WEBVTT 00:00.119 --> 00:03.059 The order Uh , today we continue our 00:03.059 --> 00:05.500 posture hearings with Indo Paycom and 00:05.500 --> 00:08.180 US Forces Korea . I want to thank our 00:08.180 --> 00:10.347 witnesses for being here and for their 00:10.347 --> 00:12.458 service to our nation and the time it 00:12.458 --> 00:14.347 took for them to prepare for this 00:14.347 --> 00:14.140 hearing . These are very helpful and I 00:14.140 --> 00:16.418 appreciate your , uh , your commitment . 00:16.509 --> 00:18.708 Last week , China carried out large 00:18.708 --> 00:21.079 scale military exercises off Taiwan's 00:21.079 --> 00:23.669 coast . China practiced assaulting 00:23.669 --> 00:26.628 maritime and ground targets and cutting 00:26.628 --> 00:29.429 Taiwan off from the world . This is not 00:29.429 --> 00:32.369 new . In recent years , China has 00:32.369 --> 00:34.091 increased the size , scope and 00:34.091 --> 00:36.369 complexity of its drills around Taiwan . 00:37.000 --> 00:39.720 As Admiral Paparo has said , these are 00:39.720 --> 00:43.159 not exercises . These are rehearsals 00:43.159 --> 00:44.715 for our future , for forced 00:44.715 --> 00:47.750 reunification . And these rehearsals 00:47.750 --> 00:50.869 are backed by real capability . China 00:50.869 --> 00:53.669 now has the world's largest navy and a 00:53.669 --> 00:56.630 shipbuilding capacity over 200 times 00:56.630 --> 00:59.569 greater than our own . It's rapidly 00:59.569 --> 01:02.209 expanding its nuclear arsenal and is 01:02.209 --> 01:05.279 expected to double its warheads by 2030 . 01:06.000 --> 01:08.660 And China leads the world in hypersonic 01:08.660 --> 01:11.330 missile systems . China's growing 01:11.330 --> 01:13.441 defense budget shows it isn't slowing 01:13.441 --> 01:17.169 down . Last month , it announced a 7.2% 01:17.169 --> 01:19.113 increase in defense spending . The 01:19.113 --> 01:21.610 fourth straight year , it increased by 01:21.610 --> 01:24.690 more than 7% . Its military 01:24.690 --> 01:26.930 modernization is also being assisted by 01:26.930 --> 01:29.449 Moscow . In return for supporting 01:29.449 --> 01:31.519 Putin's war machine , China is 01:31.519 --> 01:34.639 receiving advanced submarine , missile 01:34.639 --> 01:37.650 and nuclear technology . China is also 01:37.650 --> 01:39.650 working closely with Iran and North 01:39.650 --> 01:42.160 Korea . To further its effort to 01:42.160 --> 01:43.993 undermine American influence and 01:43.993 --> 01:45.993 alliances around the world , and we 01:45.993 --> 01:49.250 cannot let them succeed . Yet , year 01:49.250 --> 01:51.400 after year , the billions in Indo 01:51.400 --> 01:54.139 Paycom's unfunded priorities have shown 01:54.430 --> 01:56.790 we're not giving our war fighters the 01:56.790 --> 01:59.989 tools they need to defeat China or to 01:59.989 --> 02:02.980 deter China . That must change . 02:03.889 --> 02:06.209 China is our pacing threat and our 02:06.209 --> 02:08.610 defense investments must reflect that . 02:09.440 --> 02:13.080 We must fund Guam missile defense as 02:13.080 --> 02:15.279 part of President Trump's Golden Dome 02:15.279 --> 02:18.350 initiative . We must boost our defense , 02:18.479 --> 02:21.199 our ability to to blind Chinese forces 02:21.199 --> 02:23.532 while hardening our command and control . 02:23.639 --> 02:26.850 We must refill our munition stockpiles , 02:27.199 --> 02:30.490 especially long range fires . We must 02:30.759 --> 02:32.960 expand the production of a treatable 02:32.960 --> 02:35.559 unmanned systems to create the 02:35.559 --> 02:38.690 hellscape . Admiral Paparo envisions , 02:38.850 --> 02:41.490 and we must rebuild and modernize the 02:41.490 --> 02:43.320 US shipbuilding capabilities . 02:43.929 --> 02:46.151 Delivering these capabilities will take 02:46.151 --> 02:48.151 serious investment . That's why I'm 02:48.151 --> 02:49.929 pushing for an increased , uh , 02:49.929 --> 02:51.985 spending in our military , including 02:51.985 --> 02:54.449 through reconciliation . Uh , through 02:54.449 --> 02:56.929 the reconciliation process with robust 02:56.929 --> 03:00.570 defense spending . Ultimately deterring 03:00.570 --> 03:03.759 China . Excuse me , ultimately 03:03.759 --> 03:05.759 deterring China is not something we 03:05.759 --> 03:08.039 should do alone . As Secretary Highe 03:08.039 --> 03:10.206 has said during his recent trip to the 03:10.206 --> 03:12.960 to the region , America first does not 03:12.960 --> 03:15.970 mean America alone , and he's right . 03:16.320 --> 03:18.431 That's why I supported the upgrade of 03:18.431 --> 03:20.487 the US forces Japan to a joint force 03:20.487 --> 03:22.598 headquarters . It will strengthen our 03:22.598 --> 03:24.759 combined deterrence and response 03:24.759 --> 03:27.970 capabilities with Japan . We must also 03:27.970 --> 03:30.710 accelerate Aus , especially efforts to 03:30.710 --> 03:32.830 field cutting edge interoperable 03:32.830 --> 03:35.149 systems , and we need more 03:35.149 --> 03:37.205 co-production , co-development , and 03:37.205 --> 03:39.427 co-sustainment with our regional allies 03:39.630 --> 03:42.210 and partners . We must also deliver 03:42.210 --> 03:44.660 weapons and training to Taiwan faster . 03:44.990 --> 03:46.990 That's why I strongly supported the 03:46.990 --> 03:49.157 Taiwan Security Cooperation Initiative 03:49.157 --> 03:51.889 in last year's NDAA . And I intend to 03:51.889 --> 03:54.970 authorize it at a robust level again 03:54.970 --> 03:58.529 this year . We know Z uh 03:58.529 --> 04:00.679 instructed the PLA to be ready for 04:00.679 --> 04:03.279 operations against Taiwan by 2027 . 04:03.729 --> 04:05.785 However , I don't believe he has yet 04:05.785 --> 04:08.410 decided whether to pursue unification 04:08.410 --> 04:12.240 by force . Our job is to make sure Tze 04:12.240 --> 04:15.169 knows a cross-strait invasion would be 04:15.169 --> 04:18.149 too costly and ultimately futile . 04:18.688 --> 04:20.744 While China is our primary strategic 04:20.744 --> 04:22.632 adversary , North Korea remains a 04:22.632 --> 04:25.648 growing threat . In October 2024 , Kim 04:25.648 --> 04:28.169 tested a new ICBM that could strike the 04:28.169 --> 04:30.319 US homeland while carrying multiple 04:30.319 --> 04:33.229 nuclear warheads . I , I'm concerned 04:33.229 --> 04:36.049 these advances will accelerate as Kim 04:36.049 --> 04:38.058 strengthens his ties with Vladimir 04:38.058 --> 04:40.869 Putin . Especially given North Korea 04:40.869 --> 04:43.559 supplied Russia with millions of shells 04:43.559 --> 04:46.529 and thousands of troops , Putin owes 04:46.529 --> 04:48.940 him . I look forward to hearing from 04:48.940 --> 04:51.820 our witnesses on how we can establish 04:51.820 --> 04:53.764 or re-establish deterrence against 04:53.764 --> 04:55.931 these threats posed by China and North 04:55.931 --> 04:58.579 Korea and what they need from us in 04:58.579 --> 05:00.801 this committee to do that . With that , 05:00.801 --> 05:03.023 I yield to my friend the ranking member 05:03.023 --> 05:05.246 for any opening statement he may have . 05:05.246 --> 05:07.468 Thank you very much Mr . Chairman . I , 05:07.468 --> 05:09.635 I welcome our witnesses and appreciate 05:09.635 --> 05:09.369 their service and their leadership in a 05:09.369 --> 05:11.369 very , very complicated part of the 05:11.369 --> 05:13.480 world , and I agree with the chairman 05:13.480 --> 05:15.536 that the primary goal for us in that 05:15.536 --> 05:17.813 part of the world is to deter conflict , 05:17.813 --> 05:20.147 certainly deterring conflict with China , 05:20.147 --> 05:22.369 North Korea presents challenges in that 05:22.369 --> 05:24.536 regard as well . And it is problematic 05:24.536 --> 05:26.480 because China is in the midst of a 05:26.480 --> 05:28.536 massive military build up and we see 05:28.536 --> 05:30.702 increasing cooperation as the chairman 05:30.702 --> 05:32.869 outlined between China , North Korea , 05:32.869 --> 05:34.591 Russia , Iran , and all of our 05:34.591 --> 05:36.702 adversaries in a way that will really 05:36.702 --> 05:38.536 stress our ability to deter that 05:38.536 --> 05:40.702 conflict . So it's most important here 05:40.702 --> 05:42.869 from the witnesses . What do we need , 05:42.869 --> 05:45.147 uh , from an equipment standpoint , uh , 05:45.147 --> 05:47.147 in order to be in the best possible 05:47.147 --> 05:49.369 position to deter our adversaries . Now 05:49.369 --> 05:51.591 there is one challenge here and that is 05:51.591 --> 05:53.758 that we have a what is it $36 trillion 05:53.758 --> 05:55.813 debt , uh , massive deficit . So the 05:55.813 --> 05:57.925 thing I'm always anxious to hear from 05:57.925 --> 05:59.980 is what choices are we going to make 05:59.980 --> 06:02.313 because as we sit before this committee , 06:02.313 --> 06:04.536 every single group that comes before us 06:04.536 --> 06:06.758 tells us that they need a lot more than 06:06.758 --> 06:08.980 what they have uh we simply we we don't 06:08.980 --> 06:11.202 have the money or the resources to meet 06:11.202 --> 06:13.202 all of those demands . across every 06:13.202 --> 06:15.425 sphere of our national security needs , 06:15.425 --> 06:17.591 so we need to start making choices and 06:17.591 --> 06:19.702 looking for ways to effectively deter 06:19.702 --> 06:21.758 in a more cost effective manner . We 06:21.758 --> 06:23.813 can't imagine that we can just throw 06:23.813 --> 06:23.799 money at the problem we have to be 06:23.799 --> 06:26.021 really smart about what's going to work 06:26.021 --> 06:28.077 so I'm very curious to hear from our 06:28.077 --> 06:30.021 witnesses . What lessons they have 06:30.021 --> 06:32.243 learned from conflicts elsewhere in the 06:32.243 --> 06:34.466 world about what we truly need uh to to 06:34.466 --> 06:36.688 be deterrent and where we might be able 06:36.688 --> 06:38.799 to do that in a more affordable way , 06:38.799 --> 06:41.077 not less effective but more affordable . 06:41.077 --> 06:43.243 We've got the great example of Ukraine 06:43.243 --> 06:45.299 who doesn't even have a navy um that 06:45.299 --> 06:47.850 has been able to blunt the force of the 06:47.850 --> 06:49.970 Russian navy in the Black Sea with . 06:50.154 --> 06:52.885 Basically one way attack surface level 06:52.885 --> 06:55.135 drones um they've been able to really 06:55.135 --> 06:57.375 leverage that to get a good military 06:57.375 --> 06:59.486 outcome we need to be smart about how 06:59.486 --> 07:02.214 we do that going forward so that's 07:02.214 --> 07:04.975 going to be a key part of getting us to 07:04.975 --> 07:07.031 deterrence but ultimately I think we 07:07.031 --> 07:09.253 need to be mindful of the fact that one 07:09.253 --> 07:11.475 goal here needs to be to figure out how 07:11.475 --> 07:13.642 we can peacefully coexist with China . 07:13.642 --> 07:15.697 China's not going anywhere we're not 07:15.697 --> 07:17.919 going anywhere . There's no sort of win 07:17.919 --> 07:20.086 in the sense that one side is going to 07:20.086 --> 07:22.253 ultimately defeat the other . China is 07:22.253 --> 07:24.299 a major economic power . They are a 07:24.299 --> 07:27.100 major military power and so are we . So 07:27.100 --> 07:29.019 what is the plan to peacefully . 07:29.160 --> 07:31.160 Coexists with China . How do we get 07:31.160 --> 07:33.327 there admitting that deterrence has to 07:33.327 --> 07:35.493 be part of that ? We have to be strong 07:35.493 --> 07:37.493 to get to that point , but constant 07:37.493 --> 07:39.660 conflict with China does not seem like 07:39.660 --> 07:41.327 a wise course of action if we 07:41.327 --> 07:43.869 ultimately want to deter conflict . And 07:43.869 --> 07:46.070 then the last part of this , the 07:46.070 --> 07:48.126 chairman mentioned the importance of 07:48.126 --> 07:50.348 partners and allies and Secretary Hag's 07:50.348 --> 07:52.348 comment about America first doesn't 07:52.348 --> 07:55.250 mean America alone . Right now , yes , 07:55.459 --> 07:58.980 it does , right ? I cannot see a single 07:58.980 --> 08:00.647 solitary thing that the Trump 08:00.647 --> 08:03.100 administration has done to build and 08:03.100 --> 08:05.420 strengthen relationships with any 08:05.420 --> 08:07.309 partner in the world except maybe 08:07.309 --> 08:09.420 Russia , but the only place I can see 08:09.420 --> 08:11.420 where the president has said things 08:11.420 --> 08:13.476 about how he wants to get along with 08:13.476 --> 08:15.730 Russia . We have launched a trade war 08:16.299 --> 08:20.299 against every single one of our 08:20.299 --> 08:23.279 partners in the Asia region . Every 08:23.279 --> 08:25.720 last one of them , no matter how much 08:25.720 --> 08:27.942 they've worked with us , frankly , even 08:27.942 --> 08:29.929 in the case of Australia , where 08:29.929 --> 08:32.359 Australia we have a trade surplus with 08:32.359 --> 08:34.415 Australia , but we're gonna shoot at 08:34.415 --> 08:37.950 them too . How on earth is that not 08:38.390 --> 08:40.880 America alone ? And our partnerships 08:40.880 --> 08:43.047 have been really important and , and I 08:43.047 --> 08:45.269 want to thank our , our , our witnesses 08:45.269 --> 08:47.549 and others in the last 5 or 6 years 08:47.799 --> 08:49.910 we've built very strong relationships 08:49.910 --> 08:51.966 with Japan , with South Korea , with 08:51.966 --> 08:54.077 the Philippines , uh , we're building 08:54.077 --> 08:56.188 stronger relationships with India and 08:56.188 --> 08:58.132 Indonesia , Australia . has been a 08:58.132 --> 09:00.188 tremendous partner and this has been 09:00.188 --> 08:59.989 the greatest thing that has really 08:59.989 --> 09:01.859 frustrated China . They're now 09:01.859 --> 09:03.915 surrounded by a group of nations who 09:03.915 --> 09:06.081 don't want to be bullied by China , so 09:06.081 --> 09:08.192 they're looking to us for support and 09:08.192 --> 09:10.359 that has worked very well . And now we 09:10.359 --> 09:12.789 are trying to out bully China . That 09:12.789 --> 09:14.956 seems to be the strategy . We're going 09:14.956 --> 09:16.956 to show Australia and Japan and all 09:16.956 --> 09:19.122 these countries that we can punch them 09:19.122 --> 09:18.950 just as hard as China can punch them . 09:19.299 --> 09:21.489 I am deeply concerned that that is 09:21.489 --> 09:23.711 going to undermine our ability to deter 09:23.711 --> 09:26.609 the region towards no particular end , 09:26.909 --> 09:29.090 so I really hope I'll close with two 09:29.090 --> 09:31.368 things . One , let's push back on this . 09:31.450 --> 09:33.450 Let's build partnerships , and then 09:33.450 --> 09:35.617 also back to the budget point . I knew 09:35.617 --> 09:37.783 I was forgetting something . You can't 09:37.783 --> 09:40.006 cut taxes by $6 trillion and claim that 09:40.006 --> 09:42.339 you want to spend more money on defense . 09:42.339 --> 09:44.394 It just , well , unless , unless you 09:44.394 --> 09:46.561 think that the debt and deficits don't 09:46.561 --> 09:48.506 matter , and I thought that was an 09:48.506 --> 09:50.728 argument for the far left , not for the 09:50.728 --> 09:50.479 far right , so we , we have to be 09:50.479 --> 09:52.646 realistic about the choices we face if 09:52.646 --> 09:54.868 we are going to meet the very important 09:54.868 --> 09:57.090 deterrence goals , uh , that we have in 09:57.090 --> 09:59.312 the Indo-Pacific region . Thank you . I 09:59.312 --> 10:01.312 yell back . And I think the ranking 10:01.312 --> 10:04.320 member . And now I'd like to introduce 10:04.320 --> 10:06.542 our witnesses . Now , we have Mr . John 10:06.542 --> 10:08.487 No who is performing the duties of 10:08.487 --> 10:10.431 Assistant Secretary of Defense for 10:10.431 --> 10:12.653 Indo-Pacific Security Affairs , Admiral 10:12.653 --> 10:14.653 Paparo , who is the commander of US 10:14.653 --> 10:17.359 Indo Pacific Command , and General 10:17.359 --> 10:19.248 Brunson , who is the commander of 10:19.248 --> 10:21.137 United Nations Command , Combined 10:21.200 --> 10:23.311 Forces Command in the United States , 10:24.359 --> 10:26.581 Korea United States Forces Korea . With 10:26.581 --> 10:28.803 that , Mr . No , we'll start with you . 10:28.803 --> 10:30.748 You're recognized for 5 minutes to 10:30.748 --> 10:30.039 summarize your opening statement . 10:31.809 --> 10:34.340 Chairman Rogers , ranking member Smith , 10:34.710 --> 10:36.543 and distinguished members of the 10:36.543 --> 10:38.488 committee , uh , thank you for the 10:38.488 --> 10:40.710 opportunity to be here today to discuss 10:40.710 --> 10:43.429 our military posture and the national 10:43.429 --> 10:45.950 security challenges in the Indo-Pacific . 10:46.710 --> 10:48.770 And it is a distinct honor to speak 10:48.770 --> 10:52.179 with you alongside Admiral Paparo and 10:52.179 --> 10:55.070 General Brunson . Let me begin by 10:55.070 --> 10:57.679 reaffirming our mission as laid out by 10:57.679 --> 10:59.623 the commander in chief , President 10:59.623 --> 11:03.049 Donald Trump . We will achieve peace 11:03.049 --> 11:05.539 through strength . And Secretary of 11:05.539 --> 11:07.940 Defense Pete Hexeth has provided us 11:07.940 --> 11:10.500 very clear guidance on how the 11:10.500 --> 11:12.667 department will achieve that mission . 11:13.219 --> 11:15.979 Revive the warrior ethos , rebuild our 11:15.979 --> 11:18.979 military , and reestablish deterrence . 11:20.239 --> 11:22.479 China's undertaking an unprecedented 11:22.479 --> 11:25.390 military buildup . The PLA is 11:25.390 --> 11:28.659 developing a large and advanced arsenal 11:28.950 --> 11:32.590 of nuclear conventional cyber and space 11:32.590 --> 11:35.750 capabilities . Xi Jinping has ordered 11:35.750 --> 11:38.789 the PLA to be ready to invade Taiwan by 11:38.789 --> 11:42.150 2027 . China aims to dominate the 11:42.150 --> 11:44.669 Indo-Pacific and displace the United 11:44.669 --> 11:46.989 States as the world's most powerful 11:46.989 --> 11:50.320 nation . To counter the growing threat 11:50.320 --> 11:52.369 from China , it is critical that we 11:52.369 --> 11:54.036 reestablish deterrence in the 11:54.036 --> 11:56.570 Indo-Pacific . Resorts with combat 11:56.570 --> 11:59.130 credible military forces posture it 11:59.130 --> 12:01.369 forward while rebalancing burden 12:01.369 --> 12:03.425 sharing with our allies and partners 12:03.729 --> 12:05.951 and investing in our defense industrial 12:05.951 --> 12:09.460 base to support our war fighters . The 12:09.460 --> 12:11.182 bottom line is that we need to 12:11.182 --> 12:13.238 accelerate efforts to strengthen our 12:13.238 --> 12:15.770 force posture and increase operational 12:15.770 --> 12:18.580 capabilities in the Indo-Pacific given 12:18.580 --> 12:20.940 China's historic and rapid military 12:20.940 --> 12:22.900 build up and the urgent need to 12:22.900 --> 12:26.169 reestablish deterrence . And we will 12:26.169 --> 12:29.000 pursue an America first approach . 12:30.049 --> 12:32.320 But America first does not mean America 12:32.320 --> 12:36.200 alone or America only . It means 12:36.200 --> 12:38.033 that America is supported by and 12:38.033 --> 12:40.559 standing with capable like-minded 12:40.559 --> 12:43.150 allies and partners . Allies and 12:43.150 --> 12:45.320 partners who will do their part to 12:45.320 --> 12:48.429 restore and sustain deterrence stronger 12:48.429 --> 12:52.109 allies lead to stronger alliances and 12:52.109 --> 12:55.429 stronger alliances deter aggression and 12:55.429 --> 12:57.789 create dilemmas for our adversaries . 12:58.619 --> 13:00.675 And this is what the department this 13:00.675 --> 13:03.010 department and the team seated here 13:03.010 --> 13:06.210 before you today are delivering . Uh , 13:06.289 --> 13:08.511 in closing , thank you for your support 13:08.511 --> 13:10.678 and leadership and for the opportunity 13:10.678 --> 13:13.179 to testify before you today . And I 13:13.179 --> 13:15.380 greatly , greatly appreciate your 13:15.380 --> 13:17.640 continued commitment to and support for 13:17.640 --> 13:20.500 the men and women of the Department of 13:20.500 --> 13:22.722 Defense . Thank you for your time and I 13:22.722 --> 13:24.889 look forward to your questions . Thank 13:24.889 --> 13:27.056 you , Mr . No Admiral Paparro , you're 13:27.056 --> 13:29.333 recognized . Chairman , ranking member , 13:29.333 --> 13:29.179 and distinguished members of the 13:29.179 --> 13:31.123 committee . Thanks so much for the 13:31.123 --> 13:33.235 chance to appear before the committee 13:33.235 --> 13:35.568 to discuss the Indo-Pacific region . Uh , 13:35.568 --> 13:37.790 first with me over my right shoulder is 13:37.790 --> 13:39.846 United States Indo-P Pacific Command 13:39.846 --> 13:41.846 senior enlisted leader Fleet Master 13:41.846 --> 13:44.109 Chief Dave Isom , who is retiring after 13:44.109 --> 13:47.750 38 years of selfless service as a Navy 13:47.750 --> 13:50.229 SEAL and special operator . Uh , 13:50.320 --> 13:52.960 indispensable to any commander , this 13:52.960 --> 13:55.400 senior enlisted leader , uh , is in 13:55.400 --> 13:58.549 charge of , uh , of , uh , key duties , 13:58.969 --> 14:01.479 uh , involving a region that spans over 14:01.479 --> 14:03.880 50% of the globe , 4 of the 5 of the 14:03.880 --> 14:06.559 world's major threats , and most of the 14:06.559 --> 14:08.726 world's , much of the world's economic 14:08.726 --> 14:11.719 activity . Roughly 50% of the US 14:11.719 --> 14:13.880 military's operational forces falls 14:13.880 --> 14:16.349 under his charge , and as all know , 14:16.599 --> 14:18.840 the non-commissioned officer corps is 14:18.840 --> 14:21.320 one of the joint forces absolute 14:21.320 --> 14:24.049 asymmetric advantages . Fleet Master 14:24.049 --> 14:25.827 Chief Isom's leadership in this 14:25.827 --> 14:28.489 critical duty has been exemplary . I 14:28.489 --> 14:30.267 honor his service . He has been 14:30.267 --> 14:32.211 indispensable to me and making the 14:32.211 --> 14:34.211 transition as the commander for the 14:34.211 --> 14:36.719 last year and this summer , uh , having 14:36.719 --> 14:39.849 bid farewell to Master Chief Isom will 14:39.849 --> 14:42.849 welcome Marine Sergeant Major Eric Cook 14:42.849 --> 14:46.460 to this post . Indo Paycom faces a 14:46.460 --> 14:48.682 confluence of challenges for most among 14:48.682 --> 14:51.630 them is China's increasingly aggressive 14:51.630 --> 14:53.630 and assertive behavior . The 14:53.630 --> 14:56.659 unprecedented military modernization 14:56.950 --> 14:59.630 encompassing advancements in artificial 14:59.630 --> 15:01.869 intelligence , hypersonics , 15:02.140 --> 15:04.390 space-based capabilities , uh , among 15:04.390 --> 15:06.940 others poses a real and serious threat 15:06.940 --> 15:09.989 to our homeland , to our allies , and 15:09.989 --> 15:12.590 to our partners . In 2024 , the 15:12.590 --> 15:14.701 People's Liberation Army demonstrated 15:14.701 --> 15:16.989 growing capabilities through persistent 15:16.989 --> 15:19.539 pressure operations against Taiwan 15:19.539 --> 15:23.510 escalating by 300% . China's aggressive 15:23.510 --> 15:25.621 military actions near Taiwan are , as 15:25.621 --> 15:27.580 the chairman said , not just . 15:27.775 --> 15:30.604 Exercises they are rehearsals and while 15:30.604 --> 15:32.724 the PLA attempts to intimidate the 15:32.724 --> 15:34.625 people of Taiwan and demonstrate 15:34.924 --> 15:37.604 coercive capability , these actions 15:37.604 --> 15:40.125 backfire drawing increased global 15:40.125 --> 15:42.347 attention and accelerating Taiwan's own 15:42.347 --> 15:45.729 defensive preparations . North Korea's 15:45.729 --> 15:47.951 development of advanced nuclear weapons 15:47.951 --> 15:50.007 and ballistic missiles , including a 15:50.007 --> 15:52.173 new intercontinental ballistic missile 15:52.173 --> 15:54.396 capable of reaching the United States , 15:54.396 --> 15:56.507 poses a direct threat to our homeland 15:56.507 --> 15:59.150 and to our allies . Further , as 15:59.150 --> 16:01.206 discussed , North Korea is deepening 16:01.206 --> 16:02.928 its relationship with Russia , 16:02.928 --> 16:04.650 receiving military support and 16:04.650 --> 16:06.817 assistance to advance its own military 16:06.817 --> 16:08.859 capabilities . Russia's growing 16:08.859 --> 16:10.840 military cooperation with China as 16:10.840 --> 16:13.007 another layer of complexity , creating 16:13.007 --> 16:15.299 a compounding challenge with the 16:15.299 --> 16:17.809 deepening cooperation between China , 16:18.099 --> 16:21.080 Russia , and North Korea . US Indo 16:21.080 --> 16:24.000 Paycom deters threats to the regional 16:24.000 --> 16:26.950 stability in competition and in crisis 16:27.280 --> 16:29.789 while ensuring the ability to prevail 16:29.789 --> 16:32.239 in conflict . That ability to prevail 16:32.239 --> 16:35.200 is indispensable to deterrence . In 16:35.200 --> 16:39.119 2024 , the command conducted 120 16:39.119 --> 16:42.280 joint exercises , among them 20 major 16:42.280 --> 16:44.280 joint exercises across the region , 16:44.440 --> 16:46.218 including allies and partners , 16:46.218 --> 16:48.273 demonstrating our capability and our 16:48.273 --> 16:50.840 combined capacity . We continue to 16:50.840 --> 16:53.000 strengthen relationships with Japan , 16:53.359 --> 16:56.000 South Korea , Australia , Republic of 16:56.000 --> 16:58.479 the Philippines , India , Taiwan , the 16:58.479 --> 17:00.599 ASEAN nations , the Pacific island 17:00.599 --> 17:03.000 countries , and European partners in 17:03.000 --> 17:04.839 Indo-PACO , including the United 17:04.839 --> 17:07.599 Kingdom and France . Multiple groupings 17:07.599 --> 17:10.050 such as the quad and trilateral 17:10.050 --> 17:12.239 arrangements further enhance our 17:12.239 --> 17:15.229 capabilities . We must strive for 17:15.229 --> 17:18.109 dominance in space and across the 17:18.109 --> 17:20.439 information environment including cyber 17:20.790 --> 17:22.979 leveraging capabilities to counter 17:22.979 --> 17:25.150 command and control , intelligence 17:25.150 --> 17:27.589 surveillance , reconnaissance and 17:27.589 --> 17:30.469 targeting . This enables the command to 17:30.469 --> 17:33.390 gain a nonlinear advantage over 17:33.390 --> 17:35.650 potential adversaries . And while the 17:35.650 --> 17:37.780 scale of the of our effort is 17:37.780 --> 17:40.359 substantial , the ability to master 17:40.359 --> 17:43.089 information is absolutely paramount to 17:43.089 --> 17:45.290 projecting power and safeguarding our 17:45.290 --> 17:48.109 interests . To maintain credible 17:48.109 --> 17:50.949 deterrence , US Indo Paycom requires 17:50.949 --> 17:54.790 sustained investment in counter C5 ISR 17:54.790 --> 17:57.670 and T in fires , in integrated air and 17:57.670 --> 18:00.300 missile defense , in force sustainment , 18:00.500 --> 18:02.790 and as discussed in autonomous and 18:02.790 --> 18:04.901 artificial intelligence driven system 18:05.150 --> 18:07.910 and all uh all under greater ability to 18:07.910 --> 18:09.910 manage to , uh , maintain domain 18:09.910 --> 18:12.310 awareness as the most consequential 18:12.310 --> 18:14.589 opponent , China poses real and serious 18:14.589 --> 18:16.867 challenges to our military superiority . 18:16.867 --> 18:18.922 But this also presents opportunities 18:19.119 --> 18:21.319 for reform and for establishing 18:21.319 --> 18:24.680 enduring advantage . While Indoeycom 18:24.680 --> 18:27.040 faces significant challenges , I do 18:27.040 --> 18:28.984 remain confident in our deterrence 18:28.984 --> 18:31.719 posture and the ability to defend US 18:31.719 --> 18:33.497 interests and maintain regional 18:33.497 --> 18:35.497 stability , but the trajectory must 18:35.497 --> 18:37.959 change . China is outproducing the 18:37.959 --> 18:39.848 United States in air , maritime , 18:39.848 --> 18:42.319 missile capability , and accelerating 18:42.319 --> 18:44.040 their space and counter space 18:44.040 --> 18:46.500 capabilities . Though we face serious 18:46.500 --> 18:48.780 challenges , the joint force remains 18:48.780 --> 18:50.891 confident , resolute , and determined 18:50.891 --> 18:53.219 to prevail . Deterrence remains our 18:53.219 --> 18:55.108 highest duty . Thank you for your 18:55.108 --> 18:57.108 continued support for Indo Paycom . 18:57.108 --> 18:59.052 Together we advance the security , 18:59.052 --> 19:01.219 freedom and prosperity of the American 19:01.219 --> 19:03.386 people and our allies and partners . I 19:03.386 --> 19:03.099 look forward to your questions . Thank 19:03.099 --> 19:05.140 you . Thank you , Admiral General 19:05.140 --> 19:07.380 Brunson , you're recognized . Chairman 19:07.380 --> 19:09.619 Rogers , Ranking Member Smith and 19:09.619 --> 19:11.897 distinguished members of the committee . 19:11.897 --> 19:14.063 Thank you for the opportunity to speak 19:14.063 --> 19:15.952 to you today . I'm honored to sit 19:15.952 --> 19:18.008 alongside Mr . No and Admiral Paparo 19:18.008 --> 19:19.786 here in the first of my posture 19:19.786 --> 19:21.869 hearings , uh , the first of what I 19:21.869 --> 19:24.829 hope to be many more in the future . I 19:24.829 --> 19:26.940 would like to take a moment to take a 19:26.940 --> 19:28.773 moment to thank you all for your 19:28.773 --> 19:30.940 continued and steadfast leadership and 19:30.940 --> 19:32.773 support to service members , the 19:32.773 --> 19:34.885 civilians that serve alongside us and 19:34.885 --> 19:37.107 their families . I'd also like to thank 19:37.107 --> 19:38.996 you especially for your continued 19:38.996 --> 19:41.273 assistance to those soldiers , sailors , 19:41.273 --> 19:43.329 airmen , Marines , and guardians who 19:43.329 --> 19:45.979 are serving in Korea . I'd be remiss if 19:45.979 --> 19:48.140 I failed to recognize and give my 19:48.140 --> 19:50.780 condolences publicly to the family of a 19:50.780 --> 19:52.836 Republic of Korea special operations 19:52.836 --> 19:54.859 soldier who lost his life in a free 19:54.859 --> 19:57.489 fall parachute accident yesterday . 19:57.780 --> 20:00.060 It's a reminder that there is a high 20:00.060 --> 20:02.227 cost associated with wearing the cloth 20:02.227 --> 20:04.390 of our respective nations . In my 20:04.390 --> 20:06.557 career , every opportunity I've had to 20:06.557 --> 20:08.557 lead our nation's men and women has 20:08.557 --> 20:10.557 been an honor . It's a privilege to 20:10.557 --> 20:12.668 serve alongside our allies , partners 20:12.668 --> 20:15.599 and friends as we work together to to 20:15.930 --> 20:17.652 further our shared interests , 20:17.652 --> 20:19.579 strengthen our ties and further 20:19.579 --> 20:21.635 security , freedom and prosperity in 20:21.635 --> 20:23.890 all our nations . The Korean Peninsula 20:23.890 --> 20:25.834 is directly linked to the national 20:25.834 --> 20:27.939 interest of the United States . What 20:27.939 --> 20:30.069 happens in this vital region has a 20:30.069 --> 20:32.170 direct impact on American families , 20:32.339 --> 20:34.506 businesses , and our nation's future . 20:35.430 --> 20:37.709 For over 75 years , we've invested our 20:37.709 --> 20:39.598 national treasure in the region . 20:40.670 --> 20:43.109 Northeast Asia is a region critical to 20:43.109 --> 20:45.331 US national security and a region where 20:45.331 --> 20:47.949 recent authoritarian collusion between 20:47.949 --> 20:49.727 China , Russia , the Democratic 20:49.727 --> 20:52.030 People's Republic of Korea and Iran has 20:52.030 --> 20:54.910 intensified . It's a region of emergent 20:54.910 --> 20:57.030 challenges , however , there are also 20:57.030 --> 21:00.750 undeniable opportunities . Because our 21:00.750 --> 21:03.589 interconnected world grows closer and 21:03.589 --> 21:05.989 closer , any military actions that 21:05.989 --> 21:07.989 would occur on the Korean Peninsula 21:07.989 --> 21:10.109 would have worldwide and potentially 21:10.109 --> 21:12.800 global . Impacts 21:14.170 --> 21:16.392 One of the things that we're looking at 21:16.392 --> 21:19.089 presently is an ability to continue to 21:19.089 --> 21:21.650 partner alongside others like those in 21:21.650 --> 21:24.130 UN command , those 18 nations that make 21:24.130 --> 21:26.186 up that command to continue to build 21:26.186 --> 21:28.352 partnerships which will strengthen not 21:28.352 --> 21:30.449 only our capacity in the region but 21:30.449 --> 21:32.449 also be an indicator of our resolve 21:32.449 --> 21:35.829 therein . In 2024 , DPRK focused on 21:35.829 --> 21:37.900 advancing their cruise missile and 21:37.900 --> 21:40.459 hypersonic glide vehicle research and 21:40.459 --> 21:42.570 development programs , launching some 21:42.570 --> 21:44.939 47 ballistic missiles with one failed 21:44.939 --> 21:48.689 satellite launch attempt . Kim Jong Un 21:48.689 --> 21:50.800 also had two highly publicized visits 21:50.800 --> 21:52.839 to his nuclear sites , clearly 21:52.839 --> 21:55.229 conveying an intent to advance his 21:55.229 --> 21:57.920 nuclear weapons capabilities . Over the 21:57.920 --> 21:59.698 past year and a half , DPRK has 21:59.698 --> 22:01.920 exported munitions and troop support to 22:01.920 --> 22:04.079 Russia , demonstrating the ability to 22:04.079 --> 22:07.359 not only provide for another conflict 22:07.359 --> 22:09.137 but to continue advancing their 22:09.137 --> 22:11.248 domestic capabilities . In the coming 22:11.248 --> 22:13.430 year we expect DPRK to further develop 22:13.430 --> 22:17.199 hypersonic and multiple independently 22:17.199 --> 22:19.099 targetable reentry vehicle MRV 22:19.099 --> 22:21.239 capabilities to complete his eighth 22:21.239 --> 22:24.099 party Congress goals . At present he's 22:24.099 --> 22:27.160 sitting at 5 of 7 obtained . Kim Jong 22:27.160 --> 22:29.719 Un's leadership has shifted from focus 22:29.719 --> 22:32.310 on reunification to declaring his own 22:32.310 --> 22:34.477 sovereignty . This change is evidenced 22:34.477 --> 22:36.810 by the hardening of the southern border , 22:36.810 --> 22:38.532 the rejection of reunification 22:38.532 --> 22:40.588 discussions , and the destruction of 22:40.588 --> 22:42.699 reunification monuments and buildings 22:42.699 --> 22:46.449 along the joint security area . DPRK 22:46.449 --> 22:48.616 continues to build its nuclear weapons 22:48.616 --> 22:50.727 program and boast a Russian equipment 22:50.727 --> 22:53.300 augmented modernized military force of 22:53.300 --> 22:56.930 over 1.3 million personnel . To 22:56.930 --> 22:59.152 contrast that , I would like to mention 22:59.152 --> 23:02.530 the Rock US Japan alliance . Our 23:02.530 --> 23:04.849 trilateral efforts along with those 23:04.849 --> 23:07.071 other nations within the United Nations 23:07.071 --> 23:08.793 command have woven together an 23:08.793 --> 23:10.905 integrated regional defense posture . 23:11.089 --> 23:13.200 Together we've achieved new levels of 23:13.200 --> 23:15.089 interoperability and theater wide 23:15.089 --> 23:17.489 combined joint all domain exercises and 23:17.489 --> 23:19.609 training . Our presence in Korea 23:19.609 --> 23:21.890 demonstrates American strength . It 23:21.890 --> 23:23.890 imposes cost and deters military 23:23.890 --> 23:26.780 aggression by our adversaries . The ROC 23:26.780 --> 23:29.339 US alliance remains the linchpin of 23:29.339 --> 23:31.780 security in Northeast Asia . I'm 23:31.780 --> 23:34.002 committed to working with you to ensure 23:34.002 --> 23:36.058 the continued security , freedom and 23:36.058 --> 23:38.280 prosperity of the Korean Peninsula in a 23:38.280 --> 23:40.558 free and open Indo-Pacific . Thank you , 23:40.558 --> 23:42.724 and I look forward to your questions . 23:42.910 --> 23:44.688 Thank you , General Brunson . I 23:44.688 --> 23:46.854 recognize myself first for questions . 23:46.854 --> 23:48.799 Uh , Admiral Paparo , how does the 23:48.799 --> 23:51.489 growing cooperation between China , 23:51.739 --> 23:54.459 Russia , and North Korea present 23:54.459 --> 23:56.681 challenges in your area of operations ? 23:57.540 --> 24:00.479 Chairman , each country , uh , 24:00.689 --> 24:03.119 compensates for the other's weaknesses . 24:03.449 --> 24:05.338 In this case it's , it's uh quite 24:05.338 --> 24:07.449 transactional and there's a matter of 24:07.449 --> 24:10.400 symbiosis among it . So for example , 24:10.750 --> 24:13.239 uh , China has produced has provided 24:13.239 --> 24:17.079 70% of the machine tools and 90% 24:17.329 --> 24:19.430 of the semiconductors that support 24:19.430 --> 24:21.689 Russia's rebuilding its war machine . 24:22.170 --> 24:25.560 Uh , North Korea provides , uh , as 24:25.560 --> 24:27.790 discussed , thousands of rounds in 24:27.790 --> 24:30.920 support and troops and coming back to 24:30.920 --> 24:33.479 China and to North Korea are key 24:33.479 --> 24:35.701 capabilities where they would otherwise 24:35.701 --> 24:37.790 be behind that would help close the 24:37.790 --> 24:40.310 gaps , submarine technology , missile 24:40.310 --> 24:42.839 technology , and uh and uh surface to 24:42.839 --> 24:45.239 air missiles and so forth . This is a 24:45.239 --> 24:48.160 transactional symbiosis that that poses 24:48.160 --> 24:50.380 a serious challenge . Great . General 24:50.380 --> 24:52.819 Brunson , what does the US gain from 24:52.819 --> 24:54.900 our presence , uh , on the Korean 24:54.900 --> 24:57.449 Peninsula , and if , if in fact , your 24:57.449 --> 24:59.560 tri command of US , South Korea , and 24:59.560 --> 25:01.727 UN forces didn't exist , what would it 25:01.727 --> 25:03.727 cost us to reestablish that kind of 25:03.727 --> 25:06.005 foothold , uh , on the Asian continent ? 25:07.750 --> 25:09.694 Chairman , as you know that , uh , 25:09.694 --> 25:11.849 that'll be truly a matter of policy , 25:11.869 --> 25:13.980 but from my perspective what I see is 25:13.980 --> 25:15.980 that we've got positional advantage 25:15.980 --> 25:18.430 currently . um , we've had experience 25:18.430 --> 25:21.270 you asked us in your opening to to sort 25:21.270 --> 25:23.437 of highlight these things in regard to 25:23.437 --> 25:25.492 our experiences , and I can say that 25:25.492 --> 25:27.603 honestly , uh , having been a special 25:27.603 --> 25:29.714 operations Joint Task Force commander 25:29.714 --> 25:32.150 in Iraq one year , I found myself on a 25:32.150 --> 25:34.261 fob that I had been on as a battalion 25:34.261 --> 25:36.420 commander 6 years before . And uh we 25:36.420 --> 25:38.364 don't want that same condition . I 25:38.364 --> 25:40.587 think what we have to recognize is that 25:40.587 --> 25:42.698 the way that we are organized the way 25:42.698 --> 25:45.031 that we posture ourselves in the region , 25:45.031 --> 25:47.087 we ought not to seek credit for it , 25:47.087 --> 25:49.309 but we ought to uh at least acknowledge 25:49.309 --> 25:51.420 the fact that we're in all the places 25:51.420 --> 25:53.642 that we need to be . Capacities aside , 25:53.642 --> 25:55.587 the capabilities that are resident 25:55.587 --> 25:57.531 within the KTO presently are right 25:57.531 --> 25:59.420 where they need to be my military 25:59.420 --> 26:01.420 assessment . I think that decisions 26:01.420 --> 26:03.531 will be made in the future , but just 26:03.531 --> 26:05.753 getting back in there and what we might 26:05.753 --> 26:07.809 be able to provide again in terms of 26:07.809 --> 26:07.719 protection and sustainment , which 26:07.719 --> 26:10.829 we're able to do across uh the globe , 26:11.000 --> 26:13.560 I think is critically important . Great . 26:14.420 --> 26:16.253 Admiral Paparro , how can the US 26:16.253 --> 26:18.364 accelerate the delivery of US weapons 26:18.364 --> 26:20.660 to improve Taiwan's self-defense ? Uh , 26:20.760 --> 26:22.371 how will the Taiwan Security 26:22.371 --> 26:24.427 Cooperation Initiative authorized by 26:24.427 --> 26:26.939 the FY 25 NDAA help us deliver these 26:26.939 --> 26:28.859 needed capabilities to Taiwan ? 26:29.890 --> 26:31.959 Chairman , uh , key is to , um , 26:32.030 --> 26:35.800 eliminate remove bureaucratic , uh , uh , 26:35.810 --> 26:38.130 in , in some cases , um , bureaucratic 26:38.130 --> 26:40.959 limitations in order to do so , uh , 26:40.969 --> 26:42.747 liberalizing the supply bases , 26:42.780 --> 26:45.770 certifying supply bases , a steady flow 26:45.770 --> 26:48.369 of , uh , of , uh , funds in order to 26:48.369 --> 26:50.920 fund those capabilities and downstream , 26:51.369 --> 26:53.989 uh , long lead item uh matters would , 26:54.010 --> 26:56.010 uh , greatly enhance our ability to 26:56.010 --> 26:58.260 produce its speed . And do you think 26:58.260 --> 27:00.371 that would have a deterrent effect on 27:00.371 --> 27:02.149 China's , uh , perceived , uh , 27:03.579 --> 27:05.939 opportunities , sir , I think it gains 27:05.939 --> 27:09.209 3 to 5 to 1 leverage for , for uh every 27:09.209 --> 27:11.431 capability that we provide in defense . 27:11.829 --> 27:13.996 Great , thank you . For that , I yield 27:13.996 --> 27:16.329 to the ranking member for his questions . 27:16.329 --> 27:18.385 Thank you . Sort of building on that 27:18.385 --> 27:20.496 last question , Admiral Paparo and uh 27:20.496 --> 27:22.551 General Bronson , if anything , as I 27:22.551 --> 27:21.790 mentioned in my opening statement , 27:22.040 --> 27:24.207 what , what capabilities just focusing 27:24.207 --> 27:26.373 for the moment on what the US could do 27:26.670 --> 27:28.726 do you most need , um , do you think 27:28.726 --> 27:30.880 would be most have the most deterrent 27:30.880 --> 27:33.119 effect ? Uh , I know obviously everyone 27:33.119 --> 27:35.230 wants more ships , more planes , more 27:35.230 --> 27:37.230 everything , but if you could , you 27:37.230 --> 27:39.397 know , narrow it down to here are some 27:39.397 --> 27:41.508 of the most crucial things that could 27:41.508 --> 27:43.508 help you , um , just focusing on US 27:43.508 --> 27:45.508 needs to deter if both of you could 27:45.508 --> 27:47.452 give us an answer on that . Raking 27:47.452 --> 27:49.397 member , the most critical need to 27:49.397 --> 27:51.230 focus on is our counter C5 ISRNT 27:51.230 --> 27:53.459 capability which gives us freedom to 27:53.459 --> 27:55.626 maneuver , freedom to operate at lower 27:55.626 --> 27:57.979 risk throughout the area of 27:57.979 --> 28:00.260 responsibility . Secure communications 28:00.260 --> 28:02.900 basically , uh , the ability to dazzle , 28:03.020 --> 28:05.339 deceive , destroy the adversaries' 28:05.339 --> 28:08.060 ability to see and sense and then 28:08.060 --> 28:10.540 hardening our own ability to give a 28:10.540 --> 28:13.060 high fidelity common operating picture 28:13.060 --> 28:15.060 to units to unlock their ability to 28:15.060 --> 28:17.310 operate tactically . Yeah , any , any 28:17.310 --> 28:19.421 piece of that in particular where you 28:19.421 --> 28:21.199 see the greatest need right now 28:21.199 --> 28:23.366 understanding that I'll , I'll ask you 28:23.366 --> 28:25.532 this in the classified session as well 28:25.532 --> 28:27.810 and get into more detail , uh , but as , 28:27.810 --> 28:29.921 as we're because posture hearings are 28:29.921 --> 28:29.030 different this year we haven't got the 28:29.030 --> 28:31.141 budget yet , so it's a little weird , 28:31.141 --> 28:33.308 but as we will lead up to the budget , 28:33.310 --> 28:35.477 hopefully will come in about a month , 28:35.477 --> 28:37.588 what would be most important to be in 28:37.588 --> 28:39.750 there to meet that need . Leveraging 28:39.750 --> 28:42.939 the United States' ability having 90% 28:42.939 --> 28:45.380 of the spacelift in the world to bring 28:45.380 --> 28:47.939 counter space capability and then to 28:47.939 --> 28:50.219 continue to uh enhance our cyber 28:50.219 --> 28:52.579 capability , uh , and you know many 28:52.579 --> 28:54.412 others in the form of long range 28:54.412 --> 28:56.979 weapons in the form of uh unmanned and 28:56.979 --> 28:59.900 AI systems that affect air denial and 28:59.900 --> 29:02.140 sea denial in enclosed places such as 29:02.140 --> 29:04.380 the Taiwan Strait augment these yeah . 29:05.369 --> 29:07.258 Um , I'm just gonna ask this , so 29:07.258 --> 29:09.425 General Hawk got fired . He's the head 29:09.425 --> 29:11.480 of NSA cyber . How has that impacted 29:11.480 --> 29:13.702 your ability to work with NSA and cyber 29:13.702 --> 29:15.869 on those very critical issues that you 29:15.869 --> 29:17.880 just outlined ? I say , um , we're 29:17.880 --> 29:19.920 ready to work with , uh , whatever 29:19.920 --> 29:22.479 competent individual is uh , is in 29:22.479 --> 29:24.680 place and , uh , we'll continue to try 29:24.680 --> 29:26.902 to enhance that ability . Did you think 29:26.902 --> 29:29.124 General Hawk was a competent individual 29:29.124 --> 29:31.439 who you could work with ? Yes . General 29:31.439 --> 29:33.217 Brunson , on the , on the first 29:33.217 --> 29:35.328 question about uh capabilities , what 29:35.328 --> 29:37.161 what would you most need in your 29:37.161 --> 29:39.689 command ? Sir , as I , as I had the 29:39.689 --> 29:42.022 opportunity to mention yesterday in the , 29:42.022 --> 29:44.133 in the hack the closed session , uh , 29:44.133 --> 29:46.930 all my requests are inhabited within 29:46.930 --> 29:49.589 the IPI of EndoPaycom . I would tell 29:49.589 --> 29:51.700 you that , uh , as I look at the more 29:51.700 --> 29:54.079 ephemeral domains of cyber EW and space , 29:54.250 --> 29:56.472 I'm looking to be engaged in those more 29:56.472 --> 29:58.639 in a more fulsome manner , and I think 29:58.639 --> 30:00.861 that that's where we can talk and close 30:00.861 --> 30:02.583 about some of those particular 30:02.583 --> 30:04.694 capabilities that we need to bring to 30:04.694 --> 30:06.800 bear on the peninsula . But uh to an 30:06.800 --> 30:08.911 earlier question that you mentioned , 30:08.911 --> 30:11.022 uh , ranking member , I'd like to say 30:11.022 --> 30:12.967 that you know if we were trying to 30:12.967 --> 30:15.022 project strength , one of the things 30:15.022 --> 30:17.189 that we're continuing to work on right 30:17.189 --> 30:19.780 now is the assailable flank that is uh 30:19.780 --> 30:22.260 United Nations command . There are 18 30:22.260 --> 30:24.316 total nations there and so I see the 30:24.316 --> 30:26.660 KTO is being a bit wider and being able 30:26.660 --> 30:29.060 to leverage those other nations in the 30:29.060 --> 30:31.619 Republic of Korea and beyond is a way 30:31.619 --> 30:34.040 for us to continue to . Sort of 30:34.040 --> 30:36.262 underpin the things that we're doing on 30:36.262 --> 30:38.262 the peninsula with legitimacy . I'm 30:38.262 --> 30:39.984 running out of . That's really 30:39.984 --> 30:42.207 important . I want to get to that , but 30:42.207 --> 30:42.079 I wanna ask Mr . Note those questions . 30:42.160 --> 30:43.938 So as I mentioned in my opening 30:43.938 --> 30:45.938 statement , we are alienating every 30:45.938 --> 30:48.104 single partner in the region , and you 30:48.104 --> 30:50.327 made the statement , you know , America 30:50.327 --> 30:52.493 first doesn't mean America alone . I'm 30:52.493 --> 30:54.604 puzzled . What what what are we doing 30:54.604 --> 30:54.430 to enhance relationships ? I think 30:54.430 --> 30:56.486 we've all seen on display what we're 30:56.486 --> 30:58.041 doing to sort of make those 30:58.041 --> 31:00.150 relationships more problematic , but 31:00.150 --> 31:02.372 what is the administration doing to try 31:02.372 --> 31:04.594 to strengthen partnerships when they're 31:04.594 --> 31:06.650 launching a trade war against all of 31:06.650 --> 31:09.530 our partners ? Uh , ranking member 31:09.530 --> 31:11.586 Smith , so , as you know , Secretary 31:11.586 --> 31:13.869 Hexta , uh , just came back from his 31:13.869 --> 31:16.091 first trip to the Indo Pacific where he 31:16.091 --> 31:18.810 visited , uh , both the Philippines and 31:18.810 --> 31:21.689 Japan . He had a chance to reaffirm our 31:21.689 --> 31:24.550 commitment to those important alliances . 31:24.680 --> 31:27.689 What is that commitment ? I mean , we 31:27.689 --> 31:29.800 could all go on vacation to Japan and 31:29.800 --> 31:32.022 say how much we love the country , um , 31:32.022 --> 31:34.022 but what is that commitment because 31:34.022 --> 31:36.245 there doesn't seem to be any commitment 31:36.245 --> 31:38.411 other than threats and bullying . It's 31:38.411 --> 31:40.300 reaffirming our commitment uh our 31:40.300 --> 31:40.260 treaty obligations to both the 31:40.260 --> 31:42.630 Philippines and Japan . Uh , he 31:42.630 --> 31:44.741 announced a number of things that the 31:44.741 --> 31:46.890 department is currently doing to work 31:46.890 --> 31:49.057 with both the Philippines and Japan to 31:49.057 --> 31:50.819 accelerate and strengthen our 31:50.819 --> 31:53.152 relationships , uh , in the Philippines , 31:53.152 --> 31:55.097 for example , uh . Uh , he made an 31:55.097 --> 31:57.375 announcement about bilateral soft , uh , 31:57.430 --> 31:59.541 I'm sorry , special operations forces 31:59.541 --> 32:01.597 training that we're conducting . One 32:01.597 --> 32:03.763 last question , how much damage do you 32:03.763 --> 32:05.930 think the trade war that has just been 32:05.930 --> 32:08.041 launched does to all of what you just 32:08.041 --> 32:10.097 said ? Ranking member Smith , in all 32:10.097 --> 32:11.930 the engagements and the personal 32:11.930 --> 32:13.708 engagements I've had in all the 32:13.708 --> 32:13.400 engagements that I've seen the 32:13.400 --> 32:16.670 secretary , uh , uh , has had , uh , 32:16.680 --> 32:18.791 our relationships with our allies and 32:18.791 --> 32:20.902 partners in the region are strong and 32:20.902 --> 32:23.079 remain strong . it's this only started 32:23.079 --> 32:25.400 a couple days ago , so we'll see where 32:25.400 --> 32:27.733 it goes . I yield back . Thank you , Mr . 32:27.733 --> 32:30.079 Chairman . Thank the ranking member . 32:30.089 --> 32:31.922 Chair I recognize gentleman from 32:31.922 --> 32:34.033 Virginia , Mr . Whitman . Thank you , 32:34.033 --> 32:36.145 Mr . Chairman . I'd like to thank our 32:36.145 --> 32:36.010 witnesses for joining us . Thanks again 32:36.010 --> 32:38.232 for the incredible job that you all are 32:38.232 --> 32:40.343 doing . Amber Parer , I want to begin 32:40.343 --> 32:39.849 with you . You talked about the 32:39.849 --> 32:42.609 importance of shipbuilding , but very 32:42.609 --> 32:44.665 specifically shipbuilding in certain 32:44.665 --> 32:47.329 areas . We have a distinct asymmetric 32:47.329 --> 32:49.680 advantage under the sea . Can you give 32:49.680 --> 32:51.959 us a perspective about what that looks 32:51.959 --> 32:53.959 like in relation to what we have is 32:53.959 --> 32:56.126 that advantage versus what the Chinese 32:56.126 --> 32:58.403 have , what they're building , uh , in , 32:58.403 --> 33:00.681 in relation to what we have . Secondly , 33:00.681 --> 33:02.681 too is that , uh , we know that the 33:02.681 --> 33:04.792 Marine Corps is gonna be the stand in 33:04.792 --> 33:06.681 force there in the Indo-Pacific . 33:06.681 --> 33:08.903 They're gonna be the tip of the spear , 33:08.903 --> 33:10.903 have that ability to make sure that 33:10.903 --> 33:13.070 they're the crisis response team . The 33:13.070 --> 33:12.920 challenge for us today is we don't have 33:12.920 --> 33:14.976 enough amphibious ships and the ones 33:14.976 --> 33:16.976 that we do have have an operational 33:16.976 --> 33:20.329 availability of 41% . So when your call 33:20.329 --> 33:22.939 goes out , The challenge is , is can it 33:22.939 --> 33:26.020 be met because today , today we cannot 33:26.020 --> 33:28.479 put together an amphibious ready group , 33:29.060 --> 33:31.116 uh , Marine Corps expeditionary unit 33:31.116 --> 33:33.393 better known as an Am can't do it . We , 33:33.393 --> 33:33.300 we can put a single ship out there , 33:33.339 --> 33:35.283 but we can't put the complement of 33:35.283 --> 33:37.339 ships that we need for an RGMm . Can 33:37.339 --> 33:39.283 you tell me , uh . Where are we in 33:39.283 --> 33:41.283 relation to the need for getting to 33:41.283 --> 33:43.979 that 2.33 submarines a year for Augus 33:43.979 --> 33:46.035 and ourselves ? Why that's important 33:46.035 --> 33:48.489 and then what do you see as your 33:48.489 --> 33:51.300 alternative in a crisis response if 33:51.300 --> 33:53.579 when you call for an Armu there's not 33:53.579 --> 33:57.300 one to be had . Thank you 33:57.300 --> 33:59.969 sir great to see you again . Presently 33:59.969 --> 34:02.660 we have a generational advantage from a 34:02.660 --> 34:05.329 submarine standpoint against uh against 34:05.329 --> 34:07.979 our adversaries , and this is key 34:07.979 --> 34:10.260 critical and indispensable to the 34:10.260 --> 34:13.570 ability to prevail . Uh , the PRC , uh , 34:13.580 --> 34:15.691 though not perfectly linear , but the 34:15.691 --> 34:18.739 PRC is outproducing , uh , the United 34:18.739 --> 34:22.020 States by a rate of 2.0 per year to 34:22.020 --> 34:25.419 1.28 presently attack submarines per 34:25.419 --> 34:28.729 year . Uh , required to get there are 34:28.729 --> 34:30.889 continued investments in defense 34:30.889 --> 34:34.050 industrial base liberalizing the long 34:34.050 --> 34:37.159 lead time , uh , supply chains , uh , 34:37.199 --> 34:40.489 and giving a steady flow of funding on 34:40.489 --> 34:42.378 the marine stand in forces and on 34:42.378 --> 34:44.600 amphibious ships . Amphibious ships are 34:44.600 --> 34:47.159 absolutely critical to this effort , 34:47.489 --> 34:50.850 and , uh , we are not meeting mission . 34:51.549 --> 34:53.908 Uh , globally on doing so , it's a 34:53.908 --> 34:55.741 matter of the maintenance of the 34:55.741 --> 34:57.741 current capability that we have and 34:57.741 --> 34:59.630 frankly it's also a matter of the 34:59.630 --> 35:02.208 number of amphibious ships that we have , 35:02.428 --> 35:05.349 so the ops analysis does not lie um on 35:05.349 --> 35:07.539 that uh does not lie on that matter . 35:08.739 --> 35:11.017 Thank you . Let me then move from that . 35:11.017 --> 35:13.489 You talk about the need for us to get 35:13.489 --> 35:15.711 above the 1.28% production . That's not 35:15.711 --> 35:17.878 only to meet our requirements but also 35:17.878 --> 35:19.822 to fulfill the obligations we made 35:19.822 --> 35:21.822 under Aus to make sure we have that 35:21.822 --> 35:23.545 partnership . Partnerships are 35:23.545 --> 35:25.656 incredibly important in that region . 35:25.656 --> 35:25.429 We talk about August , but we also talk 35:25.429 --> 35:27.651 about the Quan agreement . Can you give 35:27.651 --> 35:29.790 us your sense about are there any 35:29.790 --> 35:31.901 barriers that are standing in the way 35:31.901 --> 35:33.957 for us to fully operationalize Aus , 35:33.957 --> 35:36.179 whether it's pillar one or pillar two . 35:36.179 --> 35:38.123 And all the opportunities that are 35:38.123 --> 35:40.300 there for us with the quad , we see 35:40.300 --> 35:42.244 what our adversaries are doing and 35:42.244 --> 35:44.244 trying to create more relationships 35:44.244 --> 35:46.879 there . um , we have to do more at the 35:46.879 --> 35:49.120 pace of relevance to make sure we have 35:49.120 --> 35:50.787 substantive outcomes of these 35:50.787 --> 35:52.509 agreements . Can you give us a 35:52.509 --> 35:54.676 perspective about where you see things 35:54.676 --> 35:56.731 and what we need to do to accelerate 35:56.731 --> 35:58.898 that ? August pillar one operationally 35:58.898 --> 36:00.953 we are meeting every milestone . The 36:00.953 --> 36:03.009 biggest risk driver to August pillar 36:03.009 --> 36:05.239 one is getting to that production rate 36:05.239 --> 36:07.409 by the time that Australia purchases 36:07.409 --> 36:09.800 its own Virginia class submarine , uh , 36:09.860 --> 36:12.193 that is the greatest barrier that I see , 36:12.219 --> 36:14.800 uh , right now presently . Uh , on the , 36:14.840 --> 36:17.870 uh , on , uh , pillar two , the other , 36:18.199 --> 36:21.929 uh , capabilities , uh , missiles and , 36:22.000 --> 36:25.159 uh , unmanned and cyber , uh , on this 36:25.159 --> 36:27.159 case , uh , the biggest barrier are 36:27.159 --> 36:29.479 barriers to our administrative and 36:29.479 --> 36:31.760 bureaucratic barriers to co-production , 36:32.040 --> 36:34.373 co-production , uh , among our partners , 36:34.373 --> 36:36.540 not just our raucus partners , but all 36:36.540 --> 36:38.762 of our partners , would greatly enhance 36:38.762 --> 36:40.873 our missile magazines for all of us . 36:40.873 --> 36:43.179 Would you say that ITAR currently has 36:43.179 --> 36:46.020 been , uh , modified enough to open the 36:46.020 --> 36:47.969 door for , uh , for Pillar two ? 36:48.139 --> 36:50.083 Because I know as we talked to the 36:50.083 --> 36:52.139 Australians , uh , they are not very 36:52.139 --> 36:54.250 happy with still the impediments with 36:54.250 --> 36:56.361 ITAR . I would agree with them . OK , 36:56.361 --> 36:58.306 very good . Let me ask , are , are 36:58.306 --> 37:00.361 there , are there other ways that we 37:00.361 --> 37:02.472 can get the most out of technological 37:02.472 --> 37:04.695 cooperation with our friends , not just 37:04.695 --> 37:06.695 there , uh , with August , but also 37:06.695 --> 37:08.583 with the quad where there's great 37:08.583 --> 37:10.472 opportunities with India and more 37:10.472 --> 37:12.639 opportunities with Japan . Uh , give , 37:12.639 --> 37:14.917 give us your perspective on that . Yes , 37:14.917 --> 37:17.110 uh , that multilateral India , Japan , 37:17.270 --> 37:20.159 the United States , and Australia , um , 37:20.280 --> 37:22.639 that is critical and it's growing , and 37:22.639 --> 37:24.583 we've seen some progress also with 37:24.583 --> 37:26.750 co-production among us and we see some 37:26.750 --> 37:29.709 progress on exercises , but again , um , 37:30.000 --> 37:33.159 our , uh , our limits to co-production . 37:33.489 --> 37:36.469 And speeding up the uh speeding up our 37:36.469 --> 37:39.389 ability to release key technologies to 37:39.389 --> 37:41.919 our partners under conditions of trust 37:42.149 --> 37:44.550 and under the scrutiny of trust that 37:44.550 --> 37:46.439 leads that leads us to do so with 37:46.439 --> 37:48.550 confidence will enhance that effort . 37:48.550 --> 37:50.717 Gentlemen's time expired . Chair and I 37:50.717 --> 37:50.479 recognize gentleman from Connecticut , 37:50.510 --> 37:52.621 Mr . Courtney , thank you , uh , Mr . 37:52.621 --> 37:54.843 Chairman and thank you to the witnesses 37:54.843 --> 37:57.121 for , uh , your testimony this morning . 37:57.121 --> 37:56.790 Again , at the outset , I just would 37:56.790 --> 37:59.110 note on Saturday the 24th Virginia 37:59.110 --> 38:01.332 class submarine was . Commissioned into 38:01.332 --> 38:03.388 the navy . There are 4 more that are 38:03.388 --> 38:05.443 coming online , uh , between now and 38:05.443 --> 38:08.459 the end of 2026 . Uh , so you know 38:08.459 --> 38:10.403 there's no question that the , the 38:10.403 --> 38:12.626 cadence is not where it should be , but 38:12.626 --> 38:14.848 if you look at tonnage and again if you 38:14.848 --> 38:17.070 look at the fact that post COVID , uh , 38:17.070 --> 38:18.848 the , the , the , the yards are 38:18.848 --> 38:20.737 recovering , we just have the new 38:20.737 --> 38:22.903 secretary of the Navy , uh , at Quanza 38:22.903 --> 38:25.126 Point on uh Friday who , uh , again got 38:25.126 --> 38:27.348 an eyeful in terms of just , uh . The , 38:27.348 --> 38:29.610 the chocka block , um , activity that's 38:29.610 --> 38:32.370 going on there , um , so just to go 38:32.370 --> 38:34.840 back to Aus for a second , uh , Admiral . 38:35.219 --> 38:37.489 This committee in record time enacted 38:37.489 --> 38:40.770 all the authorities in 2023 per optimal 38:40.770 --> 38:44.159 pathway to get uh again that uh engaged . 38:44.370 --> 38:46.370 There still isn't in my opinion , a 38:46.370 --> 38:48.489 misperception that Aus is primarily 38:48.489 --> 38:51.370 about just helping Australia . Can you 38:51.370 --> 38:53.481 talk a little bit about what it means 38:53.481 --> 38:55.899 in terms of the US as far as making our 38:55.899 --> 38:58.360 nation safer and also the Indo-Pacific , 38:58.570 --> 39:02.179 uh , safer ? Yes , um , 39:02.340 --> 39:04.229 August delivers something to Indo 39:04.229 --> 39:06.419 Paycom that is critical and could be a 39:06.419 --> 39:09.110 key advantage , and that is a , uh , an 39:09.110 --> 39:12.340 Indian Ocean submarine base . Uh , this 39:12.340 --> 39:15.260 gives us a faster response time to the 39:15.260 --> 39:18.060 South China Sea than in Hawaii , in 39:18.060 --> 39:20.770 Washington , in San Diego . It gives us 39:20.770 --> 39:23.250 the key ability to maneuver , uh , into 39:23.250 --> 39:25.620 the Indian Ocean without the burden of 39:25.620 --> 39:27.840 having to go through straits . And so 39:27.840 --> 39:29.709 it's , it is key and then , uh , 39:30.080 --> 39:32.247 Australia is making key investments in 39:32.247 --> 39:34.191 the submarine industrial base as I 39:34.191 --> 39:36.024 utter these words , there are 11 39:36.024 --> 39:38.247 Australians stationed on attack boats , 39:38.247 --> 39:40.780 uh , in Hawaii and , uh , scores that 39:40.780 --> 39:42.558 are working in the Pearl Harbor 39:42.558 --> 39:44.724 shipyard . Uh , these are just about a 39:44.724 --> 39:46.891 few of their contributions and again , 39:46.891 --> 39:49.002 the plan is also to have the rotation 39:49.002 --> 39:51.224 of , uh , Virginia's starting in 2027 , 39:51.224 --> 39:53.336 I believe , uh , in Henderson in , in 39:53.336 --> 39:55.391 Western Australia , which again they 39:55.391 --> 39:57.502 are making huge investments , uh , in 39:57.502 --> 39:59.447 terms of the infrastructure that's 39:59.447 --> 40:01.669 necessary , uh , for that effort , um . 40:01.679 --> 40:03.957 You know , one of the authorities , Mr . 40:03.957 --> 40:06.123 No , that we , um , enacted , uh , vis 40:06.123 --> 40:08.123 a vis Aus was to we had to actually 40:08.123 --> 40:10.540 pass a law to allow Australia to invest 40:10.540 --> 40:12.879 $3 billion into our industrial base . 40:12.949 --> 40:15.500 It was such a novel , extraordinary , 40:15.590 --> 40:17.701 uh , component of the optimal pathway 40:17.949 --> 40:20.060 that we actually , as I said , had to 40:20.060 --> 40:22.540 uh . Change the Treasury Department's 40:22.540 --> 40:25.060 rules to accept that money as you , I 40:25.060 --> 40:27.300 think , should know , the defense 40:27.300 --> 40:29.356 minister from Australia in his visit 40:29.356 --> 40:32.419 with Mr . Hegseth brought the first 40:32.419 --> 40:34.586 check for a half billion dollars which 40:34.586 --> 40:38.469 was deposited in the US Treasury . And 40:38.479 --> 40:40.879 to follow up Mr . Smith's question 40:40.879 --> 40:42.990 regarding , um , you know , the trade 40:42.990 --> 40:44.823 war that's happening right now , 40:44.823 --> 40:46.899 Australia has a free trade agreement 40:46.899 --> 40:49.010 with the US . They , they , there are 40:49.010 --> 40:51.659 zero tariffs on US goods that come into 40:51.659 --> 40:53.881 Australia as Adam said , there's a 2 to 40:53.881 --> 40:57.540 1 , uh , trade surplus from the US into , 40:57.889 --> 41:00.149 uh , Australia . They're putting money 41:00.149 --> 41:02.399 into our industrial base and yet we are 41:02.399 --> 41:05.179 tariffing Australia at the same level . 41:05.840 --> 41:08.479 As the country of Iran and I , I will 41:08.479 --> 41:10.701 tell you that and you know maybe you've 41:10.701 --> 41:12.757 had sort of conversations where this 41:12.757 --> 41:14.812 hasn't come up , uh , that's not the 41:14.812 --> 41:17.146 case for some of us who , um , you know , 41:17.146 --> 41:19.479 are in touch with members of parliament . 41:19.479 --> 41:21.590 Uh , in Australia there is definitely 41:21.590 --> 41:24.459 collateral damage um to our allies in 41:24.459 --> 41:26.681 terms of what's happening out there and 41:26.681 --> 41:28.737 the picture that was in the news the 41:28.737 --> 41:30.848 other day of representatives from the 41:30.848 --> 41:33.015 South Korean government and the uh and 41:33.015 --> 41:35.679 Japan shaking hands with China to 41:35.679 --> 41:39.510 announce a new anti-tariff um effort 41:39.510 --> 41:41.732 by those countries . I mean we are just 41:41.732 --> 41:43.954 pushing people in the wrong direction . 41:43.954 --> 41:46.232 Uh , in this part of the world , and I , 41:46.232 --> 41:48.343 I , we need more from you in terms of 41:48.343 --> 41:50.510 just what is the department's position 41:50.510 --> 41:52.566 in terms of advising the White House 41:52.566 --> 41:54.677 about the fact that this is driving , 41:54.750 --> 41:57.028 um , our allies in the wrong direction . 41:59.580 --> 42:01.802 Congressman , on the issue of tariffs , 42:01.802 --> 42:04.136 I mean that that's an issue that's , uh , 42:04.136 --> 42:06.024 beyond the purview of my personal 42:06.024 --> 42:08.080 position to comment on . It's , it's 42:08.080 --> 42:10.413 not something the Department of Defense , 42:10.413 --> 42:12.636 uh , focuses on , but you mentioned the 42:12.636 --> 42:14.358 $500 million contribution that 42:14.358 --> 42:16.247 Australia made . I was there when 42:16.247 --> 42:18.413 Secretary Heeth met with , uh , Deputy 42:18.413 --> 42:20.469 Prime Minister , uh , Mars . Uh , we 42:20.469 --> 42:22.580 were grateful and we are grateful for 42:22.580 --> 42:24.747 the contribution Australia is making . 42:24.747 --> 42:26.747 That's part of , uh , a larger . $3 42:26.747 --> 42:28.858 billion investment into our submarine 42:28.858 --> 42:30.969 industrial base , Secretary Hexa said 42:30.969 --> 42:33.709 at that meeting . Uh , there's more 42:33.709 --> 42:35.830 that needs to be done , uh , to 42:35.830 --> 42:37.997 increase , just be , I have just a few 42:37.997 --> 42:40.219 seconds left . I mean this is an all of 42:40.219 --> 42:42.219 government situation and you cannot 42:42.219 --> 42:44.386 stovepipe the Department of Defense in 42:44.386 --> 42:46.386 terms of just what's happening with 42:46.386 --> 42:48.497 other parts of the administration and 42:48.497 --> 42:50.497 and this trade war , as I said , is 42:50.497 --> 42:52.274 driving our allies in the wrong 42:52.274 --> 42:54.330 direction and we need to stop it . I 42:54.330 --> 42:56.219 yield back . Gentleman's time has 42:56.219 --> 42:55.959 expired here and I recognized a 42:55.959 --> 42:58.015 gentleman from South Carolina , Mr . 42:58.015 --> 42:59.903 Wilson . Thank you very much Mr . 42:59.903 --> 43:02.070 Chairman , and I want to thank each of 43:02.070 --> 43:04.292 you for your service . It's humbling to 43:04.292 --> 43:06.403 be in your presence and , uh , what a 43:06.403 --> 43:08.348 difference you make and , uh , how 43:08.348 --> 43:08.239 important it is , uh , where we are 43:08.239 --> 43:10.899 today , uh , sadly in a conflict we did 43:10.899 --> 43:13.121 not choose , and that is dictators with 43:13.121 --> 43:15.379 rule of gun invading democracies with 43:15.379 --> 43:17.669 the rule of law and what we can do to 43:17.669 --> 43:21.054 deter . And that's uh your field and we 43:21.054 --> 43:24.054 saw sadly uh dictator war criminal 43:24.054 --> 43:27.614 Putin to invade Ukraine on February 24 , 43:27.655 --> 43:30.495 2022 uh under the theory that Ukraine 43:30.495 --> 43:32.844 doesn't exist . Uh , then we know that 43:32.844 --> 43:35.895 the puppets of Iran invaded uh Israel 43:35.895 --> 43:38.844 on October 7 , 2023 under the theory 43:38.844 --> 43:40.788 that Israel doesn't exist from the 43:40.788 --> 43:43.060 river to the sea . But it's just so 43:43.060 --> 43:45.116 important that we be as strong as we 43:45.116 --> 43:47.489 can for peace through strength to deter 43:47.820 --> 43:50.042 the Chinese Communist Party that claims 43:50.042 --> 43:51.931 of course Taiwan does not exist . 43:51.931 --> 43:54.219 There's a parallel there and uh it's 43:54.219 --> 43:56.330 before us and so what you're doing is 43:56.330 --> 43:58.386 just so important . And with that in 43:58.386 --> 44:00.386 mind , I wanna thank all of you for 44:00.386 --> 44:02.989 your service and . I had the 44:02.989 --> 44:05.211 opportunity last year , uh , to have my 44:05.211 --> 44:07.550 3rd visit in the Republic of Korea to 44:07.550 --> 44:09.661 visit at Camp Humphreys . Uh , what a 44:09.661 --> 44:11.883 world-class facility that is . It was , 44:11.883 --> 44:13.883 I was there when the groundbreaking 44:13.883 --> 44:16.050 occurred and then . To go back and see 44:16.050 --> 44:18.570 this facility of $10.8 billion dollar 44:18.570 --> 44:22.169 investment , 90% paid for by 44:22.500 --> 44:24.500 the very appreciative people of the 44:24.500 --> 44:26.556 Republic of Korea , and the American 44:26.556 --> 44:28.722 people need to know that uh nearly 9 , 44:28.899 --> 44:32.534 almost $10 billion was spent . By the 44:32.534 --> 44:36.094 people of Korea to appreciate having an 44:36.094 --> 44:38.054 American presence there which is a 44:38.054 --> 44:41.294 deterrence uh to the uh maniac that's 44:41.294 --> 44:44.175 in charge of um Pyongyang . Keeping 44:44.175 --> 44:46.231 that in mind , I visited with troops 44:46.231 --> 44:48.286 from South Carolina and it's just so 44:48.286 --> 44:51.774 important that we remain iron clad in 44:51.774 --> 44:53.996 supporting the people of Korea with the 44:53.996 --> 44:56.014 instability of indeed the regime in 44:56.014 --> 44:59.290 Pyongyang . And we have 28,000 troops , 44:59.310 --> 45:01.709 uh , in Korea , uh , and the message of 45:01.709 --> 45:04.520 that is , uh , to protect , uh , Korea , 45:04.590 --> 45:07.149 of course , but , uh , Japan , uh , all 45:07.149 --> 45:09.260 of our interests in the Pacific which 45:09.260 --> 45:11.538 are , uh , so critical , and with that , 45:11.879 --> 45:14.212 uh , indeed , uh , General Brunson , uh , 45:14.212 --> 45:16.760 I'm very grateful myself that , uh , 45:16.830 --> 45:18.941 I'm the only member of Congress who's 45:18.941 --> 45:21.163 actually been to Pyongyang . I was on a 45:21.163 --> 45:24.439 delegation in 2003 . And uh and so I 45:24.439 --> 45:27.239 saw again firsthand , uh the oppression 45:27.239 --> 45:29.406 of the people of North Korea and , and 45:29.406 --> 45:31.870 how sad that is . And , but Kim Jong-un 45:31.870 --> 45:34.610 has laid out a plan . To advance 45:34.610 --> 45:36.721 missile technology of North Korea and 45:36.721 --> 45:38.610 he's proceeding with this year 8 45:38.610 --> 45:42.100 ballistic missiles that are being 45:42.100 --> 45:44.489 developed that possibly could reach the 45:44.489 --> 45:47.080 United States , uh , with that in mind 45:47.290 --> 45:49.649 and we also know the increasing 45:49.649 --> 45:51.770 relationship between North Korea and 45:51.770 --> 45:53.770 war criminal Putin uh with North 45:53.770 --> 45:56.620 Korea's . Sending troops uh to uh kill 45:56.620 --> 45:59.689 Ukrainians uh with the uh technology 46:00.060 --> 46:03.020 that indeed uh war criminal Putin is 46:03.020 --> 46:06.419 providing to uh North Korea for 46:06.419 --> 46:08.780 ultimately the ability to attack the 46:08.780 --> 46:10.891 United States . With this in mind and 46:10.891 --> 46:12.669 the strengthening ties with war 46:12.669 --> 46:14.391 criminal Putin and the Chinese 46:14.391 --> 46:16.224 Communist Party , General , what 46:16.224 --> 46:18.224 actions can we take to minimize the 46:18.224 --> 46:22.120 risk ? Congressman , thank you 46:22.120 --> 46:24.320 for the question . As a son of a Sar 46:24.320 --> 46:26.264 major retired from Manning , South 46:26.264 --> 46:28.840 Carolina , I appreciate this question 46:28.840 --> 46:31.062 today . The first thing I'd like to say 46:31.062 --> 46:32.729 is that the Korean people are 46:32.729 --> 46:34.896 incredibly resilient , as , uh , noted 46:34.896 --> 46:36.919 in , uh , the , the constitutional 46:36.919 --> 46:39.086 crisis that was occurring recently now 46:39.086 --> 46:41.520 resolved , expect a new . Uh , 46:41.649 --> 46:43.649 presidential election on the 3rd of 46:43.649 --> 46:45.816 June , uh , they also provide for us , 46:45.816 --> 46:47.705 as you mentioned , an environment 46:47.705 --> 46:50.169 wherein we can build readiness across 46:50.169 --> 46:52.449 the joint force , and I've seen that in 46:52.449 --> 46:54.449 the short 90 days that I've been in 46:54.449 --> 46:56.616 command , whether it be Marines coming 46:56.616 --> 46:58.689 or uh carrier strike group coming to 46:58.689 --> 47:01.370 the peninsula and so those things are 47:01.370 --> 47:03.537 absolutely sound and , and I thank the 47:03.537 --> 47:05.648 Korean people for what they . Provide 47:05.648 --> 47:07.981 for us as Admiral Paparo mentioned , uh , 47:07.981 --> 47:10.104 the things are are going there we can 47:10.104 --> 47:12.271 see it very well . We can see , we can 47:12.271 --> 47:14.215 sense , we can understand , we can 47:14.215 --> 47:16.104 track , we can even target , uh , 47:16.104 --> 47:18.104 things that are going . We do not , 47:18.104 --> 47:20.160 however , but we can see that what's 47:20.160 --> 47:22.271 most important is Admiral Paparo said 47:22.271 --> 47:23.826 is what's coming back , the 47:23.826 --> 47:25.993 technological development that they're 47:25.993 --> 47:28.160 able to almost cut in half in terms of 47:28.160 --> 47:30.271 developing the ballistic missile . to 47:30.271 --> 47:32.326 develop uh air vehicles for their uh 47:32.326 --> 47:34.493 their missiles , all those things that 47:34.493 --> 47:36.548 they're getting back in terms of the 47:36.548 --> 47:38.604 ability to jam in , uh , in the West 47:38.604 --> 47:40.826 Sea which has now made that a contested 47:40.826 --> 47:42.993 area . I think that's what we keep our 47:42.993 --> 47:45.215 eyes on and we deter that by continuing 47:45.215 --> 47:47.437 to bring those strategic assets to bear 47:47.437 --> 47:49.959 in the KTO . And I'm grateful to see a 47:49.959 --> 47:52.364 son of Clarendon County do well . And , 47:52.415 --> 47:54.526 uh , Admiral , I , I just a point , I 47:54.526 --> 47:56.693 wanna , uh , I appreciate Donald Trump 47:56.693 --> 47:58.544 naming the Indo paycom , and I 47:58.544 --> 48:00.711 appreciate every effort made to , uh , 48:00.711 --> 48:02.822 work with our , uh , defense allies , 48:02.822 --> 48:05.100 uh , uh , of India . What a great , uh , 48:05.100 --> 48:07.266 ally they can be and particularly with 48:07.266 --> 48:09.377 the development of an industrial base 48:09.377 --> 48:11.488 of their own , not to be depending on 48:11.488 --> 48:13.822 war criminal Putin for innumerous times . 48:13.822 --> 48:15.877 You're not recognized gentleman from 48:15.877 --> 48:17.822 California , Mr . Garamindi . Uh , 48:17.822 --> 48:20.044 thank you , Mr . Chairman and thank you 48:20.044 --> 48:22.211 for your opening remarks as well as uh 48:22.211 --> 48:24.377 ranking member Smith about this set of 48:24.377 --> 48:26.544 issues . Um , I'm gonna very quickly , 48:26.544 --> 48:29.030 Mr . Know , your response to , uh , my 48:29.030 --> 48:31.030 colleague Courtney was totally 48:31.030 --> 48:34.300 inadequate . It was wrong . You've got 48:34.300 --> 48:38.270 to send back to the secretary that the 48:38.270 --> 48:41.820 trade war significantly diminishes 48:42.110 --> 48:45.310 our power throughout the world to do 48:45.310 --> 48:47.143 anything other than to send that 48:47.143 --> 48:49.366 message back is simply a dereliction of 48:49.366 --> 48:51.929 your duties as an acting assistant 48:51.929 --> 48:54.889 secretary . So be aware last night uh 48:54.889 --> 48:57.290 it appears as though Trump's tariff war 48:57.699 --> 49:00.209 seems to be at least in part a gambit 49:00.699 --> 49:02.755 to open negotiations with individual 49:02.755 --> 49:06.040 countries . His message last night 49:06.729 --> 49:10.110 to the Republican . Conference Was 49:12.689 --> 49:15.590 To open those negotiations with this 49:15.590 --> 49:19.560 message kiss my . You 49:19.560 --> 49:21.760 might ask the secretary just how well 49:21.760 --> 49:25.139 will that work . In maintaining good 49:25.139 --> 49:27.179 relationships that are absolutely 49:27.179 --> 49:29.939 essential in the Pacific . Don't expect 49:29.939 --> 49:31.939 a response , but I expect you to do 49:31.939 --> 49:34.850 your job . Send the message back . That 49:34.850 --> 49:37.129 these negotiations , this trade war is 49:37.129 --> 49:40.810 a very serious challenge . Toward the 49:40.810 --> 49:43.409 Indo-Pacific region and other parts of 49:43.409 --> 49:47.229 the world . Now And from 49:47.229 --> 49:49.110 my perspective , uh , this 49:49.110 --> 49:51.760 administration's approach . To 49:51.760 --> 49:54.590 addressing China . I reckless 49:55.290 --> 49:57.669 And misusing our national instruments 49:57.669 --> 50:01.629 of power , so Admiral Parpero . And 50:01.629 --> 50:03.796 let's talk about the Pacific Islands . 50:03.796 --> 50:06.030 Are they important in your strategies ? 50:06.879 --> 50:10.129 In the Pacific . Congressman , just as 50:10.129 --> 50:12.399 in the Second World War , the Pacific 50:12.399 --> 50:15.600 Island countries , Guadalcanal , uh , 50:15.610 --> 50:17.721 throughout the Indo-Pacific , uh , to 50:17.721 --> 50:19.888 Bora Bora , uh are important as well , 50:19.888 --> 50:22.110 and that's why the People's Republic of 50:22.110 --> 50:23.999 China has , uh , efforts of elite 50:23.999 --> 50:25.939 capture of , uh , the attempted 50:25.939 --> 50:27.717 partnership with their security 50:27.717 --> 50:30.020 apparatuses and so on history , on 50:30.020 --> 50:32.076 geography , and on interests they're 50:32.076 --> 50:35.199 quite important . Uh , we are we 50:35.199 --> 50:37.560 missing the opportunities , uh , with 50:37.560 --> 50:41.409 the , uh . Trashing of USAID , 50:41.820 --> 50:45.010 uh , and also not using the Coast Guard 50:45.179 --> 50:48.129 to full effect . In the Pacific Islands 50:49.409 --> 50:52.120 The USAID aid is under review and I'll 50:52.120 --> 50:54.176 be advocating most strongly for that 50:54.176 --> 50:56.239 aid , uh , for , uh , for all of the 50:56.239 --> 50:58.406 countries and the Coast Guard provides 50:58.406 --> 51:00.572 a critical role in the South Pacific , 51:00.840 --> 51:03.550 and that is , uh , counter lawfare , 51:03.760 --> 51:06.110 counter illicit trafficking , counter 51:06.110 --> 51:09.510 illegal , illicit and and unregulated , 51:09.560 --> 51:11.449 uh , fishing . And those are key 51:11.449 --> 51:13.671 advantages . The Coast Guard's uniquely 51:13.671 --> 51:15.671 capable of doing that , and they've 51:15.671 --> 51:17.838 done a wonderful job for us . Are they 51:17.838 --> 51:20.229 available 365 24/7 ? 51:21.429 --> 51:25.149 Presently they're on on another task uh 51:25.149 --> 51:27.590 but uh and and we're compensating for 51:27.590 --> 51:29.830 that with the appropriate naval 51:29.830 --> 51:31.941 capabilities and air capabilities but 51:31.941 --> 51:34.310 they are quite they are quite critical 51:34.310 --> 51:36.780 to that mission . I'm told it cost 51:36.780 --> 51:39.260 about $140 million to have a Coast 51:39.260 --> 51:42.260 Guard cutter . Available 51:42.750 --> 51:45.889 operating in the Pacific Islands . Is 51:45.889 --> 51:48.056 that an investment that you're willing 51:48.056 --> 51:50.056 to make from the uh Pacific Defense 51:50.056 --> 51:53.530 Initiative ? Yes sir . Thank you . I 51:53.530 --> 51:56.050 appreciate the direct response . 140 51:56.050 --> 51:59.959 million , um . There's also issues of 51:59.959 --> 52:03.050 uh . Basing Uh , 52:03.300 --> 52:05.522 relationships with various ports in the 52:05.522 --> 52:07.739 Pacific , uh , will you be using the 52:07.739 --> 52:09.979 defense initiative to , uh , enhance 52:09.979 --> 52:12.280 those facilities that are necessary for 52:12.280 --> 52:14.613 the navy as well as for the Coast Guard ? 52:15.000 --> 52:17.056 Yes sir , those bases , places , the 52:17.056 --> 52:19.810 airfields , the ports , the piers , um , 52:19.820 --> 52:21.931 are absolutely critical . They're key 52:21.931 --> 52:24.260 to our principles of expanded maneuver 52:24.669 --> 52:26.669 that enables us to put geography to 52:26.669 --> 52:29.219 work to deter and if necessary to win . 52:29.429 --> 52:31.485 Good . I don't think I'll go back to 52:31.485 --> 52:33.596 the fact that we are imposing tariffs 52:33.596 --> 52:36.229 on islands that do not have any exports 52:36.229 --> 52:38.118 to the United States , but that's 52:38.118 --> 52:40.879 another silly sloppy piece of work that 52:40.879 --> 52:43.101 the administration is doing with regard 52:43.101 --> 52:47.000 to the tariff issue . Um I 52:47.000 --> 52:49.280 want to uh spend a few moments on . 52:50.620 --> 52:54.580 Logistics . Uh , the support of the 52:54.580 --> 52:56.636 navy , some of this came up with the 52:56.636 --> 52:59.560 military ships , the amphibs . Could 52:59.560 --> 53:02.340 you talk to us about the necessity of 53:02.340 --> 53:05.739 Transcom and non-kinetic ships 53:05.739 --> 53:08.899 providing support in the Pacific ? The 53:08.899 --> 53:10.955 combat logistics I think we're gonna 53:10.955 --> 53:12.899 take that in writing . My time has 53:12.899 --> 53:15.010 expired . Thank you , sir . Thank you 53:15.010 --> 53:14.939 very much . Thank the gentleman . Cheer 53:14.939 --> 53:17.272 now recognized gentleman from Tennessee , 53:17.272 --> 53:19.050 Doctor DesJarlais . Thank you , 53:19.050 --> 53:21.161 Chairman . Admiral Paparo , uh , good 53:21.161 --> 53:23.219 to see you . You noted that PLA 53:23.219 --> 53:25.649 activity around Taiwan jumped 300% last 53:25.649 --> 53:27.816 year , including what you described as 53:27.816 --> 53:29.927 dress rehearsals , uh , for potential 53:29.927 --> 53:31.871 invasion . What indicators are you 53:31.871 --> 53:34.093 watching most closely to assess whether 53:34.093 --> 53:36.093 those rehearsals are moving towards 53:36.093 --> 53:37.927 actual preparations for imminent 53:37.927 --> 53:40.340 conflict ? We watched the transloading 53:40.340 --> 53:44.320 of equipment of personnel of ordinance , 53:44.600 --> 53:47.090 uh , we look deeper into some of the , 53:47.219 --> 53:49.459 uh , non-military instruments of 53:49.459 --> 53:51.237 national power for the People's 53:51.237 --> 53:53.459 Republic of China in order to gain back 53:53.459 --> 53:56.100 strategic and operational warning to 53:56.100 --> 53:58.840 give us early leverage to position a 53:58.840 --> 54:02.830 force to respond to conflict . And uh 54:03.409 --> 54:05.576 you've spoken publicly about hellscape 54:05.576 --> 54:07.449 plan to deter invasions through 54:07.449 --> 54:09.393 unmanned systems and you were very 54:09.393 --> 54:11.790 generous with your time on Codell Kelly 54:11.790 --> 54:14.530 in February at your headquarters in 54:14.530 --> 54:17.489 laying that out in great detail in in 54:17.489 --> 54:19.959 open source , can you walk us through 54:20.250 --> 54:22.810 how this fits into your broader 54:22.810 --> 54:24.754 deterrence framework and how we're 54:24.754 --> 54:26.866 helping ensure Taiwan is investing in 54:26.866 --> 54:28.866 the right capabilities to make this 54:28.866 --> 54:31.389 concept viable . Yes sir , as discussed 54:31.389 --> 54:33.669 in the Black Sea , there are spaces 54:33.669 --> 54:36.540 where where the force need not gain air 54:36.540 --> 54:39.790 superiority or maritime superiority but 54:39.790 --> 54:43.149 just deny it to the other , uh , at low 54:43.149 --> 54:46.189 human cost , and this is the essence of 54:46.189 --> 54:49.040 hellscape under sea unmanned . Uh , 54:49.100 --> 54:51.300 undersea vehicles , unmanned surface 54:51.300 --> 54:54.570 vehicles , unmanned air air uh systems , 54:54.820 --> 54:57.379 and loitering munitions , uh , summing 54:57.379 --> 55:00.209 those operating them within one common 55:00.459 --> 55:02.681 command and control framework , uh , to 55:02.681 --> 55:04.848 be able to put them to that best use , 55:04.848 --> 55:08.020 and , uh , Taiwan for that matter is 55:08.020 --> 55:10.242 also making those investments and those 55:10.242 --> 55:12.409 investments are and must be aligned to 55:12.409 --> 55:14.409 the investments that we're making . 55:14.459 --> 55:16.681 thank you and Admiral . Last week , the 55:16.681 --> 55:18.848 US and Chinese military officials held 55:18.848 --> 55:20.792 their first working level maritime 55:20.792 --> 55:22.959 security talks since the start of this 55:22.959 --> 55:24.959 administration . Can you update the 55:24.959 --> 55:27.015 committee on how these conversations 55:27.015 --> 55:29.237 went and how you see their value in the 55:29.237 --> 55:32.750 current environment ? Uh , both sides 55:32.750 --> 55:34.780 were very direct , uh , they were 55:34.780 --> 55:38.030 conducted professionally and , uh , we 55:38.030 --> 55:41.310 lodged , um , several , uh , inputs 55:41.310 --> 55:43.989 into the discussions about unsafe , 55:44.110 --> 55:45.989 unprofessional behavior , the 55:45.989 --> 55:48.110 deployment of flares in front of our 55:48.110 --> 55:51.139 partner nations , uh , vehicles and , 55:51.149 --> 55:53.780 uh , and I should say , uh , aircraft , 55:54.149 --> 55:56.316 uh , dangerous maneuvers around . Uh , 55:56.340 --> 55:58.780 around ships and it's an important 55:58.780 --> 56:01.500 dialogue that we had and uh I feel 56:01.500 --> 56:03.620 confident that the , uh , People's 56:03.620 --> 56:05.787 Republic of China caught the message . 56:05.787 --> 56:07.842 OK , and you touched on this briefly 56:07.842 --> 56:09.953 with Mr . Whitman , but just a little 56:09.953 --> 56:11.787 deeper dive . We often hear that 56:11.787 --> 56:13.842 alliances are asymmetric advantage , 56:13.842 --> 56:15.898 and I agree with that in principle . 56:15.898 --> 56:17.676 But how do we ensure that those 56:17.676 --> 56:19.787 relationships may net contributors to 56:19.787 --> 56:19.429 deterrence rather than creating 56:19.429 --> 56:21.550 dependencies ? And what have you 56:21.550 --> 56:23.717 already seen that would you , that you 56:23.717 --> 56:25.939 would like to see over the next year or 56:25.939 --> 56:28.106 two that would signal they're stepping 56:28.106 --> 56:30.050 up in the face of the PLA threat ? 56:30.479 --> 56:32.701 Greater investment in their own defense 56:32.701 --> 56:34.810 from a standpoint of uh of uh 56:34.810 --> 56:37.320 percentage of their uh GDP , their 56:37.320 --> 56:39.598 gross domestic product is an indicator , 56:39.919 --> 56:42.919 uh acquiring the right systems that are 56:42.919 --> 56:45.439 interoperable among all of the partners 56:45.760 --> 56:47.389 and of course there's , uh , 56:47.800 --> 56:50.520 Australia's historic . Uh , investment 56:50.520 --> 56:52.790 in August and the United Kingdom , uh , 56:52.959 --> 56:55.669 I might also add there is , uh , 56:55.919 --> 56:58.300 there's Japan's investment in a counter 56:58.300 --> 57:00.629 strike capability with the acquisition 57:00.629 --> 57:03.280 of 400 Tomahawk land attack missiles . 57:03.439 --> 57:05.679 These are some of the examples of how 57:05.679 --> 57:07.840 this is operationalized . Are there 57:07.840 --> 57:09.784 gaps that we still need to fill to 57:09.784 --> 57:11.673 close and make those efforts more 57:11.673 --> 57:13.879 strategically impactful ? There are 57:13.879 --> 57:15.657 always gaps because we're never 57:15.657 --> 57:17.879 satisfied with how ready we are , but , 57:17.879 --> 57:20.250 uh , yes , we have to uh speed up our 57:20.250 --> 57:23.500 ability to uh co-produce capabilities . 57:23.520 --> 57:25.687 We have to speed up the bureaucratic , 57:25.959 --> 57:28.840 uh , barriers to executing those faster , 57:28.919 --> 57:31.399 and we must reform the industrial base 57:31.399 --> 57:33.510 so that those capabilities deliver on 57:33.510 --> 57:35.566 time . Thank you , sir , and uh with 57:35.566 --> 57:37.520 that I'll yield back . Thank the 57:37.520 --> 57:39.464 gentleman for yielding chair and I 57:39.464 --> 57:41.076 recognize the gentleman from 57:41.076 --> 57:43.131 Massachusetts , Mr . Moulton . Thank 57:43.131 --> 57:45.187 you , Mr . Chairman . Mr . Koh , you 57:45.187 --> 57:47.242 said in your testimony that stronger 57:47.242 --> 57:48.964 alliances is what this team is 57:48.964 --> 57:52.179 delivering . Our alliances with Japan , 57:52.389 --> 57:54.278 South Korea , Taiwan , Thailand , 57:54.278 --> 57:56.500 Vietnam , Australia , the Philippines , 57:56.500 --> 57:58.500 and India included in your stronger 57:58.500 --> 58:00.667 alliances , are those important allies 58:00.667 --> 58:02.556 for us in the Indo-Pacific ? Uh , 58:02.556 --> 58:04.611 congressman , absolutely . So you're 58:04.611 --> 58:07.590 raising tariffs 24% on Japan , 25% on 58:07.590 --> 58:10.610 South Korea , 32% on Taiwan , 36% on 58:10.610 --> 58:14.389 Thailand , 46% on Vietnam , only 10% 58:14.389 --> 58:16.709 on Australia , 18% in the Philippines , 58:16.750 --> 58:20.139 and 26% on India . How do these 58:20.139 --> 58:23.709 tariffs strengthen our alliances ? Well 58:23.709 --> 58:25.820 Congressman , uh , as I said before , 58:25.820 --> 58:28.060 the issue of , uh , tariffs is , uh , 58:28.070 --> 58:30.070 beyond purview of , uh , my , so it 58:30.070 --> 58:32.126 doesn't matter . You don't think our 58:32.126 --> 58:34.181 allies care about tariffs ? Um , you 58:34.181 --> 58:36.292 seem to care about our allies and the 58:36.292 --> 58:36.110 relationship we have with them . You 58:36.110 --> 58:38.277 don't think tariffs have any influence 58:38.277 --> 58:40.110 on that , Congressman , I've had 58:40.110 --> 58:41.888 multiple engagements , personal 58:41.888 --> 58:44.054 engagements with allies and partners . 58:44.054 --> 58:46.054 Does weakening our allies economies 58:46.054 --> 58:48.310 help our alliance ? All the engagements 58:48.310 --> 58:50.143 that I've had that I've seen the 58:50.143 --> 58:52.199 secretary have with his counterparts 58:52.199 --> 58:54.310 lead me to believe that our alliances 58:54.310 --> 58:56.421 and partnerships are a very that they 58:56.421 --> 58:58.421 like the tariffs that that's a good 58:58.421 --> 59:00.588 move . It strengthens our alliances is 59:00.588 --> 59:02.921 that what you're saying , Mr . Koh ? uh , 59:02.921 --> 59:02.379 our , our , our alliances and 59:02.379 --> 59:04.712 partnerships are in a very strong place . 59:04.750 --> 59:06.694 These tariffs are also gonna raise 59:06.694 --> 59:08.472 prices for American consumers , 59:08.472 --> 59:10.583 including American troops . Will this 59:10.583 --> 59:12.583 be good for your soldiers , General 59:12.583 --> 59:14.694 Brunson ? Do they have a lot of extra 59:14.694 --> 59:16.306 disposable income to spend ? 59:19.570 --> 59:21.626 Congressman , in answer to the extra 59:21.626 --> 59:23.850 disposable income , I've got two 59:23.850 --> 59:25.906 college age daughters that I'm still 59:25.906 --> 59:28.017 putting through college and a 15 year 59:28.017 --> 59:29.794 old at home . I don't know that 59:29.794 --> 59:31.961 disposable income is what I would look 59:31.961 --> 59:34.017 at here . I , when the tariffs raise 59:34.017 --> 59:35.850 the prices that your sailors and 59:35.850 --> 59:38.000 Marines pay at the commissaries for 59:38.000 --> 59:40.250 groceries , the PX , whatever , does 59:40.250 --> 59:42.306 that , is that good for your sailors 59:42.306 --> 59:45.010 and Marines , higher prices higher 59:45.010 --> 59:47.177 prices will hurt our service members . 59:47.429 --> 59:49.750 Mr . No , you mentioned that , I 59:49.750 --> 59:51.806 appreciate the direct answer . Thank 59:51.806 --> 59:54.969 you . Mr . No , you mentioned that 59:54.969 --> 59:57.136 Secretary Hegseth recently traveled to 59:57.136 --> 59:59.247 the region to reaffirm our commitment 59:59.247 --> 01:00:01.830 to our allies . Is South Korea one of 01:00:01.830 --> 01:00:05.510 those important allies ? Uh , South 01:00:05.510 --> 01:00:07.659 Korea is a very important ally , uh , 01:00:07.709 --> 01:00:10.419 and in his call several weeks ago with 01:00:10.419 --> 01:00:12.530 this . I wonder if the reason why you 01:00:12.530 --> 01:00:15.100 have to reaffirm those alliances is 01:00:15.100 --> 01:00:17.322 because of this trade war the president 01:00:17.322 --> 01:00:19.489 has started , but regardless of that , 01:00:19.489 --> 01:00:21.711 can you explain how pulling out Patriot 01:00:21.711 --> 01:00:24.070 batteries from South Korea demonstrates 01:00:24.070 --> 01:00:27.830 that commitment ? Uh , congressman , 01:00:27.939 --> 01:00:30.889 we face , uh , a very , uh , dangerous , 01:00:30.939 --> 01:00:33.459 uh , security environment . Uh , the 01:00:33.459 --> 01:00:35.292 department , yes , in the Indo-P 01:00:35.292 --> 01:00:37.237 Pacific , which is your number one 01:00:37.237 --> 01:00:36.939 priority . So why are you pulling 01:00:36.939 --> 01:00:39.179 Patriot batteries out of South Korea to 01:00:39.179 --> 01:00:41.012 send them to the Middle East ? I 01:00:41.012 --> 01:00:42.901 thought that China was the pacing 01:00:42.901 --> 01:00:44.568 threat . disagree with that , 01:00:44.699 --> 01:00:46.588 Congressman , the department will 01:00:46.588 --> 01:00:48.755 continue to address threats as General 01:00:48.755 --> 01:00:50.977 Brunson , is it helpful to you in South 01:00:50.977 --> 01:00:50.709 Korea and your alliance with the South 01:00:50.709 --> 01:00:52.931 Koreans to pull out a Patriot battery ? 01:00:54.090 --> 01:00:56.257 Congressman , if I could be given just 01:00:56.257 --> 01:00:58.368 a second to explain the way we handle 01:00:58.368 --> 01:01:00.590 that . No , I don't wanna know . I just 01:01:00.590 --> 01:01:02.701 wanna know if it's helpful or not . I 01:01:02.701 --> 01:01:01.929 don't want an explanation . I just want 01:01:01.929 --> 01:01:04.096 an answer , and it would be helpful if 01:01:04.096 --> 01:01:06.040 you could give direct answers like 01:01:06.040 --> 01:01:08.207 Admiral Paparo . Admiral Paparo , back 01:01:08.207 --> 01:01:10.040 to you . I recently heard from a 01:01:10.040 --> 01:01:12.151 commanding officer under your command 01:01:12.151 --> 01:01:14.373 expressing frustration and disgust over 01:01:14.373 --> 01:01:16.540 Secretary Hegseth's illegal disclosure 01:01:16.540 --> 01:01:16.419 of top secret targeting information 01:01:16.419 --> 01:01:18.820 detailing when American pilots would be 01:01:18.820 --> 01:01:21.699 over enemy territory on an unclassified 01:01:21.699 --> 01:01:23.755 platform that we know is targeted by 01:01:23.755 --> 01:01:25.921 our adversaries including China . I've 01:01:25.921 --> 01:01:28.032 never heard from this commander about 01:01:28.032 --> 01:01:30.143 an issue like this before . He seemed 01:01:30.143 --> 01:01:32.255 concerned about the example that this 01:01:32.255 --> 01:01:34.421 sets for our troops . You have to make 01:01:34.421 --> 01:01:36.477 rapid operational decisions . Do you 01:01:36.477 --> 01:01:38.699 use signal chats to discuss operational 01:01:38.699 --> 01:01:40.977 plans and other classified information ? 01:01:40.977 --> 01:01:43.032 No . Do you allow sailors under your 01:01:43.032 --> 01:01:45.088 command to keep their jobs when they 01:01:45.088 --> 01:01:46.755 knowingly disclose classified 01:01:46.755 --> 01:01:48.532 information ? No , sir . Do you 01:01:48.532 --> 01:01:50.580 criminally prosecute ? People under 01:01:50.580 --> 01:01:52.669 your command who knowingly illegally 01:01:52.669 --> 01:01:55.189 disclose top secret information upon 01:01:55.189 --> 01:01:57.356 which the lives of our pilots depend . 01:01:57.899 --> 01:02:00.989 We would if we encountered that . Do 01:02:00.989 --> 01:02:03.100 you allow your sailors and marines to 01:02:03.100 --> 01:02:05.429 drink on the job ? No , sir . 01:02:06.800 --> 01:02:08.911 Admiral Paparro , I assume you expect 01:02:08.911 --> 01:02:10.967 accountability from your commander . 01:02:10.967 --> 01:02:13.078 Secretary Hegseth said accountability 01:02:13.078 --> 01:02:16.010 is back at DOD . When you instill 01:02:16.010 --> 01:02:18.121 accountability in your subordinates , 01:02:18.121 --> 01:02:20.121 do you advise them to lie about the 01:02:20.121 --> 01:02:22.288 disclosure of classified information ? 01:02:22.288 --> 01:02:24.621 No , sir , I expect integrity . Mr . No , 01:02:24.621 --> 01:02:26.788 you talked about restoring the warrior 01:02:26.788 --> 01:02:28.843 ethos . Is part of the warrior ethos 01:02:28.843 --> 01:02:30.954 disclosing top secret information and 01:02:30.954 --> 01:02:34.399 then lying about doing so ? Uh , yes or 01:02:34.399 --> 01:02:36.677 no . Is that part of the warrior ethos ? 01:02:36.677 --> 01:02:38.899 You were in the army . Is that what the 01:02:38.899 --> 01:02:41.010 army taught you ? Congressman , there 01:02:41.010 --> 01:02:43.121 is yes or no . Did the army teach you 01:02:43.121 --> 01:02:47.060 that . My guess is no . 01:02:48.550 --> 01:02:51.669 Mr . Kelly , it's unfortunate that this 01:02:51.669 --> 01:02:53.558 committee , which has always been 01:02:53.558 --> 01:02:55.613 bipartisan , uh , this is a ways and 01:02:55.613 --> 01:02:57.836 mean tariffs and those things , but I'm 01:02:57.836 --> 01:02:59.891 gonna address some , uh , is being a 01:02:59.891 --> 01:03:01.947 weak and feckless leader , does that 01:03:01.947 --> 01:03:04.113 make you more respected by your allies 01:03:04.113 --> 01:03:06.058 and partners ? And I won't , I , I 01:03:06.058 --> 01:03:08.280 don't expect an answer , but I can tell 01:03:08.280 --> 01:03:10.447 you we lived through 4 years of a weak 01:03:10.447 --> 01:03:12.540 and feckless and , and , and 01:03:12.540 --> 01:03:15.260 non-existent leader and , and I'm 01:03:15.260 --> 01:03:17.149 trying to remember whether or not 01:03:17.149 --> 01:03:20.139 Russia invaded Ukraine under President 01:03:20.139 --> 01:03:22.250 Trump or whether he invaded under a . 01:03:22.354 --> 01:03:24.784 Weak and feckless Biden . I'm trying to 01:03:24.784 --> 01:03:27.104 remember over the last 4 years whether 01:03:27.104 --> 01:03:29.344 China has become more aggressive or 01:03:29.344 --> 01:03:31.665 less aggressive , and I , I know for a 01:03:31.665 --> 01:03:33.332 fact that they've become more 01:03:33.332 --> 01:03:36.024 aggressive because weakness invites 01:03:36.024 --> 01:03:38.625 bullies to attack . I'll talk about 01:03:38.625 --> 01:03:42.370 tariffs . Just a little bit . 01:03:43.209 --> 01:03:46.209 Is appeasement , giving 01:03:47.000 --> 01:03:49.111 everyone everything that they want at 01:03:49.111 --> 01:03:50.722 your expense , that is not a 01:03:50.722 --> 01:03:53.889 partnership . That is not a partnership . 01:03:54.550 --> 01:03:58.270 Uh , I'm reminded in 2017 when 01:03:58.270 --> 01:04:00.989 President Trump said NATO needs to pay 01:04:00.989 --> 01:04:03.489 their 2% fair share , and I remember 01:04:03.489 --> 01:04:05.989 the same kind of reactions across the 01:04:05.989 --> 01:04:08.510 aisle , oh my God , how dare we ask our 01:04:08.510 --> 01:04:10.500 allies , they're gonna hate us , 01:04:10.550 --> 01:04:12.661 they're gonna get away . But if you , 01:04:12.661 --> 01:04:14.494 if you look back now , they have 01:04:14.494 --> 01:04:16.620 increased their ability to defend 01:04:16.620 --> 01:04:18.842 themselves . And to help us defend them 01:04:18.842 --> 01:04:22.264 in NATO , I will tell you that tariffs 01:04:22.264 --> 01:04:25.225 being taken advantage of is not how we 01:04:25.225 --> 01:04:28.175 become strong leaders in the community . 01:04:28.455 --> 01:04:31.175 Giving your kids everything they want 01:04:31.175 --> 01:04:33.854 is not good parenting . It is not about 01:04:33.854 --> 01:04:37.344 likability . It is about respect . And 01:04:37.344 --> 01:04:39.824 so with that said , Admiral Papara in 01:04:39.824 --> 01:04:42.864 the in in the indopecom is arguably the 01:04:42.864 --> 01:04:44.920 most consequential theater of this , 01:04:45.044 --> 01:04:47.870 this century . Specifically , as it 01:04:47.870 --> 01:04:50.469 pertains to fuel , both in the air and 01:04:50.469 --> 01:04:53.389 on the sea , uh , are there gaps , are 01:04:53.389 --> 01:04:55.870 there things that we can do as far as 01:04:55.870 --> 01:04:59.030 air and , and , and sea and fuel 01:04:59.030 --> 01:05:01.899 delivery ? Yes sir , there are gaps in 01:05:01.899 --> 01:05:04.066 defense fueling support points . Those 01:05:04.066 --> 01:05:06.659 are those locations where uh aircraft 01:05:06.659 --> 01:05:09.500 and or ships would , uh , load fuel and 01:05:09.500 --> 01:05:11.899 distribute fuel . There are shortfalls 01:05:11.899 --> 01:05:14.066 in our tanker fleet and keeping enough 01:05:14.066 --> 01:05:16.699 fuel in the case of a contingency , and 01:05:16.699 --> 01:05:18.866 there are gaps in the combat logistics 01:05:18.866 --> 01:05:20.977 force in order to sustain the force , 01:05:20.977 --> 01:05:23.032 and , uh , I'd like to work with the 01:05:23.032 --> 01:05:25.639 committee to identify those gaps . And 01:05:25.639 --> 01:05:27.600 Admiral Paparo , uh , we've talked 01:05:27.600 --> 01:05:30.919 about USAID , but another strength that 01:05:30.919 --> 01:05:32.752 we have is our state partnership 01:05:32.752 --> 01:05:34.641 program where our National Guards 01:05:34.641 --> 01:05:36.808 partner with allies and partners . And 01:05:36.808 --> 01:05:39.030 in the Pacific , are there any of those 01:05:39.030 --> 01:05:41.141 that are valuable or are there places 01:05:41.141 --> 01:05:43.459 where we need new ones ? Everyone is 01:05:43.459 --> 01:05:45.403 highly valuable , sir , and , uh , 01:05:45.403 --> 01:05:47.570 indispensable to our capability . They 01:05:47.570 --> 01:05:50.699 build long lasting relationships and 01:05:50.699 --> 01:05:53.340 the continuity of the training that we 01:05:53.340 --> 01:05:56.429 execute um I I I will tell you there 01:05:56.429 --> 01:06:00.149 are no gaps partner to partner . Uh , 01:06:00.479 --> 01:06:02.590 because of the , uh , just because of 01:06:02.590 --> 01:06:04.646 the good faith of the state partners 01:06:04.646 --> 01:06:06.590 and the good faith of the National 01:06:06.590 --> 01:06:08.701 Guard Bureau that assigns those , but 01:06:08.701 --> 01:06:10.812 there's always room for improvement , 01:06:10.840 --> 01:06:13.062 uh , everywhere because we can never be 01:06:13.062 --> 01:06:15.284 satisfied with good enough . We also we 01:06:15.284 --> 01:06:18.449 must always strive for excellence . And 01:06:18.449 --> 01:06:20.560 I , I wanna address just a little bit 01:06:20.560 --> 01:06:22.727 because I also sit on the House Select 01:06:22.727 --> 01:06:24.782 Committee on Intelligence and , uh , 01:06:24.782 --> 01:06:27.159 And the signal chat while ill advised , 01:06:27.219 --> 01:06:29.552 and I'll be the first to say that there , 01:06:29.552 --> 01:06:31.275 there's no indication that any 01:06:31.275 --> 01:06:33.441 classified real-time information about 01:06:33.441 --> 01:06:35.497 strikes that are not specific in the 01:06:35.497 --> 01:06:37.719 location , that would not be top secret 01:06:37.719 --> 01:06:39.886 information , would it , if it doesn't 01:06:39.886 --> 01:06:41.941 disclose location , time , systems , 01:06:41.941 --> 01:06:44.108 that would not be top secret unless it 01:06:44.108 --> 01:06:47.199 disclosed beforehand sources or methods 01:06:47.199 --> 01:06:50.439 or direct specific things that could be 01:06:50.439 --> 01:06:52.328 used . Is that correct to Admiral 01:06:52.328 --> 01:06:54.439 Papara and General Bronson ? Agreed , 01:06:54.439 --> 01:06:58.409 sir . Yes , sir . And Mr . No , uh , 01:06:58.560 --> 01:07:00.727 you've had a lot of hard questions and 01:07:00.727 --> 01:07:02.727 I hate to put y'all , uh , listen , 01:07:02.727 --> 01:07:04.782 y'all are the secretary , uh , y'all 01:07:04.782 --> 01:07:06.838 work for the Department of Defense , 01:07:06.838 --> 01:07:08.949 not , uh , the Department of Commerce 01:07:08.949 --> 01:07:11.171 or for the Ways and Means Committee and 01:07:11.171 --> 01:07:13.060 tariffs , but I want to ask you , 01:07:13.060 --> 01:07:15.060 relationships . Shes Mr . No , when 01:07:15.060 --> 01:07:14.399 we're looking for strength of 01:07:14.399 --> 01:07:16.399 partnerships and alliances , are we 01:07:16.399 --> 01:07:18.288 looking at someone who just takes 01:07:18.288 --> 01:07:20.343 everything we give them and gets mad 01:07:20.343 --> 01:07:22.399 when we want something back ? Are we 01:07:22.399 --> 01:07:24.199 looking for mutually beneficial 01:07:24.199 --> 01:07:26.399 relationships with nations where we 01:07:26.399 --> 01:07:30.260 both can be more successful ? Uh , 01:07:30.320 --> 01:07:32.080 absolutely mutually beneficial 01:07:32.080 --> 01:07:34.136 relationships , Congressman . And do 01:07:34.136 --> 01:07:35.580 you agree under the Trump 01:07:35.580 --> 01:07:37.636 administration , the last time and , 01:07:37.636 --> 01:07:39.802 and this time also that he is striving 01:07:39.802 --> 01:07:42.139 to build relationships that are duly , 01:07:42.429 --> 01:07:44.820 uh , help both sides , not just one 01:07:44.820 --> 01:07:46.820 side of the equation , their side ? 01:07:46.820 --> 01:07:48.876 Absolutely , Congressman . OK . With 01:07:48.876 --> 01:07:50.931 that I yell back , Mr . Chairman . I 01:07:50.931 --> 01:07:50.639 think the gentleman chair and I 01:07:50.639 --> 01:07:52.306 recognizes a gentle lady from 01:07:52.306 --> 01:07:55.100 Pennsylvania , Ms . Houlihan . Thank 01:07:55.100 --> 01:07:57.239 you , uh , very much for the 01:07:57.239 --> 01:07:59.449 conversation . Admiral Paparo , I read 01:07:59.449 --> 01:08:01.338 that you went to Villanova , uh , 01:08:01.370 --> 01:08:03.370 University , which is just down the 01:08:03.370 --> 01:08:05.314 road from my district , um , and I 01:08:05.314 --> 01:08:07.203 wanna actually don't even need to 01:08:07.203 --> 01:08:09.203 probably draw your attention to the 01:08:09.203 --> 01:08:11.426 recent earthquake in Myanmar , um , and 01:08:11.426 --> 01:08:13.648 some of the conversation earlier in our 01:08:13.648 --> 01:08:15.759 hearing talked about , um , USAID and 01:08:15.759 --> 01:08:17.814 the earthquake in . has claimed at 01:08:17.814 --> 01:08:20.254 least 2000 lives that we know of and 01:08:20.254 --> 01:08:22.654 the US was very noticeably absent in 01:08:22.654 --> 01:08:25.535 terms of our response from USAID . No 01:08:25.535 --> 01:08:27.805 USAID , uh , presence , no visible 01:08:27.805 --> 01:08:29.975 coordination or relief efforts , even 01:08:29.975 --> 01:08:32.334 as China and Russia in fact stepped in 01:08:32.334 --> 01:08:34.223 to rescue people , children , and 01:08:34.223 --> 01:08:36.625 elderly from collapsing building , uh , 01:08:36.694 --> 01:08:38.916 given that recent earthquake in Myanmar 01:08:38.916 --> 01:08:41.055 and the most likely , uh , fact that 01:08:41.055 --> 01:08:43.111 there will be other sorts of natural 01:08:43.111 --> 01:08:45.277 disasters such as these and , and some 01:08:45.277 --> 01:08:47.499 that are not natural . Uh , what should 01:08:47.499 --> 01:08:49.722 the DOD be doing ? How does this impact 01:08:49.722 --> 01:08:52.009 our strategic posture , um , in the 01:08:52.009 --> 01:08:54.120 Indo-Pacific region , region ? Should 01:08:54.120 --> 01:08:56.479 the DOD have a posture in place in the 01:08:56.479 --> 01:08:58.970 absence of USAID to help provide 01:08:58.970 --> 01:09:01.137 resources in disasters such as these ? 01:09:01.949 --> 01:09:03.893 Congresswoman , um , thank you and 01:09:03.893 --> 01:09:05.949 thank you for the recognition of our 01:09:05.949 --> 01:09:08.378 home state . Uh , yes , we are postured , 01:09:08.548 --> 01:09:10.619 uh , in places in certain , uh , 01:09:10.938 --> 01:09:13.159 locations with crisis response forces 01:09:13.429 --> 01:09:15.938 and in partnership with USAID , uh , 01:09:15.949 --> 01:09:18.639 there are key and critical stores that 01:09:18.639 --> 01:09:21.548 enable us to respond , uh , to these 01:09:21.548 --> 01:09:23.604 natural disasters and the outcome of 01:09:23.604 --> 01:09:27.469 this is , uh , is , uh , an enhanced uh 01:09:27.469 --> 01:09:29.358 ability to gain access basing and 01:09:29.358 --> 01:09:32.189 overflight in combat . So I , I 01:09:32.189 --> 01:09:34.245 happened to have been flying through 01:09:34.245 --> 01:09:36.467 Hawaii on our way to Australia when the 01:09:36.467 --> 01:09:38.522 Maui fires happened and the response 01:09:38.522 --> 01:09:40.859 was pretty forceful from our military 01:09:40.859 --> 01:09:43.026 because we were still waiting for FEMA 01:09:43.026 --> 01:09:45.026 to respond . This has to not be the 01:09:45.026 --> 01:09:47.137 most efficient way for our government 01:09:47.137 --> 01:09:49.192 to respond to natural disasters that 01:09:49.192 --> 01:09:51.359 happen for our own people and also for 01:09:51.359 --> 01:09:53.470 those around the world . There has to 01:09:53.470 --> 01:09:55.581 be a better way of doing that than to 01:09:55.581 --> 01:09:57.581 distract and deploy our military in 01:09:57.581 --> 01:09:59.803 those sorts of situations . Do you feel 01:09:59.803 --> 01:10:02.220 as though that might be the case ? Uh 01:10:03.549 --> 01:10:05.500 As we do defense support to civil 01:10:05.500 --> 01:10:07.709 authorities , uh , stateside and as we 01:10:07.709 --> 01:10:09.709 do humanitarian assistance disaster 01:10:09.709 --> 01:10:12.430 relief , the military is frequently a 01:10:12.430 --> 01:10:15.430 key and critical partner to our other 01:10:15.430 --> 01:10:17.830 government agencies to deliver this at 01:10:17.830 --> 01:10:20.939 first , uh , but then as uh the aid 01:10:20.939 --> 01:10:23.450 organizations step in we execute a 01:10:23.450 --> 01:10:25.084 graceful . Transfer of those 01:10:25.084 --> 01:10:27.306 capabilities to get back on our primary 01:10:27.306 --> 01:10:29.473 mission of deterrence . In many ways I 01:10:29.473 --> 01:10:31.584 feel as though we're sort of inviting 01:10:31.584 --> 01:10:33.806 our adversaries into the region to take 01:10:33.806 --> 01:10:35.695 that place so it uh of course the 01:10:35.695 --> 01:10:37.917 military will still be there . We still 01:10:37.917 --> 01:10:40.140 are American and we still care , but do 01:10:40.140 --> 01:10:42.306 you believe that we're also increasing 01:10:42.306 --> 01:10:44.306 the possibility of influence in the 01:10:44.306 --> 01:10:46.306 region from places like China ? The 01:10:46.430 --> 01:10:48.541 People's Republic of China sees these 01:10:48.541 --> 01:10:51.680 opportunities and they seize them . My , 01:10:51.709 --> 01:10:53.990 my final or or my second to last 01:10:53.990 --> 01:10:56.268 question is , uh , for General Brunson . 01:10:56.268 --> 01:10:58.430 I'm going to quote an article from 01:10:58.430 --> 01:11:02.350 April 3rd from Military.com titled Army 01:11:02.350 --> 01:11:04.779 Planners are weighing Force reductions 01:11:04.779 --> 01:11:08.100 of up to 90,000 active duty soldiers . 01:11:08.390 --> 01:11:11.180 Are you aware of this article ? No , 01:11:11.229 --> 01:11:13.459 ma'am , I'm not . I , I would love to 01:11:13.459 --> 01:11:15.681 introduce that and if that's OK for the 01:11:15.681 --> 01:11:18.479 record . With objections to order . Um , 01:11:18.520 --> 01:11:20.742 it says that the military army planners 01:11:20.742 --> 01:11:22.909 are weighing reductions as a result of 01:11:22.909 --> 01:11:25.970 Secretary Hag requirement to find 8% 01:11:25.970 --> 01:11:28.850 cuts . Um , to your knowledge , the 01:11:28.850 --> 01:11:31.700 picture is actually of a live fire 01:11:31.700 --> 01:11:33.478 exercise in Indonesia , so it's 01:11:33.478 --> 01:11:35.490 specific to , uh , the , the 01:11:35.490 --> 01:11:37.657 conversation that we're having today . 01:11:37.657 --> 01:11:39.768 You're not aware of any conversations 01:11:39.768 --> 01:11:41.768 of any reduction in force of 90,000 01:11:41.768 --> 01:11:44.640 army soldiers ? No , ma'am , I'm not . 01:11:45.299 --> 01:11:47.410 I would love it if I might be able to 01:11:47.410 --> 01:11:49.521 follow up with you all and understand 01:11:49.521 --> 01:11:51.577 if there's any truth to this article 01:11:51.577 --> 01:11:53.743 because it is sort of alarming to me , 01:11:53.743 --> 01:11:56.021 uh , with what remains of my time , Mr . 01:11:56.021 --> 01:11:58.188 No , I , I wanna , uh , talk to you as 01:11:58.188 --> 01:12:00.077 well . Many of my colleagues have 01:12:00.077 --> 01:12:01.910 spoken to you about , uh , trade 01:12:01.910 --> 01:12:03.910 tariffs and yesterday we had a very 01:12:03.910 --> 01:12:06.370 similar conversation with your uh 01:12:06.370 --> 01:12:08.592 colleague uh who had a similar position 01:12:08.592 --> 01:12:11.399 in . Uh , in Europe , and I really was 01:12:11.399 --> 01:12:13.510 frustrated with her answers , and I'm 01:12:13.510 --> 01:12:15.621 also frustrated with yours that there 01:12:15.621 --> 01:12:17.232 is not a whole of government 01:12:17.232 --> 01:12:19.288 understanding of the implications of 01:12:19.288 --> 01:12:21.177 tariff , uh , being levied on our 01:12:21.177 --> 01:12:23.343 allies in the region and other nations 01:12:23.343 --> 01:12:26.540 in the region too . Is it really your 01:12:26.540 --> 01:12:28.540 position that this is not something 01:12:28.540 --> 01:12:31.839 that's yours to opine on or to talk 01:12:31.839 --> 01:12:35.609 about ? Uh , congressman , 01:12:35.779 --> 01:12:38.001 uh , Congresswoman , yes , uh , tariffs 01:12:38.001 --> 01:12:40.060 is simply beyond her view of my 01:12:40.060 --> 01:12:42.180 position to . But my understanding is 01:12:42.180 --> 01:12:44.347 that at the end of March South Korea , 01:12:44.347 --> 01:12:46.680 China , and Japan have held an economic , 01:12:46.680 --> 01:12:48.979 uh , dialogue that that they agreed 01:12:48.979 --> 01:12:51.339 that they would work together now as a 01:12:51.339 --> 01:12:53.339 result of what the United States is 01:12:53.339 --> 01:12:55.395 levying upon them . Are you aware of 01:12:55.395 --> 01:12:57.506 that ? Generally time expired . Chair 01:12:57.506 --> 01:12:59.450 and I recognize the gentleman from 01:12:59.450 --> 01:13:01.728 Nebraska , Mr . Bacon . Thank you , Mr . 01:13:01.728 --> 01:13:01.390 Chairman . I appreciate all three of 01:13:01.390 --> 01:13:03.390 you being here and we got our hands 01:13:03.390 --> 01:13:05.279 full , the United States . We got 01:13:05.279 --> 01:13:07.334 China's the pacing threat , the long 01:13:07.334 --> 01:13:09.669 term threat . They , they wanna be the 01:13:09.669 --> 01:13:12.750 regional hegemon now and they want to 01:13:12.750 --> 01:13:14.917 be the world superpower in the decades 01:13:14.917 --> 01:13:16.806 to come . I will also submit that 01:13:16.806 --> 01:13:18.917 Russia is the near term threat by its 01:13:18.917 --> 01:13:21.250 behavior with Ukraine , severing cables , 01:13:21.250 --> 01:13:23.361 shooting down airliners , and then we 01:13:23.361 --> 01:13:25.417 also have Iran , the world's largest 01:13:25.417 --> 01:13:25.379 exporter of terror , and we have to 01:13:25.379 --> 01:13:27.435 deal with all three of these , which 01:13:27.435 --> 01:13:29.712 means we have to have the capabilities , 01:13:29.712 --> 01:13:31.823 we also have to have close allies . I 01:13:31.823 --> 01:13:33.823 appreciate the job our our 2 4-star 01:13:33.823 --> 01:13:36.046 generals are doing in the Pacific . I'm 01:13:36.046 --> 01:13:38.212 grateful to you . My first question is 01:13:38.212 --> 01:13:40.212 to Admiral Paparo . I was a 30 year 01:13:40.212 --> 01:13:42.268 electronic warfare , uh , guy in the 01:13:42.268 --> 01:13:44.101 Air Force . Uh , I think we were 01:13:44.101 --> 01:13:46.435 dominant in the 1990s . We will atrophy . 01:13:46.435 --> 01:13:48.601 Could you talk about the importance of 01:13:48.601 --> 01:13:50.768 VW in the in your theater , but also . 01:13:50.768 --> 01:13:52.823 The Air Force has funded 10 EA 37s , 01:13:52.823 --> 01:13:55.046 couples call aircraft , which I used to 01:13:55.046 --> 01:13:57.268 fly the earlier version . I don't think 01:13:57.268 --> 01:13:59.435 that's adequate for your needs , so if 01:13:59.435 --> 01:14:01.601 you could talk about the importance of 01:14:01.601 --> 01:14:01.589 electronic warfare and the EA 37 . 01:14:02.430 --> 01:14:05.160 Thank you Congressman . Uh , yes , um , 01:14:05.470 --> 01:14:07.819 as discussed , our , uh , our , um , 01:14:07.959 --> 01:14:10.390 highest priority is counter command 01:14:10.390 --> 01:14:12.612 control communications and intelligence 01:14:12.612 --> 01:14:14.946 surveillance response and targeting and , 01:14:14.946 --> 01:14:17.229 um , electronic means whether that's 01:14:17.229 --> 01:14:19.173 through Internet protocol , that's 01:14:19.173 --> 01:14:21.229 through , uh , uh , you know , radio 01:14:21.229 --> 01:14:23.819 communications is the absolute linchpin 01:14:24.350 --> 01:14:26.359 and to be able to target that 01:14:26.359 --> 01:14:29.359 non-kinetically . Uh , is , uh , is 01:14:29.359 --> 01:14:31.560 absolutely critical and , uh , I , I 01:14:31.560 --> 01:14:33.759 couldn't agree more with our need to 01:14:33.759 --> 01:14:36.399 strive even harder to gain and to 01:14:36.399 --> 01:14:38.640 maintain dominance in that in those 01:14:38.640 --> 01:14:42.129 critical spectrum . Is 10 EA 01:14:42.129 --> 01:14:45.729 37s adequate ? I'll have to get back to 01:14:45.729 --> 01:14:47.850 you on that , uh , but you're talking 01:14:47.850 --> 01:14:50.072 to somebody that's never satisfied with 01:14:50.072 --> 01:14:52.294 where we are . Well I , I have had some 01:14:52.294 --> 01:14:54.406 access to studies that I think Paycom 01:14:54.406 --> 01:14:56.649 needs 21 , so I'd like to make sure we 01:14:56.649 --> 01:14:59.410 can fund more couples call aircraft so 01:14:59.410 --> 01:15:01.632 we , so you have those capabilities . I 01:15:01.632 --> 01:15:03.577 was gonna talk to you about attack 01:15:03.577 --> 01:15:05.632 submarines . But you've already done 01:15:05.632 --> 01:15:07.577 that , so let me pivot to the Ohio 01:15:07.577 --> 01:15:09.688 class SSGN . So we're gonna , they're 01:15:09.688 --> 01:15:11.299 aging out . They're gonna be 01:15:11.299 --> 01:15:13.410 deactivated at 600 tomahawks . When I 01:15:13.410 --> 01:15:15.521 visited with you in February , you're 01:15:15.521 --> 01:15:17.688 also pointing out some of the cruisers 01:15:17.688 --> 01:15:19.854 that are gonna be deactivated . So can 01:15:19.854 --> 01:15:21.743 you talk about the gap that we're 01:15:21.743 --> 01:15:23.910 starting to build here and the impacts 01:15:23.910 --> 01:15:26.243 of losing these submarines and cruisers . 01:15:26.243 --> 01:15:28.521 Yes sir , uh , having quantity of , of , 01:15:28.521 --> 01:15:31.640 uh , vessels that can impose costs , 01:15:32.020 --> 01:15:34.353 um , I'm probably quoting the wrong guy , 01:15:34.353 --> 01:15:36.569 but quantity has the has a quality all 01:15:36.569 --> 01:15:39.250 its own , and , uh , and so , uh , to 01:15:39.250 --> 01:15:41.290 the extent that our capability 01:15:41.290 --> 01:15:43.850 decreases , that's bad for us . 01:15:46.890 --> 01:15:49.112 Joan Brunson , a question for you . Can 01:15:49.112 --> 01:15:51.279 you talk a little about . Why is North 01:15:51.279 --> 01:15:54.200 Korea sending thousands of troops to 01:15:54.200 --> 01:15:56.422 Russia , and what do you think , how do 01:15:56.422 --> 01:15:58.700 you think they're benefiting from this ? 01:15:58.700 --> 01:16:01.009 Uh , yes , Congressman , uh , so one of 01:16:01.009 --> 01:16:03.240 the reasons is , is , uh , it helps 01:16:03.240 --> 01:16:05.430 them to circumvent the , the normal 01:16:05.430 --> 01:16:08.140 course of business and sanctions that 01:16:08.140 --> 01:16:10.140 exist on them presently . It allows 01:16:10.140 --> 01:16:12.362 them to get around some of that because 01:16:12.362 --> 01:16:14.529 there is material , uh , that's coming 01:16:14.529 --> 01:16:16.307 back to the Democratic People's 01:16:16.307 --> 01:16:19.740 Republic of Korea , um . They're also 01:16:19.779 --> 01:16:22.580 able to get a technological boost , if 01:16:22.580 --> 01:16:24.459 you will on things that they are 01:16:24.459 --> 01:16:26.681 seeking to develop . It's cutting their 01:16:26.681 --> 01:16:28.792 development time in in half . They're 01:16:28.792 --> 01:16:30.848 also receiving some material that we 01:16:30.848 --> 01:16:33.015 can talk about in the closed session , 01:16:33.015 --> 01:16:35.126 uh , that is causing us some problems 01:16:35.126 --> 01:16:37.403 in the operating environment currently . 01:16:38.220 --> 01:16:40.442 I'll come back to the attack submarines 01:16:40.442 --> 01:16:42.553 since it's already touched on , we've 01:16:42.553 --> 01:16:44.664 been producing about one a year right 01:16:44.664 --> 01:16:46.498 now . What's your take on that , 01:16:46.498 --> 01:16:48.553 Admiral Paparro ? It it's inadequate 01:16:48.553 --> 01:16:50.553 and we got to work harder , uh , in 01:16:50.553 --> 01:16:52.776 order to do that and it's a combination 01:16:52.776 --> 01:16:54.939 of , of a steady stream of funding . 01:16:55.020 --> 01:16:57.950 It's a combination of liberalizing the 01:16:57.950 --> 01:17:00.430 defense industrial base , reforming the 01:17:00.430 --> 01:17:03.069 industrial base , uh , and , uh , and 01:17:03.069 --> 01:17:05.470 so , uh , we have to work harder . We 01:17:05.470 --> 01:17:08.709 have to get to 2.3 , 2.4 , 2.5% per 01:17:08.709 --> 01:17:11.180 year , and we can't rest until we do so . 01:17:11.799 --> 01:17:13.966 Thank you very much . I appreciate all 01:17:13.966 --> 01:17:16.021 three of you . I would just close by 01:17:16.021 --> 01:17:18.243 saying , leader of the free world , and 01:17:18.243 --> 01:17:17.879 we can only produce one attack 01:17:17.879 --> 01:17:20.149 submarine . We got to do better . I 01:17:20.149 --> 01:17:22.310 yield . I thank the gentleman for 01:17:22.310 --> 01:17:24.477 yielding , Chair , and I recognize the 01:17:24.477 --> 01:17:26.588 gentleman from New York , Mr . Ryan . 01:17:26.588 --> 01:17:28.754 Uh , thank you , Mr . Chairman . Thank 01:17:28.754 --> 01:17:30.977 you all for being here . Appreciate you 01:17:30.977 --> 01:17:32.643 making a long , a long trip , 01:17:32.643 --> 01:17:32.500 especially for two of the three of you . 01:17:32.830 --> 01:17:35.000 Um , Admiral Paparo , thank you for 01:17:35.000 --> 01:17:37.222 hosting , uh , myself and others , uh , 01:17:37.222 --> 01:17:39.500 out in February , um , along with , uh , 01:17:39.500 --> 01:17:41.669 my colleague Mr . Bacon . Uh , I , I 01:17:41.669 --> 01:17:43.891 think it's important to say in front of 01:17:43.891 --> 01:17:46.113 the American people and , and the whole 01:17:46.113 --> 01:17:47.947 committee . I left with an um an 01:17:47.947 --> 01:17:50.058 incredibly optimistic and and frankly 01:17:50.058 --> 01:17:52.350 very proud view of your leadership all 01:17:52.350 --> 01:17:54.517 the subordinate component commands all 01:17:54.517 --> 01:17:56.628 aligned clear eyed about the threat , 01:17:56.709 --> 01:17:58.709 clear eyed about the urgency of the 01:17:58.709 --> 01:18:00.876 moment , and I just , I commend you on 01:18:00.876 --> 01:18:03.098 that , um , and I also commend you on , 01:18:03.098 --> 01:18:05.042 you know , always coming to us and 01:18:05.042 --> 01:18:07.209 letting us know , uh , in a productive 01:18:07.209 --> 01:18:09.376 way what we can be doing to enable and 01:18:09.376 --> 01:18:11.564 continue to up up . I wanna , uh , um 01:18:11.564 --> 01:18:13.675 share something specifically that you 01:18:13.675 --> 01:18:15.842 said at the the Honolulu Defense forum 01:18:15.842 --> 01:18:18.120 when I was out there that I think , um , 01:18:18.120 --> 01:18:20.231 is really aligned with the chairman's 01:18:20.231 --> 01:18:19.964 leadership and the ranking member's 01:18:19.964 --> 01:18:22.242 leadership and where we wanna focus on , 01:18:22.242 --> 01:18:24.365 um , acquisition reform . You talked 01:18:24.365 --> 01:18:27.325 about , um , procurement that moves at 01:18:27.325 --> 01:18:30.084 the speed of combat , not the speed of 01:18:30.084 --> 01:18:32.725 committee or Congress , uh , or we 01:18:32.725 --> 01:18:35.859 could use other C words um . I , I , I , 01:18:35.939 --> 01:18:37.995 uh , I just want foot stomp that and 01:18:37.995 --> 01:18:40.106 thank you for saying that so directly 01:18:40.106 --> 01:18:42.259 and again I , I , um , really 01:18:42.259 --> 01:18:44.315 appreciate the chair and the ranking 01:18:44.315 --> 01:18:46.481 member's leadership in pushing us as a 01:18:46.481 --> 01:18:48.481 whole of committee to drive on , on 01:18:48.481 --> 01:18:50.315 that um and I know that you will 01:18:50.315 --> 01:18:52.537 continue to let us know specific , uh , 01:18:52.537 --> 01:18:54.426 reforms and needs as as that goes 01:18:54.426 --> 01:18:57.850 through , um . Uh , I wanna shift now , 01:18:58.209 --> 01:19:00.379 uh , to a , uh , separate but related 01:19:00.379 --> 01:19:02.323 topic , and again I , I know we're 01:19:02.323 --> 01:19:04.490 talking about this a lot , but share , 01:19:04.490 --> 01:19:06.601 uh , Mr . No , my colleague's concern 01:19:06.601 --> 01:19:08.490 and disappointment that we're not 01:19:08.490 --> 01:19:10.712 getting candid answers . Uh , frankly , 01:19:10.712 --> 01:19:12.657 even as a , a very junior military 01:19:12.657 --> 01:19:14.657 officer , I understood that all the 01:19:14.657 --> 01:19:16.768 elements of national power diplomatic 01:19:16.768 --> 01:19:18.879 information , military , and economic 01:19:18.879 --> 01:19:20.601 have to be synchronized , uh , 01:19:20.601 --> 01:19:22.768 effectively . So I do think , uh , the 01:19:22.768 --> 01:19:22.270 committee and the American people are , 01:19:22.290 --> 01:19:24.346 are owed an answer on this . I wanna 01:19:24.346 --> 01:19:26.680 talk about the impacts to our , our 01:19:26.680 --> 01:19:28.680 allies , uh , that other colleagues 01:19:28.680 --> 01:19:32.220 have , uh , highlighted , uh , the 01:19:32.220 --> 01:19:34.442 hypocrisy of asking allies and partners 01:19:34.442 --> 01:19:36.779 in Indo Paycom . To up their defense 01:19:36.779 --> 01:19:39.370 spending up their burden sharing , uh , 01:19:39.379 --> 01:19:41.657 and then hitting them with nonsensical , 01:19:41.657 --> 01:19:44.490 uninformed , and I think now clearly , 01:19:44.839 --> 01:19:47.459 uh , shown to be not even technically 01:19:47.819 --> 01:19:50.620 correct tariffs is , is , uh , I think 01:19:50.620 --> 01:19:54.339 a a massive own goal as we would , uh , 01:19:54.419 --> 01:19:56.586 say with my 5 and 3 year olds that I'm 01:19:56.586 --> 01:20:00.330 teaching soccer , um . Your testimony 01:20:00.330 --> 01:20:02.600 specifically calls out empowering our 01:20:02.600 --> 01:20:04.433 allies and commanders in in your 01:20:04.433 --> 01:20:06.544 opening remarks as one of the keys to 01:20:06.544 --> 01:20:08.544 reestablishing deterrence and in in 01:20:08.544 --> 01:20:10.489 paycom and achieving peace through 01:20:10.489 --> 01:20:12.656 strength . Yes or no , please . Do you 01:20:12.656 --> 01:20:16.109 think a 46% or does apart think a 46% 01:20:16.109 --> 01:20:18.839 tariff empowers Vietnam ? 01:20:20.000 --> 01:20:23.040 Yes or no ? Congressman , I can't give 01:20:23.040 --> 01:20:25.262 a yes or no answer because the issue of 01:20:25.262 --> 01:20:27.640 tariffs , uh , is , do you think of my 01:20:27.640 --> 01:20:30.120 position , do you think that a 25% 01:20:30.120 --> 01:20:33.970 tariff on South Korea . Empowers 01:20:33.970 --> 01:20:36.081 our allies and partners . Same , same 01:20:36.081 --> 01:20:38.379 answer , Congressman . General Brunson . 01:20:39.180 --> 01:20:42.049 Do you think that empowers our allies 01:20:42.049 --> 01:20:43.779 and partners in South Korea ? 01:20:48.750 --> 01:20:50.972 Congressman , if I could just ask for a 01:20:50.972 --> 01:20:52.917 point of clarification , you , now 01:20:52.917 --> 01:20:55.028 we're down to 25% . I would , I would 01:20:55.028 --> 01:20:57.250 say that it impacts their budget and so 01:20:57.250 --> 01:20:59.472 that's something else they'll have to , 01:20:59.472 --> 01:21:01.583 to work through the Korean government 01:21:01.583 --> 01:21:03.361 to , to solve . Do you think it 01:21:03.361 --> 01:21:05.583 strengthens our , our partnership ? Yes 01:21:05.583 --> 01:21:08.629 or no ? Congressman , I , I cannot say 01:21:08.629 --> 01:21:10.799 that yet because I don't know the 01:21:10.799 --> 01:21:13.021 impacts of it . Uh , I've been here for 01:21:13.021 --> 01:21:15.243 a week , but we come through our recent 01:21:15.243 --> 01:21:17.299 exercise series . There have been no 01:21:17.299 --> 01:21:19.279 impacts to what I understand are 01:21:19.279 --> 01:21:21.223 purchases that are ongoing for the 01:21:21.223 --> 01:21:23.335 military element within Korea , and I 01:21:23.335 --> 01:21:26.100 believe that we're sound . Thank you , 01:21:26.160 --> 01:21:28.560 General . uh , on Australia , who 01:21:28.560 --> 01:21:30.671 everyone has acknowledged as our most 01:21:30.671 --> 01:21:32.893 strategic partner in in Indo Paycom and 01:21:32.893 --> 01:21:35.004 Mr . Courtney spoke about this . uh , 01:21:35.004 --> 01:21:37.227 Mr . Admiral Paparo , you call them our 01:21:37.227 --> 01:21:37.200 most strategic partner . Mr . No , you 01:21:37.200 --> 01:21:39.479 call them a key logistics hub . It's 01:21:39.479 --> 01:21:41.423 clear that they were blindsided in 01:21:41.423 --> 01:21:43.423 particular by this tariff which I . 01:21:43.423 --> 01:21:45.535 Find particularly offensive given the 01:21:45.535 --> 01:21:47.479 time and investment all of us have 01:21:47.479 --> 01:21:49.701 spent in building that relationship and 01:21:49.701 --> 01:21:51.923 nurturing and growing that relationship 01:21:51.923 --> 01:21:51.915 to the point that the prime minister 01:21:51.915 --> 01:21:53.615 said , quote , the Trump 01:21:53.615 --> 01:21:55.782 administration's tariffs have no basis 01:21:55.782 --> 01:21:57.726 in logic , and they go against the 01:21:57.726 --> 01:22:00.134 basis of our two nations' partnerships . 01:22:00.464 --> 01:22:02.353 He's absolutely right . Does that 01:22:02.353 --> 01:22:04.464 tariff , can you at least acknowledge 01:22:04.464 --> 01:22:06.520 on August , given all the bipartisan 01:22:06.520 --> 01:22:08.742 work that's been done there , that that 01:22:08.742 --> 01:22:10.686 hurts our relationship , Mr . No ? 01:22:11.500 --> 01:22:13.500 Congressman , we have a very strong 01:22:13.500 --> 01:22:15.833 relationship with Australia . Yes or no . 01:22:15.833 --> 01:22:17.889 Does that , does that help or hinder 01:22:17.889 --> 01:22:20.330 our partnership to blindside an ally 01:22:20.859 --> 01:22:23.899 with such a forceful tariff . I'm not , 01:22:23.939 --> 01:22:25.995 I'm not here to talk about tariffs , 01:22:25.995 --> 01:22:27.995 congressman . Gentleman's expired . 01:22:27.995 --> 01:22:30.050 Chair and I recognize gentleman from 01:22:30.050 --> 01:22:32.328 Texas , Mr . Fallon . I thank you , Mr . 01:22:32.328 --> 01:22:34.550 Chairman . Uh , Admiral , thank you for 01:22:34.550 --> 01:22:34.209 being here , general as well , just 01:22:34.209 --> 01:22:37.609 know . I like to keep things simple , 01:22:37.779 --> 01:22:40.729 basic . 20 years ago , would you agree , 01:22:41.180 --> 01:22:43.459 uh , Admiral , that in the last 20 01:22:43.459 --> 01:22:45.220 years China's capabilities and 01:22:45.220 --> 01:22:48.220 ambitions have grown exponentially ? I 01:22:48.220 --> 01:22:50.442 have a direct view of that over that 20 01:22:50.442 --> 01:22:52.664 years , yes , and you'd agree they're a 01:22:52.664 --> 01:22:55.819 military peer now . I do . OK , uh , 01:22:55.979 --> 01:22:59.509 same question , general . So looking 01:22:59.509 --> 01:23:01.731 through the DPRK lens , I would say yes 01:23:01.731 --> 01:23:04.709 on both counts . Thank you . So how 01:23:04.709 --> 01:23:06.820 many Admiral , how many Marines do we 01:23:06.820 --> 01:23:10.350 have on Okinawa today ? 18,000 and was 01:23:10.350 --> 01:23:12.461 it , was it roughly the same 20 years 01:23:12.461 --> 01:23:15.029 ago ? Uh , 20 years ago it was about 01:23:15.029 --> 01:23:17.109 the same , yes sir . What's the end 01:23:17.109 --> 01:23:19.189 strength goal right now ? Uh , 01:23:19.310 --> 01:23:21.459 presently right now , uh , 3rd Marine 01:23:21.459 --> 01:23:24.620 Expeditionary Force is at end strength 01:23:24.620 --> 01:23:27.040 as it's as it's stationed . Uh , where 01:23:27.040 --> 01:23:29.151 it is , it really is optimized . OK , 01:23:29.151 --> 01:23:31.318 and so we're not , there's no plans to 01:23:31.318 --> 01:23:33.540 reduce it from say 18 , 19,000 to about 01:23:33.540 --> 01:23:35.762 half , 10,000 . There is a , uh , there 01:23:35.762 --> 01:23:38.040 is the defense policy renew initiative , 01:23:38.040 --> 01:23:40.330 our agreement with Japan . And it's a 01:23:40.330 --> 01:23:42.209 conditions based process and uh 01:23:42.209 --> 01:23:46.020 ultimately 5000 US Marines are are 01:23:46.020 --> 01:23:48.850 uh planned to be in Guam and another 01:23:48.850 --> 01:23:51.450 2700 Marines are planned to be in 01:23:51.450 --> 01:23:53.729 Hawaii . So given the considerations 01:23:53.729 --> 01:23:55.896 that you know we're talking about with 01:23:55.896 --> 01:23:58.007 China and the threat , it's something 01:23:58.007 --> 01:23:59.951 that I would recommend we do is to 01:23:59.951 --> 01:24:02.062 renegotiate with our Japanese friends 01:24:02.062 --> 01:24:04.340 and keep those 18,000 or that strength , 01:24:04.340 --> 01:24:06.990 18 to 19,000 . Because if God forbid , 01:24:07.729 --> 01:24:09.951 general , how many troops do we have in 01:24:09.951 --> 01:24:12.173 Korea in the 80s roughly ? was it about 01:24:12.173 --> 01:24:14.340 50,000 , is that right ? Congressman , 01:24:14.340 --> 01:24:16.930 it's uh a bit lower than that 40s , 01:24:16.979 --> 01:24:19.129 45,000 or so a little bit lower than 01:24:19.129 --> 01:24:22.629 that 40 , 28 , so in the 01:24:22.629 --> 01:24:26.009 80s , 30 years ago we only had , I'm 01:24:26.009 --> 01:24:28.176 not talking today , what was it then ? 01:24:28.176 --> 01:24:30.287 What was our high strength ? Probably 01:24:30.287 --> 01:24:32.649 about 60,000 when the division and what 01:24:32.649 --> 01:24:34.871 is it now about 30 , about half , about 01:24:34.871 --> 01:24:36.871 30 , OK . So we've established that 01:24:36.871 --> 01:24:39.093 this threat has grown exponentially and 01:24:39.093 --> 01:24:41.316 yet uh we've reduced our footprint . So 01:24:41.316 --> 01:24:43.093 God forbid . Uh , it's a simple 01:24:43.093 --> 01:24:45.205 question and an obvious answer , um , 01:24:45.205 --> 01:24:47.316 but God forbid there is a conflict on 01:24:47.316 --> 01:24:49.427 the Korean Peninsula . God forbid the 01:24:49.427 --> 01:24:51.705 Chinese do cross the Taiwanese straits . 01:24:51.705 --> 01:24:53.649 Would you rather have 45 or 50,000 01:24:53.649 --> 01:24:55.760 American troops in on the peninsula , 01:24:55.760 --> 01:24:58.038 or would you rather have 30 , you know , 01:24:58.038 --> 01:24:59.982 it's obvious , right ? Yes , yes , 01:24:59.982 --> 01:25:02.149 Congressman , it's an obvious answer . 01:25:02.149 --> 01:25:04.371 You'd always want more , but , uh , but 01:25:04.371 --> 01:25:06.371 the same thing , uh , Admiral in in 01:25:06.371 --> 01:25:08.538 Okinawa , right ? I mean , if a little 01:25:08.538 --> 01:25:10.538 bit's good , a whole lot's better , 01:25:10.538 --> 01:25:12.649 yeah , you know , and I'm not worried 01:25:12.649 --> 01:25:14.593 that it's gonna capsize either . I 01:25:14.593 --> 01:25:16.927 think that's , uh , gonna be solid , um , 01:25:16.927 --> 01:25:19.189 so . Admiral , we have a great many 01:25:19.189 --> 01:25:21.522 allies in the region , wonderful allies , 01:25:21.522 --> 01:25:23.745 uh , you know , so so many of them come 01:25:23.745 --> 01:25:25.911 to mind , but what I wanna ask is what 01:25:25.911 --> 01:25:28.022 country , uh , in , in your view is , 01:25:28.022 --> 01:25:30.419 is already an established model ally 01:25:30.990 --> 01:25:33.259 that , uh , we could , what what is 01:25:33.259 --> 01:25:35.779 that model ally and how can we foster 01:25:36.069 --> 01:25:38.236 more of our relationships to look like 01:25:38.236 --> 01:25:41.080 that one ? Indo Paycom has 5 of the 01:25:41.080 --> 01:25:43.839 nation's 6 treaty allies in its AOR , 01:25:43.879 --> 01:25:46.101 and when I have got uh tremendous pride 01:25:46.101 --> 01:25:48.129 in our execution of that alliance 01:25:48.129 --> 01:25:51.529 itself , um , Japan , South Korea , and 01:25:51.529 --> 01:25:53.799 Australia , uh , are very much model 01:25:53.799 --> 01:25:56.310 allies and their ability to , uh , uh , 01:25:56.319 --> 01:25:58.939 to provide , uh , capability . And the 01:25:58.939 --> 01:26:01.459 Philippines is growing and um we've 01:26:01.459 --> 01:26:03.459 recently had a very good engagement 01:26:03.459 --> 01:26:05.403 with Thailand and they continue to 01:26:05.403 --> 01:26:07.626 contribute . Yeah , Thailand's worrying 01:26:07.626 --> 01:26:07.459 me a little bit about cozying up to 01:26:07.459 --> 01:26:09.292 China . That's why we just is so 01:26:09.292 --> 01:26:11.459 important what we do here . So another 01:26:11.459 --> 01:26:13.626 question I'm very curious to hear your 01:26:13.626 --> 01:26:15.737 answer which which friend or friendly 01:26:15.737 --> 01:26:18.640 nation in Indopeon presents the most . 01:26:18.779 --> 01:26:21.209 Promise and potential benefit for the 01:26:21.209 --> 01:26:23.265 United States uh in our interests in 01:26:23.265 --> 01:26:25.810 the future . Vietnam and Indonesia and 01:26:25.810 --> 01:26:28.759 India , absolutely India above all 01:26:28.759 --> 01:26:31.450 others . Um , I , I noticed in India in 01:26:31.450 --> 01:26:34.049 '07 they only bought about $230 million 01:26:34.049 --> 01:26:36.140 or so dollars worth of military 01:26:36.140 --> 01:26:38.196 equipment and today it's neighboring 01:26:38.196 --> 01:26:40.029 around $24 billion and it's very 01:26:40.029 --> 01:26:42.140 promising . But they're still playing 01:26:42.140 --> 01:26:44.307 with the Russians and I get why legacy 01:26:44.307 --> 01:26:46.362 systems and such , but they're still 01:26:46.362 --> 01:26:48.584 buying more from Russia so we really do 01:26:48.584 --> 01:26:50.640 need to do what what do you think we 01:26:50.640 --> 01:26:52.862 can do to pull India more towards uh uh 01:26:52.862 --> 01:26:55.359 our sphere if you will . Uh , India , 01:26:55.950 --> 01:26:58.109 India's , uh , uh , security 01:26:58.109 --> 01:27:00.709 cooperation sales with Russia is 01:27:00.709 --> 01:27:03.620 approximately 30% of their gear . No 01:27:03.620 --> 01:27:06.629 new buys on this . It's all buys to 01:27:06.629 --> 01:27:08.740 maintain the vestigial equipment that 01:27:08.740 --> 01:27:10.907 they had with India . They'll continue 01:27:10.907 --> 01:27:13.310 to treasure their non-aligned status , 01:27:13.390 --> 01:27:15.819 but they'll move more and more , uh , 01:27:15.830 --> 01:27:17.941 in partnership with the United States 01:27:17.941 --> 01:27:20.108 and the other market democracies as we 01:27:20.108 --> 01:27:22.052 move forward . And uh just for the 01:27:22.052 --> 01:27:24.219 record , Mr . Chairman , I really hope 01:27:24.219 --> 01:27:26.274 that we do increase our footprint on 01:27:26.274 --> 01:27:28.497 the Korean Peninsula and in Okinawa . I 01:27:28.497 --> 01:27:27.720 think it's strategic and important and 01:27:27.720 --> 01:27:29.887 vital , and I yield back . Thank you . 01:27:29.887 --> 01:27:32.053 Thank the gentlemen , cheering on Rick 01:27:32.053 --> 01:27:34.331 knows gently from Hawaii , Ms . Dakota . 01:27:34.331 --> 01:27:36.890 Thank you Mr . Chair . Section 356 of 01:27:36.890 --> 01:27:38.850 last year's NDAA directed the 01:27:38.850 --> 01:27:40.961 Department of Defense to establish an 01:27:40.961 --> 01:27:42.906 advanced manufacturing facility to 01:27:42.906 --> 01:27:45.089 support submarine shipbuilding and the 01:27:45.089 --> 01:27:47.256 broader defense industrial base in the 01:27:47.256 --> 01:27:49.200 Indo-Pacific . I was proud to help 01:27:49.200 --> 01:27:51.422 secure this provision , and I'm keen to 01:27:51.422 --> 01:27:53.589 better . Understand how the department 01:27:53.589 --> 01:27:55.756 is implementing it . Admiral Paparo as 01:27:55.756 --> 01:27:55.589 a primary user of this advanced 01:27:55.589 --> 01:27:57.589 manufacturing program , how does it 01:27:57.589 --> 01:27:59.367 support your requirement as the 01:27:59.367 --> 01:28:01.367 combatant commander and how are you 01:28:01.367 --> 01:28:03.589 providing direction to the services and 01:28:03.589 --> 01:28:05.811 other entities to guide ongoing efforts 01:28:05.811 --> 01:28:07.867 related to advanced manufacturing in 01:28:07.867 --> 01:28:09.867 Hawaii to best support your needs ? 01:28:09.867 --> 01:28:12.089 Aloha Congresswoman , good to see you . 01:28:12.450 --> 01:28:14.672 We are implementing in partnership with 01:28:14.672 --> 01:28:17.129 Hawaii Community College and on uh at 01:28:17.129 --> 01:28:19.351 Wheeler Airfield and Schofield Barracks 01:28:19.351 --> 01:28:21.296 to bring additive manufacturing in 01:28:21.296 --> 01:28:23.351 order to gain as much leverage as we 01:28:23.351 --> 01:28:27.240 can on the ability on scene to provide , 01:28:27.370 --> 01:28:29.250 uh , to provide uh replacement 01:28:29.250 --> 01:28:31.609 capabilities , replacement parts , and 01:28:31.609 --> 01:28:33.850 to speed up our , uh , our supply 01:28:33.850 --> 01:28:36.229 chains . Uh , and , uh , we think this 01:28:36.229 --> 01:28:38.509 is a model everywhere is to be at the 01:28:38.509 --> 01:28:41.899 point of need there , uh , and , um , 01:28:41.910 --> 01:28:43.466 greater investment in these 01:28:43.466 --> 01:28:45.577 capabilities , additive manufacturing 01:28:45.577 --> 01:28:48.029 aided by AI is critical to us . Uh , I 01:28:48.029 --> 01:28:50.160 made it a focus , as you know , um , 01:28:50.189 --> 01:28:52.356 having been on this mission for a good 01:28:52.356 --> 01:28:54.522 while , and , uh , and I , I think one 01:28:54.522 --> 01:28:56.689 of the biggest barriers to it is going 01:28:56.689 --> 01:28:59.240 to be , uh , to ensure that the systems 01:28:59.240 --> 01:29:02.049 commands quickly assess . The 01:29:02.049 --> 01:29:04.919 applicability of those components , uh , 01:29:04.930 --> 01:29:07.041 and when they're finding them wanting 01:29:07.041 --> 01:29:09.097 we run to the problem and improve it 01:29:09.097 --> 01:29:11.319 and when they are adequate quickly give 01:29:11.319 --> 01:29:13.430 authorities to employ those to employ 01:29:13.430 --> 01:29:15.208 those uh additive manufacturing 01:29:15.208 --> 01:29:17.319 capabilities to move faster to repair 01:29:17.319 --> 01:29:19.541 gear and to get it on the line faster . 01:29:19.589 --> 01:29:21.645 Thank you , Admiral . I'm sure we'll 01:29:21.645 --> 01:29:23.978 have many more discussions on this , um , 01:29:23.978 --> 01:29:26.089 right now if I can't pivot slightly a 01:29:26.089 --> 01:29:28.200 bit , Admiral , is it helpful to your 01:29:28.200 --> 01:29:30.089 work in the Indo-Pacific when our 01:29:30.089 --> 01:29:32.256 European allies support our deterrence 01:29:32.256 --> 01:29:34.367 in the Pacific , such as when Germany 01:29:34.367 --> 01:29:36.311 and France conducted Taiwan Strait 01:29:36.311 --> 01:29:38.367 Traits last fall ? It is , and I , I 01:29:38.367 --> 01:29:40.256 commend our European partners for 01:29:40.256 --> 01:29:42.478 having been especially robust in 2024 . 01:29:42.600 --> 01:29:44.711 Thank you and Mr . No , going back to 01:29:44.711 --> 01:29:46.822 the discussions about whether America 01:29:46.822 --> 01:29:48.933 first means America alone , Mr . No , 01:29:48.933 --> 01:29:51.100 do you , um , does this administration 01:29:51.100 --> 01:29:53.322 agree that our European and NATO allies 01:29:53.322 --> 01:29:55.433 have an important role to play in the 01:29:55.433 --> 01:29:58.930 Indo-Pacific ? Uh , congresswoman , 01:29:59.220 --> 01:30:01.331 uh , the department does believe they 01:30:01.331 --> 01:30:03.660 have a , a role , uh , is it an 01:30:03.660 --> 01:30:05.660 important role that they play given 01:30:05.660 --> 01:30:07.779 that China is facing . It's an 01:30:07.779 --> 01:30:09.501 important role . However , the 01:30:09.501 --> 01:30:11.335 Secretary has asked our European 01:30:11.335 --> 01:30:13.446 partners to first and foremost , uh , 01:30:13.446 --> 01:30:15.223 prioritize European continental 01:30:15.223 --> 01:30:17.459 security . Uh , to do more , uh , for 01:30:17.459 --> 01:30:19.459 their own backyard , uh , first and 01:30:19.459 --> 01:30:21.626 foremost , but we will see it in a bit 01:30:21.626 --> 01:30:23.848 of a siloed effect in terms of stick to 01:30:23.848 --> 01:30:26.015 your region , uh , Admiral Paparo , do 01:30:26.015 --> 01:30:27.792 you think China is watching our 01:30:27.792 --> 01:30:29.959 commitment in Ukraine ? Do you believe 01:30:29.959 --> 01:30:31.848 China is engaging in the European 01:30:31.848 --> 01:30:33.903 theater , uh , not sticking to their 01:30:33.903 --> 01:30:35.737 own region ? Uh , I believe just 01:30:35.737 --> 01:30:37.792 recently Ukraine captured two men of 01:30:37.792 --> 01:30:40.126 Chinese origin fighting for Russia . Uh , 01:30:40.126 --> 01:30:42.220 they did , and , um , any success 01:30:42.220 --> 01:30:44.500 offensively in Europe will embolden the 01:30:44.500 --> 01:30:47.049 PRC in their own offensive ambitions . 01:30:47.509 --> 01:30:49.565 Clearly we can't disentangle the the 01:30:49.565 --> 01:30:51.453 theaters like perhaps some in the 01:30:51.453 --> 01:30:53.676 administration might think we can , and 01:30:53.676 --> 01:30:55.842 I would hope that the administration's 01:30:55.842 --> 01:30:57.842 comments and action . Going forward 01:30:57.842 --> 01:30:59.842 would reflect um the global impacts 01:30:59.842 --> 01:31:01.731 that what happens in Ukraine does 01:31:01.731 --> 01:31:03.620 matter in terms of our ability to 01:31:03.620 --> 01:31:05.787 safeguard the Indo-Pacific and provide 01:31:05.787 --> 01:31:07.842 stability there um I just wanna with 01:31:07.842 --> 01:31:10.065 the time I have remaining go to another 01:31:10.065 --> 01:31:12.231 question . Transactional relationships 01:31:12.231 --> 01:31:14.819 don't work in defense . They don't , uh , 01:31:14.830 --> 01:31:16.886 whether you're talking about tariffs 01:31:16.886 --> 01:31:18.663 it's been talked about today or 01:31:18.663 --> 01:31:20.830 demanding increased burden for defense 01:31:20.830 --> 01:31:23.052 costs it undermines trust it undermines 01:31:23.052 --> 01:31:25.274 commitment and our ability to withstand 01:31:25.274 --> 01:31:27.497 adversity going forward . The president 01:31:27.497 --> 01:31:29.608 has talked about providing our allies 01:31:29.608 --> 01:31:31.441 even with toned down versions of 01:31:31.441 --> 01:31:33.552 aircrafts because they may not always 01:31:33.552 --> 01:31:35.719 be our allies . uh , now this does not 01:31:35.719 --> 01:31:38.189 to me uh project confidence , uh , to 01:31:38.189 --> 01:31:40.245 people that we want to fight side by 01:31:40.245 --> 01:31:42.830 side us in the case of aggression . Um , 01:31:42.839 --> 01:31:44.783 Admiral Paparo , does this kind of 01:31:44.783 --> 01:31:47.140 transactional relationship that is 01:31:47.140 --> 01:31:49.390 being projected and these statements 01:31:49.390 --> 01:31:51.501 being made about providing our allies 01:31:51.501 --> 01:31:54.060 with substandard aircraft or equipment , 01:31:54.220 --> 01:31:56.270 does this help or hurt us in the 01:31:56.270 --> 01:31:59.069 Indo-Pacific ? Congresswoman , um . 01:32:00.080 --> 01:32:02.200 There there are operational security 01:32:02.200 --> 01:32:04.200 requirements for those based on the 01:32:04.200 --> 01:32:06.367 ability of our partners to secure that 01:32:06.367 --> 01:32:08.533 information . Uh , we do our very best 01:32:08.533 --> 01:32:10.589 to get , uh . But do you feel in the 01:32:10.589 --> 01:32:12.478 time remaining that transactional 01:32:12.478 --> 01:32:14.700 relationships are a good foundation for 01:32:14.700 --> 01:32:16.533 defense partners in any region , 01:32:16.533 --> 01:32:19.040 especially the Indo-Pacific . Um , you 01:32:19.040 --> 01:32:20.818 know my commitment to authentic 01:32:20.818 --> 01:32:22.707 relationships with our allies and 01:32:22.707 --> 01:32:24.818 partners . Thank you very much , Mr . 01:32:24.818 --> 01:32:24.160 Chair . You'll back .