18:12.910
taking to ensure that , uh , the

01:18:12.910 --> 01:18:14.966
Department of the Air Force passes a

01:18:14.966 --> 01:18:18.819
clean audit this fiscal year . Uh ,

01:18:18.979 --> 01:18:21.890
thanks , Congresswoman . Yeah , we , uh ,

01:18:22.060 --> 01:18:23.949
spent quite a bit of money in the

01:18:23.949 --> 01:18:26.227
military . Uh , wanna make sure we are ,

01:18:26.227 --> 01:18:28.171
we are good , uh , stewards of the

01:18:28.171 --> 01:18:30.338
taxpayer and how we do that . Um , you

01:18:30.338 --> 01:18:32.560
know , my , my , my previous job , uh ,

01:18:32.560 --> 01:18:32.310
the organization I worked in , we had

01:18:32.310 --> 01:18:34.330
actually had 16 clean consecutive

01:18:34.330 --> 01:18:36.552
audits , so I do understand the kind of

01:18:36.552 --> 01:18:38.719
the steps that and the things that are

01:18:38.719 --> 01:18:40.774
required to do that . Uh , obviously

01:18:40.774 --> 01:18:42.886
this is much larger scale , um , so ,

01:18:42.886 --> 01:18:44.719
so I , I , I'm in the process of

01:18:44.719 --> 01:18:46.774
actually assessing where we have our

01:18:46.774 --> 01:18:48.941
deficiencies , uh , and then laying in

01:18:48.941 --> 01:18:50.830
a plan to go after those . I just

01:18:50.830 --> 01:18:50.330
signed out a note to put the

01:18:50.330 --> 01:18:52.770
undersecretary . As one of his primary

01:18:52.770 --> 01:18:55.479
jobs is to ensure that that that that

01:18:55.490 --> 01:18:57.770
that gets accomplished um but the

01:18:57.770 --> 01:18:58.881
fundamental thing .

01:19:02.890 --> 01:19:04.890
So those , those deficiencies , you

01:19:04.890 --> 01:19:07.112
know , with the past audits have been ,

01:19:07.112 --> 01:19:09.223
many of them have been identified . I

01:19:09.223 --> 01:19:11.390
think the question is , is all what do

01:19:11.390 --> 01:19:13.612
you do what's the reman what does you ,

01:19:13.612 --> 01:19:15.834
Congressman , what do you do to address

01:19:15.834 --> 01:19:17.668
those ? Some of them can be very

01:19:17.668 --> 01:19:17.129
challenging . Some of them is just

01:19:17.129 --> 01:19:19.240
tying together . All the systems that

01:19:19.240 --> 01:19:21.296
manage the data , manage the , the ,

01:19:21.296 --> 01:19:23.544
the finances , those can be really

01:19:23.544 --> 01:19:26.194
challenging steps . And , and so

01:19:26.194 --> 01:19:28.027
identifying those efficiencies ,

01:19:28.064 --> 01:19:30.745
budgeting to fix those things right and

01:19:30.745 --> 01:19:32.856
get it right is , is what we're gonna

01:19:32.856 --> 01:19:35.078
be focused on . Well , would appreciate

01:19:35.078 --> 01:19:37.078
the chance to hear from you in real

01:19:37.078 --> 01:19:39.078
time how your progress is going and

01:19:39.078 --> 01:19:41.189
what this committee can do to support

01:19:41.189 --> 01:19:43.412
you in that effort . Um , we've got the

01:19:43.412 --> 01:19:45.745
National Defense Authorization Act , uh ,

01:19:45.745 --> 01:19:47.856
which is one of the reasons I came to

01:19:47.856 --> 01:19:50.134
this committee . It's knocking on wood ,

01:19:50.134 --> 01:19:52.245
63 years in running a bill , and we'd

01:19:52.245 --> 01:19:54.467
we'd very much like to work with you to

01:19:54.467 --> 01:19:56.523
be sure that you can join , uh , our

01:19:56.523 --> 01:19:56.459
colleagues from the Marine Corps in

01:19:56.459 --> 01:19:58.292
passing a clean audit as soon as

01:19:58.292 --> 01:20:00.529
possible . I wanted to also ask you

01:20:00.529 --> 01:20:03.359
about , you know , another issue that

01:20:03.359 --> 01:20:05.581
matters a lot to my constituents , uh ,

01:20:05.879 --> 01:20:09.000
the right to repair . Uh , could you

01:20:09.000 --> 01:20:11.167
tell us a bit about your understanding

01:20:11.167 --> 01:20:13.500
of what the right to repair means to me ,

01:20:13.500 --> 01:20:16.029
uh , the notion that our military

01:20:16.029 --> 01:20:19.060
cannot repair our own equipment . And

01:20:19.060 --> 01:20:22.180
weapon systems and aircraft is an

01:20:22.180 --> 01:20:24.979
outrage . We , it's costing us billions

01:20:24.979 --> 01:20:27.850
and billions of dollars to the taxpayer .

01:20:28.220 --> 01:20:31.270
It's delaying our military readiness .

01:20:31.419 --> 01:20:33.910
Um , it's , it's a driver of waste

01:20:33.910 --> 01:20:36.140
fraud and abuse , and we're , we're all

01:20:36.140 --> 01:20:38.362
very committed to cutting down on waste

01:20:38.362 --> 01:20:40.418
fraud and abuse . So I wanted to ask

01:20:40.418 --> 01:20:42.362
you , uh , we heard from Secretary

01:20:42.362 --> 01:20:44.696
Driscoll yesterday about his commitment .

01:20:44.696 --> 01:20:48.359
Um , to ensure that going forward any

01:20:48.359 --> 01:20:50.520
contracts and you know the , the way

01:20:50.520 --> 01:20:52.687
that the right to repair is undermined

01:20:52.687 --> 01:20:54.950
is really through uh highly obscure and

01:20:54.950 --> 01:20:58.069
technical provisions in our contracts

01:20:58.240 --> 01:21:00.018
that going forward that doesn't

01:21:00.018 --> 01:21:02.439
continue and working retroactively so

01:21:02.439 --> 01:21:04.550
can you tell us about your efforts on

01:21:04.550 --> 01:21:06.830
this front ? So first off , I'll , as

01:21:06.830 --> 01:21:09.990
with uh Secretary Driscoll , I , I , I

01:21:09.990 --> 01:21:12.212
gave you my commitment that this , this

01:21:12.212 --> 01:21:14.323
will be something that we will ensure

01:21:14.323 --> 01:21:16.379
contracts going forward that we have

01:21:16.379 --> 01:21:18.434
full , full flexibility , um , and ,

01:21:18.434 --> 01:21:18.180
and , and I think as you alluded to ,

01:21:18.189 --> 01:21:20.411
there's a whole spectrum can be all the

01:21:20.411 --> 01:21:22.467
way from the contractor has the full

01:21:22.467 --> 01:21:24.633
right and authority to do that to even

01:21:24.633 --> 01:21:26.800
if they don't , the government doesn't

01:21:26.800 --> 01:21:28.911
actually have enough of the technical

01:21:28.911 --> 01:21:30.856
specs to actually do it , so we're

01:21:30.856 --> 01:21:33.133
still relying upon the contractor . Uh ,

01:21:33.133 --> 01:21:35.300
so one of the things I've been doing ,

01:21:35.300 --> 01:21:37.467
and , and it's , and there isn't a one

01:21:37.467 --> 01:21:37.160
size fits all because there , it varies

01:21:37.160 --> 01:21:39.438
across the different contracts we have ,

01:21:39.438 --> 01:21:41.660
uh , within the department looking into

01:21:41.660 --> 01:21:43.827
the conditions are different and we're

01:21:43.827 --> 01:21:45.993
gonna have to go and address every one

01:21:45.993 --> 01:21:45.520
of those , every one of those

01:21:45.520 --> 01:21:47.576
conditions in a little bit different

01:21:47.576 --> 01:21:49.798
way , uh , but in the end we , we , and

01:21:49.798 --> 01:21:51.964
we've already made some progress , but

01:21:51.964 --> 01:21:54.020
in the end I think we , we will , we

01:21:54.020 --> 01:21:53.879
have to get there . There's no question

01:21:53.879 --> 01:21:56.046
about it . I don't know , General , if

01:21:56.046 --> 01:21:58.268
you have any other comments on it . I ,

01:21:58.268 --> 01:22:00.435
I , I just totally associate with what

01:22:00.435 --> 01:22:02.490
the secretary said it's that some of

01:22:02.490 --> 01:22:04.657
the contractual pieces that we entered

01:22:04.657 --> 01:22:03.890
into the more we can get relief from

01:22:03.890 --> 01:22:06.001
that , the more flexibility we're all

01:22:06.001 --> 01:22:08.223
about that . Well , I appreciate that ,

01:22:08.223 --> 01:22:10.390
and we want to support you . We've got

01:22:10.390 --> 01:22:12.446
bipartisan support for provisions in

01:22:12.446 --> 01:22:14.668
this year's NDAA , and we would love to

01:22:14.668 --> 01:22:16.723
work with you on that . Um , General

01:22:16.723 --> 01:22:18.946
Saltzman , I thank you for being here .

01:22:18.946 --> 01:22:21.112
My home state of New Hampshire is home

01:22:21.112 --> 01:22:23.223
to the new Boston Space Force Station

01:22:23.223 --> 01:22:25.446
in Hillsborough County and . You know ,

01:22:25.446 --> 01:22:27.501
I had a chance to visit New Boston .

01:22:27.501 --> 01:22:29.612
They're providing critical around the

01:22:29.612 --> 01:22:31.612
clock satellite command and control

01:22:31.612 --> 01:22:33.446
capabilities for , for , for our

01:22:33.446 --> 01:22:35.557
country . I wanted to ask you , I , I

01:22:35.557 --> 01:22:35.229
know I have 10 seconds left , so maybe

01:22:35.229 --> 01:22:37.430
we can follow up , um , offline , but

01:22:37.709 --> 01:22:39.820
I'm eager to talk to you about how we

01:22:39.820 --> 01:22:41.910
can ensure that our infrastructure

01:22:41.910 --> 01:22:44.549
installations like the new Boston Space

01:22:44.549 --> 01:22:46.629
Force Station are protected from the

01:22:46.629 --> 01:22:48.796
wide range of vulnerabilities that are

01:22:48.796 --> 01:22:51.018
out there . Uh , very quickly , we have

01:22:51.018 --> 01:22:53.018
a lady's time expired . Jerry and I

01:22:53.018 --> 01:22:55.240
recognize this gentleman from Florida ,

01:22:55.240 --> 01:22:57.518
Mr . Jimenez . Thank you Mr . Chairman ,

01:22:57.518 --> 01:23:00.790
uh . Last weekend I think uh we saw a a

01:23:00.790 --> 01:23:03.029
pivotal moment in warfare when the

01:23:03.029 --> 01:23:06.629
Ukrainian uh Ukrainian army um launched

01:23:06.629 --> 01:23:09.160
an unbelievable attack on the uh

01:23:09.160 --> 01:23:11.859
Russian Air Force but it also for me ,

01:23:11.979 --> 01:23:15.229
uh , under under underlined a uh a

01:23:15.229 --> 01:23:18.930
vulnerability for us . Um ,

01:23:19.250 --> 01:23:21.361
for a long time we thought , uh , you

01:23:21.361 --> 01:23:23.306
know , distance was a great , uh ,

01:23:23.306 --> 01:23:26.089
equalizer , but now you with the , with

01:23:26.089 --> 01:23:28.033
the , you know , with the onset of

01:23:28.033 --> 01:23:31.220
drones , etc . You could have uh

01:23:31.220 --> 01:23:33.164
maligned actors here in the United

01:23:33.164 --> 01:23:35.720
States take out a lot of our assets in

01:23:35.720 --> 01:23:38.229
a very short period of time . What are

01:23:38.229 --> 01:23:40.451
we doing to protect against drones this

01:23:40.451 --> 01:23:44.229
kind of activity , um , to protect our

01:23:44.229 --> 01:23:46.339
assets here on the homeland , uh ,

01:23:46.350 --> 01:23:49.399
General Alvin . Thank you Congressman

01:23:49.399 --> 01:23:51.566
and to the conversation we had earlier

01:23:51.566 --> 01:23:53.621
it's really uh it's a , it's a joint

01:23:53.621 --> 01:23:55.677
force problem and it is one of those

01:23:55.677 --> 01:23:57.732
that is multifaceted different it is

01:23:57.732 --> 01:23:59.750
different in um in characterization

01:23:59.839 --> 01:24:01.783
than what happened with Russia and

01:24:01.783 --> 01:24:03.839
Ukraine , but it certainly shows the

01:24:03.839 --> 01:24:06.006
consequences if we don't pay attention

01:24:06.006 --> 01:24:08.228
to it . Uh , this is one of those where

01:24:08.228 --> 01:24:10.450
we have to have an understanding of the

01:24:10.450 --> 01:24:12.506
current restrictions that we have in

01:24:12.506 --> 01:24:12.339
place with respect to rules of

01:24:12.339 --> 01:24:14.459
engagements with the local county ,

01:24:14.660 --> 01:24:17.370
state , federal , forget that , OK , OK .

01:24:17.620 --> 01:24:19.660
Do we have my , my concern is the

01:24:19.660 --> 01:24:22.560
capability of us being able to defend

01:24:22.970 --> 01:24:25.339
against , uh , AI drones . We may have

01:24:25.339 --> 01:24:27.172
the capability to defend against

01:24:27.172 --> 01:24:29.061
piloted drones , right , but I've

01:24:29.061 --> 01:24:31.117
always been afraid of AI drones that

01:24:31.117 --> 01:24:33.149
are unpiloted . And that you you

01:24:33.149 --> 01:24:35.371
basically have to knock them out of the

01:24:35.371 --> 01:24:37.371
sky . You just can't say , OK , you

01:24:37.371 --> 01:24:39.427
can't pilot anymore and they fall to

01:24:39.427 --> 01:24:39.200
the ground . That's not the case

01:24:39.200 --> 01:24:41.209
anymore . I'm worried about our

01:24:41.209 --> 01:24:43.265
capabilities there , all right , and

01:24:43.265 --> 01:24:45.431
I'm that's uh that's all I'm gonna say

01:24:45.431 --> 01:24:47.598
and also not only for our civilian our

01:24:47.598 --> 01:24:49.765
our military but also on our civilians

01:24:49.765 --> 01:24:51.931
and a civilian uh uh uh transportation

01:24:51.931 --> 01:24:54.098
infrastructure because if some kind of

01:24:54.098 --> 01:24:55.876
an attack happens on a civilian

01:24:55.876 --> 01:24:58.490
aircraft then basically air travel it

01:24:58.490 --> 01:25:01.069
grinds to a halt . Nobody's gonna take

01:25:01.069 --> 01:25:03.450
a plane . And so I would hope , uh ,

01:25:03.459 --> 01:25:05.569
secretary that uh that we're on this

01:25:06.020 --> 01:25:08.580
and not only just for uh protecting our

01:25:08.580 --> 01:25:11.169
military assets but also our our entire

01:25:11.169 --> 01:25:14.620
transportation um uh network uh so

01:25:14.620 --> 01:25:16.787
that's that's that's all I'm gonna say

01:25:16.787 --> 01:25:18.842
I really don't want to get into what

01:25:18.842 --> 01:25:20.953
you're doing , uh , but uh maybe in a

01:25:20.953 --> 01:25:23.009
classified setting we would find out

01:25:23.009 --> 01:25:24.898
what it is we're doing to protect

01:25:24.898 --> 01:25:27.120
against this uh this threat . I've been

01:25:27.120 --> 01:25:29.287
really worried about this threat for a

01:25:29.287 --> 01:25:31.231
really long time . And uh and what

01:25:31.231 --> 01:25:33.799
happened uh last weekend just you know

01:25:33.799 --> 01:25:36.279
puts an exclamation point on my worry

01:25:36.279 --> 01:25:39.450
about what's could happen here just for ,

01:25:39.509 --> 01:25:43.169
for the sake . How much is a B-2 bomber

01:25:43.169 --> 01:25:43.580
cost ?

01:25:48.229 --> 01:25:50.285
Yeah , I think it's probably , I , I

01:25:50.285 --> 01:25:52.340
don't know what the replacement cost

01:25:52.340 --> 01:25:54.396
would be and I think originally it's

01:25:54.396 --> 01:25:54.029
multiple billion . Are they , are they

01:25:54.029 --> 01:25:56.029
all cluster around the same place ?

01:25:56.500 --> 01:25:58.611
Yeah a lot of them are OK , so one of

01:25:58.611 --> 01:26:00.778
the things maybe we maybe we should be

01:26:00.778 --> 01:26:00.560
looking at is maybe dispersing our

01:26:00.560 --> 01:26:03.350
assets , OK , in the near term , uh ,

01:26:03.359 --> 01:26:05.526
until we figure out how we can do deal

01:26:05.526 --> 01:26:07.748
with this , um , on , on the , on the ,

01:26:07.748 --> 01:26:09.919
on the on space and I think that we do

01:26:09.919 --> 01:26:12.086
need to enhance our capabilities but I

01:26:12.086 --> 01:26:15.830
also think that eventually . We're also

01:26:15.830 --> 01:26:17.941
gonna need to develop redundancy to a

01:26:17.941 --> 01:26:20.709
lack of space if somebody knocks our

01:26:20.709 --> 01:26:23.310
space assets out , are we too reliant

01:26:23.310 --> 01:26:25.509
on space ? Do we have redundancy so

01:26:25.509 --> 01:26:27.740
that we can continue to operate without

01:26:27.740 --> 01:26:29.779
the space , uh , platform , uh ,

01:26:29.790 --> 01:26:32.399
General Saltzman . No , I don't . I

01:26:32.399 --> 01:26:34.455
think there are missions we're doing

01:26:34.455 --> 01:26:36.510
from space that we can't easily just

01:26:36.510 --> 01:26:38.510
redundantly cover , uh , if , if we

01:26:38.510 --> 01:26:40.677
were to lose space . Well , I think if

01:26:40.677 --> 01:26:42.732
we're too overly re relying on on on

01:26:42.732 --> 01:26:44.788
space and we don't have redundancy ,

01:26:44.788 --> 01:26:46.732
we're asking for trouble . Because

01:26:46.732 --> 01:26:48.788
everything that we can put up can be

01:26:48.788 --> 01:26:52.089
taken down . And and you have to you

01:26:52.089 --> 01:26:54.256
have you know I , I kind of believe in

01:26:54.256 --> 01:26:56.311
Murphy's law which doesn't mean that

01:26:56.311 --> 01:26:58.145
everything that it it means that

01:26:58.145 --> 01:27:00.256
everything that bad can't happen well

01:27:00.256 --> 01:26:59.830
it just means that anything that can

01:26:59.830 --> 01:27:03.609
happen will . And so let's not rely too

01:27:03.609 --> 01:27:05.776
much on . I , I'm not saying invest in

01:27:05.776 --> 01:27:07.720
space absolutely , OK , and try to

01:27:07.720 --> 01:27:09.776
defend it as much as we can , but in

01:27:09.776 --> 01:27:13.129
just in case it does get taken out we

01:27:13.129 --> 01:27:16.290
can't be helpless as a nation . And so

01:27:16.290 --> 01:27:18.568
Secretary Minsk , I'm asking you again ,

01:27:18.568 --> 01:27:21.729
are we , do we have redundancy ? Are we

01:27:21.729 --> 01:27:24.850
developing redundancy to space again

01:27:24.850 --> 01:27:26.850
that's another question for another

01:27:26.850 --> 01:27:30.790
time , uh . Are we are we are we uh uh

01:27:30.790 --> 01:27:34.660
investing in directed energy ? I

01:27:34.660 --> 01:27:36.604
think at this level we can say yes

01:27:36.604 --> 01:27:38.493
we're , we're investing in direct

01:27:38.493 --> 01:27:40.660
energy . OK , very , very good and you

01:27:40.660 --> 01:27:42.882
know I guess I have 15 seconds left and

01:27:42.882 --> 01:27:44.993
I guess my time is up and I yield , I

01:27:44.993 --> 01:27:47.271
yield back to the chairman . Thank you .

01:27:47.271 --> 01:27:49.604
Uh , I would , uh , follow up , let the ,

01:27:49.604 --> 01:27:51.771
uh , gentleman of Florida know that we

01:27:51.771 --> 01:27:53.771
have been for many years developing

01:27:53.771 --> 01:27:55.882
directed energy capabilities and it's

01:27:55.882 --> 01:27:58.104
maturing at a nice clip . What you just

01:27:58.104 --> 01:28:00.271
saw happen in Israel with Iron Beam is

01:28:00.271 --> 01:28:02.382
part of our investments , but . Yes ,

01:28:02.382 --> 01:28:04.493
and a lot of it . I'd be happy if you

01:28:04.493 --> 01:28:06.716
to learn more in a SCIFF , but I'm very

01:28:06.716 --> 01:28:06.689
proud of that technology and it's got

01:28:06.689 --> 01:28:08.745
great potential in the future . With

01:28:08.745 --> 01:28:10.633
that , the chair and I recognized

01:28:10.633 --> 01:28:12.856
gentle gentle lady from Maryland , Ms .

01:28:12.856 --> 01:28:14.800
Elforth . Thank you , Mr . Chair .

01:28:14.800 --> 01:28:14.479
Gentlemen , thank you for being here

01:28:14.479 --> 01:28:16.720
and good morning . I echo the chairs

01:28:16.720 --> 01:28:18.776
and the concerns you heard from both

01:28:18.776 --> 01:28:20.831
sides of the aisle of this committee

01:28:20.831 --> 01:28:22.942
around the lateness of the budget and

01:28:22.942 --> 01:28:25.053
particularly Mr . Courtney's concerns

01:28:25.053 --> 01:28:26.998
around having an open , honest and

01:28:26.998 --> 01:28:29.053
transparent conversation about . The

01:28:29.053 --> 01:28:31.053
future of Air Force One . I'm gonna

01:28:31.053 --> 01:28:30.649
start with a local issue and then

01:28:30.649 --> 01:28:32.649
expand to a national issue . We've

01:28:32.649 --> 01:28:34.871
talked about A-10s quite a bit . I know

01:28:34.871 --> 01:28:36.982
that you all talk about the future of

01:28:36.982 --> 01:28:39.149
A-10s quite a bit in every , every one

01:28:39.149 --> 01:28:41.149
of our states , but as you , as you

01:28:41.149 --> 01:28:43.371
well know , Maryland's National Guard ,

01:28:43.371 --> 01:28:45.316
uh , our 175th wing is unique . It

01:28:45.316 --> 01:28:47.538
comprises both the flight component and

01:28:47.538 --> 01:28:49.593
the cyber component , which I'm very

01:28:49.593 --> 01:28:51.538
grateful for the expansion of that

01:28:51.538 --> 01:28:53.260
cyber component . But with the

01:28:53.260 --> 01:28:55.316
divestment of the A-10s , we'll lose

01:28:55.316 --> 01:28:57.316
that flight mission , but the cyber

01:28:57.316 --> 01:28:59.427
component has not yet stood up and so

01:28:59.427 --> 01:28:59.229
there's going to be a bit of a gap in

01:28:59.229 --> 01:29:01.229
our mission , and I would just love

01:29:01.229 --> 01:29:03.285
some , some greater clarity , um , I

01:29:03.285 --> 01:29:05.779
guess General Alvin about , uh ,

01:29:05.790 --> 01:29:07.734
cyberwings expansion . When do you

01:29:07.734 --> 01:29:09.901
expect the full operational capacity ?

01:29:10.060 --> 01:29:12.004
What's our planning to manage this

01:29:12.004 --> 01:29:14.171
transition period ? I'm giving you all

01:29:14.171 --> 01:29:16.338
this at once , and then , uh , how are

01:29:16.338 --> 01:29:18.171
we coordinating with Cybercom in

01:29:18.171 --> 01:29:20.282
particular to properly integrate this

01:29:20.282 --> 01:29:22.282
expanded wing . Well thank you very

01:29:22.282 --> 01:29:24.116
much and uh it it truly is a key

01:29:24.116 --> 01:29:26.004
mission going forward in a growth

01:29:26.004 --> 01:29:28.227
industry in the cyberwing so it it's we

01:29:28.227 --> 01:29:30.393
wanna go as fast as we possibly can so

01:29:30.393 --> 01:29:32.449
it really is not gonna be a a gap of

01:29:32.449 --> 01:29:34.338
sorts . You'll be a gap from full

01:29:34.338 --> 01:29:36.393
capability to full capability but we

01:29:36.393 --> 01:29:38.560
expect . The , the sun downing of that

01:29:38.560 --> 01:29:40.449
of the A-10 mission by the end of

01:29:40.449 --> 01:29:42.671
fiscal year 25 , so in about 5 months ,

01:29:42.671 --> 01:29:42.259
but in October is when we start

01:29:42.259 --> 01:29:44.481
building and we expect within 36 months

01:29:44.481 --> 01:29:46.481
of that we'll have a full , uh , an

01:29:46.481 --> 01:29:48.592
initial operation capability . But in

01:29:48.592 --> 01:29:50.815
between times we will slowly be gaining

01:29:50.815 --> 01:29:52.926
missions . So there will be things we

01:29:52.926 --> 01:29:52.620
already be doing just robusting up in

01:29:52.620 --> 01:29:54.676
both capacity and sophistication and

01:29:54.676 --> 01:29:56.676
then having Fort Meade right up the

01:29:56.676 --> 01:29:58.620
street is one of those where we're

01:29:58.620 --> 01:29:58.419
gonna be able to leverage that

01:29:58.419 --> 01:30:00.586
capability to bring that on as fast as

01:30:00.586 --> 01:30:03.450
possible . One of the advantages is

01:30:03.450 --> 01:30:05.672
with the greatest asset that we have in

01:30:05.672 --> 01:30:07.728
a cyber wing are are are the are the

01:30:07.728 --> 01:30:09.894
personnel and so being able to attract

01:30:09.894 --> 01:30:12.006
that talent in that area is is one of

01:30:12.006 --> 01:30:14.061
the big advantages there and it also

01:30:14.061 --> 01:30:16.283
reduces the ability for potential extra

01:30:16.283 --> 01:30:18.172
milk on that will go with another

01:30:18.172 --> 01:30:20.339
platform coming in . So we're gonna be

01:30:20.339 --> 01:30:22.283
aggressively standing up between 1

01:30:22.283 --> 01:30:24.283
October 2025 , beginning of 26 , 36

01:30:24.283 --> 01:30:26.394
months later we're looking to get IOC

01:30:26.394 --> 01:30:28.339
and we'd like to get it sooner . I

01:30:28.339 --> 01:30:30.450
share . I would like to get it sooner

01:30:30.450 --> 01:30:32.506
as well . And , and Mr . Secretary ,

01:30:32.506 --> 01:30:34.617
just following up on that , our , our

01:30:34.617 --> 01:30:36.617
air wing in Maryland , uh , we've ,

01:30:36.617 --> 01:30:38.839
we've seen 8 combat deployments in , in

01:30:38.839 --> 01:30:40.950
just 20 , uh , since 2001 , uh , just

01:30:40.950 --> 01:30:43.229
over 23 years . Um , my governor ,

01:30:43.350 --> 01:30:45.461
Governor Westmore recently sent you a

01:30:45.461 --> 01:30:47.461
letter , I believe it was last week

01:30:47.461 --> 01:30:49.683
asking for a meeting . I , I appreciate

01:30:49.683 --> 01:30:51.906
you've been on the job 2.5 weeks . Uh ,

01:30:51.906 --> 01:30:53.961
but to expand in , in detail on what

01:30:53.961 --> 01:30:56.183
the general just shared , can I ask for

01:30:56.183 --> 01:30:58.294
a commitment right now , you and your

01:30:58.294 --> 01:30:58.205
staff , to meet with my my governor in

01:30:58.205 --> 01:31:00.427
the Maryland delegation to walk through

01:31:00.427 --> 01:31:02.094
this so we have that seamless

01:31:02.094 --> 01:31:04.372
transition . I'll be happy to . OK , I ,

01:31:04.372 --> 01:31:06.594
my staff will follow up with your staff

01:31:06.594 --> 01:31:08.594
literally as we walk out the door .

01:31:08.594 --> 01:31:10.872
Thank you very much . OK , moving , um ,

01:31:10.872 --> 01:31:10.845
thank you for that . Moving on to to

01:31:10.845 --> 01:31:13.178
General Saltzman . Uh , well , actually ,

01:31:13.178 --> 01:31:15.512
to , to everybody at the panel , um , I ,

01:31:15.512 --> 01:31:17.734
I bring this up . I'm a broken record ,

01:31:17.734 --> 01:31:17.669
but I'm really proud that my first code ,

01:31:17.910 --> 01:31:20.350
uh , being a member of Congress , 153

01:31:20.350 --> 01:31:22.017
days so far , was actually to

01:31:22.017 --> 01:31:24.239
Vandenberg , and I greatly enjoyed that

01:31:24.239 --> 01:31:26.406
experience . It also kind of opened my

01:31:26.406 --> 01:31:29.660
eyes to the , to . To physically seeing

01:31:29.660 --> 01:31:31.410
you have a solar field you're

01:31:31.410 --> 01:31:33.632
generating energy at Vandenberg , which

01:31:33.632 --> 01:31:35.854
is very exciting . We talk about energy

01:31:35.854 --> 01:31:37.410
resilience and capability ,

01:31:37.410 --> 01:31:39.521
particularly as you know we're overly

01:31:39.521 --> 01:31:42.660
relying on 50 states , uh , for , for

01:31:42.660 --> 01:31:44.882
energy generation and delivery . So you

01:31:44.882 --> 01:31:47.379
have a solar generating farm but you

01:31:47.379 --> 01:31:50.700
have no storage . So it gives me great

01:31:50.700 --> 01:31:52.419
pause to think about our

01:31:52.419 --> 01:31:54.530
vulnerabilities both just from a grid

01:31:54.530 --> 01:31:56.530
system , but also our vulnerability

01:31:56.530 --> 01:31:59.569
from , from foes , uh , very easy to ,

01:31:59.689 --> 01:32:02.200
to disrupt readiness capabilities when

01:32:02.200 --> 01:32:04.649
we don't have energy to and from . So ,

01:32:05.029 --> 01:32:06.973
If you could speak specifically to

01:32:06.973 --> 01:32:08.807
Vandenberg General and then Mr .

01:32:08.807 --> 01:32:11.029
Secretary , your plans to obviously the

01:32:11.029 --> 01:32:13.362
low hanging fruit is is is a Vandenberg ,

01:32:13.362 --> 01:32:15.529
but I would love to hear your plans on

01:32:15.529 --> 01:32:17.362
how we're going to make sure our

01:32:17.362 --> 01:32:19.418
installations , our energy as energy

01:32:19.418 --> 01:32:21.529
independent and resilient as possible

01:32:21.529 --> 01:32:23.529
from a readiness perspective . Well

01:32:23.529 --> 01:32:25.751
thank you for that and I appreciate you

01:32:25.751 --> 01:32:27.862
coming out to Vandenberg and taking a

01:32:27.862 --> 01:32:26.640
look at all the great people and

01:32:26.640 --> 01:32:28.807
mission they're doing out there . Um ,

01:32:28.807 --> 01:32:30.918
I , I couldn't agree more that energy

01:32:30.918 --> 01:32:33.560
resiliency is operational readiness and

01:32:33.560 --> 01:32:35.727
especially in the space force where we

01:32:35.727 --> 01:32:37.949
do all most of our missions from our in

01:32:37.949 --> 01:32:39.893
base locations uh we don't have to

01:32:39.893 --> 01:32:42.116
deploy to do space operations or launch

01:32:42.116 --> 01:32:44.116
operations . And so we take it very

01:32:44.116 --> 01:32:46.430
seriously we do mission continuity

01:32:46.430 --> 01:32:48.839
exercises on a routine basis to uncover

01:32:48.839 --> 01:32:50.783
where the particular shortfalls or

01:32:50.783 --> 01:32:52.950
vulnerabilities are . We we flow those

01:32:52.950 --> 01:32:55.006
back up to try to make sure we're as

01:32:55.006 --> 01:32:57.228
resilient as possible . The , the other

01:32:57.228 --> 01:32:59.395
initiative that we've taken on is , is

01:32:59.395 --> 01:33:01.117
a weapon system infrastructure

01:33:01.117 --> 01:33:03.117
accounting drill , uh , making sure

01:33:03.117 --> 01:33:04.783
that when we talk about power

01:33:04.783 --> 01:33:04.680
generation , it's a part of our

01:33:04.680 --> 01:33:06.680
readiness account . Uh , we haven't

01:33:06.680 --> 01:33:08.736
traditionally done that . That's not

01:33:08.736 --> 01:33:10.958
something that , uh , other forces have

01:33:10.958 --> 01:33:12.958
to do to the same degree we do . So

01:33:12.958 --> 01:33:14.847
we're redesigning how we have the

01:33:14.847 --> 01:33:17.069
transparency of our readiness , uh , in

01:33:17.069 --> 01:33:16.339
that kind of infrastructure , and I

01:33:16.339 --> 01:33:18.339
think that'll generally these times

01:33:18.339 --> 01:33:20.117
expired . You and I recognize a

01:33:20.117 --> 01:33:22.228
gentleman from Texas , Mr . Latrell .

01:33:24.770 --> 01:33:26.992
Thank you , Mr . Chairman . Gentlemen ,

01:33:26.992 --> 01:33:29.048
thank you for coming to see us today

01:33:29.048 --> 01:33:31.381
and thank you all for your service . Uh ,

01:33:31.381 --> 01:33:33.492
Ms . Elfrith and Mr . Wilson actually

01:33:33.492 --> 01:33:35.492
started this conversation about the

01:33:35.492 --> 01:33:37.659
A-10s . I , I was , I think I got lost

01:33:37.659 --> 01:33:39.770
in space when I was talking , I'm not

01:33:39.770 --> 01:33:41.881
talking to you when I say that . That

01:33:41.881 --> 01:33:43.992
the A10's shelf life is gone and then

01:33:43.992 --> 01:33:46.159
we're going to create the next asset .

01:33:46.200 --> 01:33:48.549
I think that's a horrible idea . Um , I

01:33:48.549 --> 01:33:50.549
think the 10 is probably one of the

01:33:50.549 --> 01:33:53.899
best creations . We have . And I've

01:33:53.899 --> 01:33:56.180
been in the theater of war calling that

01:33:56.180 --> 01:33:58.402
plane in and it saved my life countless

01:33:58.402 --> 01:34:00.124
times and there's nothing more

01:34:00.124 --> 01:34:03.479
terrifying . Then that flying bathtub

01:34:03.479 --> 01:34:06.089
with bombs . And that gun hanging off

01:34:06.089 --> 01:34:08.256
the front of it and I think we're in a

01:34:08.256 --> 01:34:10.850
bad spot if we clack off somewhere and

01:34:10.850 --> 01:34:13.072
we put boots on the ground that's gonna

01:34:13.072 --> 01:34:15.294
be the asset that we're gonna be flying

01:34:15.294 --> 01:34:14.729
overhead . I'm gonna take anything away

01:34:14.729 --> 01:34:17.062
from everything else that we have , but ,

01:34:17.062 --> 01:34:19.173
uh , I just , I felt like I needed to

01:34:19.173 --> 01:34:21.340
say that because again that that plane

01:34:21.340 --> 01:34:23.340
has saved my life and my teammates'

01:34:23.340 --> 01:34:25.396
lives more times than I can possibly

01:34:25.396 --> 01:34:28.140
count . Um , I'm gonna shift gears , um ,

01:34:28.240 --> 01:34:31.430
so I , I'm talking hypersonics . Um ,

01:34:31.720 --> 01:34:33.959
Mr . Secretary and Mr . General , you

01:34:33.959 --> 01:34:36.319
guys can kind of pick which one's gonna

01:34:36.319 --> 01:34:39.200
answer this . I . Um , I have the , the

01:34:39.200 --> 01:34:41.367
list of the weapon assets , the weapon

01:34:41.367 --> 01:34:43.311
systems that China and Russia have

01:34:43.311 --> 01:34:45.500
right here , um , and general , you

01:34:45.500 --> 01:34:49.069
said , um . Rapid modernization ,

01:34:49.109 --> 01:34:52.509
evolving , um , kind of evolution of

01:34:52.509 --> 01:34:54.509
technology and and and in the PLA I

01:34:54.509 --> 01:34:56.509
think they're there . I think we're

01:34:56.509 --> 01:34:58.676
kind of looking at them is that's kind

01:34:58.676 --> 01:35:00.953
of the , the , the bar that's been set .

01:35:00.953 --> 01:35:03.065
Uh , very focused in on hypersonics ,

01:35:03.065 --> 01:35:05.176
can you give me a current briefing on

01:35:05.176 --> 01:35:07.287
where we are and when that capability

01:35:07.287 --> 01:35:09.790
and that asset will be . Able to be

01:35:09.790 --> 01:35:13.609
employed . I , I can give you

01:35:13.609 --> 01:35:15.776
the broad brush at this classification

01:35:15.776 --> 01:35:17.942
level , yeah , yeah , absolutely , yes

01:35:17.942 --> 01:35:19.776
broad brush and it's interesting

01:35:19.776 --> 01:35:21.887
because when you juxtapose , uh , you

01:35:21.887 --> 01:35:21.859
know , the rapid advance in technology

01:35:21.859 --> 01:35:23.692
and going to hypersonics and you

01:35:23.692 --> 01:35:25.859
compare it to what we all love , which

01:35:25.859 --> 01:35:27.970
is the A-10 , it's it that the second

01:35:27.970 --> 01:35:30.137
question this is sort of the answer to

01:35:30.137 --> 01:35:32.081
the first those sort of things are

01:35:32.081 --> 01:35:34.248
making that awesome A-10 lesson . Less

01:35:34.248 --> 01:35:36.359
survivable . The most important thing

01:35:36.359 --> 01:35:38.470
for us was to we had hypersonics that

01:35:38.470 --> 01:35:38.174
worked well , but we're , I would say

01:35:38.174 --> 01:35:40.230
it's not only hypersonics , it's the

01:35:40.230 --> 01:35:42.341
other advanced capabilities are gonna

01:35:42.341 --> 01:35:44.563
be more survivable for our boots on the

01:35:44.563 --> 01:35:44.544
ground in the future given the enemy

01:35:44.544 --> 01:35:46.655
capabilities than the A-10 , which we

01:35:46.655 --> 01:35:49.145
all love in the element of hypersonics

01:35:49.145 --> 01:35:51.256
there at this level , I will tell you

01:35:51.256 --> 01:35:53.534
that we're looking , we are developing .

01:35:53.534 --> 01:35:55.423
And have you'll see in the in the

01:35:55.423 --> 01:35:57.478
budget submission assuming it's it's

01:35:57.478 --> 01:35:59.201
what we had put forward uh two

01:35:59.201 --> 01:36:01.089
different programs . One is a , a

01:36:01.089 --> 01:36:03.359
larger form factor that is , is sort of

01:36:03.359 --> 01:36:05.600
more strategic long range that we have

01:36:05.600 --> 01:36:07.767
already uh tested several times . It's

01:36:07.767 --> 01:36:09.878
called Aero and the other one is hack

01:36:09.878 --> 01:36:09.720
them that we got those that's we'll

01:36:09.720 --> 01:36:11.887
just leave it at there but there there

01:36:11.887 --> 01:36:14.109
are two systems that are now continuing

01:36:14.109 --> 01:36:16.276
to develop . Moving beyond the RDT and

01:36:16.276 --> 01:36:18.442
and getting into the procurement range

01:36:18.442 --> 01:36:18.029
in the very near future , and I , I

01:36:18.029 --> 01:36:19.807
will be happy to go at a higher

01:36:19.807 --> 01:36:22.029
classification level , the specifics of

01:36:22.029 --> 01:36:24.251
both of those , but we are accelerating

01:36:24.251 --> 01:36:26.029
in our development not only the

01:36:26.029 --> 01:36:28.085
technology but of the procurement of

01:36:28.085 --> 01:36:30.418
the capabilities that it'll create . Mr .

01:36:30.418 --> 01:36:32.473
Secretary , you having conversations

01:36:32.473 --> 01:36:34.696
about increasing funding for hypersonic

01:36:34.696 --> 01:36:36.862
capabilities in the Air Force ? Yeah ,

01:36:36.862 --> 01:36:39.196
fielding , filling those weapon systems ,

01:36:39.196 --> 01:36:41.709
uh , 222 sides of that , that coin .

01:36:42.040 --> 01:36:44.439
First is we , we really need to , as we

01:36:44.439 --> 01:36:47.080
matured the technology , we focused on

01:36:47.080 --> 01:36:49.247
maturing the technology now we need to

01:36:49.247 --> 01:36:51.413
focus on lowering the cost and getting

01:36:51.413 --> 01:36:53.779
into production . Um , uh , it , it's

01:36:53.779 --> 01:36:55.946
got to be affordable . We've got to be

01:36:55.946 --> 01:36:57.835
able to buy more than 10 of these

01:36:57.835 --> 01:37:00.001
things , right ? So , so that , that's

01:37:00.001 --> 01:37:01.946
a big focus right now is , is , is

01:37:01.946 --> 01:37:04.112
lowering the production costs , well ,

01:37:04.112 --> 01:37:06.279
ramping up the production and lowering

01:37:06.279 --> 01:37:05.819
the cost so we can get enough of that

01:37:05.819 --> 01:37:08.097
kit to actually make a difference , um ,

01:37:08.097 --> 01:37:10.041
but yes , on the other side of the

01:37:10.041 --> 01:37:12.208
house making sure . That if once we do

01:37:12.208 --> 01:37:13.875
kind of get more efficient in

01:37:13.875 --> 01:37:16.041
production that we properly fund those

01:37:16.041 --> 01:37:16.015
programs deliver that capability and

01:37:16.015 --> 01:37:18.237
it's really across the across the force

01:37:18.237 --> 01:37:20.348
not just in the Air Force but the the

01:37:20.348 --> 01:37:22.293
entire department is is looking at

01:37:22.293 --> 01:37:24.404
these systems and there's no question

01:37:24.404 --> 01:37:26.654
the Chinese moved uh uh really fast on

01:37:26.654 --> 01:37:29.520
these capabilities . General Salzman ,

01:37:29.600 --> 01:37:32.319
uh , as far as AI capabilities in Space

01:37:32.319 --> 01:37:35.399
Force , um , when the current budget

01:37:35.399 --> 01:37:37.732
plan comes out that we get to see , are ,

01:37:37.732 --> 01:37:39.843
are , how are those numbers looking ?

01:37:39.843 --> 01:37:42.066
Are we comfortable in , in where we sit

01:37:42.066 --> 01:37:44.399
at this classification level ? Uh , yes ,

01:37:44.399 --> 01:37:46.621
sir . I , a lot of it is early S&T work

01:37:46.621 --> 01:37:48.510
that's being done , uh , focusing

01:37:48.510 --> 01:37:50.843
heavily on decision support kinds of AI ,

01:37:50.843 --> 01:37:52.955
uh , take a lot of data and turn into

01:37:52.955 --> 01:37:55.121
decision quality as fast as possible .

01:37:55.121 --> 01:37:57.177
There's some good returns in the S&T

01:37:57.177 --> 01:37:56.709
environment and , and it's fully funded ,

01:37:56.720 --> 01:37:58.942
uh , in support of those efforts , OK ,

01:37:58.942 --> 01:38:00.998
and I'll close with this , uh , Mr .

01:38:00.998 --> 01:38:02.776
Secretary . You and the general

01:38:02.776 --> 01:38:04.942
answered this , and I know General Oma

01:38:04.942 --> 01:38:04.799
would say the same thing , but your

01:38:04.799 --> 01:38:06.799
most cherished asset is your , your

01:38:06.799 --> 01:38:09.339
people . And their health and

01:38:09.339 --> 01:38:12.680
well-being is everything . And I , I

01:38:12.680 --> 01:38:15.240
would ask that you take a that if even

01:38:15.240 --> 01:38:17.296
if you are an art , take a very hard

01:38:17.296 --> 01:38:19.351
look at the uh currently and as they

01:38:19.351 --> 01:38:21.184
transition out because once they

01:38:21.184 --> 01:38:24.180
transition out . We get lost in space

01:38:24.549 --> 01:38:27.450
and . Mr . Secretary , you most likely

01:38:27.450 --> 01:38:29.506
probably already know that , but the

01:38:29.506 --> 01:38:31.728
generals mark my words , OK ? So health

01:38:31.728 --> 01:38:33.839
and welfare of our service members as

01:38:33.839 --> 01:38:35.728
they transition out . Current and

01:38:35.728 --> 01:38:35.339
transitioning out , please . gentlemen ,

01:38:35.490 --> 01:38:37.546
time expired . I recognize gentleman

01:38:37.546 --> 01:38:39.546
from California , Mr . Whitesides .

01:38:39.740 --> 01:38:41.796
Thank you Mr . Chairman . Uh , thank

01:38:41.796 --> 01:38:43.796
you all for being here today , Mr .

01:38:43.796 --> 01:38:45.796
Secretary , congratulations on your

01:38:45.796 --> 01:38:45.689
confirmation . It's good to have

01:38:45.689 --> 01:38:47.689
someone with your depth of relevant

01:38:47.689 --> 01:38:49.356
experience leading a military

01:38:49.356 --> 01:38:51.467
department . I had the opportunity to

01:38:51.467 --> 01:38:53.800
work with Director Scalise back at NASA ,

01:38:53.800 --> 01:38:55.689
so welcome . Uh , I represent the

01:38:55.689 --> 01:38:57.800
northern side of Los Angeles County ,

01:38:57.800 --> 01:38:56.979
and I want to begin by just thanking

01:38:56.979 --> 01:38:58.979
your teams , uh , for their crucial

01:38:58.979 --> 01:39:00.812
role in fighting the Los Angeles

01:39:00.812 --> 01:39:02.979
firestorm in January . Between the

01:39:02.979 --> 01:39:05.459
fireguard data program , firefighting

01:39:05.459 --> 01:39:07.515
aircraft , and other aspects , we're

01:39:07.515 --> 01:39:09.681
deeply grateful to your teams . I want

01:39:09.681 --> 01:39:11.848
to support those efforts going forward

01:39:11.848 --> 01:39:11.700
as much as I can . I'm also

01:39:11.700 --> 01:39:13.811
enthusiastic about the possibility of

01:39:13.811 --> 01:39:16.033
using autonomy and aerial platforms and

01:39:16.033 --> 01:39:18.256
advanced remote sensing to enable us to

01:39:18.256 --> 01:39:20.089
more quickly suppress fires that

01:39:20.089 --> 01:39:22.256
threaten critical installations . Like

01:39:22.256 --> 01:39:24.720
the Vandenberg Space Force base and our

01:39:24.720 --> 01:39:26.942
home communities , and I'd love to work

01:39:26.942 --> 01:39:28.998
with your teams to continue to think

01:39:28.998 --> 01:39:31.220
about that . As you know , I'm proud to

01:39:31.220 --> 01:39:33.276
represent Plant 42 , the home of the

01:39:33.276 --> 01:39:35.387
B-21 raider . To me , that program is

01:39:35.387 --> 01:39:37.053
really a gold standard . It's

01:39:37.053 --> 01:39:39.164
delivering tremendous capability with

01:39:39.164 --> 01:39:38.410
an efficient development and

01:39:38.410 --> 01:39:40.819
manufacturing program . With that said ,

01:39:40.930 --> 01:39:43.097
I want to follow up on a question that

01:39:43.097 --> 01:39:45.263
Senator Fisher asked this group during

01:39:45.263 --> 01:39:47.597
this As posture hearing late last month .

01:39:47.597 --> 01:39:49.486
As Senator Fisher noted , General

01:39:49.486 --> 01:39:49.419
Cotton has recommended that the Air

01:39:49.419 --> 01:39:52.580
Force procure at least 145 B-21s .

01:39:52.750 --> 01:39:54.472
Couldn't agree with him more ,

01:39:54.472 --> 01:39:56.528
especially when increasing our total

01:39:56.528 --> 01:39:58.417
could decrease costs and move the

01:39:58.417 --> 01:40:00.583
production timeline to the left . Mr .

01:40:00.583 --> 01:40:00.379
Secretary , you noted , uh , to Senator

01:40:00.379 --> 01:40:02.435
Fisher that you were gonna meet with

01:40:02.435 --> 01:40:04.435
General Cotton and discuss his B-21

01:40:04.435 --> 01:40:06.546
requirements . I was just wondering ,

01:40:06.546 --> 01:40:08.490
has that discussion happened ? Are

01:40:08.490 --> 01:40:07.859
there any updates that you might be

01:40:07.859 --> 01:40:11.270
able to share at this time ? I , I , I

01:40:11.270 --> 01:40:13.214
have not , but I expect to have an

01:40:13.214 --> 01:40:15.270
opportunity to talk to him next next

01:40:15.270 --> 01:40:17.437
Tuesday , right ? Um , just checking ,

01:40:17.437 --> 01:40:19.326
uh , I have not had that detailed

01:40:19.326 --> 01:40:21.326
conversation with him , but , but I

01:40:21.326 --> 01:40:23.437
will soon , uh , and , and , and we ,

01:40:23.437 --> 01:40:26.549
yeah , we are looking , uh , very

01:40:26.549 --> 01:40:28.660
closely at how we increase production

01:40:28.660 --> 01:40:30.660
just to get to the 100 , right ? We

01:40:30.660 --> 01:40:32.993
wanna increase the production rate . Uh ,

01:40:32.993 --> 01:40:35.160
that , that's , you know , the program

01:40:35.160 --> 01:40:37.216
is executing very well . Uh , that's

01:40:37.216 --> 01:40:36.669
really the challenge we have right now

01:40:36.669 --> 01:40:39.529
is getting the production rate up , um ,

01:40:39.540 --> 01:40:41.651
to , to deliver the numbers that we'd

01:40:41.651 --> 01:40:43.373
like , which then gives us the

01:40:43.373 --> 01:40:45.707
opportunity to increase numbers if , if ,

01:40:45.707 --> 01:40:47.651
if we can . Thanks for that , Mr .

01:40:47.651 --> 01:40:49.818
Secretary . Um , the committee has had

01:40:49.818 --> 01:40:51.984
multiple discussions over the past few

01:40:51.984 --> 01:40:51.779
months about the importance of

01:40:51.779 --> 01:40:53.501
developing robust space domain

01:40:53.501 --> 01:40:55.612
awareness , something that I strongly

01:40:55.612 --> 01:40:57.723
support . Most of my career I've been

01:40:57.723 --> 01:40:59.779
focused on securing US leadership in

01:40:59.779 --> 01:41:01.890
space space both from an economic and

01:41:01.890 --> 01:41:04.057
national security perspective . Remote

01:41:04.057 --> 01:41:06.223
sensing is central to the fight of the

01:41:06.223 --> 01:41:06.180
future , and space-based capabilities

01:41:06.180 --> 01:41:08.140
are critical . That said , as I

01:41:08.140 --> 01:41:10.196
recently raised with General Gio and

01:41:10.196 --> 01:41:12.095
his representative . As discussed

01:41:12.095 --> 01:41:14.262
space-based capabilities cannot be the

01:41:14.262 --> 01:41:16.539
basket in which we put all of our eggs .

01:41:16.539 --> 01:41:18.651
We need redundancies across domains .

01:41:18.651 --> 01:41:20.373
Uh , that's underscored by the

01:41:20.373 --> 01:41:22.539
insatiable appetite for remote sensing

01:41:22.539 --> 01:41:24.873
information from forward operators . Mr .

01:41:24.873 --> 01:41:24.814
Secretary , I know you spent much of

01:41:24.814 --> 01:41:27.055
your , um , incredible career around

01:41:27.055 --> 01:41:29.055
space assets . Can you give us some

01:41:29.055 --> 01:41:30.999
reassurance that you'll support an

01:41:30.999 --> 01:41:33.333
appropriate balance between space , air ,

01:41:33.333 --> 01:41:33.254
and terrestrial-based systems when it

01:41:33.254 --> 01:41:35.421
comes to remote sensing capabilities ?

01:41:36.569 --> 01:41:38.959
Uh , uh , yes , Congressman , I , I can .

01:41:38.970 --> 01:41:41.137
You can never allow yourself to be put

01:41:41.137 --> 01:41:42.914
into a , a single point failure

01:41:42.914 --> 01:41:45.137
situation to where if you lose a system

01:41:45.137 --> 01:41:47.248
you've totally lost that capability .

01:41:47.248 --> 01:41:49.248
So , so both on space redundancy in

01:41:49.248 --> 01:41:51.470
space is gonna be critical , um , the ,

01:41:51.470 --> 01:41:53.870
uh . Uh , General Salzman talked a

01:41:53.870 --> 01:41:56.203
little bit about that earlier , so that ,

01:41:56.203 --> 01:41:58.370
that's gonna be important , but also ,

01:41:58.370 --> 01:41:58.029
uh , you know , mix between the

01:41:58.029 --> 01:42:00.196
different domains is gonna be critical

01:42:00.196 --> 01:42:02.029
going forward , uh , and that is

01:42:02.029 --> 01:42:04.307
something , uh , we intend to continue .

01:42:04.307 --> 01:42:06.307
It's always a balance , right ? You

01:42:06.307 --> 01:42:08.362
you're never gonna be able to afford

01:42:08.362 --> 01:42:08.229
everything , as was mentioned , we have

01:42:08.229 --> 01:42:10.007
a lot of modernization going on

01:42:10.007 --> 01:42:12.173
simultaneously across the department .

01:42:12.173 --> 01:42:14.229
It's never gonna build a necessarily

01:42:14.229 --> 01:42:16.340
for everything you'd like , but it is

01:42:16.340 --> 01:42:16.100
important to make sure that you're not ,

01:42:16.270 --> 01:42:18.492
you know , single point failure on , on

01:42:18.492 --> 01:42:21.229
these critical capabilities . Thanks so

01:42:21.229 --> 01:42:23.173
much . Um , uh , last week I had a

01:42:23.173 --> 01:42:25.396
great visit to Edwards Air Force Base ,

01:42:25.396 --> 01:42:27.507
which is just north of my district in

01:42:27.507 --> 01:42:29.673
the 412 test wing , and , uh , just on

01:42:29.673 --> 01:42:32.007
the point that represented , by the way ,

01:42:32.007 --> 01:42:31.140
you've got an incredible team out there .

01:42:31.189 --> 01:42:33.467
They're doing incredible work and , uh ,

01:42:33.467 --> 01:42:35.411
General Alvin , uh , we're , we're

01:42:35.411 --> 01:42:37.633
grateful for the great support you've ,

01:42:37.633 --> 01:42:37.520
you've made to them . Uh , just on the

01:42:37.520 --> 01:42:39.631
point , uh , minor point , but on the

01:42:39.631 --> 01:42:41.742
point that Representative Efreth made

01:42:41.742 --> 01:42:43.964
about energy storage , they have a huge

01:42:43.964 --> 01:42:43.560
private solar installation on that base

01:42:43.560 --> 01:42:45.449
territory , and if you could just

01:42:45.449 --> 01:42:47.727
provide a little linkage in solar , uh ,

01:42:47.727 --> 01:42:49.671
local storage , I think , uh , you

01:42:49.671 --> 01:42:51.782
could make Edwards , uh , ensure that

01:42:51.782 --> 01:42:53.727
it's , uh , keep operating through

01:42:53.727 --> 01:42:55.449
potential natural and man-made

01:42:55.449 --> 01:42:57.449
disruptions , so something to think

01:42:57.449 --> 01:42:59.504
about for the future and with that I

01:42:59.504 --> 01:43:01.727
yield back . Thanks so much . Gentleman

01:43:01.727 --> 01:43:01.680
yields back here and I recognize this

01:43:01.680 --> 01:43:03.680
gentleman from Guam , Mr . Moylan .

01:43:04.990 --> 01:43:07.259
Thank you Mr . Chairman and to our

01:43:07.259 --> 01:43:09.481
distinguished witnesses , thank you for

01:43:09.481 --> 01:43:11.500
your leadership and joining us here

01:43:11.500 --> 01:43:14.669
today . General Alvin , uh , given the

01:43:14.669 --> 01:43:16.790
recent reports of unsafe and

01:43:16.790 --> 01:43:19.589
substandard conditions in unaccompanied

01:43:19.589 --> 01:43:22.430
housing on Guam , what steps is the

01:43:22.430 --> 01:43:26.109
department taking in the FY26 budget to

01:43:26.109 --> 01:43:28.620
address these deficiencies and ensure

01:43:28.620 --> 01:43:31.390
habitability of our service members ?

01:43:32.609 --> 01:43:34.665
Thank you Congressman . I appreciate

01:43:34.665 --> 01:43:37.240
the question and certainly uh that that

01:43:37.240 --> 01:43:38.962
is something that we take very

01:43:38.962 --> 01:43:41.073
seriously . We always pride ourselves

01:43:41.073 --> 01:43:42.573
in really working hard for

01:43:42.573 --> 01:43:44.629
unaccompanied housing and , and when

01:43:44.629 --> 01:43:46.573
the Secretary of the Navy went out

01:43:46.573 --> 01:43:48.629
there , he happened to find our very

01:43:48.629 --> 01:43:50.518
worst , uh , through the building

01:43:50.518 --> 01:43:52.351
condition index , uh , uh , uh ,

01:43:52.351 --> 01:43:54.296
assessment , the very worst in our

01:43:54.296 --> 01:43:56.407
United States Air Force , but even in

01:43:56.407 --> 01:43:58.629
our very worst should not be that bad .

01:43:58.629 --> 01:44:00.796
So with res uh respect to specifically

01:44:00.796 --> 01:44:02.907
uh Palau dorm and then wrote it after

01:44:02.907 --> 01:44:05.073
that . Uh , we aren't waiting until FY

01:44:05.073 --> 01:44:07.296
26 . We had seen this coming , and it's

01:44:07.296 --> 01:44:09.296
been about 5-6 months since we took

01:44:09.296 --> 01:44:10.962
over all of those , uh , uh ,

01:44:10.962 --> 01:44:13.073
facilities from the Navy , and we had

01:44:13.073 --> 01:44:15.296
tried to identify and , and ensure that

01:44:15.296 --> 01:44:14.990
we're moving forward with all of our

01:44:14.990 --> 01:44:17.157
unaccompanied housing across the way .

01:44:17.157 --> 01:44:19.379
And then of course Mauer didn't help at

01:44:19.379 --> 01:44:21.434
all , but this year we now expect to

01:44:21.434 --> 01:44:23.546
award $53 million for the improvement

01:44:23.546 --> 01:44:25.768
of Palau dorm this year , and it should

01:44:25.768 --> 01:44:27.934
start within , uh , we should award it

01:44:27.934 --> 01:44:29.823
within 90 days . And should start

01:44:29.823 --> 01:44:32.046
within 60 days after that and so we are

01:44:32.046 --> 01:44:34.046
getting after that right now it's ,

01:44:34.046 --> 01:44:36.212
it's never enough and as you know Guam

01:44:36.212 --> 01:44:38.323
is such an important place we need to

01:44:38.323 --> 01:44:40.546
make sure ourmen are focused on mission

01:44:40.546 --> 01:44:40.259
rather than just their , their housing .

01:44:40.270 --> 01:44:42.660
So between uh the Palau dorms and the

01:44:42.660 --> 01:44:44.882
rota dorms and across the board we have

01:44:44.882 --> 01:44:46.993
an aggressive schedule against that .

01:44:46.993 --> 01:44:49.104
Uh , that's great to hear , General .

01:44:49.104 --> 01:44:51.271
Thank , thank you so much for that and

01:44:51.271 --> 01:44:51.000
as a follow up , is the department

01:44:51.000 --> 01:44:53.319
considering privatizing unaccompanied

01:44:53.319 --> 01:44:55.919
housing as long term solution and what

01:44:55.919 --> 01:44:58.030
oversight mechanisms will be in place

01:44:58.030 --> 01:45:00.359
to ensure quality and accountability ?

01:45:01.649 --> 01:45:03.427
Now , I would , of course , the

01:45:03.427 --> 01:45:05.538
secretary of state's only been in for

01:45:05.538 --> 01:45:04.970
2.5 weeks . We certainly haven't had

01:45:04.970 --> 01:45:07.081
those conversations and it's , and it

01:45:07.081 --> 01:45:09.137
isn't really in of all the things we

01:45:09.137 --> 01:45:11.303
would consider privatizing , uh , that

01:45:11.303 --> 01:45:13.248
really isn't on our list right now

01:45:13.248 --> 01:45:15.192
because of that criticality of the

01:45:15.192 --> 01:45:17.248
young airmen who are living in there

01:45:17.248 --> 01:45:19.470
are sort of need sort of that oversight

01:45:19.470 --> 01:45:21.581
and leadership of the next level NCOs

01:45:21.581 --> 01:45:23.470
to be there . So we we that's not

01:45:23.470 --> 01:45:22.930
currently in the plans for me to

01:45:22.930 --> 01:45:24.986
propose for the secretary . We wanna

01:45:24.986 --> 01:45:27.152
remain that under government control .

01:45:27.152 --> 01:45:29.041
I'm looking forward to this great

01:45:29.041 --> 01:45:31.374
improvements . Thank you , General . Uh ,

01:45:31.374 --> 01:45:33.374
uh , one another question , General

01:45:33.374 --> 01:45:35.649
Alvin , your testimony high highlights

01:45:35.649 --> 01:45:38.569
rele PAC and the need to operate from

01:45:38.569 --> 01:45:41.169
austere airfields in contested

01:45:41.169 --> 01:45:43.391
environments . How is the Air Force res

01:45:43.391 --> 01:45:45.660
resource in Guam to support agile

01:45:45.660 --> 01:45:47.979
combat employment , particularly in

01:45:47.979 --> 01:45:51.370
terms of disperse logistics ,

01:45:51.660 --> 01:45:53.529
airlift , and handling of

01:45:53.529 --> 01:45:55.339
infrastructure under real world

01:45:55.339 --> 01:45:57.899
contingency conditions . Thank you for

01:45:57.899 --> 01:46:00.066
that question , Congressman . Uh we're

01:46:00.066 --> 01:46:02.379
very excited about uh the 4 pack , uh ,

01:46:02.390 --> 01:46:04.446
resolute forces specific exercises .

01:46:04.446 --> 01:46:06.223
This will be one of the largest

01:46:06.223 --> 01:46:08.390
exercises that we've done . Uh , since

01:46:08.390 --> 01:46:10.557
the Cold War , quite frankly , because

01:46:10.557 --> 01:46:12.557
as we do exercises by sort of piece

01:46:12.557 --> 01:46:14.668
parts we get insights , but we really

01:46:14.668 --> 01:46:17.001
wanna see where the true shortfalls are ,

01:46:17.001 --> 01:46:16.870
and we expect and we've talked about

01:46:16.870 --> 01:46:19.092
this congressman that we know logistics

01:46:19.092 --> 01:46:21.092
is going to be important . It's not

01:46:21.092 --> 01:46:23.203
just logistics because the tyranny of

01:46:23.203 --> 01:46:25.370
distance it's gonna be logistics under

01:46:25.370 --> 01:46:25.069
attack and understanding those

01:46:25.069 --> 01:46:27.291
contested environments we're gonna ring

01:46:27.291 --> 01:46:29.458
that out , ring this out this summer .

01:46:29.458 --> 01:46:31.569
We have already in the past couple of

01:46:31.569 --> 01:46:33.791
years been putting forward a request in

01:46:33.791 --> 01:46:35.958
our budget for things like . Um , uh ,

01:46:35.958 --> 01:46:37.736
shelters and hardening and some

01:46:37.736 --> 01:46:39.958
non-kinetic capabilities to sense so we

01:46:39.958 --> 01:46:42.013
know we have work to do to make this

01:46:42.013 --> 01:46:44.069
very critical concept of as a combat

01:46:44.069 --> 01:46:46.013
employment work this summer . This

01:46:46.013 --> 01:46:48.180
exercise is gonna help expose any more

01:46:48.180 --> 01:46:50.125
shortfalls that we haven't already

01:46:50.125 --> 01:46:52.069
identified . In addition , we know

01:46:52.069 --> 01:46:54.291
having preposition of parts and , and ,

01:46:54.291 --> 01:46:56.180
and forward storage to be able to

01:46:56.180 --> 01:46:58.347
accelerate the repair of the platforms

01:46:58.347 --> 01:47:00.569
when they when they break down , that's

01:47:00.569 --> 01:47:02.830
also another uh key performance that we

01:47:02.830 --> 01:47:04.886
have to have in the Indo Pacific and

01:47:04.886 --> 01:47:06.663
that's why I put in my unfunded

01:47:06.663 --> 01:47:08.774
priority list about a 1.5 billion for

01:47:08.774 --> 01:47:10.886
spare parts to increase the health of

01:47:10.886 --> 01:47:13.108
the shelf so we can increase the combat

01:47:13.108 --> 01:47:15.108
generation under attack . Excellent

01:47:15.108 --> 01:47:17.720
thank you general uh Secretary Mee . On ,

01:47:18.229 --> 01:47:20.390
on a code last Congress , I flew to

01:47:20.390 --> 01:47:22.580
Guam , uh , with my colleagues on an

01:47:22.580 --> 01:47:25.229
Air Force C-40 . The jet suffered a

01:47:25.229 --> 01:47:27.259
landing gear malfunction and was

01:47:27.259 --> 01:47:29.370
stranded on Guam , which doesn't mean

01:47:29.370 --> 01:47:31.481
it's bad to be stranded on Guam , but

01:47:31.481 --> 01:47:33.648
it was stranded there for several days

01:47:33.648 --> 01:47:35.703
while awaiting parts for , uh , from

01:47:35.703 --> 01:47:38.540
Konas . Does our operational force

01:47:38.540 --> 01:47:41.490
encounter this type of issue ? And how

01:47:41.490 --> 01:47:44.330
can new force design concepts or

01:47:44.330 --> 01:47:46.520
prepositioning ensure airmen are not

01:47:46.520 --> 01:47:48.853
stranded while operating in the Pacific ?

01:47:52.950 --> 01:47:54.950
I know how much time , so just real

01:47:54.950 --> 01:47:57.172
quickly , yes , that , that happens . I

01:47:57.172 --> 01:47:59.061
think the key thing is you almost

01:47:59.061 --> 01:48:01.006
alluded to is making sure you have

01:48:01.006 --> 01:48:03.061
enough spare parts and enough , uh ,

01:48:03.061 --> 01:48:05.228
supplies to repair the aircraft , uh ,

01:48:05.228 --> 01:48:07.506
across the force , and that's a that's ,

01:48:07.506 --> 01:48:09.672
that's a focus in our budgets missions

01:48:09.672 --> 01:48:11.783
and then prepositioning , uh , yeah ,

01:48:11.783 --> 01:48:13.950
we , we can't preposition everywhere ,

01:48:13.950 --> 01:48:16.172
um , because we just we'll never have ,

01:48:16.172 --> 01:48:18.506
uh , that would be terribly inefficient .

01:48:18.506 --> 01:48:18.450
Um , so those sort of conditions do

01:48:18.450 --> 01:48:20.506
happen , but , but those are the two

01:48:20.506 --> 01:48:22.561
things . Make sure we have the right

01:48:22.561 --> 01:48:24.672
part time so they're expired . Uh , I

01:48:24.672 --> 01:48:27.330
would , uh , point out that all housing

01:48:27.330 --> 01:48:29.970
at Guam has fallen in , fallen into an

01:48:30.529 --> 01:48:33.740
unacceptable state of disrepair . Not

01:48:33.740 --> 01:48:35.907
just unaccompanied , and there's a lot

01:48:35.907 --> 01:48:38.129
of blame to go around up on the dice as

01:48:38.129 --> 01:48:40.240
well as at the witness table , but we

01:48:40.240 --> 01:48:42.296
all need to be focused on correcting

01:48:42.296 --> 01:48:44.407
that and General Allen , I'm thrilled

01:48:44.407 --> 01:48:46.629
to hear about what you just described ,

01:48:46.629 --> 01:48:46.299
but I would urge you and General

01:48:46.299 --> 01:48:48.410
Saltzman and , and the secretary to .

01:48:48.770 --> 01:48:51.029
Let us know how we can help deal with

01:48:51.029 --> 01:48:53.779
all of it because uh that is a critical

01:48:53.779 --> 01:48:56.870
area uh for our national security and

01:48:56.870 --> 01:48:58.759
we need to start putting a lot of

01:48:58.759 --> 01:49:00.926
resources against its capabilities and

01:49:00.926 --> 01:49:02.870
what we need to do for our service

01:49:02.870 --> 01:49:05.092
members that are stationed there . With

01:49:05.092 --> 01:49:07.148
that , I'll recognize gentleman from

01:49:07.148 --> 01:49:09.314
California , Mr . Cisneros . Thank you

01:49:09.314 --> 01:49:11.426
Mr . Chairman and uh thank you to all

01:49:11.426 --> 01:49:13.648
our witnesses today for taking time and

01:49:13.648 --> 01:49:15.814
I know what are your busy schedules uh

01:49:15.814 --> 01:49:17.814
to be with you today . um , General

01:49:17.814 --> 01:49:19.870
Alvin , I appreciate in your opening

01:49:19.870 --> 01:49:21.926
comments , uh , about the continuing

01:49:21.926 --> 01:49:24.160
resolution and really the effect that

01:49:24.160 --> 01:49:27.000
it's having on quality of life as well

01:49:27.000 --> 01:49:29.759
as recruiting , uh , you know , I

01:49:29.759 --> 01:49:31.981
wonder if you could go into more detail

01:49:31.981 --> 01:49:33.981
about . Uh , how important it is to

01:49:33.981 --> 01:49:36.660
have a robust budget with recruiting in

01:49:36.660 --> 01:49:39.819
order to recruit individuals because we

01:49:39.819 --> 01:49:42.020
are competing with corporations out

01:49:42.020 --> 01:49:44.187
there today that is vying for the same

01:49:44.187 --> 01:49:46.640
talent , so please . Uh thank you for

01:49:46.640 --> 01:49:48.529
that , Congressman . It really is

01:49:48.529 --> 01:49:50.307
because we are , uh , our , our

01:49:50.307 --> 01:49:52.529
recruiters are just the hardest working

01:49:52.529 --> 01:49:54.751
in the business right now and they work

01:49:54.751 --> 01:49:56.918
very hard to bring those Americans who

01:49:56.918 --> 01:49:56.520
want to raise their right hand and

01:49:56.520 --> 01:49:58.687
serve in the United States Air Force .

01:49:58.687 --> 01:50:00.798
They work very hard to , to give them

01:50:00.798 --> 01:50:02.742
some sense of this is what you can

01:50:02.742 --> 01:50:02.399
expect . Welcome to the team . This is

01:50:02.399 --> 01:50:04.455
when you're gonna get here and if we

01:50:04.455 --> 01:50:06.566
don't have that funding to be able to

01:50:06.566 --> 01:50:08.788
follow through on that . To bring those

01:50:08.788 --> 01:50:10.843
in not only to keep the Americans to

01:50:10.843 --> 01:50:12.788
want to come into our force but to

01:50:12.788 --> 01:50:12.310
ensure that we are bringing the right

01:50:12.310 --> 01:50:14.421
talent at the right time without that

01:50:14.421 --> 01:50:16.477
predictability of funding or in this

01:50:16.477 --> 01:50:18.643
case the mark that when we had already

01:50:18.643 --> 01:50:20.910
intended to to recruit 3000 more we had

01:50:20.910 --> 01:50:23.021
to back off of that because we didn't

01:50:23.021 --> 01:50:25.243
have the funding . It's very disruptive

01:50:25.243 --> 01:50:27.354
and that lack of reliability , it has

01:50:27.354 --> 01:50:29.466
ripple effects well into the future ,

01:50:29.466 --> 01:50:31.577
right ? And so even though it's we're

01:50:31.577 --> 01:50:31.200
talking about a continuing resolution

01:50:31.200 --> 01:50:33.256
now , a possibility of maybe another

01:50:33.256 --> 01:50:35.970
one . Um , I mean , how many years down

01:50:35.970 --> 01:50:38.192
the line could that have effects into ,

01:50:38.192 --> 01:50:40.939
into your recruiting ? Actually , the

01:50:40.939 --> 01:50:43.161
fact that we've been under a continuing

01:50:43.161 --> 01:50:45.470
resolution about . Most of the time for

01:50:45.470 --> 01:50:47.692
the past decade plus that's part of the

01:50:47.692 --> 01:50:49.748
the challenge that we're seeing here

01:50:49.748 --> 01:50:51.859
today . Well , thank you for that . I

01:50:51.859 --> 01:50:54.081
appreciate your , your answer on that .

01:50:54.081 --> 01:50:56.081
Uh , General Saltzman , um , former

01:50:56.081 --> 01:50:57.914
Secretary Kendall had written an

01:50:57.914 --> 01:51:00.081
article , uh , really at the beginning

01:51:00.081 --> 01:51:02.137
of this year about the future of the

01:51:02.137 --> 01:51:04.137
Space Force and really about how it

01:51:04.137 --> 01:51:06.248
needs to really kind of transform . I

01:51:06.248 --> 01:51:08.629
think the example he used is , uh , was

01:51:08.629 --> 01:51:11.069
he used the navy analogy of a merchant

01:51:11.069 --> 01:51:13.180
marine going into actually becoming a

01:51:13.180 --> 01:51:16.240
fighting force navy . Um , where are we

01:51:16.240 --> 01:51:18.351
on that timeline and really what's it

01:51:18.351 --> 01:51:20.462
gonna take us to get there it's where

01:51:20.462 --> 01:51:22.462
we can see the space force becoming

01:51:22.462 --> 01:51:24.629
that the fighting force that it should

01:51:24.629 --> 01:51:27.040
be . Yeah , thank you for that sir it's ,

01:51:27.049 --> 01:51:29.529
it's equipment , it's training , and

01:51:29.529 --> 01:51:31.751
it's the operational concepts . I think

01:51:31.751 --> 01:51:33.973
we've done some pretty good work on the

01:51:33.973 --> 01:51:36.140
operational concepts we , we generally

01:51:36.140 --> 01:51:37.751
know what we wanna do . uh ,

01:51:37.751 --> 01:51:39.807
acquisition uh of the equipment is a

01:51:39.807 --> 01:51:41.862
little longer lead item , but I feel

01:51:41.862 --> 01:51:43.973
good about the protection assets that

01:51:43.973 --> 01:51:43.959
we put in place in terms of resiliency

01:51:44.250 --> 01:51:46.361
and now we've got good plans in place

01:51:46.361 --> 01:51:48.250
to put together the counter space

01:51:48.250 --> 01:51:50.250
capabilities that convert us to the

01:51:50.250 --> 01:51:52.306
navy , not the merchant marine , and

01:51:52.306 --> 01:51:51.955
then training . Uh , modeling and

01:51:51.955 --> 01:51:54.325
simulation range assets , uh , high

01:51:54.325 --> 01:51:56.674
fidelity simulators , um , to , to

01:51:56.674 --> 01:51:58.896
train our people to make sure that they

01:51:58.896 --> 01:52:01.063
practice the tactics that are gonna be

01:52:01.063 --> 01:52:03.063
necessary . All of those are coming

01:52:03.063 --> 01:52:03.035
together , uh , we'll have to grow a

01:52:03.035 --> 01:52:05.146
little bit as a force as we bring new

01:52:05.146 --> 01:52:07.313
capabilities on new missions on , uh ,

01:52:07.313 --> 01:52:09.591
but I think we're well on our way , uh ,

01:52:09.591 --> 01:52:12.450
to , to that evolution . And as um you

01:52:12.450 --> 01:52:14.617
know , all the services still do space

01:52:14.617 --> 01:52:16.728
they're still in the space game there

01:52:16.728 --> 01:52:19.169
but as the space force grows and

01:52:19.169 --> 01:52:21.370
becomes , you know , larger and it is

01:52:21.370 --> 01:52:23.481
it taking over more of these roles to

01:52:23.481 --> 01:52:25.481
where now it'll be Space Force will

01:52:25.481 --> 01:52:27.648
kind of be there or we'll be more of a

01:52:27.648 --> 01:52:29.426
working together with the other

01:52:29.426 --> 01:52:31.314
services to kind of oversee their

01:52:31.314 --> 01:52:33.426
missions as well . Well thank you for

01:52:33.426 --> 01:52:35.426
that because it it came up a little

01:52:35.426 --> 01:52:37.426
earlier too and and I think General

01:52:37.426 --> 01:52:39.648
Alvin would agree with me when we think

01:52:39.648 --> 01:52:41.814
about our missions and how we're gonna

01:52:41.814 --> 01:52:41.100
perform the missions , the last

01:52:41.100 --> 01:52:43.267
question we ask is which domain should

01:52:43.267 --> 01:52:45.322
we use first it's about what are the

01:52:45.322 --> 01:52:47.433
threats , what are the capabilities ,

01:52:47.433 --> 01:52:49.267
what what's required of us to be

01:52:49.267 --> 01:52:51.378
survivable , to create the effects we

01:52:51.378 --> 01:52:53.378
want . You can get to uh what where

01:52:53.378 --> 01:52:55.600
should this platform be located ? Is it

01:52:55.600 --> 01:52:57.711
an airborne platform ? You can get to

01:52:57.711 --> 01:52:56.979
that , but that's not our starting

01:52:56.979 --> 01:52:59.149
point . And so I see all of our our

01:52:59.149 --> 01:53:01.299
challenges as all domain challenges .

01:53:01.649 --> 01:53:03.816
Some of those will play out in space .

01:53:03.816 --> 01:53:05.816
Some of those we I rely on maritime

01:53:05.816 --> 01:53:07.816
capability , uh , to do the counter

01:53:07.816 --> 01:53:09.982
space missions . So it's an all domain

01:53:09.982 --> 01:53:11.593
effort now in this networked

01:53:11.593 --> 01:53:11.350
environment . The modern battlefield

01:53:11.350 --> 01:53:13.350
doesn't just restrict itself to one

01:53:13.350 --> 01:53:15.461
domain or another . All right , thank

01:53:15.461 --> 01:53:17.517
you for that , uh , Mr . Secretary .

01:53:17.517 --> 01:53:19.461
You commented earlier about the uh

01:53:19.461 --> 01:53:23.410
Qatari 747 , about 70

01:53:23.410 --> 01:53:27.089
or $250 million or yeah $250

01:53:27.089 --> 01:53:30.439
million to uh to retrofit it um

01:53:30.890 --> 01:53:33.169
but in that estimate that you gave to

01:53:33.169 --> 01:53:35.336
kind of modernize it or to bring it up

01:53:35.336 --> 01:53:37.558
to to standards to meet the president's

01:53:37.558 --> 01:53:40.049
needs did I also consider what it's

01:53:40.049 --> 01:53:42.216
gonna take to go through that and make

01:53:42.216 --> 01:53:44.327
sure that that aircraft . Hasn't been

01:53:44.327 --> 01:53:46.493
compromised because as soon as I heard

01:53:46.493 --> 01:53:48.716
about this in the news if I was a , you

01:53:48.716 --> 01:53:51.240
know , the CPC , I would be trying to

01:53:51.240 --> 01:53:53.589
get somebody on there bugging it doing

01:53:53.589 --> 01:53:55.910
what they ever can . So how are we

01:53:55.910 --> 01:53:57.966
going to make sure that the aircraft

01:53:57.966 --> 01:54:00.132
was not compromised ? Uh , so thanks ,

01:54:00.189 --> 01:54:02.356
Congressman . First off , I , I didn't

01:54:02.356 --> 01:54:04.522
say 250 million , um , and we can talk

01:54:04.522 --> 01:54:06.745
more details in a different environment

01:54:06.745 --> 01:54:08.856
about what needs to go on there , but

01:54:08.856 --> 01:54:10.467
part of upgrading it is , is

01:54:10.467 --> 01:54:12.633
essentially doing a deep sweep to make

01:54:12.633 --> 01:54:14.189
sure that there's no . Uh ,

01:54:14.189 --> 01:54:16.133
counterintelligence threats on the

01:54:16.133 --> 01:54:18.245
platform . Gentleman's time expired .

01:54:18.245 --> 01:54:17.390
Chair and I recognized gentleman from

01:54:17.390 --> 01:54:19.612
Texas , Mr . Jackson . Thank you , Mr .

01:54:19.612 --> 01:54:21.390
Chairman , and thank you to our

01:54:21.390 --> 01:54:23.612
witnesses for being here today . I have

01:54:23.612 --> 01:54:22.790
three real quick questions I'm gonna

01:54:22.790 --> 01:54:24.846
try to ask , uh , for , uh , General

01:54:24.846 --> 01:54:26.734
Alvin and for the secretary , all

01:54:26.734 --> 01:54:28.790
related to Shepherd Air Force Base .

01:54:28.790 --> 01:54:30.901
But start with , uh , one of my early

01:54:30.901 --> 01:54:30.350
achievements as a member of Congress

01:54:30.350 --> 01:54:32.830
was back in 2021 when I was successful

01:54:32.830 --> 01:54:34.886
in getting the new Child Development

01:54:34.886 --> 01:54:36.774
Center at Shepherd Air Force Base

01:54:36.774 --> 01:54:38.830
funded and authorized years ahead of

01:54:38.830 --> 01:54:40.941
its schedule . Shortly after breaking

01:54:40.941 --> 01:54:43.163
ground in 2023 , however , construction

01:54:43.163 --> 01:54:45.497
crews identified asbestos in the ground ,

01:54:45.497 --> 01:54:47.497
and the project has still yet to be

01:54:47.497 --> 01:54:49.163
completed . I'm concerned the

01:54:49.163 --> 01:54:48.930
Department of the Air Force has not

01:54:48.930 --> 01:54:50.930
been aggressive enough in resolving

01:54:50.930 --> 01:54:52.819
these types of issues . Uh , Mr .

01:54:52.819 --> 01:54:55.129
Secretary and General Alvin , uh , how

01:54:55.129 --> 01:54:57.240
are we addressing delays for projects

01:54:57.240 --> 01:54:59.351
like the CDC at Shepherd ? Would both

01:54:59.351 --> 01:55:01.462
of you please commit to ensuring that

01:55:01.462 --> 01:55:03.629
this project can stay on track , if at

01:55:03.629 --> 01:55:05.796
all possible , and we can deliver this

01:55:05.796 --> 01:55:07.907
critical support that we need for our

01:55:07.907 --> 01:55:10.129
families at Shepherd . Absolutely I can

01:55:10.129 --> 01:55:12.185
commit and uh I can commit to uh you

01:55:12.185 --> 01:55:14.407
know proposing to the secretary that we

01:55:14.407 --> 01:55:14.290
put the right funding against it . The

01:55:14.290 --> 01:55:16.179
remediation should be complete by

01:55:16.179 --> 01:55:18.179
October . Get us back on track . We

01:55:18.179 --> 01:55:20.234
understand this is one of those that

01:55:20.234 --> 01:55:22.401
discovery . The last thing we wanna do

01:55:22.401 --> 01:55:24.457
though is put a CDC where there's uh

01:55:24.457 --> 01:55:26.568
lead and it harm to the children . So

01:55:26.568 --> 01:55:26.169
we want to make sure that entire

01:55:26.169 --> 01:55:28.336
environment is fully cleaned up and so

01:55:28.336 --> 01:55:30.391
by October 25 , we should be able to

01:55:30.391 --> 01:55:32.669
have the remediation get back on track .

01:55:32.669 --> 01:55:34.725
Yes sir , I understand that and uh I

01:55:34.725 --> 01:55:33.899
appreciate that , uh , Mr . Secretary .

01:55:35.470 --> 01:55:37.248
Oh yeah , I think we're , we're

01:55:37.248 --> 01:55:39.529
expecting if it by the end of the year

01:55:39.529 --> 01:55:41.751
get it cleaned up , get going . I think

01:55:41.751 --> 01:55:43.751
we're looking at like 28 to have it

01:55:43.751 --> 01:55:43.709
have it complete . Thank you . I

01:55:43.709 --> 01:55:45.765
appreciate that . And if there's any

01:55:45.765 --> 01:55:47.820
opportunity to expedite things after

01:55:47.820 --> 01:55:47.080
that to make up for some of the lost

01:55:47.080 --> 01:55:49.247
time , I think we should do that . And

01:55:49.247 --> 01:55:51.191
thank you . I appreciate it . Uh ,

01:55:51.191 --> 01:55:53.247
another question here across the air

01:55:53.247 --> 01:55:55.413
across the aircraft fleets in the US ,

01:55:55.413 --> 01:55:55.270
uh , Air Force inventory pilot training

01:55:55.270 --> 01:55:57.549
is foundational to our readiness . As

01:55:57.549 --> 01:55:59.716
the service continues to struggle with

01:55:59.716 --> 01:56:01.938
the pilot shortage , I'm also concerned

01:56:01.938 --> 01:56:04.271
about the delayed acquisition of the T7 ,

01:56:04.271 --> 01:56:06.271
which is further constraining pilot

01:56:06.271 --> 01:56:08.105
training pipeline . Uh , despite

01:56:08.105 --> 01:56:10.160
announcements earlier this year that

01:56:10.160 --> 01:56:09.979
the program may achieve an accelerated

01:56:09.979 --> 01:56:11.812
initial operational capability ,

01:56:11.812 --> 01:56:13.979
there's been limited information about

01:56:13.979 --> 01:56:16.090
whether Uh , this will translate into

01:56:16.090 --> 01:56:18.090
expedited deliveries . Uh , General

01:56:18.090 --> 01:56:20.146
Alvin , um , or Alvin , sorry , uh ,

01:56:20.146 --> 01:56:22.257
would you provide an update on the T7

01:56:22.257 --> 01:56:24.479
timeline and what these delays mean for

01:56:24.479 --> 01:56:26.535
the Air Force's ability to train our

01:56:26.535 --> 01:56:28.479
pilots ? Uh , what actions has the

01:56:28.479 --> 01:56:30.590
department taken to expedite delivery

01:56:30.590 --> 01:56:32.757
of these platforms , and when could we

01:56:32.757 --> 01:56:34.868
expect delivery at Shepherd Air Force

01:56:34.868 --> 01:56:37.201
Base in particular ? Yeah , Congressman ,

01:56:37.201 --> 01:56:39.146
we can give you the uh the current

01:56:39.146 --> 01:56:41.368
understanding of of the lay down of the

01:56:41.368 --> 01:56:41.140
order and the sequence and the timing .

01:56:41.339 --> 01:56:43.580
Uh , it still is , is for Shepherd .

01:56:43.660 --> 01:56:45.604
I'll go to the last question first

01:56:45.604 --> 01:56:47.859
right now it's about 7 years from now

01:56:47.859 --> 01:56:49.915
for the for finally . However , that

01:56:49.915 --> 01:56:52.026
that can be accelerated . Here's what

01:56:52.026 --> 01:56:54.248
we've done to accelerate that . We have

01:56:54.248 --> 01:56:54.149
taken some of the articles that were

01:56:54.149 --> 01:56:56.149
gonna be production articles we put

01:56:56.149 --> 01:56:58.316
them into test . We've accelerated the

01:56:58.316 --> 01:57:00.649
number of T7 platforms that are in test .

01:57:00.649 --> 01:57:02.871
Now we've completed 140 flights , 67 of

01:57:02.871 --> 01:57:05.093
them were in all of last year . Already

01:57:05.093 --> 01:57:06.982
this year we've made up the other

01:57:06.982 --> 01:57:08.982
ground , so we are accelerating the

01:57:08.982 --> 01:57:08.799
test and as a test pilot I've been

01:57:08.799 --> 01:57:11.319
checking in with it . Uh , quite often

01:57:11.319 --> 01:57:13.060
and the airplane is performing

01:57:13.060 --> 01:57:15.060
phenomenally so we're trying to buy

01:57:15.060 --> 01:57:17.116
down the risk as fast as we can . If

01:57:17.116 --> 01:57:19.227
when we put the more platforms and we

01:57:19.227 --> 01:57:21.338
can accelerate and move it to less by

01:57:21.338 --> 01:57:21.310
buying , buying down the test risk ,

01:57:21.459 --> 01:57:23.792
we're ready to do that because you know ,

01:57:23.792 --> 01:57:25.903
Congressman , the T-38s are operating

01:57:25.903 --> 01:57:27.903
great but those J85 engines and all

01:57:27.903 --> 01:57:27.899
those challenges are things we don't

01:57:27.899 --> 01:57:30.066
want to contend with the next decade .

01:57:30.066 --> 01:57:32.121
So we're stepping through and making

01:57:32.121 --> 01:57:34.010
sure . That the Milon is lined up

01:57:34.010 --> 01:57:36.010
associated with all the funding and

01:57:36.010 --> 01:57:38.177
with Shepherd , of course we have it's

01:57:38.177 --> 01:57:40.177
crown jewel . It's got the Euroatal

01:57:40.177 --> 01:57:42.399
piece and so which means they all get a

01:57:42.399 --> 01:57:44.510
say in when funding goes in to do the

01:57:44.510 --> 01:57:44.254
milkon and so we wanna make sure we

01:57:44.254 --> 01:57:46.476
don't get ahead of that , make promises

01:57:46.476 --> 01:57:48.698
that our international partners we have

01:57:48.698 --> 01:57:50.754
to put money against that we have to

01:57:50.754 --> 01:57:52.810
renege on . So we wanna make sure we

01:57:52.810 --> 01:57:52.415
have confidence in that and buy down

01:57:52.415 --> 01:57:54.694
the test risk as we lay out the uh .

01:57:55.029 --> 01:57:56.970
The actual production and the uh

01:57:56.970 --> 01:57:58.970
delivery capability across . It's a

01:57:58.970 --> 01:58:01.081
great platform . We can't get it fast

01:58:01.081 --> 01:58:02.914
enough . Well , thanks , sir . I

01:58:02.914 --> 01:58:05.137
appreciate that and yeah , I agree 100%

01:58:05.137 --> 01:58:04.629
and , and obviously as important as

01:58:04.629 --> 01:58:06.685
that training program is to not only

01:58:06.685 --> 01:58:08.573
our pilots , but our , our allied

01:58:08.573 --> 01:58:10.740
pilots . Uh , 7 years is a long time .

01:58:10.740 --> 01:58:12.796
So anything that , you know , that I

01:58:12.796 --> 01:58:12.720
can do on my end , obviously , uh ,

01:58:12.729 --> 01:58:14.785
from where I sit , I'm anxious and ,

01:58:14.785 --> 01:58:17.062
and willing to , to help expedite that .

01:58:17.062 --> 01:58:19.173
It just , it , it seems like that's a

01:58:19.173 --> 01:58:21.285
long ways out . All right . Thank you

01:58:21.285 --> 01:58:20.229
with that . I yield back , Mr .

01:58:20.290 --> 01:58:23.290
Chairman . A gentleman yields back

01:58:23.290 --> 01:58:25.290
chair and I recognize the gentleman

01:58:25.290 --> 01:58:27.457
from , uh , Illinois , Mr . Sorenson .

01:58:27.457 --> 01:58:29.568
Thank you to our chairman and ranking

01:58:29.568 --> 01:58:31.734
member . Uh , good morning , uh , just

01:58:31.734 --> 01:58:33.957
about good afternoon , uh , and welcome

01:58:33.957 --> 01:58:36.234
to , uh , Secretary Me , General Alvin ,

01:58:36.234 --> 01:58:38.290
and General Saltzman . Thank you for

01:58:38.290 --> 01:58:40.012
your many years of service and

01:58:40.012 --> 01:58:42.234
dedication to our nation . Uh , I first

01:58:42.234 --> 01:58:44.290
have to say I'm really excited about

01:58:44.290 --> 01:58:43.859
where the Air Force is headed in terms

01:58:43.859 --> 01:58:46.220
of investing in new technology and new

01:58:46.220 --> 01:58:48.459
capabilities while also making sure

01:58:48.459 --> 01:58:50.570
that we're equipping the Air National

01:58:50.570 --> 01:58:52.459
Guard . Uh , these new assets and

01:58:52.459 --> 01:58:54.459
capabilities will be crucial to our

01:58:54.459 --> 01:58:56.348
national security . Uh , our next

01:58:56.348 --> 01:58:59.109
generation air missions like the F-47s

01:58:59.109 --> 01:59:02.779
and CCAs must also be fielded to the

01:59:02.779 --> 01:59:05.100
Air National Guard . I proudly

01:59:05.100 --> 01:59:07.267
represent the heart of Illinois , home

01:59:07.267 --> 01:59:09.930
to the 182nd Airlift Wing in Peoria .

01:59:10.299 --> 01:59:12.355
As you all are well aware , they are

01:59:12.355 --> 01:59:14.379
the gold standard for Air National

01:59:14.379 --> 01:59:17.259
Guard service , and I know I speak for

01:59:17.259 --> 01:59:19.203
everyone back home when I say that

01:59:19.203 --> 01:59:21.919
we're so excited to welcome the C-130J

01:59:22.140 --> 01:59:24.418
model to our airports and our airspace .

01:59:24.640 --> 01:59:27.430
The 1802 wing is exemplary and I'm

01:59:27.430 --> 01:59:29.910
proud to support their work doing the

01:59:29.910 --> 01:59:32.750
crucial work that many of our neighbors ,

01:59:32.870 --> 01:59:35.069
my neighbors are doing , Title 5

01:59:35.069 --> 01:59:37.310
employees at the Peoria Air National

01:59:37.310 --> 01:59:39.430
Guard . Like so many of my colleagues

01:59:39.430 --> 01:59:41.486
here in the committee , I'm troubled

01:59:41.486 --> 01:59:43.374
why Donald Trump's administration

01:59:43.374 --> 01:59:45.152
thinks that cuts to the defense

01:59:45.152 --> 01:59:47.319
workforce are a good idea . This drain

01:59:47.319 --> 01:59:49.470
of expertise is detrimental at a time

01:59:49.470 --> 01:59:51.248
when we should be improving our

01:59:51.248 --> 01:59:53.248
readiness to meet the challenges of

01:59:53.248 --> 01:59:55.192
today and tomorrow . I'm concerned

01:59:55.192 --> 01:59:57.414
about what the loss of Title 5 civilian

01:59:57.414 --> 01:59:59.526
employees at our National Guard bases

01:59:59.526 --> 02:00:01.692
across the country . And what it means

02:00:01.692 --> 02:00:03.970
for overall readiness to the secretary ,

02:00:04.169 --> 02:00:06.391
could you explain how the loss of these

02:00:06.391 --> 02:00:08.558
employees in Air National Guard , um ,

02:00:09.009 --> 02:00:11.729
will impact our emissions , but you

02:00:11.729 --> 02:00:14.129
know , how should other federal workers

02:00:14.129 --> 02:00:16.479
feel ? How are they supposed to to keep

02:00:16.479 --> 02:00:18.729
their morale so high if cuts are

02:00:18.729 --> 02:00:20.896
happening to the best workers on their

02:00:20.896 --> 02:00:23.790
team ? Mr . Congressman , thanks . uh ,

02:00:23.890 --> 02:00:26.279
I can't speak specifically to Peoria ,

02:00:26.589 --> 02:00:29.430
um , uh , been there a couple of times ,

02:00:29.549 --> 02:00:31.605
but , uh , can't speak to , uh , the

02:00:31.605 --> 02:00:33.771
guard base there and how they're gonna

02:00:33.771 --> 02:00:35.771
handle the , the civilian workforce

02:00:35.771 --> 02:00:37.993
impacts . I think overall though , uh ,

02:00:37.993 --> 02:00:40.105
across the department . Uh , the push

02:00:40.105 --> 02:00:42.271
and again civilian workers have been ,

02:00:42.271 --> 02:00:44.327
uh , critical . I've been one for 30

02:00:44.327 --> 02:00:46.382
odd years , uh , so , so critical to

02:00:46.382 --> 02:00:48.438
the Defense Department , uh , saying

02:00:48.438 --> 02:00:48.379
that though , there's always an

02:00:48.379 --> 02:00:50.601
opportunity to improve efficiencies and

02:00:50.601 --> 02:00:52.768
the organization has an opportunity to

02:00:52.768 --> 02:00:54.990
prove efficiencies , and I think that's

02:00:54.990 --> 02:00:54.540
what's , uh , going on in the

02:00:54.540 --> 02:00:56.762
department right now is how do we , how

02:00:56.762 --> 02:00:58.651
do we , uh , continue to increase

02:00:58.651 --> 02:01:00.707
efficiency support or prioritize the

02:01:00.707 --> 02:01:02.596
workforce on the highest priority

02:01:02.596 --> 02:01:04.762
missions , uh , so that we can deliver

02:01:04.762 --> 02:01:06.818
these cases . abilities we have more

02:01:06.818 --> 02:01:08.651
free , more resources to deliver

02:01:08.651 --> 02:01:10.873
critical capabilities , but it's always

02:01:10.873 --> 02:01:10.075
gonna be a balance , right ? You're

02:01:10.075 --> 02:01:12.186
always gonna be a balance . Um , I've

02:01:12.186 --> 02:01:14.408
seen this many times in my career where

02:01:14.408 --> 02:01:16.464
there's , uh , give and take on , on

02:01:16.464 --> 02:01:18.464
the size of the workforce and , and

02:01:18.464 --> 02:01:18.395
we're in another area we're trying to

02:01:18.395 --> 02:01:20.506
improve our efficiencies , um , and ,

02:01:20.564 --> 02:01:22.453
and , you know , I , I've done it

02:01:22.453 --> 02:01:24.620
before , and that's what we're working

02:01:24.620 --> 02:01:24.395
across the department to try to make

02:01:24.395 --> 02:01:26.451
sure that , uh , we continue to meet

02:01:26.451 --> 02:01:28.506
the priorities . So what do I say to

02:01:28.506 --> 02:01:30.284
people when they back home when

02:01:30.284 --> 02:01:32.173
somebody hears we want to improve

02:01:32.173 --> 02:01:34.173
efficiency , there's a skip of your

02:01:34.173 --> 02:01:36.649
heart . Because does the improving of

02:01:36.649 --> 02:01:39.209
the efficiency mean it's my job ? What

02:01:39.209 --> 02:01:43.069
do I say ? So it's always

02:01:43.069 --> 02:01:45.236
hard , you're , you're exactly right .

02:01:45.236 --> 02:01:47.709
It's always hard , um , uh , but as

02:01:47.709 --> 02:01:49.931
we've discussed , the prioritization of

02:01:49.931 --> 02:01:52.153
funds both on hardware and people are ,

02:01:52.153 --> 02:01:54.320
are the tough decisions sometimes that

02:01:54.320 --> 02:01:56.376
we have to make , and , but we do we

02:01:56.376 --> 02:01:58.598
need to do everything we can to support

02:01:58.598 --> 02:02:00.876
the workforce as we do that , you know ,

02:02:00.876 --> 02:02:02.987
I'm also concerned about our National

02:02:02.987 --> 02:02:05.209
Guard federal technicians . Um , do you

02:02:05.209 --> 02:02:07.431
expect that the president's 2026 budget

02:02:07.431 --> 02:02:09.265
will request adequate funding to

02:02:09.265 --> 02:02:09.189
support our National Guard's federal

02:02:09.189 --> 02:02:12.580
technicians ? Uh , I'd be happy to

02:02:12.580 --> 02:02:14.913
discuss that once the budget's released ,

02:02:14.913 --> 02:02:17.080
Congressman . I look forward to seeing

02:02:17.080 --> 02:02:19.247
it as everyone does . And while I have

02:02:19.247 --> 02:02:21.080
just one minute left , I want to

02:02:21.080 --> 02:02:23.080
acknowledge that just yesterday the

02:02:23.080 --> 02:02:23.049
Rock Island Arsenal's Joint

02:02:23.049 --> 02:02:25.049
Manufacturing and Technology Center

02:02:25.049 --> 02:02:27.569
just received their AS 9100

02:02:27.569 --> 02:02:29.930
certification . This will allow them to

02:02:29.930 --> 02:02:31.874
deliver the best components to the

02:02:31.874 --> 02:02:34.097
aerospace industry , and I , I strongly

02:02:34.097 --> 02:02:36.208
urge the Air Force to make efforts to

02:02:36.208 --> 02:02:38.208
partner with our organic industrial

02:02:38.208 --> 02:02:40.430
base to make sure that our war fighters

02:02:40.430 --> 02:02:42.541
have everything that they need . Um ,

02:02:42.541 --> 02:02:44.763
also , as a meteorologist , um , I'd be

02:02:44.763 --> 02:02:47.049
remiss as we begin hurricane season ,

02:02:47.259 --> 02:02:49.459
my thanks , uh , to the courageous

02:02:49.459 --> 02:02:51.259
folks at the Air Force Reserve

02:02:51.259 --> 02:02:54.089
Hurricane hunters , uh , who do

02:02:54.089 --> 02:02:56.145
everything that they can to fly into

02:02:56.145 --> 02:02:58.629
these the world's biggest storms with

02:02:58.629 --> 02:03:02.250
the sole purpose of keeping us safe ,

02:03:02.560 --> 02:03:04.504
uh , so may they stay safe in this

02:03:04.504 --> 02:03:06.727
hurricane season . And if you ever need

02:03:06.727 --> 02:03:08.782
a meteorologist from Congress to fly

02:03:08.782 --> 02:03:10.782
with them , I just give me a call .

02:03:10.782 --> 02:03:12.949
Thank you , Mr . Chairman . I'll yield

02:03:12.949 --> 02:03:14.419
back . That's a first for me .