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Taller than others . 

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Let me call the hearing to order . Uh 

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Good morning . Uh The committee meets 

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today to consider the nomination of 

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General Charles CQ Brown to be chairman 

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of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General . 

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Congratulations on your nomination and 

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thank you for stepping forward to lead 

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at this critical time . I would like to 

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welcome your wife , Sherene , who is 

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with us today and thank your son , Sean 

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and Ross , who I'm sure are watching 

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proudly . We thank your family for 

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their continued support of your service 

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over many years . I also like to thank 

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the current chairman , General Mark 

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Milley who will retire later this year . 

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General Milley has served this nation 

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honorably for more than four decades 

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and has led the Joint chiefs with skill 

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and vision . We are grateful for his 

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service and we congratulate him on his 

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retirement . General Brown . You are 

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well qualified to serve as chairman of 

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the Joint chiefs of staff . As the 

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current Chief of staff of the Air Force . 

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You have led the service as it adapts 

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to a rapidly changing global security 

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environment . You bring a record of 

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successful leadership around the globe 

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and command experience at all levels of 

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our military . This expertise will 

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serve you . Well , if confirmed , you 

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will serve as the principal military 

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adviser to the President , the National 

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Security Council , the Secretary of 

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Defense and Congress . You will be 

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expected to be an effective strategist 

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advisor and manager and your council 

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will be relied upon as we confront the 

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multitude of national security issues 

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before us . Indeed , we face 

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significant challenges . First and 

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foremost , as the national defense 

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strategy makes clear , China is our 

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primary competitor . China is the only 

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nation with both the intent and the 

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capability to challenge the interests 

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of the United States and our allies and 

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partners . At the same time , Russia 

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remains a violent and destabilizing 

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force . And nations like Iran and North 

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Korea continue to push the boundaries 

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of military brinksmanship to succeed in 

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this environment . The US military must 

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better develop its joint capabilities 

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across all domains including space , 

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cyber and information . As the defense 

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department's recently released joint 

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concept for competing makes clear the 

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objective of our nation's adversaries 

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is to win without fighting . The 

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document warns that if we do not adapt 

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our approach to competition more 

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effectively , the United States risks 

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seeing strategic influence advantage 

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and leverage while preparing for a war 

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that never comes . General Brown , I am 

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interested to know how you would 

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promote the development of joint 

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capabilities to ensure our military 

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remains the world's premier fighting 

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force . While it is the purview of the 

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military services to equip our soldiers , 

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sailors , airmen , marines and 

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guardians . If confirmed as chairman , 

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you will be responsible for identifying 

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new joint capabilities and performing 

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net assessments to ensure the services 

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are procuring the right capabilities 

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needed for the joint force . The 

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chairman must review capabilities 

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holistically across this total force 

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which can conflict with the priorities 

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of individual services . The committee 

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would be interested to learn how you 

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plan to manage this dynamic if 

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confirmed . In addition , the national 

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defense strategy , the national 

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military strategy and the annual 

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chairman's risk assessment are vital 

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documents . This committee relies upon 

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to perform its oversight functions . 

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General Brown , I would like your 

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assessment of the implementation of the 

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national defense strategy and the 

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national military strategy and whether 

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you would recommend any changes or 

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updates to those strategic documents 

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further , it is imperative that these 

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documents be submitted to Congress on 

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time . I would look forward to working 

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with you to ensure these statutory 

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deadlines are upheld . The joint force 

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is fundamentally about people as the 

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nation's senior most military officer . 

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It will be your responsibility to 

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understand the needs of America's 

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service members and be their greatest 

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advocate . Our military is facing its 

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most difficult recruiting environment 

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in decades , fewer and fewer young 

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Americans are eligible for or 

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interested in service and issues such 

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as discrimination and harassment . Too 

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often push current members out while 

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recruiting is one of the primary duties 

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of the military services . If confirmed 

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to the chairman , you would be 

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responsible for advising the secretary 

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on comprehensive joint readiness , 

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which includes assessing the effect of 

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manpower shortfalls across the total 

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force . Therefore , I would like to 

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know your thoughts on the current 

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recruiting crisis and the impact it may 

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have on the readiness of the joint 

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force . Finally , if confirmed , you 

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will be the most visible military 

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officer in the nation , it will be 

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critical for you to represent the force 

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with total professionalism and 

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trustworthiness . Frankly , I am 

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concerned about the health of our 

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nation's civil and political military 

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relationships , more and more the 

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military is being dragged into 

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political fights and public trust in 

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the military is eroding because of it . 

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Civilian control of the military is a 

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sacred duty that must be carried out , 

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responsibly , not be exploited . 

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General I'd like to know how you will 

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work to help improve civil military 

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relations and demonstrate this ethos 

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yourself . General Brown , if confirmed , 

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you will lead the joint force at a 

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momentous time . I am grateful for your 

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willingness to step forward to meet 

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this challenge . Thank you and I look 

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forward to your testimony . Now , let 

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me recognize the ranking member , 

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Senator Worker . Thank you , Mr 

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Chairman for that fine statement and 

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General Brown , welcome to this 

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committee . I um 

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welcome your nomination to serve as 

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chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff . 

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It's uh great to see that you are 

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accompanied by your wife , Shereen and 

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um the chair has also acknowledged your 

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son Sean and Ross who are supporting 

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their daddy throughout the confirmation 

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process as you testify 

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before us and prepare to assume the 

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senior most position in the US 

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military . You are uh continuing 

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with a profound concept that dates back 

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to the founding of our Republic , uh 

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dates back to uh before our 

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constitution to the days of George 

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Washington , where we established and 

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we maintain the proposition 

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that the military in our country is 

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answerable to the civilian elected 

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leadership of our country . You've been 

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nominated by our commander in chief for 

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the senior most position . And um I 

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believe you're exceptionally qualified 

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for this position . Um And we certainly 

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need Mr Chairman . We need um an 

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exceptionally qualified officer during 

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this perilous national moment . Mr 

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Chairman and members of the committee , 

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multiple senior national defense 

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leaders have told this committee we are 

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in the most dangerous global security 

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environment since world war two . And I 

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agree during that pivotal time , 70 

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years ago , our country faced two great 

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military powers across different oceans 

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with the capability and intent to 

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threaten American domestic security 

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directly . We see a similar dual threat 

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today which the chair has already 

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alluded to the Chinese Communist Party 

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is conducting the largest and most 

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rapid military build up in modern 

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history . Surpassing our own military 

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in many places . It is a military built 

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for a single purpose to undermine indo 

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Pacific and American security and 

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prosperity by expanding the Chinese 

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Communist Party's totalitarian 

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influence to the entire globe . 

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In Europe , the Kremlin's brutal war in 

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Ukraine is the most dangerous crisis we 

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have faced in half a century . And 

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their self defeating war of aggression 

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has brought China , North Korea and 

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Iran all closer together . 

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This dangerous moment demands an 

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exceptionally competent set of 

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uniformed leaders . Regrettably many 

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Americans have lost confidence in our 

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senior military leadership , which for 

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the past 20 years had been very high 

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while we all may debate the reasons . I 

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believe that the lack of accountability 

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for failures among military leadership 

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being thrust into the spotlight of 

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politically divisive issues like 

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critical race theory and abortion have 

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significantly contributed to this 

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decline in trust . General Brown 

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speaks often of accelerating innovation 

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in the Air Force . He recognizes the 

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difficulties of doing so amid an 

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entrenched bureaucracy and he's open 

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about how he has learned in his job and 

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improved his approach that candor and 

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self accountability should serve him 

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well , in this new role , including as 

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an example to other officers . I'm 

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hopeful that General Brown's detailed 

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focus on innovation and culture change 

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will bring new thinking and action to 

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the massive problems of our joint force 

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that that our joint force faces . I 

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hope General Brown will continue to 

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focus on restoring a culture built on 

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meritocracy in the US military that 

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considerably that continuously fosters 

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new approaches to readiness and war 

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fighting , make no mistake . The next 

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few years will be critical for our 

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national security as General Brown has 

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stated we cannot wait for a crisis to 

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drive change for our joint force . 

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Years of lackluster budgeting for our 

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national defense has put us far behind 

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where we need to be . We have a 

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bureaucracy and industrial base that is 

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clunky and military promotion system 

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geared toward risk aversion . It will 

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take honest and realistic threat and 

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capability assessments from our senior 

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uniformed leaders to empower lower 

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level , lower level personnel to fix 

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the many problems we face . I expect 

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General Brown will offer his most frank 

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unreserved military judgment . Both to 

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the president and Congress have 

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confirmed during a similarly decisive 

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moment for our national defense in 1980 . 

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Then candidate Reagan spoke of the need 

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for a renaissance in American military 

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superiority . American military 

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superiority to avoid war with the 

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Soviets to avoid war . Reagan said our 

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best hope of persuading them to live in 

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peace is to convince them they cannot 

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win at war . We avoided war then , but 

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only because we had leaders who were 

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bold enough to pursue the wisdom of 

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peace through strength with alacrity , 

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that timeless advice still applies 

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today and I'm hopeful our nominee 

280
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agrees . Thank you , General Brown for 

281
00:12:43,007 --> 00:12:45,284
being here and thank you , Mr Chairman . 

282
00:12:45,284 --> 00:12:47,229
Thank you , Senator Worker General 

283
00:12:47,229 --> 00:12:49,118
Brown . Your statement , please . 

284
00:12:49,118 --> 00:12:51,270
Chairman Reed ranking member wicker 

285
00:12:51,280 --> 00:12:53,613
distinguished members of this committee . 

286
00:12:53,613 --> 00:12:55,502
I'm honored by the opportunity to 

287
00:12:55,502 --> 00:12:57,724
appear before you . Uh This morning . I 

288
00:12:57,724 --> 00:12:59,724
want to thank the president and the 

289
00:12:59,724 --> 00:13:01,780
Secretary of Defense for their trust 

290
00:13:01,780 --> 00:13:04,179
and confidence in nominating me to be 

291
00:13:04,190 --> 00:13:06,134
the chairman of the , of the joint 

292
00:13:06,134 --> 00:13:08,479
chiefs of staff . I also thank General 

293
00:13:08,489 --> 00:13:10,979
Mark Milley and Holly Ann . As they 

294
00:13:10,989 --> 00:13:13,045
conclude their decades of remarkable 

295
00:13:13,045 --> 00:13:15,156
and honorable service to our nation . 

296
00:13:15,169 --> 00:13:17,799
We wish them the very best . I'd like 

297
00:13:17,809 --> 00:13:20,031
to take a few moments to acknowledge my 

298
00:13:20,031 --> 00:13:22,253
family . Joining me today is my wife of 

299
00:13:22,253 --> 00:13:24,710
34 years , Shereen . She's been 

300
00:13:24,719 --> 00:13:26,608
committed to our family and to my 

301
00:13:26,608 --> 00:13:29,039
journey is also tirelessly advocated 

302
00:13:29,049 --> 00:13:32,190
for the families of our army . I'm also 

303
00:13:32,200 --> 00:13:34,367
extremely proud of our two sons , Sean 

304
00:13:34,367 --> 00:13:36,422
and Ross . They're outstanding young 

305
00:13:36,422 --> 00:13:38,589
man . Excellent in their own right . I 

306
00:13:38,589 --> 00:13:40,880
would not be here today . If not for 

307
00:13:40,890 --> 00:13:43,340
the year . Sacrifice , love and support . 

308
00:13:44,909 --> 00:13:47,131
I'd like to thank my number one fan and 

309
00:13:47,131 --> 00:13:49,242
the most vocal supporter who played a 

310
00:13:49,242 --> 00:13:51,298
lead role in my development into the 

311
00:13:51,298 --> 00:13:53,298
man I am today . My mother Kay also 

312
00:13:53,298 --> 00:13:55,242
want to thank the most influential 

313
00:13:55,242 --> 00:13:57,242
leader in my career . The offer who 

314
00:13:57,242 --> 00:13:59,465
commissioned me , my father Charles , a 

315
00:13:59,465 --> 00:14:01,520
Vietnam veteran who retired from the 

316
00:14:01,520 --> 00:14:03,631
United States army as a colonel after 

317
00:14:03,631 --> 00:14:05,853
30 years of service . I'm also grateful 

318
00:14:05,853 --> 00:14:08,059
to my sister , Stephanie for her 

319
00:14:08,070 --> 00:14:10,237
support as well as the influence of my 

320
00:14:10,237 --> 00:14:12,459
younger brother Kevin had on me and our 

321
00:14:12,459 --> 00:14:16,099
family before his passing . I want to 

322
00:14:16,109 --> 00:14:18,276
express my gratitude to this committee 

323
00:14:18,276 --> 00:14:20,276
and the Congress for your continued 

324
00:14:20,276 --> 00:14:22,498
support to our men and women in uniform 

325
00:14:22,498 --> 00:14:26,409
dod civilians and their families . It 

326
00:14:26,419 --> 00:14:28,530
is thanks to your enduring commitment 

327
00:14:28,530 --> 00:14:30,697
and advocacy that will remain the most 

328
00:14:30,697 --> 00:14:34,289
capable military force in the world . I 

329
00:14:34,299 --> 00:14:36,410
come before you today , having served 

330
00:14:36,410 --> 00:14:38,521
the last three years as a service and 

331
00:14:38,521 --> 00:14:41,030
joint chief . But for the 11 years 

332
00:14:41,039 --> 00:14:43,880
prior , I served in seven assignments 

333
00:14:44,039 --> 00:14:47,619
across four combatant commands UC A 

334
00:14:48,650 --> 00:14:52,299
Centcom and pay of all leadership 

335
00:14:52,309 --> 00:14:54,476
positions . Focus on our five national 

336
00:14:54,476 --> 00:14:57,340
security challenges . China Russia , 

337
00:14:57,719 --> 00:15:00,229
North Korea , Iran and violent 

338
00:15:00,239 --> 00:15:03,320
extremists . So I arrive before you , 

339
00:15:03,330 --> 00:15:05,330
having spent less time as a general 

340
00:15:05,330 --> 00:15:07,849
officer in Washington DC . More time 

341
00:15:07,859 --> 00:15:10,179
with their field forces , allies and 

342
00:15:10,190 --> 00:15:12,520
partners either in conflict or 

343
00:15:12,530 --> 00:15:15,219
preparing for conflict . Having led war 

344
00:15:15,229 --> 00:15:19,109
fighters abroad shapes my thinking as a 

345
00:15:19,119 --> 00:15:21,409
result . I'm mindful of security 

346
00:15:21,419 --> 00:15:23,530
challenges at this consequential time 

347
00:15:24,289 --> 00:15:26,460
and the need to accelerate to stay 

348
00:15:26,469 --> 00:15:28,859
ahead of the growing threat . The 

349
00:15:28,869 --> 00:15:30,925
Department of Defense must implement 

350
00:15:30,925 --> 00:15:32,813
the national defense strategy and 

351
00:15:32,813 --> 00:15:34,980
prepare a joint force that can win the 

352
00:15:34,980 --> 00:15:37,369
next war if called upon a joint force 

353
00:15:37,380 --> 00:15:39,859
that deters a today and into the future 

354
00:15:39,929 --> 00:15:43,239
to maintain peace . If confirmed , I 

355
00:15:43,250 --> 00:15:45,472
commit to provide the president and the 

356
00:15:45,472 --> 00:15:47,979
Secretary of Defense by military advice , 

357
00:15:48,479 --> 00:15:50,535
informed by the joint chiefs and our 

358
00:15:50,535 --> 00:15:52,940
military leaders throughout , I will 

359
00:15:52,950 --> 00:15:54,894
collaborate with the Department of 

360
00:15:54,894 --> 00:15:57,299
Civilian leadership , an agency and 

361
00:15:57,309 --> 00:15:59,859
with our allies and partners . And if 

362
00:15:59,869 --> 00:16:02,036
confirmed , I commit to provide candid 

363
00:16:02,036 --> 00:16:03,758
and open communication to this 

364
00:16:03,758 --> 00:16:06,400
committee and the Congress , we will 

365
00:16:06,409 --> 00:16:08,576
work closely with you to invest in our 

366
00:16:08,576 --> 00:16:10,576
National defense and strengthen our 

367
00:16:10,576 --> 00:16:13,659
national security . Finally , I commit 

368
00:16:13,669 --> 00:16:15,391
myself to sustaining faith and 

369
00:16:15,391 --> 00:16:17,380
confidence , both our soldiers , 

370
00:16:17,390 --> 00:16:20,400
sailors , airmen , marines , guardians 

371
00:16:20,409 --> 00:16:22,465
and dod civilians and their families 

372
00:16:23,080 --> 00:16:25,302
will likewise work to sustain faith and 

373
00:16:25,302 --> 00:16:27,524
confidence with the American people and 

374
00:16:27,524 --> 00:16:29,747
their elected officials . Above all , I 

375
00:16:29,747 --> 00:16:31,358
will dedicate myself to this 

376
00:16:31,358 --> 00:16:33,413
proposition that the American people 

377
00:16:33,413 --> 00:16:35,247
should understand and know their 

378
00:16:35,247 --> 00:16:38,109
military and its service members solely 

379
00:16:38,119 --> 00:16:40,008
as an unwavering defenders of the 

380
00:16:40,008 --> 00:16:42,960
constitution and our nation . And thank 

381
00:16:42,969 --> 00:16:45,191
you again for the opportunity to appear 

382
00:16:45,191 --> 00:16:47,358
before you today and I look forward to 

383
00:16:47,358 --> 00:16:49,413
your questions . Thank you very much 

384
00:16:49,413 --> 00:16:51,191
General . There are a series of 

385
00:16:51,191 --> 00:16:53,429
questions that are addressed to 

386
00:16:53,440 --> 00:16:57,030
nominees . Uh You can respond . Uh 

387
00:16:58,260 --> 00:17:00,482
Have you adhered to the applicable laws 

388
00:17:00,482 --> 00:17:02,649
and regulations governing conflicts of 

389
00:17:02,649 --> 00:17:04,704
interest ? I have , have you assumed 

390
00:17:04,704 --> 00:17:06,816
any duties of taking any actions that 

391
00:17:06,816 --> 00:17:08,982
would appear to presume the outcome of 

392
00:17:08,982 --> 00:17:11,093
the confirmation process ? I have not 

393
00:17:11,093 --> 00:17:12,816
exercising our legislative and 

394
00:17:12,816 --> 00:17:14,927
oversight responsibilities . Makes it 

395
00:17:14,927 --> 00:17:16,816
important that this committee its 

396
00:17:16,816 --> 00:17:18,816
subcommittees and other appropriate 

397
00:17:18,816 --> 00:17:18,540
committees of Congress receive 

398
00:17:18,550 --> 00:17:20,709
testimony , briefings , reports , 

399
00:17:20,719 --> 00:17:22,886
records and other information from the 

400
00:17:22,886 --> 00:17:25,599
executive branch on a timely basis . Do 

401
00:17:25,609 --> 00:17:27,939
you agree if confirmed to appear and 

402
00:17:27,949 --> 00:17:29,893
testify before this committee when 

403
00:17:29,893 --> 00:17:32,579
requested ? I , do you agree when asked 

404
00:17:32,589 --> 00:17:34,533
before this committee to give your 

405
00:17:34,533 --> 00:17:36,533
personal views ? Even if your views 

406
00:17:36,533 --> 00:17:38,756
differ from the administration ? I do , 

407
00:17:39,150 --> 00:17:41,039
do you agree to provide records , 

408
00:17:41,039 --> 00:17:43,261
documents and electronic communications 

409
00:17:43,261 --> 00:17:45,317
in a timely manner when requested by 

410
00:17:45,317 --> 00:17:47,428
this committee , its subcommittees or 

411
00:17:47,428 --> 00:17:49,206
other appropriate committees of 

412
00:17:49,206 --> 00:17:51,039
Congress and to consult with the 

413
00:17:51,039 --> 00:17:53,150
requester regarding the basis for any 

414
00:17:53,150 --> 00:17:55,372
good faith delay or denial in providing 

415
00:17:55,372 --> 00:17:57,483
such records . I do . Will you ensure 

416
00:17:57,483 --> 00:17:59,706
that your staff complies with deadlines 

417
00:17:59,706 --> 00:18:01,817
established by this committee for the 

418
00:18:01,817 --> 00:18:03,817
production of reports , records and 

419
00:18:03,817 --> 00:18:05,761
other information including timely 

420
00:18:05,761 --> 00:18:07,983
responding to hearing questions for the 

421
00:18:07,983 --> 00:18:10,206
record ? I will , will you cooperate in 

422
00:18:10,206 --> 00:18:12,206
providing witnesses and briefers in 

423
00:18:12,206 --> 00:18:14,317
response to congressional request ? I 

424
00:18:14,317 --> 00:18:16,539
will will those witnesses and briefings 

425
00:18:16,539 --> 00:18:18,594
be protected from Reprisal for their 

426
00:18:18,594 --> 00:18:20,650
testimony or briefings ? They will . 

427
00:18:20,650 --> 00:18:22,483
Thank you very much , sir . As I 

428
00:18:22,483 --> 00:18:24,589
indicated in my opening statement , 

429
00:18:24,599 --> 00:18:27,689
we're facing a challenging environment 

430
00:18:28,390 --> 00:18:31,609
and one of the aspects is the challenge 

431
00:18:31,619 --> 00:18:33,563
of recruiting with fewer and fewer 

432
00:18:33,563 --> 00:18:35,810
Americans eligible because of many 

433
00:18:35,819 --> 00:18:39,640
factors including health and uh uh 

434
00:18:39,650 --> 00:18:43,010
other aspects , but also uh a 

435
00:18:43,430 --> 00:18:46,079
sense of uh lack of 

436
00:18:46,089 --> 00:18:49,579
participation uh in the military . Uh 

437
00:18:50,079 --> 00:18:52,219
recruiting is the primary duty of the 

438
00:18:52,229 --> 00:18:54,396
services , the , the chiefs of staff , 

439
00:18:54,396 --> 00:18:57,400
who each the services . Uh But what 

440
00:18:57,410 --> 00:19:00,510
action will you take to uh ensure this 

441
00:19:00,520 --> 00:19:03,530
recruiting process becomes successful 

442
00:19:03,760 --> 00:19:07,119
and also enhances readiness ? Listen , 

443
00:19:07,130 --> 00:19:09,241
I I appreciate the question and , you 

444
00:19:09,241 --> 00:19:11,463
know , as a service chief , I've had an 

445
00:19:11,463 --> 00:19:11,420
opportunity to really think deeply 

446
00:19:11,430 --> 00:19:13,430
about this and I've had a number of 

447
00:19:13,430 --> 00:19:15,541
opportunities to engage with my uh uh 

448
00:19:15,709 --> 00:19:18,219
fellow service chiefs on , on how best 

449
00:19:18,229 --> 00:19:20,569
we move forward as the chairman have 

450
00:19:20,579 --> 00:19:22,690
confirmed . You know , one of the key 

451
00:19:22,690 --> 00:19:24,468
areas I I do think about is the 

452
00:19:24,468 --> 00:19:26,412
ensuring that the young people and 

453
00:19:26,412 --> 00:19:28,246
their influencers understand the 

454
00:19:28,246 --> 00:19:30,190
opportunity to serve and the great 

455
00:19:30,190 --> 00:19:30,020
opportunities provided by serving in 

456
00:19:30,030 --> 00:19:32,197
the military . And uh I , I think just 

457
00:19:32,199 --> 00:19:34,421
based on my own experience being a role 

458
00:19:34,421 --> 00:19:36,643
model to , to show the young people and 

459
00:19:36,643 --> 00:19:38,755
their influencers that there are many 

460
00:19:38,755 --> 00:19:40,810
uh great career opportunities within 

461
00:19:40,810 --> 00:19:42,866
the military . And there's many that 

462
00:19:42,866 --> 00:19:42,520
have served in the military have gone 

463
00:19:42,530 --> 00:19:44,641
on to be successful . They stay for a 

464
00:19:44,641 --> 00:19:46,919
full career or stay for , for one tour . 

465
00:19:47,175 --> 00:19:49,119
I , I really believe that uh young 

466
00:19:49,119 --> 00:19:51,286
people only aspire to be what they see 

467
00:19:51,286 --> 00:19:53,508
or know about and it's hard for them to 

468
00:19:53,508 --> 00:19:55,064
uh you know , be part of an 

469
00:19:55,064 --> 00:19:57,084
organization or aspire to go down a 

470
00:19:57,094 --> 00:19:58,816
career path , they don't fully 

471
00:19:58,816 --> 00:20:01,038
understand or appreciate it . And so we 

472
00:20:01,038 --> 00:20:03,261
have a responsibility to , to reconnect 

473
00:20:03,261 --> 00:20:05,150
with the nation to talk about the 

474
00:20:05,150 --> 00:20:07,372
opportunities uh and for all of us that 

475
00:20:07,372 --> 00:20:07,224
are interested in the national defense 

476
00:20:07,234 --> 00:20:09,290
and national security , how we share 

477
00:20:09,290 --> 00:20:11,915
the stories of what inspired us to join . 

478
00:20:12,369 --> 00:20:14,480
Um You know , I , I joined because of 

479
00:20:14,480 --> 00:20:15,869
my father and his uh his 

480
00:20:15,869 --> 00:20:17,925
recommendations and , and because of 

481
00:20:17,925 --> 00:20:20,258
opportunities I had to in our RT C from , 

482
00:20:20,258 --> 00:20:22,147
I was going to be an engineer and 

483
00:20:22,147 --> 00:20:21,869
decided to become a pilot because I had 

484
00:20:21,880 --> 00:20:25,489
a chance to be exposed to uh be able to 

485
00:20:25,500 --> 00:20:28,829
fly um at RT C summer camp . So there's 

486
00:20:28,839 --> 00:20:30,895
a number of things I think we can do 

487
00:20:30,895 --> 00:20:32,950
and , and and those are the things I 

488
00:20:32,950 --> 00:20:34,950
would do is if uh if confirmed as a 

489
00:20:34,950 --> 00:20:36,895
German . Thank you uh general . Uh 

490
00:20:36,895 --> 00:20:39,079
Another topic that I mentioned is the 

491
00:20:39,119 --> 00:20:41,500
development of joint capabilities . Uh 

492
00:20:42,189 --> 00:20:44,050
The services are principally 

493
00:20:44,060 --> 00:20:46,439
responsible for developing equipment 

494
00:20:46,449 --> 00:20:49,900
and operational techniques , but uh you 

495
00:20:49,910 --> 00:20:53,520
will be the the the point uh of uh 

496
00:20:53,530 --> 00:20:55,489
ultimate decision on many of these 

497
00:20:55,500 --> 00:20:59,280
proposals . Uh And historically , 

498
00:20:59,290 --> 00:21:02,030
service , parochialism has interfered 

499
00:21:02,040 --> 00:21:05,430
with true jointness . Uh If confirmed 

500
00:21:05,439 --> 00:21:08,800
what actions we take to uh inhibit 

501
00:21:08,810 --> 00:21:11,260
parochialism , encourage 

502
00:21:11,270 --> 00:21:14,560
interoperability and to get us the best 

503
00:21:14,569 --> 00:21:16,680
equipment and the best trained people 

504
00:21:16,680 --> 00:21:18,569
in the field . Well , Senator , I 

505
00:21:18,569 --> 00:21:20,791
appreciate the question again and , and 

506
00:21:20,791 --> 00:21:22,902
one of the things that uh was started 

507
00:21:22,902 --> 00:21:25,069
by uh um a couple of the vice chairman 

508
00:21:25,069 --> 00:21:28,770
before was to uh rework the uh Joint 

509
00:21:28,780 --> 00:21:30,613
Requirements Oversight Council . 

510
00:21:30,613 --> 00:21:32,558
Instead of being just an Oversight 

511
00:21:32,558 --> 00:21:34,613
Council , we a bit more directive to 

512
00:21:34,613 --> 00:21:36,836
ensure we have the joint capabilities . 

513
00:21:36,836 --> 00:21:38,780
I think we , I want to continue to 

514
00:21:38,780 --> 00:21:40,947
build up on that , but we also need to 

515
00:21:40,947 --> 00:21:40,810
do it based on analysis to , to show 

516
00:21:40,819 --> 00:21:42,819
the value of each part of the joint 

517
00:21:42,819 --> 00:21:44,875
force and what they provide and then 

518
00:21:44,875 --> 00:21:46,875
there will have to be some give and 

519
00:21:46,875 --> 00:21:48,986
take and some hard decisions and hard 

520
00:21:48,986 --> 00:21:51,097
calls that need to be made . Um But I 

521
00:21:51,097 --> 00:21:50,599
think that's a responsible not just for 

522
00:21:50,609 --> 00:21:52,553
me but also with the , the service 

523
00:21:52,553 --> 00:21:54,665
chiefs and also serve as joint chiefs 

524
00:21:54,665 --> 00:21:56,665
that we have to take off our uh our 

525
00:21:56,665 --> 00:21:58,776
service uh identities and think about 

526
00:21:58,776 --> 00:22:00,998
what's best for the joint force . Thank 

527
00:22:00,998 --> 00:22:03,053
you . Uh We're engaged in supporting 

528
00:22:03,053 --> 00:22:04,998
the Ukrainian people in a critical 

529
00:22:04,998 --> 00:22:07,640
battle because uh my view is if they 

530
00:22:07,650 --> 00:22:11,060
lose , we lose also . Um Are there any 

531
00:22:11,069 --> 00:22:13,979
immediate lessons operationally or 

532
00:22:13,989 --> 00:22:16,045
strategically that you've taken away 

533
00:22:16,045 --> 00:22:18,780
from the conflict in Ukraine ? Well , 

534
00:22:18,790 --> 00:22:20,901
Senator , I think strategically , the 

535
00:22:20,901 --> 00:22:23,500
thing I I do think about is how the 

536
00:22:23,510 --> 00:22:25,621
value of information early before the 

537
00:22:25,621 --> 00:22:28,229
campaign started before the conflict 

538
00:22:28,239 --> 00:22:30,640
started and how that was able to bring 

539
00:22:30,650 --> 00:22:32,761
not only a NATO closer together , but 

540
00:22:32,761 --> 00:22:34,872
also to bring together our allies and 

541
00:22:34,872 --> 00:22:36,983
partners around the world . Uh And so 

542
00:22:36,983 --> 00:22:38,706
that is one point about how we 

543
00:22:38,706 --> 00:22:38,189
collaborate and how we build 

544
00:22:38,199 --> 00:22:40,143
relationships well before a crisis 

545
00:22:40,143 --> 00:22:41,866
occurs and then how we use the 

546
00:22:41,866 --> 00:22:43,866
information we have available uh to 

547
00:22:43,866 --> 00:22:46,088
help their decision makers or political 

548
00:22:46,088 --> 00:22:48,310
decision makers make those decisions to 

549
00:22:48,310 --> 00:22:50,477
move forward . I think the other thing 

550
00:22:50,477 --> 00:22:52,643
I highlight to you is the uh the value 

551
00:22:52,643 --> 00:22:54,866
of logistics . And I think the Russians 

552
00:22:54,866 --> 00:22:57,088
learned , if you don't pay attention to 

553
00:22:57,088 --> 00:22:59,143
the logistics , it's hard to win and 

554
00:22:59,143 --> 00:23:01,310
hard to have move forward . I think we 

555
00:23:01,310 --> 00:23:03,421
also learned that the uh the timeline 

556
00:23:03,421 --> 00:23:05,199
for military operations dic the 

557
00:23:05,199 --> 00:23:08,140
conflict sometimes take longer than we 

558
00:23:08,150 --> 00:23:09,983
might expect . And that's also a 

559
00:23:09,983 --> 00:23:12,310
challenge . I think the other piece 

560
00:23:12,319 --> 00:23:14,541
that I would highlight is just the will 

561
00:23:14,541 --> 00:23:16,708
to fight . And the one thing about the 

562
00:23:16,708 --> 00:23:18,597
determination and the will of the 

563
00:23:18,597 --> 00:23:20,819
Ukrainian people and their leadership . 

564
00:23:20,819 --> 00:23:23,041
That's something that's hard to measure 

565
00:23:23,041 --> 00:23:25,263
before a conflict , but it plays a huge 

566
00:23:25,263 --> 00:23:27,430
dividend . And then the last thing I'd 

567
00:23:27,430 --> 00:23:29,652
say , just from my own perspective , as 

568
00:23:29,652 --> 00:23:31,708
an iman , the value of air power and 

569
00:23:31,708 --> 00:23:33,819
having watched the , uh , what either 

570
00:23:33,819 --> 00:23:35,875
side has been able to do or not do , 

571
00:23:35,875 --> 00:23:37,763
but the value of air defenses and 

572
00:23:37,763 --> 00:23:39,875
integrated air defense and how that's 

573
00:23:39,875 --> 00:23:39,449
been helpful to the Ukrainians in 

574
00:23:39,459 --> 00:23:41,626
defense of the nation . Thank you very 

575
00:23:41,626 --> 00:23:43,903
much , General Senator Wicker , please . 

576
00:23:43,903 --> 00:23:46,126
Thank you very much , Mr Chairman . And 

577
00:23:46,126 --> 00:23:48,070
thank you , General Brown . Let me 

578
00:23:48,070 --> 00:23:50,380
first mention a statutory requirement 

579
00:23:50,390 --> 00:23:52,959
that you and I have discussed before 10 

580
00:23:52,969 --> 00:23:56,109
US . C 1 53 . It requires the chairman 

581
00:23:56,119 --> 00:23:58,359
of the joint chiefs of staff to 

582
00:23:58,369 --> 00:24:00,609
complete a chairman's risk assessment 

583
00:24:00,619 --> 00:24:03,910
cr a of the national military 

584
00:24:04,239 --> 00:24:07,949
strategy each year . Now , we have 

585
00:24:07,959 --> 00:24:10,619
had a problem with this in the past 

586
00:24:11,219 --> 00:24:14,880
and , and a frustration from 

587
00:24:14,890 --> 00:24:18,400
Congress in not receiving this cr a 

588
00:24:18,410 --> 00:24:20,569
even the national military strategy 

589
00:24:20,579 --> 00:24:24,329
itself . Uh Last time was unacceptably 

590
00:24:24,339 --> 00:24:27,479
late if confirmed . I need your 

591
00:24:27,489 --> 00:24:30,000
commitment to carrying out the statutes 

592
00:24:30,589 --> 00:24:32,756
governing the relationship between the 

593
00:24:32,756 --> 00:24:34,867
chairman of the joint chiefs of staff 

594
00:24:34,867 --> 00:24:37,089
and Congress , including submitting the 

595
00:24:37,089 --> 00:24:39,311
chairman's risk assessment on time . Um 

596
00:24:39,311 --> 00:24:41,478
Can I get your assurance that you will 

597
00:24:41,478 --> 00:24:45,380
do this General Brown uh worker as we 

598
00:24:45,390 --> 00:24:47,334
discuss her say , I will uh I will 

599
00:24:47,339 --> 00:24:49,395
assure you that I will do my best to 

600
00:24:49,395 --> 00:24:51,172
make sure we get those uh those 

601
00:24:51,172 --> 00:24:53,283
documents to you on time because it's 

602
00:24:53,283 --> 00:24:55,117
important to uh allow you in the 

603
00:24:55,117 --> 00:24:57,006
Congress to do the things you you 

604
00:24:57,006 --> 00:24:59,117
require in order to provide the , the 

605
00:24:59,117 --> 00:25:01,283
budget for us and the authorization to 

606
00:25:01,283 --> 00:25:03,450
uh to execute . Absolutely , this is a 

607
00:25:03,450 --> 00:25:05,617
law passed by the Congress signed into 

608
00:25:05,617 --> 00:25:05,189
law by the president of the United 

609
00:25:05,199 --> 00:25:08,979
States some years ago . And uh if , if 

610
00:25:08,989 --> 00:25:11,156
you as chairman of the joint chiefs of 

611
00:25:11,156 --> 00:25:14,140
staff need some additional resources or 

612
00:25:14,150 --> 00:25:16,770
if there's something with , within your 

613
00:25:16,780 --> 00:25:18,947
jurisdiction that keeps you from doing 

614
00:25:18,947 --> 00:25:21,170
this , will you let us know so that we 

615
00:25:21,180 --> 00:25:23,579
can be on time with this very important ? 

616
00:25:23,589 --> 00:25:26,079
Cr A ? Yes , sir . I will definitely be 

617
00:25:26,089 --> 00:25:28,089
communicate with you if there's any 

618
00:25:28,089 --> 00:25:30,145
challenges . Thank you very much for 

619
00:25:30,145 --> 00:25:32,033
that assurance . Uh General Brown 

620
00:25:32,033 --> 00:25:34,439
Congress , let , let's talk about the 

621
00:25:34,449 --> 00:25:37,199
Pacific Congress provided the 

622
00:25:37,209 --> 00:25:39,265
administration with the authority to 

623
00:25:39,265 --> 00:25:42,790
provide $1 billion in transfers of us 

624
00:25:42,800 --> 00:25:46,150
equipment authority to help Taiwan . Is 

625
00:25:46,160 --> 00:25:49,390
it your best military judgment that the 

626
00:25:49,400 --> 00:25:51,630
usage of this drawdown authority and 

627
00:25:51,640 --> 00:25:54,979
training would improve Taiwan's ability 

628
00:25:54,989 --> 00:25:58,239
to defend itself ? Yes , sir . It will 

629
00:25:58,250 --> 00:26:00,900
and it help , help them to procure some 

630
00:26:00,910 --> 00:26:03,021
asymmetric capabilities to defend our 

631
00:26:03,021 --> 00:26:04,939
nation ? All right . And uh so I 

632
00:26:04,949 --> 00:26:07,171
certainly hope that we can move forward 

633
00:26:07,171 --> 00:26:10,420
with that . I described um in my 

634
00:26:10,430 --> 00:26:12,310
opening statement , General , I 

635
00:26:12,319 --> 00:26:16,160
described our um capa our defense 

636
00:26:16,170 --> 00:26:19,180
capacity as um in our industrial base 

637
00:26:19,189 --> 00:26:22,719
as clunky . Uh You and I also discussed 

638
00:26:22,729 --> 00:26:25,780
this in , in our conversation . Do you , 

639
00:26:25,790 --> 00:26:28,069
uh , do you agree with my assessment 

640
00:26:28,339 --> 00:26:30,589
that the bureaucracy and the industrial 

641
00:26:30,599 --> 00:26:34,400
base are , are clunky based on the , 

642
00:26:34,479 --> 00:26:38,300
uh the speed with which technology has 

643
00:26:38,310 --> 00:26:41,479
evolved and changes uh , as compared to 

644
00:26:41,489 --> 00:26:45,119
how , uh we are able to uh access that 

645
00:26:45,130 --> 00:26:47,339
as a military ? I , I do and I think 

646
00:26:47,349 --> 00:26:49,571
it's an area I think we can all improve 

647
00:26:49,571 --> 00:26:51,293
upon . Uh , we have a great uh 

648
00:26:51,293 --> 00:26:53,405
innovation here within our nation and 

649
00:26:53,405 --> 00:26:55,516
we wanna make sure that we're putting 

650
00:26:55,516 --> 00:26:55,239
that into the hands of our war fighters 

651
00:26:55,250 --> 00:26:57,472
as quickly as possible . I also believe 

652
00:26:57,472 --> 00:26:59,417
there's an in process to this just 

653
00:26:59,417 --> 00:27:01,417
based on . There are so many things 

654
00:27:01,417 --> 00:27:03,639
that are software based today and if we 

655
00:27:03,639 --> 00:27:05,806
can knock down any barriers to be able 

656
00:27:05,806 --> 00:27:07,861
to move faster . Um I'm all for it . 

657
00:27:07,861 --> 00:27:09,917
Well , do you , do you have specific 

658
00:27:09,917 --> 00:27:12,250
plans for how we would do this based on , 

659
00:27:12,250 --> 00:27:14,139
on your experience in the various 

660
00:27:14,139 --> 00:27:15,806
theaters ? You mentioned some 

661
00:27:15,806 --> 00:27:17,917
experience and what I've been able to 

662
00:27:17,917 --> 00:27:20,139
do is part part of this is really how I 

663
00:27:20,139 --> 00:27:22,306
build those relationships . And that's 

664
00:27:22,306 --> 00:27:22,010
what I've done as the Air Force Chief 

665
00:27:22,020 --> 00:27:23,964
of staff . That's what I did as my 

666
00:27:23,964 --> 00:27:26,187
previous assignment as the Commander of 

667
00:27:26,187 --> 00:27:28,409
Pacific Air Forces is to be engaged and 

668
00:27:28,409 --> 00:27:30,520
be able to collaborate and figure out 

669
00:27:30,520 --> 00:27:30,459
where those barriers might be , that 

670
00:27:30,469 --> 00:27:32,691
would prevent us from moving as fast as 

671
00:27:32,691 --> 00:27:35,640
we need to . Um OK , now let's talk 

672
00:27:35,650 --> 00:27:39,609
about the European Theater and and NATO . 

673
00:27:40,689 --> 00:27:43,880
Um , the , the Department of Defense 

674
00:27:43,890 --> 00:27:46,209
leadership , uh , regularly states the 

675
00:27:46,219 --> 00:27:48,163
department is following the normal 

676
00:27:48,163 --> 00:27:51,020
process or requirements generated by 

677
00:27:51,030 --> 00:27:54,420
the European Command . Can we agree 

678
00:27:55,079 --> 00:27:58,579
general that the threat against NATO 

679
00:27:58,589 --> 00:28:01,780
countries today is far 

680
00:28:01,790 --> 00:28:04,650
different than it was three years ago 

681
00:28:05,060 --> 00:28:08,819
before the Russians invaded Ukraine and 

682
00:28:08,829 --> 00:28:10,940
depleted much of their ammunition and 

683
00:28:10,940 --> 00:28:14,550
capability in this unjust and 

684
00:28:14,560 --> 00:28:17,310
illegal war . Yes , sir . I say the 

685
00:28:17,319 --> 00:28:19,541
threat and the security environment are 

686
00:28:19,541 --> 00:28:21,541
both different from where they were 

687
00:28:21,541 --> 00:28:23,763
three years ago . Ok . Well , on , on a 

688
00:28:23,763 --> 00:28:26,819
bipartisan basis , senators and members 

689
00:28:26,829 --> 00:28:28,773
of the House have repeatedly asked 

690
00:28:28,773 --> 00:28:31,089
senior joints , leadership staff to 

691
00:28:31,099 --> 00:28:34,540
lead a dynamic requirements review of 

692
00:28:34,550 --> 00:28:36,717
the European theater that accounts for 

693
00:28:36,717 --> 00:28:40,250
this reality . In other words , uh we , 

694
00:28:40,260 --> 00:28:43,550
we were prepared to defend NATO 

695
00:28:43,560 --> 00:28:45,719
nations against the threat , which 

696
00:28:46,050 --> 00:28:49,520
which Russia is simply incapable of 

697
00:28:49,530 --> 00:28:52,630
doing at this point . Are , are we able 

698
00:28:52,930 --> 00:28:56,010
to uh to be flexible enough to admit 

699
00:28:56,020 --> 00:28:59,000
that and to , and to direct more of our 

700
00:28:59,010 --> 00:29:02,530
help toward toward our ally in Ukraine ? 

701
00:29:03,380 --> 00:29:05,880
Uh Senator ranking member if confirmed , 

702
00:29:05,890 --> 00:29:08,057
one of the things I want to be able to 

703
00:29:08,057 --> 00:29:10,223
do is actually assess where we are . I 

704
00:29:10,223 --> 00:29:12,446
am an engineer by background . So doing 

705
00:29:12,446 --> 00:29:14,612
assessments and doing analysis is , is 

706
00:29:14,612 --> 00:29:14,300
how I think about things and that's 

707
00:29:14,310 --> 00:29:16,310
something we do need to do . Um not 

708
00:29:16,310 --> 00:29:18,421
just for Europe , but I would say for 

709
00:29:18,421 --> 00:29:20,477
all of our major security challenges 

710
00:29:20,477 --> 00:29:22,754
continue to reassess . Thank you , sir . 

711
00:29:22,754 --> 00:29:22,589
Thank you , Mr Chairman Thank you , 

712
00:29:22,599 --> 00:29:24,821
Senator Worker G , please . Thank you , 

713
00:29:24,821 --> 00:29:26,780
Mr Chair . Congratulations General 

714
00:29:26,790 --> 00:29:28,846
Brown . Thank you to your family for 

715
00:29:28,846 --> 00:29:30,790
being here to support you . I just 

716
00:29:30,790 --> 00:29:32,901
returned from a codel surveying a lot 

717
00:29:32,901 --> 00:29:35,810
of our operations in Europe to prepare 

718
00:29:35,819 --> 00:29:37,900
Ukrainians to fight to preposition 

719
00:29:37,910 --> 00:29:40,619
equipment , to do the type of readiness 

720
00:29:40,630 --> 00:29:43,180
training with our NATO allies that are 

721
00:29:43,189 --> 00:29:46,829
so essential to preparation and 

722
00:29:46,839 --> 00:29:49,069
to giving the Ukrainians the ability to 

723
00:29:49,079 --> 00:29:51,410
win their war against Russia . And you 

724
00:29:51,420 --> 00:29:53,790
mentioned how important logistics are 

725
00:29:53,800 --> 00:29:56,319
and how important readiness is and the 

726
00:29:56,329 --> 00:29:59,839
will to fight is and we have a growing 

727
00:29:59,849 --> 00:30:03,369
threat from China uh from the um Xi 

728
00:30:03,380 --> 00:30:07,349
regime with regard to Taiwan . And 

729
00:30:07,420 --> 00:30:09,819
I'd like to hear your assessments on 

730
00:30:10,069 --> 00:30:12,609
the challenges of that type of theater 

731
00:30:12,619 --> 00:30:16,619
versus the ease with which we were 

732
00:30:16,630 --> 00:30:18,741
able to do the work in our , with our 

733
00:30:18,741 --> 00:30:21,829
NATO allies in Europe since we have um 

734
00:30:21,839 --> 00:30:24,060
allies on the border of Ukraine that 

735
00:30:24,069 --> 00:30:26,125
facilitate a lot of our training and 

736
00:30:26,125 --> 00:30:28,439
exercises in preparation . So could you 

737
00:30:28,449 --> 00:30:30,616
talk a little bit about the challenges 

738
00:30:30,616 --> 00:30:32,727
with regard to that other theater and 

739
00:30:32,727 --> 00:30:34,838
uh what type of preparation you think 

740
00:30:34,838 --> 00:30:37,005
will be essential ? Sure . Uh Thanks . 

741
00:30:37,005 --> 00:30:39,227
Thanks for the question . And the thing 

742
00:30:39,227 --> 00:30:41,338
I think about when you looking at the 

743
00:30:41,338 --> 00:30:41,089
two theaters there , there's a couple 

744
00:30:41,099 --> 00:30:43,043
of factors that I I play in and is 

745
00:30:43,043 --> 00:30:45,210
geography and infrastructure . And you 

746
00:30:45,210 --> 00:30:47,321
look at the geography of Europe where 

747
00:30:47,321 --> 00:30:49,488
you have uh you know , large land mass 

748
00:30:49,488 --> 00:30:51,821
uh borders you also have infrastructure , 

749
00:30:51,821 --> 00:30:53,932
roads , railroads , airfields are all 

750
00:30:53,932 --> 00:30:56,266
close together . Um In the Indo Pacific , 

751
00:30:56,266 --> 00:30:58,488
you don't necessarily have that uh what 

752
00:30:58,488 --> 00:31:00,710
you have is uh more maritime space , uh 

753
00:31:00,710 --> 00:31:02,599
islands and you , but you do have 

754
00:31:02,599 --> 00:31:04,321
airfields and so it'll be more 

755
00:31:04,321 --> 00:31:06,543
challenging . And by the way , the , uh 

756
00:31:06,543 --> 00:31:08,655
the size of the region is much larger 

757
00:31:08,655 --> 00:31:10,877
than , uh than it is in Europe . And so 

758
00:31:10,877 --> 00:31:12,932
the distances are , are , are pretty 

759
00:31:12,932 --> 00:31:14,543
massive . And so , from that 

760
00:31:14,543 --> 00:31:16,766
perspective , uh one of the things that 

761
00:31:16,766 --> 00:31:18,766
I've thought about going back to my 

762
00:31:18,766 --> 00:31:20,710
time as a commander of Pacific Air 

763
00:31:20,710 --> 00:31:22,710
Forces is you cannot wait until the 

764
00:31:22,710 --> 00:31:24,655
crisis occurs to be able to deploy 

765
00:31:24,655 --> 00:31:24,520
capability . You have to preposition 

766
00:31:24,530 --> 00:31:26,752
capability and have that in place . You 

767
00:31:26,752 --> 00:31:28,863
have to work with allies and partners 

768
00:31:28,863 --> 00:31:30,919
to have access to locations . So you 

769
00:31:30,919 --> 00:31:33,030
can , you can put the capability into 

770
00:31:33,030 --> 00:31:35,197
place and , and that's an area that we 

771
00:31:35,197 --> 00:31:37,530
are focused on not only as an air force , 

772
00:31:37,530 --> 00:31:37,390
but I would also say as a joint force . 

773
00:31:37,400 --> 00:31:39,511
Uh matter of fact , right now , we're 

774
00:31:39,511 --> 00:31:41,567
in the process of a large exercise , 

775
00:31:41,567 --> 00:31:43,789
mobility guarding , led by air mobility 

776
00:31:43,789 --> 00:31:46,011
command to really test ourselves on how 

777
00:31:46,011 --> 00:31:47,956
quickly we can move via by air and 

778
00:31:47,956 --> 00:31:50,122
other means to get capability into the 

779
00:31:50,122 --> 00:31:52,178
theater as quickly as possible . And 

780
00:31:52,178 --> 00:31:54,289
we'll take that and learn from that . 

781
00:31:54,289 --> 00:31:56,344
We also just did for the Air Force , 

782
00:31:56,344 --> 00:31:58,400
did a table top exercise focus on in 

783
00:31:58,400 --> 00:32:00,622
the Inner Pacific . And so , um because 

784
00:32:00,622 --> 00:32:02,733
of those differences in geography and 

785
00:32:02,733 --> 00:32:04,956
infrastructure , we cannot use the same 

786
00:32:04,956 --> 00:32:06,956
approach in both theaters and , and 

787
00:32:06,956 --> 00:32:09,067
that's where I've been focused as the 

788
00:32:09,067 --> 00:32:08,219
Air Force Chief and we'll continue to 

789
00:32:08,229 --> 00:32:10,173
focus as the chairman of confirmed 

790
00:32:10,270 --> 00:32:13,729
agreed um with regard to Asia . Um 

791
00:32:13,739 --> 00:32:16,619
there will be certain reliance on other 

792
00:32:16,630 --> 00:32:19,650
assets such as cyber such as space such 

793
00:32:19,660 --> 00:32:22,119
as Air Force as you say . And one of 

794
00:32:22,130 --> 00:32:24,390
the challenges that we have is critical 

795
00:32:24,400 --> 00:32:26,420
infrastructure that's necessary to 

796
00:32:26,430 --> 00:32:30,069
deploy to stage to 

797
00:32:30,079 --> 00:32:34,050
prepare . And we recently had um or we 

798
00:32:34,060 --> 00:32:37,400
heard reporting on China's 

799
00:32:37,410 --> 00:32:40,410
cyber threat with regard to Guam . I'd 

800
00:32:40,420 --> 00:32:43,640
like to know your thoughts on um how 

801
00:32:43,650 --> 00:32:45,872
will cyber threats inform your thinking 

802
00:32:45,872 --> 00:32:47,650
and viewing these logistics and 

803
00:32:47,650 --> 00:32:49,761
mobility plans and what collaboration 

804
00:32:49,761 --> 00:32:52,119
exists between the joint staff and DH S 

805
00:32:52,130 --> 00:32:54,130
and relevant senior risk management 

806
00:32:54,140 --> 00:32:56,307
agencies to ensure whole of government 

807
00:32:56,307 --> 00:32:58,180
alignment in the event of such a 

808
00:32:58,189 --> 00:33:01,140
conflict . What I do think about from 

809
00:33:01,150 --> 00:33:03,206
the cyber threat , it's not just for 

810
00:33:03,206 --> 00:33:05,317
Guam , but I really say the aspect of 

811
00:33:05,317 --> 00:33:07,317
here back in the continental United 

812
00:33:07,317 --> 00:33:10,069
States and the aspect of in order for 

813
00:33:10,079 --> 00:33:12,246
us to generate combat power and get it 

814
00:33:12,246 --> 00:33:14,246
deployed . We depend on our various 

815
00:33:14,246 --> 00:33:16,910
ports and rail yards and other areas 

816
00:33:16,920 --> 00:33:18,976
and airfields to get ourselves to be 

817
00:33:18,976 --> 00:33:21,087
able to deploy . We got to be able to 

818
00:33:21,087 --> 00:33:22,642
protect that critical cyber 

819
00:33:22,642 --> 00:33:24,753
infrastructure . And if we don't , it 

820
00:33:24,753 --> 00:33:24,290
will challenge us to be able to get 

821
00:33:24,300 --> 00:33:26,467
ourselves deployed . And so that's why 

822
00:33:26,467 --> 00:33:28,467
it's very important that we work uh 

823
00:33:28,467 --> 00:33:30,522
collecting , not just in part inside 

824
00:33:30,522 --> 00:33:29,930
the Department of Defense , uh 

825
00:33:29,939 --> 00:33:32,109
primarily through Cyber Command , but 

826
00:33:32,119 --> 00:33:34,341
uh as you highlighted the Department of 

827
00:33:34,341 --> 00:33:36,508
Homeland Security and others to take a 

828
00:33:36,508 --> 00:33:38,730
look at the critical nodes that we have 

829
00:33:38,730 --> 00:33:40,786
to protect . Uh because I believe in 

830
00:33:40,786 --> 00:33:42,841
Cyber , we're , we're in a contested 

831
00:33:42,841 --> 00:33:42,300
environment today that we need to be 

832
00:33:42,310 --> 00:33:44,366
paying attention . And I think we've 

833
00:33:44,366 --> 00:33:46,366
seen that in , in past examples and 

834
00:33:46,366 --> 00:33:48,421
we've got to make sure we're working 

835
00:33:48,421 --> 00:33:50,532
closely together um across the entire 

836
00:33:50,532 --> 00:33:52,699
government uh and also with our allies 

837
00:33:52,699 --> 00:33:52,219
and partners to ensure we are 

838
00:33:52,229 --> 00:33:54,229
protecting ourselves in , in the in 

839
00:33:54,229 --> 00:33:56,285
from the in the Cyber domain . Now , 

840
00:33:56,285 --> 00:33:58,650
with regard to Cyber , um services are 

841
00:33:58,660 --> 00:34:00,882
responsible for establishing a range of 

842
00:34:00,882 --> 00:34:03,049
personnel policies for cyber personnel 

843
00:34:03,049 --> 00:34:05,160
and providing them to Cyber Command . 

844
00:34:05,160 --> 00:34:06,938
This leads to variations across 

845
00:34:06,938 --> 00:34:08,660
services and length of service 

846
00:34:08,660 --> 00:34:10,660
requirements and length of tours at 

847
00:34:10,660 --> 00:34:12,771
Cyber Command as chairman . How would 

848
00:34:12,771 --> 00:34:14,882
you approach working with the service 

849
00:34:14,882 --> 00:34:16,993
chiefs to help break service policies 

850
00:34:16,993 --> 00:34:19,216
into better alignment with the needs of 

851
00:34:19,216 --> 00:34:21,382
Cyber command ? I think one of the key 

852
00:34:21,382 --> 00:34:21,330
areas is one to meet the needs of Cyber 

853
00:34:21,340 --> 00:34:23,396
Command , but at the same time align 

854
00:34:23,396 --> 00:34:25,451
from our policies and processes . So 

855
00:34:25,451 --> 00:34:27,618
we're not committing amongst ourselves 

856
00:34:27,618 --> 00:34:29,840
for , for talent . If we have a similar 

857
00:34:29,840 --> 00:34:32,062
uh approaches , it helps us to bring in 

858
00:34:32,062 --> 00:34:34,173
all talent from across the nation and 

859
00:34:34,173 --> 00:34:36,229
then also help to retain that talent 

860
00:34:36,229 --> 00:34:38,507
within the within the services as well . 

861
00:34:38,507 --> 00:34:38,449
Thank you , Mr Chairman . Thank you , 

862
00:34:38,459 --> 00:34:40,570
Senator Gillibrand , Senator Fisher , 

863
00:34:40,570 --> 00:34:42,626
please . Thank you , Mr Chairman and 

864
00:34:42,626 --> 00:34:44,792
thank you General to you and your wife 

865
00:34:44,792 --> 00:34:46,792
and your family for your service to 

866
00:34:46,792 --> 00:34:49,110
this country . I took note of the 

867
00:34:49,120 --> 00:34:51,009
comments you made in your opening 

868
00:34:51,009 --> 00:34:53,009
statement . You said having led war 

869
00:34:53,009 --> 00:34:56,229
fighters abroad has shaped my thinking 

870
00:34:57,270 --> 00:34:59,492
as you know , I remain deeply concerned 

871
00:34:59,492 --> 00:35:03,199
about our munitions production capacity . 

872
00:35:03,340 --> 00:35:05,562
And in the Wall Street Journal a couple 

873
00:35:05,562 --> 00:35:08,949
days ago , um they wrote an editorial 

874
00:35:08,959 --> 00:35:11,070
about America's running out of Ammo . 

875
00:35:11,070 --> 00:35:13,870
Biden admits the problem , but then why 

876
00:35:13,879 --> 00:35:16,219
not do something about it ? I remember 

877
00:35:16,229 --> 00:35:19,629
hearing the president make a passing 

878
00:35:19,639 --> 00:35:22,189
comment on that a couple days ago and I 

879
00:35:22,199 --> 00:35:25,560
was struck by it because it's the first 

880
00:35:25,570 --> 00:35:29,000
time I had heard from the 

881
00:35:29,010 --> 00:35:32,879
administration concern about munitions 

882
00:35:32,889 --> 00:35:35,510
for our security and our defense here 

883
00:35:35,520 --> 00:35:38,260
in this country . So frankly , after 

884
00:35:38,270 --> 00:35:40,709
years of under investing in munitions 

885
00:35:40,719 --> 00:35:42,939
production , we now find ourselves , I 

886
00:35:42,949 --> 00:35:45,100
think in a very precarious position 

887
00:35:45,370 --> 00:35:47,840
while this committee has generally been 

888
00:35:47,850 --> 00:35:49,628
supportive of providing aid and 

889
00:35:49,628 --> 00:35:52,590
transferring excess munitions from our 

890
00:35:52,600 --> 00:35:55,459
stockpiles . We also have a clear 

891
00:35:55,469 --> 00:35:58,020
expectation that the department will 

892
00:35:58,030 --> 00:36:00,629
work with us to ensure that we produce 

893
00:36:00,860 --> 00:36:03,850
more munitions as many as we can and as 

894
00:36:03,860 --> 00:36:05,739
fast as we can to backfill our 

895
00:36:05,750 --> 00:36:08,610
stockpiles , increase our margins and 

896
00:36:08,620 --> 00:36:11,360
support our allies and partners . Do 

897
00:36:11,370 --> 00:36:13,870
you agree that we need to increase our 

898
00:36:13,879 --> 00:36:17,280
munitions production capacity ? I do . 

899
00:36:17,290 --> 00:36:19,179
And one of the areas that I would 

900
00:36:19,179 --> 00:36:21,401
highlight is uh for all the services in 

901
00:36:21,401 --> 00:36:23,346
this year's budget submission , we 

902
00:36:23,346 --> 00:36:25,401
asked for multi year procurement and 

903
00:36:25,401 --> 00:36:25,040
that multi year procurement was 

904
00:36:25,050 --> 00:36:27,217
designed to help increase our stocks . 

905
00:36:27,217 --> 00:36:30,139
But it also what it does for us is help 

906
00:36:30,149 --> 00:36:32,260
provide predictability to the defense 

907
00:36:32,260 --> 00:36:34,205
industrial base uh to their supply 

908
00:36:34,205 --> 00:36:36,590
chains and to the workforce . This , 

909
00:36:36,600 --> 00:36:39,659
this committee's led Congress in giving 

910
00:36:39,669 --> 00:36:42,000
more tools to the department to address 

911
00:36:42,010 --> 00:36:44,250
the shortages and that includes um 

912
00:36:44,260 --> 00:36:46,750
providing multiyear procurement 

913
00:36:46,760 --> 00:36:49,860
authority modi modifying older and 

914
00:36:49,870 --> 00:36:52,800
unnecessary uh contracting requirements 

915
00:36:52,810 --> 00:36:55,760
so that we can get contracting officer 

916
00:36:55,834 --> 00:36:58,074
is to move faster . We need them to 

917
00:36:58,084 --> 00:37:00,465
move faster . I understand the 

918
00:37:00,475 --> 00:37:02,925
department is reviewing its total 

919
00:37:02,935 --> 00:37:05,245
munitions requirements amid the 

920
00:37:05,254 --> 00:37:08,024
worsening geopolitical environment as 

921
00:37:08,034 --> 00:37:10,804
new stockpile levels are determined 

922
00:37:10,814 --> 00:37:13,554
particularly for precision guide guided 

923
00:37:13,564 --> 00:37:15,705
munitions . Will you work with this 

924
00:37:15,715 --> 00:37:18,915
committee to identify any emerging gaps 

925
00:37:18,925 --> 00:37:21,036
in our stockpiles ? Uh Yes , I will . 

926
00:37:21,036 --> 00:37:23,500
Thank you . Do you believe the tools 

927
00:37:23,510 --> 00:37:26,840
that , that we have um given the 

928
00:37:26,850 --> 00:37:29,780
department those uh contracts multi 

929
00:37:29,790 --> 00:37:32,600
year um is that going to continue to 

930
00:37:32,610 --> 00:37:35,370
help you meet those requirements as 

931
00:37:35,379 --> 00:37:37,601
well ? So I , I think it will and , and 

932
00:37:37,601 --> 00:37:39,823
one of the areas is we work through the 

933
00:37:39,823 --> 00:37:41,435
contracting aspect is how we 

934
00:37:41,435 --> 00:37:41,100
incentivize our , our uh our 

935
00:37:41,110 --> 00:37:44,239
contractors , uh contracting officers 

936
00:37:44,250 --> 00:37:46,250
and how we build those contracts to 

937
00:37:46,250 --> 00:37:48,361
make sure they're moving in the right 

938
00:37:48,361 --> 00:37:50,528
direction to change the culture of how 

939
00:37:50,528 --> 00:37:52,639
we've done things in the past , right 

940
00:37:52,639 --> 00:37:54,639
to be clear , I think there is much 

941
00:37:54,639 --> 00:37:57,260
more that can be done in fiscal year 

942
00:37:57,270 --> 00:38:00,270
2024 to address the munitions 

943
00:38:00,280 --> 00:38:02,850
production challenges than what was in 

944
00:38:02,959 --> 00:38:06,850
the president's budget request . For 

945
00:38:06,860 --> 00:38:10,500
example , for $67 million the army 

946
00:38:10,510 --> 00:38:13,209
could expand the capacity of the , of 

947
00:38:13,219 --> 00:38:17,100
the Gimler from 120 per 

948
00:38:17,110 --> 00:38:21,010
year to 1000 per year by 2025 . 

949
00:38:21,379 --> 00:38:24,600
This is a key long range fire line that 

950
00:38:24,610 --> 00:38:27,290
could be relevant in multiple theaters . 

951
00:38:28,139 --> 00:38:30,306
And I'm frequently asked , what can we 

952
00:38:30,306 --> 00:38:33,270
do to help Taiwan help themselves more ? 

953
00:38:34,129 --> 00:38:36,909
Well , for around 70 million more 

954
00:38:36,919 --> 00:38:39,330
dollars , we could expand the harpoon 

955
00:38:39,340 --> 00:38:41,879
production capacity such that we 

956
00:38:41,889 --> 00:38:44,219
accelerate the final deliveries to 

957
00:38:44,229 --> 00:38:48,179
Taiwan from 2029 to 2027 . 

958
00:38:48,439 --> 00:38:51,790
And that 2027 is an important date that 

959
00:38:51,800 --> 00:38:55,179
we hear from Xi himself 

960
00:38:55,379 --> 00:38:58,889
as a goal that he hopes to reach to be 

961
00:38:58,899 --> 00:39:02,330
able to invade Taiwan . But it's not in 

962
00:39:02,340 --> 00:39:05,360
the fiscal year 2024 budget request , 

963
00:39:06,610 --> 00:39:08,820
we could have 100 and 50 million more 

964
00:39:08,830 --> 00:39:11,370
dollars that buys us another Patriot 

965
00:39:11,379 --> 00:39:14,620
launcher battery this year alone , 

966
00:39:14,870 --> 00:39:17,439
these , these are some of the examples 

967
00:39:17,449 --> 00:39:19,560
of what we could be doing and I would 

968
00:39:19,560 --> 00:39:22,169
say what we should be doing , but we 

969
00:39:22,179 --> 00:39:24,068
aren't doing it because of budget 

970
00:39:24,068 --> 00:39:26,100
constraints . Uh They've all been 

971
00:39:26,110 --> 00:39:28,790
confirmed by industry and by the 

972
00:39:28,800 --> 00:39:31,399
department that it can happen and I 

973
00:39:31,409 --> 00:39:35,189
hope that you will be an advocate to be 

974
00:39:35,199 --> 00:39:39,010
able to help us um push for what 

975
00:39:39,020 --> 00:39:41,600
we need to address the threats that we 

976
00:39:41,610 --> 00:39:45,370
face as a country and as a world 

977
00:39:45,379 --> 00:39:48,030
in any emergency spending package or 

978
00:39:48,040 --> 00:39:50,540
supplemental that comes up . Would you , 

979
00:39:51,149 --> 00:39:54,649
um , be , be willing to put 

980
00:39:54,659 --> 00:39:56,800
yourself forward ? We talk about this 

981
00:39:56,810 --> 00:39:59,389
all the time . You and I , I always say 

982
00:39:59,399 --> 00:40:01,510
if the American people hear about the 

983
00:40:01,510 --> 00:40:03,909
threats that we have , we will see 

984
00:40:03,919 --> 00:40:07,189
tremendous support for our military and 

985
00:40:07,199 --> 00:40:10,719
for the needs that we have to be met 

986
00:40:10,729 --> 00:40:13,979
for the resources that we must have to 

987
00:40:13,989 --> 00:40:16,429
defend this country . Senator I will 

988
00:40:16,439 --> 00:40:18,383
definitely work with you , be very 

989
00:40:18,383 --> 00:40:20,495
candid about the threat and then also 

990
00:40:20,495 --> 00:40:22,620
be willing to make the tough calls as 

991
00:40:22,639 --> 00:40:24,919
if confirmed as the chairman . Thank 

992
00:40:24,929 --> 00:40:27,207
you , sir . Thank you , Senator Fisher , 

993
00:40:27,207 --> 00:40:29,969
Senator Hirono . Please . Thank you , 

994
00:40:29,979 --> 00:40:32,679
Mr Chairman . Congratulations General 

995
00:40:32,689 --> 00:40:34,750
on your nomination . I thank you and 

996
00:40:34,760 --> 00:40:36,760
your family for your service to our 

997
00:40:36,760 --> 00:40:39,489
country . Uh to ensure the fitness of 

998
00:40:39,500 --> 00:40:41,611
all nominees who appear before any of 

999
00:40:41,611 --> 00:40:43,833
the committees on which I sit . I asked 

1000
00:40:43,833 --> 00:40:46,000
the nominees the following two initial 

1001
00:40:46,000 --> 00:40:48,419
questions . One since you became a 

1002
00:40:48,429 --> 00:40:50,262
legal adult , have you ever made 

1003
00:40:50,262 --> 00:40:53,229
unwanted requests for sexual favors or 

1004
00:40:53,239 --> 00:40:55,072
committed any verbal or physical 

1005
00:40:55,072 --> 00:40:56,961
harassment or assault of a sexual 

1006
00:40:56,961 --> 00:40:59,659
nature ? I have not two . Have you ever 

1007
00:40:59,669 --> 00:41:01,613
faced discipline or entered into a 

1008
00:41:01,613 --> 00:41:03,558
settlement related to this kind of 

1009
00:41:03,558 --> 00:41:06,520
conduct ? I have not General II , I 

1010
00:41:06,530 --> 00:41:09,290
thank you for your consistent support 

1011
00:41:09,300 --> 00:41:11,300
for our service members , access to 

1012
00:41:11,300 --> 00:41:13,356
critical health care no matter where 

1013
00:41:13,356 --> 00:41:15,467
they are stationed around the world . 

1014
00:41:15,467 --> 00:41:17,189
And as we face recruitment and 

1015
00:41:17,189 --> 00:41:18,967
retention challenges across the 

1016
00:41:18,967 --> 00:41:21,133
services , support for service members 

1017
00:41:21,133 --> 00:41:23,479
of all backgrounds is critical . And 

1018
00:41:23,489 --> 00:41:25,656
for almost four decades now , you have 

1019
00:41:25,656 --> 00:41:27,656
built inclusive , diverse and ready 

1020
00:41:27,656 --> 00:41:30,229
teams in the Air Force . And I assume 

1021
00:41:30,239 --> 00:41:32,879
you will support such teams uh 

1022
00:41:32,889 --> 00:41:36,090
throughout the dod when we had a chance 

1023
00:41:36,100 --> 00:41:38,209
to chat yesterday , you gave me an 

1024
00:41:38,219 --> 00:41:41,379
example of how important uh the de I 

1025
00:41:41,389 --> 00:41:43,889
programs , as we refer to diversity 

1026
00:41:43,899 --> 00:41:46,270
equity and inclusive programs are 

1027
00:41:46,280 --> 00:41:48,447
within the military . You talked about 

1028
00:41:48,447 --> 00:41:50,447
your own experience . Can you share 

1029
00:41:50,447 --> 00:41:52,447
with this committee ? Uh , what you 

1030
00:41:52,447 --> 00:41:56,139
shared with me yesterday ? Uh I 

1031
00:41:56,149 --> 00:41:58,316
think about , uh for my own career and 

1032
00:41:58,316 --> 00:42:00,482
for many all of our members , all they 

1033
00:42:00,482 --> 00:42:02,816
want is a fair opportunity to , to , uh , 

1034
00:42:02,816 --> 00:42:05,040
to perform and by preventing them that 

1035
00:42:05,050 --> 00:42:07,217
fair opportunity , they do not want to 

1036
00:42:07,217 --> 00:42:09,510
be advantaged or disadvantaged or 

1037
00:42:09,520 --> 00:42:11,353
discounted , uh , based on their 

1038
00:42:11,353 --> 00:42:13,576
background . Um , they want to have the 

1039
00:42:13,576 --> 00:42:15,798
opportunity but they gotta be qualified 

1040
00:42:15,798 --> 00:42:17,742
and I'll just tell you from my own 

1041
00:42:17,742 --> 00:42:19,909
career when , when I came in and , and 

1042
00:42:19,909 --> 00:42:22,076
flying the F-16s , I didn't want to be 

1043
00:42:22,076 --> 00:42:24,242
the best African American F-16 pilot . 

1044
00:42:24,242 --> 00:42:26,409
I wanted to be the best F-16 pilot . I 

1045
00:42:26,409 --> 00:42:28,576
would say the same thing . Uh , when I 

1046
00:42:28,576 --> 00:42:28,500
went to be a , a instructor at the 

1047
00:42:28,510 --> 00:42:30,566
weapons , go to weapons school to go 

1048
00:42:30,566 --> 00:42:32,288
back as an instructor , be the 

1049
00:42:32,288 --> 00:42:34,454
commandant and every position I've had 

1050
00:42:34,454 --> 00:42:36,677
throughout my career , I wanted because 

1051
00:42:36,677 --> 00:42:36,209
I was the best and qualified . I did 

1052
00:42:36,219 --> 00:42:38,386
not want to be provided a , a position 

1053
00:42:38,386 --> 00:42:40,052
or promotion . Uh based on my 

1054
00:42:40,052 --> 00:42:42,330
background , I wanted to be , you know , 

1055
00:42:42,330 --> 00:42:44,552
based on the quality of my work . And I 

1056
00:42:44,552 --> 00:42:46,719
think that's uh the aspect that all of 

1057
00:42:46,719 --> 00:42:48,775
our service members look for is they 

1058
00:42:48,775 --> 00:42:50,886
want a fair opportunity . Uh But they 

1059
00:42:50,886 --> 00:42:52,830
also be uh rewarded for the uh the 

1060
00:42:52,830 --> 00:42:56,010
performance . And when you uh when we 

1061
00:42:56,020 --> 00:42:58,242
have this discussion , fair opportunity 

1062
00:42:58,242 --> 00:43:00,242
means that they are able to have uh 

1063
00:43:00,242 --> 00:43:02,464
experiences that they may otherwise not 

1064
00:43:02,464 --> 00:43:05,629
have um access to . And that is the 

1065
00:43:05,639 --> 00:43:08,800
importance in my view of the attention 

1066
00:43:08,810 --> 00:43:10,588
being paid to the importance of 

1067
00:43:10,588 --> 00:43:13,719
diversity uh in our services . And the , 

1068
00:43:13,729 --> 00:43:15,639
the the fairness that diversity 

1069
00:43:15,679 --> 00:43:19,080
provides . If confirmed , you will be 

1070
00:43:19,090 --> 00:43:21,201
the highest ranking officer in the US 

1071
00:43:21,201 --> 00:43:23,201
military , which gives you a unique 

1072
00:43:23,201 --> 00:43:25,368
perspective on the burden of command . 

1073
00:43:25,368 --> 00:43:27,534
I have repeatedly asked for leadership 

1074
00:43:27,534 --> 00:43:29,646
accountability and structural changes 

1075
00:43:29,646 --> 00:43:32,379
from the dod in the wake of high 

1076
00:43:32,389 --> 00:43:35,010
profile failures of in Hawaii , for 

1077
00:43:35,020 --> 00:43:37,239
example , the disaster at Red Hill , 

1078
00:43:37,250 --> 00:43:39,419
which I'm sure you are familiar with 

1079
00:43:39,429 --> 00:43:42,209
and that disaster has led to public 

1080
00:43:42,219 --> 00:43:45,649
mistrust in the military in Hawaii 

1081
00:43:45,780 --> 00:43:48,002
General . How do you view the burden of 

1082
00:43:48,002 --> 00:43:50,479
command and the ultimate responsibility 

1083
00:43:50,489 --> 00:43:53,590
and trusted in military commanders ? 

1084
00:43:53,969 --> 00:43:56,080
There , there are two factors I think 

1085
00:43:56,080 --> 00:43:58,080
about in the responsibly command or 

1086
00:43:58,080 --> 00:44:00,191
leadership at any level . Um You have 

1087
00:44:00,191 --> 00:44:02,302
the responsibility to get the mission 

1088
00:44:02,302 --> 00:44:02,030
done , but you're also accountable for 

1089
00:44:02,040 --> 00:44:04,050
the mission uh as well and that 

1090
00:44:04,060 --> 00:44:06,520
accountability , um if it doesn't go 

1091
00:44:06,530 --> 00:44:09,820
well , um you know , you should be held 

1092
00:44:09,830 --> 00:44:11,830
accountable and those are the areas 

1093
00:44:11,830 --> 00:44:13,774
that I focus on and ensure that we 

1094
00:44:13,774 --> 00:44:15,608
maintain the standard across the 

1095
00:44:15,608 --> 00:44:17,497
military . But at the same time , 

1096
00:44:17,497 --> 00:44:19,719
maintain the public confidence from the 

1097
00:44:19,719 --> 00:44:21,790
American people that uh that we do 

1098
00:44:21,800 --> 00:44:25,679
support . I think that , that if we 

1099
00:44:25,689 --> 00:44:28,479
don't hold our commanders responsible , 

1100
00:44:28,580 --> 00:44:30,800
uh that it does continue to shake the 

1101
00:44:30,810 --> 00:44:33,600
faith that communities have and the 

1102
00:44:33,610 --> 00:44:36,540
leadership of the military . And uh as 

1103
00:44:36,550 --> 00:44:39,199
of the chief of the uh joint chiefs , 

1104
00:44:39,209 --> 00:44:41,330
you are going to have major 

1105
00:44:41,340 --> 00:44:44,360
responsibility to make sure that the uh 

1106
00:44:45,629 --> 00:44:48,479
burden of command . As I uh uh I've 

1107
00:44:48,489 --> 00:44:52,469
expressed , it is carried through . I 

1108
00:44:52,479 --> 00:44:56,149
just visited with the um with the 

1109
00:44:56,159 --> 00:44:58,719
Deputy Secretary of the dod our 

1110
00:44:58,739 --> 00:45:01,370
shipyards and I just wanna make sure 

1111
00:45:01,379 --> 00:45:04,449
that you will continue to support the 

1112
00:45:04,459 --> 00:45:07,040
modernization of our shipyards because 

1113
00:45:07,050 --> 00:45:09,439
even as we make decisions to build new 

1114
00:45:09,449 --> 00:45:11,739
ships , ie assets that we have to make 

1115
00:45:11,750 --> 00:45:13,979
sure that we have the capability to 

1116
00:45:13,989 --> 00:45:16,100
repair and maintain the ships that we 

1117
00:45:16,100 --> 00:45:18,156
already have . And that means that , 

1118
00:45:18,156 --> 00:45:20,770
that the ship uh shipyard improvement 

1119
00:45:21,350 --> 00:45:23,989
commitment has to conti continue . And 

1120
00:45:24,000 --> 00:45:26,056
this is a multiyear commitment . I'd 

1121
00:45:26,056 --> 00:45:28,056
like to have your commitment that , 

1122
00:45:28,056 --> 00:45:30,278
that we will continue to fund this very 

1123
00:45:30,278 --> 00:45:33,649
critical part of our military readiness . 

1124
00:45:33,659 --> 00:45:35,881
Uh You have my commitment . Thank you . 

1125
00:45:35,881 --> 00:45:37,992
Thank you , Mr Chairman . Thank you . 

1126
00:45:37,992 --> 00:45:41,300
Senator Senator rounds , please . Thank 

1127
00:45:41,310 --> 00:45:43,669
you , Mr Chairman General Brown . First 

1128
00:45:43,679 --> 00:45:45,790
of all , I want to thank you for your 

1129
00:45:45,790 --> 00:45:48,012
years of service . I also want to thank 

1130
00:45:48,012 --> 00:45:50,699
your family . Um , specifically Shereen , 

1131
00:45:50,709 --> 00:45:52,765
who is with you here today and , and 

1132
00:45:52,765 --> 00:45:54,919
your Children . But when we deploy 

1133
00:45:54,929 --> 00:45:56,762
someone and you've been deployed 

1134
00:45:56,762 --> 00:45:58,985
multiple times , it's not just you that 

1135
00:45:58,985 --> 00:46:01,300
gets deployed , it's the entire family 

1136
00:46:01,310 --> 00:46:03,254
that feels that deployment . And I 

1137
00:46:03,254 --> 00:46:05,310
thank all of you for your service to 

1138
00:46:05,310 --> 00:46:08,179
our country uh General earlier this 

1139
00:46:08,189 --> 00:46:10,500
year at the Air Force Posture hearing 

1140
00:46:10,729 --> 00:46:13,679
you and I discussed the impact uh of 

1141
00:46:13,689 --> 00:46:16,030
auctioning off portions of the spectrum . 

1142
00:46:16,580 --> 00:46:18,747
Uh and , and what that would do to our 

1143
00:46:18,747 --> 00:46:20,850
defense capabilities . Those same 

1144
00:46:20,860 --> 00:46:22,804
concerns were echoed by all of the 

1145
00:46:22,804 --> 00:46:24,971
other service chiefs and the combatant 

1146
00:46:24,971 --> 00:46:28,080
commanders . All of them based on what 

1147
00:46:28,090 --> 00:46:30,469
we've discussed before . If this report , 

1148
00:46:30,479 --> 00:46:33,629
which is due in September demonstrates 

1149
00:46:33,639 --> 00:46:36,760
that auctioning off the 3.1 to 3.45 

1150
00:46:36,770 --> 00:46:39,030
gigahertz portion of the spectrum will 

1151
00:46:39,040 --> 00:46:41,959
adversely impact our national security . 

1152
00:46:42,370 --> 00:46:44,790
What would be your advice to the 

1153
00:46:44,800 --> 00:46:48,550
president and to the Congress ? Um And , 

1154
00:46:48,560 --> 00:46:52,110
and how would you proceed ? Senator ? I 

1155
00:46:52,120 --> 00:46:53,959
would echo exactly what you just 

1156
00:46:53,969 --> 00:46:56,136
highlighted the impact to our national 

1157
00:46:56,136 --> 00:46:58,025
security because that part of the 

1158
00:46:58,025 --> 00:47:00,191
spectrum is where we , we have uh many 

1159
00:47:00,191 --> 00:47:02,302
of our capabilities across the uh the 

1160
00:47:02,302 --> 00:47:04,413
joint force . And if we had to vacate 

1161
00:47:04,413 --> 00:47:06,525
that um we'd lose that capability and 

1162
00:47:06,525 --> 00:47:08,469
we'd have to figure out how now to 

1163
00:47:08,469 --> 00:47:10,525
regain that capability and that will 

1164
00:47:10,525 --> 00:47:12,636
take time and cost money . And now it 

1165
00:47:12,636 --> 00:47:14,802
is not the time to , to drop our , our 

1166
00:47:14,802 --> 00:47:16,636
national security . And so uh my 

1167
00:47:16,636 --> 00:47:18,913
recommendation is we should not vacate . 

1168
00:47:18,913 --> 00:47:21,025
Uh and realizing we have to still get 

1169
00:47:21,025 --> 00:47:23,247
through uh the study before we make any 

1170
00:47:23,247 --> 00:47:25,247
decisions . But um there will be an 

1171
00:47:25,247 --> 00:47:27,358
impact and if confirmed , I'll , I'll 

1172
00:47:27,358 --> 00:47:29,580
bring uh with , with the services , you 

1173
00:47:29,580 --> 00:47:31,691
know , detailed information on the uh 

1174
00:47:31,691 --> 00:47:33,636
the challenges and uh how it might 

1175
00:47:33,636 --> 00:47:35,691
impact the joint force . Thank you , 

1176
00:47:35,691 --> 00:47:38,090
sir . Uh Let me just ask you with 

1177
00:47:38,100 --> 00:47:40,219
regard to your professional military 

1178
00:47:40,229 --> 00:47:42,120
opinion . Do you think there's a 

1179
00:47:42,129 --> 00:47:44,185
possibility that our adversaries are 

1180
00:47:44,185 --> 00:47:46,240
actually attempting to influence the 

1181
00:47:46,240 --> 00:47:49,800
debate and to convince us that 

1182
00:47:50,040 --> 00:47:52,096
it's appropriate to sell portions of 

1183
00:47:52,096 --> 00:47:54,040
the spectrum that are vital to our 

1184
00:47:54,040 --> 00:47:55,984
national security . Well , I can't 

1185
00:47:55,984 --> 00:47:58,151
speak positively on that topic , but I 

1186
00:47:58,151 --> 00:47:59,818
would not be surprised if our 

1187
00:47:59,818 --> 00:48:01,873
adversaries were always trying to do 

1188
00:48:01,873 --> 00:48:04,040
something to uh decrease our advantage 

1189
00:48:04,040 --> 00:48:06,151
and uh complicate our decision making 

1190
00:48:06,151 --> 00:48:08,373
and it's something we need to be paying 

1191
00:48:08,373 --> 00:48:08,129
attention to you as , as senior leaders . 

1192
00:48:08,209 --> 00:48:10,699
Thank you , sir . Um I've gone on 

1193
00:48:10,709 --> 00:48:12,931
record many times regarding my concerns 

1194
00:48:12,931 --> 00:48:15,042
about the dod S approach to providing 

1195
00:48:15,042 --> 00:48:16,876
space based ground moving target 

1196
00:48:16,876 --> 00:48:19,500
indication capabilities to dod users 

1197
00:48:19,510 --> 00:48:21,732
following the development of the jstars 

1198
00:48:21,732 --> 00:48:23,550
platform . There's an ongoing 

1199
00:48:23,560 --> 00:48:25,727
conversation within the interagency as 

1200
00:48:25,727 --> 00:48:27,838
to how the funding responsibility and 

1201
00:48:27,838 --> 00:48:30,060
priority of GMT I the ground moving 

1202
00:48:30,070 --> 00:48:32,439
target indication capabilities will be 

1203
00:48:32,449 --> 00:48:35,199
handled and I'm not confident , I am 

1204
00:48:35,209 --> 00:48:37,530
not confident the war fighters will get 

1205
00:48:37,540 --> 00:48:39,909
this vital capability that they need to 

1206
00:48:39,919 --> 00:48:42,370
close the kill chain in the future . As 

1207
00:48:42,379 --> 00:48:44,490
chairman , will you use your position 

1208
00:48:44,490 --> 00:48:46,657
to make certain that our men and women 

1209
00:48:46,659 --> 00:48:49,419
on the front lines have full and 

1210
00:48:49,429 --> 00:48:51,360
priority use of the platforms 

1211
00:48:51,370 --> 00:48:54,659
conducting GMT I missions in the future ? 

1212
00:48:55,139 --> 00:48:57,760
Uh Soon I will thank you , sir , 

1213
00:48:58,580 --> 00:49:00,524
General . This is something that I 

1214
00:49:00,524 --> 00:49:02,636
never thought I would be sitting here 

1215
00:49:02,636 --> 00:49:02,510
in the United States Senate asking 

1216
00:49:02,520 --> 00:49:04,790
questions about and yet it's one that 

1217
00:49:04,800 --> 00:49:07,022
has been brought to my attention by our 

1218
00:49:07,022 --> 00:49:09,889
South Dakota Adn General General Brown . 

1219
00:49:09,899 --> 00:49:12,066
You will take the seat in the midst of 

1220
00:49:12,066 --> 00:49:14,121
the largest recruiting crisis in the 

1221
00:49:14,121 --> 00:49:16,780
history of DOD S 50 year all volunteer 

1222
00:49:16,790 --> 00:49:19,260
force . While the service has struggled 

1223
00:49:19,270 --> 00:49:21,500
to meet recruiting numbers , there has 

1224
00:49:21,510 --> 00:49:24,040
been an increased emphasis on immutable 

1225
00:49:24,050 --> 00:49:27,879
characteristics like race and and the 

1226
00:49:27,889 --> 00:49:30,709
department has increasingly focused on 

1227
00:49:30,719 --> 00:49:33,429
new policies and plans in areas like 

1228
00:49:33,439 --> 00:49:37,370
equity , extremism , gender ideology , 

1229
00:49:37,379 --> 00:49:41,139
abortion and change operations . There 

1230
00:49:41,149 --> 00:49:43,209
is even a growing bureaucracy that 

1231
00:49:43,219 --> 00:49:47,120
focuses on these specific issues . I'm 

1232
00:49:47,129 --> 00:49:49,073
aware of a situation that was just 

1233
00:49:49,073 --> 00:49:51,185
brought to my attention where a young 

1234
00:49:51,185 --> 00:49:53,129
woman in the South Dakota National 

1235
00:49:53,129 --> 00:49:55,296
Guard experienced a situation at basic 

1236
00:49:55,296 --> 00:49:57,629
training where she was sleeping in open 

1237
00:49:57,639 --> 00:50:01,330
bay and showering with biological males 

1238
00:50:01,340 --> 00:50:03,570
who had not had gender reassignment 

1239
00:50:03,580 --> 00:50:07,169
surgery but were documented as females 

1240
00:50:07,179 --> 00:50:09,401
because they had begun the drug therapy 

1241
00:50:09,401 --> 00:50:13,250
process . This 18 year old girl was 

1242
00:50:13,260 --> 00:50:15,989
uncomfortable with her situation but 

1243
00:50:16,000 --> 00:50:18,222
had limited options on how to deal with 

1244
00:50:18,222 --> 00:50:21,979
it . If she raised her hand , she 

1245
00:50:21,989 --> 00:50:23,600
feared she'd be targeted for 

1246
00:50:23,600 --> 00:50:26,310
retaliation . She could have recycled , 

1247
00:50:26,320 --> 00:50:28,431
which would have delayed her freshman 

1248
00:50:28,431 --> 00:50:30,264
college start and would not have 

1249
00:50:30,264 --> 00:50:32,264
provided a guarantee of a different 

1250
00:50:32,264 --> 00:50:34,399
situation . She could request uh to 

1251
00:50:34,409 --> 00:50:36,580
leave the guard for religious purposes 

1252
00:50:36,699 --> 00:50:39,209
and not be able to pursue her dream of 

1253
00:50:39,219 --> 00:50:41,989
serving our country . General Brown , 

1254
00:50:42,040 --> 00:50:45,899
this is a challenging situation if 

1255
00:50:45,909 --> 00:50:48,879
confirmed as the chairman . How do you 

1256
00:50:48,889 --> 00:50:51,167
propose to handle situations like this , 

1257
00:50:51,167 --> 00:50:54,010
which I truly believe may be impacting 

1258
00:50:54,020 --> 00:50:56,850
recruitment and morale by placing a 

1259
00:50:56,860 --> 00:50:59,810
disproportionate emphasis on gender 

1260
00:50:59,820 --> 00:51:03,439
related ideology . Senator , one of the 

1261
00:51:03,449 --> 00:51:05,338
things I've I've thought about in 

1262
00:51:05,338 --> 00:51:07,399
throughout my career as you're being 

1263
00:51:07,409 --> 00:51:09,520
inclusive , you also don't wanna make 

1264
00:51:09,520 --> 00:51:11,631
other individuals uncomfortable . And 

1265
00:51:11,631 --> 00:51:13,742
so there's areas of as we look at our 

1266
00:51:13,742 --> 00:51:15,520
policies and approaches and get 

1267
00:51:15,520 --> 00:51:17,576
feedback like this . We , we have to 

1268
00:51:17,576 --> 00:51:19,798
take a look to see if we can improve on 

1269
00:51:19,798 --> 00:51:21,853
our uh how we uh approach situations 

1270
00:51:21,853 --> 00:51:24,050
like this . And as I've done as the 

1271
00:51:24,060 --> 00:51:26,171
service chief as I've done throughout 

1272
00:51:26,171 --> 00:51:28,060
my career , if confirmed , I will 

1273
00:51:28,060 --> 00:51:30,171
continue to do so . Thank you , sir . 

1274
00:51:30,171 --> 00:51:32,282
Thank you , Mr Chairman . Thank you . 

1275
00:51:32,282 --> 00:51:34,171
Round uh Senator Kaine , please . 

1276
00:51:34,429 --> 00:51:36,485
General , congratulations to you and 

1277
00:51:36,485 --> 00:51:38,707
your family for the nomination . You're 

1278
00:51:38,707 --> 00:51:40,873
eminently qualified for the position . 

1279
00:51:40,873 --> 00:51:43,280
Um Just situational awareness . Uh two 

1280
00:51:43,290 --> 00:51:45,520
events happened yesterday that really 

1281
00:51:45,530 --> 00:51:48,000
bear upon the nation's military mission . 

1282
00:51:48,340 --> 00:51:51,270
One very positive one negative . Uh the 

1283
00:51:51,280 --> 00:51:53,113
positive event yesterday was the 

1284
00:51:53,113 --> 00:51:55,419
announcement uh by the Biden 

1285
00:51:55,429 --> 00:51:57,485
administration working together with 

1286
00:51:57,485 --> 00:51:59,429
the NATO Secretary General and the 

1287
00:51:59,429 --> 00:52:01,540
governments of Sweden and Turkey that 

1288
00:52:01,540 --> 00:52:03,719
Turkey would uh support accession of 

1289
00:52:03,729 --> 00:52:05,850
Sweden to NATO . It was followed up 

1290
00:52:05,860 --> 00:52:07,860
immediately by an announcement from 

1291
00:52:07,860 --> 00:52:09,916
Hungary that they would also support 

1292
00:52:09,916 --> 00:52:13,409
accession of Sweden to NATO with just 

1293
00:52:13,419 --> 00:52:15,419
in the last few years , people were 

1294
00:52:15,419 --> 00:52:17,475
questioning whether NATO had value , 

1295
00:52:17,475 --> 00:52:19,752
whether the US should continue in NATO . 

1296
00:52:20,149 --> 00:52:22,639
Um We have demonstrated through 

1297
00:52:22,649 --> 00:52:25,989
American leadership , the strength of 

1298
00:52:26,000 --> 00:52:28,459
alliances that democracies in the world 

1299
00:52:28,469 --> 00:52:31,139
can link arms . And when we do uh our 

1300
00:52:31,149 --> 00:52:34,389
alliances enable us to defend Ukraine 

1301
00:52:34,399 --> 00:52:36,455
and promote democracy throughout the 

1302
00:52:36,455 --> 00:52:38,566
world . And I think it's important to 

1303
00:52:38,566 --> 00:52:41,379
recognize that the US and the cause of 

1304
00:52:41,389 --> 00:52:43,580
global democracy is stronger today 

1305
00:52:43,929 --> 00:52:46,659
because of this decision announced 

1306
00:52:46,669 --> 00:52:48,613
yesterday that Sweden would now be 

1307
00:52:48,613 --> 00:52:52,129
green lit for NATO membership . The bad 

1308
00:52:52,139 --> 00:52:54,250
event that happened yesterday was the 

1309
00:52:54,250 --> 00:52:56,540
retirement of General David Berger . It 

1310
00:52:56,550 --> 00:52:58,717
was not bad that he retired . He had a 

1311
00:52:58,717 --> 00:53:00,939
distinguished career and served very as 

1312
00:53:00,939 --> 00:53:02,994
we all know . But for the first time 

1313
00:53:02,994 --> 00:53:05,106
after that retirement , uh in 100 and 

1314
00:53:05,106 --> 00:53:07,106
64 years , the United States Marine 

1315
00:53:07,106 --> 00:53:09,919
Corps does not have a commandant 

1316
00:53:09,929 --> 00:53:12,040
confirmed by the Senate of the United 

1317
00:53:12,040 --> 00:53:14,649
States . I'm the father of a United 

1318
00:53:14,659 --> 00:53:17,860
States Marine . I'm unaware of anything 

1319
00:53:17,870 --> 00:53:20,830
that the Marines have done that would 

1320
00:53:20,840 --> 00:53:22,896
warrant being punished in this way . 

1321
00:53:23,520 --> 00:53:25,770
I'm unaware of anything that the 

1322
00:53:25,780 --> 00:53:27,969
Marines have done that would warrant 

1323
00:53:27,979 --> 00:53:31,750
being disrespected in this way , having 

1324
00:53:31,760 --> 00:53:33,989
their leadership hobbled in this way . 

1325
00:53:34,679 --> 00:53:37,219
One of my colleagues is exercising a 

1326
00:53:37,229 --> 00:53:40,830
prerogative to place a hold on 250 

1327
00:53:41,000 --> 00:53:43,419
generals and flag officers . I'm 

1328
00:53:43,429 --> 00:53:45,651
unaware of anything that they have done 

1329
00:53:45,949 --> 00:53:47,616
that would warrant them being 

1330
00:53:47,616 --> 00:53:50,860
disrespected or punished or delayed in 

1331
00:53:50,870 --> 00:53:51,949
their careers 

1332
00:53:54,570 --> 00:53:56,459
just because a prerogative can be 

1333
00:53:56,459 --> 00:53:58,719
exercised doesn't mean that it should 

1334
00:53:58,729 --> 00:54:02,659
be exercised . We marked up the 

1335
00:54:02,669 --> 00:54:04,669
National Defense Authorizing Act in 

1336
00:54:04,669 --> 00:54:06,613
this committee two weeks ago . And 

1337
00:54:06,613 --> 00:54:08,836
there were some things that I wanted in 

1338
00:54:08,836 --> 00:54:10,947
the act that I did not get in . I was 

1339
00:54:10,947 --> 00:54:13,058
disappointed . There were some things 

1340
00:54:13,058 --> 00:54:14,891
that got added to the act that I 

1341
00:54:14,891 --> 00:54:17,750
opposed . I was disappointed , but I'm 

1342
00:54:17,760 --> 00:54:20,320
not taking my disappointment out on 

1343
00:54:20,330 --> 00:54:22,552
people who have volunteered to wear the 

1344
00:54:22,552 --> 00:54:24,663
uniform of this country and even risk 

1345
00:54:24,663 --> 00:54:28,489
their lives in doing . So , I would 

1346
00:54:28,500 --> 00:54:31,770
urge all of my colleagues to turn away 

1347
00:54:32,510 --> 00:54:34,649
from the path that we're on where we 

1348
00:54:34,659 --> 00:54:37,860
are disrespecting and punishing people 

1349
00:54:38,679 --> 00:54:41,010
because we're unhappy with policies in 

1350
00:54:41,020 --> 00:54:43,379
the military that these individuals had 

1351
00:54:43,389 --> 00:54:47,320
nothing to do with . If I'm not able 

1352
00:54:47,330 --> 00:54:49,052
to convince my colleagues in a 

1353
00:54:49,052 --> 00:54:51,219
committee of a position that's on me , 

1354
00:54:52,120 --> 00:54:54,120
I'll have to try to do a better job 

1355
00:54:54,120 --> 00:54:56,120
next time and maybe try to convince 

1356
00:54:56,120 --> 00:54:58,287
more to support the position that I've 

1357
00:54:58,287 --> 00:55:01,010
taken . But if I'm unable to do that , 

1358
00:55:02,850 --> 00:55:06,639
I would never even contemplate taking 

1359
00:55:06,649 --> 00:55:09,100
out my disappointment and punishing 

1360
00:55:09,110 --> 00:55:11,332
people who have volunteered to wear the 

1361
00:55:11,790 --> 00:55:15,250
uniform of this country . People who 

1362
00:55:15,260 --> 00:55:17,482
volunteered to serve in the military do 

1363
00:55:17,482 --> 00:55:19,704
so knowing that their lives could be at 

1364
00:55:19,704 --> 00:55:23,580
risk . But if they think not only 

1365
00:55:23,659 --> 00:55:26,159
will my life be at risk , but do I want 

1366
00:55:26,169 --> 00:55:29,000
to run the risk that a member of the 

1367
00:55:29,010 --> 00:55:31,177
Senate being unhappy with the policy ? 

1368
00:55:31,177 --> 00:55:33,300
I had nothing to do with , may choose 

1369
00:55:33,479 --> 00:55:36,300
to block my career . That might be a 

1370
00:55:36,310 --> 00:55:39,179
risk that people might choose not to 

1371
00:55:39,189 --> 00:55:41,580
undertake . That might be the kind of 

1372
00:55:41,590 --> 00:55:43,812
thing that might make them decide if my 

1373
00:55:44,919 --> 00:55:47,649
article one branch is not gonna respect 

1374
00:55:47,659 --> 00:55:49,603
the service that I have given this 

1375
00:55:49,603 --> 00:55:51,889
country including deployments overseas . 

1376
00:55:52,129 --> 00:55:54,449
Maybe I should look for a line of work 

1377
00:55:54,459 --> 00:55:58,370
where I will be respected . General 

1378
00:55:58,379 --> 00:56:00,323
Brown , I wanna ask you a question 

1379
00:56:00,323 --> 00:56:02,435
about a um I think this committee and 

1380
00:56:02,435 --> 00:56:04,490
other committees have been following 

1381
00:56:04,490 --> 00:56:06,546
the Aus Agreement very closely . I'm 

1382
00:56:06,546 --> 00:56:08,435
particularly focused on it as the 

1383
00:56:08,435 --> 00:56:10,712
chairman of the sea power subcommittee . 

1384
00:56:10,712 --> 00:56:12,768
And also because some of the work on 

1385
00:56:12,768 --> 00:56:14,935
the Virginia class submarines that are 

1386
00:56:14,935 --> 00:56:16,879
part of pillar one will be done in 

1387
00:56:16,879 --> 00:56:19,101
Virginia , much of the focus on a right 

1388
00:56:19,101 --> 00:56:21,212
now is about pillar one , the ability 

1389
00:56:21,212 --> 00:56:23,323
to transfer Virginia class submarines 

1390
00:56:23,323 --> 00:56:25,435
and related technology to Australia . 

1391
00:56:25,435 --> 00:56:27,212
Pillar two refers to a suite of 

1392
00:56:27,212 --> 00:56:29,540
cooperative activities in areas such as 

1393
00:56:29,850 --> 00:56:32,250
advanced capabilities . Quantum A I 

1394
00:56:32,260 --> 00:56:35,520
cyber hypersonic , if confirmed . What 

1395
00:56:35,530 --> 00:56:37,929
role do you see for yourself in 

1396
00:56:37,939 --> 00:56:40,280
advancing integrated defense in uh 

1397
00:56:40,290 --> 00:56:42,919
integrated deterrence initiatives in 

1398
00:56:42,929 --> 00:56:45,879
the Indo Pacific such as August Senator . 

1399
00:56:46,429 --> 00:56:48,485
What the thing I do think about when 

1400
00:56:48,485 --> 00:56:50,596
you look at a , as you thought it was 

1401
00:56:50,596 --> 00:56:52,429
more of the uh the nuclear power 

1402
00:56:52,429 --> 00:56:54,262
submarines , but all these other 

1403
00:56:54,262 --> 00:56:56,373
factors that we can bring together to 

1404
00:56:56,373 --> 00:56:56,129
break down barriers to work with allies 

1405
00:56:56,139 --> 00:56:58,629
and partners , not just with Australia 

1406
00:56:58,639 --> 00:57:00,695
and the UK in this case , but really 

1407
00:57:00,695 --> 00:57:03,229
across the Indo Pacific . Uh one of the 

1408
00:57:03,239 --> 00:57:05,461
benefits that I've had is having served 

1409
00:57:05,461 --> 00:57:07,628
as the Commander of Pacific Air Forces 

1410
00:57:07,628 --> 00:57:09,939
is the number of air Chiefs and Chief 

1411
00:57:09,949 --> 00:57:11,860
of Defense . And in some cases , 

1412
00:57:11,870 --> 00:57:14,037
Ministers of Defense that I I've known 

1413
00:57:14,037 --> 00:57:16,203
personally had a chance to engage with 

1414
00:57:16,203 --> 00:57:17,981
that dialogue . To me is hugely 

1415
00:57:17,981 --> 00:57:20,148
important to determine how best we can 

1416
00:57:20,148 --> 00:57:22,203
move forward and break down barriers 

1417
00:57:22,203 --> 00:57:24,203
and identify areas that we can work 

1418
00:57:24,203 --> 00:57:26,370
together on as a , not as a military , 

1419
00:57:26,370 --> 00:57:28,259
not only as a military , but also 

1420
00:57:28,259 --> 00:57:30,148
between our nations as well . And 

1421
00:57:30,148 --> 00:57:32,148
that's where my focus will be is to 

1422
00:57:32,148 --> 00:57:34,314
continue that dialogue to ensure we uh 

1423
00:57:34,314 --> 00:57:36,537
we can work together and then highlight 

1424
00:57:36,537 --> 00:57:38,648
some uh some where the challenges may 

1425
00:57:38,648 --> 00:57:40,426
be and then work with the right 

1426
00:57:40,426 --> 00:57:42,537
entities to be able to move forward , 

1427
00:57:42,537 --> 00:57:44,648
to ensure that we are able to win the 

1428
00:57:44,648 --> 00:57:46,759
next war of called upon to do so . Uh 

1429
00:57:46,759 --> 00:57:48,926
But definitely deter us to avoid war . 

1430
00:57:48,926 --> 00:57:50,981
I thank you for that answer . I yell 

1431
00:57:50,981 --> 00:57:52,981
back Mr Chair . Thank you , Senator 

1432
00:57:52,981 --> 00:57:55,148
Kaine , Senator Ernst , please . Thank 

1433
00:57:55,148 --> 00:57:57,203
you Mr Chair and thank you very much 

1434
00:57:57,203 --> 00:57:59,259
General Brown for being here today . 

1435
00:57:59,259 --> 00:57:59,090
And I wanna thank your wife Shereen as 

1436
00:57:59,100 --> 00:58:01,100
well for being here . We appreciate 

1437
00:58:01,100 --> 00:58:03,267
your , your support through the many , 

1438
00:58:03,267 --> 00:58:05,433
many years . Um General Brown , you've 

1439
00:58:05,433 --> 00:58:07,433
had a very distinguished career and 

1440
00:58:07,433 --> 00:58:09,433
have held many commands and , and I 

1441
00:58:09,433 --> 00:58:11,600
want to distinguish uh between some of 

1442
00:58:11,600 --> 00:58:13,822
my colleagues . Um I know the burden of 

1443
00:58:13,822 --> 00:58:16,955
command was uh referenced , but I would 

1444
00:58:16,965 --> 00:58:18,965
state having served as a low level 

1445
00:58:18,975 --> 00:58:21,135
commander in , in our armed services 

1446
00:58:21,145 --> 00:58:22,935
that it's not a burden to be a 

1447
00:58:22,945 --> 00:58:25,294
commander . It is a great honor and 

1448
00:58:25,304 --> 00:58:27,526
distinction . And I wanna thank you for 

1449
00:58:27,526 --> 00:58:30,754
your , your service to our country . Um 

1450
00:58:30,764 --> 00:58:32,614
You are moving into a different 

1451
00:58:32,625 --> 00:58:35,385
position , I'll assume uh your 

1452
00:58:35,395 --> 00:58:37,274
confirmation and I support your 

1453
00:58:37,284 --> 00:58:39,506
confirmation . I think you're the right 

1454
00:58:39,506 --> 00:58:41,570
person at the right time . Um If 

1455
00:58:41,580 --> 00:58:43,979
confirmed , you will be chairman at a 

1456
00:58:43,989 --> 00:58:45,989
time when threats to the nation are 

1457
00:58:45,989 --> 00:58:48,530
mounting while our resources are 

1458
00:58:48,540 --> 00:58:50,909
actually shrinking , we will be 

1459
00:58:50,919 --> 00:58:52,919
operating our Department of Defense 

1460
00:58:52,919 --> 00:58:55,290
under a constrained environment and 

1461
00:58:55,300 --> 00:58:57,356
under those constrained budgets , we 

1462
00:58:57,356 --> 00:58:59,578
have to put our defense dollars towards 

1463
00:58:59,578 --> 00:59:03,330
smarter investments . And you uh as a 

1464
00:59:03,340 --> 00:59:06,030
Chief of , of the Air Force have uh 

1465
00:59:06,040 --> 00:59:09,879
focused on modernizing our Air 

1466
00:59:09,889 --> 00:59:12,830
Force . I assume that you will continue 

1467
00:59:12,840 --> 00:59:15,419
the modernization process through the 

1468
00:59:15,429 --> 00:59:17,959
rest of our service branches . So 

1469
00:59:17,969 --> 00:59:20,614
general , um you'll inform investments 

1470
00:59:20,625 --> 00:59:22,864
across what we talked about the iron 

1471
00:59:22,875 --> 00:59:25,965
triangle of modernization for 

1472
00:59:25,975 --> 00:59:29,745
structure and readiness . And so I am 

1473
00:59:29,754 --> 00:59:31,754
assuming there will have to be hard 

1474
00:59:31,754 --> 00:59:35,205
choices made and some trade offs . So , 

1475
00:59:35,215 --> 00:59:37,324
if you could , um could you talk a 

1476
00:59:37,334 --> 00:59:39,425
little bit about your vision of 

1477
00:59:39,435 --> 00:59:43,324
modernizing our force ? Senator ? I 

1478
00:59:43,334 --> 00:59:45,939
appreciate the question and uh to your 

1479
00:59:45,949 --> 00:59:48,060
question , I've done kind of the same 

1480
00:59:48,060 --> 00:59:50,227
thing as a service chief . Um And if , 

1481
00:59:50,227 --> 00:59:52,227
if confirmed as a chairman , I will 

1482
00:59:52,227 --> 00:59:54,282
take that same approach . I've often 

1483
00:59:54,282 --> 00:59:56,282
talked about how we have to balance 

1484
00:59:56,282 --> 00:59:58,393
risk over time and look at capability 

1485
00:59:58,393 --> 01:00:00,560
and capacity and because we can't just 

1486
01:00:00,560 --> 01:00:02,782
try to modernize completely at the risk 

1487
01:00:02,782 --> 01:00:04,782
of today's operations . At the same 

1488
01:00:04,782 --> 01:00:07,270
time , we can't maintain all capability 

1489
01:00:07,280 --> 01:00:09,502
for today's operations and not have the 

1490
01:00:09,502 --> 01:00:11,669
capabilities because of the threats we 

1491
01:00:11,669 --> 01:00:14,030
see forthcoming . And so between that 

1492
01:00:14,040 --> 01:00:16,262
as you look at Iron Triangle , it's the 

1493
01:00:16,262 --> 01:00:18,429
balance between those . And I really , 

1494
01:00:18,429 --> 01:00:20,651
again , really believe on analysis that 

1495
01:00:20,651 --> 01:00:22,818
we have to do . We can , we can work a 

1496
01:00:22,818 --> 01:00:24,984
motion but emotion doesn't work . It's 

1497
01:00:24,984 --> 01:00:27,151
really the analysis that we have to go 

1498
01:00:27,151 --> 01:00:29,318
through to be able to determine how we 

1499
01:00:29,318 --> 01:00:31,373
make those tough calls . And then we 

1500
01:00:31,373 --> 01:00:33,207
have a responsibility . I have a 

1501
01:00:33,207 --> 01:00:33,169
responsibility to confirm as chairman 

1502
01:00:33,179 --> 01:00:35,290
to articulate what that risk might be 

1503
01:00:35,290 --> 01:00:37,457
for whatever choice we make . And then 

1504
01:00:37,457 --> 01:00:39,568
we've determined as a nation , how we 

1505
01:00:39,568 --> 01:00:41,568
accept that risk or how we mitigate 

1506
01:00:41,568 --> 01:00:43,512
that risk . And uh again , this is 

1507
01:00:43,512 --> 01:00:45,679
where I think allies and partners play 

1508
01:00:45,679 --> 01:00:47,790
a key role in , in , in some of these 

1509
01:00:47,790 --> 01:00:50,012
areas and how we ensure and think about 

1510
01:00:50,012 --> 01:00:51,901
all the capabilities that we have 

1511
01:00:51,901 --> 01:00:53,957
available and , and how we might use 

1512
01:00:53,957 --> 01:00:56,012
those to uh best make the , make the 

1513
01:00:56,012 --> 01:00:55,750
best decisions based on the resources 

1514
01:00:55,760 --> 01:00:57,982
that are provided . No , thank you . Um 

1515
01:00:57,982 --> 01:01:00,204
I , I was going to ask about that about 

1516
01:01:00,204 --> 01:01:02,260
mitigating the risk and , and you're 

1517
01:01:02,260 --> 01:01:04,038
talking about that using allies 

1518
01:01:04,038 --> 01:01:06,479
partners um but uh spreading out the 

1519
01:01:06,489 --> 01:01:09,879
risk over time . So I do appreciate 

1520
01:01:09,889 --> 01:01:12,780
that . Um During the office call , you 

1521
01:01:12,790 --> 01:01:15,280
also mentioned the constant demand 

1522
01:01:15,290 --> 01:01:17,401
signal that we've got from our global 

1523
01:01:17,401 --> 01:01:20,139
combatant commanders . And how would 

1524
01:01:20,149 --> 01:01:22,260
you strike that right balance between 

1525
01:01:22,260 --> 01:01:24,239
our near term readiness and those 

1526
01:01:24,250 --> 01:01:28,030
future modernizations um including and 

1527
01:01:28,040 --> 01:01:30,419
accepting prudent risk ? Well , I've 

1528
01:01:30,429 --> 01:01:32,429
looked on both sides of the coin um 

1529
01:01:32,429 --> 01:01:34,651
serving as a deputy commander in United 

1530
01:01:34,651 --> 01:01:36,873
States Central Command , but , but then 

1531
01:01:36,873 --> 01:01:36,739
also as a service chief and , and the 

1532
01:01:36,750 --> 01:01:38,917
way I , I've always thought about this 

1533
01:01:38,917 --> 01:01:40,972
is is we got to put all of the cards 

1534
01:01:40,972 --> 01:01:43,028
and all the details on the table and 

1535
01:01:43,028 --> 01:01:45,250
then have uh a conversation that is not 

1536
01:01:45,250 --> 01:01:47,139
tied to a particular position and 

1537
01:01:47,139 --> 01:01:49,361
figure out what's best to do um for the 

1538
01:01:49,361 --> 01:01:51,583
joint force , what's best to do for all 

1539
01:01:51,583 --> 01:01:53,750
the combatant commands because there's 

1540
01:01:53,750 --> 01:01:53,649
gonna be some give and take as we do 

1541
01:01:53,659 --> 01:01:56,129
this . Um And , and that's the , where 

1542
01:01:56,139 --> 01:01:58,472
those dialogue to me are very important . 

1543
01:01:58,472 --> 01:02:01,739
Um And it's really about dialogue . Uh 

1544
01:02:01,750 --> 01:02:03,972
There's many things we can agree on and 

1545
01:02:03,972 --> 01:02:06,139
those are the things we need to report 

1546
01:02:06,139 --> 01:02:08,306
on and continue to debate , the things 

1547
01:02:08,306 --> 01:02:07,310
that we don't necessarily see , eye to 

1548
01:02:07,320 --> 01:02:09,431
eye on . But at some point , you have 

1549
01:02:09,431 --> 01:02:11,598
to make a decision . And I think uh my 

1550
01:02:11,598 --> 01:02:13,542
role as the uh if confirmed as the 

1551
01:02:13,542 --> 01:02:15,860
chairman is to provide my best advice 

1552
01:02:15,870 --> 01:02:17,870
to the Secretary of Defense and the 

1553
01:02:17,870 --> 01:02:19,981
president on what , how we make those 

1554
01:02:19,981 --> 01:02:22,148
decisions and again articulate where I 

1555
01:02:22,148 --> 01:02:24,314
see the risk of uh you know , whatever 

1556
01:02:24,314 --> 01:02:26,537
decision or whatever path or options we 

1557
01:02:26,537 --> 01:02:28,203
we do lay out . Thank you . I 

1558
01:02:28,203 --> 01:02:30,426
appreciate it . And in just my last few 

1559
01:02:30,426 --> 01:02:32,648
moments , um I do want to talk about my 

1560
01:02:32,648 --> 01:02:34,750
concern that the military is being 

1561
01:02:34,760 --> 01:02:38,270
dragged into politics . And if 

1562
01:02:38,280 --> 01:02:40,224
confirmed , how would you keep the 

1563
01:02:40,224 --> 01:02:42,459
military out of the political limelight 

1564
01:02:42,469 --> 01:02:46,209
and focused on the mission of our 

1565
01:02:46,219 --> 01:02:48,163
Department of Defense ? Well , the 

1566
01:02:48,163 --> 01:02:50,052
first thing I do is set a perfect 

1567
01:02:50,052 --> 01:02:52,275
personal example um that I would stay a 

1568
01:02:52,275 --> 01:02:54,163
nonpartisan nonpolitical in how I 

1569
01:02:54,163 --> 01:02:55,941
approach uh uh the position the 

1570
01:02:55,941 --> 01:02:57,941
chairman have confirmed . And I set 

1571
01:02:57,941 --> 01:02:59,997
that same expectation throughout the 

1572
01:02:59,997 --> 01:03:01,886
force that we need to stay out of 

1573
01:03:01,886 --> 01:03:03,552
politics and stay nonpartisan 

1574
01:03:03,552 --> 01:03:05,552
nonpolitical . And at the same time 

1575
01:03:05,552 --> 01:03:07,729
advocate that our civilians leadership 

1576
01:03:07,739 --> 01:03:10,379
does not bring us in , into political 

1577
01:03:10,389 --> 01:03:12,760
situations . Um Part of that is the 

1578
01:03:12,770 --> 01:03:14,826
dialogue that we have to have and we 

1579
01:03:14,826 --> 01:03:16,992
have to maintain a standard as part of 

1580
01:03:16,992 --> 01:03:19,214
the force and that's what's expected of 

1581
01:03:19,214 --> 01:03:22,090
the nation for us as military members 

1582
01:03:22,250 --> 01:03:24,194
to support the Constitution of the 

1583
01:03:24,194 --> 01:03:26,306
United States and , and stay out of , 

1584
01:03:26,699 --> 01:03:28,921
out of politics . Thank you very much , 

1585
01:03:28,921 --> 01:03:31,199
sir . I look forward to supporting you . 

1586
01:03:31,199 --> 01:03:33,199
Thank you . Thank you . Thank you , 

1587
01:03:33,199 --> 01:03:35,143
Senator Senator Manchin , please . 

1588
01:03:35,143 --> 01:03:37,143
Thank you , Mr Chairman and General 

1589
01:03:37,143 --> 01:03:36,669
Brown . First of all , let me thank you 

1590
01:03:36,679 --> 01:03:39,012
for your service . I want to thank your , 

1591
01:03:39,012 --> 01:03:41,068
your wife and your Children and your 

1592
01:03:41,068 --> 01:03:43,290
family for their service and supporting 

1593
01:03:43,290 --> 01:03:45,457
you for your service . It's a , it's a 

1594
01:03:45,457 --> 01:03:47,512
team effort . I know that um we , we 

1595
01:03:47,512 --> 01:03:49,679
had a nice conversation . I appreciate 

1596
01:03:49,679 --> 01:03:51,735
that very much and I'm gonna ask the 

1597
01:03:51,735 --> 01:03:53,901
question , follow up on this on the um 

1598
01:03:53,901 --> 01:03:55,846
uh the financial stability of what 

1599
01:03:55,846 --> 01:03:58,068
we're dealing with uh and the demand in 

1600
01:03:58,068 --> 01:04:00,235
the , in the department of Defense and 

1601
01:04:00,235 --> 01:04:02,457
defending our country . The bottom line 

1602
01:04:02,457 --> 01:04:04,512
is we've been talking about if we do 

1603
01:04:04,512 --> 01:04:07,439
our job on time and we , as Congress 

1604
01:04:07,449 --> 01:04:09,820
get our budget done by September 30th . 

1605
01:04:10,000 --> 01:04:12,179
What does that mean to you all as far 

1606
01:04:12,189 --> 01:04:15,500
as in having that uh on timeliness as 

1607
01:04:15,510 --> 01:04:17,590
far as financial to you , how much 

1608
01:04:17,600 --> 01:04:19,767
money would that save you by not going 

1609
01:04:19,767 --> 01:04:21,878
into the continuing resolutions or an 

1610
01:04:21,878 --> 01:04:23,989
omnibus bill and how we've been doing 

1611
01:04:23,989 --> 01:04:26,429
it for far too long . I , I don't have 

1612
01:04:26,439 --> 01:04:28,661
a figure . I have to come back to you , 

1613
01:04:28,661 --> 01:04:30,883
uh uh senator with a , with a figure um 

1614
01:04:30,883 --> 01:04:33,050
but we can get that for you . But what 

1615
01:04:33,050 --> 01:04:35,050
I can tell you is the , uh it's the 

1616
01:04:35,050 --> 01:04:37,161
aspect of , let me just throw out one 

1617
01:04:37,161 --> 01:04:39,161
for you . The American Institute uh 

1618
01:04:39,161 --> 01:04:41,328
Enterprise Institute threw out a rough 

1619
01:04:41,328 --> 01:04:43,439
estimate of 200 million per day under 

1620
01:04:43,439 --> 01:04:45,550
the latest continuing resolution that 

1621
01:04:45,550 --> 01:04:47,495
covered the start of fiscal 2023 . 

1622
01:04:47,495 --> 01:04:49,550
That's a total of $18 billion . Just 

1623
01:04:49,550 --> 01:04:51,772
that I've been told by retired generals 

1624
01:04:51,772 --> 01:04:53,828
who weren't on the spot . You know , 

1625
01:04:53,828 --> 01:04:55,772
that basically have said that they 

1626
01:04:55,772 --> 01:04:59,659
could save overall 5% minimum of 5% uh 

1627
01:04:59,669 --> 01:05:02,850
and 5% across the board of $880 billion . 

1628
01:05:02,860 --> 01:05:04,804
That's 44 billion . And we've been 

1629
01:05:04,804 --> 01:05:06,916
talking about more appropriated funds 

1630
01:05:06,916 --> 01:05:08,582
for our military with all the 

1631
01:05:08,582 --> 01:05:10,969
challenges we have . This , the money 

1632
01:05:10,979 --> 01:05:13,189
is right there , the spending power of 

1633
01:05:13,199 --> 01:05:15,389
us doing our job and we're gonna need 

1634
01:05:15,399 --> 01:05:17,510
someone like you who's gonna take the 

1635
01:05:17,510 --> 01:05:19,732
financial concerns and basically let us 

1636
01:05:19,732 --> 01:05:21,843
know how we should be able to help by 

1637
01:05:21,843 --> 01:05:23,955
just doing our job too . We asked you 

1638
01:05:23,955 --> 01:05:27,110
to do yours , Senator , I'd agree . And 

1639
01:05:27,120 --> 01:05:29,342
uh you know , the , the key area that I 

1640
01:05:29,342 --> 01:05:31,509
would highlight that and challenges is 

1641
01:05:31,509 --> 01:05:31,439
we lose buying power . As you describe , 

1642
01:05:31,770 --> 01:05:33,270
at the same time , we lose 

1643
01:05:33,270 --> 01:05:35,326
predictability . Um not only for the 

1644
01:05:35,326 --> 01:05:37,492
force but also for our industrial base 

1645
01:05:37,492 --> 01:05:39,659
to be able to produce the capabilities 

1646
01:05:39,659 --> 01:05:41,770
that are required for our , our joint 

1647
01:05:41,770 --> 01:05:43,770
team . Here's one other fact to the 

1648
01:05:43,770 --> 01:05:45,937
Department of Defense Controller noted 

1649
01:05:45,937 --> 01:05:47,992
that from fiscal year 1991 to 2010 . 

1650
01:05:47,992 --> 01:05:49,659
The average delay for defense 

1651
01:05:49,659 --> 01:05:51,689
appropriations was 29 days . The 

1652
01:05:51,699 --> 01:05:54,419
average , the average delay for the 

1653
01:05:54,429 --> 01:05:56,860
preparations for defense was 29 days . 

1654
01:05:56,870 --> 01:05:58,870
That's a tremendous amount of money 

1655
01:05:58,870 --> 01:06:00,814
over the period of time that we've 

1656
01:06:00,814 --> 01:06:02,759
talked about . I just , I , uh , I 

1657
01:06:02,759 --> 01:06:04,926
would hope that you would work with us 

1658
01:06:04,926 --> 01:06:06,870
in trying to make sure that we are 

1659
01:06:06,870 --> 01:06:08,926
keeping our feet to the fire to make 

1660
01:06:08,926 --> 01:06:11,037
sure you have the resources to do the 

1661
01:06:11,037 --> 01:06:13,148
job that we need you to do . That's , 

1662
01:06:13,148 --> 01:06:15,148
that's my commitment to you . Uh So 

1663
01:06:15,148 --> 01:06:16,926
going to another topic , fiscal 

1664
01:06:16,926 --> 01:06:18,870
responsibility and peg , I've been 

1665
01:06:18,870 --> 01:06:20,648
extremely concerned the lack of 

1666
01:06:20,648 --> 01:06:19,949
progress in the business , 

1667
01:06:19,959 --> 01:06:22,419
modernization , auditing , commercial 

1668
01:06:22,429 --> 01:06:24,096
cost comparison , independent 

1669
01:06:24,096 --> 01:06:26,373
evaluations of programs , how it's run . 

1670
01:06:26,373 --> 01:06:28,485
The Department of Defense is the only 

1671
01:06:28,485 --> 01:06:30,540
department in the federal government 

1672
01:06:30,540 --> 01:06:33,080
that we don't have an audit myself and , 

1673
01:06:33,090 --> 01:06:35,320
and Senator John and late John mccain , 

1674
01:06:35,330 --> 01:06:37,608
our dear friend worked with me on that . 

1675
01:06:37,608 --> 01:06:40,080
We tried our and we got a few of them 

1676
01:06:40,090 --> 01:06:42,201
done , but not many . So if you could 

1677
01:06:42,201 --> 01:06:44,659
commit to getting the department 

1678
01:06:44,669 --> 01:06:46,891
audited and making sure they do it in a 

1679
01:06:46,891 --> 01:06:48,780
timely fashion , it would be very 

1680
01:06:48,780 --> 01:06:50,836
helpful for us to do our job here to 

1681
01:06:50,836 --> 01:06:53,002
make sure that we're appropriating the 

1682
01:06:53,002 --> 01:06:55,002
funds that are needed . I commit to 

1683
01:06:55,002 --> 01:06:57,225
work with you . The other thing is , uh 

1684
01:06:57,225 --> 01:06:59,336
the concerns have been validated year 

1685
01:06:59,336 --> 01:07:01,558
after year with abolishment , the chief 

1686
01:07:01,558 --> 01:07:03,725
management office . They abolished the 

1687
01:07:03,725 --> 01:07:03,479
Chief management officer position 

1688
01:07:03,540 --> 01:07:05,669
within the department in 2020 . And 

1689
01:07:05,679 --> 01:07:07,901
most recently , with the abolishment of 

1690
01:07:07,901 --> 01:07:09,679
the cost assessment and program 

1691
01:07:09,679 --> 01:07:11,790
evaluation , not only do , they don't 

1692
01:07:11,790 --> 01:07:13,957
want to audit , they don't want anyone 

1693
01:07:13,957 --> 01:07:16,123
being held accountable to oversee , to 

1694
01:07:16,123 --> 01:07:17,901
make sure they would audit . So 

1695
01:07:17,901 --> 01:07:20,012
thankfully , I had an amendment NDA A 

1696
01:07:20,012 --> 01:07:21,846
this year to reinstate the Chief 

1697
01:07:21,846 --> 01:07:23,901
Management Officer Officer , the CMO 

1698
01:07:24,050 --> 01:07:26,649
that was adopted into the Senate and to 

1699
01:07:26,659 --> 01:07:28,715
ensure the department has leadership 

1700
01:07:28,715 --> 01:07:30,937
position . So based on your 40 years of 

1701
01:07:30,937 --> 01:07:33,159
military service and your nomination to 

1702
01:07:33,159 --> 01:07:35,215
become the most senior member of our 

1703
01:07:35,215 --> 01:07:37,326
military in the service , uh , do you 

1704
01:07:37,326 --> 01:07:39,492
believe that a confirmed and chartered 

1705
01:07:39,492 --> 01:07:41,659
chief management officer is a position 

1706
01:07:41,659 --> 01:07:43,381
that the department and you if 

1707
01:07:43,381 --> 01:07:45,620
confirmed would benefit from and will 

1708
01:07:45,629 --> 01:07:48,070
basically support Senator II . I agree 

1709
01:07:48,080 --> 01:07:50,360
that , that uh having that position 

1710
01:07:50,370 --> 01:07:52,370
filled or , or someone filling that 

1711
01:07:52,370 --> 01:07:54,314
position to help us go through the 

1712
01:07:54,314 --> 01:07:56,426
audit process like you described , to 

1713
01:07:56,426 --> 01:07:58,648
make sure we're doing our uh aspects of 

1714
01:07:58,648 --> 01:08:00,703
fiscal responsibility is important . 

1715
01:08:00,703 --> 01:08:00,030
The problem we had before . It never 

1716
01:08:00,040 --> 01:08:02,262
had support from the top . And you know 

1717
01:08:02,262 --> 01:08:04,262
yourself , if , if , if the leaders 

1718
01:08:04,262 --> 01:08:06,318
don't support it , it's not going to 

1719
01:08:06,318 --> 01:08:06,239
happen . And that's why they said , 

1720
01:08:06,250 --> 01:08:07,861
well , it was meaning it was 

1721
01:08:07,861 --> 01:08:10,083
meaningless , it wasn't doing the job . 

1722
01:08:10,083 --> 01:08:12,139
They had no charter to do it . There 

1723
01:08:12,139 --> 01:08:14,194
was no direction for them to do it , 

1724
01:08:14,194 --> 01:08:16,417
but I guarantee you it needs to be done 

1725
01:08:16,417 --> 01:08:18,417
and no , no business with there any 

1726
01:08:18,417 --> 01:08:20,472
type of value to it whatsoever would 

1727
01:08:20,472 --> 01:08:22,417
ever operate without an assessment 

1728
01:08:22,417 --> 01:08:24,417
value uh an officer that can do the 

1729
01:08:24,417 --> 01:08:26,589
management the whole process . So it's 

1730
01:08:26,600 --> 01:08:28,878
there . It's coming back for you , sir . 

1731
01:08:28,878 --> 01:08:30,989
So we hope you take advantage of it . 

1732
01:08:31,119 --> 01:08:33,452
Thank you . Thank you , Senator Manchin , 

1733
01:08:33,452 --> 01:08:35,563
Senator Rember , please . Thank you , 

1734
01:08:35,563 --> 01:08:37,897
Mr Chairman . Thank you , General Brown , 

1735
01:08:37,897 --> 01:08:40,119
your entire family . Thank you for your 

1736
01:08:40,119 --> 01:08:41,952
service . Congratulations on the 

1737
01:08:41,952 --> 01:08:44,175
nomination . Let me just follow up with 

1738
01:08:44,175 --> 01:08:46,397
Senator Manchin's point about the chief 

1739
01:08:46,397 --> 01:08:46,389
management officer . I just had to turn 

1740
01:08:46,398 --> 01:08:48,565
around and ask myself , why did we get 

1741
01:08:48,565 --> 01:08:50,620
rid of it again ? I remember when it 

1742
01:08:50,620 --> 01:08:52,842
happened , I , I remember um the person 

1743
01:08:52,842 --> 01:08:54,898
in the position , we did it to quote 

1744
01:08:54,898 --> 01:08:57,065
cut bureaucracy and what we did is cut 

1745
01:08:57,065 --> 01:08:59,342
our throats and I'm with you , Joe . I , 

1746
01:08:59,342 --> 01:09:01,884
I hope we get it back and then we have 

1747
01:09:01,895 --> 01:09:05,544
to , as members insist regardless of 

1748
01:09:05,555 --> 01:09:07,734
who's at the top . Um That , that we 

1749
01:09:07,745 --> 01:09:10,924
have some fiscal responsibility at the , 

1750
01:09:10,935 --> 01:09:14,549
at the department . Thank you for 

1751
01:09:14,560 --> 01:09:16,727
firing me up just before my question , 

1752
01:09:16,727 --> 01:09:18,838
Angel . Um It will not surprise you , 

1753
01:09:18,838 --> 01:09:21,069
General Brown that over my nearly five 

1754
01:09:21,080 --> 01:09:23,136
years on this committee , I've asked 

1755
01:09:23,136 --> 01:09:25,358
almost every single combatant commander 

1756
01:09:25,358 --> 01:09:27,830
if they get enough uh ISR from the air . 

1757
01:09:27,839 --> 01:09:29,895
And it'll also not surprise you that 

1758
01:09:29,895 --> 01:09:31,839
every one of them says , no , no . 

1759
01:09:31,839 --> 01:09:33,728
That's a little bit like asking a 

1760
01:09:33,728 --> 01:09:35,783
billionaire if he has enough money . 

1761
01:09:35,783 --> 01:09:35,290
And you know , the answer is always no , 

1762
01:09:35,299 --> 01:09:37,950
he can always use more . That said , 

1763
01:09:38,430 --> 01:09:40,263
that said , um , you , you had a 

1764
01:09:40,263 --> 01:09:42,479
wonderful discussion in response to , 

1765
01:09:42,490 --> 01:09:44,434
to Chairman Reed's questions about 

1766
01:09:44,434 --> 01:09:46,919
interoperability , the changing role , 

1767
01:09:46,939 --> 01:09:49,660
um as well as with , with Senator Ernst . 

1768
01:09:49,950 --> 01:09:52,600
Um but as Air Force Chief , you know , 

1769
01:09:52,609 --> 01:09:54,720
you , you were making tough calls and 

1770
01:09:54,720 --> 01:09:56,887
asked for some , some cuts to airborne 

1771
01:09:56,887 --> 01:09:59,720
ISR , um sometimes with the , you know , 

1772
01:09:59,729 --> 01:10:01,562
the , the hope or the promise of 

1773
01:10:01,562 --> 01:10:03,118
replacing with , with space 

1774
01:10:03,118 --> 01:10:05,229
capabilities . Um But now in this new 

1775
01:10:05,229 --> 01:10:07,640
role uh that I , I like Senator Ernst , 

1776
01:10:07,649 --> 01:10:09,649
I suspect you , you will soon be uh 

1777
01:10:09,649 --> 01:10:13,049
confirmed . Um How , how do you , how 

1778
01:10:13,060 --> 01:10:15,700
do you plan to , to bridge that gap ? 

1779
01:10:15,709 --> 01:10:17,709
Again , it's , it's a more specific 

1780
01:10:17,709 --> 01:10:19,820
question to the broader question that 

1781
01:10:19,820 --> 01:10:21,820
Joni asked . But um as you , as you 

1782
01:10:21,820 --> 01:10:23,598
view the needs of the combatant 

1783
01:10:23,598 --> 01:10:25,598
commanders as they state versus the 

1784
01:10:25,598 --> 01:10:27,709
needs that the , the services want to 

1785
01:10:27,709 --> 01:10:29,931
provide specifically in this case , the 

1786
01:10:29,931 --> 01:10:32,700
Air Force uh with the eyes in the sky . 

1787
01:10:32,709 --> 01:10:34,876
Ho ho how , how do you see that moving 

1788
01:10:34,876 --> 01:10:37,153
forward in your decision making ? Well , 

1789
01:10:37,153 --> 01:10:39,042
Senator , this has been uh as you 

1790
01:10:39,042 --> 01:10:41,098
highlight , this has been an ongoing 

1791
01:10:41,098 --> 01:10:43,265
debate uh between the services and the 

1792
01:10:43,265 --> 01:10:45,209
combatant commands at large and uh 

1793
01:10:45,209 --> 01:10:47,431
having set as , as a joint chief as the 

1794
01:10:47,431 --> 01:10:49,376
past three years , I , I've really 

1795
01:10:49,376 --> 01:10:49,259
started to think through how we 

1796
01:10:49,270 --> 01:10:53,259
approach this and , and there's aspects 

1797
01:10:53,270 --> 01:10:56,040
of when you look at not just the IRS , 

1798
01:10:56,049 --> 01:10:58,327
what are you trying to get from the IR , 

1799
01:10:58,327 --> 01:11:00,216
it's the information that's being 

1800
01:11:00,216 --> 01:11:02,105
provided from the ISR . And so um 

1801
01:11:02,105 --> 01:11:04,271
there's one aspect of the platform but 

1802
01:11:04,271 --> 01:11:06,382
how you're getting the information uh 

1803
01:11:06,382 --> 01:11:07,993
uh back to command , command 

1804
01:11:07,993 --> 01:11:10,327
headquarters so they can make decisions . 

1805
01:11:10,327 --> 01:11:12,493
And so for me , it's with the stamp of 

1806
01:11:12,493 --> 01:11:14,729
the Space Force and access to space . 

1807
01:11:14,740 --> 01:11:17,049
Space ISR , it's a combination of the 

1808
01:11:17,060 --> 01:11:19,259
two and it's going to drive us to have 

1809
01:11:19,270 --> 01:11:21,381
to change some processes about how we 

1810
01:11:21,381 --> 01:11:23,410
provide information and how then we 

1811
01:11:23,419 --> 01:11:25,759
work with the commands . And this is a 

1812
01:11:25,770 --> 01:11:27,881
conversation that we've been having . 

1813
01:11:27,881 --> 01:11:29,826
Um I've had this conversation with 

1814
01:11:29,826 --> 01:11:29,609
General Salman , the Chief of Space 

1815
01:11:29,620 --> 01:11:31,479
Operations of how we lay out a 

1816
01:11:31,490 --> 01:11:34,359
different approach in some areas to be 

1817
01:11:34,370 --> 01:11:37,089
able to get to all of the information 

1818
01:11:37,100 --> 01:11:39,270
that's available and not just what's 

1819
01:11:39,279 --> 01:11:42,220
reliable on an airplane airborne . I it 

1820
01:11:42,229 --> 01:11:45,850
may not be there 24 7 , 365 and that's 

1821
01:11:45,859 --> 01:11:48,220
where the focus has to be of how do we 

1822
01:11:48,229 --> 01:11:50,340
maybe in some cases , do things a bit 

1823
01:11:50,340 --> 01:11:52,396
differently and provide not only the 

1824
01:11:52,396 --> 01:11:54,451
capability of today but even greater 

1825
01:11:54,451 --> 01:11:56,229
capability uh in the future . I 

1826
01:11:56,229 --> 01:11:59,040
appreciate that . Um I wanna piggy back 

1827
01:11:59,049 --> 01:12:00,771
a little bit on Senator rounds 

1828
01:12:00,771 --> 01:12:02,993
questioning he's become very consistent 

1829
01:12:02,993 --> 01:12:05,216
as I have on , on what matters the most 

1830
01:12:05,216 --> 01:12:07,382
and , and I have great respect for his 

1831
01:12:07,382 --> 01:12:09,605
questions about relief relieving uh the 

1832
01:12:09,605 --> 01:12:11,660
spectrum prior particularly prior to 

1833
01:12:11,660 --> 01:12:13,660
the to the study that you've talked 

1834
01:12:13,660 --> 01:12:16,569
about so without prejudging that study , 

1835
01:12:16,580 --> 01:12:19,899
I I , and , and maybe even piggy back 

1836
01:12:19,910 --> 01:12:22,021
in a little bit on some of the things 

1837
01:12:22,021 --> 01:12:23,910
you said earlier about , um about 

1838
01:12:23,910 --> 01:12:26,188
specifically our defense industry base . 

1839
01:12:26,188 --> 01:12:28,620
But I'm gonna talk more about the , the 

1840
01:12:28,629 --> 01:12:31,399
private sector in general . What we 

1841
01:12:31,410 --> 01:12:33,632
often , I don't , what I think we don't 

1842
01:12:33,632 --> 01:12:35,743
talk about enough on the committee is 

1843
01:12:35,743 --> 01:12:37,513
the role that our , you know , 

1844
01:12:37,522 --> 01:12:38,942
technology companies or 

1845
01:12:38,953 --> 01:12:40,620
telecommunications industry , 

1846
01:12:40,620 --> 01:12:43,303
particularly in five G . Um all 

1847
01:12:43,312 --> 01:12:45,256
important back to , to some of the 

1848
01:12:45,256 --> 01:12:47,201
other discussions we're having and 

1849
01:12:47,201 --> 01:12:49,256
you've been noted to be an innovator 

1850
01:12:49,256 --> 01:12:51,423
and you have been and , and appreciate 

1851
01:12:51,423 --> 01:12:53,645
that . What , what role has the private 

1852
01:12:53,645 --> 01:12:55,868
sector played in the advancement of the 

1853
01:12:55,868 --> 01:12:57,868
technological , um you know , tools 

1854
01:12:57,868 --> 01:12:59,868
that , that are at your disposal in 

1855
01:12:59,868 --> 01:13:01,979
both in the Air Force and now perhaps 

1856
01:13:01,979 --> 01:13:04,256
hopefully as uh the joint force . Well , 

1857
01:13:04,256 --> 01:13:06,312
they , they played a pretty big role 

1858
01:13:06,312 --> 01:13:05,195
and I'll just tell you from my own 

1859
01:13:05,206 --> 01:13:06,817
personal experience , the uh 

1860
01:13:06,817 --> 01:13:08,928
opportunity to go out to silicon uh a 

1861
01:13:08,928 --> 01:13:11,150
couple of times and , and talk to those 

1862
01:13:11,150 --> 01:13:12,984
who have an interest in national 

1863
01:13:12,984 --> 01:13:14,984
security . Um That's a conversation 

1864
01:13:14,984 --> 01:13:17,150
that we need to continue to have . And 

1865
01:13:17,150 --> 01:13:19,317
so that we understand the , the aspect 

1866
01:13:19,317 --> 01:13:19,229
of all the capabilities we have within 

1867
01:13:19,240 --> 01:13:21,240
our nation and how they all in some 

1868
01:13:21,240 --> 01:13:23,129
form or fashion contribute to our 

1869
01:13:23,129 --> 01:13:25,129
national security . Um Even when we 

1870
01:13:25,129 --> 01:13:27,351
have these discussions about spectrum , 

1871
01:13:27,351 --> 01:13:29,296
um there's an economic aspect that 

1872
01:13:29,296 --> 01:13:31,240
supports our uh our , our economic 

1873
01:13:31,240 --> 01:13:33,129
security , but there's a national 

1874
01:13:33,129 --> 01:13:32,770
security and , and we gotta have the 

1875
01:13:32,779 --> 01:13:34,835
same conversa those conversations in 

1876
01:13:34,835 --> 01:13:37,001
the same room because it has an impact 

1877
01:13:37,001 --> 01:13:38,890
in some form of fashion and , and 

1878
01:13:38,890 --> 01:13:41,057
that's why it's important that we , we 

1879
01:13:41,057 --> 01:13:40,770
build those relationships and we have 

1880
01:13:40,779 --> 01:13:42,946
those dialogue that , that dialogue to 

1881
01:13:42,946 --> 01:13:45,168
ensure we're doing what's right for the 

1882
01:13:45,168 --> 01:13:47,930
nation um as we uh make decisions , I 

1883
01:13:48,000 --> 01:13:50,056
appreciate that attitude . Thank you 

1884
01:13:50,056 --> 01:13:52,167
very much . Thank you , Mr Chairman . 

1885
01:13:52,167 --> 01:13:54,167
Thank you , Senator Senator Kelly , 

1886
01:13:54,167 --> 01:13:53,669
please . Thank you , Mr Chairman 

1887
01:13:53,680 --> 01:13:55,624
General Brown . Thank you for your 

1888
01:13:55,624 --> 01:13:58,009
decades of service and uh welcome today . 

1889
01:13:58,160 --> 01:14:00,271
Uh I want to talk to you a little bit 

1890
01:14:00,271 --> 01:14:02,438
about our military's close air support 

1891
01:14:02,438 --> 01:14:04,493
capability . Uh We've discussed this 

1892
01:14:04,493 --> 01:14:06,839
issue at length a number of times and 

1893
01:14:06,850 --> 01:14:08,906
you know how important this is to me 

1894
01:14:09,310 --> 01:14:11,310
and you know that , that our ground 

1895
01:14:11,310 --> 01:14:13,620
troops and special operators depend on 

1896
01:14:13,629 --> 01:14:15,740
this capability and it's often a life 

1897
01:14:15,750 --> 01:14:18,200
or death matter for them . And you and 

1898
01:14:18,209 --> 01:14:20,098
I have talked through some of the 

1899
01:14:20,098 --> 01:14:22,265
current planning uh that the air force 

1900
01:14:22,265 --> 01:14:24,890
is doing to transition to a future CASS 

1901
01:14:24,899 --> 01:14:28,729
capability . And in my view , uh the 

1902
01:14:28,740 --> 01:14:31,259
design of our close air support uh 

1903
01:14:31,270 --> 01:14:34,000
needs to stay centered on the guys on 

1904
01:14:34,009 --> 01:14:36,689
the ground . So general , how will you 

1905
01:14:36,700 --> 01:14:38,970
achieve the same level of protection 

1906
01:14:38,979 --> 01:14:40,868
for those troops with future cast 

1907
01:14:40,868 --> 01:14:43,220
solutions ? And how are we going to 

1908
01:14:43,250 --> 01:14:47,000
avoid any kind of a gap ? Well as we uh 

1909
01:14:47,009 --> 01:14:49,120
Senator , appreciate the question and 

1910
01:14:49,120 --> 01:14:51,231
as we talked uh in , in your office a 

1911
01:14:51,231 --> 01:14:53,287
couple of months ago , it , it's the 

1912
01:14:53,287 --> 01:14:55,779
aspect of not only um the platforms 

1913
01:14:55,790 --> 01:14:57,901
that we operate , it's the technology 

1914
01:14:58,140 --> 01:15:00,580
that we uh use and still be able to use 

1915
01:15:00,589 --> 01:15:02,645
the , the basic tactics , techniques 

1916
01:15:02,645 --> 01:15:04,478
and procedures we use . Since we 

1917
01:15:04,478 --> 01:15:06,689
started doing close air support . It's 

1918
01:15:06,700 --> 01:15:08,922
the aspect of providing that capability 

1919
01:15:08,922 --> 01:15:11,089
and the dialogue and how we'll be able 

1920
01:15:11,089 --> 01:15:13,200
to move information electronically to 

1921
01:15:13,200 --> 01:15:15,311
be more responsive at the same time , 

1922
01:15:15,311 --> 01:15:17,533
have weapons that are highly precise to 

1923
01:15:17,533 --> 01:15:19,478
support our service members on the 

1924
01:15:19,478 --> 01:15:21,700
ground . And uh one of my concerns here 

1925
01:15:21,700 --> 01:15:24,839
is um you know , F-35s , uh you know , 

1926
01:15:24,850 --> 01:15:27,259
multi mission , you know , a lot of 

1927
01:15:27,270 --> 01:15:29,270
capability in the airplane . I just 

1928
01:15:29,270 --> 01:15:31,437
asked that you uh continue to focus on 

1929
01:15:31,437 --> 01:15:35,049
this as a important uh mission uh 

1930
01:15:35,060 --> 01:15:37,060
for future fighters , including the 

1931
01:15:37,060 --> 01:15:39,004
F-35 . And then I'm also concerned 

1932
01:15:39,004 --> 01:15:41,060
about the personnel that support our 

1933
01:15:41,060 --> 01:15:43,171
cast community uh As we transition to 

1934
01:15:43,171 --> 01:15:45,850
these new platforms , are there any 

1935
01:15:45,859 --> 01:15:48,081
plans to transition some of the skill , 

1936
01:15:48,081 --> 01:15:51,200
the skill sets that reside in our 

1937
01:15:51,209 --> 01:15:53,759
tactical air control and J A community 

1938
01:15:53,770 --> 01:15:56,370
today ? Uh They are and uh we , we , 

1939
01:15:56,379 --> 01:15:58,970
we're using uh their capability to help 

1940
01:15:58,979 --> 01:16:01,810
us in our command and control um as 

1941
01:16:01,819 --> 01:16:03,986
well as making sure those , you know , 

1942
01:16:03,986 --> 01:16:06,097
the procedures that we already have , 

1943
01:16:06,097 --> 01:16:08,450
we do not uh let atrophy and continue 

1944
01:16:08,459 --> 01:16:10,681
to work . Uh that and one thing I would 

1945
01:16:10,681 --> 01:16:12,903
highlight to you on the F-35 is uh many 

1946
01:16:12,903 --> 01:16:15,126
of our A 10 pilots , they have a lot of 

1947
01:16:15,126 --> 01:16:17,181
cast background are , are flying and 

1948
01:16:17,181 --> 01:16:19,403
going to F-35 . As a matter of fact , I 

1949
01:16:19,403 --> 01:16:21,570
just met a captain here this past week 

1950
01:16:21,570 --> 01:16:23,681
who's just converted from uh uh the A 

1951
01:16:23,681 --> 01:16:25,737
10 into the F-35 . And those are the 

1952
01:16:25,737 --> 01:16:25,509
kinds of things we got to continue to 

1953
01:16:25,520 --> 01:16:27,742
do to ensure we do not let the uh skill 

1954
01:16:27,742 --> 01:16:29,742
sets that we had atrophy . That's a 

1955
01:16:29,742 --> 01:16:31,853
positive thing now . But when we look 

1956
01:16:31,853 --> 01:16:34,076
at a decade from now , you're not gonna 

1957
01:16:34,076 --> 01:16:36,242
have that same kind of transition . So 

1958
01:16:36,242 --> 01:16:38,464
I encourage you uh to continue to focus 

1959
01:16:38,464 --> 01:16:40,464
on this and make sure we retain the 

1960
01:16:40,464 --> 01:16:42,742
unique expertise of these other groups , 

1961
01:16:42,742 --> 01:16:44,798
not just the pilots but the tactical 

1962
01:16:44,798 --> 01:16:47,529
air controllers . And um I wanna talk 

1963
01:16:47,540 --> 01:16:50,419
about another uh issue . Uh I'm the 

1964
01:16:50,430 --> 01:16:52,652
only graduate of the US Merchant Marine 

1965
01:16:52,652 --> 01:16:54,819
Academy in Congress as far as I know . 

1966
01:16:54,819 --> 01:16:57,649
Uh so I pay um special attention to our 

1967
01:16:57,660 --> 01:17:00,200
nation's maritime strength . We talked 

1968
01:17:00,209 --> 01:17:02,265
a little bit about that when Senator 

1969
01:17:02,265 --> 01:17:04,540
Gillibrand asked , asked her questions 

1970
01:17:04,790 --> 01:17:06,457
and I'm concerned that the US 

1971
01:17:06,457 --> 01:17:08,540
investment is falling dramatically 

1972
01:17:08,549 --> 01:17:11,799
behind what the Chinese government has 

1973
01:17:11,810 --> 01:17:14,689
invested in terms of the size and 

1974
01:17:14,700 --> 01:17:18,129
modernization of each of our respective 

1975
01:17:18,140 --> 01:17:20,660
merchant fleets . Since the 19 eighties . 

1976
01:17:21,020 --> 01:17:22,964
There have been a series of policy 

1977
01:17:22,964 --> 01:17:25,259
decisions that have brought us down to 

1978
01:17:25,270 --> 01:17:28,859
a rather startling figure of just 80 US 

1979
01:17:28,870 --> 01:17:32,169
flagged merchant vessels operating in 

1980
01:17:32,180 --> 01:17:34,649
international trade and 60 of those 

1981
01:17:34,759 --> 01:17:38,240
consist of a maritime security program 

1982
01:17:38,250 --> 01:17:40,810
that allows them to contract us flag 

1983
01:17:40,819 --> 01:17:43,410
vessels during times of war . So we 

1984
01:17:43,419 --> 01:17:46,660
have 80 ships . The Chinese have over 

1985
01:17:46,669 --> 01:17:50,569
5500 and they're the world's 

1986
01:17:50,580 --> 01:17:53,160
top ship builder and they control ports 

1987
01:17:53,169 --> 01:17:56,390
that handle 67% of the world's shipping 

1988
01:17:56,399 --> 01:17:59,129
shipping containers as you know . Well , 

1989
01:17:59,140 --> 01:18:01,307
this impacts our ability to supply our 

1990
01:18:01,307 --> 01:18:03,740
own troops in conflict . You talked 

1991
01:18:03,750 --> 01:18:06,430
about how much different the Western 

1992
01:18:06,439 --> 01:18:08,580
Pacific is from Europe , you know , 

1993
01:18:08,589 --> 01:18:10,478
islands , mobility and logistical 

1994
01:18:10,478 --> 01:18:13,379
challenges . It also impacts trade and 

1995
01:18:13,390 --> 01:18:15,700
global supply chains and peace time . 

1996
01:18:15,709 --> 01:18:18,089
And it's critical , I mean , this is 

1997
01:18:18,100 --> 01:18:20,156
the kind of capability that can't be 

1998
01:18:20,156 --> 01:18:23,049
turned on and off overnight . We need 

1999
01:18:23,060 --> 01:18:25,171
to invest . Now if we want to rely on 

2000
01:18:25,171 --> 01:18:27,799
it tomorrow , I know in your new role , 

2001
01:18:28,129 --> 01:18:30,351
it's a chance that you're going to need 

2002
01:18:30,351 --> 01:18:32,296
this capability . We also see some 

2003
01:18:32,296 --> 01:18:34,296
similar under investments in the US 

2004
01:18:34,296 --> 01:18:36,296
Merchant Marine Academy uh which is 

2005
01:18:36,296 --> 01:18:37,629
under the Department of 

2006
01:18:37,629 --> 01:18:39,518
Transportation's purview , but it 

2007
01:18:39,518 --> 01:18:41,779
trains our a lot of military officers 

2008
01:18:42,000 --> 01:18:44,056
and the Mariners that will man those 

2009
01:18:44,056 --> 01:18:46,819
ships . Our nation's national security 

2010
01:18:46,830 --> 01:18:49,399
leaders cannot turn a blind eye to 

2011
01:18:49,410 --> 01:18:51,577
these capabilities simply because they 

2012
01:18:51,577 --> 01:18:55,250
lie outside of the militaries and your 

2013
01:18:55,259 --> 01:18:57,979
immediate juri jurisdiction . And I 

2014
01:18:57,990 --> 01:19:00,046
think we really need to increase our 

2015
01:19:00,046 --> 01:19:02,101
focus here . So if confirmed , can I 

2016
01:19:02,101 --> 01:19:03,990
have your commitment to keep this 

2017
01:19:03,990 --> 01:19:07,319
concern ? Top of mind as you enter into 

2018
01:19:07,330 --> 01:19:09,497
this new role as chairman Senator , if 

2019
01:19:09,497 --> 01:19:11,163
confirmed uh , you do have my 

2020
01:19:11,163 --> 01:19:12,080
commitment . Thank you .