WEBVTT

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Defense sub-committee will come to

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order today . The sub-committee will

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receive testimony from the honorable

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Frank Kendall , Secretary of the Air

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Force General David Alvin , chief of

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Staff of the Air Force General Chance

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Saltzman , chief of Space Operations .

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Thank you all for joining us today .

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General Alvin , I'll note that this is

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your first appearance before this uh

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subcomittee . Welcome and

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congratulations on your new role ,

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increasingly volatile world events

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since the hearing last year have

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underscored the importance of

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maintaining a strong and ready air

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force and Space Force . China is

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engaged in a historic military build up

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seeks to erode our military superiority

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while China remains our pacing threat ,

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it's not only a threat we face . Russia

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continues its assault on Ukraine . And

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early this month , Iran launched its

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first ever direct attack on Israel .

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I'm pleased that we were able to get

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supplemental preparations across the

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finish line to address our met needs in

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these three regions . Our air and space

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forces must be ready and able to

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respond across the globe if needed . We

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need to be an innovative and agile with

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the goal of rapidly putting advanced

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capability in the hands of our airmen

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and guardians for the Air Force . The

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fiscal year 2025 budget request is

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228.8 billion . This is 2% more than an

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active amount for fiscal year 24 which

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I note does not keep up with inflation .

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When budgets are constrained tradeoffs

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must be made . And a certain level of

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risk is assumed today , we will discuss

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your proposed tradeoffs in a

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constrained top line . One area that

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gets a lot of attention is the is the

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divestment of aircraft . And this

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budget proposes significant divestments .

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On one hand , older airframes are less

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suited for modern missions , expensive

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to maintain and parts are at a premium

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on the other quantity has a quality

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unto itself , particularly in a

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perilous security environment . I

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understand that you have to prioritize

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to your constrained top line , but we

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need to understand the capability gaps

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this will create and your mitigation

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plans . We also need assurance that

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your bet on modernization over

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sustainment will yield success . And

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unfortunately , the track record is not

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encouraging so far . Just last week ,

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we were notified of a none mccurdy

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breach for the MH 139 Gray Wolf . This

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follows the Sentinels none mccurdy

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breach . We need to understand the

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implications of both of these breach

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reviews for fiscal year 2025 and beyond .

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I also hope to hear how the Air Force

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plans to address the acquisition delays

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for the and mitigation plans to ensure

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there's no capability gap for the war

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fighter and the F-15 EXT seven and E

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seven to name just a few particularly

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uh in cons uh of our own , of all , all

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of our concern . On the bright side ,

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I'm pleased to see that the Air Force

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continued to prioritize investments in

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the B 21 and next generation air doin

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aircraft , especially with the recent

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down select of the collaborative combat

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aircraft , two companies , one of which

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was founded just a few years ago for

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the space force . The fiscal year 2025

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budget request is 29.4 billion which is

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effectively flat funding compared to

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last year . Factoring in inflation .

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This is a real dollar cut . In fact ,

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the projected budget for Space force

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remains flat at this amount for the

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over the next five years . Budgets are

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obviously tight . However , given the

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increasing reliance on space capability

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and plans to pivot some missions from

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aircraft to space , I'm skeptical that

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a flat line level budget is credible to

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deliver all the capabilities needed .

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I'd like to know where you choose to

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take risks in a space portfolio . In

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this year's budget , this committee

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expects programs to be well managed .

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One of the key reasons for establishing

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the space force was to bring a focused

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discipline in delivering capabilities

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on schedule and within budget , the

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space force continues to work in

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progress in this regard , a work in

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progress in this regard , I should say

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especially when it comes to delivering

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ground systems and user equipment . For

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example , the global positioning system ,

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ground control system is more than $3

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billion over budget , more than seven

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years late and still has not been

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delivered . Further . Your own

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assessment identifies the space command

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and control program and the family of

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beyond line of sight terminals as

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another challenging program that fail

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to meet schedule mile milestones and

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will be delivered late . The pattern is

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clear . The problem with space is on

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the ground . I hope you to hear your

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plans to ensure ground systems keep

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pace with the satellite developments .

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On a positive note , I continue to be

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impressed with the progress of Space

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Development Agency and the rapid

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development to acquisition process .

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This committee is willing to give the

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space force resources to take risks and

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pursue new approaches when warranted

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and SD A has lived up to its investment

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so far . I think we can agree that

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there are challenges that need to be

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addressed , but I also know that the

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devil is in the details and it matters

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how things are being addressed . I have

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been disappointed with the level of

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rigor in the analysis behind some of

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the department's program decisions and

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organizational proposals . This

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subcomittee is data driven and will not

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accept proposals that are pre uh

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presented simply as done deals .

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Another area of concern is the

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innovation and rapid fielding accounts

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which has been a focus of mine . The

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request for APP works is 20.5 million .

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A substantial decrease from the last

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two years . App works and space wars

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are critical to the defense innovation

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ecosystem , essential to expanding

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opportunities of nontraditional defense

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companies and increasing use of

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commercial technologies . I'll be

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interested to hear how you intend to

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get after various innovation , if not

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through the apps and space wars .

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Finally , we are aware of the challenge

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of the entire department is having with

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recruitment across all components . I

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want to hear about your strategy to

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recruit the airmen and guardians of

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today and the service leaders of

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tomorrow . We'll be working closely

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with you throughout this budget process

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to find ways we can accelerate the

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fielding of platforms needed by our war

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fighters today . With that , I'll yield

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to the ranking member MS mccullum for

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any opening remarks you would like to

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make . Thank you , Mr Chairman for the

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courtesy . I'd also like to welcome the

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Secretary Kendall General Alban and

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General Saltzman for fiscal year 2025

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president has proposed eight , excuse

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me , $832 billion within our

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subcommittee's jurisdiction for the

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Department of Defense , which is $213

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billion for the Air Force and Space

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Force . The air Force has requested a

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1% increase and space force remains

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relatively flat following a large

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growth year in 2024 . Each of these

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dollars represents an effort to remain

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vigilant in our national defense and to

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ensure that America meets our pacing

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threats . We are operating under the

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umbrella of a Fiscal Responsibility Act .

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And I know that tough choices were made

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in this budget in order to conform to

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the what the law will allow . As I said

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in the hearing with Secretary Austin ,

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I hope Congress has learned the hard

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lesson that we should not hold a

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national debt limit hostage to

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arbitrary spending caps . So for those

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who have buyer's remorse over their

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votes last May and those who are now

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criticizing the overall levels in the

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budget request . I wish to remind them

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that the fundamental strength of our

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nation's defenses and the strength of

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our military personnel and their

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families . And that requires a whole of

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government approach . Our national

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security is supported through our

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entire budget which includes health

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care , education , transportation , and

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not just the defense budget growing our

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technological superiority in the air

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and space domain are also critical and

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it is as important as ever to educate

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and train the next generation of

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mathematicians , physicists ,

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aeronautical engineers and computer

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scientists . In addition , Congress set

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the department's hiring a new start

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schedules six months back by enacting a

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final appropriations bill in March . We

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must do better to break the cycle of

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continuing resolutions . And I turn to

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the budget at hand now and the

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modernization which we know is a key

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theme for the Department of Air Force .

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It's concerning that several Air Force

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programs are still struggling F-35

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deliveries are delayed along with an

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associated plant repair and

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infrastructure projects . Mr Secretary ,

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we have discussed this several times in

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conversations now and I hope that it's

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been resolved , it needs to be resolved ,

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it needs to be resolved immediately .

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The sentinel program is under a

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critical review because of time delays

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and major cost overruns . The E

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seven program has been delayed and the

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budget does not have

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advanced uh program for procurement .

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At the same time , the air Force is

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proposing fielding new capabilities and

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required complex technology

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development along with it . For example ,

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I have to ask , how can we be assured

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that programs to support long range

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kill chains will be a success when the

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air force continues to struggle with

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the existing programs of record . I'm

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also concerned about the state of the

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air force's infrastructure is deficient

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and it does not seem to be a high

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priority . We've discussed sinkholes at

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Vandenberg Space Force Base , the

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uh deterioration of runways , the early

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warning radar stations in Alaska ,

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climate change continues to have a high

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cost impact on our national security

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infrastructure at Guam still needs

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repair following last year's typhoon

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and Congress should have acted on that .

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I hope we do so in the future .

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But most importantly , our service

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members need all of us , Congress and

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the department to do a better job ,

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working together , to provide and

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maintain infrastructure necessary for

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them to be able to even do their jobs ,

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Mr Chair . As I close 10 days ago , we

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had a series of overwhelming bipartisan

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votes on the components of national

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security supplemental to support

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Ukraine Israel and the Indo Pacific . I

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hope that that will serve as a model

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for improving appropriation bills and

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getting them approved expeditiously

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through 2025 because as you pointed out ,

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we don't have time to waste . Gentlemen ,

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I thank you for your service to the

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country and for appearing here today

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with that Mr Chair . I yield back .

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Thank you , Miss mccollum , Chairman

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Cole intended to be here today but is

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unable to present his statement due to

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obvious disaster in Oklahoma and

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certainly our prayers for those who

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experience these terrible tornadoes in

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Oklahoma , Nebraska and elsewhere . So

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without objection , as prepared remarks

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will be included in the record . Uh

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I'll now recognize uh m ranking

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member Laura for any comments you may

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like to make . Thank you so much , Mr

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Chairman and thank you to you and to

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ranking member mccullum uh for holding

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the hearing on the 2025 budget for the

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United States Air Force and the Space

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force . I want to thank our witnesses ,

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Secretary Kendall and Generals Alvin

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and Saltzman for appearing before the

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subcomittee today and for your

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dedicated service to our nation . You

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keep the nation safe , you keep our

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airmen and women and guardians safe and

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you ensure our allies are supported

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wherever democracy and freedom are

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threatened around the globe . Through

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the fiscal year 2025 budget Congress

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has a sacred duty to ensure the air

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force and space force have the

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resources to fulfill its mission to

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keep our country secure and ensure our

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service members are protected and well

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equipped . The president's 2025 budget

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supports our brave airmen and women

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guardians , their families with a 4.5%

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pay , raise furthers initiatives to

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improve access to health care and

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childcare while addressing housing and

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subsistence needs . This is the full

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compensation package that our service

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members deserve and we need to deliver

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on all of those components in the

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president's request . The Space force

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budget is relatively flat following a

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large growth year in 2024 . Meanwhile ,

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the air force has requested roughly $3

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billion more than last year . I would

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be remiss if I did not point out that

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the combat rescue helicopter is not

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included in the request . This

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helicopter is still flying a critical

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mission and Congress supported this

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mission in the final 2024 bill by

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ordering an additional 10 helicopters

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to maintain production . I will

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continue to support this program . I

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hope to hear more about the air force's

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plans for maintaining a strong combat

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rescue capability . I'm also interested

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to hear today about how the force is

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planned to balance their modernization

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efforts with management of existing

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programs . Additionally , I want to

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hear about how the Air Force and Space

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Force are addressing recruitment issues .

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Regrettably , the majority chose to

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inject culture war debates into last

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year's Department of Defense funding

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process . And I am concerned with how

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that might further hurt recruitment

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efforts , especially among women . We

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must do all we can to ensure that any

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American who wants to bravely serve in

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the US armed forces to defend our

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nation feels that they belong and that

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they are now not going to be drawn into

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political warfare while confronting the

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legitimate threats to freedom ,

14:23.630 --> 14:26.239
democracy and above all to our national

14:26.250 --> 14:28.659
security . Thank you , Mr Chairman I ,

14:28.669 --> 14:32.000
you back . Thank you ,

14:32.299 --> 14:34.410
Showman . Your full written testimony

14:34.410 --> 14:36.521
will be placed in the record . Please

14:36.521 --> 14:38.855
give a brief summary of your statements .

14:38.855 --> 14:41.077
Secretary Kendall , you're recognized .

14:41.077 --> 14:43.077
Thank you , Mr Chairman uh Chairman

14:43.077 --> 14:45.077
Calvert , ranking member mccollum ,

14:45.077 --> 14:47.243
members of the sub-committee , General

14:47.243 --> 14:49.355
Saltzman John Alvin . And I thank you

14:49.355 --> 14:51.577
for the opportunity to testify today on

14:51.577 --> 14:51.359
the Department of the Air Force's fy 25

14:51.369 --> 14:53.480
budget submission , Department of the

14:53.480 --> 14:55.647
Air Force . Uh Budget request supports

14:55.647 --> 14:57.591
the national defense strategy . We

14:57.591 --> 14:59.758
appreciate the committee's support for

14:59.758 --> 15:01.869
the recently enacted fy 24 budget and

15:01.869 --> 15:04.091
your efforts to secure timely passage .

15:04.091 --> 15:06.258
As you are aware , the six month delay

15:06.258 --> 15:08.313
has had a real impact . Uh that time

15:08.313 --> 15:10.425
cannot be recovered , but at least we

15:10.425 --> 15:12.480
can now move forward with our urgent

15:12.480 --> 15:14.258
modernization plans . As I have

15:14.258 --> 15:16.036
testified before this committee

15:16.036 --> 15:17.869
repeatedly , time is my greatest

15:17.869 --> 15:20.091
concern . We are in a race for military

15:20.091 --> 15:21.925
technological superiority with a

15:21.925 --> 15:24.091
capable pacing challenge . Our cushion

15:24.091 --> 15:26.313
is gone . We are out of time as we have

15:26.313 --> 15:28.425
briefed the committee at a classified

15:28.425 --> 15:28.299
level . The pacing threat moves

15:28.309 --> 15:31.000
steadily forward , continued failure to

15:31.010 --> 15:32.899
provide on time . Authorities and

15:32.899 --> 15:35.121
appropriations will leave the Air force

15:35.121 --> 15:37.343
and space force inadequately prepared .

15:37.343 --> 15:39.566
We know this committee fully recognizes

15:39.566 --> 15:41.510
this and we appreciate your strong

15:41.510 --> 15:43.621
bipartisan support . Our fy 25 budget

15:43.621 --> 15:45.566
request complies with the Physical

15:45.566 --> 15:47.732
Responsibility Act . We are requesting

15:47.732 --> 15:50.450
27 217.5 billion for the Department of

15:50.460 --> 15:52.780
the Air Force which includes 100 and 88

15:52.789 --> 15:55.250
million for the Air Force and 29.4

15:55.260 --> 15:58.099
billion for the Space Force . The fy 25

15:58.109 --> 16:01.390
budget reflects an increase of 2.1% for

16:01.400 --> 16:03.456
the Department of the Air Force over

16:03.456 --> 16:06.000
the enacted fy 24 budget , a 2%

16:06.010 --> 16:08.349
increase for the Air Force and a 2.4%

16:08.359 --> 16:10.510
increase for the Space Force . This

16:10.520 --> 16:12.576
does not keep pace with inflation as

16:12.576 --> 16:14.780
was mentioned earlier or with the 7%

16:14.789 --> 16:17.011
publicly acknowledged growth to China's

16:17.011 --> 16:18.956
military budget to stay within the

16:18.956 --> 16:21.020
levels of the of the fr a . The

16:21.030 --> 16:22.974
Department of the Air Force had to

16:22.974 --> 16:25.440
adjust our previous plans . The DAF 25

16:25.450 --> 16:27.580
budget seeks to preserve the momentum

16:27.590 --> 16:29.534
behind our modernization efforts ,

16:29.534 --> 16:31.590
particularly the work on operational

16:31.590 --> 16:33.757
imperatives that we initiated and that

16:33.757 --> 16:36.280
this committee supported in fy 24 . In

16:36.289 --> 16:38.345
order to preserve modernization , we

16:38.345 --> 16:40.567
have marginally reduced procurement and

16:40.567 --> 16:42.511
we have sustained our foundational

16:42.511 --> 16:44.733
accounts at levels we deemed acceptable

16:44.733 --> 16:46.733
but no more because the space force

16:46.733 --> 16:48.733
budget is dominated by research and

16:48.733 --> 16:50.845
development accounts . We have had to

16:50.845 --> 16:53.067
marginally reduce the pace and scope of

16:53.067 --> 16:55.345
our space force modernization programs .

16:55.345 --> 16:57.289
Our first priority in the national

16:57.289 --> 16:59.511
defense strategy remains defense of the

16:59.511 --> 17:01.678
homeland , which the Department of the

17:01.678 --> 17:01.229
Air Force primarily supports through

17:01.239 --> 17:03.429
investments in domain awareness , air

17:03.440 --> 17:05.579
and space defense , early warning and

17:05.589 --> 17:08.150
cyberspace defense programs . Our

17:08.160 --> 17:10.271
second priority is to deter strategic

17:10.271 --> 17:12.493
attacks against the United States , our

17:12.493 --> 17:14.160
allies and our partners , the

17:14.160 --> 17:16.049
Department of the Air Force fy 25

17:16.049 --> 17:17.993
budget request prioritizes nuclear

17:17.993 --> 17:19.938
modernization to maintain a safe ,

17:19.938 --> 17:22.216
secure and effective nuclear deterrent .

17:22.409 --> 17:24.631
Notably , the Sentinel ICBM program has

17:24.639 --> 17:26.629
experienced unacceptable cost and

17:26.639 --> 17:28.639
schedule increases and is currently

17:28.639 --> 17:30.695
undergoing a number mccurdy review .

17:30.769 --> 17:32.880
Department of the Air Force will work

17:32.880 --> 17:34.825
closely with the committee as that

17:34.825 --> 17:36.991
review reaches its conclusions . Third

17:36.991 --> 17:39.102
national defense strategy priority is

17:39.102 --> 17:41.269
to deter aggression and be prepared to

17:41.269 --> 17:43.325
prevail in conflict when necessary .

17:43.325 --> 17:43.170
Department of the Air Force needs

17:43.180 --> 17:45.347
immediate and significant capability .

17:45.347 --> 17:47.347
Modernization to keep pace with the

17:47.347 --> 17:49.569
growing military capabilities of the PR

17:49.569 --> 17:51.569
C . The Department of the Air Force

17:51.569 --> 17:53.736
operational imperative and the closely

17:53.736 --> 17:55.624
related cross cutting operational

17:55.624 --> 17:57.458
neighbors continues to guide our

17:57.458 --> 17:59.347
modernization program . The fy 25

17:59.347 --> 18:01.569
budget request includes 6.1 billion for

18:01.569 --> 18:03.624
these efforts . Finally , the fourth

18:03.624 --> 18:05.847
national defense priority is to build a

18:05.847 --> 18:07.791
resilient joint force and enduring

18:07.791 --> 18:09.736
advantages . This budget request ,

18:09.736 --> 18:11.847
invests to ensure that we can recruit

18:11.847 --> 18:13.958
and retain the force we need . And so

18:13.958 --> 18:15.902
the airmen and guardians and their

18:15.902 --> 18:18.069
families have the quality of life they

18:18.069 --> 18:17.979
deserve and conserve to their full

18:17.989 --> 18:20.369
potential . As we have briefed the

18:20.380 --> 18:22.491
committee , the Department of the Air

18:22.491 --> 18:24.602
Force is also currently undertaking a

18:24.602 --> 18:26.380
department wide effort to re re

18:26.380 --> 18:28.491
optimize to meet the demands of great

18:28.491 --> 18:30.547
power competition . The intent is to

18:30.547 --> 18:32.269
minimize both cost impacts and

18:32.269 --> 18:34.380
personnel or unit or unit movements .

18:34.469 --> 18:36.691
We will work closely with the committee

18:36.691 --> 18:38.747
as we develop detailed plans , we do

18:38.747 --> 18:40.858
not anticipate any significant impact

18:40.858 --> 18:42.858
on the fy 25 budget and we have not

18:42.858 --> 18:45.040
requested funds for this purpose . The

18:45.050 --> 18:46.828
department also appreciates the

18:46.828 --> 18:48.939
committee's support for the dod quick

18:48.939 --> 18:51.106
start initiative that was enacted last

18:51.106 --> 18:53.272
year . Department of the Air Force has

18:53.272 --> 18:55.494
obtained approval from the Secretary of

18:55.494 --> 18:57.606
Defense for two programs that will be

18:57.606 --> 18:59.661
initiated under this new authority .

18:59.661 --> 19:01.606
They are more resilient , national

19:01.606 --> 19:01.099
position , navigation and timing

19:01.109 --> 19:03.060
capability and C three battle

19:03.069 --> 19:05.402
management for moving target indication ,

19:05.949 --> 19:08.390
time matters . But so do resources .

19:08.770 --> 19:10.437
The United States is facing a

19:10.437 --> 19:12.437
competitor with national purchasing

19:12.437 --> 19:14.159
power that exceeds our own . A

19:14.159 --> 19:16.381
challenge we have never faced in modern

19:16.381 --> 19:18.437
times . China is actively developing

19:18.437 --> 19:20.659
and expanding capabilities to challenge

19:20.659 --> 19:22.492
strategic stability , attack our

19:22.492 --> 19:24.603
critical space systems and defeat our

19:24.603 --> 19:26.714
ability to project power , especially

19:26.714 --> 19:28.770
air power conflict is not inevitable

19:28.770 --> 19:30.659
but it could happen at any time .

19:31.719 --> 19:33.830
General Al and I just returned from a

19:33.830 --> 19:35.886
trip to some of our key bases in the

19:35.886 --> 19:37.886
Indo Pacific . We shall all be very

19:37.886 --> 19:39.997
proud of our men and women serving in

19:39.997 --> 19:42.052
harm's way and doing everything they

19:42.052 --> 19:43.830
can to deter and be ready for a

19:43.830 --> 19:46.163
conflict . Unlike any we've seen before ,

19:46.163 --> 19:48.386
the Department of the Air Force , fy 25

19:48.386 --> 19:50.608
budget request is focused on addressing

19:50.608 --> 19:52.775
these realities . We commit to working

19:52.775 --> 19:54.775
with the committee to secure timely

19:54.775 --> 19:54.650
enactment of this budget request .

19:54.660 --> 19:56.660
Thank you . We look forward to your

19:56.660 --> 19:58.827
questions . Thank you , Mr Secretary .

19:58.827 --> 20:00.938
I now recognize General Alvin for his

20:00.938 --> 20:03.140
remarks . Thank you . Good afternoon ,

20:03.150 --> 20:05.039
Chairman Calvert , ranking member

20:05.039 --> 20:07.150
mccollum and distinguished members of

20:07.150 --> 20:09.290
this subcomittee . Today . I am proud

20:09.300 --> 20:11.760
to represent the 677,000 total four

20:11.810 --> 20:13.921
chairman serving our nation . I wanna

20:13.921 --> 20:16.143
thank you for your unyielding support ,

20:16.143 --> 20:18.366
not only for those airmen but for their

20:18.366 --> 20:20.532
families as well as we look across the

20:20.532 --> 20:22.754
strategic landscape . We find ourselves

20:22.754 --> 20:24.921
in a time of significant consequence .

20:24.921 --> 20:27.032
The simultaneous demands of strategic

20:27.032 --> 20:28.977
competition with an aggressive and

20:28.977 --> 20:30.643
increasingly capable PR C and

20:30.643 --> 20:32.699
persistent acute threats from around

20:32.699 --> 20:34.643
the globe require the air force to

20:34.643 --> 20:36.532
maximize the readiness of today's

20:36.532 --> 20:38.588
forces while adapting our structures

20:38.588 --> 20:40.366
and processes to offer the best

20:40.366 --> 20:41.977
opportunity to prevail in an

20:41.977 --> 20:43.977
environment of enduring great power

20:43.977 --> 20:46.199
competition . Time is not on our side .

20:46.760 --> 20:48.760
The F I 25 Air Force budget request

20:48.760 --> 20:50.982
reflects difficult choices . We've made

20:50.982 --> 20:52.871
tradeoffs to keep the Air force's

20:52.871 --> 20:54.816
operational readiness today at the

20:54.816 --> 20:57.038
minimum acceptable to meet the nation's

20:57.038 --> 20:59.149
needs . While seeking to preserve the

20:59.149 --> 21:00.704
previous year's advances in

21:00.704 --> 21:02.760
modernization . The Air Force budget

21:02.760 --> 21:04.982
request also invests in the air force's

21:04.982 --> 21:07.038
most precious asset . It's airmen to

21:07.038 --> 21:08.816
ensure they remain the decisive

21:08.816 --> 21:11.149
advantage upon which the nation depends .

21:11.149 --> 21:13.316
Strategic deterrence is a key priority

21:13.316 --> 21:13.199
in our national defense strategy . And

21:13.209 --> 21:15.320
the US Air Force remains committed to

21:15.320 --> 21:17.542
recapitalization of our nuclear force .

21:17.770 --> 21:19.937
We are actively supporting the process

21:19.937 --> 21:22.103
triggered by the nun mccurdy breach of

21:22.103 --> 21:23.937
the Sentinel program and we will

21:23.937 --> 21:26.159
continue to pursue the path of a safe ,

21:26.159 --> 21:28.326
reliable , secure and effective ground

21:28.326 --> 21:30.492
leg of the nuclear triad will into the

21:30.492 --> 21:32.492
future . Our ability to support the

21:32.492 --> 21:34.714
national defense strategy . Priority of

21:34.714 --> 21:36.881
deterring aggression and prevailing in

21:36.881 --> 21:38.992
conflict demands . A modern air force

21:38.992 --> 21:41.048
that is connected to the joint force

21:41.048 --> 21:40.959
and can close multiple kill chains in

21:40.969 --> 21:43.479
minimal time to control the tempo of a

21:43.489 --> 21:45.767
complex fight with the pure competitor .

21:46.040 --> 21:48.599
The F to that end , the fy 25 budget

21:48.609 --> 21:50.720
proposes continued investments in the

21:50.720 --> 21:54.020
F-35 and the F-15 ex , albeit with

21:54.030 --> 21:56.060
fewer than preferred quantities

21:56.069 --> 21:58.013
dictated by the constraints of the

21:58.013 --> 22:00.125
Fiscal Responsibility Act . We remain

22:00.125 --> 22:02.180
committed to the advanced air battle

22:02.180 --> 22:04.180
management system of the NGA family

22:04.180 --> 22:05.680
systems , particularly the

22:05.680 --> 22:07.680
collaborative combat aircraft which

22:07.680 --> 22:09.902
will allow the air force to deliver the

22:09.902 --> 22:11.625
affordable mass required to be

22:11.625 --> 22:13.847
effective against a very capable PR C .

22:14.170 --> 22:16.003
We're also committed to building

22:16.003 --> 22:18.226
forward basing that is resilient enough

22:18.226 --> 22:20.337
to enable continued sortie generation

22:20.337 --> 22:22.448
even while under attack to arrest the

22:22.448 --> 22:24.392
decline in our readiness . We have

22:24.392 --> 22:26.003
proposed modest increases in

22:26.003 --> 22:28.226
investments in flying hours and weapons

22:28.226 --> 22:30.226
systems sustainment to support them

22:30.226 --> 22:30.160
while prioritizing investments in

22:30.170 --> 22:31.959
critical physical and cyber

22:31.969 --> 22:34.280
infrastructure , our airmen are and

22:34.290 --> 22:36.401
always will be the deciding factor in

22:36.401 --> 22:38.623
any conflict our air force faces and we

22:38.623 --> 22:40.290
are committed to their health

22:40.290 --> 22:42.346
development and quality of life . We

22:42.346 --> 22:44.457
have made significant progress thanks

22:44.457 --> 22:46.623
to Congress's support and increases in

22:46.623 --> 22:48.457
basic pay , adjustments to basic

22:48.457 --> 22:50.568
allowance for housing and subsistence

22:50.568 --> 22:52.401
to account for the macroeconomic

22:52.401 --> 22:54.623
factors they face . There is still work

22:54.623 --> 22:56.679
to be done during our recent trip to

22:56.679 --> 22:58.846
the Indo Pacific Secretary Kendall and

22:58.846 --> 23:01.012
I saw dedicated airmen that were eager

23:01.012 --> 23:02.901
to accomplish the mission despite

23:02.901 --> 23:02.729
infrastructure degradation caused by

23:02.739 --> 23:04.660
natural disaster and persistent

23:04.670 --> 23:06.839
environmental challenges as well as

23:06.849 --> 23:08.738
limited access to the health care

23:08.738 --> 23:11.109
enjoyed by most Conus bases . The job

23:11.119 --> 23:13.341
of your air force has not changed since

23:13.341 --> 23:15.819
its inception , support the defense of

23:15.829 --> 23:18.051
this nation through credible deterrence

23:18.051 --> 23:20.359
and unmatched combat prowess . To

23:20.369 --> 23:22.536
preserve that level of deterrence . We

23:22.536 --> 23:24.536
must maintain our readiness today ,

23:24.536 --> 23:26.591
modernize our force for tomorrow and

23:26.591 --> 23:28.647
provide the absolute best support to

23:28.647 --> 23:30.869
our airmen and their families . Success

23:30.869 --> 23:33.091
on any battlefield is a team effort . I

23:33.091 --> 23:32.959
want to thank the members of Congress

23:32.969 --> 23:35.025
and this committee for your past and

23:35.025 --> 23:37.025
continued support . Thank you and I

23:37.025 --> 23:39.810
look forward to your questions . Thank

23:39.819 --> 23:42.380
you , general . Uh Now , uh we'll move

23:42.390 --> 23:44.501
to General Saltzman for his remarks .

23:44.501 --> 23:45.723
General you recognize

26:52.880 --> 26:54.936
so long as you continue to trust and

26:54.936 --> 26:56.880
invest in your space force . Space

26:56.880 --> 26:58.936
Force will respond with unparalleled

26:58.936 --> 27:02.810
dive 40 years . Thank you . Uh And we ,

27:02.819 --> 27:04.986
we will begin with the question . Each

27:04.986 --> 27:07.041
uh member will be given five minutes

27:07.041 --> 27:09.208
for their questions and answers . When

27:09.208 --> 27:08.510
your time returns , yow , you have a

27:08.520 --> 27:10.569
minute remaining . Uh First , I'll

27:10.579 --> 27:13.030
recognize myself . Um

27:13.859 --> 27:17.000
Obviously the KC 46 is an important

27:17.010 --> 27:20.949
aircraft for us and to obtain Air Force

27:20.959 --> 27:23.181
is in the process of recapitalizing its

27:23.181 --> 27:26.689
aging fleet of KC 135 which I think was

27:26.699 --> 27:30.010
the old 707 airframe , which probably

27:30.020 --> 27:33.050
the only plane on the 707 still flying

27:33.060 --> 27:36.530
on the planet is our fleet of , of uh

27:36.540 --> 27:39.170
that aircraft . There's been some

27:39.180 --> 27:41.859
issues obviously with the KC 46

27:42.859 --> 27:45.000
but the one that seems to keep , it

27:45.010 --> 27:47.066
never seems to go away is the remote

27:47.066 --> 27:50.689
vision system , the RVS and uh and a

27:50.699 --> 27:54.339
stiff uh refueling boom . Um efforts to

27:54.349 --> 27:56.627
resolve both these issues are underway .

27:56.627 --> 27:58.793
It's been underway for a long time . I

27:58.793 --> 28:00.682
understand there's a final design

28:00.682 --> 28:02.989
solution expected for RVS by the early

28:03.000 --> 28:07.000
Fy 26 and mid Fy 25

28:07.010 --> 28:09.479
respectively . Until the deficiencies

28:09.489 --> 28:12.329
are resolved . The KC 46 A will not be

28:12.719 --> 28:15.790
fully mission capable secretary . We

28:15.800 --> 28:17.967
just heard this morning from the Chief

28:17.967 --> 28:19.856
of the Air Force Reserve that the

28:19.856 --> 28:22.569
delivery of KKC 46 for instance at

28:22.579 --> 28:26.130
March Air Force Base in my area

28:26.140 --> 28:28.589
will be laid , what is the problem and

28:28.599 --> 28:31.989
what are you doing to resolve it ? Uh

28:33.530 --> 28:35.863
As you , as you mentioned , Mr Chairman ,

28:35.863 --> 28:37.808
this issue with the remote viewing

28:37.808 --> 28:39.863
system has been there for quite some

28:39.863 --> 28:41.974
time . Um It , it does not completely

28:41.974 --> 28:44.030
limit the aircraft . The aircraft is

28:44.030 --> 28:46.030
capable for uh transmitting fuel to

28:46.030 --> 28:48.197
every aircraft in our inventory except

28:48.197 --> 28:50.363
the A 10 . I think that's the only one

28:50.363 --> 28:52.363
that at this point . So uh we can't

28:52.363 --> 28:54.252
refuel . Um And there are certain

28:54.252 --> 28:56.141
lighting conditions which make it

28:56.141 --> 28:58.086
difficult to do refueling . So the

28:58.086 --> 29:00.086
aircraft is largely operational and

29:00.086 --> 29:02.141
we're continuing to take delivery of

29:02.141 --> 29:01.910
them while we work through solving this

29:01.920 --> 29:03.920
problem . And I think the dates you

29:03.920 --> 29:06.140
said were roughly the dates . Uh We're

29:06.150 --> 29:08.430
continuing to procure A KC 46 at a rate

29:08.439 --> 29:11.020
of about 15 per year including an Fy 25 .

29:11.189 --> 29:13.078
And we're starting to work on the

29:13.078 --> 29:15.133
transition to the next generation of

29:15.133 --> 29:17.356
reviewers which will have to be able to

29:17.356 --> 29:19.245
uh uh survive in a more contested

29:19.245 --> 29:18.989
environment .

29:22.930 --> 29:24.708
Looking forward to getting that

29:24.708 --> 29:26.930
resolved and getting delivery on the KC

29:26.930 --> 29:30.579
46 aircraft . Uh innovation and rapid

29:30.589 --> 29:32.645
fielding to the warfighter have been

29:32.645 --> 29:34.756
obviously top heard of this committee

29:34.756 --> 29:36.700
of mine since coming to Congress ,

29:36.700 --> 29:39.280
which I consider a collaborative effort

29:39.290 --> 29:41.500
with , with diu establishing a strong

29:41.510 --> 29:43.232
infrastructure for the defense

29:43.339 --> 29:46.599
innovation ecosystem is critical . And

29:46.609 --> 29:50.119
fy 25 request includes 20.5 million for

29:50.520 --> 29:52.910
awards prime , which is a decrease of

29:52.920 --> 29:56.430
83.3 million and 24 and over 100 30

29:56.439 --> 29:59.550
million and 23 requests . Jodi and

29:59.560 --> 30:01.910
autonomy Prime efforts dropped from 70

30:01.920 --> 30:05.589
million in ffy 24 to 6 million in 25 .

30:06.130 --> 30:08.352
I'm concerned the Air Force has decided

30:08.352 --> 30:10.770
to slash resources in a well known

30:10.780 --> 30:13.900
innovation hub . Uh Mr Secretary , what

30:13.910 --> 30:16.021
message are you sending to innovators

30:16.189 --> 30:19.459
if a budget request has been gutted in

30:19.650 --> 30:23.010
fiscal year 25 and given the importance

30:23.020 --> 30:25.109
of innovation , uh can I get your

30:25.119 --> 30:27.008
commitment to support the IU with

30:27.008 --> 30:29.230
manpower billets and detainees for , we

30:29.230 --> 30:31.452
can get this thing off the ground . But

30:31.452 --> 30:33.508
with that secretary , you won't find

30:33.508 --> 30:35.619
anybody more supportive of innovation

30:35.619 --> 30:35.089
than myself and my colleagues here . I

30:35.099 --> 30:37.900
think um as as I mentioned in my

30:37.910 --> 30:40.132
opening statement , we're putting about

30:40.132 --> 30:42.354
$6 billion into modernization under the

30:42.354 --> 30:44.521
operational imperatives . The guidance

30:44.521 --> 30:46.743
I've given to our acquisition people is

30:46.743 --> 30:48.966
to structure programs to get meaningful

30:48.966 --> 30:48.880
capability in the hands of our

30:48.890 --> 30:51.170
operators as quickly as possible . So

30:51.180 --> 30:53.402
that's what we're trying to do with our

30:53.402 --> 30:55.124
programs . But there's also an

30:55.124 --> 30:57.347
observation uh that goes back some time

30:57.347 --> 30:59.402
that we've been starting more things

30:59.402 --> 31:01.402
than we can finish by a significant

31:01.402 --> 31:03.402
margin . We have to be more careful

31:03.402 --> 31:03.239
about the things we start and be

31:03.250 --> 31:05.194
certain that they're gonna be cost

31:05.194 --> 31:07.250
effective and they're gonna fit into

31:07.250 --> 31:09.306
our budgets in the future and lead a

31:09.306 --> 31:11.306
real field of capability . So we've

31:11.306 --> 31:13.528
been trying to pin uh pare back some of

31:13.528 --> 31:15.528
the things which have little if any

31:15.528 --> 31:17.750
chance of actually transitioning across

31:17.750 --> 31:19.694
the value of death to focus on the

31:19.694 --> 31:21.528
things that will , I've recently

31:21.528 --> 31:23.583
reached out to the directors of both

31:23.583 --> 31:25.417
DIU and so uh to set up day long

31:25.417 --> 31:27.528
briefings with them to go through all

31:27.528 --> 31:29.750
their programs to give them feedback on

31:29.750 --> 31:29.660
the things that they're working on that

31:29.670 --> 31:31.670
we think will actually get into our

31:31.670 --> 31:33.781
budgets . And in general , what we're

31:33.781 --> 31:35.948
working to do is try to ensure that we

31:35.948 --> 31:35.489
have a much more efficient and

31:35.500 --> 31:37.829
effective pipeline of new capabilities

31:37.839 --> 31:40.061
coming into the inventory as quickly as

31:40.061 --> 31:42.117
you can . The threat demands that so

31:42.117 --> 31:44.228
you wouldn't find anybody , you won't

31:44.228 --> 31:46.172
find anybody more interested in uh

31:46.172 --> 31:48.395
innovation and getting it fielded . But

31:48.395 --> 31:50.228
we also have to given the budget

31:50.228 --> 31:52.172
constraints that we have make wise

31:52.172 --> 31:54.339
decisions at the front end , front end

31:54.339 --> 31:57.619
about which things to pursue . Anything

31:57.630 --> 32:00.530
else general . The only thing I would

32:00.540 --> 32:02.707
add to what the secretary said is also

32:02.707 --> 32:04.762
in one of our re optimized for great

32:04.762 --> 32:06.929
power competition is one of the things

32:06.929 --> 32:08.984
that we're looking at is having this

32:08.984 --> 32:08.609
integrated capability command . When we

32:08.619 --> 32:10.841
talk about the value of death , we need

32:10.841 --> 32:13.008
to have the other side of the value of

32:13.008 --> 32:15.230
death pulling , saying bring this to me

32:15.230 --> 32:17.341
and , and having this integrated into

32:17.341 --> 32:17.329
one entity that says , I have a single

32:17.510 --> 32:19.677
design . I need this . I need this , I

32:19.677 --> 32:21.621
need this and be able to match the

32:21.621 --> 32:23.843
innovative ideas to something that will

32:23.843 --> 32:26.010
make it into the force design . To the

32:26.010 --> 32:28.232
secretary said that dollar has a better

32:28.232 --> 32:30.232
chance of making it into meaningful

32:30.232 --> 32:30.209
capability sooner . So we're trying to

32:30.219 --> 32:32.441
also work on the other end to make sure

32:32.441 --> 32:34.386
those innovations are targeted and

32:34.386 --> 32:36.552
focused on a force design that's going

32:36.552 --> 32:38.219
to use them , Miss mccullum .

32:40.329 --> 32:43.069
Thank you , Mr Chair . Um This morning ,

32:43.079 --> 32:45.760
we heard from the National Guard , uh

32:45.770 --> 32:48.380
during the budget hearing a lot about a

32:48.390 --> 32:50.709
legislative proposal to move the air

32:50.719 --> 32:53.839
National Guard members to space force .

32:54.050 --> 32:56.217
In the hearing , we were informed that

32:56.217 --> 32:59.130
70% of Guard members wish to stay in

32:59.140 --> 33:02.819
the Guard . Um And I expect that you

33:02.829 --> 33:05.107
are more than aware that our governors ,

33:05.107 --> 33:07.218
the chairs of my governors included ,

33:07.339 --> 33:09.430
uh were very unhappy about this

33:09.439 --> 33:12.520
proposal . 48 of the 50 governors

33:12.530 --> 33:14.939
signed a letter in opposition as well

33:14.949 --> 33:17.380
as uh all the States and territories

33:17.619 --> 33:19.786
and as I mentioned this morning , as a

33:19.786 --> 33:21.897
state , former state legislature that

33:21.897 --> 33:24.390
had uh the preview over the Minnesota

33:24.400 --> 33:28.300
National Guard . Um I can tell

33:28.310 --> 33:30.160
you that the states need to be

33:30.170 --> 33:32.560
consulted and need to be full partners

33:32.569 --> 33:35.020
moving forward in any major change such

33:35.030 --> 33:38.260
as this . So , uh you know , one would

33:38.270 --> 33:40.930
wonder why Congress should seriously

33:40.939 --> 33:42.883
consider this if our Governors and

33:42.883 --> 33:45.359
National Guards are so opposed . Maybe

33:45.369 --> 33:47.719
I wonder were they opposed because they

33:47.729 --> 33:50.280
weren't consulted and their input

33:50.290 --> 33:53.280
wasn't sought before this proposal . So

33:53.290 --> 33:55.179
right now this morning , it would

33:55.179 --> 33:57.068
appear that this would be dead on

33:57.068 --> 33:59.179
arrival . And the creation of a space

33:59.179 --> 34:01.234
National Guard might not be the most

34:01.234 --> 34:03.829
cost effective idea either . In fact ,

34:03.839 --> 34:06.209
the the congressional budget office uh

34:06.219 --> 34:09.879
said in 2020 that the estimated one

34:09.889 --> 34:13.610
time cost of 400 to $900 million for

34:13.620 --> 34:16.090
additional facilities in each state .

34:16.620 --> 34:20.540
And then anywhere from uh 385 to

34:20.550 --> 34:24.020
$490 million in annual operating costs .

34:24.030 --> 34:26.252
So I know the authorizes are looking at

34:26.252 --> 34:28.540
that . This is their preview . I look

34:28.550 --> 34:30.494
forward to their decision and then

34:30.494 --> 34:32.760
we'll work with them um as , as uh

34:32.770 --> 34:35.270
finding funding as they move forward .

34:35.719 --> 34:37.959
So I , we had the conversation this

34:37.969 --> 34:40.025
morning . I thought it was only fair

34:40.025 --> 34:41.747
that , that you hear what this

34:41.747 --> 34:43.858
committee had to say . What I want to

34:43.858 --> 34:46.025
ask you about though . Today is cancer

34:46.025 --> 34:49.149
rates . Uh Last year we discussed about

34:49.159 --> 34:51.159
the high cancer rates in pilots and

34:51.159 --> 34:53.370
ground crews . Air crews and members

34:53.379 --> 34:56.399
had an 87% higher rate of

34:56.409 --> 34:59.969
melanoma and a 39% higher rate of

34:59.979 --> 35:03.689
thyroid cancer . Men had a 16% higher

35:03.699 --> 35:07.310
rate of prostate cancer women , a 16%

35:07.320 --> 35:10.510
higher rate of breast cancer overall

35:10.520 --> 35:14.449
air crews 24% higher rate of all

35:14.459 --> 35:17.489
types of cancer . In addition , ground

35:17.500 --> 35:20.479
crews had a 19% higher rate of brain

35:20.489 --> 35:23.590
and nervous systems . Uh cancers ,

35:24.040 --> 35:27.229
15% higher rate of thyroid cancers ,

35:27.239 --> 35:30.320
9% rate higher of kidney or retinal

35:30.330 --> 35:33.439
cancers while women had a 7% higher

35:33.449 --> 35:36.469
rate of breast cancer . Now , a new two

35:36.479 --> 35:39.399
year Air Force study has found what

35:39.409 --> 35:42.739
appears to be a higher rate of brain

35:42.750 --> 35:46.139
and spinal cord cancer among Children

35:46.149 --> 35:48.939
of service members at Cannon Air Force

35:48.949 --> 35:52.260
Base in New Mexico . The Air Force has

35:52.270 --> 35:54.381
been saying that the three incidences

35:54.381 --> 35:55.949
of the rare cancers are not

35:55.959 --> 35:58.350
significantly significant ,

35:58.719 --> 36:01.459
statistically significant yet , those

36:01.469 --> 36:03.469
rare tumors are showing up among

36:03.479 --> 36:05.449
Children with parents stationed at

36:05.459 --> 36:08.439
Cannon Air Force Base at higher rates

36:08.449 --> 36:11.439
than Children with parents stationed at

36:11.449 --> 36:14.020
other bases or in the civilian

36:14.030 --> 36:16.159
population . And of course , the Air

36:16.169 --> 36:18.169
Force is still investigating cancer

36:18.169 --> 36:21.129
concerns among missiles , nuclear

36:21.139 --> 36:23.729
missile maintainers and support staff .

36:24.100 --> 36:26.879
So if this is about how we're keeping

36:26.889 --> 36:29.111
our troops and their families safe , if

36:29.111 --> 36:31.222
our service members are signing up to

36:31.222 --> 36:34.050
serve and they're getting cancer at 30

36:34.060 --> 36:37.889
to 40 years old or their spouses

36:37.899 --> 36:39.760
or their Children now have life

36:39.770 --> 36:42.860
threatening tumors . How is their

36:42.870 --> 36:46.010
quality of life affected ?

36:46.790 --> 36:48.846
Not only do they have to worry about

36:48.846 --> 36:50.957
their own personal health , they have

36:50.957 --> 36:52.901
to take time off of duty to extend

36:52.901 --> 36:55.234
hospital stays and doctors appointments .

36:55.234 --> 36:57.290
This will certainly impact retention

36:57.290 --> 37:00.080
and will impact overall dod health care

37:00.090 --> 37:03.320
costs . Secretary Kendall your posture

37:03.330 --> 37:05.600
statement in a lengthy session is

37:05.610 --> 37:07.499
outlining the Air Force's role in

37:07.499 --> 37:09.770
taking care of its people , but it

37:09.780 --> 37:12.080
fails to mention about the health care

37:12.260 --> 37:15.060
or cancer . So please tell me that

37:15.070 --> 37:17.292
you're working to address this and what

37:17.292 --> 37:20.530
we can expect to see from the Air Force

37:20.540 --> 37:22.969
about these cancer rates . They are

37:22.979 --> 37:25.209
alarming . And I want you to know this

37:25.219 --> 37:28.389
committee is very concerned . Uh I

37:28.520 --> 37:30.631
remember , um , we are very concerned

37:30.631 --> 37:32.840
about uh the possibility of increased

37:32.850 --> 37:34.906
cancer rates among people that are ,

37:34.906 --> 37:36.906
are serving in certain locations in

37:36.906 --> 37:38.906
particular . We have a study as you

37:38.906 --> 37:41.072
mentioned on missile that's been going

37:41.072 --> 37:43.072
on for about a year now . It's well

37:43.072 --> 37:45.017
underway . We're trying to be very

37:45.017 --> 37:47.239
transparent about our findings and work

37:47.239 --> 37:49.350
very closely with , with our people .

37:49.350 --> 37:51.350
We're reaching out to uh people who

37:51.350 --> 37:53.294
have served to try to get a better

37:53.294 --> 37:55.183
sense of what , what incidence of

37:55.183 --> 37:57.239
cancer really is . And we're working

37:57.239 --> 37:59.350
very closely with the va on this . So

37:59.350 --> 38:01.517
we , we are , we are just as concerned

38:01.517 --> 38:03.739
as you are about this . We're trying to

38:03.739 --> 38:03.239
get to the bottom of it and understand

38:03.250 --> 38:05.361
exactly what's happened and trying to

38:05.361 --> 38:07.361
make sure that our people work in a

38:07.361 --> 38:09.472
safe environment . Do you want to add

38:09.472 --> 38:09.310
anything to that ? I would just say

38:09.320 --> 38:11.376
that as the secretary said , the Air

38:11.376 --> 38:13.320
Force School of Advanced Aerospace

38:13.320 --> 38:14.764
Medicine is doing as much

38:14.764 --> 38:16.987
longitudinally forward , as backward as

38:16.987 --> 38:16.899
we can do because there's the

38:16.909 --> 38:18.798
correlation in the causation . We

38:18.798 --> 38:20.965
really need to figure out what some of

38:20.965 --> 38:23.131
the root causes are . So we don't , we

38:23.131 --> 38:22.860
don't spend money where it's not going

38:22.870 --> 38:25.092
to be most effective for them and their

38:25.092 --> 38:27.314
families . But to the secretary's point

38:27.314 --> 38:27.290
on the transparency , that's the one

38:27.300 --> 38:29.411
thing we can do that doesn't cost any

38:29.411 --> 38:31.078
money . And we are being very

38:31.078 --> 38:32.967
aggressive about that through our

38:32.967 --> 38:34.911
commanders and our leaders are are

38:34.911 --> 38:36.633
letting the people know in the

38:36.633 --> 38:36.600
communities what's going on when it's

38:36.610 --> 38:38.800
going on . However , until we get to

38:38.810 --> 38:40.921
the final answer , we understand that

38:40.921 --> 38:43.032
that's not gonna be satisfactory . So

38:43.032 --> 38:45.254
we are putting , we are putting the Air

38:45.254 --> 38:44.370
Force School of advanced aerospace

38:44.379 --> 38:47.129
medicine uh on this as , as hard as we

38:47.139 --> 38:49.139
certainly can . Well , being of the

38:49.139 --> 38:50.679
Asian Orange generation

38:52.260 --> 38:53.560
and um

38:56.280 --> 38:58.058
I'll just , I , I won't get too

38:58.058 --> 39:00.909
personal about this being through

39:00.919 --> 39:04.129
reunions and that Marine Corps reunions

39:04.139 --> 39:07.520
hearing the stories of how things were

39:07.530 --> 39:10.209
impacted , knowing how difficult the

39:10.219 --> 39:13.090
Department of Defense and the D A made

39:13.100 --> 39:15.989
processing agent Orange claims the

39:16.000 --> 39:18.330
lesson we learned in passing the past

39:18.340 --> 39:21.360
Pact Act and moving forward on that . I

39:21.370 --> 39:23.703
know that you're working and looking at ,

39:23.703 --> 39:25.759
studying it . But for these families

39:25.759 --> 39:27.814
affected , looking and studying , we

39:27.814 --> 39:31.139
need to start making sure that they're

39:31.149 --> 39:34.020
included in how we're moving forward in

39:34.030 --> 39:37.919
addressing this . And um I hear

39:37.929 --> 39:40.096
what you're saying . I just don't know

39:40.096 --> 39:42.262
that people are feeling the care , the

39:42.262 --> 39:45.010
way that we want them to . So would you

39:45.020 --> 39:48.159
keep uh the committee informed um on a

39:48.169 --> 39:50.300
quarterly basis where you are on this

39:50.310 --> 39:52.199
if you need more , funding , more

39:52.199 --> 39:54.254
resources . We have to work with the

39:54.254 --> 39:56.477
NIH , we have to do whatever we have to

39:56.477 --> 39:59.489
do . But the atomic war veterans are ,

39:59.590 --> 40:02.030
you know , still not recognized for

40:02.040 --> 40:04.260
their health concerns in my opinion .

40:04.540 --> 40:07.229
And I don't want on my watch to be part

40:07.239 --> 40:09.520
of this committee . Uh , nor do I

40:09.530 --> 40:11.560
believe you gentlemen want to be on

40:11.570 --> 40:13.560
your watch , not addressing this

40:13.570 --> 40:17.250
expeditiously . I yield back . Uh ,

40:17.260 --> 40:19.790
thank you , General Lady Mr Womack . Oh ,

40:19.879 --> 40:22.209
is the old Mr Law ? Well , let's see ,

40:22.219 --> 40:25.139
how do we proceed with this ? Ok , Mr

40:25.159 --> 40:28.879
Womack . Thank you very much , Mr

40:28.889 --> 40:31.120
Chairman . Thank you , Mr Womack . Um

40:31.449 --> 40:33.709
uh Secretary Kendall General Alvin . Uh

40:33.719 --> 40:35.949
again , thanks for being here . Uh I

40:35.959 --> 40:38.070
understand you have to make difficult

40:38.070 --> 40:40.181
budget decisions . In my view , a top

40:40.181 --> 40:42.237
priority should be the capability to

40:42.237 --> 40:44.237
rescue our men and women who are in

40:44.237 --> 40:46.292
harm's way . I'm concerned about the

40:46.292 --> 40:48.479
service's decision to terminate the

40:48.489 --> 40:51.060
combat rescue helicopter program . In

40:51.070 --> 40:53.292
my view , the moral imperative to quote

40:53.292 --> 40:55.399
leave . No one behind is critical to

40:55.409 --> 40:57.353
show our commitment to the men and

40:57.353 --> 40:59.465
women who risk their lives to protect

40:59.465 --> 41:01.520
and who defend us in all theaters of

41:01.520 --> 41:03.631
operation . Last year , the air force

41:03.631 --> 41:05.840
told this committee that a decision to

41:05.850 --> 41:09.189
truncate uh crh would limit the

41:09.199 --> 41:11.540
capacity for dedicated combat search

41:11.550 --> 41:13.949
and rescue . Uh uh Combat search and

41:13.959 --> 41:16.520
rescue force is available to the joint

41:16.530 --> 41:19.320
force . How does this decision

41:19.510 --> 41:22.629
ensure that no one is left behind . How

41:22.639 --> 41:24.583
do you plan to protect the men and

41:24.583 --> 41:26.889
women in uniform moving forward ? Uh uh

41:26.899 --> 41:29.010
uh uh You know , what , what will you

41:29.010 --> 41:31.177
be doing in the future ? Is , is there

41:31.177 --> 41:33.399
a replacement for what we're doing with

41:33.399 --> 41:35.455
the combat rescue helicopter ? The ,

41:35.455 --> 41:37.621
the search and rescue mission ? Uh The

41:37.621 --> 41:39.788
recovery mission is a critical mission

41:39.788 --> 41:42.229
for our force . Uh what has changed and

41:42.239 --> 41:44.350
cause us to change our program is the

41:44.350 --> 41:45.961
threats that we face and the

41:45.961 --> 41:47.961
operational environment which we're

41:47.961 --> 41:49.961
likely to be committed . Uh When we

41:49.961 --> 41:52.183
look at the mix of systems that we have

41:52.183 --> 41:52.000
and the capabilities are in the joint

41:52.010 --> 41:54.530
force , we we the the type of

41:54.540 --> 41:57.000
helicopter that the 60 whiskey is will

41:57.010 --> 41:59.121
work in certain circumstances but not

41:59.121 --> 42:01.343
in others , in particular , not against

42:01.343 --> 42:03.399
the most stressing threats that we ,

42:03.399 --> 42:05.454
that we face . And also for a lot of

42:05.454 --> 42:07.621
recoveries in the Pacific over water .

42:07.621 --> 42:09.788
For example , you don't need that kind

42:09.788 --> 42:11.843
of a capability . You can use a uh a

42:11.843 --> 42:13.621
helicopter that's not specially

42:13.621 --> 42:15.732
equipped or very expensive . So we're

42:15.732 --> 42:17.843
looking at the mix , we think we have

42:17.843 --> 42:20.066
acquired enough of the 60 whiskeys that

42:20.066 --> 42:19.639
uh we'll be able to do the mission

42:19.649 --> 42:21.760
where it's the appropriate tool to do

42:21.760 --> 42:23.982
it . And we're starting to look at more

42:23.982 --> 42:25.927
survival ways to do recoveries and

42:25.927 --> 42:28.093
provide her the chance to survive in ,

42:28.093 --> 42:27.689
in other environments , particularly

42:27.699 --> 42:29.810
more contested environment . I'll let

42:29.810 --> 42:31.921
uh General Alban add that if he wants

42:31.921 --> 42:33.977
to secretary really cover just about

42:33.977 --> 42:36.088
all of it . We're not only looking at

42:36.088 --> 42:38.310
our joint partners uh who do have uh uh

42:38.310 --> 42:40.532
uh additional capabilities but also our

42:40.532 --> 42:42.755
allies and partners in the environments

42:42.755 --> 42:42.270
in which we may also need them . Which

42:42.280 --> 42:44.280
is when we think about the European

42:44.280 --> 42:46.169
context , we , we do believe that

42:46.169 --> 42:48.280
between our joint partners around and

42:48.280 --> 42:50.447
partners who have that capability , we

42:50.447 --> 42:52.558
would be able to have enough capacity

42:52.558 --> 42:54.780
sufficiently . But the secretary really

42:54.780 --> 42:56.947
nailed it . And when we talk about the

42:56.947 --> 42:59.169
Indo Pacific Theater , it's a different

42:59.169 --> 42:58.905
ball game . We have to understand how

42:58.915 --> 43:01.784
to get there over vast distances and

43:01.794 --> 43:03.961
try and survive . We have our folks at

43:03.961 --> 43:06.304
the Warfare Center doing um uh weapon

43:06.314 --> 43:09.514
schools , um integration exercise and

43:09.524 --> 43:11.802
task to figure out how through tactics ,

43:11.802 --> 43:14.024
techniques and procedures , we can make

43:14.024 --> 43:15.968
it more survivable . And the , the

43:15.968 --> 43:18.080
combat rescue helicopter in the in hh

43:18.080 --> 43:20.246
Whiskey is not that significantly more

43:20.246 --> 43:22.524
survivable than , than the uh than the ,

43:22.524 --> 43:24.468
than the Gulf War or in any of the

43:24.468 --> 43:26.691
other that our joint partners have . So

43:26.691 --> 43:28.913
any more of that capacity did not yield

43:28.913 --> 43:31.080
that much more capability for us to do

43:31.080 --> 43:33.024
that . So we do need to solve that

43:33.024 --> 43:32.770
problem in the Indo Pacific . And I

43:32.780 --> 43:34.447
would say with the , with the

43:34.447 --> 43:36.558
additional 10 that was uh I was added

43:36.558 --> 43:38.613
in 24 we're almost to the program of

43:38.613 --> 43:40.502
record anyway . So the program of

43:40.502 --> 43:42.169
record has designed with that

43:42.169 --> 43:44.391
additional 10 , it almost gets us there

43:44.391 --> 43:44.280
anyway . So we almost have the capacity

43:44.290 --> 43:46.830
that was envisioned to begin with . Is

43:46.840 --> 43:49.820
it possible for you all to , you know ,

43:49.830 --> 43:52.689
share with us ? Um Given what you've

43:52.699 --> 43:54.760
talked about in terms of changing

43:54.770 --> 43:56.881
environments , changing theaters , et

43:56.881 --> 43:59.800
cetera to really , to let us know what

43:59.810 --> 44:02.719
your uh what , what are your plans in

44:02.729 --> 44:05.729
terms of uh replacing that capacity ?

44:05.949 --> 44:09.080
Um uh uh uh uh A

44:09.330 --> 44:13.290
and Yyy , you know , at what stage is

44:13.300 --> 44:16.689
the development ? Um um uh at

44:16.699 --> 44:19.399
what stage are , are we in that

44:19.409 --> 44:22.080
planning uh for the , for the future ?

44:22.169 --> 44:25.870
Um um uh uh uh the , the Indo

44:26.020 --> 44:30.010
Pacific is in the future . It uh you

44:30.020 --> 44:32.242
know , but today we're operating in the

44:32.242 --> 44:36.030
Red Sea . So I , I it's

44:36.600 --> 44:39.800
how do we um operate there , what is

44:39.810 --> 44:42.290
our capacity going to be ? And you ,

44:42.300 --> 44:44.356
you , you know , and again , for the

44:44.356 --> 44:46.356
future to let us know where , where

44:46.356 --> 44:48.578
that , where that's going , but I worry

44:48.578 --> 44:51.800
about the new term uh versus what that

44:51.810 --> 44:54.840
uh uh future uh environment is gonna be .

44:54.850 --> 44:57.128
Yes , ma'am . Absolutely . I , I agree .

44:57.128 --> 44:59.183
And , and I would say that the , you

44:59.183 --> 45:01.406
know , Pacific is not only the future ,

45:01.406 --> 45:00.750
it's approaching us rapidly , but your

45:00.760 --> 45:02.927
point about today being in the Red Sea

45:02.927 --> 45:05.149
and then , and in uh the Middle East uh

45:05.149 --> 45:06.927
with that , we , we do have the

45:06.927 --> 45:08.982
capacity again , we , between us and

45:08.982 --> 45:10.982
our joint partners , we do have the

45:10.982 --> 45:13.629
capacity to those . I do , I do OK , I

45:13.639 --> 45:15.417
I think it's important for this

45:15.417 --> 45:17.583
committee to understand , to know that

45:17.583 --> 45:19.695
is because what we don't want to do ,

45:19.695 --> 45:21.639
as I say last year , you told this

45:21.639 --> 45:23.695
committee , the decision to truncate

45:23.695 --> 45:25.861
would limit the capacity for dedicated

45:25.861 --> 45:27.639
combat search and rescue forces

45:27.639 --> 45:29.861
available to the joint force . That was

45:29.861 --> 45:32.195
just last year from the Air force . Yes .

45:32.195 --> 45:31.979
And so that's why we are working with

45:31.989 --> 45:34.211
our other joint partners and allies and

45:34.211 --> 45:36.322
partners and with the addition of the

45:36.322 --> 45:38.560
additional 10% of the capacity that was

45:38.570 --> 45:40.570
added into last year , I believe we

45:40.570 --> 45:42.737
have sufficient capacity . Ok . If you

45:42.737 --> 45:44.959
can lend more clarity to that first , I

45:44.959 --> 45:47.126
think would be , would be helpful , at

45:47.126 --> 45:49.237
least for myself . I don't know about

45:49.237 --> 45:51.459
others . Um Let me just try to focus uh

45:51.459 --> 45:53.514
on another aircraft and in , in full

45:53.514 --> 45:55.810
disclosure , it's tied to my home state

45:55.820 --> 45:58.679
of Connecticut . That's the F-35 . Um

45:58.689 --> 46:01.340
many capabilities with the F-35 , we

46:01.350 --> 46:03.572
cannot discuss them all here in an open

46:03.572 --> 46:05.580
session . Um But do you know of any

46:05.590 --> 46:07.590
other tactical fighter in the world

46:07.590 --> 46:09.646
being produced that is as capable as

46:09.646 --> 46:13.550
the F-35 ? No . Ok .

46:14.129 --> 46:16.919
What advantage does the F-35 and the

46:16.929 --> 46:19.096
fifth generation aircraft bring to the

46:19.096 --> 46:22.090
fight ? What positive feedback have you

46:22.100 --> 46:24.540
gotten from the recent deployments on

46:24.550 --> 46:26.606
the on the jet ? And what additional

46:26.606 --> 46:28.439
investments can Congress make to

46:28.439 --> 46:31.040
increase readiness of the F-35 fleet ?

46:33.030 --> 46:35.086
Well , I would say to begin with the

46:35.086 --> 46:38.129
F-35 offers uh additional survivability

46:38.139 --> 46:40.270
an advanced suite of sensors and uh

46:40.280 --> 46:44.260
integration into uh into the fight that

46:44.270 --> 46:46.489
really we haven't seen before in , in

46:46.500 --> 46:48.222
modern combat . So that , that

46:48.222 --> 46:50.444
survivability , the lethality of it and

46:50.444 --> 46:52.667
the ability to penetrate deep in places

46:52.667 --> 46:54.333
that that other of our fourth

46:54.333 --> 46:56.780
generation aircraft can't uh including

46:56.790 --> 46:59.300
the , the s the , the sensors and the

46:59.310 --> 47:01.532
radar that is coming . And that's why I

47:01.532 --> 47:03.588
want to say this is the difference .

47:03.588 --> 47:05.699
The F-35 we have is a good F-35 . The

47:05.699 --> 47:08.179
F-35 on the horizon is the F-35 that we

47:08.189 --> 47:10.300
really need for the China fight . The

47:10.300 --> 47:12.356
one that has the tech refresh , that

47:12.356 --> 47:14.467
gives us the capability to have those

47:14.467 --> 47:16.578
future , the future capabilities that

47:16.578 --> 47:18.856
meet the threat where it is . So it is ,

47:18.856 --> 47:20.911
it is capable and it will defeat the

47:20.911 --> 47:22.689
threats that we have today . We

47:22.689 --> 47:24.856
continue to need the modernization and

47:24.856 --> 47:27.078
the new capabilities to meet the threat

47:27.078 --> 47:29.300
that is rapidly approaching . I've been

47:29.300 --> 47:31.467
with the 35 since its inception and it

47:31.467 --> 47:34.284
is the best aircraft uh all around

47:34.294 --> 47:36.461
multi role aircraft , certainly in the

47:36.461 --> 47:38.627
world and we'll stay so , but it's got

47:38.627 --> 47:40.627
to get to the next set of technical

47:40.627 --> 47:42.683
upgrades . Block four is what , what

47:42.683 --> 47:44.905
it's called . And for the years , I was

47:44.905 --> 47:46.794
in my previous position , we were

47:46.794 --> 47:48.794
trying to get the block three . The

47:48.794 --> 47:50.850
threat has not stood still and we've

47:50.850 --> 47:50.310
got to continue to modernize and

47:50.320 --> 47:52.542
upgrade the aircraft as we go forward .

47:52.542 --> 47:54.709
And right now , uh the contractors are

47:54.709 --> 47:56.931
really struggling to deliver black four

47:56.931 --> 47:59.098
to us . And that , that's our priority

47:59.098 --> 48:01.320
is to get those aircrafts . It's one of

48:01.320 --> 48:03.487
the reasons we reduced our by about 35

48:03.487 --> 48:05.709
a little bit in this budget . Uh We had

48:05.709 --> 48:07.876
financial constraints as well , but we

48:07.876 --> 48:10.042
also are , are really uh in great need

48:10.042 --> 48:12.153
of getting that , that next iteration

48:12.153 --> 48:14.320
of capability out of it . So does that

48:14.320 --> 48:16.320
mean additional investments for the

48:16.320 --> 48:18.431
Congress to assist that process or is

48:18.431 --> 48:20.487
it what we need fundamentally is for

48:20.487 --> 48:22.153
the contractor to deliver the

48:22.153 --> 48:24.264
capability that we've been promised ?

48:24.264 --> 48:26.487
Yeah , what , what are the obstacles to

48:26.487 --> 48:28.209
getting to block for ? Uh they

48:28.209 --> 48:30.431
struggled with uh with the technology ,

48:30.431 --> 48:30.209
with the software in particular , but

48:30.219 --> 48:32.441
also with some of the hardware involved

48:32.441 --> 48:34.489
in the and this each , each major

48:34.500 --> 48:36.444
upgrade includes both hardware and

48:36.444 --> 48:38.611
software upgrades and both have been a

48:38.611 --> 48:41.060
problem for this aircraft . Uh And II ,

48:41.070 --> 48:42.848
I can't go , as you said , it's

48:42.848 --> 48:44.737
classified , I can't get a lot of

48:44.737 --> 48:46.903
details , but we can get your briefing

48:46.903 --> 48:46.389
on the details if you'd like to see

48:46.399 --> 48:48.399
that and some of the subsystems are

48:48.399 --> 48:50.455
struggling as well . Uh So it it's ,

48:50.455 --> 48:52.455
it's been a combination of problems

48:52.455 --> 48:54.621
with different parts of the , of the ,

48:54.621 --> 48:56.788
of the major upgrade ? Thank you . Are

48:56.788 --> 48:58.939
you back ? Thank the John Lady Mr

48:58.979 --> 49:01.110
Womack . Thank you . I am so glad you

49:01.120 --> 49:03.800
brought up the F-35 because I'm gonna

49:03.810 --> 49:06.379
throw a softball question at the

49:06.389 --> 49:09.149
secretary . Um You know , we're not the

49:09.159 --> 49:11.709
only people gonna be flying the F-35 .

49:11.719 --> 49:13.886
We've got a lot of allies and partners

49:13.886 --> 49:16.052
buying it through the foreign military

49:16.052 --> 49:18.275
sales program . And after an exhaustive

49:18.275 --> 49:20.600
and very lengthy process , uh the

49:20.610 --> 49:23.520
decision was made to train foreign

49:23.530 --> 49:26.560
military pilots in my district in Fort

49:26.570 --> 49:28.739
Smith , Arkansas . And I can tell all

49:28.750 --> 49:31.639
of you the river valley in Arkansas is

49:31.649 --> 49:33.538
very excited to hear the sound of

49:33.538 --> 49:35.649
freedom . The beginning this fall , I

49:35.649 --> 49:37.760
guess when the , when the Polish show

49:37.760 --> 49:41.659
up , um Secretary , how

49:41.669 --> 49:44.370
important is it to get our foreign

49:44.379 --> 49:47.020
partners trained on this amazing

49:47.030 --> 49:49.040
airframe and the impact it has on

49:49.050 --> 49:51.560
national security . Uh It's critically

49:51.570 --> 49:53.681
important and I think one of the best

49:53.681 --> 49:55.903
testimonials to the to the value of the

49:55.903 --> 49:57.959
aircraft is that the , the number of

49:57.959 --> 50:00.126
countries buying it keeps increasing .

50:00.126 --> 50:02.126
Uh You know , we started with seven

50:02.126 --> 50:04.403
partners and now we've got quite a few ,

50:04.403 --> 50:06.459
no additional uh people acquiring it

50:06.459 --> 50:08.681
and it , it is critical for a number of

50:08.681 --> 50:10.348
reasons . A it's cutting edge

50:10.348 --> 50:12.292
technology , but b it allows us to

50:12.292 --> 50:14.459
interoperate very effectively uh train

50:14.459 --> 50:16.237
with and fight alongside of our

50:16.237 --> 50:18.126
partners in the same way to be as

50:18.126 --> 50:19.903
effective as the total force as

50:19.903 --> 50:22.126
possible and to integrate into the rest

50:22.126 --> 50:24.348
of the elements of the force . So we're

50:24.348 --> 50:26.403
uh we're delighted that we're moving

50:26.403 --> 50:28.626
forward on having and getting that into

50:28.626 --> 50:30.792
under operation as well . That's gonna

50:30.792 --> 50:30.689
be a major step forward to be able to

50:30.699 --> 50:32.810
train in the United States the way we

50:32.810 --> 50:35.219
have plans , General Alvin , I was just

50:35.229 --> 50:37.451
going to second what the secretary said

50:37.451 --> 50:39.600
about the value of being able to hold

50:39.610 --> 50:42.360
training on fifth generation platforms .

50:42.620 --> 50:44.620
And I'm a little bit biased , but I

50:44.620 --> 50:46.676
would say we have the best pilots in

50:46.676 --> 50:48.953
the world and if you're going to train ,

50:48.953 --> 50:51.176
you want to train with the best . And I

50:51.176 --> 50:51.000
just think that helps our combat

50:51.010 --> 50:53.232
capability as United States Air Force ,

50:53.232 --> 50:55.343
as the Department of Defense and as a

50:55.343 --> 50:57.566
nation . If we can maintain the ability

50:57.566 --> 50:59.399
to train in the common tactics ,

50:59.399 --> 51:01.510
techniques and procedures and be able

51:01.510 --> 51:01.139
to proliferate that throughout

51:01.149 --> 51:03.482
like-minded nations . I think that is a ,

51:03.482 --> 51:05.705
that is a value proposition that , that

51:05.705 --> 51:07.482
makes the foreign military self

51:07.482 --> 51:09.705
training in the United States that much

51:09.705 --> 51:11.927
more to stand up a mission like that is

51:11.927 --> 51:13.705
not easy and there are facility

51:13.705 --> 51:15.927
improvements that need to be made . And

51:15.927 --> 51:15.419
this committee has been very good to

51:15.520 --> 51:18.229
help us fund those . And uh all of you

51:18.239 --> 51:20.461
have a standing invitation to come down

51:20.461 --> 51:22.628
and , and see the work that's going on

51:22.628 --> 51:24.795
and , and to see some of that training

51:24.795 --> 51:27.017
once it commences a little bit later on

51:27.017 --> 51:29.072
this fall , I want to ask a question

51:29.072 --> 51:31.689
about um exercises because I , I note

51:31.699 --> 51:33.866
that there's an unfunded requirement ,

51:33.866 --> 51:36.088
amount of nearly a quarter of a billion

51:36.088 --> 51:38.340
dollars for the Pacific Air Force

51:38.350 --> 51:41.939
Exercises . General Alvin help me

51:41.949 --> 51:45.699
understand the importance of

51:45.709 --> 51:48.729
conducting these theater wide exercises .

51:48.739 --> 51:52.239
How do they help our formations ? How

51:52.250 --> 51:54.879
do they help us integrate at scale and

51:54.889 --> 51:57.570
across domains ? Well , thank you for

51:57.580 --> 51:59.636
that congressman . We , we certainly

51:59.636 --> 52:01.879
are looking to change the manner in

52:01.889 --> 52:04.111
which we do exercises . We have done uh

52:04.111 --> 52:06.409
exercises in bits and pieces and a lot

52:06.419 --> 52:08.586
of the exercises are done on the backs

52:08.586 --> 52:10.808
of the wing commands who understand how

52:10.808 --> 52:12.530
they want to try and get their

52:12.530 --> 52:12.350
formations within their wings more

52:12.360 --> 52:14.527
ready to do their piece of the fight .

52:14.527 --> 52:16.693
But if we're going to enter a fight in

52:16.693 --> 52:18.860
the Indo Pacific , where we have to do

52:18.860 --> 52:20.749
agile combat employment , complex

52:20.749 --> 52:22.916
situations where we need to be able to

52:22.916 --> 52:22.610
aggregate for effect and disaggregate

52:22.620 --> 52:25.179
for survival . That is complex and that

52:25.189 --> 52:27.300
takes training at a larger scale . If

52:27.300 --> 52:29.245
you just do it in bit pieces , you

52:29.245 --> 52:31.411
won't find out where the holes in your

52:31.411 --> 52:31.149
swing are . You have to understand

52:31.159 --> 52:33.270
fitting it together in something that

52:33.270 --> 52:35.381
looks more like you may actually have

52:35.381 --> 52:37.492
to experience in combat before you'll

52:37.492 --> 52:39.715
do that . So the increase in being able

52:39.715 --> 52:41.826
to do larger scale exercises , that's

52:41.826 --> 52:41.649
where you're going to find out where

52:41.659 --> 52:43.492
some of your weaknesses are , we

52:43.492 --> 52:45.603
haven't had the ability to do that as

52:45.603 --> 52:47.659
much as we'd like to . And so moving

52:47.659 --> 52:47.659
forward , I think that will help us

52:47.729 --> 52:50.199
advance our capability more effective

52:50.209 --> 52:52.320
in the Indo Pacific fight . Finally ,

52:52.320 --> 52:54.431
Mr Chairman , you know , I'm going to

52:54.431 --> 52:57.955
reserve , you know , an opinion on this

52:57.975 --> 53:00.754
whole LP 480 of this legislative

53:00.764 --> 53:03.485
proposal that uh M mccullum brought up .

53:03.614 --> 53:05.614
I , I do think it's a bit dangerous

53:05.614 --> 53:07.764
though for us to enter into an era

53:07.774 --> 53:11.125
where we are usurping the authority of

53:11.135 --> 53:14.014
our governors . 4848 of them have ,

53:14.024 --> 53:16.725
have expressed some discontent with the

53:16.735 --> 53:19.580
proposal . Um There , there , there is

53:19.590 --> 53:22.219
the option of status quo and I , and I

53:22.229 --> 53:24.479
don't know , you know , I've not

53:24.489 --> 53:26.656
thought through it completely , but uh

53:26.656 --> 53:28.959
as a , as a guardsman , as somebody who

53:28.969 --> 53:31.280
has some unique insight into some of

53:31.330 --> 53:34.219
the dual mission of , of our guard . Uh

53:34.229 --> 53:36.610
II , I guess I would say this . I , I'm

53:36.620 --> 53:38.842
a little concerned . I saw some numbers

53:38.842 --> 53:41.770
on polling um among these personnel ,

53:41.780 --> 53:44.002
we're talking about 1000 people here in

53:44.002 --> 53:46.790
the prospect of some of them looking

53:46.800 --> 53:48.800
for other missions so that they can

53:48.810 --> 53:50.977
remain part of the guard is a bit of a

53:50.977 --> 53:52.977
concern for me . So I guess my last

53:52.977 --> 53:55.030
question would be , are we going to

53:55.040 --> 53:57.320
create a gap in here in capability ?

53:57.330 --> 53:59.441
That would , that would ultimately be

53:59.441 --> 54:02.850
my biggest concern . There's been a lot

54:02.860 --> 54:04.860
of confusion , I think about this .

54:04.860 --> 54:06.804
First of all , we deeply value the

54:06.804 --> 54:08.693
guard itself . It's an enormously

54:08.693 --> 54:10.638
important component of our overall

54:10.638 --> 54:12.804
force and we deeply value these people

54:12.804 --> 54:15.027
and the units that they're in . There's

54:15.027 --> 54:16.971
only about 578 people that will be

54:16.971 --> 54:19.027
affected by this . Uh you know , the

54:19.027 --> 54:21.193
guard is over 100,000 . So it's a very

54:21.193 --> 54:25.100
small fraction . The , this is a very

54:25.110 --> 54:26.943
unusual situation . We have , we

54:26.943 --> 54:28.943
created the Space Force and we took

54:28.943 --> 54:31.054
people out of the Air Force and other

54:31.054 --> 54:33.277
services and we're taking people out of

54:33.277 --> 54:35.499
the reserve component and we're part of

54:35.499 --> 54:37.777
the , the act we just passed last year ,

54:37.777 --> 54:39.888
created a personnel management system

54:39.888 --> 54:39.389
for the Space Force so they could have

54:39.399 --> 54:41.455
full and part time people and manage

54:41.459 --> 54:43.681
that very small force as efficiently as

54:43.681 --> 54:46.169
possible . We've got 578 people in the

54:46.179 --> 54:48.449
guard in the Air Guard who are

54:48.459 --> 54:50.459
essentially orphans right now . And

54:50.459 --> 54:52.126
they , they really need to be

54:52.126 --> 54:54.237
integrated into the space force . The

54:54.237 --> 54:56.403
intent is to integrate them exactly as

54:56.403 --> 54:58.515
they are to keep them in place , keep

54:58.515 --> 55:00.626
them in the same job showing the same

55:00.626 --> 55:02.681
way , doing the same thing . So they

55:02.681 --> 55:02.604
not gonna be any change here . Thi this

55:02.614 --> 55:04.834
is also , this is not a precedent for

55:04.844 --> 55:07.122
anything else . This is a very unusual ,

55:07.122 --> 55:09.288
unique situation we created because of

55:09.288 --> 55:11.344
the creation of the Space force . So

55:11.344 --> 55:13.400
we're trying to essentially clean up

55:13.400 --> 55:15.566
the battlefield or collect to fix this

55:15.566 --> 55:17.455
loose end if you will in , in the

55:17.455 --> 55:19.288
creation of the Space force . Uh

55:19.288 --> 55:21.288
General Saltzman uh has an , a very

55:21.288 --> 55:23.511
small entity . I don't mean to say that

55:23.511 --> 55:25.233
in a dearg way . Uh but a very

55:25.233 --> 55:26.955
important one , his mission is

55:26.955 --> 55:29.122
absolutely critical to the country and

55:29.122 --> 55:28.899
he needs to be able to manage that

55:28.909 --> 55:31.131
force , including the personnel in that

55:31.131 --> 55:33.353
force as efficiently and effectively as

55:33.353 --> 55:35.353
low bureaucracy as possible . So we

55:35.353 --> 55:37.187
don't want to go in the opposite

55:37.187 --> 55:39.187
direction that the Congress went in

55:39.187 --> 55:41.353
last year of giving the opportunity to

55:41.353 --> 55:41.189
do that under the space force , manage

55:41.199 --> 55:43.366
personnel management act by creating a

55:43.366 --> 55:45.588
whole new entity or by leaving for that

55:45.588 --> 55:47.643
matter , the people in the Air Guard

55:47.643 --> 55:49.643
where we can work that out , we can

55:49.643 --> 55:51.643
make any of these things work if we

55:51.643 --> 55:53.421
have to . But by far , the best

55:53.421 --> 55:55.643
solution is to actually integrate those

55:55.643 --> 55:57.866
people in the space force . And again ,

55:57.866 --> 55:59.810
this is not an attempt to undo the

55:59.810 --> 56:01.810
Guard . It's a very small number of

56:01.810 --> 56:01.620
people . It's only six states that are

56:01.629 --> 56:04.080
affected . It's not a precedent for

56:04.090 --> 56:07.290
anything else . It's just a way to make

56:07.300 --> 56:09.522
the space force into the entity that it

56:09.522 --> 56:11.744
needs to be to be effective . Thank you

56:11.744 --> 56:13.578
for clarifying uh your bank , Mr

56:13.578 --> 56:15.689
Chairman . Thank you so much . By the

56:15.689 --> 56:17.578
way , I've got to leave here in a

56:17.578 --> 56:19.578
minute and go meet with the city of

56:19.578 --> 56:21.689
Fort Smith board of directors who are

56:21.689 --> 56:23.911
here today and I'm sure the first thing

56:23.911 --> 56:26.078
they're gonna ask me is how's our F-35

56:26.078 --> 56:28.300
mission coming ? So , thank you so much

56:28.300 --> 56:27.479
since you brought up the F-35 risk

56:27.489 --> 56:29.711
really quickly . Uh what , what's going

56:29.711 --> 56:31.600
on since I heard from some of our

56:31.600 --> 56:33.489
friends in UAE the other day ? Um

56:33.489 --> 56:35.545
What's going on with the proposed uh

56:35.545 --> 56:37.656
purchase of UAE uh acquisition of the

56:37.656 --> 56:39.656
F-35 . There any progress on that ?

56:41.870 --> 56:43.981
I don't have any new on that . Let me

56:43.981 --> 56:45.759
take that fucking capacity , Mr

56:45.759 --> 56:47.703
Chairman . As far as I know it's ,

56:47.703 --> 56:47.500
there's , there's no obstacle that ,

56:47.510 --> 56:49.177
that I'm aware of right now .

56:51.830 --> 56:54.139
Yeah . Uh Secretary Kendall . Um as

56:54.149 --> 56:56.205
you're well aware , the Air Force is

56:56.205 --> 56:59.540
having trouble retaining as many , many

56:59.550 --> 57:03.030
pilots because of the private sector

57:03.040 --> 57:05.189
pays so much more money , better

57:05.199 --> 57:07.629
benefits and , and those type of issues ,

57:07.939 --> 57:11.250
um the air force is

57:11.260 --> 57:14.879
competing and , and I , I don't know

57:14.889 --> 57:17.000
how they can continue to compete . So

57:17.000 --> 57:19.222
it's a major issue that we , we have to

57:19.222 --> 57:22.939
deal with . Um the what are the

57:22.949 --> 57:26.860
um incentives that we have ? If

57:26.870 --> 57:29.050
any they can , can do that ? There are

57:29.060 --> 57:31.479
people that can leave the Air Force to

57:31.489 --> 57:34.760
fly and then also be in the Reserves or

57:34.770 --> 57:37.209
National Guard or www whatever you

57:37.219 --> 57:39.830
would call that . Uh Have you um

57:41.229 --> 57:44.250
seen any improvements over the last two

57:44.260 --> 57:47.090
years of this issue ? And , and then

57:47.100 --> 57:49.267
finally , what about the percentage of

57:49.267 --> 57:51.689
pilots who leave active duty uh for

57:51.699 --> 57:54.290
private sector ? And I've asked this

57:54.300 --> 57:56.467
before , join the Reserves or National

57:56.620 --> 57:58.787
Guard . Now , what we can get you some

57:58.787 --> 58:01.009
numbers on that ? We do have a shortage

58:01.009 --> 58:03.009
of pilots and we've been working to

58:03.009 --> 58:05.176
reduce that . The greatest obstacle to

58:05.176 --> 58:07.659
uh uh higher power production is the

58:07.669 --> 58:09.225
pipeline , particularly the

58:09.225 --> 58:11.225
availability of training aircraft ,

58:11.225 --> 58:13.391
which are a very and that's one of the

58:13.391 --> 58:13.340
reasons we need to get the T seven

58:13.350 --> 58:15.517
field , that they have a more reliable

58:15.517 --> 58:17.517
aircraft . So I've been visited the

58:17.517 --> 58:19.739
contractors involved in the maintenance

58:19.739 --> 58:21.683
of the T 38 and it's just , it's a

58:21.683 --> 58:23.850
constant struggle to try to keep those

58:23.850 --> 58:26.072
airplanes flying and get people through

58:26.072 --> 58:27.906
the pipeline . Um , we are using

58:27.906 --> 58:30.128
bonuses very effectively . The Congress

58:30.128 --> 58:29.879
just gave us the authority to increase

58:29.889 --> 58:32.320
our bonuses for , for pilot retention .

58:32.330 --> 58:34.497
And I think that's , that was just put

58:34.497 --> 58:36.108
in place . And I think early

58:36.108 --> 58:38.163
indications are that that's gonna be

58:38.163 --> 58:40.330
effective . Uh We have a lot of pilots

58:40.330 --> 58:42.608
who are in the reserving guard who are ,

58:42.608 --> 58:44.552
are commercial pilots , you know ,

58:44.552 --> 58:46.608
during their civilian lives and then

58:46.608 --> 58:46.570
still remain in the service part time .

58:46.899 --> 58:49.010
And , and that's a very effective way

58:49.010 --> 58:51.232
to retain those people as well . Do you

58:51.232 --> 58:53.343
wanna add some ? I , I would just add

58:53.343 --> 58:52.949
to the , uh to the retention

58:52.959 --> 58:55.126
initiatives . You know , we have often

58:55.126 --> 58:57.770
uh offered the , uh the incentives for ,

58:57.780 --> 59:00.219
for reenlistment or retention bonuses .

59:00.439 --> 59:02.383
Uh What we've done though is we've

59:02.383 --> 59:05.110
actually taken some data and it turns

59:05.120 --> 59:07.231
out that the way we've done it in the

59:07.231 --> 59:09.398
past , sometimes we asked those uh who

59:09.398 --> 59:11.453
are eligible for it , maybe within a

59:11.453 --> 59:13.342
year or a year and a half of when

59:13.342 --> 59:15.342
they're making or when , when their

59:15.342 --> 59:17.564
sort of commitment is up . And we found

59:17.564 --> 59:19.676
out after lots of surveys that , uh ,

59:19.676 --> 59:19.040
they may have already sort of made up

59:19.050 --> 59:21.300
their , their mind by that time . So in

59:21.310 --> 59:23.143
working with Congress , this new

59:23.149 --> 59:25.371
incentive program allows us to actually

59:25.371 --> 59:27.427
request it earlier and they can help

59:27.427 --> 59:29.316
shape their future rather than be

59:29.316 --> 59:31.649
shaped by a decision at the last minute .

59:31.649 --> 59:33.649
And we also find that it's not just

59:33.649 --> 59:35.593
about the pay for them . There are

59:35.593 --> 59:35.590
opportunities where depending on where

59:35.600 --> 59:37.489
they are in their life with their

59:37.489 --> 59:39.322
family , the opportunity to , to

59:39.322 --> 59:41.378
perhaps get a preference for getting

59:41.378 --> 59:43.322
stations somewhere or not moving ,

59:43.322 --> 59:45.433
that's an alternative for them . They

59:45.433 --> 59:47.489
value that over the actual financial

59:47.489 --> 59:49.322
incentive . And so this is we're

59:49.322 --> 59:51.600
starting our second year of doing that .

59:51.600 --> 59:53.822
So we're doing longitudinal analysis as

59:53.822 --> 59:53.810
the secretary said , the early returns

59:53.820 --> 59:55.931
are good , but we're finding out that

59:55.931 --> 59:58.098
we can just find more creative ways to

59:58.098 --> 59:57.830
meet them where they're at . And it's

59:57.840 --> 59:59.896
not just about the dollars and cents

59:59.896 --> 01:00:02.007
because they love to serve . Uh We're

01:00:02.007 --> 01:00:04.229
gonna continue to , to seek those to be

01:00:04.229 --> 01:00:06.451
able to maintain the retention . I will

01:00:06.451 --> 01:00:08.451
add that while we do have retention

01:00:08.451 --> 01:00:10.396
issues , it , it is , we are still

01:00:10.396 --> 01:00:12.507
filling 100% of our combat cockpits .

01:00:12.507 --> 01:00:14.618
Those are being filled as well as our

01:00:14.618 --> 01:00:16.729
training . We , we're taking the risk

01:00:16.729 --> 01:00:16.479
in mitigating in the rated staff

01:00:16.489 --> 01:00:18.600
positions and some of the other , but

01:00:18.600 --> 01:00:20.711
we still do need to plus up and , and

01:00:20.711 --> 01:00:22.878
retain as many of those policies as we

01:00:22.878 --> 01:00:22.239
can . Well , on the other hand ,

01:00:22.250 --> 01:00:25.340
there's a also a training backlog for

01:00:25.350 --> 01:00:27.709
power . What are the root causes of

01:00:27.719 --> 01:00:30.260
this backlog ? Uh And how are you

01:00:30.270 --> 01:00:32.270
addressing it ? And what additional

01:00:32.270 --> 01:00:34.489
resources do you need from us ? Well ,

01:00:34.500 --> 01:00:36.611
thank you , Congressman . As , as the

01:00:36.611 --> 01:00:38.778
secretary said , it really has been uh

01:00:38.778 --> 01:00:40.667
getting them through the pipeline

01:00:40.667 --> 01:00:42.889
because of aging aircraft . So the T 38

01:00:43.000 --> 01:00:45.449
much older and we had issues with the J

01:00:45.459 --> 01:00:47.570
85 engine and as the secretary said ,

01:00:47.570 --> 01:00:49.626
getting that T seven here as soon as

01:00:49.626 --> 01:00:51.626
possible , uh with the air aircraft

01:00:51.626 --> 01:00:53.515
that we need is really what we're

01:00:53.515 --> 01:00:55.570
focusing on with the contractor , we

01:00:55.570 --> 01:00:57.626
also have are looking at new ways of

01:00:57.626 --> 01:00:59.181
doing uh pilot training and

01:00:59.181 --> 01:01:01.403
understanding ways that we can get them

01:01:01.403 --> 01:01:03.626
through the pipeline faster . And those

01:01:03.626 --> 01:01:03.250
are things like if you have a , a multi

01:01:03.290 --> 01:01:05.512
seat aircraft where it's more like what

01:01:05.512 --> 01:01:07.790
the airlines do as far as the training ,

01:01:07.790 --> 01:01:09.901
you can do more in the simulator . If

01:01:09.901 --> 01:01:09.570
you can do more in the simulator , you

01:01:09.580 --> 01:01:11.691
can preserve the pilot's time , fewer

01:01:11.691 --> 01:01:14.024
aircraft hours . So we are seeing those ,

01:01:14.024 --> 01:01:15.802
we are seeing gains there . But

01:01:15.802 --> 01:01:17.969
unfortunately , they've been masked by

01:01:17.969 --> 01:01:19.913
the supply issues and supply chain

01:01:19.913 --> 01:01:19.729
issues that are limiting the

01:01:19.739 --> 01:01:21.961
availability of the aircraft . So if we

01:01:21.961 --> 01:01:24.072
can get through the supply and supply

01:01:24.072 --> 01:01:26.072
chain issues , I think that's where

01:01:26.072 --> 01:01:25.040
we're going to see the fruits of the

01:01:25.050 --> 01:01:27.161
labor of these other initiatives that

01:01:27.161 --> 01:01:29.328
on their own are increasing the number

01:01:29.328 --> 01:01:31.383
of throughput pilots . So we can get

01:01:31.383 --> 01:01:34.459
you back . Thank you , gentlemen , Mr

01:01:34.469 --> 01:01:35.469
Aderholt .

01:01:38.530 --> 01:01:42.179
Thank you , Mr Chairman . Um Just wanna

01:01:42.189 --> 01:01:44.411
mention that , you know , that Congress

01:01:44.411 --> 01:01:46.522
has been remain troubled about the uh

01:01:46.522 --> 01:01:49.219
how space command location was selected .

01:01:49.639 --> 01:01:52.389
And uh as you saw the language in both

01:01:52.399 --> 01:01:55.929
the NDA A and the fy 24 budget , um

01:01:57.000 --> 01:01:59.879
Mr Secretary uh just wanted to get your

01:01:59.889 --> 01:02:03.260
commitment that you will uh continue to

01:02:03.270 --> 01:02:05.149
follow congressional intent as

01:02:05.159 --> 01:02:07.770
expressed by the laws that we passed

01:02:07.959 --> 01:02:10.689
and especially uh let the independent

01:02:10.699 --> 01:02:12.850
investigation uh run their course on

01:02:12.860 --> 01:02:15.889
this . Uh obviously very familiar with

01:02:15.899 --> 01:02:18.060
the issue . Congressman . And uh we

01:02:18.070 --> 01:02:19.959
will certainly follow the law and

01:02:19.959 --> 01:02:21.903
cooperating with the investigation

01:02:21.903 --> 01:02:23.959
under way . Thank you . I appreciate

01:02:23.959 --> 01:02:26.070
that . And let me ask about the space

01:02:26.070 --> 01:02:30.020
access , mobility and logistics . Um in

01:02:30.030 --> 01:02:32.070
a recent testimony , uh General

01:02:32.080 --> 01:02:35.020
Saltzman , you uh to the Arm Senate

01:02:35.030 --> 01:02:37.520
Armed Services Committee , you uh

01:02:37.530 --> 01:02:40.139
talked about 20 million in this year's

01:02:40.149 --> 01:02:42.610
president's budget for space access ,

01:02:42.620 --> 01:02:45.659
mobility and logistics and said the

01:02:45.669 --> 01:02:48.639
funding would be used , quote used to

01:02:48.649 --> 01:02:50.699
study and figure out if there's

01:02:50.810 --> 01:02:54.659
military utility um for much needed

01:02:54.669 --> 01:02:57.100
capabilities like in space refueling .

01:02:58.020 --> 01:03:01.429
Uh According to public reports , China

01:03:01.439 --> 01:03:04.679
has already found utility for in space

01:03:04.689 --> 01:03:07.229
refueling and they've demonstrated this

01:03:07.239 --> 01:03:11.120
uh capability in 2021 and 2022

01:03:11.739 --> 01:03:14.709
and have integrated lessons learned

01:03:14.719 --> 01:03:17.459
into military doctrine . So , would it

01:03:17.469 --> 01:03:20.679
be accurate to say that the uh dod is

01:03:20.689 --> 01:03:23.179
going to study a capability that our

01:03:23.189 --> 01:03:25.780
adversary is already executing and

01:03:25.790 --> 01:03:28.070
could you talk about that ? Yes , sir .

01:03:28.080 --> 01:03:30.247
Thank you for your question . I it's ,

01:03:30.247 --> 01:03:32.413
I , I have two things to say on that .

01:03:32.413 --> 01:03:34.191
One is uh we are evaluating the

01:03:34.191 --> 01:03:36.247
military utility . As , as Secretary

01:03:36.247 --> 01:03:38.247
Kendall mentioned , we want to make

01:03:38.247 --> 01:03:40.302
sure that our S and T budget goes as

01:03:40.302 --> 01:03:42.302
far as we possibly can and we wanna

01:03:42.302 --> 01:03:41.570
make sure if we're gonna pursue a

01:03:41.580 --> 01:03:43.620
technology , there's a pathway to

01:03:43.629 --> 01:03:45.851
fielding an operational capability . So

01:03:45.851 --> 01:03:47.851
that's part of the assessment . And

01:03:47.851 --> 01:03:49.851
then from a mission standpoint , uh

01:03:49.851 --> 01:03:51.796
we're rapidly trying to shift from

01:03:51.800 --> 01:03:53.800
large satellites and geosynchronous

01:03:53.800 --> 01:03:57.389
orbit who's uh lifespan requires them

01:03:57.399 --> 01:03:59.510
to have a lot of fuel where refueling

01:03:59.520 --> 01:04:01.742
could be valuable . We're shifting from

01:04:01.742 --> 01:04:03.576
that kind of architecture into a

01:04:03.576 --> 01:04:05.689
proliferated low earth orbit , set of

01:04:05.699 --> 01:04:07.755
constellations , talking hundreds of

01:04:07.755 --> 01:04:10.770
satellites much smaller and more easily

01:04:10.780 --> 01:04:12.929
to replace . So the idea is that you

01:04:12.939 --> 01:04:14.995
wouldn't need to refuel them because

01:04:14.995 --> 01:04:17.106
you're trying to re replenish that um

01:04:17.219 --> 01:04:19.275
that proliferated constellation on a

01:04:19.275 --> 01:04:21.590
more frequent basis . So 3 to 5 years

01:04:21.600 --> 01:04:23.510
on orbit replace it with updated

01:04:23.520 --> 01:04:26.229
technology wouldn't necessarily require

01:04:26.239 --> 01:04:28.406
the same level of servicing on orbit .

01:04:28.489 --> 01:04:30.711
So we're trying to get the balance just

01:04:30.711 --> 01:04:32.545
right and make sure that all the

01:04:32.545 --> 01:04:34.322
dollars that we invest would be

01:04:34.322 --> 01:04:36.770
properly utilized . Oh , Secretary

01:04:36.790 --> 01:04:38.957
Kendall , you got anything you want to

01:04:38.957 --> 01:04:41.123
add to that or I think General Salzman

01:04:41.123 --> 01:04:43.879
had it just right . Oh , well , how

01:04:43.889 --> 01:04:45.959
would additional resources for the

01:04:45.969 --> 01:04:47.919
space uh access , mobility and

01:04:47.929 --> 01:04:50.919
logistics be helpful and to ensure the

01:04:50.929 --> 01:04:54.540
continued us space priority . Well ,

01:04:54.550 --> 01:04:57.060
01 area of course is the launch

01:04:57.070 --> 01:04:59.239
infrastructure . A lot of this comes

01:04:59.250 --> 01:05:01.139
when we talk about space access ,

01:05:01.139 --> 01:05:03.139
mobility logistics . One of the key

01:05:03.139 --> 01:05:05.250
pieces is space lift infrastructure .

01:05:05.250 --> 01:05:07.840
Uh and the uh dramatic increase of

01:05:07.850 --> 01:05:10.389
commercial launches at our two primary

01:05:10.540 --> 01:05:12.651
uh launch locations at Cape near Cape

01:05:12.659 --> 01:05:14.937
Canaveral at Patrick Space Force based ,

01:05:14.937 --> 01:05:17.103
not at Vandenberg . Uh That's taking a

01:05:17.103 --> 01:05:19.270
toll on its infrastructure and we need

01:05:19.270 --> 01:05:21.326
to recoup that and keep that up . So

01:05:21.326 --> 01:05:23.270
that's keeping that infrastructure

01:05:23.270 --> 01:05:25.381
current and capable of supporting the

01:05:25.381 --> 01:05:24.929
ops tempo is going to be a primary

01:05:24.939 --> 01:05:27.600
resourcing concern . Ok . I just add to

01:05:27.610 --> 01:05:29.610
that , that the biggest and general

01:05:29.610 --> 01:05:31.721
Saltzman should comment on this too .

01:05:31.721 --> 01:05:34.389
Um Our greatest regret if you will and

01:05:34.399 --> 01:05:36.510
the constraints that we had this year

01:05:36.510 --> 01:05:38.399
was we couldn't move forward more

01:05:38.399 --> 01:05:40.566
quickly on counter space capability in

01:05:40.566 --> 01:05:43.270
particular . Um The , the the are

01:05:43.280 --> 01:05:45.447
facing challenges fielding a number of

01:05:45.447 --> 01:05:47.558
systems that threaten the joint force

01:05:47.620 --> 01:05:49.564
and that essentially are targeting

01:05:49.564 --> 01:05:51.787
assets like aircraft carriers . We need

01:05:51.787 --> 01:05:53.953
to have the capability to do something

01:05:53.953 --> 01:05:55.787
about those assets so they can't

01:05:55.787 --> 01:05:57.953
provide that targeting service to , to

01:05:57.953 --> 01:06:00.064
the Chinese military . And that would

01:06:00.064 --> 01:06:02.231
be the highest thing on our list of uh

01:06:02.231 --> 01:06:04.342
of things that we aren't able to move

01:06:04.342 --> 01:06:04.239
forward as quickly as we'd like to on .

01:06:06.850 --> 01:06:08.739
I say my time is going iiy back .

01:06:10.590 --> 01:06:12.534
Thank the gentleman . Uh Mr Case .

01:06:14.459 --> 01:06:17.689
Thank you , General Saltzman , your

01:06:17.699 --> 01:06:21.139
budget came to us at um a reduction in

01:06:21.320 --> 01:06:24.760
uh of 2% after of course , um four

01:06:24.770 --> 01:06:27.290
years of significant growth , but we

01:06:27.300 --> 01:06:29.300
would expect that growth given that

01:06:29.300 --> 01:06:31.522
you're five years old . So we're trying

01:06:31.522 --> 01:06:33.300
to obviously ramp up as fast as

01:06:33.300 --> 01:06:35.300
possible . And although I guess you

01:06:35.300 --> 01:06:37.522
could say that a 2% budget uh reduction

01:06:37.522 --> 01:06:39.744
is uh well , thanks for that because we

01:06:39.744 --> 01:06:41.856
got a lot of demand . Still . It begs

01:06:41.856 --> 01:06:43.967
the question of , of what risks we're

01:06:43.967 --> 01:06:46.189
accepting in , in your trajectory uh to

01:06:46.189 --> 01:06:48.356
get you as there as fast as possible .

01:06:48.356 --> 01:06:50.522
Now , I I understand that , I mean the

01:06:50.522 --> 01:06:52.467
the reason advanced really for the

01:06:52.467 --> 01:06:54.633
budget reduction has been a lower pace

01:06:54.633 --> 01:06:57.080
of space launches . Uh which um and one

01:06:57.090 --> 01:06:59.201
of the questions is what kind of risk

01:06:59.201 --> 01:07:01.201
does that present ? But I also just

01:07:01.201 --> 01:07:01.110
took a look at your unfunded priority

01:07:01.120 --> 01:07:03.469
list because the real concern here is

01:07:03.479 --> 01:07:05.646
that in a , in a in a budget pressured

01:07:05.646 --> 01:07:08.489
environment um where the real

01:07:08.500 --> 01:07:11.649
consequences is being taken is in is in

01:07:11.659 --> 01:07:13.929
some of the baseline infrastructure .

01:07:13.939 --> 01:07:16.570
So you know , staff training um

01:07:16.580 --> 01:07:19.729
infrastructure capability mil on

01:07:19.899 --> 01:07:23.689
training facilities exercises . So um

01:07:23.699 --> 01:07:25.866
and I did , you know your you your you

01:07:25.866 --> 01:07:27.977
pull list does have some of that . It

01:07:27.977 --> 01:07:30.143
looks like some , some um some milk on

01:07:30.143 --> 01:07:32.143
some some training exercises . So I

01:07:32.143 --> 01:07:34.489
guess I guess my real question is other

01:07:34.500 --> 01:07:36.556
than for us to just say ok to the 2%

01:07:36.556 --> 01:07:38.778
reduction I mean , what are we actually

01:07:38.778 --> 01:07:41.000
doing here ? What what is this gonna do

01:07:41.000 --> 01:07:43.111
to your , the direction you're trying

01:07:43.111 --> 01:07:43.020
to take because we're trying to get you

01:07:43.030 --> 01:07:44.974
to somewhere as fast as possible .

01:07:47.389 --> 01:07:49.445
Well , I think you got it just right

01:07:49.445 --> 01:07:51.667
and I think Secretary Kendall mentioned

01:07:51.667 --> 01:07:53.889
the the the biggest regret of course is

01:07:53.889 --> 01:07:56.167
the lack of counter space capabilities .

01:07:56.167 --> 01:07:58.056
So the budget includes a a pretty

01:07:58.056 --> 01:08:00.278
substantial investment in this shift to

01:08:00.278 --> 01:08:02.500
more resilient architectures . So we're

01:08:02.500 --> 01:08:02.370
on a good path there . Uh It has good

01:08:02.379 --> 01:08:04.435
investments in operational tests and

01:08:04.435 --> 01:08:06.657
training infrastructure . So I like the

01:08:06.657 --> 01:08:08.823
idea of training our operators against

01:08:08.823 --> 01:08:10.823
the thinking threat . What I'm most

01:08:10.823 --> 01:08:12.990
concerned about is how fast we're able

01:08:12.990 --> 01:08:15.212
to put those counter space capabilities

01:08:15.212 --> 01:08:17.046
to hold that risk , the the PR C

01:08:17.046 --> 01:08:16.950
targets that Secretary Kendall

01:08:16.959 --> 01:08:19.339
mentioned , the ones that can uh uh

01:08:19.350 --> 01:08:21.350
it's space enabled targeting of the

01:08:21.350 --> 01:08:23.183
joint force . That's the biggest

01:08:23.183 --> 01:08:25.350
concern and what this budget needed to

01:08:25.350 --> 01:08:28.680
do was slow that acquisition down . So

01:08:28.689 --> 01:08:30.911
the programs are still there . Um We're

01:08:30.911 --> 01:08:33.078
still making progress . We're just not

01:08:33.078 --> 01:08:35.411
putting it in place as fast as possible ,

01:08:35.411 --> 01:08:37.522
ok , I'm sorry , secretary . Anything

01:08:37.522 --> 01:08:41.338
that , ok . Um um General , just

01:08:41.358 --> 01:08:43.659
some of the same questions to you just

01:08:43.668 --> 01:08:46.108
in terms of , of , of , of your budget

01:08:46.119 --> 01:08:48.063
and taking a look at your unfunded

01:08:48.063 --> 01:08:51.269
priority list . Um Mr Womack , I think

01:08:51.278 --> 01:08:53.334
talked about your , your exercises .

01:08:53.334 --> 01:08:55.334
You're , you're , you're not adding

01:08:55.334 --> 01:08:57.559
some exercises in PAC A specifically in

01:08:57.568 --> 01:08:59.679
the agile combat space that you would

01:08:59.679 --> 01:09:01.790
otherwise wanna do . Right . That's ,

01:09:01.790 --> 01:09:04.012
but the one that really kind of , and ,

01:09:04.012 --> 01:09:06.580
and you've got a mil con of $1.115

01:09:06.589 --> 01:09:08.756
billion . And I think we all know that

01:09:08.756 --> 01:09:10.922
your , that your mil con is a , is a ,

01:09:10.922 --> 01:09:13.145
is a huge gap right now , especially if

01:09:13.145 --> 01:09:15.256
you take a look at your annual combat

01:09:15.256 --> 01:09:17.478
plans out in the Pacific . You just saw

01:09:17.478 --> 01:09:19.700
that again . The one that really struck

01:09:19.700 --> 01:09:19.330
me when I took a look at it was um

01:09:19.339 --> 01:09:23.040
spare parts 1.566 billion . Um

01:09:23.049 --> 01:09:25.959
and it , it says here funds single

01:09:25.970 --> 01:09:29.149
spares restock for aircraft projected

01:09:29.160 --> 01:09:31.459
to be grounded due to a lack of spare

01:09:31.470 --> 01:09:33.470
parts . I mean , that sounds pretty

01:09:33.470 --> 01:09:35.526
serious actually to me to be in a ya

01:09:35.526 --> 01:09:37.637
list number one and then number two ,

01:09:37.637 --> 01:09:39.692
we've had a lot of discussion on the

01:09:39.692 --> 01:09:41.914
committee about um um just basic um you

01:09:41.914 --> 01:09:44.248
know , industrial base ability to prove .

01:09:44.248 --> 01:09:46.192
Is this an issue of a supply chain

01:09:46.192 --> 01:09:48.192
disruption or is this the parts are

01:09:48.192 --> 01:09:50.137
available where you still have the

01:09:50.137 --> 01:09:52.137
money to buy them ? Congressman ? I

01:09:52.137 --> 01:09:54.026
think it was , it was more of the

01:09:54.026 --> 01:09:55.970
latter . But the the Department of

01:09:55.970 --> 01:09:58.137
Defense did put an emphasis during the

01:09:58.137 --> 01:10:00.359
budget submission and the contemplation

01:10:00.359 --> 01:10:02.526
about about readiness . So I I did not

01:10:02.526 --> 01:10:04.526
want this committee to , to believe

01:10:04.526 --> 01:10:06.470
that that that the dod did ignored

01:10:06.470 --> 01:10:08.581
readiness . But what happened is this

01:10:08.581 --> 01:10:10.414
year as we looked at some of the

01:10:10.414 --> 01:10:12.470
continued erosion . And we looked at

01:10:12.470 --> 01:10:14.581
the strategy that we talked about . I

01:10:14.581 --> 01:10:16.470
went to uh our Air Force Material

01:10:16.470 --> 01:10:18.637
Command commander and a four and asked

01:10:18.637 --> 01:10:20.748
them to do a sprint . Let's deep dive

01:10:20.748 --> 01:10:22.970
into some data driven analysis that can

01:10:22.970 --> 01:10:25.137
drive from inputs to outputs where you

01:10:25.137 --> 01:10:27.303
can say , if I put a dollar in here in

01:10:27.303 --> 01:10:29.414
this spare part , what can , what can

01:10:29.414 --> 01:10:31.359
it deliver out there ? And we have

01:10:31.359 --> 01:10:31.354
really just developed the data

01:10:31.365 --> 01:10:33.421
platforms to be able to do that with

01:10:33.421 --> 01:10:35.643
rigor . And so that happened during the

01:10:35.643 --> 01:10:37.754
summer and the fall and we focused on

01:10:37.754 --> 01:10:39.976
aircraft and weapon systems that we had

01:10:39.976 --> 01:10:41.976
more control of the , of all of the

01:10:41.976 --> 01:10:44.087
organic aircraft , the C 130 the B 50

01:10:44.087 --> 01:10:46.143
twos , those where we had a lot more

01:10:46.143 --> 01:10:48.254
control over that entire supply chain

01:10:48.254 --> 01:10:50.198
process and , and the supply parts

01:10:50.198 --> 01:10:52.421
where we could visualize throughout the

01:10:52.421 --> 01:10:54.365
system and then looked at which of

01:10:54.365 --> 01:10:56.365
those which we knew had limitations

01:10:56.365 --> 01:10:58.476
because of spare parts because we had

01:10:58.476 --> 01:11:00.643
that across our Air Force , which ones

01:11:00.643 --> 01:11:00.479
would drive the biggest change . And

01:11:00.490 --> 01:11:02.712
when we saw that they came up with that

01:11:02.712 --> 01:11:04.823
analysis and it was complete , but it

01:11:04.823 --> 01:11:06.712
wasn't incomplete in time for the

01:11:06.712 --> 01:11:08.823
budget submission . My sense is if we

01:11:08.823 --> 01:11:08.580
had been done there earlier , I would

01:11:08.589 --> 01:11:10.645
have gone . Secretary Kendall said ,

01:11:10.645 --> 01:11:12.700
maybe perhaps we could put this in .

01:11:12.700 --> 01:11:14.645
But when I saw the , the potential

01:11:14.645 --> 01:11:16.700
output , I couldn't , it didn't seem

01:11:16.700 --> 01:11:16.229
like I could wait another year for the

01:11:16.240 --> 01:11:18.351
next budget submission . So it really

01:11:18.351 --> 01:11:20.462
was a matter of sequencing because we

01:11:20.462 --> 01:11:22.629
didn't want to just put in a wedge and

01:11:22.629 --> 01:11:22.330
say give us more money for parts . I

01:11:22.339 --> 01:11:24.061
wanted to be able to have some

01:11:24.061 --> 01:11:26.283
specificity to show the drive the input

01:11:26.283 --> 01:11:28.450
to the output . And I feel like we had

01:11:28.450 --> 01:11:28.339
confidence enough to , I could submit

01:11:28.350 --> 01:11:30.406
that in my unfunded priority list uh

01:11:30.406 --> 01:11:32.461
because I don't , I would rather not

01:11:32.461 --> 01:11:34.628
wait another year to , to fight in the

01:11:34.628 --> 01:11:36.850
submission . OK . Thank you very much .

01:11:36.850 --> 01:11:39.017
Thank the gentleman . Uh Next to judge

01:11:39.017 --> 01:11:41.410
Carter Show ,

01:11:44.259 --> 01:11:46.720
uh Jill Salzman , the space force

01:11:46.729 --> 01:11:49.319
recently announced the creation of a

01:11:49.330 --> 01:11:53.029
space futures command . Can you talk

01:11:53.040 --> 01:11:55.620
about the goals of this command and its

01:11:55.629 --> 01:11:58.649
timeline ? And can you give us examples

01:11:58.660 --> 01:12:01.209
of what types of missions this command

01:12:01.220 --> 01:12:03.370
will look at ? Thank you , sir . I

01:12:03.379 --> 01:12:05.490
appreciate the question . The futures

01:12:05.490 --> 01:12:07.600
command came out of our uh analysis

01:12:07.609 --> 01:12:09.665
associated with optimizing for great

01:12:09.665 --> 01:12:11.887
power competition . And we became aware

01:12:11.887 --> 01:12:14.109
of the fact that that while there was a

01:12:14.109 --> 01:12:16.276
lot of disaggregated activities across

01:12:16.276 --> 01:12:18.387
the entire force and , and the entire

01:12:18.387 --> 01:12:20.387
department quite frankly associated

01:12:20.387 --> 01:12:22.387
with trying to build the force that

01:12:22.387 --> 01:12:24.553
we're going to need in the future , it

01:12:24.553 --> 01:12:24.240
wasn't coherent enough so that we could

01:12:24.250 --> 01:12:26.361
understand what the 2nd and 3rd order

01:12:26.361 --> 01:12:28.472
effects of any one decision were . So

01:12:28.472 --> 01:12:30.250
what futures command does is it

01:12:30.250 --> 01:12:32.139
aggregates all those capabilities

01:12:32.139 --> 01:12:34.306
together . It will look at operational

01:12:34.306 --> 01:12:36.417
concepts , which technologies will be

01:12:36.417 --> 01:12:38.472
most likely to be used against us or

01:12:38.472 --> 01:12:40.472
that we can leverage against future

01:12:40.472 --> 01:12:42.528
threats . What are the missions that

01:12:42.528 --> 01:12:42.029
are going to be expected of us in the

01:12:42.040 --> 01:12:44.040
future ? It will evaluate all those

01:12:44.040 --> 01:12:46.180
operational concepts , wargaming them

01:12:46.189 --> 01:12:48.430
do tabletop sizes , do some

01:12:48.439 --> 01:12:50.560
experimentation to validate those

01:12:50.569 --> 01:12:52.791
concepts . And then finally do the real

01:12:53.310 --> 01:12:55.609
data analytics that results in a forced

01:12:55.620 --> 01:12:57.398
design so that we can build the

01:12:57.398 --> 01:12:59.287
requirements and buy the kinds of

01:12:59.287 --> 01:13:01.398
capabilities that we know we're going

01:13:01.398 --> 01:13:03.398
to need in the future . All of that

01:13:03.398 --> 01:13:03.339
would fall under one field command .

01:13:04.330 --> 01:13:06.663
And when do you expect to stand this up ?

01:13:07.080 --> 01:13:09.024
I'm I'm hoping that from a process

01:13:09.024 --> 01:13:11.080
standpoint later this summer , early

01:13:11.080 --> 01:13:13.191
fall , we're actually working through

01:13:13.191 --> 01:13:15.413
the processes . It's going to take me a

01:13:15.413 --> 01:13:15.180
while to put a command structure in

01:13:15.189 --> 01:13:16.967
place . There could be a basing

01:13:16.967 --> 01:13:19.022
decision and that will take a little

01:13:19.022 --> 01:13:21.245
more time to put in place . But process

01:13:21.245 --> 01:13:23.133
wise , because a lot of these are

01:13:23.133 --> 01:13:25.078
already occurring across the space

01:13:25.078 --> 01:13:26.911
force , we'll pull them together

01:13:26.911 --> 01:13:29.133
coherently and work the processes later

01:13:29.133 --> 01:13:31.022
this fall is gonna be an issue of

01:13:31.022 --> 01:13:33.189
location . We're going to have to look

01:13:33.189 --> 01:13:32.910
at that as a part of a basing process .

01:13:37.390 --> 01:13:39.446
The Air Force recently announced the

01:13:39.446 --> 01:13:42.089
next phase of the collaborative combat

01:13:42.100 --> 01:13:45.259
aircraft program . And I understand

01:13:45.270 --> 01:13:48.180
that you're exploring international

01:13:48.189 --> 01:13:50.919
partnerships as part of this program .

01:13:51.330 --> 01:13:53.552
Can you elaborate on what it would look

01:13:53.552 --> 01:13:55.850
like and the benefit of this

01:13:55.859 --> 01:13:58.220
partnership might bring the further

01:13:58.229 --> 01:14:01.319
development of the of the program and

01:14:01.330 --> 01:14:04.740
the utility of its across the

01:14:04.750 --> 01:14:07.290
partners , our partners and allies .

01:14:08.169 --> 01:14:10.280
The the collaborative combat aircraft

01:14:10.280 --> 01:14:12.830
program is the un creed , you know ,

01:14:12.839 --> 01:14:15.569
companions wing men , if you will to to

01:14:15.580 --> 01:14:18.330
command aircraft uh started out as a ,

01:14:18.339 --> 01:14:20.560
as a companion for the national next

01:14:20.569 --> 01:14:22.847
next generation Air dominance platform ,

01:14:22.847 --> 01:14:25.029
but also could be used by N F-22 or an

01:14:25.040 --> 01:14:28.100
F-35 or , or an F-15 . And we just down

01:14:28.109 --> 01:14:30.331
selected as you mentioned , congressman

01:14:30.331 --> 01:14:32.053
to two companies for the first

01:14:32.053 --> 01:14:33.998
increment , the way the program is

01:14:33.998 --> 01:14:36.331
structured , it has multiple increments ,

01:14:36.331 --> 01:14:38.442
they're about two years apart and the

01:14:38.442 --> 01:14:40.776
first one will go quickly to production .

01:14:40.776 --> 01:14:42.776
We expect to have that , that those

01:14:42.776 --> 01:14:44.942
aircraft in production within , within

01:14:44.942 --> 01:14:47.109
the next few years and have deliveries

01:14:47.109 --> 01:14:47.000
before the end of the fiveyear plan .

01:14:47.390 --> 01:14:49.446
Um They're gonna allow us to learn a

01:14:49.446 --> 01:14:51.501
lot . They'll give us an operational

01:14:51.501 --> 01:14:53.612
capability . I mentioned earlier that

01:14:53.612 --> 01:14:53.390
we're trying to make sure we feel

01:14:53.399 --> 01:14:55.455
meaningful operational capability as

01:14:55.455 --> 01:14:57.455
quickly as possible . So that first

01:14:57.455 --> 01:14:59.566
increment will give us some degree of

01:14:59.566 --> 01:15:01.455
capability . There'll be a second

01:15:01.455 --> 01:15:03.399
increment coming along a couple of

01:15:03.399 --> 01:15:05.510
years behind that one . Um And we are

01:15:05.510 --> 01:15:07.677
particularly looking for international

01:15:07.677 --> 01:15:10.010
co-operation with that second increment .

01:15:10.010 --> 01:15:12.066
Uh We've had talk with General Alvin

01:15:12.066 --> 01:15:11.430
and I both have had talked to some of

01:15:11.439 --> 01:15:13.661
our partners , our closest partners who

01:15:13.669 --> 01:15:15.891
would be , who are very interested . So

01:15:15.891 --> 01:15:18.002
it's early stages , but we would like

01:15:18.002 --> 01:15:20.225
to go in that direction , we think this

01:15:20.225 --> 01:15:22.280
will be something uh that could have

01:15:22.280 --> 01:15:24.447
great value to all of our partners and

01:15:24.447 --> 01:15:26.780
and enhance our capabilities , you know ,

01:15:26.780 --> 01:15:29.113
uh particularly in partnership with our ,

01:15:29.113 --> 01:15:31.391
with our closest allies doing anything .

01:15:31.391 --> 01:15:33.447
The only thing on that is the secret

01:15:33.447 --> 01:15:35.669
sauce there that I think will enable us

01:15:35.669 --> 01:15:35.560
to be more rapidly integrating with our

01:15:35.569 --> 01:15:37.569
allies and partners is part of this

01:15:37.569 --> 01:15:39.791
entire concept , is a , is a government

01:15:39.791 --> 01:15:41.513
owned reference architecture ,

01:15:41.513 --> 01:15:43.625
something that we control . And so as

01:15:43.625 --> 01:15:45.513
we are seeing advancements in the

01:15:45.513 --> 01:15:47.680
technology , we can maybe set the pace

01:15:47.680 --> 01:15:47.419
for how we can integrate and work with

01:15:47.430 --> 01:15:49.541
our allies and partners . And I think

01:15:49.541 --> 01:15:51.652
that's one of the , that's one of the

01:15:51.652 --> 01:15:50.779
big things that's gonna let us go

01:15:50.790 --> 01:15:54.399
faster like it was German .

01:15:55.410 --> 01:15:58.439
Uh just uh following up on the judge's

01:15:58.450 --> 01:16:01.680
question uh on the uh on this aircraft ,

01:16:01.689 --> 01:16:03.759
the collaborative aircraft . What do

01:16:03.770 --> 01:16:07.000
you envision ? How many aircraft are we

01:16:07.009 --> 01:16:09.009
talking about here in the next five

01:16:09.009 --> 01:16:12.149
years ? Um We'll , we'll have over 100

01:16:12.160 --> 01:16:14.382
on order or delivered by the end of the

01:16:14.382 --> 01:16:16.660
fed up uh with Dutch for increment one ,

01:16:16.660 --> 01:16:18.771
the planning figure I've given people

01:16:18.771 --> 01:16:20.959
to use is 1000 . Uh And that's just

01:16:20.970 --> 01:16:23.081
really to reflect the fact that we're

01:16:23.081 --> 01:16:25.192
serious about this . It is gonna be a

01:16:25.192 --> 01:16:27.526
significant part of our force structure .

01:16:27.526 --> 01:16:29.692
Um The ultimate number is gonna depend

01:16:29.692 --> 01:16:32.029
upon uh all the uh cost affordability

01:16:32.040 --> 01:16:34.096
and a number of other factors but th

01:16:34.096 --> 01:16:36.740
this is a fairly transformative change

01:16:36.750 --> 01:16:38.729
to going away from , you know ,

01:16:38.740 --> 01:16:40.962
individual fighter pilots all out there

01:16:40.962 --> 01:16:43.649
at risk together to giving the giving

01:16:43.660 --> 01:16:46.379
our fighter pilots , AAA wingman that ,

01:16:46.700 --> 01:16:48.867
that can be treated to a degree , it's

01:16:48.867 --> 01:16:50.700
intended to be survival , but at

01:16:50.700 --> 01:16:52.830
treatable , uh that'll give us a wide

01:16:52.839 --> 01:16:55.061
range of tactics and techniques that we

01:16:55.061 --> 01:16:57.117
currently can't , can't utilize . So

01:16:57.117 --> 01:16:59.339
it's going to become a mainstay part of

01:16:59.339 --> 01:17:01.640
the . So each say F-35 , for instance ,

01:17:01.649 --> 01:17:03.816
how many collaborative aircraft do you

01:17:03.816 --> 01:17:05.816
think would be attached to a single

01:17:05.816 --> 01:17:07.982
F-35 ? We won't do it for every single

01:17:07.982 --> 01:17:09.760
fighter , probably at least not

01:17:09.760 --> 01:17:13.729
initially but nominally 2 to 2 to 5 ,

01:17:13.740 --> 01:17:15.851
for example , under the control of an

01:17:15.851 --> 01:17:17.851
individual pilot and the costs I've

01:17:17.851 --> 01:17:19.518
read in the press reports are

01:17:19.518 --> 01:17:21.684
approximately 30 million apiece . Does

01:17:21.684 --> 01:17:23.851
that sound about right ? We're , we're

01:17:23.851 --> 01:17:26.073
looking for something that's a fraction

01:17:26.073 --> 01:17:28.296
of the cost of a fighter . So the order

01:17:28.296 --> 01:17:30.296
of 25 or 30 million apiece would be

01:17:30.296 --> 01:17:30.279
kind of what I would consider

01:17:30.290 --> 01:17:32.346
personally an upper bound . Yeah , I

01:17:32.346 --> 01:17:34.512
would hope so . I would hope that cost

01:17:34.512 --> 01:17:36.568
could come down considerably . Thank

01:17:36.568 --> 01:17:39.410
you . Uh M caper . Thank you , Mr ,

01:17:39.419 --> 01:17:41.399
Chairman Mr Secretary Generals .

01:17:41.410 --> 01:17:43.521
Welcome and to all your staff . Thank

01:17:43.521 --> 01:17:45.709
you for the patriotic job that you all

01:17:45.720 --> 01:17:48.600
do . I wanted to uh go to General Alvin

01:17:48.609 --> 01:17:51.359
first . Uh If I might uh what is the

01:17:51.370 --> 01:17:53.439
Air Force learning from the Ukraine

01:17:53.450 --> 01:17:56.120
Theater and uh operations there that

01:17:56.129 --> 01:17:58.720
would inform our posture toward uh

01:17:58.729 --> 01:18:02.009
future uh flight and uh

01:18:02.020 --> 01:18:03.839
future fights .

01:18:05.720 --> 01:18:08.000
Thank you . And I , I hesitate early on

01:18:08.009 --> 01:18:09.953
to talk about lessons learned . We

01:18:09.953 --> 01:18:12.009
certainly want to want to , to learn

01:18:12.009 --> 01:18:14.009
what we can . But understanding the

01:18:14.009 --> 01:18:16.120
context is important . I believe that

01:18:16.120 --> 01:18:18.287
there are a couple of things , uh a as

01:18:18.287 --> 01:18:20.398
an airman . It reminds me of that . I

01:18:20.398 --> 01:18:19.680
don't think you want to fight without

01:18:19.689 --> 01:18:21.800
some level of air superiority because

01:18:21.800 --> 01:18:23.800
that's where we are right now . And

01:18:23.800 --> 01:18:25.911
that's painful for both sides . But I

01:18:25.911 --> 01:18:28.022
think the , the advancements in uh in

01:18:28.022 --> 01:18:30.189
the , in the U A Bs and the drones and

01:18:30.189 --> 01:18:32.356
what that means for a change in , in ,

01:18:32.356 --> 01:18:34.049
in the ability to retain air

01:18:34.060 --> 01:18:36.171
superiority long enough to be able to

01:18:36.171 --> 01:18:38.282
have those uh the , the , the overall

01:18:38.282 --> 01:18:40.227
combat objectives is , is a little

01:18:40.227 --> 01:18:42.338
different depending on where you go .

01:18:42.338 --> 01:18:44.504
We wanna make sure that even though we

01:18:44.504 --> 01:18:46.504
have massive , you know , swarms of

01:18:46.504 --> 01:18:48.393
drones that works in the European

01:18:48.393 --> 01:18:50.393
theater , when you have a different

01:18:50.393 --> 01:18:50.089
theater , you have to think of a

01:18:50.100 --> 01:18:52.350
different context because there's much

01:18:52.359 --> 01:18:54.359
more range . And so you wouldn't be

01:18:54.359 --> 01:18:56.526
able to use them in the same way . But

01:18:56.526 --> 01:18:58.581
I think that the , the idea that the

01:18:58.581 --> 01:19:00.748
electromagnetic spectrum may be one of

01:19:00.748 --> 01:19:02.915
the biggest lessons that still matters

01:19:02.915 --> 01:19:04.915
more than we did before because the

01:19:04.915 --> 01:19:07.081
ability for those uh crude or un crude

01:19:07.081 --> 01:19:09.137
aircraft to be effective . And there

01:19:09.137 --> 01:19:11.248
really depends on how they can defend

01:19:11.248 --> 01:19:13.415
against they can jam against or defend

01:19:13.415 --> 01:19:15.359
against jamming and survive in the

01:19:15.359 --> 01:19:17.581
electromagnetic spectrum . That and the

01:19:17.581 --> 01:19:19.748
innovation that's happening within the

01:19:19.748 --> 01:19:21.859
conflict , I think are things that we

01:19:21.859 --> 01:19:23.915
need to be prepared for . We need to

01:19:23.915 --> 01:19:26.081
solve for agility to make sure that we

01:19:26.081 --> 01:19:28.303
can , we can adapt to those maybe lower

01:19:28.303 --> 01:19:30.415
cost but asymmetric capabilities that

01:19:30.415 --> 01:19:32.359
pop up early up early in wartime .

01:19:32.359 --> 01:19:34.640
Thank you uh very much . Um Let me ask

01:19:34.649 --> 01:19:37.319
any one of you if the uh boards of

01:19:37.330 --> 01:19:39.919
education that I represent across

01:19:39.930 --> 01:19:42.180
Northern Ohio and our community

01:19:42.189 --> 01:19:44.859
colleges wanted to connect to any of

01:19:44.870 --> 01:19:47.370
your cyber training or cyber

01:19:47.379 --> 01:19:49.930
possibilities for younger people that

01:19:49.939 --> 01:19:52.120
holds the potential for recruitment as

01:19:52.129 --> 01:19:54.640
well as workforce development . Uh on

01:19:54.649 --> 01:19:57.279
the private side . Uh If we have

01:19:57.290 --> 01:19:59.457
interested teachers and their students

01:19:59.457 --> 01:20:01.779
who do we contact , we'll get you

01:20:01.790 --> 01:20:03.901
someone to talk to about that . We're

01:20:03.901 --> 01:20:06.068
very interested in that you may not be

01:20:06.068 --> 01:20:08.234
aware . We just created a new category

01:20:08.234 --> 01:20:10.729
of , of airmen , warrant officers in

01:20:10.740 --> 01:20:12.907
the cyber and it field . So we're very

01:20:12.907 --> 01:20:14.962
much interested in expertise in that

01:20:14.962 --> 01:20:17.184
area and having people come in who want

01:20:17.184 --> 01:20:19.296
to work in that area and stay in that

01:20:19.296 --> 01:20:21.296
area during their career . So we uh

01:20:21.296 --> 01:20:23.296
I'll get you a point of contact and

01:20:23.296 --> 01:20:25.296
we'll have someone work with you on

01:20:25.296 --> 01:20:24.959
that . I hear there might be a Cyber

01:20:24.970 --> 01:20:27.120
command that was established in uh

01:20:27.129 --> 01:20:29.979
Cincinnati . I'm not sure who that's

01:20:29.990 --> 01:20:32.101
done through whether it was right pat

01:20:32.101 --> 01:20:34.319
or I , I don't know the university

01:20:34.330 --> 01:20:36.330
there but it's not connected to the

01:20:36.330 --> 01:20:38.441
places that I represent . So I'm just

01:20:38.441 --> 01:20:40.770
curious uh to be connected to the right

01:20:40.779 --> 01:20:43.359
place at Air Force , Ohio is a state of

01:20:43.370 --> 01:20:45.537
flight . So we have to protect our own

01:20:45.537 --> 01:20:47.203
and uh we go on to engage our

01:20:47.203 --> 01:20:50.140
educational um community in that effort

01:20:50.149 --> 01:20:53.930
as well . Uh uh 20 years ago uh at the

01:20:53.939 --> 01:20:56.930
1/80 fighter wing in uh Western Ohio ,

01:20:57.310 --> 01:20:59.910
uh a biofuel F-16 was flown

01:20:59.919 --> 01:21:02.430
successfully . I'm interested in how

01:21:02.439 --> 01:21:04.870
you Mr Secretary or any of you think

01:21:04.879 --> 01:21:08.169
about fueling the future and uh in

01:21:08.180 --> 01:21:10.910
craft that are airborne . Uh

01:21:11.029 --> 01:21:14.149
Just curious how you think about that .

01:21:16.649 --> 01:21:18.816
I think in general uh uh congresswoman

01:21:18.816 --> 01:21:21.450
the , the idea for us is , is fuel ,

01:21:21.459 --> 01:21:23.810
fuel conservation is not only just good

01:21:23.819 --> 01:21:25.819
for the planet , it helps us in our

01:21:25.819 --> 01:21:27.930
mission as well . So anything that we

01:21:27.930 --> 01:21:30.459
can do that can preserve uh duration

01:21:30.520 --> 01:21:32.850
endurance regardless of the type of

01:21:32.859 --> 01:21:35.192
fuel , uh that's what we're looking for .

01:21:35.192 --> 01:21:37.303
But before we , we transform into the

01:21:37.303 --> 01:21:39.359
sort of the fossil fuel uh platforms

01:21:39.359 --> 01:21:41.415
that we have into something into the

01:21:41.415 --> 01:21:43.526
future , we need to ensure that it is

01:21:43.526 --> 01:21:45.803
sustainable and it's something you can ,

01:21:45.803 --> 01:21:47.915
we can take with us into combat . But

01:21:47.915 --> 01:21:49.748
the idea that we would always be

01:21:49.748 --> 01:21:51.970
looking at operational energy and being

01:21:51.970 --> 01:21:51.910
able to , to better use that it

01:21:51.919 --> 01:21:53.530
actually enhances our combat

01:21:53.530 --> 01:21:55.810
effectiveness as well . Should we be

01:21:55.979 --> 01:21:59.040
apprehensive about the space force ?

01:21:59.049 --> 01:22:01.910
And the uh uh current air uh

01:22:01.919 --> 01:22:04.430
responsibilities that our region holds

01:22:04.439 --> 01:22:07.080
with F-16s and potentially F-35s

01:22:07.089 --> 01:22:10.080
because of the uh dawn of Space Force .

01:22:10.089 --> 01:22:12.200
Are , do we have reason to be worried

01:22:12.200 --> 01:22:14.256
that we're going to lose our fighter

01:22:14.256 --> 01:22:16.729
wing ? I , I'm not aware of any reason

01:22:16.740 --> 01:22:18.851
why you would be . All right . Well ,

01:22:18.851 --> 01:22:21.018
that's good news . Finally . Uh , what

01:22:21.018 --> 01:22:23.299
about the , um , balloon that flew over

01:22:23.310 --> 01:22:25.421
the country ? What did we decide that

01:22:25.421 --> 01:22:28.419
was uh the one that there was a Chinese

01:22:28.430 --> 01:22:30.890
balloon that came by ? And uh

01:22:32.850 --> 01:22:35.049
uh it's , I'm not sure how much I can

01:22:35.060 --> 01:22:36.727
say that I being getting into

01:22:36.727 --> 01:22:38.799
classified , you know , it was very

01:22:38.810 --> 01:22:40.977
visible people , you know , were aware

01:22:40.977 --> 01:22:43.750
of it . It was shut down . Um , the

01:22:43.759 --> 01:22:45.879
Chinese claim that it was not an

01:22:45.890 --> 01:22:47.890
intentional on their part . I'm not

01:22:47.890 --> 01:22:50.049
sure that we believe that uh I , I

01:22:50.060 --> 01:22:52.060
think we've raised the awareness of

01:22:52.060 --> 01:22:54.171
that kind of threat quite , quite a ,

01:22:54.171 --> 01:22:56.282
quite a bit . Uh , and we're on the ,

01:22:56.282 --> 01:22:58.393
on the alert for those . We have seen

01:22:58.393 --> 01:23:00.504
some other cases where will have come

01:23:00.504 --> 01:23:00.450
close if not come over the United

01:23:00.459 --> 01:23:02.700
States . Thank you , Mr Secretary . We

01:23:02.709 --> 01:23:04.876
could , we could give you much more at

01:23:04.876 --> 01:23:06.876
a classified level . Thank you . Uh

01:23:06.876 --> 01:23:09.529
Thank you . Uh I don't know why they

01:23:09.540 --> 01:23:12.870
don't just put that debris on display

01:23:12.879 --> 01:23:14.990
someplace and let the American public

01:23:14.990 --> 01:23:17.268
look at it and make their own decision .

01:23:17.268 --> 01:23:19.435
I think we all know what that decision

01:23:19.435 --> 01:23:21.546
would be . Uh Mr Garcia . Thank you ,

01:23:21.546 --> 01:23:23.712
Mr Chairman . I thank the three of you

01:23:23.712 --> 01:23:23.509
for being here today . Thank you for

01:23:23.520 --> 01:23:25.742
your service to our beautiful country .

01:23:25.742 --> 01:23:27.964
Uh Mr Secretary , congratulations on CC

01:23:27.964 --> 01:23:30.419
A uh two outstanding choices there with

01:23:30.430 --> 01:23:32.541
uh and roll and uh General Tomic . Uh

01:23:32.541 --> 01:23:34.486
and looking forward to seeing that

01:23:34.486 --> 01:23:37.200
program uh accelerate and actually it's

01:23:37.209 --> 01:23:39.153
a paradigm breaking acquisition uh

01:23:39.153 --> 01:23:40.990
model uh as well as the source

01:23:41.000 --> 01:23:43.000
selection . So really appreciate it

01:23:43.000 --> 01:23:45.140
survivable but uh tradable uh was

01:23:45.149 --> 01:23:47.316
actually my call sign in the navy . So

01:23:47.316 --> 01:23:49.538
uh that uh that's a good thing to see .

01:23:49.538 --> 01:23:51.593
Hopefully , that's not a black cloud

01:23:51.593 --> 01:23:53.705
for CC A . Um You , we're in a unique

01:23:53.705 --> 01:23:55.927
uh era right now where you're trying to

01:23:55.927 --> 01:23:58.149
balance capability with capacity . I've

01:23:58.149 --> 01:24:00.149
been very adamant that I don't know

01:24:00.149 --> 01:24:01.982
that we have a uh capability gap

01:24:01.982 --> 01:24:04.038
relative to China . I think that's a

01:24:04.038 --> 01:24:03.529
fight we always keep fighting , but I

01:24:03.540 --> 01:24:05.707
think we do have a unique capabilities

01:24:05.707 --> 01:24:08.060
high in exotics , but the capacity uh

01:24:08.069 --> 01:24:10.220
is the challenge with the force

01:24:10.229 --> 01:24:12.229
projection of , you know , three or

01:24:12.229 --> 01:24:14.451
4000 miles and not in our backyard like

01:24:14.451 --> 01:24:16.507
what they enjoy . So now we're in an

01:24:16.507 --> 01:24:18.451
era where you see , you know , the

01:24:18.451 --> 01:24:20.673
first flight of B 21 happen this year ,

01:24:20.673 --> 01:24:22.840
but also the service life extension of

01:24:22.840 --> 01:24:24.896
B 52 out to be 100 year old platform

01:24:24.896 --> 01:24:27.062
with new radars , new sensors . Uh you

01:24:27.062 --> 01:24:29.118
see Teddy Roosevelt's vision of F-35

01:24:29.118 --> 01:24:31.118
finally being realized with uh tech

01:24:31.118 --> 01:24:34.189
refresh and now also F-15 ex capacity

01:24:34.200 --> 01:24:36.779
supplementing that capability . Uh I

01:24:36.790 --> 01:24:38.957
think these are good things . J AC two

01:24:38.957 --> 01:24:41.529
A B MS uh maturation and some

01:24:41.540 --> 01:24:43.979
classified programs . So uh I don't

01:24:43.990 --> 01:24:46.212
envy your jobs , but I think overall uh

01:24:46.212 --> 01:24:48.323
at the , at the macro level , the Air

01:24:48.323 --> 01:24:50.212
Force is doing a good job of , of

01:24:50.212 --> 01:24:52.157
executing that , that pivot to the

01:24:52.157 --> 01:24:54.323
Pacific and maintaining the capability

01:24:54.323 --> 01:24:56.323
advantage while also addressing the

01:24:56.323 --> 01:24:58.434
capacity challenges that uh we have .

01:24:58.434 --> 01:25:00.490
So uh just , just wanted to give you

01:25:00.490 --> 01:25:03.959
kudos for that . Um uh My concern is

01:25:03.970 --> 01:25:06.026
around the T seven and how we can go

01:25:06.026 --> 01:25:07.859
faster . I've been a asking this

01:25:07.859 --> 01:25:10.439
question for a few years . Um uh Mr

01:25:10.450 --> 01:25:12.561
Elsie and I lost a good friend in the

01:25:12.561 --> 01:25:14.990
uh T 38 accident back in 2019 out of

01:25:15.000 --> 01:25:17.950
Enon Oklahoma , 47 year old uh naval

01:25:17.959 --> 01:25:20.292
aviator who did an air force transition ,

01:25:20.292 --> 01:25:23.359
he was in the back seat . Uh that T 38

01:25:23.370 --> 01:25:25.879
aircraft was not a good trainer in the

01:25:25.890 --> 01:25:28.001
sixties or seventies and sure as hell

01:25:28.001 --> 01:25:30.057
is not a good trainer today . Uh And

01:25:30.057 --> 01:25:32.001
it's the widow maker , I think , I

01:25:32.001 --> 01:25:34.057
think it's killed about 100 and 4900

01:25:34.057 --> 01:25:36.279
and 50 aviators or pilots . Excuse me .

01:25:36.279 --> 01:25:39.379
Uh Sorry . Um Since , since it's come

01:25:39.390 --> 01:25:42.609
on online , so are , what are we doing ?

01:25:42.620 --> 01:25:44.620
Is it a Boeing limitation ? Is it a

01:25:44.620 --> 01:25:47.120
material limitation ? What can we in

01:25:47.129 --> 01:25:50.029
Congress do to help accelerate the T

01:25:50.040 --> 01:25:53.399
seven to avoid t 38

01:25:53.410 --> 01:25:56.000
deaths in the next call . It 2 to 4

01:25:56.020 --> 01:25:58.180
year period . I , I'm not aware of

01:25:58.189 --> 01:26:00.411
anything you can do to make the program

01:26:00.411 --> 01:26:02.078
move faster . We had this sub

01:26:02.078 --> 01:26:04.189
production uh out a year because they

01:26:04.189 --> 01:26:06.245
trying to negotiate and get the cost

01:26:06.245 --> 01:26:08.300
down and deal with some difficulties

01:26:08.300 --> 01:26:10.522
that have occurred in development . You

01:26:10.522 --> 01:26:10.410
may be aware we've had problems with

01:26:10.419 --> 01:26:12.729
the ejection seat and ejection system

01:26:12.740 --> 01:26:14.796
and with some of the controls . So I

01:26:14.796 --> 01:26:16.629
think that we're working our way

01:26:16.629 --> 01:26:18.684
through those . I could get you uh a

01:26:18.684 --> 01:26:20.740
more detailed report general and may

01:26:20.740 --> 01:26:23.018
have more information than I do . Uh I ,

01:26:23.018 --> 01:26:25.129
I think this is some of it is in , in

01:26:25.129 --> 01:26:25.040
general . I and I , I don't want to

01:26:25.049 --> 01:26:27.049
speak for Boeing specifically , but

01:26:27.049 --> 01:26:29.160
there are some growing pains when you

01:26:29.160 --> 01:26:31.382
start with uh sort of a new way of , of

01:26:31.382 --> 01:26:31.290
building and designing . This started

01:26:31.299 --> 01:26:33.466
with more digital engineering . And so

01:26:33.466 --> 01:26:35.466
there , there , there may have been

01:26:35.466 --> 01:26:35.270
some things associated with that , that

01:26:35.279 --> 01:26:37.112
sort of hindered the pace of the

01:26:37.112 --> 01:26:39.112
development . Uh I'm encouraged the

01:26:39.112 --> 01:26:41.279
fact that it's in flight test now . Um

01:26:41.279 --> 01:26:43.390
I , I think that this is where we can

01:26:43.390 --> 01:26:45.335
perhaps accelerate . Um But as the

01:26:45.335 --> 01:26:47.446
secretary said , it really is just by

01:26:47.446 --> 01:26:47.339
getting it through this developmental

01:26:47.350 --> 01:26:49.479
test and buying the first ones next

01:26:49.490 --> 01:26:51.657
year , you know , 26 . Ok . Well , I I

01:26:51.657 --> 01:26:53.879
would just encourage you if you see any

01:26:53.879 --> 01:26:55.712
opportunity to accelerate either

01:26:55.712 --> 01:26:57.712
through parallel risk reduction . I

01:26:57.712 --> 01:26:59.934
know there's gonna be concurrency risks

01:26:59.934 --> 01:26:59.919
that come with that . This , this isn't

01:26:59.930 --> 01:27:02.240
as , as exotic as the F-35 . So those ,

01:27:02.310 --> 01:27:04.366
those penalties won't be as severe .

01:27:04.366 --> 01:27:06.421
But , you know , uh , Matt Kincaid's

01:27:06.421 --> 01:27:08.359
widow is , is , is out there in

01:27:08.370 --> 01:27:10.592
Oklahoma still . Uh , and she's looking

01:27:10.592 --> 01:27:12.870
at this very closely and , and , and I ,

01:27:12.870 --> 01:27:14.981
I think it will save lives and we can

01:27:14.981 --> 01:27:17.203
go faster . Uh , my last request , uh ,

01:27:17.203 --> 01:27:19.370
General Saltzman , if we can get uh in

01:27:19.370 --> 01:27:22.109
the skiff at some point , you mentioned

01:27:22.120 --> 01:27:24.287
a program today that we as a committee

01:27:24.287 --> 01:27:27.259
have grave concerns over . Um But we

01:27:27.270 --> 01:27:30.439
can't talk about it here that um is

01:27:30.450 --> 01:27:32.979
very relevant right now and very timely

01:27:32.990 --> 01:27:35.101
discussion I think would be needed in

01:27:35.101 --> 01:27:37.379
the skiff if , if we can at some point .

01:27:37.379 --> 01:27:39.657
Um I , I took a brief at space command ,

01:27:39.657 --> 01:27:41.934
I think actually , uh the chairman was ,

01:27:41.934 --> 01:27:44.157
was , was there as well uh in Elsie Gun

01:27:44.157 --> 01:27:46.268
uh about a year ago . Now when , when

01:27:46.268 --> 01:27:48.490
uh we were , when you were promoting uh

01:27:48.490 --> 01:27:51.680
Buzz Aldrin . And uh um I , I wanna

01:27:51.689 --> 01:27:53.856
follow up on that uh if we can at some

01:27:53.856 --> 01:27:56.078
point . Uh But I think it would behoove

01:27:56.078 --> 01:27:58.189
Mr chairman for the , for the , the ,

01:27:58.189 --> 01:28:00.356
the whole sub-committee to hear , hear

01:28:00.356 --> 01:28:02.356
what's going on there . But uh with

01:28:02.356 --> 01:28:04.578
that , I yield back . Thank you . Thank

01:28:04.578 --> 01:28:06.689
you . I remember that uh meeting with

01:28:06.689 --> 01:28:08.745
General Alden uh very well as we can

01:28:08.745 --> 01:28:10.911
call him now with the secretary's help

01:28:10.911 --> 01:28:12.911
by the way I , I appreciate that uh

01:28:12.911 --> 01:28:16.580
very much . Uh Mr El , thank you , Mr

01:28:16.589 --> 01:28:18.811
Chairman . Thank you all for being here

01:28:18.811 --> 01:28:20.978
today . It's nice to see you , General

01:28:20.978 --> 01:28:20.640
Saltzman . Are the lights in here in

01:28:20.649 --> 01:28:22.700
this windowless room ? Ok . For a

01:28:22.709 --> 01:28:24.970
missile , is it ok ? All right .

01:28:27.040 --> 01:28:29.151
I'd like to thank you and your fellow

01:28:29.151 --> 01:28:31.262
missile for what you do . There is no

01:28:31.262 --> 01:28:33.262
way in Hades . I could , I could do

01:28:33.262 --> 01:28:35.207
that . So thank you for taking the

01:28:35.207 --> 01:28:34.750
strain . You're the perfect guy for

01:28:34.759 --> 01:28:37.279
this job right now on expanding space

01:28:37.290 --> 01:28:39.457
capabilities . And , uh Mr Secretary ,

01:28:39.457 --> 01:28:41.623
thank you for being here . We've never

01:28:41.623 --> 01:28:43.568
met before . But , uh , I , I just

01:28:43.568 --> 01:28:43.200
would like to ask what's wrong with the

01:28:43.209 --> 01:28:45.376
Air Force Academy that they can't find

01:28:45.376 --> 01:28:47.320
the Secretary of the Air Force for

01:28:47.320 --> 01:28:49.487
themselves , that they would require a

01:28:49.487 --> 01:28:51.653
West pointer . It defies logic . But ,

01:28:51.653 --> 01:28:53.598
uh , glad you're here and , and of

01:28:53.598 --> 01:28:55.931
course , from your years in acquisition ,

01:28:55.931 --> 01:28:55.669
you are the right guy for these , these

01:28:55.680 --> 01:28:58.439
times as well . And , uh , and general

01:28:58.450 --> 01:29:00.561
Alvin your , your history as a , as a

01:29:00.561 --> 01:29:04.180
heavy guy . Uh Holland , uh , logistics

01:29:04.189 --> 01:29:06.245
is , is the right , you're the right

01:29:06.245 --> 01:29:08.245
man for that job right now too . So

01:29:08.245 --> 01:29:10.356
it's a pleasure to be with you guys .

01:29:10.356 --> 01:29:12.522
Thank you very much . Uh General , I'd

01:29:12.522 --> 01:29:14.578
like to start with you . Uh , by the

01:29:14.578 --> 01:29:14.259
way , someday it's gonna be admirable

01:29:14.270 --> 01:29:16.859
because , you know , Star Trek , it was

01:29:16.870 --> 01:29:19.037
the fleet , star fleet . We're gonna ,

01:29:19.037 --> 01:29:21.037
we're gonna , we're gonna do that .

01:29:21.037 --> 01:29:22.481
Before I leave Congress .

01:29:24.319 --> 01:29:27.049
Sadly , on November 29th , 2023 we lost

01:29:27.060 --> 01:29:30.180
to V 22 from A so , um and then on

01:29:30.189 --> 01:29:32.245
December 6th , 2023 . After watching

01:29:32.245 --> 01:29:34.300
the video , the A O commander downed

01:29:34.300 --> 01:29:36.390
the whole fleet . Uh there were some

01:29:36.399 --> 01:29:38.455
issues with it which I won't go into

01:29:38.455 --> 01:29:40.566
here . Uh That led to that mishap and

01:29:40.566 --> 01:29:42.788
very mishap rates between the different

01:29:42.788 --> 01:29:44.955
services . Uh On March 8th , the Naval

01:29:44.955 --> 01:29:46.955
Air Systems Command deemed the V 22

01:29:46.955 --> 01:29:49.370
safe to fly based on a meticulous and

01:29:49.379 --> 01:29:51.740
data driven approach that prioritized

01:29:51.750 --> 01:29:53.917
safety . And then just days later , uh

01:29:53.917 --> 01:29:55.806
the Marine Corps and the Japanese

01:29:55.806 --> 01:29:58.209
started flying them and the Navy has as

01:29:58.220 --> 01:30:00.700
well . We talked to the SOCOM commander

01:30:00.709 --> 01:30:03.729
a couple of weeks ago and he said he

01:30:03.740 --> 01:30:05.518
said their operations have been

01:30:05.518 --> 01:30:07.629
severely impacted in , in this room .

01:30:07.629 --> 01:30:09.740
That's where I'll leave it because of

01:30:09.740 --> 01:30:11.851
the V 22 grounding . So I've spoke to

01:30:11.851 --> 01:30:14.018
the A O commander and he can't give me

01:30:14.018 --> 01:30:16.018
a timeline for a return to flight .

01:30:16.018 --> 01:30:18.073
It's been six weeks since the Marine

01:30:18.073 --> 01:30:18.049
Corps and Japanese started flying as

01:30:18.060 --> 01:30:20.171
well as the Navy . That's a long time

01:30:20.171 --> 01:30:22.282
considering the operational impacts .

01:30:22.282 --> 01:30:24.282
And I want to know when the V 22 is

01:30:24.282 --> 01:30:26.616
gonna start flying again . Well , again ,

01:30:26.616 --> 01:30:28.560
I I know and uh the fo commander ,

01:30:28.560 --> 01:30:30.616
General Bauer Frein spoke with me as

01:30:30.616 --> 01:30:32.616
well and we , we , we keep in touch

01:30:32.616 --> 01:30:34.838
very frequently about , about this . Um

01:30:34.838 --> 01:30:36.949
So I can tell you right now that uh ,

01:30:36.949 --> 01:30:38.782
three of the platforms have gone

01:30:38.782 --> 01:30:40.893
through FCFS , they've gone through a

01:30:40.893 --> 01:30:43.060
functional check flights . And so we ,

01:30:43.060 --> 01:30:45.171
we are making a deliberate approach ,

01:30:45.171 --> 01:30:47.060
but it is , it is a comprehensive

01:30:47.060 --> 01:30:49.227
approach because the manner in which ,

01:30:49.227 --> 01:30:51.338
as you know , the , the CB 22 is used

01:30:51.338 --> 01:30:50.600
in the Air Force is really much

01:30:50.609 --> 01:30:52.665
different . And so he is in lockstep

01:30:52.665 --> 01:30:54.776
with the joint program office and his

01:30:54.776 --> 01:30:57.060
sister services in , in understanding

01:30:57.069 --> 01:30:59.180
how and why they are returning theirs

01:30:59.180 --> 01:31:01.402
to fly . But he's taking a FSOC in , in

01:31:01.402 --> 01:31:03.458
a deliberate manner to ensure , um ,

01:31:03.458 --> 01:31:05.402
every one of the , the maintenance

01:31:05.402 --> 01:31:07.458
records checked and every one of the

01:31:07.458 --> 01:31:09.569
crews are , are ready to fly . And so

01:31:09.569 --> 01:31:08.955
he's , he's taking a deliberate

01:31:08.964 --> 01:31:11.075
approach in a comprehensive review on

01:31:11.075 --> 01:31:12.853
the weapon system , on the crew

01:31:12.853 --> 01:31:14.964
complement on the mission set and how

01:31:14.964 --> 01:31:17.131
it's unique to the Air Force and AOC .

01:31:17.131 --> 01:31:19.297
Ok . Well , I got the same answer from

01:31:19.297 --> 01:31:21.520
him and I quite frankly , how he downed

01:31:21.520 --> 01:31:23.131
it based on a video that was

01:31:23.131 --> 01:31:25.924
preemptively to a mishap investigation .

01:31:26.205 --> 01:31:28.261
I was a mishap investigator . I flew

01:31:28.261 --> 01:31:31.169
Helos and jets . Quite frankly , he the

01:31:31.180 --> 01:31:33.180
decision to do that should not have

01:31:33.180 --> 01:31:35.347
been approved and it hurt our national

01:31:35.347 --> 01:31:37.291
security . That is my take on it .

01:31:37.291 --> 01:31:39.624
We'll move on to a different issue . Um ,

01:31:39.624 --> 01:31:41.791
let's talk about acquisitions and like

01:31:41.791 --> 01:31:43.736
I said , Mr Secretary , you're the

01:31:43.736 --> 01:31:43.399
right guy for this , but it seems like

01:31:43.410 --> 01:31:45.577
we keep making these mistakes over and

01:31:45.577 --> 01:31:47.632
over and over again . And you know ,

01:31:47.632 --> 01:31:49.799
the B 21 is a great program . The F-15

01:31:49.799 --> 01:31:51.854
EX was a great program . Future long

01:31:51.854 --> 01:31:54.077
range assault aircraft is on timeline .

01:31:54.077 --> 01:31:56.299
But when we talk about none mccurdy and

01:31:56.299 --> 01:31:58.521
the 139 Gray Wolf , it's a helicopter .

01:31:58.521 --> 01:32:00.632
Um the Sentinel which I know is a lot

01:32:00.632 --> 01:32:02.466
more complex . Uh but in our own

01:32:02.466 --> 01:32:04.688
service , um the FFG the DDG 1000 the L

01:32:04.688 --> 01:32:06.743
CS , the Presidential Hilo Air Force

01:32:06.743 --> 01:32:08.966
one , the Ford's three years behind the

01:32:08.966 --> 01:32:11.077
F-35 got cut F-22 got cut T seven was

01:32:11.077 --> 01:32:13.188
behind timeline . So my question is ,

01:32:13.188 --> 01:32:15.354
and I'm , and I'm asking this in a way

01:32:15.354 --> 01:32:17.577
that is completely innocent . I have no

01:32:17.577 --> 01:32:19.688
agenda here , but I really wanna know

01:32:19.688 --> 01:32:21.799
that after decades of doing the wrong

01:32:21.799 --> 01:32:24.132
thing , do we have a requirements issue ?

01:32:24.132 --> 01:32:26.466
Because I think in my service we do are ,

01:32:26.466 --> 01:32:28.632
are we underestimating uh supply chain

01:32:28.632 --> 01:32:30.688
issues and we're just catching up to

01:32:30.688 --> 01:32:32.854
them or is it a lack of business sense

01:32:32.854 --> 01:32:32.229
and acquisitions ? And , and I'm not

01:32:32.240 --> 01:32:34.129
trying to lead you down the right

01:32:34.129 --> 01:32:36.296
answer . I really just kind of want to

01:32:36.296 --> 01:32:38.629
know . How long do you have Congressman ?

01:32:38.629 --> 01:32:42.600
40 seconds . Um I've , I've , I've done

01:32:42.609 --> 01:32:44.942
this , we get a minute extension . I've ,

01:32:44.942 --> 01:32:46.998
I've got 50 years of experience with

01:32:47.020 --> 01:32:49.600
new product development basically and

01:32:49.609 --> 01:32:51.665
I've seen us get in trouble the same

01:32:51.665 --> 01:32:53.831
way over and over . Um And you had the

01:32:53.831 --> 01:32:55.831
list . It's not always the same but

01:32:56.290 --> 01:32:57.901
unrealistic . Requirements ,

01:32:57.901 --> 01:33:00.129
unrealistic schedules , lack of

01:33:00.140 --> 01:33:02.473
appreciation of technical risk . I mean ,

01:33:02.473 --> 01:33:05.069
all of these things . And , uh , there

01:33:05.080 --> 01:33:07.191
have been , there's been an effort to

01:33:07.191 --> 01:33:09.500
chase , I think what I call acquisition

01:33:09.509 --> 01:33:11.620
magic a few times , which is somebody

01:33:11.620 --> 01:33:13.731
comes up with a new idea . They think

01:33:13.731 --> 01:33:15.787
about how to do it . Uh , usually it

01:33:15.787 --> 01:33:17.953
involves taking extraordinary risk and

01:33:17.953 --> 01:33:20.065
then we pay the price for that . Um ,

01:33:20.065 --> 01:33:22.287
putting amateurs in charge doesn't work

01:33:22.287 --> 01:33:24.509
very well . Uh The things we ask people

01:33:24.509 --> 01:33:26.565
to do to develop new weapons systems

01:33:26.565 --> 01:33:28.787
for the United States are hard things .

01:33:28.787 --> 01:33:30.731
We're asking them to build , build

01:33:30.731 --> 01:33:32.787
weapon systems that are a generation

01:33:32.787 --> 01:33:34.898
ahead of anything ever built before .

01:33:34.898 --> 01:33:36.953
There is inherent risk in that . And

01:33:36.953 --> 01:33:36.899
you have to plan and manage that risk .

01:33:36.910 --> 01:33:39.188
You have to take risk mitigation steps .

01:33:39.188 --> 01:33:41.299
Uh You have to understand deeply what

01:33:41.299 --> 01:33:43.354
those technical risks really are and

01:33:43.354 --> 01:33:45.243
then what's appropriate to try to

01:33:45.243 --> 01:33:47.354
reduce that risk or to manage it . So

01:33:47.354 --> 01:33:49.466
you have alternatives if you , if you

01:33:49.466 --> 01:33:51.688
encounter it , uh there's no substitute

01:33:51.688 --> 01:33:53.799
for professionalism . Um There's this

01:33:53.799 --> 01:33:55.939
idea that we , where we can go much

01:33:55.950 --> 01:33:58.200
faster if we just , you know , somehow

01:33:58.209 --> 01:34:00.153
weighed our , weighed our arms and

01:34:00.153 --> 01:34:02.209
create a different set of structures

01:34:02.209 --> 01:34:04.431
that tends to just get you in trouble .

01:34:04.431 --> 01:34:06.653
Uh You can be overly conservative , but

01:34:06.653 --> 01:34:08.820
I think that's the exception , most of

01:34:08.820 --> 01:34:10.987
our programs overrun uh in development

01:34:10.987 --> 01:34:13.153
by about 25% . That's the average in ,

01:34:13.153 --> 01:34:15.153
in early production they overrun by

01:34:15.153 --> 01:34:17.320
about 10% . And when I was running the

01:34:17.320 --> 01:34:19.431
acquisition for dod , we were able to

01:34:19.431 --> 01:34:21.542
drive that down . Uh , but it's , you

01:34:21.542 --> 01:34:21.250
know , you mentioned a couple of the

01:34:21.259 --> 01:34:23.426
programs . B 21 is the one that doctor

01:34:23.426 --> 01:34:25.648
of the plan who's now the A Ns uh under

01:34:25.648 --> 01:34:27.870
secretary and I put together . But when

01:34:27.870 --> 01:34:29.759
we take wild chances , we get the

01:34:29.759 --> 01:34:31.870
results you should expect . So that ,

01:34:31.870 --> 01:34:34.037
that's very in a nutshell . So we , we

01:34:34.037 --> 01:34:35.981
don't wanna be , I I would tend to

01:34:35.981 --> 01:34:37.870
structure programs to be somewhat

01:34:37.870 --> 01:34:39.815
aggressive but not so much so that

01:34:39.815 --> 01:34:41.759
you're guaranteeing failure , that

01:34:41.759 --> 01:34:43.926
that's really the key to success . But

01:34:43.926 --> 01:34:43.069
you gotta really understand what you're

01:34:43.080 --> 01:34:44.969
doing . There's no magic answer .

01:34:46.910 --> 01:34:49.220
Just put my two cents into this . I and

01:34:49.229 --> 01:34:51.173
I've been here for a while 30 some

01:34:51.173 --> 01:34:53.396
years and uh I was here when we started

01:34:53.396 --> 01:34:55.285
the F-35 program . I remember the

01:34:55.350 --> 01:34:57.461
principal bringing in the powerpoints

01:34:57.461 --> 01:34:59.406
and saying this is going to be the

01:34:59.406 --> 01:35:01.683
Swiss Army knife of all fighter planes .

01:35:01.683 --> 01:35:03.739
You know , we're gonna have a single

01:35:03.739 --> 01:35:05.961
frame , three variants . Uh gonna use a

01:35:05.961 --> 01:35:08.072
single engine . It's gonna bring down

01:35:08.072 --> 01:35:10.350
our maintenance cost , our hourly cost ,

01:35:10.350 --> 01:35:12.406
it's gonna our per unit cost and all

01:35:12.406 --> 01:35:14.517
that . And we're gonna get rid of the

01:35:14.517 --> 01:35:16.794
F-16 . We're gonna get rid of the F-18 .

01:35:16.794 --> 01:35:16.740
We're gonna get rid of the F-15 . We're

01:35:16.750 --> 01:35:19.339
gonna get really a 10 , we're gonna ,

01:35:19.350 --> 01:35:21.520
you know , this is gonna be it and uh

01:35:21.649 --> 01:35:23.760
and we're building more F-18s , we're

01:35:23.760 --> 01:35:26.330
building F-15 X . Uh I got an upgraded

01:35:26.339 --> 01:35:28.919
F-16 so it didn't quite work out the

01:35:28.930 --> 01:35:31.859
way we thought . And my , my thought on

01:35:31.870 --> 01:35:34.509
this is , and this is a serious

01:35:34.520 --> 01:35:36.576
question . How many program managers

01:35:36.576 --> 01:35:38.464
have we had on the F-35 since the

01:35:38.464 --> 01:35:40.353
inception ? Does anybody know the

01:35:40.353 --> 01:35:42.529
answer to that question ? Several ? Um

01:35:42.540 --> 01:35:44.651
Only one of which I can think of that

01:35:44.651 --> 01:35:46.873
was fired , you know , but , but when ,

01:35:46.873 --> 01:35:49.560
you know , years ago and I may be not ,

01:35:49.569 --> 01:35:51.680
not an ample comparison , but Admiral

01:35:51.680 --> 01:35:54.350
Rickover took over the started the

01:35:54.359 --> 01:35:56.248
submarine program or the Nautilus

01:35:56.248 --> 01:35:58.303
program and stayed with it until God

01:35:58.303 --> 01:36:00.303
knows he was how old but , and took

01:36:00.303 --> 01:36:02.430
responsibility for every single

01:36:02.439 --> 01:36:04.383
submarine , every single submarine

01:36:04.383 --> 01:36:07.120
program and everyone knew who to call

01:36:07.129 --> 01:36:09.209
if there was a problem . And uh and

01:36:09.220 --> 01:36:11.164
right now , you know , but some of

01:36:11.164 --> 01:36:13.509
these programs , I , if we put a young

01:36:13.520 --> 01:36:16.770
officer and say , look , you're going

01:36:16.779 --> 01:36:19.001
to be with this program until you leave

01:36:19.001 --> 01:36:21.168
and you're going to get all your ups ,

01:36:21.168 --> 01:36:20.879
you're going to get all that . But I

01:36:20.890 --> 01:36:23.112
think there's got to be a better way to

01:36:23.112 --> 01:36:25.223
do this because what we've been doing

01:36:25.223 --> 01:36:27.446
hasn't been working . So I just want to

01:36:27.446 --> 01:36:30.169
throw my two cents in on that and I , I

01:36:30.180 --> 01:36:32.291
know you put a lot of thought on that

01:36:32.291 --> 01:36:34.513
and everybody else has , but um it is a

01:36:34.513 --> 01:36:37.819
problem , ok ? Uh Mr Aguilar ,

01:36:39.750 --> 01:36:42.029
thank you , Mr Chairman uh Secretary

01:36:42.040 --> 01:36:44.207
Kendall . I understand there have been

01:36:44.207 --> 01:36:46.040
some critiques of the air forces

01:36:46.040 --> 01:36:48.899
testing on hypersonic weapons um uh due

01:36:48.910 --> 01:36:50.879
in part to the low number of glide

01:36:50.890 --> 01:36:53.057
vehicle test events along with limited

01:36:53.057 --> 01:36:54.946
availability of hypersonic flight

01:36:54.946 --> 01:36:56.850
corridors , target areas and test

01:36:56.859 --> 01:36:59.799
support assets . Um uh Is this true ?

01:36:59.810 --> 01:37:01.977
And if so what resources are necessary

01:37:01.977 --> 01:37:04.199
to increase the capacity for hypersonic

01:37:04.199 --> 01:37:06.589
glide ve glide vehicle testing ? Yeah ,

01:37:06.600 --> 01:37:08.930
we do have issues with test capacity

01:37:08.939 --> 01:37:11.500
and and availability of ranges

01:37:11.509 --> 01:37:13.176
essentially to do some of our

01:37:13.176 --> 01:37:15.259
hypersonic testing . Um I don't have

01:37:15.270 --> 01:37:17.299
any details for you , but uh I know

01:37:17.310 --> 01:37:19.421
there's been a substantial investment

01:37:19.549 --> 01:37:22.169
in uh I improved infrastructure to

01:37:22.180 --> 01:37:24.291
support hypersonic testing . I'd have

01:37:24.291 --> 01:37:26.569
to get you an answer for the record on ,

01:37:26.569 --> 01:37:28.736
on the the content of that . I haven't

01:37:28.736 --> 01:37:30.958
followed that that closely myself . I I

01:37:30.958 --> 01:37:33.013
appreciate it . General Salzman . Uh

01:37:33.013 --> 01:37:35.124
we're investing significant resources

01:37:35.124 --> 01:37:37.347
into space based tracking of hypersonic

01:37:37.347 --> 01:37:39.569
threats and this is critical uh for our

01:37:39.569 --> 01:37:42.000
defense capabilities . Uh It would be

01:37:42.009 --> 01:37:44.479
logical that that such a system uh

01:37:44.490 --> 01:37:46.490
would be trained against real world

01:37:46.490 --> 01:37:49.509
scenarios . Um uh You know , given what

01:37:49.520 --> 01:37:52.509
the the secret you know , indicated to ,

01:37:52.520 --> 01:37:54.631
you know , how do we trust test these

01:37:54.631 --> 01:37:56.576
tracking capabilities , you know ,

01:37:56.576 --> 01:37:58.520
under your programs and where do ,

01:37:58.520 --> 01:38:00.576
where do these uh priorities kind of

01:38:00.576 --> 01:38:02.520
reconcile and where do they meet ?

01:38:02.520 --> 01:38:04.464
That's a great question . We , I I

01:38:04.464 --> 01:38:06.353
would say we have a three pronged

01:38:06.353 --> 01:38:08.464
approach to that . Uh anywhere we can

01:38:08.464 --> 01:38:10.464
use uh digital simulations , we are

01:38:10.464 --> 01:38:12.353
leveraging that to the max extent

01:38:12.353 --> 01:38:14.520
possible . Uh There will be some range

01:38:14.520 --> 01:38:16.742
testing to try to calibrate the systems

01:38:16.742 --> 01:38:18.798
as they go into orbit and real world

01:38:18.798 --> 01:38:20.687
live events . Uh We never miss an

01:38:20.687 --> 01:38:22.964
opportunity to take advantage of those .

01:38:22.964 --> 01:38:22.740
And unfortunately , these days , there

01:38:22.750 --> 01:38:24.861
are those events to , to look at . So

01:38:24.990 --> 01:38:27.157
uh we don't have all the compliment on

01:38:27.157 --> 01:38:29.500
orbit yet to be able to uh to fully

01:38:29.509 --> 01:38:32.220
test that um um as an operational

01:38:32.229 --> 01:38:34.285
capability . But we're gonna rapidly

01:38:34.285 --> 01:38:36.910
get there in the next year or so . When

01:38:36.919 --> 01:38:38.950
do you expect a more robust kind of

01:38:38.959 --> 01:38:40.250
launch um

01:38:42.500 --> 01:38:45.689
ability to the the the low the

01:38:45.700 --> 01:38:47.422
proliferative warfighter space

01:38:47.422 --> 01:38:49.644
architecture that our space development

01:38:49.644 --> 01:38:51.756
agency is putting putting together is

01:38:51.756 --> 01:38:53.922
the sensors that will be able to track

01:38:53.922 --> 01:38:56.089
the hypersonics between we're going to

01:38:56.089 --> 01:38:58.200
start tranche one delivery later this

01:38:58.200 --> 01:39:00.589
year . And by fy 26 we should have

01:39:00.600 --> 01:39:02.267
enough on orbit to be able to

01:39:02.267 --> 01:39:04.322
demonstrate the capability and we'll

01:39:04.322 --> 01:39:06.600
have enough data to make that decision .

01:39:06.600 --> 01:39:08.822
We'll be testing all every time there's

01:39:08.822 --> 01:39:10.878
a launch in . Check out we test that

01:39:10.878 --> 01:39:13.044
information , we test the data . Thank

01:39:13.044 --> 01:39:15.156
you Mr Chairman , since Mister Hailar

01:39:15.379 --> 01:39:17.490
brought up the hypersonic program . I

01:39:17.490 --> 01:39:19.712
just drew a quick comment on that . You

01:39:19.712 --> 01:39:21.601
know , we have the Navy program ,

01:39:21.601 --> 01:39:23.768
obviously , we have the army program ,

01:39:23.768 --> 01:39:25.546
we have the Air Force program ,

01:39:25.546 --> 01:39:27.712
Lockheed has the interest in all three

01:39:27.712 --> 01:39:29.819
of the programs . And obviously from

01:39:29.830 --> 01:39:32.359
from our perspective , it's uh it's

01:39:32.370 --> 01:39:35.919
been somewhat frustrating . I , I think

01:39:35.930 --> 01:39:39.649
uh so far in all three programs , we've

01:39:39.660 --> 01:39:42.259
been spending about $3.5 billion a year

01:39:42.740 --> 01:39:44.851
to get to a hypersonic missile and we

01:39:44.851 --> 01:39:47.100
have yet to get there on any of the

01:39:47.109 --> 01:39:50.209
programs . And as , as far as I know it ,

01:39:50.220 --> 01:39:52.053
it's a classified number but the

01:39:52.053 --> 01:39:54.109
Chinese , I , I'll just say at least

01:39:54.109 --> 01:39:56.839
1000 hypersonic missiles that are

01:39:56.850 --> 01:39:59.819
maneuverable . Uh And , you know , I ,

01:39:59.830 --> 01:40:01.997
I was around when Mike Griffin did the

01:40:01.997 --> 01:40:04.163
first test and I think you were around

01:40:04.163 --> 01:40:06.274
too uh at that time on the hypersonic

01:40:06.274 --> 01:40:08.219
program back in 96 when we did the

01:40:08.219 --> 01:40:10.979
first hypersonic missile test and got

01:40:10.990 --> 01:40:12.934
the speed was successful test . We

01:40:12.934 --> 01:40:14.879
offered it to the Air Force , they

01:40:14.879 --> 01:40:17.046
turned it down , the Chinese stole the

01:40:17.046 --> 01:40:19.379
technology perfected it and deployed it .

01:40:19.379 --> 01:40:21.323
Um I don't know if I had to get my

01:40:21.323 --> 01:40:23.379
frustration out , but here we are uh

01:40:23.379 --> 01:40:25.729
spent , I think , well , well over 10

01:40:25.740 --> 01:40:28.250
$12 billion and uh we're yet to get

01:40:28.259 --> 01:40:31.850
there . So it's uh not good , Mr

01:40:32.029 --> 01:40:34.196
Fleischman . Thank you , Mr Chairman ,

01:40:34.196 --> 01:40:37.270
uh Secretary Kendall General Alvin and

01:40:37.279 --> 01:40:39.229
General Saltzman . Let me join my

01:40:39.240 --> 01:40:41.351
colleagues on both sides of the aisle

01:40:41.351 --> 01:40:43.589
for well deserved accolades uh to all

01:40:43.600 --> 01:40:45.378
of you all . Thank you for your

01:40:45.378 --> 01:40:47.600
tremendous service to our nation . It's

01:40:47.600 --> 01:40:50.069
a privilege to be with you today . Uh

01:40:50.080 --> 01:40:52.490
Gentlemen , as , as you may be aware ,

01:40:52.500 --> 01:40:54.689
I am I chair the energy and water

01:40:54.700 --> 01:40:57.750
subcomittee of appropriations . Um and

01:40:57.759 --> 01:40:59.537
I'm well aware that the highest

01:40:59.537 --> 01:41:02.149
priority of Dod and N NSA is completing

01:41:02.160 --> 01:41:04.382
the nuclear recapitalization program of

01:41:04.382 --> 01:41:07.459
record . We recognize the air Force is

01:41:07.470 --> 01:41:09.000
a tremendous role with the

01:41:09.009 --> 01:41:11.370
responsibility for both the ICBM and

01:41:11.379 --> 01:41:14.109
strategic bomber legs of the triad , as

01:41:14.120 --> 01:41:16.529
well as the NC three infrastructure

01:41:16.600 --> 01:41:18.939
along with the Space force and the Navy .

01:41:19.319 --> 01:41:21.430
I want to thank all the airmen , Miss

01:41:21.439 --> 01:41:23.680
Leers , submariners and guardians that

01:41:23.689 --> 01:41:26.080
protect our nation and our allies every

01:41:26.089 --> 01:41:29.609
day . Unfortunately , we're uh

01:41:29.620 --> 01:41:32.540
experiencing schedule delays and cost

01:41:32.549 --> 01:41:34.438
overruns that have become all too

01:41:34.438 --> 01:41:37.009
common with major programs . I

01:41:37.020 --> 01:41:39.020
recognize the greatest challenge we

01:41:39.020 --> 01:41:41.089
face is probably workforce as with

01:41:41.100 --> 01:41:42.933
military recruitment , we have a

01:41:42.933 --> 01:41:44.822
shortage of the necessary skilled

01:41:44.822 --> 01:41:46.767
personnel from program managers to

01:41:46.767 --> 01:41:48.489
engineers , to technicians and

01:41:48.489 --> 01:41:50.600
tradesmen . After decades of under

01:41:50.609 --> 01:41:52.498
investment , we are now paying to

01:41:52.498 --> 01:41:55.240
relearn costly lessons all the while

01:41:55.250 --> 01:41:57.472
the Russians have suspended new start ,

01:41:57.879 --> 01:42:00.046
even though they seem to be keeping to

01:42:00.046 --> 01:42:02.350
the treaty limits for now , it expires

01:42:02.359 --> 01:42:04.740
in less than two years . China is

01:42:04.750 --> 01:42:06.639
meanwhile , rapidly expanding its

01:42:06.639 --> 01:42:08.720
nuclear forces and could catch us

01:42:08.729 --> 01:42:11.339
within a decade . We are entering

01:42:11.350 --> 01:42:13.406
uncharted territory dealing with two

01:42:13.406 --> 01:42:15.649
pure nuclear adversaries as we are in

01:42:15.660 --> 01:42:17.919
the middle of recapitalizing our entire

01:42:17.930 --> 01:42:20.680
deterrent . Uh with just a time of

01:42:20.689 --> 01:42:23.689
schedule question , what is the air

01:42:23.700 --> 01:42:26.330
force doing to keep Sentinel and B 21

01:42:26.339 --> 01:42:28.520
schedules from slipping further ? And

01:42:28.529 --> 01:42:30.899
how can Congress better help ensure

01:42:31.029 --> 01:42:33.085
that there's not an unacceptable dip

01:42:33.085 --> 01:42:35.085
and force structure ? Once we begin

01:42:35.085 --> 01:42:38.540
replacing legacy systems , uh uh B

01:42:38.549 --> 01:42:41.919
21 is roughly on schedule , it's still

01:42:41.930 --> 01:42:44.097
an involvement and it's , it's in test

01:42:44.097 --> 01:42:45.874
flight . Uh I wouldn't make any

01:42:45.874 --> 01:42:48.097
commitments or promises about what will

01:42:48.097 --> 01:42:50.208
happen going forward , but today it's

01:42:50.208 --> 01:42:52.374
executed fairly well . Sentinel is the

01:42:52.374 --> 01:42:54.208
opposite story . Basically , I'm

01:42:54.208 --> 01:42:56.152
recused on Sentinel . Oh , that uh

01:42:56.152 --> 01:42:58.152
General Alen talked about that . Uh

01:42:58.152 --> 01:43:00.263
It's going through the number . Curdy

01:43:00.263 --> 01:43:02.486
and General Doctor . The plan is , is ,

01:43:02.486 --> 01:43:04.750
is running that process . Uh And we'll

01:43:04.759 --> 01:43:06.926
come out of that with a recommendation

01:43:06.926 --> 01:43:09.092
about how to proceed on Sentinel , but

01:43:09.092 --> 01:43:11.259
I think I'm pretty comfortable with as

01:43:11.259 --> 01:43:13.426
much as I can be at this point in time

01:43:13.426 --> 01:43:15.648
with RB 21 . Thank you , sir . The only

01:43:15.648 --> 01:43:17.926
thing I'd I'd add is on Sentinel again .

01:43:17.926 --> 01:43:20.037
It's , it's one of those uh Secretary

01:43:20.037 --> 01:43:22.092
Kendall talked earlier about some of

01:43:22.092 --> 01:43:23.981
the challenges in the acquisition

01:43:23.981 --> 01:43:23.859
process and some of those is maybe

01:43:23.910 --> 01:43:25.790
underestimating what some of the

01:43:25.799 --> 01:43:29.250
complexity is . And I think um perhaps

01:43:29.259 --> 01:43:31.580
we'll discover that it the , the two

01:43:31.589 --> 01:43:33.756
parts of the Sentinel program . One is

01:43:33.756 --> 01:43:35.978
actually the technology and the missile

01:43:35.978 --> 01:43:35.629
and all that . And the other was

01:43:35.640 --> 01:43:37.862
actually the scope and scale of what is

01:43:37.862 --> 01:43:40.029
really the largest civil works program

01:43:40.029 --> 01:43:42.029
that we've had in the Department of

01:43:42.029 --> 01:43:41.979
Defense for a long time . Maybe there

01:43:41.990 --> 01:43:43.990
was under appreciation of that . So

01:43:43.990 --> 01:43:46.157
we're the , the drivers of the cost is

01:43:46.157 --> 01:43:47.934
something that's gonna uh at uh

01:43:47.934 --> 01:43:50.046
doctoral plant is going through in in

01:43:50.046 --> 01:43:52.268
the Nun mccurdy review . And we again ,

01:43:52.268 --> 01:43:54.379
the point you made your opening point

01:43:54.379 --> 01:43:56.546
is the right one congressman . We , we

01:43:56.546 --> 01:43:56.490
have to be committed to a safe ,

01:43:56.500 --> 01:43:58.278
effective , reliable triad . So

01:43:58.278 --> 01:44:00.222
whatever the Nun mccurdy review uh

01:44:00.222 --> 01:44:02.222
delivers for us , we're going to be

01:44:02.222 --> 01:44:04.444
supportive and we're going to deal with

01:44:04.444 --> 01:44:06.611
that because uh as you mentioned , the

01:44:06.611 --> 01:44:08.722
threats are not sitting idly by while

01:44:08.722 --> 01:44:08.689
we sort out what we do with our trial .

01:44:08.930 --> 01:44:11.097
Thank you , sir . A follow up question

01:44:11.259 --> 01:44:13.500
with the expiration of new start in

01:44:13.509 --> 01:44:15.899
less than two years . Can you commit to

01:44:15.910 --> 01:44:18.129
this committee that the Air Force is

01:44:18.140 --> 01:44:20.370
preparing contingency plans now in

01:44:20.379 --> 01:44:23.049
cooper operation with N NSA to upload

01:44:23.060 --> 01:44:25.359
Minuteman three and recertify more . B

01:44:25.370 --> 01:44:28.459
50 twos for nuclear missions . Um There

01:44:28.470 --> 01:44:30.581
are some discussions happening in the

01:44:30.581 --> 01:44:33.279
policy framework . Uh what to happen ,

01:44:33.290 --> 01:44:35.512
what will happen if Russia does not see

01:44:35.512 --> 01:44:37.623
in compliance and also to react it as

01:44:37.623 --> 01:44:39.568
you mentioned that China's growing

01:44:39.568 --> 01:44:42.359
arsenal uh at this point in time , um

01:44:42.390 --> 01:44:44.390
we don't have any specific plans in

01:44:44.390 --> 01:44:46.850
place or any specific intentions . Uh I

01:44:46.859 --> 01:44:48.526
think we'd have to get into a

01:44:48.526 --> 01:44:50.581
classified forum to talk about those

01:44:50.581 --> 01:44:52.303
options in any more detail . I

01:44:52.303 --> 01:44:54.359
understand . Thank you . Uh for your

01:44:54.359 --> 01:44:56.359
answer . General , uh Mr Chairman ,

01:44:56.359 --> 01:44:58.192
I'll yield back . Thank you , MS

01:44:58.192 --> 01:45:01.899
mccullen . Thank you . Um

01:45:02.240 --> 01:45:04.518
As I mentioned in my opening statement ,

01:45:04.518 --> 01:45:06.629
climate change is a costly impact for

01:45:06.629 --> 01:45:08.796
our national security . It shows up in

01:45:08.796 --> 01:45:10.907
cracks and cement , large temperature

01:45:10.907 --> 01:45:12.740
swings from cold weather to warm

01:45:12.740 --> 01:45:14.629
weather , soil erosion leading to

01:45:14.629 --> 01:45:16.529
sinkholes damage from significant

01:45:16.540 --> 01:45:18.660
weather events . Uh It's an

01:45:18.669 --> 01:45:20.225
environmental stress on our

01:45:20.225 --> 01:45:22.336
infrastructure and the department has

01:45:22.336 --> 01:45:24.540
long recognized this . In addition to

01:45:24.549 --> 01:45:27.049
the operational stress of more frequent

01:45:27.060 --> 01:45:29.959
rocket launches at launch sites .

01:45:30.140 --> 01:45:32.189
General uh Saltzman , you are now

01:45:32.200 --> 01:45:34.367
working through a plan to collect fees

01:45:34.367 --> 01:45:36.367
from industry to recoup some of the

01:45:36.367 --> 01:45:38.422
indirect costs for operations at the

01:45:38.422 --> 01:45:40.478
launch pads and implementation could

01:45:40.478 --> 01:45:42.500
start as early as this summer . Now

01:45:42.509 --> 01:45:44.870
from a appropriation standpoint , we'll

01:45:44.879 --> 01:45:47.770
wanna have visibility on , on how and

01:45:47.779 --> 01:45:49.990
where such funds are spent . Uh The

01:45:50.000 --> 01:45:52.111
chairman and I served on the interior

01:45:52.111 --> 01:45:54.389
committee where there's fees collected .

01:45:54.389 --> 01:45:56.389
I know that when uh they decided to

01:45:56.389 --> 01:45:58.556
collect fees on passports we have seen

01:45:58.750 --> 01:46:01.240
except for during COVID and some of the

01:46:01.250 --> 01:46:03.472
challenges we have that we , we've seen

01:46:03.472 --> 01:46:05.639
great success in , in , in passport um

01:46:05.639 --> 01:46:07.750
things so fees can be a really good ,

01:46:07.750 --> 01:46:10.200
good thing to happen . But I think we

01:46:10.209 --> 01:46:12.240
need to clarify the language and we

01:46:12.250 --> 01:46:14.520
need to work on that together . I think

01:46:14.529 --> 01:46:16.418
it's important that those fees be

01:46:16.418 --> 01:46:18.473
clearly reinvested in the facilities

01:46:18.473 --> 01:46:20.696
both to improve their resiliency and to

01:46:20.696 --> 01:46:22.918
handle the workload and that's what the

01:46:22.918 --> 01:46:25.029
industry is going to expect . So , um

01:46:25.029 --> 01:46:26.862
that means transparency , proper

01:46:26.862 --> 01:46:29.029
accounting uh on these collections and

01:46:29.029 --> 01:46:31.140
expenditure . So we , I would like to

01:46:31.140 --> 01:46:32.918
learn more and I , I'm sure the

01:46:32.918 --> 01:46:35.140
committee would too on that . And along

01:46:35.140 --> 01:46:37.251
with that comes um when you and I met

01:46:37.251 --> 01:46:39.362
earlier talking about a clean audit ,

01:46:39.362 --> 01:46:41.585
this might be a great place to start to

01:46:41.585 --> 01:46:43.640
get a clean audit . So we've got the

01:46:43.640 --> 01:46:45.640
Marine Corps , we've got one of our

01:46:45.640 --> 01:46:47.696
other intelligence agencies doing it

01:46:47.696 --> 01:46:49.807
and I think Space Force can be next .

01:46:49.807 --> 01:46:52.085
So any comments you want to make , sir ?

01:46:52.085 --> 01:46:54.196
Yes , ma'am . We definitely owe you a

01:46:54.196 --> 01:46:56.990
um uh uh a plan for how we plan to

01:46:57.000 --> 01:46:58.944
utilize those indirect costs . The

01:46:58.944 --> 01:47:00.944
authorities that we've been given ,

01:47:00.944 --> 01:47:03.000
it's up to $5 million I think is the

01:47:03.000 --> 01:47:05.111
cap per provider . Uh But we , we owe

01:47:05.111 --> 01:47:07.278
you that mechanism and we'll come back

01:47:07.278 --> 01:47:09.500
to you and show you exactly how we plan

01:47:09.500 --> 01:47:11.667
to exercise those authorities . Uh And

01:47:11.667 --> 01:47:14.379
I left uh the hill the other day after

01:47:14.390 --> 01:47:16.446
you talked to us about the audit , I

01:47:16.446 --> 01:47:18.390
went straight to the Vice Chief of

01:47:18.390 --> 01:47:20.501
Space Operations and I said , tell me

01:47:20.501 --> 01:47:22.612
what it would take to give us a clean

01:47:22.612 --> 01:47:22.180
audit . And so they're going through uh

01:47:22.189 --> 01:47:24.419
now in detail to try to figure out what

01:47:24.430 --> 01:47:28.419
the , what the lim fact might be . I

01:47:28.430 --> 01:47:30.374
almost forgot you , Mr Joyce , I'd

01:47:30.374 --> 01:47:32.152
never want to do that , but you

01:47:32.152 --> 01:47:34.729
recognize him very kind , Mr Chairman .

01:47:34.740 --> 01:47:37.689
Uh uh Yeah .

01:47:39.500 --> 01:47:42.259
Um after uh Mr Edgar came in and took

01:47:42.270 --> 01:47:45.200
over , I figured that I was back to the

01:47:45.209 --> 01:47:48.029
bottom of the list . But um thank you

01:47:48.040 --> 01:47:50.262
all for being here . Uh And thank you ,

01:47:50.262 --> 01:47:52.319
especially men and women in the back

01:47:52.330 --> 01:47:54.330
row as well for your service to our

01:47:54.330 --> 01:47:57.040
country . And I apologize when I saw my

01:47:57.049 --> 01:47:59.160
wife texting me . That's one that and

01:47:59.160 --> 01:48:01.327
then somehow I hit , I don't know what

01:48:01.327 --> 01:48:03.549
the hell I hit , but it started playing

01:48:03.549 --> 01:48:05.605
that funky music . So uh I apologize

01:48:05.605 --> 01:48:07.850
for that . Se Secretary Kendall uh

01:48:07.859 --> 01:48:10.549
Youngstown Air Force Reserve uh station

01:48:10.560 --> 01:48:12.782
is in my district and we also have four

01:48:12.782 --> 01:48:14.727
active National Air National Guard

01:48:14.727 --> 01:48:16.504
Wings in the State of Ohio . In

01:48:16.504 --> 01:48:18.671
February . You unveiled your plan , uh

01:48:18.671 --> 01:48:20.671
re optimization efforts for the Air

01:48:20.671 --> 01:48:22.782
Force and Space Force . Can you share

01:48:22.782 --> 01:48:25.004
your insight on how the Air Force plans

01:48:25.004 --> 01:48:27.171
on incorporating the Air Force Reserve

01:48:27.171 --> 01:48:29.282
and National Guard bases into the new

01:48:29.282 --> 01:48:31.560
proposed reorganization of the service ?

01:48:31.560 --> 01:48:33.879
Um The , the overarching answer is that

01:48:33.890 --> 01:48:35.979
there no major changes should be

01:48:35.990 --> 01:48:38.919
expected that what we're doing is to

01:48:38.930 --> 01:48:41.549
try to ensure that we are , we're

01:48:41.560 --> 01:48:43.671
focused on the pacing challenge , the

01:48:43.671 --> 01:48:45.893
threat that's most dominant right now .

01:48:45.893 --> 01:48:48.004
Uh And ensuring that we have in place

01:48:48.004 --> 01:48:50.171
or administration structures mostly in

01:48:50.171 --> 01:48:52.171
the active air force and the active

01:48:52.171 --> 01:48:54.393
Space Force that are focused on keeping

01:48:54.393 --> 01:48:56.616
us competitive over time and keeping us

01:48:56.616 --> 01:48:58.727
as ready with the current forces . We

01:48:58.727 --> 01:49:00.671
can be at all times . Uh The Guard

01:49:00.671 --> 01:49:02.782
Reserves are both very much a part of

01:49:02.782 --> 01:49:05.229
that readiness equation . And what what

01:49:05.240 --> 01:49:07.351
will probably happen is there'll be a

01:49:07.351 --> 01:49:09.462
look at how readiness is assessed for

01:49:09.462 --> 01:49:11.689
those units uh to ensure that the right

01:49:11.700 --> 01:49:13.867
standards and so on are in place . And

01:49:13.867 --> 01:49:16.033
the right uh assessment mechanisms are

01:49:16.033 --> 01:49:18.200
in place . We wanna make sure that our

01:49:18.200 --> 01:49:19.867
units that are intended to be

01:49:19.867 --> 01:49:21.867
deployable to support an operations

01:49:21.867 --> 01:49:24.033
plan have everything they need so that

01:49:24.033 --> 01:49:23.410
they can go do that and that they're

01:49:23.419 --> 01:49:25.470
really ready to go deploy and that

01:49:25.479 --> 01:49:27.590
would apply to some of those units as

01:49:27.590 --> 01:49:29.757
well . So there are some things on the

01:49:29.757 --> 01:49:31.757
margin that might change because of

01:49:31.757 --> 01:49:33.646
this . But I don't think anything

01:49:33.646 --> 01:49:33.479
fundamental is expected to change .

01:49:33.740 --> 01:49:35.851
General . What do you want ? Anything

01:49:35.851 --> 01:49:38.018
that I , I think secretary has it just

01:49:38.018 --> 01:49:40.073
right . I think that when we look at

01:49:40.073 --> 01:49:42.296
manner in which we look at changing how

01:49:42.296 --> 01:49:41.754
we're going to present forces to the

01:49:41.765 --> 01:49:43.487
combatant commands . It's been

01:49:43.487 --> 01:49:45.709
different for the last 20 years . We've

01:49:45.709 --> 01:49:47.654
been sort of crowdsourcing our air

01:49:47.654 --> 01:49:47.524
force and we've sort of been

01:49:47.535 --> 01:49:49.535
privileging the preservation of the

01:49:49.535 --> 01:49:51.535
installation at the expense of absa

01:49:51.535 --> 01:49:53.591
combat unit . They sort of meet over

01:49:53.591 --> 01:49:55.757
there in theater . We can't do that in

01:49:55.757 --> 01:49:58.035
the Pacific . And so as we change that ,

01:49:58.035 --> 01:50:00.257
we need to understand , what exactly is

01:50:00.257 --> 01:50:02.368
it going to take for a unit that sits

01:50:02.368 --> 01:50:04.646
together , uh be behind the fence line ,

01:50:04.646 --> 01:50:06.868
it is given in installation or a wing ,

01:50:06.868 --> 01:50:08.924
what do they need ? As the secretary

01:50:08.924 --> 01:50:11.035
said , to be able to pick up , deploy

01:50:11.035 --> 01:50:10.959
on short notice , go someplace ,

01:50:10.970 --> 01:50:13.026
generate combat power , sustain that

01:50:13.026 --> 01:50:15.192
combat in a way . We haven't done that

01:50:15.192 --> 01:50:17.248
before . So General Lowe and general

01:50:17.248 --> 01:50:19.303
Healy were there at the inception of

01:50:19.303 --> 01:50:21.414
this . And I asked him , I said , how

01:50:21.414 --> 01:50:21.350
do you see the garden reserves playing

01:50:21.359 --> 01:50:23.415
into this ? And they said , we share

01:50:23.415 --> 01:50:25.415
ourselves perfectly because we were

01:50:25.415 --> 01:50:27.637
designed to be that we all sort of work

01:50:27.637 --> 01:50:29.803
designed to be that way . We just sort

01:50:29.803 --> 01:50:29.774
of started presenting forces

01:50:29.785 --> 01:50:31.952
differently . And so we are looking as

01:50:31.952 --> 01:50:34.063
we start doing our exercises , how we

01:50:34.063 --> 01:50:36.174
can include whole guard units , whole

01:50:36.174 --> 01:50:38.007
reserve units in a manner that's

01:50:38.007 --> 01:50:40.063
consistent with their volunteerism ,

01:50:40.063 --> 01:50:42.174
but we'll still enable them to do the

01:50:42.174 --> 01:50:44.396
training just like the actor duty force

01:50:44.396 --> 01:50:44.185
to be these deployable combat wings and

01:50:44.194 --> 01:50:46.305
go and exercise against what we think

01:50:46.305 --> 01:50:48.472
the facing challenges in the Pacific .

01:50:48.472 --> 01:50:50.694
One of the things we discovered we were

01:50:50.694 --> 01:50:52.916
doing is we were crowdsourcing in order

01:50:52.916 --> 01:50:55.138
to deploy units , we would send , say a

01:50:55.138 --> 01:50:55.060
fighter squadron to the Middle East

01:50:55.069 --> 01:50:56.902
somewhere and all the supporting

01:50:56.902 --> 01:50:58.902
functions that had to go with it to

01:50:58.902 --> 01:51:01.125
make it , you know , fully functional .

01:51:01.125 --> 01:51:03.125
We would crowdsource across the air

01:51:03.125 --> 01:51:02.830
force including elements out of the

01:51:02.839 --> 01:51:04.895
garden reserves . So we're picking a

01:51:04.895 --> 01:51:07.061
few people here , a few people there ,

01:51:07.061 --> 01:51:09.283
a few people there . That's not the way

01:51:09.283 --> 01:51:09.189
you want to go into a combat zone into

01:51:09.200 --> 01:51:11.256
a war . You wanna have a unit that's

01:51:11.256 --> 01:51:13.200
cohesive that's trained together ,

01:51:13.200 --> 01:51:15.367
that's ready to go deploy together and

01:51:15.367 --> 01:51:17.478
fight together . And we got away from

01:51:17.478 --> 01:51:19.589
that for efficiency reasons cause the

01:51:19.589 --> 01:51:19.435
environment we were deploying into

01:51:19.444 --> 01:51:21.111
wasn't a combat zone . It was

01:51:21.111 --> 01:51:23.111
essentially a , a relatively benign

01:51:23.111 --> 01:51:25.166
area . So that will be a change that

01:51:25.166 --> 01:51:27.388
people may say that those opportunities

01:51:27.388 --> 01:51:29.611
to do individual or just a few people ,

01:51:29.611 --> 01:51:31.833
uh kind of deployments may not be there

01:51:31.833 --> 01:51:33.888
anymore because we're trying to have

01:51:33.888 --> 01:51:35.888
units that can deploy as opposed to

01:51:35.888 --> 01:51:37.944
pick up games if you will let me put

01:51:37.944 --> 01:51:39.888
together at the last minute . Fair

01:51:39.888 --> 01:51:42.000
enough . Uh Secretary , the Air Force

01:51:42.000 --> 01:51:44.055
is expecting its fleet to drop below

01:51:44.055 --> 01:51:46.709
5000 aircraft in fy 25 . Your budget

01:51:46.720 --> 01:51:48.831
proposes cutting hundreds of aircraft

01:51:48.831 --> 01:51:50.609
and repurposing those funds for

01:51:50.609 --> 01:51:52.553
research and development . Are you

01:51:52.553 --> 01:51:54.331
concerned that the Air Force is

01:51:54.331 --> 01:51:56.553
prioritizing quality over quantity with

01:51:56.553 --> 01:51:58.720
aircraft and that we could still deter

01:51:58.720 --> 01:51:58.290
our adversaries with a fleet of less

01:51:58.299 --> 01:52:01.689
than 5000 aircraft . Um We are making

01:52:01.700 --> 01:52:04.169
some difficult tradeoffs but in both

01:52:04.180 --> 01:52:06.910
capacity and and capability matter . Uh

01:52:06.930 --> 01:52:09.540
Carman Garcia talked about that earlier .

01:52:09.930 --> 01:52:12.060
Um the aircraft that were retiring ,

01:52:12.069 --> 01:52:14.069
they're divesting our aircraft that

01:52:14.069 --> 01:52:16.290
have are generally reaching the end of

01:52:16.299 --> 01:52:18.600
their service life and or they're no

01:52:18.609 --> 01:52:20.609
longer effective against the pacing

01:52:20.609 --> 01:52:22.776
threat and so retaining those aircraft

01:52:22.776 --> 01:52:24.776
and carrying the cost of sustaining

01:52:24.776 --> 01:52:27.549
them um is really would , would keep us

01:52:27.560 --> 01:52:29.727
from moving forward as fast as we need

01:52:29.727 --> 01:52:31.838
to . So I think we've got the balance

01:52:31.838 --> 01:52:33.893
about right . I'll let General Alban

01:52:33.893 --> 01:52:36.004
add to that . Um You know , if we had

01:52:36.004 --> 01:52:38.004
more resources , I think I would be

01:52:38.004 --> 01:52:40.229
prioritizing modernization still over ,

01:52:40.240 --> 01:52:42.040
over retention of older forest

01:52:42.049 --> 01:52:44.271
structure that's not gonna be effective

01:52:44.271 --> 01:52:46.438
against the facing challenge . I would

01:52:46.438 --> 01:52:48.716
just add numbers for numbers this year ,

01:52:48.716 --> 01:52:50.938
specifically , about 250 were divesting

01:52:50.938 --> 01:52:54.620
uh of those 56 or a 1065 or the F-15 CS

01:52:54.629 --> 01:52:56.462
and Ds because those are sort of

01:52:56.462 --> 01:52:58.462
running out of , of service life as

01:52:58.462 --> 01:53:00.685
well . 22 are in the T ones . We talked

01:53:00.685 --> 01:53:02.796
about how we're shifting to simulator

01:53:02.796 --> 01:53:05.018
from the , the aircraft to , to be able

01:53:05.018 --> 01:53:06.851
to increase velocity through the

01:53:06.851 --> 01:53:09.018
pipeline . The C 130 are transitioning

01:53:09.018 --> 01:53:11.185
one for one . The KC 130 fives are one

01:53:11.185 --> 01:53:13.407
for one with KC 46 and the EC 130 we're

01:53:13.407 --> 01:53:15.573
losing one EC 130 . We're gaining an E

01:53:15.573 --> 01:53:17.729
five E 837 . So as we look at the

01:53:17.740 --> 01:53:20.200
overall quantity for quality , I would ,

01:53:20.209 --> 01:53:22.320
I think I would rather have a smaller

01:53:22.320 --> 01:53:24.431
number of aircraft that maybe can win

01:53:24.431 --> 01:53:27.270
than a larger number of these F uh F 56

01:53:27.279 --> 01:53:29.589
A tens that probably aren't gonna help

01:53:29.600 --> 01:53:33.520
against the China fight . I

01:53:33.529 --> 01:53:35.620
know who'll take those a tens . Uh

01:53:35.629 --> 01:53:39.129
Thank you , Mr Chairman . Thank you uh

01:53:39.140 --> 01:53:41.362
one quick comment and I think I'll wrap

01:53:41.362 --> 01:53:44.169
the the hearing up . Um mm has any

01:53:44.180 --> 01:53:47.609
additional comments of uh as you know ,

01:53:47.620 --> 01:53:50.799
as we all know uh back in the old days ,

01:53:50.810 --> 01:53:53.160
uh the R and D budgets were in the in

01:53:53.169 --> 01:53:55.169
the US government . I mean that was

01:53:55.169 --> 01:53:57.459
where the , that was where all the

01:53:57.470 --> 01:53:59.779
everything happened . So all the , all

01:53:59.790 --> 01:54:02.068
the bells and whistles were over there .

01:54:02.068 --> 01:54:05.270
But uh nowadays , its commercial side

01:54:05.279 --> 01:54:07.740
is quite frankly , are the ones that

01:54:07.750 --> 01:54:09.472
are coming up with the primary

01:54:09.472 --> 01:54:11.194
innovations and we adapt those

01:54:11.194 --> 01:54:13.028
innovations in the Department of

01:54:13.028 --> 01:54:15.169
Defense . So uh certainly in the

01:54:15.180 --> 01:54:19.009
communications satellites on down the

01:54:19.020 --> 01:54:20.853
road , especially , I think this

01:54:20.853 --> 01:54:24.029
applies to the uh the space side . Uh

01:54:24.370 --> 01:54:26.790
I'm certainly encouraged by your

01:54:26.799 --> 01:54:29.021
emphasizing leveraging these commercial

01:54:29.021 --> 01:54:31.870
capabilities because uh we need to take

01:54:31.879 --> 01:54:34.410
advantage of this nation . We're still

01:54:34.419 --> 01:54:37.870
ahead on many things . And so uh we

01:54:37.879 --> 01:54:39.712
need to , to do that and I'll be

01:54:39.712 --> 01:54:41.935
concerned about uh how much fun we have

01:54:41.935 --> 01:54:44.830
in fy 25 in that commercial , in that

01:54:44.839 --> 01:54:46.779
commercial arena . But before we

01:54:46.790 --> 01:54:48.512
conclude , I want to thank the

01:54:48.512 --> 01:54:50.623
witnesses for their testimony today .

01:54:50.623 --> 01:54:52.568
Subcomittee members are welcome to

01:54:52.568 --> 01:54:54.790
submit questions for the record . I ask

01:54:54.790 --> 01:54:56.568
that the witnesses respond in a

01:54:56.568 --> 01:54:58.679
reasonable time , amount of uh time ,

01:54:58.679 --> 01:55:00.346
uh time . And with that , the

01:55:00.346 --> 01:54:59.910
subcomittee stands adjourned .