1 00:00:00,740 --> 00:00:02,851 Come to order . I'd like to thank the 2 00:00:02,851 --> 00:00:05,739 witnesses for being here today . This 3 00:00:05,739 --> 00:00:08,420 subcommittee has long worked on a 4 00:00:08,420 --> 00:00:11,060 bipartisan basis to strengthen and 5 00:00:11,060 --> 00:00:13,282 improve our national integrated air and 6 00:00:13,282 --> 00:00:15,789 missile defense architecture . Our 7 00:00:15,789 --> 00:00:17,940 adversaries continue to improve and 8 00:00:17,940 --> 00:00:20,180 diversify their ability to hold the 9 00:00:20,180 --> 00:00:22,340 homeland at risk , including through 10 00:00:22,340 --> 00:00:24,459 ballistic , hypersonic , and cruise 11 00:00:24,459 --> 00:00:27,459 missiles . I remain deeply concerned 12 00:00:27,659 --> 00:00:30,500 that the status quo will not suffice in 13 00:00:30,500 --> 00:00:32,740 the coming decades , and I look forward 14 00:00:32,740 --> 00:00:34,851 to hearing from each of our witnesses 15 00:00:34,851 --> 00:00:36,907 about their work on the department's 16 00:00:36,907 --> 00:00:39,290 various missile defense activities . 17 00:00:40,049 --> 00:00:43,380 General Dio , as the commander of NORCO , 18 00:00:43,970 --> 00:00:46,250 you are ultimately responsible for the 19 00:00:46,250 --> 00:00:48,529 defense of our homeland . I look 20 00:00:48,529 --> 00:00:50,669 forward to hearing how NorthCOM is 21 00:00:50,669 --> 00:00:53,490 working to enhance domain awareness to 22 00:00:53,490 --> 00:00:56,119 provide a common picture of the 23 00:00:56,119 --> 00:00:59,049 operational environment , Ms . Yaffe . 24 00:00:59,860 --> 00:01:02,193 As you stated in your written testimony , 25 00:01:02,193 --> 00:01:04,349 missile defense and the space domain 26 00:01:04,349 --> 00:01:06,980 are intrinsically linked . I look 27 00:01:06,980 --> 00:01:09,036 forward to hearing your views on the 28 00:01:09,036 --> 00:01:11,339 evolution of missile defense and how 29 00:01:11,339 --> 00:01:14,319 space-based systems can continue to 30 00:01:14,319 --> 00:01:16,529 play an important role going forward . 31 00:01:17,379 --> 00:01:19,580 Lieutenant General Collins , I 32 00:01:19,580 --> 00:01:21,691 understand the missile Defense Agency 33 00:01:21,691 --> 00:01:24,220 will retain its key role in developing , 34 00:01:24,379 --> 00:01:26,540 testing , and integrating many of the 35 00:01:26,540 --> 00:01:29,180 technologies that comprise our missile 36 00:01:29,180 --> 00:01:31,660 defense system , and I look forward to 37 00:01:31,660 --> 00:01:34,300 hearing how we can expect to expand on 38 00:01:34,300 --> 00:01:36,849 these efforts in the coming fiscal year . 39 00:01:37,529 --> 00:01:39,196 Finally , I'd like to welcome 40 00:01:39,196 --> 00:01:41,379 Lieutenant General Rush and his 41 00:01:41,379 --> 00:01:43,730 capacity as the executive officer of 42 00:01:43,730 --> 00:01:46,089 the Guam Defense System Joint Program 43 00:01:46,089 --> 00:01:48,330 Office . I look forward to hearing from 44 00:01:48,330 --> 00:01:50,569 you about the progress being made to 45 00:01:50,569 --> 00:01:53,970 expand and improve the integrated air 46 00:01:53,970 --> 00:01:56,209 and missile defense of Guam , which 47 00:01:56,209 --> 00:01:59,860 will protect over 168,000 48 00:01:59,870 --> 00:02:03,660 American citizens living on Guam . I 49 00:02:03,660 --> 00:02:05,716 understand that we are still waiting 50 00:02:05,716 --> 00:02:08,360 for details of the fiscal year 2026 51 00:02:08,360 --> 00:02:10,399 president's budget request to be 52 00:02:10,399 --> 00:02:13,000 released and that the president is in 53 00:02:13,000 --> 00:02:15,490 the final stages of making key 54 00:02:15,490 --> 00:02:18,229 decisions about the golden dome system . 55 00:02:18,970 --> 00:02:21,110 Well , this means that follow on 56 00:02:21,110 --> 00:02:23,166 conversations will be necessary once 57 00:02:23,166 --> 00:02:25,279 the administration provides us those 58 00:02:25,279 --> 00:02:28,529 details . I still expect a robust 59 00:02:28,529 --> 00:02:30,600 conversation this afternoon on the 60 00:02:30,600 --> 00:02:33,009 future of missile defense . Thank you 61 00:02:33,009 --> 00:02:35,190 again , Senator King , would you like 62 00:02:35,190 --> 00:02:37,412 to make some opening remarks , please ? 63 00:02:37,412 --> 00:02:39,579 Thank you very much , Madam co-chair . 64 00:02:39,600 --> 00:02:42,289 Can I say that ? Yes , thank you , um . 65 00:02:42,820 --> 00:02:45,042 This committee , this subcommittee does 66 00:02:45,042 --> 00:02:46,987 work on a very strongly bipartisan 67 00:02:46,987 --> 00:02:48,764 basis . We look forward to your 68 00:02:48,764 --> 00:02:50,709 testimony , very important hearing 69 00:02:50,709 --> 00:02:52,820 today with regard to a very important 70 00:02:52,820 --> 00:02:55,089 subject , um , Ms . Zaffi , I don't 71 00:02:55,089 --> 00:02:57,145 expect you to answer these questions 72 00:02:57,145 --> 00:02:59,200 now , but I'm giving you a preview . 73 00:02:59,200 --> 00:03:01,311 One of the questions is , in light of 74 00:03:01,311 --> 00:03:03,533 the , the multiplicity of threats now , 75 00:03:03,570 --> 00:03:05,792 whether it's standoff cruise missiles , 76 00:03:05,792 --> 00:03:09,089 ICBMs , sea launch missiles , uh . 77 00:03:09,639 --> 00:03:12,830 Uh , space-based weapons , is missile 78 00:03:12,830 --> 00:03:15,110 defense feasible ? In other words , is 79 00:03:15,110 --> 00:03:17,054 it , is it , is it technologically 80 00:03:17,054 --> 00:03:20,630 feasible if we , uh , face a serious 81 00:03:20,630 --> 00:03:22,860 attack from an adversary that has not , 82 00:03:23,270 --> 00:03:25,492 uh , several dozen missiles but several 83 00:03:25,492 --> 00:03:28,820 1000 Mr . Gay , one of the , uh , 84 00:03:28,830 --> 00:03:31,052 general , I'm sorry , one of the , uh , 85 00:03:31,052 --> 00:03:32,997 questions I'm interested in is the 86 00:03:32,997 --> 00:03:35,219 importance of sensors . This discussion 87 00:03:35,219 --> 00:03:37,441 is often about missiles , but it's also 88 00:03:37,441 --> 00:03:40,350 about knowing . What's going on and 89 00:03:40,350 --> 00:03:42,800 particularly in your uh AOR I think 90 00:03:42,800 --> 00:03:44,800 there's some serious questions that 91 00:03:44,800 --> 00:03:47,520 bear discussion about our situational 92 00:03:47,520 --> 00:03:50,619 awareness uh and finally Mr . General 93 00:03:50,619 --> 00:03:53,479 Collins , I'm interested in what is 94 00:03:53,479 --> 00:03:56,509 Golden Dome . In other words , what is 95 00:03:56,509 --> 00:03:58,710 it , what is the plan ? What does it 96 00:03:58,710 --> 00:04:01,789 consist of ? I did a little AI research 97 00:04:01,789 --> 00:04:03,845 this morning and found out Israel is 98 00:04:03,845 --> 00:04:05,956 exactly the same size as New Jersey . 99 00:04:06,100 --> 00:04:09,440 So having a missile defense system in a 100 00:04:09,440 --> 00:04:13,100 limited uh space also that 101 00:04:13,100 --> 00:04:16,029 defends against pretty small caliber , 102 00:04:16,209 --> 00:04:19,380 uh munitions from uh uh from the 103 00:04:19,380 --> 00:04:21,436 terrorists in the region , obviously 104 00:04:21,436 --> 00:04:24,850 more serious from Iran , but , uh , 105 00:04:24,859 --> 00:04:27,730 whether that concept can be transferred 106 00:04:27,730 --> 00:04:29,841 to the continental United States is a 107 00:04:29,841 --> 00:04:31,841 question I'll be interested in . So 108 00:04:31,841 --> 00:04:34,063 look forward to all of your testimony , 109 00:04:34,063 --> 00:04:35,786 very important hearing . And I 110 00:04:35,786 --> 00:04:37,952 appreciate all the work that you do in 111 00:04:37,952 --> 00:04:40,230 the service you provide to the country . 112 00:04:40,230 --> 00:04:39,940 Thank you , Madam Chair . Thank you , 113 00:04:39,980 --> 00:04:43,690 Senator King . Now I'd like to begin 114 00:04:43,690 --> 00:04:47,000 with um statements from each member who 115 00:04:47,450 --> 00:04:49,672 who is going first at this point , Ms . 116 00:04:49,672 --> 00:04:52,029 Yaffe . Thank you . I , I'm happy to 117 00:04:52,029 --> 00:04:53,807 start out to provide the policy 118 00:04:53,807 --> 00:04:56,140 perspective . Great , um , Chair Fisher , 119 00:04:56,230 --> 00:04:58,452 ranking member King , and distinguished 120 00:04:58,452 --> 00:05:00,508 members of the committee , thank you 121 00:05:00,508 --> 00:05:02,397 for inviting me to testify on the 122 00:05:02,397 --> 00:05:04,619 Department of Defense's missile defense 123 00:05:04,619 --> 00:05:06,786 posture on behalf of the Office of the 124 00:05:06,786 --> 00:05:09,008 Secretary of Defense . I am grateful to 125 00:05:09,008 --> 00:05:08,429 appear alongside my distinguished 126 00:05:08,429 --> 00:05:10,470 colleagues . Missile defenses are a 127 00:05:10,470 --> 00:05:12,589 vital element of our strategic force 128 00:05:12,589 --> 00:05:15,220 posture , both as a means of deterrence 129 00:05:15,220 --> 00:05:17,276 as well as defending the US homeland 130 00:05:17,276 --> 00:05:19,790 and security interests abroad . As we 131 00:05:19,790 --> 00:05:21,899 see nearly every day in conflicts 132 00:05:21,899 --> 00:05:23,955 across the world , offensive missile 133 00:05:23,955 --> 00:05:26,121 capabilities are now a central feature 134 00:05:26,121 --> 00:05:28,119 of modern warfare and routinely 135 00:05:28,119 --> 00:05:30,008 deployed to coerce and intimidate 136 00:05:30,008 --> 00:05:32,119 opponents , inflict tactical damage , 137 00:05:32,339 --> 00:05:34,630 and carry out strategic campaigns . Our 138 00:05:34,630 --> 00:05:36,741 adversaries are investing in the next 139 00:05:36,741 --> 00:05:38,908 generation . Offensive capabilities to 140 00:05:38,908 --> 00:05:41,241 hold the United States homeland at risk , 141 00:05:41,241 --> 00:05:43,297 coerce our allies and partners , and 142 00:05:43,297 --> 00:05:45,519 threaten our deployed forces to counter 143 00:05:45,519 --> 00:05:47,574 these growing threats , we need next 144 00:05:47,574 --> 00:05:49,686 generation missile defeat and missile 145 00:05:49,686 --> 00:05:51,408 defense architectures that can 146 00:05:51,408 --> 00:05:53,408 complement our existing nuclear and 147 00:05:53,408 --> 00:05:55,519 conventional offensive capabilities . 148 00:05:55,519 --> 00:05:57,519 The president has mandated that the 149 00:05:57,519 --> 00:05:59,686 United States will develop and field a 150 00:05:59,686 --> 00:06:01,852 next generation missile defense shield 151 00:06:01,852 --> 00:06:03,908 to provide for the common defense of 152 00:06:03,908 --> 00:06:06,130 our citizens and the nation and deter , 153 00:06:06,130 --> 00:06:08,352 defend against , and defeat any foreign 154 00:06:08,352 --> 00:06:10,574 aerial attack on the homeland . We will 155 00:06:10,574 --> 00:06:12,797 also guarantee our secure second strike 156 00:06:12,797 --> 00:06:14,963 capability . This broad mission set is 157 00:06:14,963 --> 00:06:17,350 the task before us today . Missile 158 00:06:17,350 --> 00:06:19,517 threats pose a substantial and growing 159 00:06:19,517 --> 00:06:21,350 risk to the American people , US 160 00:06:21,350 --> 00:06:23,572 national interests , and our allies and 161 00:06:23,572 --> 00:06:25,739 partners . The growing cooperation and 162 00:06:25,739 --> 00:06:27,850 potential for more coordinated action 163 00:06:27,850 --> 00:06:29,906 among China , Russia , North Korea , 164 00:06:29,950 --> 00:06:31,829 and Iran is reflecting a shared 165 00:06:31,829 --> 00:06:33,885 interest in undermining US interests 166 00:06:33,885 --> 00:06:36,051 globally . We also see these countries 167 00:06:36,051 --> 00:06:37,940 working together to advance their 168 00:06:37,940 --> 00:06:39,829 respective interests . Russia has 169 00:06:39,829 --> 00:06:41,607 provided technical and economic 170 00:06:41,607 --> 00:06:43,880 assistance to North Korea and Iran in 171 00:06:43,880 --> 00:06:45,880 return for thousands of munitions , 172 00:06:45,880 --> 00:06:48,158 attack drones , and ballistic missiles . 173 00:06:48,158 --> 00:06:49,991 Russia has employed North Korean 174 00:06:49,991 --> 00:06:51,936 missiles in Ukraine , resulting in 175 00:06:51,936 --> 00:06:53,880 improvements in their accuracy and 176 00:06:53,880 --> 00:06:55,959 destructive capability . DUD must 177 00:06:55,959 --> 00:06:58,070 contend with adversaries possessing a 178 00:06:58,070 --> 00:07:00,070 range of sophisticated technologies 179 00:07:00,160 --> 00:07:01,882 including advanced cruises and 180 00:07:01,882 --> 00:07:03,882 ballistic missiles and maneuverable 181 00:07:03,882 --> 00:07:06,104 HGVs as well as lower tier threats like 182 00:07:06,104 --> 00:07:08,104 unmanned aircraft systems from both 183 00:07:08,104 --> 00:07:10,049 state and non-state actors . These 184 00:07:10,049 --> 00:07:12,079 capabilities continue to evolve and 185 00:07:12,079 --> 00:07:14,079 include a wide range of platforms , 186 00:07:14,220 --> 00:07:16,640 speeds , distances , and attack vectors 187 00:07:16,640 --> 00:07:18,862 that are easily concealed and evasive . 188 00:07:18,959 --> 00:07:20,903 This is where the value of missile 189 00:07:20,903 --> 00:07:22,570 defense , a core component of 190 00:07:22,570 --> 00:07:24,459 deterrence by denial , comes in . 191 00:07:24,459 --> 00:07:26,459 Robust missile defense capabilities 192 00:07:26,459 --> 00:07:28,515 raise the threshold for conflict and 193 00:07:28,515 --> 00:07:30,570 introduce uncertainty and complexity 194 00:07:30,570 --> 00:07:32,470 into attack planning , thereby 195 00:07:32,470 --> 00:07:34,581 undermining an adversary's confidence 196 00:07:34,581 --> 00:07:36,859 that an attack will be successful . The 197 00:07:36,859 --> 00:07:38,970 greater the cumulative challenges for 198 00:07:38,970 --> 00:07:40,692 an adversary , the greater the 199 00:07:40,692 --> 00:07:42,915 likelihood of avoiding an attack in the 200 00:07:42,915 --> 00:07:45,026 first place . If deterrence fails and 201 00:07:45,026 --> 00:07:47,248 an attack does occur , missile defenses 202 00:07:47,248 --> 00:07:49,359 limit the damage and assure the means 203 00:07:49,359 --> 00:07:51,359 of effective responses . Moreover , 204 00:07:51,369 --> 00:07:53,369 missile . Defenses provide time and 205 00:07:53,369 --> 00:07:55,480 space for the president to decide how 206 00:07:55,480 --> 00:07:57,369 to respond most effectively . The 207 00:07:57,369 --> 00:07:59,425 financial outlays of missile defense 208 00:07:59,425 --> 00:08:01,369 and missile defeat today more than 209 00:08:01,369 --> 00:08:03,536 offset the exponentially greater costs 210 00:08:03,536 --> 00:08:05,647 that would be incurred by the lack of 211 00:08:05,647 --> 00:08:07,480 defenses in a potential conflict 212 00:08:07,480 --> 00:08:09,702 tomorrow . Missile defense systems also 213 00:08:09,702 --> 00:08:11,925 contribute to deterrence by reinforcing 214 00:08:11,925 --> 00:08:13,925 our diplomatic and securing posture 215 00:08:13,925 --> 00:08:16,091 while reassuring allies and partners . 216 00:08:16,091 --> 00:08:18,091 Should deterrence fail , the United 217 00:08:18,091 --> 00:08:20,258 States , our allies and partners would 218 00:08:20,258 --> 00:08:22,425 need robust missile defense and defeat 219 00:08:22,425 --> 00:08:24,258 options , not only to defend and 220 00:08:24,258 --> 00:08:26,147 protect our interests but also to 221 00:08:26,147 --> 00:08:28,202 manage escalation . Integration with 222 00:08:28,202 --> 00:08:30,258 our allies and partners improves our 223 00:08:30,258 --> 00:08:32,480 all domain awareness , redundancy , and 224 00:08:32,480 --> 00:08:34,647 shot deconfliction . The deterrence by 225 00:08:34,647 --> 00:08:36,869 denial contributions to missile defense 226 00:08:36,869 --> 00:08:38,925 continue to serve as a complement to 227 00:08:38,925 --> 00:08:41,091 the cost imposition strategies offered 228 00:08:41,091 --> 00:08:43,369 by our conventional and nuclear forces . 229 00:08:43,369 --> 00:08:45,536 Together they give our decision makers 230 00:08:45,536 --> 00:08:47,480 time and credible options to deter 231 00:08:47,480 --> 00:08:49,702 aggression , assure lethality , protect 232 00:08:49,702 --> 00:08:51,702 the American people from harm , and 233 00:08:51,702 --> 00:08:53,980 respond to attacks if deterrence fails . 234 00:08:53,980 --> 00:08:55,869 The Department of Defense remains 235 00:08:55,869 --> 00:08:57,758 committed to making the necessary 236 00:08:57,758 --> 00:08:59,980 investments in our strategic posture to 237 00:08:59,980 --> 00:09:02,202 deter our adversaries and if deterrence 238 00:09:02,202 --> 00:09:04,147 fails to prevail in conflict . The 239 00:09:04,147 --> 00:09:06,091 missile defense and defeat mission 240 00:09:06,091 --> 00:09:08,036 requires sufficient and consistent 241 00:09:08,036 --> 00:09:10,036 funding and support . Thank you for 242 00:09:10,036 --> 00:09:12,202 your dedication to our mission and our 243 00:09:12,202 --> 00:09:14,425 service members and for the opportunity 244 00:09:14,425 --> 00:09:16,480 to testify to you today alongside my 245 00:09:16,480 --> 00:09:15,900 colleagues . I look forward to 246 00:09:15,900 --> 00:09:18,599 answering your questions . Thank you 247 00:09:18,599 --> 00:09:21,599 very much General Go welcome . 248 00:09:22,880 --> 00:09:24,936 Chair Fisher , ranking member King , 249 00:09:24,936 --> 00:09:26,769 and distinguished members of the 250 00:09:26,769 --> 00:09:28,824 subcommittee , thank you for holding 251 00:09:28,824 --> 00:09:31,047 this important hearing . North American 252 00:09:31,047 --> 00:09:33,102 Aerospace Defense Command and United 253 00:09:33,102 --> 00:09:35,213 States Northern Command have critical 254 00:09:35,213 --> 00:09:34,679 roles in defending the homeland from 255 00:09:34,679 --> 00:09:36,719 missile attack , and your support 256 00:09:36,719 --> 00:09:39,380 remains vital to our success . I'd like 257 00:09:39,380 --> 00:09:41,547 to start by recognizing the tremendous 258 00:09:41,547 --> 00:09:43,658 work being done by Lieutenant General 259 00:09:43,658 --> 00:09:45,713 Collins , ASD Yaffe , and Lieutenant 260 00:09:45,713 --> 00:09:47,824 General Rash . NORAD and Northcom are 261 00:09:47,824 --> 00:09:49,658 fortunate to have such committed 262 00:09:49,658 --> 00:09:51,936 partners in our shared no fail mission . 263 00:09:52,090 --> 00:09:53,923 Defending the United States from 264 00:09:53,923 --> 00:09:56,034 missile threats remains a top command 265 00:09:56,034 --> 00:09:57,812 priority . That mission is more 266 00:09:58,169 --> 00:09:59,836 important than ever as global 267 00:09:59,836 --> 00:10:01,669 competitors continue their rapid 268 00:10:01,669 --> 00:10:03,725 development and fielding of advanced 269 00:10:03,725 --> 00:10:05,613 missile capabilities and delivery 270 00:10:05,613 --> 00:10:07,336 platforms along with increased 271 00:10:07,336 --> 00:10:09,558 cooperation and technology sharing . To 272 00:10:09,558 --> 00:10:11,502 counter these growing challenges , 273 00:10:11,502 --> 00:10:13,558 NORAD and Northcom rely on realistic 274 00:10:13,558 --> 00:10:15,669 planning on time investments based on 275 00:10:15,669 --> 00:10:17,836 specific threats , and forward looking 276 00:10:17,836 --> 00:10:19,780 policies that ensure the command's 277 00:10:19,780 --> 00:10:21,947 ability to detect , track , and defeat 278 00:10:21,947 --> 00:10:24,659 potential threats in all domains . To 279 00:10:24,659 --> 00:10:26,715 ensure our ability to defend against 280 00:10:26,715 --> 00:10:28,770 missile attacks , North and Northcom 281 00:10:28,770 --> 00:10:30,715 require a layered domain awareness 282 00:10:30,715 --> 00:10:33,250 network from seabed to space to detect 283 00:10:33,250 --> 00:10:35,530 and track threats to North America . 284 00:10:35,820 --> 00:10:37,940 That sensing network is vital today . 285 00:10:38,859 --> 00:10:41,081 To today's ballistic and cruise missile 286 00:10:41,081 --> 00:10:43,280 defense missions to and to the golden 287 00:10:43,900 --> 00:10:46,539 dome concept because we can't defeat 288 00:10:46,780 --> 00:10:49,609 what we can't see . Alongside improved 289 00:10:49,609 --> 00:10:51,831 domain awareness , we must also improve 290 00:10:51,831 --> 00:10:53,942 our capability and capacity to defeat 291 00:10:53,942 --> 00:10:55,942 advanced missile threats . The next 292 00:10:55,942 --> 00:10:57,887 generation interceptor is vital to 293 00:10:57,887 --> 00:10:59,998 countering North Korea's growing ICBM 294 00:10:59,998 --> 00:11:01,665 capability , and innovation , 295 00:11:01,665 --> 00:11:03,331 investment in advanced defeat 296 00:11:03,331 --> 00:11:05,553 mechanisms which could include directed 297 00:11:05,553 --> 00:11:07,776 energy and boost phase intercept , will 298 00:11:07,776 --> 00:11:09,890 be crucial against cruise missiles , 299 00:11:09,900 --> 00:11:11,733 hypersonics , and other advanced 300 00:11:11,733 --> 00:11:14,020 threats . There are significant 301 00:11:14,020 --> 00:11:16,187 challenges ahead of us , but NORAD and 302 00:11:16,187 --> 00:11:17,853 Northcom stand ready to deter 303 00:11:17,853 --> 00:11:19,909 aggression and defeat threats to our 304 00:11:19,909 --> 00:11:21,798 nation . Again , thank you to the 305 00:11:21,798 --> 00:11:23,853 subcommittee and my fellow witnesses 306 00:11:23,853 --> 00:11:26,076 for your continued support , and I look 307 00:11:26,076 --> 00:11:28,298 forward to your questions . We have the 308 00:11:28,298 --> 00:11:30,409 watch . Thank you , General . General 309 00:11:30,409 --> 00:11:32,880 Collins , welcome . Thank you ma'am . 310 00:11:32,969 --> 00:11:35,080 Good afternoon , Chair Fisher ranking 311 00:11:35,080 --> 00:11:37,191 member , King , distinguished members 312 00:11:37,191 --> 00:11:39,191 of the subcommittee . Thank you for 313 00:11:39,191 --> 00:11:39,010 this opportunity to talk about the 314 00:11:39,010 --> 00:11:41,849 missile defense agency portfolio . MDA 315 00:11:41,849 --> 00:11:44,016 is moving quickly to provide effective 316 00:11:44,016 --> 00:11:46,182 defenses against the dangerous missile 317 00:11:46,182 --> 00:11:48,349 threat to defend the US homeland , our 318 00:11:48,349 --> 00:11:50,405 deployed forces , and our allies and 319 00:11:50,405 --> 00:11:52,650 friends . The agency is transforming 320 00:11:52,650 --> 00:11:54,770 itself , it's enterprise , and its 321 00:11:54,770 --> 00:11:56,881 industry base in order to develop and 322 00:11:56,881 --> 00:11:59,103 deliver capabilities to the war fighter 323 00:11:59,103 --> 00:12:01,159 at scale and speed . As we move with 324 00:12:01,159 --> 00:12:03,326 urgency to deliver the next generation 325 00:12:03,326 --> 00:12:05,437 missile defense system , we intend to 326 00:12:05,437 --> 00:12:07,548 leverage the performance efficiencies 327 00:12:07,548 --> 00:12:09,714 found in integrated layered defenses . 328 00:12:09,714 --> 00:12:11,881 We also will continue to integrate and 329 00:12:11,881 --> 00:12:14,059 improve the space domain to support a 330 00:12:14,059 --> 00:12:16,115 missile defense posture that is more 331 00:12:16,115 --> 00:12:18,226 effective , resilient , and adaptable 332 00:12:18,226 --> 00:12:20,770 to known and unanticipated threats . 333 00:12:21,179 --> 00:12:23,290 MDA's focus is on the improvement and 334 00:12:23,290 --> 00:12:25,512 sustainment of US homeland and regional 335 00:12:25,512 --> 00:12:27,290 defenses . We are enhancing the 336 00:12:27,290 --> 00:12:29,179 performance and capability of the 337 00:12:29,179 --> 00:12:31,346 fielded ground-based midcourse defense 338 00:12:31,346 --> 00:12:33,235 system along with development and 339 00:12:33,235 --> 00:12:34,957 testing of the next generation 340 00:12:34,957 --> 00:12:37,068 interceptor . We are working with the 341 00:12:37,068 --> 00:12:38,735 Navy to improve the Aegis BMD 342 00:12:38,735 --> 00:12:40,979 capability and enhance hypersonic 343 00:12:40,979 --> 00:12:42,960 defenses and with the Army to make 344 00:12:42,960 --> 00:12:45,071 investments in the future development 345 00:12:45,071 --> 00:12:47,016 of the terminal high altitude area 346 00:12:47,016 --> 00:12:49,016 defense systems THAAD . Together in 347 00:12:49,016 --> 00:12:51,238 support of the nation's missile defense 348 00:12:51,238 --> 00:12:53,516 enterprise and Golden Dome for America , 349 00:12:53,516 --> 00:12:55,404 MDA remains focused on delivering 350 00:12:55,404 --> 00:12:57,182 advanced reliable and resilient 351 00:12:57,182 --> 00:12:59,293 capabilities on accelerated timelines 352 00:12:59,293 --> 00:13:01,238 to meet the warfighters' needs . I 353 00:13:01,238 --> 00:13:03,127 greatly appreciate your continued 354 00:13:03,127 --> 00:13:05,127 support for the for MDA and for the 355 00:13:05,127 --> 00:13:07,182 missile defense mission , and I look 356 00:13:07,182 --> 00:13:09,293 forward to answering your questions . 357 00:13:09,293 --> 00:13:11,182 Thank you . Thank you , General . 358 00:13:11,182 --> 00:13:13,650 General Rash , welcome . Thank you 359 00:13:13,650 --> 00:13:15,539 Madam Chair . Uh , Chair Fisher , 360 00:13:15,539 --> 00:13:17,650 ranking member King and distinguished 361 00:13:17,650 --> 00:13:19,872 members of the subcommittee , thank you 362 00:13:19,872 --> 00:13:21,928 for the opportunity to appear before 363 00:13:21,928 --> 00:13:24,150 you today to discuss the criticality of 364 00:13:24,150 --> 00:13:26,039 defending the island of Guam . On 365 00:13:26,039 --> 00:13:28,150 behalf of Army senior leadership , we 366 00:13:28,150 --> 00:13:28,130 thank you for your continued support of 367 00:13:28,130 --> 00:13:30,489 our soldiers , sailors , airmen , 368 00:13:30,650 --> 00:13:33,090 Marines , guardians , civilians and 369 00:13:33,090 --> 00:13:35,260 their families . Guam is an 370 00:13:35,260 --> 00:13:37,316 indispensable part of the homeland , 371 00:13:37,316 --> 00:13:39,427 and its defense is not only essential 372 00:13:39,427 --> 00:13:41,482 to the security of the United States 373 00:13:41,482 --> 00:13:43,649 but is also a strong deterrence to the 374 00:13:43,649 --> 00:13:45,871 ever evolving complex threats we face . 375 00:13:45,871 --> 00:13:47,820 The FY23 National Defense National 376 00:13:47,820 --> 00:13:50,020 Defense Authorization Act required the 377 00:13:50,020 --> 00:13:52,780 Secretary of Defense to to designate a 378 00:13:52,780 --> 00:13:54,947 senior official to oversee the missile 379 00:13:54,947 --> 00:13:57,570 defense of Guam . In February of 2024 , 380 00:13:57,609 --> 00:13:59,665 as directed by the Undersecretary of 381 00:13:59,665 --> 00:14:01,776 Defense Acquisition and Sustainment , 382 00:14:01,776 --> 00:14:03,942 the Guam Defense Systems Joint Program 383 00:14:03,942 --> 00:14:06,109 Office JPO was established at the Army 384 00:14:06,109 --> 00:14:07,776 Rapid Capability and Critical 385 00:14:07,776 --> 00:14:09,609 Technologies Office . Beyond the 386 00:14:09,609 --> 00:14:11,553 department's investments in Guam's 387 00:14:11,553 --> 00:14:13,553 defense , the Undersecretary of the 388 00:14:13,553 --> 00:14:15,442 Navy is the appointed lead senior 389 00:14:15,442 --> 00:14:17,387 defense official for all other DOD 390 00:14:17,387 --> 00:14:19,880 efforts in Guam . The joint program 391 00:14:19,880 --> 00:14:21,936 office is charged with synchronizing 392 00:14:21,936 --> 00:14:24,479 the development , testing , fielding , 393 00:14:24,590 --> 00:14:26,590 and sustainment of the Guam defense 394 00:14:26,590 --> 00:14:28,812 system components in the integration of 395 00:14:28,812 --> 00:14:30,923 the corresponding command and control 396 00:14:30,923 --> 00:14:33,146 systems resulting in the development of 397 00:14:33,146 --> 00:14:35,257 a joint integrated battle manager and 398 00:14:35,257 --> 00:14:37,423 this battle manager will allow current 399 00:14:37,423 --> 00:14:39,590 service and agency owned components to 400 00:14:39,590 --> 00:14:41,590 behave as an integrated and unified 401 00:14:41,590 --> 00:14:44,119 system . The Joint Program Office works 402 00:14:44,119 --> 00:14:46,063 closely with the Undersecretary of 403 00:14:46,063 --> 00:14:48,397 Defense for acquisition and sustainment , 404 00:14:48,397 --> 00:14:50,341 the Guam Synchronization Oversight 405 00:14:50,341 --> 00:14:52,341 Council , and leadership across the 406 00:14:52,341 --> 00:14:54,563 services and the Missile Defense Agency 407 00:14:54,563 --> 00:14:56,619 to build and sustain an architecture 408 00:14:56,619 --> 00:14:58,619 capable of defending Guam against a 409 00:14:58,619 --> 00:15:00,675 multitude of complex air and missile 410 00:15:00,675 --> 00:15:02,508 defense threats . Together , the 411 00:15:02,508 --> 00:15:04,563 department is working diligently and 412 00:15:04,563 --> 00:15:06,508 with urgency to secure the initial 413 00:15:06,508 --> 00:15:08,508 capability increment in 2027 . This 414 00:15:08,508 --> 00:15:10,730 will provide capability well beyond the 415 00:15:10,730 --> 00:15:12,563 current uh currently employed TA 416 00:15:12,563 --> 00:15:14,730 battery as part of task force talent . 417 00:15:14,730 --> 00:15:16,897 Your continued support ensures that we 418 00:15:16,897 --> 00:15:19,119 remain capable of fighting for and from 419 00:15:19,119 --> 00:15:21,175 Guam meeting the challenges of today 420 00:15:21,175 --> 00:15:23,341 and tomorrow . Thank you again for the 421 00:15:23,341 --> 00:15:25,341 opportunity to speak with you about 422 00:15:25,341 --> 00:15:25,289 this critical mission and the joint 423 00:15:25,289 --> 00:15:27,289 commitment to the defense of Guam . 424 00:15:27,289 --> 00:15:29,456 Thank you . Thank you , General Rash , 425 00:15:29,456 --> 00:15:31,400 and thank you all for your opening 426 00:15:31,400 --> 00:15:33,450 statements . Um , we don't have too 427 00:15:33,450 --> 00:15:36,039 many of us here today , so we may have , 428 00:15:36,169 --> 00:15:38,391 uh , more than one round of questions . 429 00:15:38,409 --> 00:15:40,940 I'll begin the first round . Uh , 430 00:15:41,000 --> 00:15:44,210 General Gio , I've appreciated our past 431 00:15:44,210 --> 00:15:46,359 conversations about the need for 432 00:15:46,359 --> 00:15:49,200 increased domain awareness , or we 433 00:15:49,200 --> 00:15:52,750 cannot shoot what we cannot see . As we 434 00:15:52,750 --> 00:15:55,270 look towards Golden Dome and the future 435 00:15:55,270 --> 00:15:57,590 of missile defense , what additional 436 00:15:57,590 --> 00:15:59,950 improvements need to be made with 437 00:15:59,950 --> 00:16:01,859 respect to domain awareness ? 438 00:16:03,760 --> 00:16:05,871 Madam Chair , I think that the , uh , 439 00:16:05,919 --> 00:16:09,109 what I call the domain awareness layer 440 00:16:09,109 --> 00:16:11,409 of uh Golden Dome is the most critical 441 00:16:11,760 --> 00:16:13,704 that we need to have first for the 442 00:16:13,704 --> 00:16:15,871 reasons that you just mentioned . Uh , 443 00:16:15,871 --> 00:16:17,482 any chance of using advanced 444 00:16:17,482 --> 00:16:19,593 interceptors or defeat capabilities , 445 00:16:19,593 --> 00:16:21,760 uh , would not be possible if we can't 446 00:16:21,760 --> 00:16:24,520 detect and track uh these threats . I 447 00:16:24,520 --> 00:16:26,630 think that it's a seabed to space 448 00:16:26,630 --> 00:16:28,797 approach . Uh , we need to have , uh , 449 00:16:28,797 --> 00:16:31,179 undersea sensors to detect submarines 450 00:16:31,179 --> 00:16:33,700 that can now get closer . Uh , to North 451 00:16:33,700 --> 00:16:35,922 America than they could before based on 452 00:16:35,922 --> 00:16:38,144 improved , uh , stealthiness of those , 453 00:16:38,144 --> 00:16:41,419 uh , ships and then , uh , a ground 454 00:16:41,419 --> 00:16:43,619 layer that can see much further out 455 00:16:43,619 --> 00:16:46,679 because of the , uh , advanced , um , 456 00:16:46,830 --> 00:16:48,941 standoff weapons that our adversaries 457 00:16:48,941 --> 00:16:51,299 can now uh employ . We need an air 458 00:16:51,299 --> 00:16:54,059 layer like the E-7 to close the kill 459 00:16:54,059 --> 00:16:56,609 chain uh with uh fighter aircraft or 460 00:16:56,609 --> 00:16:59,419 surface to air . Uh , systems and then 461 00:16:59,419 --> 00:17:01,475 a space layer , uh , the space layer 462 00:17:01,475 --> 00:17:04,229 would both track , uh , um , airborne 463 00:17:04,229 --> 00:17:06,229 moving targets or or aircraft , but 464 00:17:06,229 --> 00:17:09,209 also , uh , systems like HBTSS that 465 00:17:09,209 --> 00:17:11,560 could track hypersonics as well as the , 466 00:17:11,609 --> 00:17:14,170 uh , warning , uh , capability that we 467 00:17:14,170 --> 00:17:16,280 need to detect the launches to begin 468 00:17:16,280 --> 00:17:19,189 with . Is there anything you can tell 469 00:17:19,189 --> 00:17:22,790 us in this setting um about Golden 470 00:17:22,790 --> 00:17:26,030 Dome and the , the options that may be 471 00:17:26,030 --> 00:17:29,869 available on the sensors and the and 472 00:17:29,869 --> 00:17:32,109 the radar systems that would be used . 473 00:17:33,000 --> 00:17:35,900 Uh , Madam Chair , uh , I don't know 474 00:17:35,900 --> 00:17:38,020 what the , uh , Golden Dome will look 475 00:17:38,020 --> 00:17:40,180 like , but I suspect that it would be 476 00:17:40,180 --> 00:17:42,291 able to use a lot of the systems that 477 00:17:42,291 --> 00:17:45,449 are already in place , and currently in 478 00:17:45,449 --> 00:17:47,616 development . Uh , which would give us 479 00:17:47,616 --> 00:17:49,819 a full capability and probably 480 00:17:49,819 --> 00:17:51,819 something closer to 0 to 5 years as 481 00:17:51,819 --> 00:17:53,819 opposed to something , you know , a 482 00:17:53,819 --> 00:17:55,930 decade out into the future . A couple 483 00:17:55,930 --> 00:17:57,930 of those systems would be the HBTSS 484 00:17:57,930 --> 00:17:59,986 that I just mentioned , uh , for the 485 00:17:59,986 --> 00:18:01,986 hypersonics , uh , space-based AMTI 486 00:18:01,986 --> 00:18:03,986 which we have a number of prototype 487 00:18:03,986 --> 00:18:06,729 systems on orbit now , uh , over the 488 00:18:06,729 --> 00:18:09,609 horizon radars which , uh , are also , 489 00:18:10,020 --> 00:18:13,380 uh , uh , operational and , uh , not in 490 00:18:13,380 --> 00:18:15,658 the United States but , uh , elsewhere . 491 00:18:15,658 --> 00:18:17,713 And then , uh , the , for instance , 492 00:18:17,713 --> 00:18:19,619 the E7 which many other countries 493 00:18:19,619 --> 00:18:23,219 operate . So , so given that , how much 494 00:18:23,219 --> 00:18:25,819 risk uh would Golden Dome incur if the 495 00:18:25,819 --> 00:18:28,219 department was forced to vacate the 496 00:18:28,219 --> 00:18:31,359 lower 3 gigahertz or portion of the 7 497 00:18:31,359 --> 00:18:34,160 to 8 gigahertz spectrum that it now has ? 498 00:18:34,579 --> 00:18:36,690 Madam Chair , it's my assessment that 499 00:18:36,690 --> 00:18:38,135 we would , uh , assume an 500 00:18:38,219 --> 00:18:40,660 extraordinarily high level of risk if 501 00:18:40,660 --> 00:18:43,170 we lose control of those , uh , 502 00:18:43,540 --> 00:18:45,762 portions of the spectrum . Uh , many of 503 00:18:45,762 --> 00:18:47,873 the systems that we rely on every day 504 00:18:47,873 --> 00:18:50,130 today , much less in the future , uh , 505 00:18:50,140 --> 00:18:52,540 for homeland defense reside in that 506 00:18:52,540 --> 00:18:54,849 spectrum range . Thank you , uh , 507 00:18:54,979 --> 00:18:57,180 General Collins , can you provide us 508 00:18:57,180 --> 00:18:59,660 with an update on the hypersonic and 509 00:18:59,660 --> 00:19:03,619 ballistic tracking space sensor or the 510 00:19:03,619 --> 00:19:07,069 ABTSS system ? Yes , Madam Chair , 511 00:19:07,189 --> 00:19:09,133 thank you . Uh , so the hypersonic 512 00:19:09,133 --> 00:19:11,467 ballistic tracking space sensor is , uh , 513 00:19:11,467 --> 00:19:13,467 a prototype program that , uh , MDA 514 00:19:13,467 --> 00:19:16,939 pursued to , uh , to prove out the 515 00:19:16,939 --> 00:19:19,106 technology such , uh , that from space 516 00:19:19,106 --> 00:19:21,869 we could close the hypersonic fire uh 517 00:19:21,869 --> 00:19:24,036 fire chain , uh , to the kill chain on 518 00:19:24,036 --> 00:19:25,980 a , on a hypersonic weapon and the 519 00:19:25,980 --> 00:19:28,202 focus of that was to prove out that the 520 00:19:28,202 --> 00:19:30,369 space system could have the accuracy , 521 00:19:30,369 --> 00:19:32,480 the track quality , and get that data 522 00:19:32,480 --> 00:19:34,480 into the command and control system 523 00:19:34,480 --> 00:19:36,480 fast enough to be able to . Uh , to 524 00:19:36,480 --> 00:19:38,480 close that , uh , that fire control 525 00:19:38,480 --> 00:19:40,536 loop , uh , those two systems , uh , 526 00:19:40,536 --> 00:19:42,702 launched in February of last year have 527 00:19:42,702 --> 00:19:44,758 gone through two , test bed launches 528 00:19:44,758 --> 00:19:46,925 where we had a , a , a test bed , uh , 529 00:19:46,925 --> 00:19:49,680 target launch fly a hypersonic profile , 530 00:19:49,939 --> 00:19:52,106 uh , and we have collected data from , 531 00:19:52,106 --> 00:19:54,383 uh , from the sensors during that . uh , 532 00:19:54,609 --> 00:19:56,920 so far we have proven out , uh , the , 533 00:19:57,000 --> 00:19:59,609 uh , the timeliness latency that the , 534 00:19:59,619 --> 00:20:01,563 uh , of the fire control loop with 535 00:20:01,563 --> 00:20:03,175 those systems as well as the 536 00:20:03,175 --> 00:20:05,341 sensitivity . Uh , of those systems to 537 00:20:05,341 --> 00:20:07,508 close the loop , uh , we're going back 538 00:20:07,508 --> 00:20:09,730 with , uh , some algorithm updates into 539 00:20:09,730 --> 00:20:11,952 the payload , uh , to , uh , to improve 540 00:20:11,952 --> 00:20:11,699 on the track quality , but we see that 541 00:20:11,699 --> 00:20:13,643 closing as well . It's been a very 542 00:20:13,643 --> 00:20:16,119 successful prototype program and , uh , 543 00:20:16,140 --> 00:20:18,362 all along we've worked in parallel with 544 00:20:18,362 --> 00:20:20,029 the Space Force and the Space 545 00:20:20,029 --> 00:20:22,196 Development Agency . They now have our 546 00:20:22,196 --> 00:20:24,209 HBTSS like requirements as part of 547 00:20:24,209 --> 00:20:26,449 their proliferated war fighting space 548 00:20:26,449 --> 00:20:28,489 architecture and in the tranches to 549 00:20:28,489 --> 00:20:30,680 come in the in the uh follow on years 550 00:20:31,010 --> 00:20:32,954 they will slowly be building up an 551 00:20:32,954 --> 00:20:35,050 operational hypersonic tracking uh 552 00:20:35,050 --> 00:20:38,219 layer for us . Thank you . Perhaps in 553 00:20:38,219 --> 00:20:40,163 another setting , uh , we can talk 554 00:20:40,163 --> 00:20:43,699 about a more definitive timeline , um , 555 00:20:43,729 --> 00:20:45,785 when that would be available . Thank 556 00:20:45,785 --> 00:20:49,109 you , Senator King . Thank you Madam 557 00:20:49,109 --> 00:20:51,550 Chair . The , the , uh , nature of my 558 00:20:51,550 --> 00:20:53,661 questions may appear to be critical . 559 00:20:53,920 --> 00:20:56,310 Uh , I'm certainly in favor of 560 00:20:56,310 --> 00:20:58,477 defending the homeland against missile 561 00:20:58,477 --> 00:21:00,588 attack . No question . My fundamental 562 00:21:00,588 --> 00:21:02,588 question is , is it feasible , uh , 563 00:21:02,588 --> 00:21:04,810 given today's technology and also the , 564 00:21:04,810 --> 00:21:07,579 the cost involved , um , I'll , uh , 565 00:21:07,650 --> 00:21:09,650 I'll quote Lincoln , your critic is 566 00:21:09,650 --> 00:21:11,790 your best friend , uh , so take it in 567 00:21:11,790 --> 00:21:15,500 that spirit , uh . For example , Jaffe , 568 00:21:15,540 --> 00:21:17,429 you , you mentioned deterrence by 569 00:21:17,429 --> 00:21:19,699 denial . Is that really viable today , 570 00:21:19,900 --> 00:21:22,339 deterrence by denial ? Can you , can we 571 00:21:22,339 --> 00:21:25,260 realistically say that we could deny a 572 00:21:25,260 --> 00:21:28,020 substantial missile attack from Russia 573 00:21:28,020 --> 00:21:30,010 or China or heaven forbid both ? 574 00:21:32,969 --> 00:21:35,025 I'm a great believer in deterrence . 575 00:21:35,025 --> 00:21:37,191 I'm just not sure deterrence by denial 576 00:21:37,191 --> 00:21:39,413 is realistic in this setting . Convince 577 00:21:39,413 --> 00:21:41,660 me . Senator , thank you for the 578 00:21:41,660 --> 00:21:44,540 question . Um , this is meant to be an 579 00:21:44,540 --> 00:21:46,651 integrated air missile defense system 580 00:21:46,651 --> 00:21:48,762 that is intended to send a message to 581 00:21:48,762 --> 00:21:50,984 the adversary that they may not achieve 582 00:21:50,984 --> 00:21:53,151 their objectives . What we wanna do is 583 00:21:53,151 --> 00:21:55,262 place the burden of escalation on the 584 00:21:55,262 --> 00:21:57,429 adversary and demonstrate that it will 585 00:21:57,429 --> 00:21:59,429 be harder for them to achieve their 586 00:21:59,429 --> 00:21:59,364 objectives in an attack . Right now , 587 00:21:59,405 --> 00:22:01,572 as you are well aware , we do not have 588 00:22:01,572 --> 00:22:03,738 a homeland missile defense system that 589 00:22:03,738 --> 00:22:05,905 is intended to guard against adversary 590 00:22:05,905 --> 00:22:07,905 threats beyond North Korea or rogue 591 00:22:07,905 --> 00:22:10,016 state actor threats . Meanwhile , the 592 00:22:10,016 --> 00:22:12,183 threats themselves have been expanding 593 00:22:12,183 --> 00:22:14,183 significantly with Russia and China 594 00:22:14,183 --> 00:22:16,127 pursuing a breadth of capability . 595 00:22:16,127 --> 00:22:15,885 That's my point . We've developed a 596 00:22:15,885 --> 00:22:18,525 missile defense agency essentially to 597 00:22:18,525 --> 00:22:20,747 defend against North Korea and Iran and 598 00:22:20,747 --> 00:22:23,364 perhaps a rogue , not China and Russia . 599 00:22:23,880 --> 00:22:26,102 Now we're talking about an accelerating 600 00:22:26,102 --> 00:22:28,158 Chinese pursuit of this capability . 601 00:22:28,160 --> 00:22:30,479 Russia already has the largest nuclear 602 00:22:30,839 --> 00:22:33,520 stockpile in the world . Um , is it , 603 00:22:33,560 --> 00:22:36,079 is it really ? What , what level of 604 00:22:36,079 --> 00:22:39,849 scaling up ? Would it take to have 605 00:22:39,849 --> 00:22:43,660 a missile defense system 606 00:22:43,660 --> 00:22:46,420 capable of providing any realistic 607 00:22:46,420 --> 00:22:48,650 deterrent to China and Russia ? Sir , 608 00:22:48,699 --> 00:22:50,643 this is not an answer that will be 609 00:22:50,643 --> 00:22:52,810 deliverable overnight . However , what 610 00:22:52,810 --> 00:22:55,032 the president has done is challenged us 611 00:22:55,032 --> 00:22:57,199 to actually look at what an integrated 612 00:22:57,199 --> 00:22:57,020 air and missile defense system of the 613 00:22:57,020 --> 00:22:59,242 homeland would look like , which is not 614 00:22:59,242 --> 00:23:01,353 something we've . Mean , is that 1000 615 00:23:01,353 --> 00:23:03,446 FA batteries around cities , Sir , I 616 00:23:03,446 --> 00:23:05,446 can't weigh in on what the specific 617 00:23:05,446 --> 00:23:07,613 architecture would look like . I can't 618 00:23:07,613 --> 00:23:09,557 get ahead of what the architecture 619 00:23:09,557 --> 00:23:09,115 decisions will be that will come out , 620 00:23:09,156 --> 00:23:11,505 I think with the budget . Um , however , 621 00:23:11,556 --> 00:23:13,278 it is intended to leverage new 622 00:23:13,278 --> 00:23:15,500 technologies to , to get ahead of we've 623 00:23:15,500 --> 00:23:17,667 got , you know , certainly the list in 624 00:23:17,667 --> 00:23:19,778 the executive order , but to leverage 625 00:23:19,778 --> 00:23:21,445 some new technologies both to 626 00:23:21,445 --> 00:23:23,667 accelerate the deployment of the HBTS . 627 00:23:23,667 --> 00:23:25,778 on the hypersonic side , um , also to 628 00:23:25,778 --> 00:23:27,889 leverage non-kinetics and I know that 629 00:23:27,889 --> 00:23:27,371 you're interested in directed energy to 630 00:23:27,371 --> 00:23:29,538 see what directed energy might be able 631 00:23:29,538 --> 00:23:31,760 to help with to help us change the cost 632 00:23:31,760 --> 00:23:33,815 curve , but it should be a mix of of 633 00:23:33,815 --> 00:23:35,982 new technologies that we might be able 634 00:23:35,982 --> 00:23:38,204 to demonstrate in the next 4 or 5 years 635 00:23:38,204 --> 00:23:40,204 along with legacy systems . General 636 00:23:40,204 --> 00:23:39,932 Collins , what's the assumption of how 637 00:23:39,932 --> 00:23:42,099 many GBIs would have to be launched to 638 00:23:42,099 --> 00:23:43,988 knock out one North Korean ICBM ? 639 00:23:46,030 --> 00:23:47,919 Sir , uh , that'd be a classified 640 00:23:47,919 --> 00:23:49,919 number . We'd have to wait till the 641 00:23:49,919 --> 00:23:52,086 closed session , uh , to answer that . 642 00:23:52,086 --> 00:23:54,040 All right . Um . Well , General , 643 00:23:54,180 --> 00:23:56,300 General Gill , um , you mentioned 644 00:23:56,300 --> 00:23:59,300 seabed . Isn't that a critical area 645 00:23:59,300 --> 00:24:01,420 where we need better sensors , better 646 00:24:01,420 --> 00:24:03,476 knowledge , and particularly in your 647 00:24:03,476 --> 00:24:05,589 AOR in the Northwest , Senator , 648 00:24:05,699 --> 00:24:07,890 absolutely . It is a critter Mike I 649 00:24:07,890 --> 00:24:11,010 think needs . Senator , absolutely , it , 650 00:24:11,060 --> 00:24:14,140 it is critical . The seabed detection 651 00:24:14,140 --> 00:24:16,362 and awareness of the seabed and and the 652 00:24:16,362 --> 00:24:18,619 undersea environment are critical to 653 00:24:18,619 --> 00:24:20,900 homeland defense and and the the 654 00:24:20,900 --> 00:24:23,300 Russians are in fact significantly 655 00:24:23,300 --> 00:24:24,800 building up their military 656 00:24:24,800 --> 00:24:26,967 infrastructure on their their shore of 657 00:24:26,967 --> 00:24:29,022 the Arctic Ocean . Is that correct ? 658 00:24:29,022 --> 00:24:31,244 That is correct , Senator . So that may 659 00:24:31,244 --> 00:24:33,300 that's an area where we have to have 660 00:24:33,300 --> 00:24:35,467 better visibility and also to the west 661 00:24:35,467 --> 00:24:37,578 as the balloon incident told us . Yes 662 00:24:37,578 --> 00:24:41,439 sir , all true , uh . You mentioned uh 663 00:24:41,449 --> 00:24:44,489 directed energy . Uh , the reason for 664 00:24:44,489 --> 00:24:46,600 my question , General Collins , and I 665 00:24:46,600 --> 00:24:48,767 understand it classified , but those , 666 00:24:48,767 --> 00:24:50,600 those interceptors are about $60 667 00:24:50,600 --> 00:24:54,160 million a copy , one . I just , I , I 668 00:24:54,160 --> 00:24:55,827 can understand maybe that's a 669 00:24:55,827 --> 00:24:57,827 reasonable number if you're talking 670 00:24:57,827 --> 00:24:59,827 about a a limited capacity of North 671 00:24:59,827 --> 00:25:01,938 Korea or Iran , but if you're talking 672 00:25:01,938 --> 00:25:05,040 about between now it's 300 to 1000 673 00:25:05,040 --> 00:25:07,280 missiles in China , I don't know how 674 00:25:07,280 --> 00:25:10,000 many , several 1000 from Russia , the 675 00:25:10,000 --> 00:25:12,630 economics don't work . How do you feel 676 00:25:12,630 --> 00:25:14,750 about the potential of of directed 677 00:25:14,750 --> 00:25:17,819 energy , which is about 75 cents a shot 678 00:25:17,819 --> 00:25:21,790 once it's installed ? Yes sir , 679 00:25:22,270 --> 00:25:24,159 we are certainly uh interested in 680 00:25:24,159 --> 00:25:26,381 pursuing directed energy from a missile 681 00:25:26,381 --> 00:25:28,589 defense perspective . Um , at this 682 00:25:28,589 --> 00:25:31,800 point in time , uh , it is , we , uh , 683 00:25:32,150 --> 00:25:34,109 we are years away from having a 684 00:25:34,109 --> 00:25:36,220 capability that would be able to have 685 00:25:36,220 --> 00:25:38,442 an effect against a ballistic missile , 686 00:25:38,442 --> 00:25:40,387 uh , an intercontinental ballistic 687 00:25:40,387 --> 00:25:42,442 missile , and so , uh , for the near 688 00:25:42,442 --> 00:25:44,553 future we will still very much , uh , 689 00:25:44,553 --> 00:25:46,910 rely on , uh , the layered approaches 690 00:25:46,910 --> 00:25:48,743 that we have today for ballistic 691 00:25:48,743 --> 00:25:50,930 missile , uh , defense . Uh , we're 692 00:25:50,930 --> 00:25:53,097 certainly layered approach you've used 693 00:25:53,097 --> 00:25:55,208 that term several times . Yes , sir , 694 00:25:55,208 --> 00:25:56,986 we , we look to be able to take 695 00:25:56,986 --> 00:25:58,930 multiple , uh , engagements on any 696 00:25:58,930 --> 00:26:01,263 missile as it's coming in . And so , uh , 697 00:26:01,263 --> 00:26:03,486 in , in a perfect world , uh , we would 698 00:26:03,486 --> 00:26:05,374 try to intercept and take out the 699 00:26:05,374 --> 00:26:07,486 missile when it's still coming out of 700 00:26:07,486 --> 00:26:09,652 the the ground and being launched from 701 00:26:09,652 --> 00:26:09,410 the , from , uh , from the enemy 702 00:26:09,410 --> 00:26:11,743 territory . That's the boost phase , uh , 703 00:26:11,743 --> 00:26:13,688 while it's in space , it's the mid 704 00:26:13,688 --> 00:26:15,743 course phase and then as it's coming 705 00:26:15,743 --> 00:26:17,743 back into the atmosphere , it's the 706 00:26:17,743 --> 00:26:19,743 terminal phase . Uh , today we very 707 00:26:19,743 --> 00:26:19,689 much focused on the mid course , uh , 708 00:26:19,719 --> 00:26:21,775 uh , for engagements . Uh , we would 709 00:26:21,775 --> 00:26:23,997 certainly look to be able to , uh , try 710 00:26:23,997 --> 00:26:25,997 to bring technology to bear that we 711 00:26:25,997 --> 00:26:27,719 could get into the boost phase 712 00:26:27,719 --> 00:26:29,830 preferred . But then we may also have 713 00:26:29,830 --> 00:26:31,608 capabilities and under layer of 714 00:26:31,608 --> 00:26:33,608 capability that could be brought to 715 00:26:33,608 --> 00:26:35,663 bear to then have a second shot or a 716 00:26:35,663 --> 00:26:37,775 second engagement capability uh while 717 00:26:37,775 --> 00:26:39,886 it's in terminal and so the layers of 718 00:26:39,886 --> 00:26:41,997 defense or defense in depth is what I 719 00:26:41,997 --> 00:26:44,219 refer to when I mention layered missile 720 00:26:44,219 --> 00:26:45,775 defense . I think the prior 721 00:26:45,775 --> 00:26:47,775 administration lowered the directed 722 00:26:47,775 --> 00:26:49,997 energy budget by 50% over the past 4 or 723 00:26:49,997 --> 00:26:52,108 5 years . I think that was a terrible 724 00:26:52,108 --> 00:26:53,886 strategic mistake . I hope this 725 00:26:53,886 --> 00:26:56,108 administration will remedy that because 726 00:26:56,108 --> 00:26:58,330 you mentioned it's gonna be years . One 727 00:26:58,330 --> 00:27:00,497 way to make it months instead of years 728 00:27:00,497 --> 00:27:02,441 is to devote more resources to the 729 00:27:02,441 --> 00:27:02,369 research and development of that 730 00:27:02,369 --> 00:27:04,425 capability , which it seems to me is 731 00:27:04,425 --> 00:27:06,689 clearly the technology of the future in 732 00:27:06,689 --> 00:27:08,856 this in this field . Thank you , Madam 733 00:27:08,856 --> 00:27:10,800 Chair . Thank you , Senator King , 734 00:27:10,800 --> 00:27:13,859 Senator Tuperville . Thank you . Sounds 735 00:27:13,859 --> 00:27:16,040 like a guessing game to me . Yeah , a 736 00:27:16,040 --> 00:27:18,096 lot of things that are , that , that 737 00:27:18,096 --> 00:27:20,262 are gonna happen , of course , I don't 738 00:27:20,262 --> 00:27:22,484 know how many missiles that could reach 739 00:27:22,484 --> 00:27:24,429 our mainland , uh , that they have 740 00:27:24,429 --> 00:27:26,651 right now , but a lot , obviously space 741 00:27:26,651 --> 00:27:28,707 is going . Just decide a lot of that 742 00:27:28,707 --> 00:27:28,550 with missiles coming from space in the 743 00:27:28,550 --> 00:27:31,000 near future , but uh that being said , 744 00:27:31,069 --> 00:27:34,449 general . How are we doing on Guam ? We 745 00:27:34,449 --> 00:27:36,616 get the EI system started about what , 746 00:27:36,616 --> 00:27:38,893 3 years ago , uh , maybe a little less . 747 00:27:39,130 --> 00:27:41,599 Uh , how you doing ? Getting better ? 748 00:27:41,810 --> 00:27:44,439 Senator , getting better , um , lots of , 749 00:27:44,489 --> 00:27:46,449 uh , of , of teamwork across the 750 00:27:46,449 --> 00:27:48,338 services and with Missile Defense 751 00:27:48,338 --> 00:27:50,505 Agency and , uh , my hat goes off to , 752 00:27:50,505 --> 00:27:52,616 uh , General Collins and his team who 753 00:27:52,616 --> 00:27:54,671 really led the Department of Defense 754 00:27:54,671 --> 00:27:56,727 and , and early implementation , all 755 00:27:56,727 --> 00:27:58,671 the leg work for , uh . You know , 756 00:27:58,671 --> 00:28:00,560 laying the ground efforts for the 757 00:28:00,560 --> 00:28:02,671 military construction that will occur 758 00:28:02,671 --> 00:28:04,893 there . um , we demonstrated , uh , MDA 759 00:28:04,893 --> 00:28:06,838 demonstrated this last year , um , 760 00:28:06,838 --> 00:28:09,699 early Aegis Guam capability , uh , with , 761 00:28:09,770 --> 00:28:11,881 uh , with a flight test , uh , that , 762 00:28:11,881 --> 00:28:13,492 that was executed there very 763 00:28:13,492 --> 00:28:15,420 successfully . Um , that work was 764 00:28:15,420 --> 00:28:17,531 really the starting point . Uh , that 765 00:28:17,531 --> 00:28:19,642 equipment has stayed , uh , on site . 766 00:28:19,642 --> 00:28:21,864 It offers a credible deterrence against 767 00:28:21,864 --> 00:28:23,920 potential adversaries while the army 768 00:28:23,920 --> 00:28:26,031 then , uh , does its planning to , to 769 00:28:26,031 --> 00:28:28,142 come in in the 27 time frame with the 770 00:28:28,142 --> 00:28:29,976 next what we call tranche one of 771 00:28:29,976 --> 00:28:32,142 capability for Guam . Uh , it is a lot 772 00:28:32,142 --> 00:28:34,253 of consensus building . There's a lot 773 00:28:34,253 --> 00:28:36,476 of teamwork uh across the Department of 774 00:28:36,476 --> 00:28:38,642 Defense . This is the homeland , so in 775 00:28:38,642 --> 00:28:38,505 in several ways we're learning a lot of 776 00:28:38,505 --> 00:28:40,727 lessons , uh , that we believe can also 777 00:28:40,727 --> 00:28:42,838 apply to the Golden Dome team as they 778 00:28:42,838 --> 00:28:44,949 continue , uh , continue that mission 779 00:28:44,949 --> 00:28:47,005 set , um , but , but very optimistic 780 00:28:47,005 --> 00:28:49,172 that the army's gonna meet its mission 781 00:28:49,172 --> 00:28:51,283 that we'll have a credible capability 782 00:28:51,283 --> 00:28:51,224 uh on island in the time frame we lay 783 00:28:51,224 --> 00:28:53,113 out . Have we decided who's gonna 784 00:28:53,113 --> 00:28:55,719 operate it ? Well , that , that , that 785 00:28:55,719 --> 00:28:57,719 decision , uh , as we build out the 786 00:28:57,719 --> 00:28:59,997 overall command and control capability , 787 00:28:59,997 --> 00:29:02,052 the C2 for the defense of Guam would 788 00:29:02,052 --> 00:29:04,219 typically fall to the Air Force , uh , 789 00:29:04,219 --> 00:29:06,386 to conduct that overall coordination , 790 00:29:06,386 --> 00:29:08,608 but it will be manned jointly , uh , as 791 00:29:08,608 --> 00:29:10,719 we have both Navy systems . Air Force 792 00:29:10,719 --> 00:29:12,775 systems , Army systems , uh , on the 793 00:29:12,775 --> 00:29:14,497 ground we'll have , you know , 794 00:29:14,497 --> 00:29:16,663 servicemen and women from all of those 795 00:29:16,663 --> 00:29:18,830 services operating it , uh , typically 796 00:29:18,830 --> 00:29:20,941 under , under an Air Force leadership 797 00:29:20,941 --> 00:29:23,052 who will then report to the combatant 798 00:29:23,052 --> 00:29:24,886 commander I that include reserve 799 00:29:24,886 --> 00:29:26,941 National Guard , sir , it absolutely 800 00:29:26,941 --> 00:29:29,108 can , um , and we even with , uh , the 801 00:29:29,108 --> 00:29:30,997 small footprint the army's had on 802 00:29:30,997 --> 00:29:33,330 island today . Uh , with the , with the , 803 00:29:33,330 --> 00:29:35,552 the task force town , which is the THAD 804 00:29:35,552 --> 00:29:37,719 battery , uh , we've relied heavily on 805 00:29:37,719 --> 00:29:39,886 the Guam National Guard who provides a 806 00:29:39,886 --> 00:29:41,997 security force , uh , for that , that 807 00:29:41,997 --> 00:29:43,997 unit , uh , that's , it's operating 808 00:29:43,997 --> 00:29:46,163 away from a typical army base , uh , a 809 00:29:46,163 --> 00:29:48,497 great job , uh , of those soldiers , uh , 810 00:29:48,497 --> 00:29:50,275 supporting that mission , truly 811 00:29:50,275 --> 00:29:52,497 defending the homeland . And within the 812 00:29:52,497 --> 00:29:54,663 army there's talk about uh potentially 813 00:29:54,663 --> 00:29:56,608 expanding that mission set for the 814 00:29:56,608 --> 00:29:58,497 guard members on Guam still under 815 00:29:58,497 --> 00:30:00,552 discussion , so I can't get ahead of 816 00:30:00,552 --> 00:30:02,775 those decisions as they play out but uh 817 00:30:02,775 --> 00:30:02,189 I believe all things are on the table 818 00:30:02,189 --> 00:30:04,839 at this point . Thank you . I know it's 819 00:30:04,839 --> 00:30:07,469 a long process and its long process . I 820 00:30:07,469 --> 00:30:09,413 mean , how many years do you think 821 00:30:09,413 --> 00:30:11,780 we've got left fully operational . Uh , 822 00:30:11,819 --> 00:30:13,599 Senator , I believe we will be 823 00:30:13,599 --> 00:30:15,877 improving this capability forever , um , 824 00:30:15,900 --> 00:30:17,678 and defense never rests because 825 00:30:17,678 --> 00:30:19,979 offensive threat never , never rests so 826 00:30:19,979 --> 00:30:22,146 we will continually evolve the , the , 827 00:30:22,146 --> 00:30:24,201 the point , uh , of our effort is to 828 00:30:24,201 --> 00:30:26,312 try to get as much capability as soon 829 00:30:26,312 --> 00:30:28,535 as possible , and capability isn't just 830 00:30:28,535 --> 00:30:30,701 a thing , it's not just , you know , a 831 00:30:30,701 --> 00:30:32,923 launcher , it's not just a radar , it's 832 00:30:32,923 --> 00:30:35,035 not even just a command and control , 833 00:30:35,035 --> 00:30:36,923 it's . Soldiers , you know , uh , 834 00:30:36,923 --> 00:30:39,201 airmen , you know , uh , all the , the , 835 00:30:39,201 --> 00:30:41,423 the folks actually man this equipment , 836 00:30:41,423 --> 00:30:41,030 ensuring they're properly trained , 837 00:30:41,119 --> 00:30:43,230 it's ensuring that we have the proper 838 00:30:43,230 --> 00:30:45,341 sustainment tail on island to support 839 00:30:45,341 --> 00:30:47,397 it , that we can sustain it not just 840 00:30:47,397 --> 00:30:49,675 for a day but for years , uh , in time . 841 00:30:49,675 --> 00:30:51,841 So we'll be at this for a while . Like 842 00:30:51,841 --> 00:30:53,841 defending a different offense every 843 00:30:53,841 --> 00:30:53,479 week if you're a football coach . You 844 00:30:53,479 --> 00:30:55,757 got to change , don't you ? Absolutely , 845 00:30:55,757 --> 00:30:57,701 Senator , thank you , uh , General 846 00:30:57,701 --> 00:30:59,579 Collins , uh , thank you for the 847 00:30:59,579 --> 00:31:01,523 footprints you have in my state of 848 00:31:01,523 --> 00:31:03,690 Alabama . Rest on ours and we're proud 849 00:31:03,690 --> 00:31:07,079 of all the work you're doing . Um , How 850 00:31:07,079 --> 00:31:09,246 much of MDA's effort and investment in 851 00:31:09,246 --> 00:31:11,468 Golden Dome do you expect to take place 852 00:31:11,468 --> 00:31:13,680 in Huntsville , and you expect uh to 853 00:31:13,680 --> 00:31:15,736 request any additional resources for 854 00:31:15,920 --> 00:31:17,976 maintenance or buildings or anything 855 00:31:17,976 --> 00:31:21,750 like that in , in the future ? Well , 856 00:31:21,839 --> 00:31:23,783 sir , we're , uh , missile defense 857 00:31:23,783 --> 00:31:26,117 agency is really proud of being part of , 858 00:31:26,117 --> 00:31:28,061 uh , the Tennessee Valley and that 859 00:31:28,061 --> 00:31:28,050 Redstone arsenal . Uh , certainly a 860 00:31:28,050 --> 00:31:30,650 large contingent of our workforce is at 861 00:31:30,650 --> 00:31:33,010 Redstone Arsenal and as well as many of 862 00:31:33,010 --> 00:31:35,010 our , uh , industry partners are in 863 00:31:35,010 --> 00:31:37,232 that area as well . And so , uh , I , I 864 00:31:37,232 --> 00:31:39,566 can't give you an exact percentage , uh , 865 00:31:39,566 --> 00:31:41,899 but certainly , uh , the engineers , uh , 866 00:31:41,899 --> 00:31:44,066 the program managers , the contracting 867 00:31:44,066 --> 00:31:46,010 officers , the entire workforce of 868 00:31:46,010 --> 00:31:47,843 missile defense agency , and the 869 00:31:47,843 --> 00:31:47,449 associate industry members are gonna be 870 00:31:47,449 --> 00:31:49,505 very busy and very devoted , uh , to 871 00:31:49,505 --> 00:31:51,671 making . Any of the parts of of Golden 872 00:31:51,671 --> 00:31:53,800 Dome Reel and we're building things 873 00:31:53,800 --> 00:31:55,744 right now too , right ? You've got 874 00:31:55,744 --> 00:31:57,967 things under construction . I think the 875 00:31:57,967 --> 00:31:59,967 last time I was there . Yes , sir , 876 00:31:59,967 --> 00:32:02,189 we're doing um we're in the middle of a 877 00:32:02,189 --> 00:32:03,633 of a ground test facility 878 00:32:03,633 --> 00:32:05,689 infrastructure update which is a a a 879 00:32:05,689 --> 00:32:07,244 fairly large renovation and 880 00:32:07,244 --> 00:32:09,411 construction project that's going on . 881 00:32:09,411 --> 00:32:11,744 Uh , and , uh , that it's , uh , that's , 882 00:32:11,744 --> 00:32:11,650 that's going on right now to help get 883 00:32:11,650 --> 00:32:13,594 us ready for the , the ground test 884 00:32:13,594 --> 00:32:15,483 infrastructure we need to support 885 00:32:15,483 --> 00:32:17,594 NextGen missile defense , uh , and as 886 00:32:17,594 --> 00:32:19,849 we start digesting and , and , uh , and 887 00:32:19,849 --> 00:32:21,738 dissolving , uh , the Golden Dome 888 00:32:21,738 --> 00:32:23,571 requirements , uh , there may be 889 00:32:23,571 --> 00:32:25,793 additional requirements that we need to 890 00:32:25,793 --> 00:32:25,609 make sure we're ready . I got one more 891 00:32:25,609 --> 00:32:28,280 question . If , if you got time here , 892 00:32:28,449 --> 00:32:30,616 General Collins , uh , I wanna ask you 893 00:32:30,616 --> 00:32:32,727 about our space-based sensors , which 894 00:32:32,727 --> 00:32:35,109 is Absolutely critical component of any 895 00:32:35,109 --> 00:32:37,220 effort to develop the next generation 896 00:32:37,220 --> 00:32:39,750 missile defense capability . Last year , 897 00:32:39,790 --> 00:32:41,910 the US put a new hypersonic and 898 00:32:41,910 --> 00:32:44,021 ballistic track tracking space center 899 00:32:44,349 --> 00:32:47,469 satellite in orbit , uh . We have any 900 00:32:47,469 --> 00:32:49,413 plans , uh , either as part of the 901 00:32:49,413 --> 00:32:50,969 Golden Dome architecture or 902 00:32:50,969 --> 00:32:53,302 independently to expand that capability ? 903 00:32:53,579 --> 00:32:55,746 Yes sir , we , we as well believe that 904 00:32:55,746 --> 00:32:57,968 uh a very effective and resilient space 905 00:32:57,968 --> 00:33:00,023 layer is going to be critical to the 906 00:33:00,023 --> 00:33:01,690 future , uh , missile defense 907 00:33:01,690 --> 00:33:03,746 requirements of , of the homeland as 908 00:33:03,746 --> 00:33:05,857 well as our deployed forces . Uh , we 909 00:33:05,857 --> 00:33:05,609 rely on space assets today as part of 910 00:33:05,609 --> 00:33:07,942 our kill chain for initial tip off , uh , 911 00:33:07,942 --> 00:33:10,109 and we will continue to do that . Uh , 912 00:33:10,109 --> 00:33:11,720 the Space Force , uh , Space 913 00:33:11,720 --> 00:33:13,887 Development Agency will operationalize 914 00:33:13,887 --> 00:33:16,500 the HPTSS , uh , capability . um , our , 915 00:33:17,770 --> 00:33:19,770 the relationship we have with Space 916 00:33:19,770 --> 00:33:21,826 Force is we may prototype technology 917 00:33:21,826 --> 00:33:24,048 that is required and prove it out . For 918 00:33:24,048 --> 00:33:26,214 missile defense , the space force will 919 00:33:26,214 --> 00:33:28,270 operationalize that capability as we 920 00:33:28,270 --> 00:33:30,103 move forward , and HBTSS will be 921 00:33:30,103 --> 00:33:32,270 foundational . That type of technology 922 00:33:32,270 --> 00:33:34,214 will be foundational to hypersonic 923 00:33:34,214 --> 00:33:36,214 missile defense in the future , and 924 00:33:36,214 --> 00:33:38,214 we're working on future prototyping 925 00:33:38,214 --> 00:33:40,214 space center capabilities , uh , in 926 00:33:40,214 --> 00:33:42,381 particular discriminating space sensor 927 00:33:42,381 --> 00:33:44,270 to help improve ballistic missile 928 00:33:44,270 --> 00:33:44,074 defense in the future as well . Uh , 929 00:33:44,194 --> 00:33:46,250 we'll prototype and space force will 930 00:33:46,250 --> 00:33:48,250 operationalize and so space will be 931 00:33:48,250 --> 00:33:50,472 very key to protecting the homeland and 932 00:33:50,472 --> 00:33:52,472 our deployed forces in the future . 933 00:33:52,472 --> 00:33:54,699 Thanks Jenna , thanks , Senator . Thank 934 00:33:54,699 --> 00:33:57,630 you , Mr . Chairman . Thank you , 935 00:33:57,640 --> 00:34:01,489 Senator Tuperville . General Rush , 936 00:34:01,530 --> 00:34:04,560 um , when you , when you look at , um , 937 00:34:04,650 --> 00:34:06,817 the defense that Guam's gonna retire , 938 00:34:06,817 --> 00:34:09,610 you and I earlier today we had a 939 00:34:09,610 --> 00:34:11,449 conversation about that and the 940 00:34:11,449 --> 00:34:14,370 importance of integrating , uh , those 941 00:34:14,370 --> 00:34:16,340 systems Army , Navy , MDA . 942 00:34:18,389 --> 00:34:21,820 The my co-chair talked about directed 943 00:34:21,820 --> 00:34:24,979 energy and how um . 944 00:34:26,389 --> 00:34:29,030 How important the the uses of that 945 00:34:29,030 --> 00:34:31,540 could be and it would be a lot cheaper . 946 00:34:31,959 --> 00:34:35,100 Uh , but can you compare the systems 947 00:34:35,100 --> 00:34:37,580 that we need to integrate , uh , for 948 00:34:37,580 --> 00:34:40,790 the defense of Guam specifically and , 949 00:34:40,800 --> 00:34:43,729 and some of the challenges that we face , 950 00:34:43,909 --> 00:34:46,979 um , looking at directed energy and the 951 00:34:46,979 --> 00:34:50,419 capabilities it has in , uh , some 952 00:34:50,419 --> 00:34:52,899 more adverse conditions that are out 953 00:34:52,899 --> 00:34:56,250 there maybe not always ready , uh , and , 954 00:34:56,260 --> 00:34:58,959 and the different , um . And the 955 00:34:58,959 --> 00:35:02,360 different options it provides uh you 956 00:35:02,360 --> 00:35:05,629 and your soldiers with as you looked uh 957 00:35:06,199 --> 00:35:09,219 towards defending that island . Madam 958 00:35:09,219 --> 00:35:11,275 Chair , absolutely , and , and thank 959 00:35:11,275 --> 00:35:13,699 you for the question . So , um , as we 960 00:35:13,699 --> 00:35:16,100 spoke earlier , the , the , the new 961 00:35:16,100 --> 00:35:18,267 thing that we're doing for Guam is not 962 00:35:18,267 --> 00:35:20,322 just putting the individual material 963 00:35:20,322 --> 00:35:22,544 systems and programs , uh , on island , 964 00:35:22,580 --> 00:35:24,580 but really taking the first step at 965 00:35:24,580 --> 00:35:26,580 integrating the command and control 966 00:35:26,580 --> 00:35:28,691 functions . So Air Force , uh , has a 967 00:35:28,691 --> 00:35:30,929 system to light . A navy has their AIS 968 00:35:30,929 --> 00:35:33,100 system which will be Aegis Guam , uh , 969 00:35:33,169 --> 00:35:35,979 missile Defense Agency has uh C2BMC and 970 00:35:35,979 --> 00:35:38,201 the Army has the integrated air missile 971 00:35:38,201 --> 00:35:40,257 defense battle battle command system 972 00:35:40,257 --> 00:35:42,360 IBCS . These are our four separate 973 00:35:42,360 --> 00:35:45,310 systems , uh , that , that loosely , uh , 974 00:35:45,330 --> 00:35:47,552 interoperate now , but , but we believe 975 00:35:47,552 --> 00:35:49,886 that's not good enough in the long term . 976 00:35:49,886 --> 00:35:52,219 So we're , we're integrating these , uh , 977 00:35:52,219 --> 00:35:54,989 with a layer uh of decision support on 978 00:35:54,989 --> 00:35:56,989 top called the Joint Integrated Bat 979 00:35:56,989 --> 00:35:59,100 Manager . Uh , this capability will , 980 00:35:59,100 --> 00:36:01,156 will leverage a lot of the work that 981 00:36:01,156 --> 00:36:03,489 Missile Defense Agency has done to date , 982 00:36:03,489 --> 00:36:05,711 uh , in , in that single integrated air 983 00:36:05,711 --> 00:36:07,889 picture arena of getting a common air 984 00:36:07,889 --> 00:36:09,778 picture with those sys with those 985 00:36:09,778 --> 00:36:11,778 systems , uh , and then providing a 986 00:36:11,778 --> 00:36:14,030 layer of decision aids on top so that 987 00:36:14,030 --> 00:36:16,429 the decision maker , uh , who's got a 988 00:36:16,429 --> 00:36:18,485 hard decision to make on a potential 989 00:36:18,485 --> 00:36:21,560 threat . Um , can actually do fire 990 00:36:21,560 --> 00:36:23,560 direction to the appropriate system 991 00:36:23,560 --> 00:36:25,282 that actually has uh a killing 992 00:36:25,282 --> 00:36:27,282 capability . So that's the new work 993 00:36:27,282 --> 00:36:29,449 that we're doing , uh , doing for Guam 994 00:36:29,449 --> 00:36:31,393 from a command and control or fire 995 00:36:31,393 --> 00:36:33,616 control perspective , uh , with regards 996 00:36:33,616 --> 00:36:35,671 to directed energy , um , as General 997 00:36:35,671 --> 00:36:37,504 Collins said , the technology is 998 00:36:37,504 --> 00:36:39,616 evolving , uh , and the army , uh , I 999 00:36:39,616 --> 00:36:41,504 know has invested a lot in ground 1000 00:36:41,504 --> 00:36:43,227 systems from a directed energy 1001 00:36:43,227 --> 00:36:45,449 perspective . We've deployed several of 1002 00:36:45,449 --> 00:36:47,282 those systems overseas to get uh 1003 00:36:47,282 --> 00:36:49,504 continued operational assessment . Uh , 1004 00:36:49,504 --> 00:36:51,727 and for the defense of Guam , there's a 1005 00:36:51,727 --> 00:36:53,504 potential as those technologies 1006 00:36:53,504 --> 00:36:55,671 continue to evolve to be integrated in 1007 00:36:55,671 --> 00:36:57,893 as part of this , this infrastructure . 1008 00:36:57,893 --> 00:36:59,820 Um , or our architecture , uh , 1009 00:36:59,870 --> 00:37:01,870 realizing though that that directed 1010 00:37:01,870 --> 00:37:03,926 energy is not a panacea , um , there 1011 00:37:03,926 --> 00:37:06,259 are , as you pointed out , there's days , 1012 00:37:06,259 --> 00:37:08,481 uh , good days and bad days for , for , 1013 00:37:08,481 --> 00:37:10,648 for lasers . Uh , weather can affect , 1014 00:37:10,648 --> 00:37:12,592 uh , their lethality , it , it can 1015 00:37:12,592 --> 00:37:14,537 affect the range and so we , as we 1016 00:37:14,537 --> 00:37:16,759 continue to learn about this technology 1017 00:37:16,759 --> 00:37:18,814 and what its capability is , we also 1018 00:37:18,814 --> 00:37:20,870 have to ensure that we integrate the 1019 00:37:20,870 --> 00:37:22,981 atmospherics at the time . You know , 1020 00:37:22,981 --> 00:37:25,092 that as you get closer to the earth , 1021 00:37:25,092 --> 00:37:27,426 the environment is , the air is dirtier , 1022 00:37:27,426 --> 00:37:29,537 uh , windy days create dust which can 1023 00:37:29,537 --> 00:37:31,537 reflect or refract the light , uh , 1024 00:37:31,537 --> 00:37:33,703 moisture can do the same thing if it's 1025 00:37:33,703 --> 00:37:33,590 raining , so having a mix of 1026 00:37:33,590 --> 00:37:35,812 capabilities and that the soldiers that 1027 00:37:35,812 --> 00:37:37,868 are operating that integrated system 1028 00:37:38,070 --> 00:37:40,292 understand basically how good the laser 1029 00:37:40,292 --> 00:37:42,292 is today . Uh , the ranges of those 1030 00:37:42,292 --> 00:37:44,459 directed energy systems are not out at 1031 00:37:44,459 --> 00:37:46,403 the ranges of our more exquisite . 1032 00:37:46,403 --> 00:37:48,570 Visit , uh , and expensive , uh , uh , 1033 00:37:48,570 --> 00:37:50,681 missile systems are , uh , so we have 1034 00:37:50,681 --> 00:37:52,792 to build that trust with the soldiers 1035 00:37:52,792 --> 00:37:54,681 that if they let a threat getting 1036 00:37:54,681 --> 00:37:56,792 closer to allow directed energy to be 1037 00:37:56,792 --> 00:37:59,070 the effector that it's gonna work , um , 1038 00:37:59,070 --> 00:38:01,181 so that's something that the army , I 1039 00:38:01,181 --> 00:38:03,126 know we're working at lower powers 1040 00:38:03,126 --> 00:38:02,790 necessarily than we would put on Guam , 1041 00:38:03,070 --> 00:38:05,237 but starting down that venture now and 1042 00:38:05,237 --> 00:38:07,126 looking forward to see where that 1043 00:38:07,126 --> 00:38:09,014 technology takes us . Thank you , 1044 00:38:09,014 --> 00:38:10,792 General Senator Kelly , you are 1045 00:38:10,792 --> 00:38:12,959 recognized . Thank you , Madam Chair . 1046 00:38:14,870 --> 00:38:18,179 General Collins , uh , so last year , 1047 00:38:18,429 --> 00:38:20,709 uh , Missile Defense Agency proposed 1048 00:38:20,709 --> 00:38:24,330 termination of the SM3 . And 1049 00:38:24,340 --> 00:38:27,510 months after that termination 1050 00:38:27,510 --> 00:38:30,770 recommendation , that missile was used 1051 00:38:30,770 --> 00:38:33,409 in uh defense of Israel against 1052 00:38:33,409 --> 00:38:36,409 ballistic missiles . So based on the 1053 00:38:36,409 --> 00:38:39,610 recent combat experience with the SM3 1054 00:38:39,929 --> 00:38:43,929 and , and I , I am not sure exactly 1055 00:38:43,929 --> 00:38:46,489 what the number of rounds that were 1056 00:38:46,489 --> 00:38:49,560 fired , um , but is there . 1057 00:38:51,530 --> 00:38:53,752 What , what is the current plan for the 1058 00:38:53,752 --> 00:38:55,919 SM3 going forward ? Has that plan been 1059 00:38:56,250 --> 00:38:58,929 re-evaluated ? Thanks , Senator for 1060 00:38:58,929 --> 00:39:01,040 that question . Uh , certainly that , 1061 00:39:01,040 --> 00:39:03,262 that , uh , in , in last year's hearing 1062 00:39:03,262 --> 00:39:05,373 we , we , we certainly talked about , 1063 00:39:05,373 --> 00:39:07,596 uh , the decision , the fiscal decision 1064 00:39:07,596 --> 00:39:09,707 that was made , um , to terminate the 1065 00:39:09,707 --> 00:39:11,929 SM3 Block 1B line , uh , and since that 1066 00:39:11,929 --> 00:39:13,818 you're very right , it has been a 1067 00:39:13,818 --> 00:39:15,873 workhorse , uh , in , in the Eastern 1068 00:39:15,873 --> 00:39:17,985 Mediterranean , uh , protecting the , 1069 00:39:17,985 --> 00:39:19,873 uh , the citizens of the state of 1070 00:39:19,873 --> 00:39:22,510 Israel , um . As we now are planning , 1071 00:39:22,570 --> 00:39:24,403 uh , with the increased focus on 1072 00:39:24,403 --> 00:39:26,403 missile defense of the homeland and 1073 00:39:26,403 --> 00:39:28,626 missile defense in general , uh , the , 1074 00:39:28,626 --> 00:39:30,681 the future decision space within the 1075 00:39:30,681 --> 00:39:32,626 SM3 program , uh , is , uh , being 1076 00:39:32,626 --> 00:39:34,126 relooked at as part of the 1077 00:39:34,126 --> 00:39:36,181 deliberations for Golden Dome , uh , 1078 00:39:36,181 --> 00:39:38,514 and , uh , as well with the president's , 1079 00:39:38,514 --> 00:39:40,126 uh , budget , uh , that's in 1080 00:39:40,126 --> 00:39:42,181 development . Uh , what I would also 1081 00:39:42,181 --> 00:39:44,070 though say is uh . Uh , through a 1082 00:39:44,070 --> 00:39:46,292 number of supplementals we , we , we do 1083 00:39:46,292 --> 00:39:48,348 appreciate the support that has come 1084 00:39:48,348 --> 00:39:50,459 through supplemental funding that has 1085 00:39:50,459 --> 00:39:52,681 come back to replenish the SM31B , uh , 1086 00:39:52,681 --> 00:39:54,792 lots that were , were expended , uh , 1087 00:39:54,792 --> 00:39:56,626 in the eastern med , and we will 1088 00:39:56,626 --> 00:39:58,626 continue to track that very closely 1089 00:39:58,626 --> 00:40:00,848 with both the Block 1B and the block 2A 1090 00:40:00,848 --> 00:40:00,580 as we move forward . Do you know how 1091 00:40:00,580 --> 00:40:02,929 many rounds were fired ? SM 3 rounds . 1092 00:40:03,389 --> 00:40:05,500 Uh , I do not have the , the latest , 1093 00:40:05,500 --> 00:40:07,500 but it is in the dozens . And , and 1094 00:40:07,500 --> 00:40:10,469 there hasn't been the , the , the SM 3 1095 00:40:10,469 --> 00:40:14,110 line has not been shut down at all , so 1096 00:40:14,110 --> 00:40:16,969 it sounds like in fact it's the rate of 1097 00:40:16,969 --> 00:40:18,969 production has increased . Uh , the 1098 00:40:18,969 --> 00:40:20,802 rate of production is , is still 1099 00:40:20,802 --> 00:40:22,969 continuing . We are still in the midst 1100 00:40:22,969 --> 00:40:25,310 of , we still have FY 24 and FY25 plus 1101 00:40:25,310 --> 00:40:27,310 the supplemental funding that still 1102 00:40:27,310 --> 00:40:29,421 will go on contract before the end of 1103 00:40:29,421 --> 00:40:31,421 this year , so that line will still 1104 00:40:31,421 --> 00:40:33,532 remain open , uh , for years into the 1105 00:40:33,532 --> 00:40:35,754 future , uh . Takes a few years to from 1106 00:40:35,754 --> 00:40:37,810 beginning to end to get those rounds 1107 00:40:37,810 --> 00:40:39,977 out so , uh , the decisions , uh , the 1108 00:40:39,977 --> 00:40:42,143 funding decisions that are , are , are 1109 00:40:42,143 --> 00:40:44,032 here and now to make sure we , we 1110 00:40:44,032 --> 00:40:43,550 continue to keep that line open and 1111 00:40:43,550 --> 00:40:45,717 viable as we move forward . Go back to 1112 00:40:45,717 --> 00:40:47,939 last year when the decision was made to 1113 00:40:47,939 --> 00:40:50,590 terminate production of SM3 . What was 1114 00:40:50,590 --> 00:40:54,060 the plan . For the , the follow 1115 00:40:54,060 --> 00:40:56,179 on missile that would . 1116 00:40:57,790 --> 00:41:00,409 Perform the duties of the SM3 . So , 1117 00:41:00,459 --> 00:41:03,780 there wasn't a plan uh set forward on a 1118 00:41:03,780 --> 00:41:06,219 replacement for the SM31B . Uh , it was 1119 00:41:06,219 --> 00:41:08,330 to rely more on the , the , the block 1120 00:41:08,330 --> 00:41:10,552 2A line , uh , which is a larger , more 1121 00:41:10,552 --> 00:41:12,441 expensive missile , but the , the 1122 00:41:12,441 --> 00:41:14,552 quantity , uh , production rates were 1123 00:41:14,552 --> 00:41:14,379 lower for that missile , but that was 1124 00:41:14,379 --> 00:41:16,790 the decision . But General , General 1125 00:41:16,790 --> 00:41:20,780 Rosh , um . Appreciate all the work 1126 00:41:20,909 --> 00:41:23,510 you and your team have done on the Guam 1127 00:41:23,510 --> 00:41:25,343 defense system and interested in 1128 00:41:25,343 --> 00:41:29,060 hearing any lessons from Guam Defense 1129 00:41:29,350 --> 00:41:32,949 that can be applied to Golden Dome uh 1130 00:41:32,949 --> 00:41:35,669 as we come up with a plan . I know the 1131 00:41:35,669 --> 00:41:37,949 study has been , well , the timeline 1132 00:41:37,949 --> 00:41:41,320 for this 60 day study is complete , but 1133 00:41:41,320 --> 00:41:44,239 anything that informed that study from 1134 00:41:44,239 --> 00:41:47,879 Guam Defense . Senator , thank you for 1135 00:41:47,879 --> 00:41:50,229 your question and , and absolutely , uh , 1136 00:41:50,239 --> 00:41:52,620 lessons learned . Uh , Guam , uh , 1137 00:41:52,629 --> 00:41:54,518 being part of the homeland , uh , 1138 00:41:54,518 --> 00:41:56,629 provides a lot of the same challenges 1139 00:41:56,629 --> 00:41:58,518 that we will have here COA , uh , 1140 00:41:58,518 --> 00:42:00,073 interagency cooperation and 1141 00:42:00,073 --> 00:42:02,185 coordination will be required . We've 1142 00:42:02,185 --> 00:42:04,185 certainly learned that on Guam , so 1143 00:42:04,185 --> 00:42:06,018 it's not just a DOD venture it's 1144 00:42:06,018 --> 00:42:08,129 bringing in the whole of government . 1145 00:42:08,129 --> 00:42:09,907 Uh , as far as site locations , 1146 00:42:09,907 --> 00:42:11,907 environmentals , everything that we 1147 00:42:11,907 --> 00:42:11,540 have to do there , and I certainly 1148 00:42:11,540 --> 00:42:13,596 shared that , uh , across with the , 1149 00:42:13,596 --> 00:42:15,762 with the teammates as they're thinking 1150 00:42:15,762 --> 00:42:17,984 about , uh , the Golden Dome , uh , the 1151 00:42:17,984 --> 00:42:20,151 Golden Dome challenge . Uh , the other 1152 00:42:20,151 --> 00:42:21,818 area , uh , that I believe is 1153 00:42:21,818 --> 00:42:23,429 significant is really is the 1154 00:42:23,429 --> 00:42:25,596 integration of our command and control 1155 00:42:25,596 --> 00:42:27,651 systems . You know our services have 1156 00:42:27,651 --> 00:42:27,229 typically fought the air missile 1157 00:42:27,229 --> 00:42:30,530 defense threat um as stove pipes , uh , 1158 00:42:30,580 --> 00:42:32,669 and so our work to do that level of 1159 00:42:32,669 --> 00:42:34,891 integration for at least the land piece 1160 00:42:34,891 --> 00:42:37,610 of those systems from the army , the 1161 00:42:37,610 --> 00:42:39,443 Navy , the Air Force , and , and 1162 00:42:39,443 --> 00:42:41,499 missile defense agency to , to start 1163 00:42:41,499 --> 00:42:43,499 the integration of that , uh , will 1164 00:42:43,499 --> 00:42:46,110 absolutely , uh , should be a model or 1165 00:42:46,110 --> 00:42:48,166 at least a starting point , uh , for 1166 00:42:48,166 --> 00:42:50,332 how we take on the bigger challenge of 1167 00:42:50,332 --> 00:42:52,221 developing an air missile defense 1168 00:42:52,221 --> 00:42:53,832 capability across the entire 1169 00:42:53,832 --> 00:42:56,054 continental US . And Ms . Jaffee on the 1170 00:42:56,054 --> 00:42:58,360 60 day study , I know the report has 1171 00:42:58,360 --> 00:43:00,527 gone to the White House . I don't know 1172 00:43:00,527 --> 00:43:02,638 if the president has signed off on it 1173 00:43:02,638 --> 00:43:04,804 yet . It doesn't sound like it , but I 1174 00:43:04,804 --> 00:43:07,027 wanted to just hear if you can speak to 1175 00:43:07,027 --> 00:43:09,639 what kind of preliminary activities 1176 00:43:09,639 --> 00:43:11,861 have been accomplished and anything you 1177 00:43:11,861 --> 00:43:14,020 can say about what you've . Uh , 1178 00:43:14,189 --> 00:43:16,669 discovered in the , uh , in the 60 day 1179 00:43:16,669 --> 00:43:20,060 study . Sir , thank you . I think I can 1180 00:43:20,060 --> 00:43:22,171 say broadly , um , as you know , this 1181 00:43:22,171 --> 00:43:24,282 executive order really challenged the 1182 00:43:24,282 --> 00:43:26,227 department to take this integrated 1183 00:43:26,227 --> 00:43:28,393 approach in a really unprecedented way 1184 00:43:28,393 --> 00:43:27,580 that would require the breaking down of 1185 00:43:27,580 --> 00:43:29,850 silos to be successful when it came 1186 00:43:29,850 --> 00:43:31,906 into the building , our office , the 1187 00:43:31,906 --> 00:43:33,961 office of the Secretary of Defense , 1188 00:43:33,961 --> 00:43:35,739 joined the joint staff to bring 1189 00:43:35,739 --> 00:43:37,794 together all of the stakeholders and 1190 00:43:37,794 --> 00:43:37,370 start working on different design 1191 00:43:37,370 --> 00:43:39,426 options , we matured them to a place 1192 00:43:39,426 --> 00:43:41,481 that the technical experts took over 1193 00:43:41,481 --> 00:43:43,537 and really refined them into . A few 1194 00:43:43,537 --> 00:43:45,426 different options to bring to the 1195 00:43:45,426 --> 00:43:47,426 secretary . My understanding is the 1196 00:43:47,426 --> 00:43:47,340 Secretary of Defense and other 1197 00:43:47,340 --> 00:43:49,396 department leaders have engaged with 1198 00:43:49,396 --> 00:43:51,451 the president , and the hope is that 1199 00:43:51,451 --> 00:43:53,507 there will be an announcement soon , 1200 00:43:53,507 --> 00:43:55,673 certainly tied with the budget . There 1201 00:43:55,673 --> 00:43:55,340 was certainly a breadth of options 1202 00:43:55,340 --> 00:43:57,118 looked at that tied the new and 1203 00:43:57,118 --> 00:43:59,739 potential ways to accelerate 1204 00:43:59,739 --> 00:44:01,906 developmental capabilities to get some 1205 00:44:01,906 --> 00:44:03,840 demonstrations with the existing 1206 00:44:03,840 --> 00:44:05,840 capabilities so that we can have an 1207 00:44:05,840 --> 00:44:08,007 integrated layered system . OK , thank 1208 00:44:08,007 --> 00:44:10,199 you . Thank you , Senator Kelly . 1209 00:44:10,469 --> 00:44:12,469 Senator King , you are recognized . 1210 00:44:13,209 --> 00:44:15,560 General Rash , I'm , I'm very 1211 00:44:15,560 --> 00:44:18,290 interested in Guam as a , as a test bed 1212 00:44:18,639 --> 00:44:20,806 which has been discussed repeatedly in 1213 00:44:20,806 --> 00:44:22,861 the in this hearing . My question is 1214 00:44:22,861 --> 00:44:24,861 how much has the development of the 1215 00:44:24,861 --> 00:44:27,399 missile defense infrastructure on Guam 1216 00:44:27,399 --> 00:44:28,030 cost ? 1217 00:44:30,969 --> 00:44:32,747 Senator , that's a , a , a good 1218 00:44:32,747 --> 00:44:35,080 question , obviously one that gets , uh , 1219 00:44:35,080 --> 00:44:37,080 uh , gets a lot of interest because 1220 00:44:37,080 --> 00:44:39,399 there , there tends to be a con uh , a 1221 00:44:39,399 --> 00:44:41,232 conflating of different costs to 1222 00:44:41,232 --> 00:44:43,288 support overall , uh , the island of 1223 00:44:43,288 --> 00:44:45,560 Guam , um , obviously still recovering 1224 00:44:45,560 --> 00:44:47,671 from , uh , from a horrible typhoon a 1225 00:44:47,671 --> 00:44:49,727 few years ago . There's dollars that 1226 00:44:49,727 --> 00:44:51,838 the DOD is investing in fixing things 1227 00:44:51,838 --> 00:44:54,060 that were damaged . I understand that , 1228 00:44:54,060 --> 00:44:56,879 but I'm , can the , the defense piece 1229 00:44:56,879 --> 00:44:59,046 that you're just that you've discussed 1230 00:44:59,046 --> 00:45:02,070 here today . Be isolated and identified 1231 00:45:02,070 --> 00:45:04,403 somebody must know what it's cost . Yes , 1232 00:45:04,403 --> 00:45:06,626 Senator , it , it can , and , and we've 1233 00:45:06,626 --> 00:45:08,570 estimated that at about $8 billion 1234 00:45:08,570 --> 00:45:10,737 investment , uh , not new investment , 1235 00:45:10,737 --> 00:45:12,959 but really it's the cost of the systems 1236 00:45:12,959 --> 00:45:15,181 that the services were building already 1237 00:45:15,181 --> 00:45:17,610 that will now be located at Guam , uh , 1238 00:45:17,629 --> 00:45:19,796 approximately $8 billion across all of 1239 00:45:19,796 --> 00:45:22,073 the services when you look through the , 1240 00:45:22,073 --> 00:45:24,018 the overall cost of the individual 1241 00:45:24,018 --> 00:45:26,310 components . I find that concerning 1242 00:45:26,310 --> 00:45:28,439 because I just did a calculation . 1243 00:45:28,530 --> 00:45:31,050 There's 779 cities in the United States 1244 00:45:31,050 --> 00:45:34,209 with more than 50,000 people . Uh , 1245 00:45:34,479 --> 00:45:36,590 many of them , in fact , Guam is half 1246 00:45:36,590 --> 00:45:39,040 the size of San Antonio . So if we're 1247 00:45:39,040 --> 00:45:41,096 talking about providing the level of 1248 00:45:41,096 --> 00:45:43,151 defense that we have on Guam for our 1249 00:45:43,151 --> 00:45:45,373 citizens in our country . We're talking 1250 00:45:45,373 --> 00:45:47,484 about an awful lot of money . I can't 1251 00:45:47,484 --> 00:45:49,651 do the math in my head , but 800 times 1252 00:45:49,651 --> 00:45:51,270 6 billion is a , is a pretty 1253 00:45:51,270 --> 00:45:54,030 astronomical cost . Uh , again , as you 1254 00:45:54,030 --> 00:45:56,252 can tell , I'm , I'm skeptical . I want 1255 00:45:56,252 --> 00:45:58,330 to be proven wrong . And I'll look 1256 00:45:58,330 --> 00:46:00,052 forward to future hearings and 1257 00:46:00,052 --> 00:46:02,219 discussions and seeing how Golden Dome 1258 00:46:02,219 --> 00:46:05,560 evolves uh the , the question is , uh , 1259 00:46:05,570 --> 00:46:08,929 is it the best place to put our money , 1260 00:46:08,939 --> 00:46:10,661 or should we be developing our 1261 00:46:10,850 --> 00:46:12,489 deterrent capability and and 1262 00:46:12,489 --> 00:46:15,360 accelerating the , the reconstruction 1263 00:46:15,360 --> 00:46:17,395 of the triad . As a more effective 1264 00:46:17,395 --> 00:46:19,834 deterrent than one that looks like it , 1265 00:46:19,915 --> 00:46:23,314 it has some technical and financial uh 1266 00:46:23,314 --> 00:46:25,481 questions but we'll , I think the next 1267 00:46:25,481 --> 00:46:27,481 time we have this hearing , we'll , 1268 00:46:27,481 --> 00:46:29,425 we'll probably will have some more 1269 00:46:29,425 --> 00:46:31,647 answers about what Golden Dome actually 1270 00:46:31,647 --> 00:46:33,870 looks like and don't get me wrong , I'm 1271 00:46:33,870 --> 00:46:33,834 all for protecting the homeland . It's 1272 00:46:33,834 --> 00:46:36,195 just a question of how does it , how 1273 00:46:36,195 --> 00:46:38,417 much does it , will it cost relative to 1274 00:46:38,417 --> 00:46:41,235 other defense needs and uh how 1275 00:46:41,235 --> 00:46:43,235 effective can it be technologically 1276 00:46:43,235 --> 00:46:45,124 given . The , uh , development of 1277 00:46:45,124 --> 00:46:47,291 things like hypersonics maneuverable , 1278 00:46:47,500 --> 00:46:49,879 uh , missiles that , uh , as you know , 1279 00:46:50,100 --> 00:46:53,739 General Gimo are , are below the level 1280 00:46:53,739 --> 00:46:56,100 of traditional sensors , uh , and much 1281 00:46:56,100 --> 00:46:58,780 more difficult to , to intercept . So 1282 00:46:58,780 --> 00:47:00,836 I'll look forward to continuing this 1283 00:47:00,836 --> 00:47:03,058 discussion and certainly I hope , Madam 1284 00:47:03,058 --> 00:47:05,224 Chair , that as soon as Golden Dome is 1285 00:47:05,224 --> 00:47:07,391 more . Uh , formulated , we can have a 1286 00:47:07,391 --> 00:47:09,570 hearing to discuss the it's it's 1287 00:47:09,570 --> 00:47:13,479 components . Thank you Senator King . I 1288 00:47:13,479 --> 00:47:16,000 agree with you . Um , I believe Golden 1289 00:47:16,000 --> 00:47:19,439 Dome is , is part of the mix and the 1290 00:47:19,439 --> 00:47:22,020 options that are out there as we look 1291 00:47:22,020 --> 00:47:24,750 at the defense of our homeland , uh , 1292 00:47:24,760 --> 00:47:26,919 and specifically in the Indo-Pacific 1293 00:47:26,919 --> 00:47:29,429 with Guam as well . Uh , we've heard 1294 00:47:29,429 --> 00:47:33,070 from a number of our , um , panelists 1295 00:47:33,070 --> 00:47:36,389 at posture hearings but also in , in 1296 00:47:36,389 --> 00:47:38,959 classified briefings that the 1297 00:47:38,959 --> 00:47:41,129 administration has followed previous 1298 00:47:41,129 --> 00:47:44,510 administrations in putting the top 1299 00:47:44,510 --> 00:47:47,425 priority on . Our triad on 1300 00:47:47,425 --> 00:47:50,745 modernization on making sure that um 1301 00:47:50,745 --> 00:47:53,485 the president will have options there 1302 00:47:53,485 --> 00:47:56,544 as well so I'm um look forward to 1303 00:47:56,544 --> 00:47:59,254 seeing with you how Golden Dome is 1304 00:47:59,254 --> 00:48:02,284 going to be able to to fit in the mix 1305 00:48:02,284 --> 00:48:05,544 uh uh along with hypersonics 1306 00:48:05,544 --> 00:48:08,114 and and many other options that are 1307 00:48:08,114 --> 00:48:10,790 gonna be available in the future . Uh , 1308 00:48:10,830 --> 00:48:13,510 with that , I thank the panel for being 1309 00:48:13,510 --> 00:48:15,750 here today . uh , Senator King and I 1310 00:48:15,750 --> 00:48:18,070 need to get down and vote , but we 1311 00:48:18,070 --> 00:48:21,070 thank all of you for your dedication 1312 00:48:21,070 --> 00:48:23,469 for the time you give us here in the 1313 00:48:23,469 --> 00:48:25,358 Senate and on this subcommittee , 1314 00:48:25,358 --> 00:48:27,469 especially in the information you 1315 00:48:27,469 --> 00:48:29,850 provide us . Thank you . We are 1316 00:48:29,850 --> 00:48:30,550 adjourned