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Tony , we look forward to your 

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testimony as this is the first 

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Strategic Forces subcommittee hearing 

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of the 118th congress . I'm gonna take 

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a chairman's prerogative and lay out 

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some agenda and priorities for me . I 

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would like to start by acknowledging 

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the new ranking member of the 

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subcommittee . Mr Seth Moulton of 

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Massachusetts . Weren't you on the 

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screen just a moment ago for C SPAN . 

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You must have hurried back over here . 

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I hustled , I'm a marine . I can hustle 

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and just from our short time working 

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together in our new capacities , I am 

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already confident that we will continue 

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a strong bipartisan tradition of this 

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subcommittee . So I'm pleased for us to 

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officially start our work together 

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today and I would like to welcome the 

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new members of the subcommittee as well 

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who might be in and out as we are going 

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through this hearing , Mr Bacon of 

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Nebraska , Mr Banks of Indiana , Mr 

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Strong of Alabama , Mr Norcross of New 

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Jersey , Miss Hoolahan of Pennsylvania , 

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and Mr Vasquez of New Mexico . I'm 

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honored to be the chairman of this 

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subcommittee and privileged to be the 

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first person from Colorado to hold this 

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position . I've been working on these 

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issues for many years as they are 

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integral to the fabric of my district 

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as well as to our national defense . I 

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have big shoes to fill recently retired 

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Jim Cooper , Mike Turner , Mike Rogers , 

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Ellen Tauscher are among those who have 

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served so capably in this position 

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while I have been in Congress . Thank 

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you to our witnesses for appearing 

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today and uh I wish we had the 

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president's budget to inform our 

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discussion . Uh The budget was due last 

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month but it seems like we're still one 

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day early regardless , there are 

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nation of Ukraine which just passed its 

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year mark has been punctuated by 

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attempts were coercion now , 

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Putin has suspended Russia's 

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participation in the new start treaty . 

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I understand that Russia has ceased 

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providing the US with treaty 

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notifications yet . We continue to 

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provide them for Russia . It is curious 

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that we provide Russia with this 

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benefit under our treaty . When Russia 

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is no longer reciprocating given 

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Russia's suspension and their false 

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declaration that the U S is in material 

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breach . The joint staff with the help 

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of stratcom needs to accelerate 

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contingency planning . Should Russia 

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begin uploading warheads on its 

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strategic delivery systems ? Beyond the 

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numbers called for China is also 

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building up its nuclear arsenal at an 

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unanticipated and rapid pace and is 

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pursuing aggressive activities in all 

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domains . Most notably , there is 

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public reporting that Russia's state 

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owned Nuclear Energy Corporation Gross 

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Adam is helping China acquire enough 

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weapons grade plutonium to fuel its 

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strategic nuclear breakout . I'm 

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hopeful that we will see a 

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comprehensive strategy from the 

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administration to break this 

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relationship and ideally shutter Ross 

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Adam now that India , excuse me , now 

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that China has surpassed the United 

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States in the number of 

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intercontinental ballistic missile 

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launchers , stratcom has additional 

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targets to hold at risk . I'm sure 

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we'll hear from General Cotton about 

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how that complicates his targeting 

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efforts and challenges his ability to 

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deter to near Pierre nuclear 

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adversaries simultaneously . We can't 

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also forget that North Korea has an I C 

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B M program that is proceeding apace 

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and Iran has multiple space launch 

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vehicle programs giving cover for the 

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development of an Iranian I C B M . 

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Given all these threats . My priorities 

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for the subcommittee include the 

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following . We must accelerate and 

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timely field hypersonic weapons systems 

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for all three services , adjust our 

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nuclear modernization program to deter 

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both Russia and China simultaneously 

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and ensure our missile defenses can 

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outpace the North Korean and 

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forthcoming Iranian I C B M threats . 

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This includes ensuring that the 

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Department of Defense maintains the 

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necessary spectrum to discriminate 

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targets at range in the atmosphere at 

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all times . I will also continue to 

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push the department to develop a space 

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policy , we can debate in public take . 

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So we'll take a hard look at 

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classification and continue to push for 

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changes in how we do space acquisitions 

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as well . Finally , I want to highlight 

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that last year on a bipartisan basis . 

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Congress authorized and appropriated 

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funds to the Navy and the National 

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Nuclear Security Administration for 

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Research and development of the nuclear 

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sea launched cruise missile or slick . 

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Um in the restriction in the N D A only 

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applied to production work and was not 

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meant to constrain research and 

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development in any way . And I also 

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hope to hear how the department is 

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progressing on the hard and deeply 

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buried target . Steady with that . I'll 

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turn it over to ranking member Moulton 

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for any remarks he would like to make . 

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Thank you , Mr Chairman and 

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congratulations on your appointment as 

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chairman of this subcommittee . I know 

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that you believe as I do that the 

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issues this committee tackles are at 

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the very core of our national security 

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as a nation . Therefore , it is 

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important that we work together in a 

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bipartisan fashion to address the 

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critical issues before us . I already 

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know that there is much that we agree 

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on and I hope that through open and 

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transparent dialogue and debate , we 

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can expand that area of agreement as we 

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both learn more about these important 

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and fascinating issues . I would also 

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like to uh welcome General Cotton as 

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this is your first strategic forces 

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hearing . I'm encouraged by our 

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discussion last week and your 

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leadership is critical given the 

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growing global strategic threat to the 

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United States , I appreciate your view 

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that strategic deterrence is much 

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broader than nuclear weapons as the 

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world and the threats we face as a 

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nation have evolved significantly since 

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our nuclear triad was first established . 

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I look forward to learning more about 

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how you understand and apply integrated 

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deterrence across multiple domains as 

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you take command of stratcom . And as 

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we welcome you , I also want to 

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acknowledge that this will be General 

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Van Herk final or last Strategic Forces 

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Posture hearing . Thank you sir for 

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your 36 years of distinguished service 

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to our nation in the past three years 

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as head of northern command . During 

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that time , you have shown great 

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leadership across a range of critical 

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issues from welcoming our Afghan 

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refugees , responding to COVID-19 and 

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highlighting the need for better 

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situational awareness over the 

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continental United States , which as we 

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saw very clearly last month is not just 

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a hypothetical or a future need . Thank 

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you to all our witnesses for being here 

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and for helping us been begin the 

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important work of writing the fiscal 

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year 2020 for National Defense 

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Authorization Act . As we sit in this 

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hearing , Russia continues to wage an 

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unconscionable war against Ukraine 

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using veiled threats of nuclear weapons 

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not to keep the peace between 

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superpowers but offensively to try and 

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turn around its losing war . Meanwhile , 

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China is launching satellites that have 

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dual use capability , putting us 

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systems at risk . North Korea has been 

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consistently launching ballistic 

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missiles that can reach the United 

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States . And just last week , the U N 

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International Atomic Energy Agency 

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reported that they had found uranium 

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enriched to near bomb grade purity at 

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an Iranian nuclear facility . The 

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mission of this subcommittee is growing 

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in scope importance and urgency . 

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Our witnesses do not oversee 

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development of weapon weapon systems 

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per se but they are responsible for 

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current operations and are given the 

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challenging task of predicting what the 

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Department of Defense will need in the 

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future to maintain strategic deterrence 

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across all domains , air land , sea 

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space and cyber . While we are clear 

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eyed about the advancements , our 

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competitors are making in various 

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weapons systems , we must also reflect 

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on how our decisions , actions and 

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statements are understood by those 

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competitors and adversaries to avoid 

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starting or escalating an arms race or 

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worse . A miscalculation that could 

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have catastrophic effects . Ultimately , 

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we should have two shared goals , 

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ensuring our credible deterrence and 

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strategic advantage over our 

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adversaries and reducing the number of 

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weapons and chances of warfare on all 

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sides . I'm encouraged that the Biden 

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administration is taking a more 

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balanced approach to strategic 

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deterrence while maintaining and 

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modernizing the triad and focusing on 

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the greatest strength of the United 

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States , our partners and allies . 

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Doctor Plum , I am heartened to hear 

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you say clearly that quote , the 

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department , you're nervous now about 

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what you just said , the department 

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will protect and defend us space 

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capabilities along with those of our 

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allies , partners and the commercial 

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sector when directed to do so . And I 

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welcome this administration's real 

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investments in domain awareness for 

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NORAD with the modernization of the 

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over the horizon radars along the 

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existing northern warning system 

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architecture . But there remains much 

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work to be done in the jurisdiction of 

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this subcommittee and the strategic 

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posture of the United States must 

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remain a top priority across both the 

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administration and Congress . I look 

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forward to working to conducting that 

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work together over the next two years . 

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Thank you , Mr Chairman . I yield back . 

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Okay . Thank you . Now we'll move from 

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opening statements uh from our opening 

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statements to those of the witnesses . 

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I would note that you're prepared 

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statements will be made part of the 

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record , but you'll each have five 

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minutes to make some opening remarks 

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and Dr Plum will begin with you . Thank 

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you very much , Chairman Lamborn and 

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ranking member Moulton , thanks for 

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inviting me to testify on Strategic 

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forces posture . I appreciated sitting 

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down with both of you last week . Uh 

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And I look forward to working with you 

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in your new roles as well as with the 

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rest of the distinguished members of 

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this committee . Today . The United 

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States finds itself in a highly dynamic 

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and challenging security environment is 

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characterized by intensifying strategic 

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competition , assertive behavior by 

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multiple competitors , rapidly evolving 

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domains of conflict and a growing risk 

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of military confrontation . China and 

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Russia have placed nuclear weapons , 

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00:10:49,186 --> 00:10:51,352
space warfare and long range strike at 

281
00:10:51,352 --> 00:10:53,241
the center of their strategies to 

282
00:10:53,241 --> 00:10:55,130
counter the United States and our 

283
00:10:55,130 --> 00:10:57,074
allies and partners . As Secretary 

284
00:10:57,074 --> 00:10:59,241
Austin has said , since his first days 

285
00:10:59,241 --> 00:11:01,352
in office , China is the department's 

286
00:11:01,352 --> 00:11:03,860
pacing challenge . China is engaged in 

287
00:11:03,860 --> 00:11:06,027
a significant and fast paced expansion 

288
00:11:06,027 --> 00:11:07,971
and diversification of its nuclear 

289
00:11:07,971 --> 00:11:10,500
forces like Russia , China views space 

290
00:11:10,500 --> 00:11:13,270
as a warfighting domain and China is 

291
00:11:13,270 --> 00:11:15,048
developing testing and fielding 

292
00:11:15,048 --> 00:11:16,603
sophisticated counter space 

293
00:11:16,603 --> 00:11:18,492
capabilities intended to deny the 

294
00:11:18,492 --> 00:11:20,270
United States our space enabled 

295
00:11:20,270 --> 00:11:22,800
advantage and China has an ever growing 

296
00:11:22,800 --> 00:11:24,911
inventory of sophisticated long range 

297
00:11:24,911 --> 00:11:27,250
strike systems to hold U S forces at 

298
00:11:27,250 --> 00:11:29,472
risk at greater and greater distances . 

299
00:11:30,250 --> 00:11:32,139
In Ukraine . Russia's illegal and 

300
00:11:32,139 --> 00:11:34,083
unprovoked full scale invasion has 

301
00:11:34,083 --> 00:11:35,806
showcased the critical role of 

302
00:11:35,806 --> 00:11:38,070
strategic forces in conflict space 

303
00:11:38,070 --> 00:11:40,181
systems . Inform us national security 

304
00:11:40,181 --> 00:11:42,480
decisions every single day , President 

305
00:11:42,480 --> 00:11:44,480
Biden has declassified intelligence 

306
00:11:44,480 --> 00:11:45,480
gained from us 

307
00:11:50,240 --> 00:11:52,073
proliferated satellite broadband 

308
00:11:52,073 --> 00:11:54,129
constellations in innovative ways to 

309
00:11:54,129 --> 00:11:57,630
support their own operations . Russia 

310
00:11:57,640 --> 00:11:59,940
has repeated has conducted repeated 

311
00:11:59,940 --> 00:12:01,773
missile attacks against civilian 

312
00:12:01,773 --> 00:12:03,773
infrastructure which highlights the 

313
00:12:03,773 --> 00:12:06,130
need for air and missile defenses and 

314
00:12:06,130 --> 00:12:08,297
as uh some of the members have already 

315
00:12:08,297 --> 00:12:10,241
said Putin's irresponsible nuclear 

316
00:12:10,241 --> 00:12:12,408
saber rattling has further underscored 

317
00:12:12,408 --> 00:12:14,297
the importance of the U S nuclear 

318
00:12:14,297 --> 00:12:16,519
deterrent , which is the bedrock of our 

319
00:12:16,519 --> 00:12:19,250
own national security . Just this last 

320
00:12:19,250 --> 00:12:21,139
October , the department released 

321
00:12:21,139 --> 00:12:23,250
unclassified versions of the National 

322
00:12:23,250 --> 00:12:25,417
defense strategy , the Nuclear Posture 

323
00:12:25,417 --> 00:12:27,639
Review and the missile defense review . 

324
00:12:27,639 --> 00:12:29,861
Together these documents recognize that 

325
00:12:29,861 --> 00:12:32,028
the United States is entering a period 

326
00:12:32,028 --> 00:12:34,194
of heightened risk and they articulate 

327
00:12:34,194 --> 00:12:34,020
an urgent imperative to strengthen 

328
00:12:34,020 --> 00:12:36,810
deterrence . The National defense 

329
00:12:36,810 --> 00:12:39,032
strategy identified four priorities for 

330
00:12:39,032 --> 00:12:40,810
the department , one defend the 

331
00:12:40,810 --> 00:12:43,060
homeland to deter strategic attacks 

332
00:12:43,070 --> 00:12:45,290
three deter aggression while preparing 

333
00:12:45,290 --> 00:12:47,234
to prevail in conflict . And we're 

334
00:12:47,234 --> 00:12:49,123
prioritizing China first and then 

335
00:12:49,123 --> 00:12:51,480
Russia And four build a resilient joint 

336
00:12:51,480 --> 00:12:54,280
force . All four of these priorities 

337
00:12:54,280 --> 00:12:56,502
rely heavily on our space systems , our 

338
00:12:56,502 --> 00:12:58,724
missile defenses and our nuclear forces 

339
00:12:59,730 --> 00:13:01,952
cooperation with allies and partners is 

340
00:13:01,952 --> 00:13:03,952
also a core element of the national 

341
00:13:03,952 --> 00:13:06,063
defense strategy and it is central to 

342
00:13:06,063 --> 00:13:08,119
our national security and deterrence 

343
00:13:08,119 --> 00:13:10,174
schools . The department is actively 

344
00:13:10,174 --> 00:13:12,341
pursuing deeper cooperation to enhance 

345
00:13:12,341 --> 00:13:14,508
our extended deterrence commitments to 

346
00:13:14,508 --> 00:13:16,619
achieve combined space operations and 

347
00:13:16,619 --> 00:13:18,730
to share data in real time to support 

348
00:13:18,730 --> 00:13:20,841
air and missile defenses . Our allies 

349
00:13:20,841 --> 00:13:22,563
and partners are an asymmetric 

350
00:13:22,563 --> 00:13:24,786
advantage that neither China nor Russia 

351
00:13:24,786 --> 00:13:26,952
can ever hope to match . Now , for the 

352
00:13:26,952 --> 00:13:29,008
department , we are clear eyed about 

353
00:13:29,008 --> 00:13:28,760
the threats we face and the importance 

354
00:13:28,760 --> 00:13:30,593
of our nuclear space and missile 

355
00:13:30,593 --> 00:13:32,871
defense forces in defending the nation . 

356
00:13:32,871 --> 00:13:34,982
The department is committed to making 

357
00:13:34,982 --> 00:13:36,982
critical investments in our nuclear 

358
00:13:36,982 --> 00:13:39,204
triad modernization in a more resilient 

359
00:13:39,204 --> 00:13:41,260
space , architecture and in homeland 

360
00:13:41,260 --> 00:13:43,371
and regional missile offenses . These 

361
00:13:43,371 --> 00:13:45,371
investments will be detailed in the 

362
00:13:45,371 --> 00:13:47,371
upcoming forthcoming fiscal year 24 

363
00:13:47,371 --> 00:13:49,780
budget request , but these investments 

364
00:13:49,780 --> 00:13:51,947
are necessary to deter conflict in the 

365
00:13:51,947 --> 00:13:54,240
fight and win if deterrence fails . So , 

366
00:13:54,240 --> 00:13:56,184
thank you to the committee for its 

367
00:13:56,184 --> 00:13:58,296
tireless dedication to the department 

368
00:13:58,296 --> 00:14:00,240
and our service members and I look 

369
00:14:00,240 --> 00:14:02,351
forward to your questions . Thank you 

370
00:14:02,351 --> 00:14:04,518
and I didn't say it but Dr Plum is the 

371
00:14:04,518 --> 00:14:06,462
Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

372
00:14:06,462 --> 00:14:08,629
Space Policy with the US Department of 

373
00:14:08,629 --> 00:14:11,920
Defense . Now , we will hear from uh 

374
00:14:11,930 --> 00:14:14,830
General Glenn Van Herk , commander of 

375
00:14:14,830 --> 00:14:17,240
the United States Northern Command and 

376
00:14:17,250 --> 00:14:19,083
North American Aerospace Defense 

377
00:14:19,083 --> 00:14:22,180
Command . Thank you , Chairman Lamborn , 

378
00:14:22,190 --> 00:14:24,350
ranking member Molten and members of 

379
00:14:24,350 --> 00:14:26,294
the committee , the subcommittee . 

380
00:14:26,294 --> 00:14:28,183
Thank you for your opportunity to 

381
00:14:28,183 --> 00:14:30,017
appear this afternoon before the 

382
00:14:30,017 --> 00:14:32,017
Strategic Forces subcommittee along 

383
00:14:32,017 --> 00:14:34,239
with General Dickinson , General Cotton 

384
00:14:34,239 --> 00:14:36,406
and Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

385
00:14:36,406 --> 00:14:38,517
Space Policy . Dr John Plumb , as you 

386
00:14:38,517 --> 00:14:40,683
know , I testified this morning before 

387
00:14:40,683 --> 00:14:42,906
the full committee . Therefore , I will 

388
00:14:42,906 --> 00:14:45,128
be brief in my remarks here in the open 

389
00:14:45,128 --> 00:14:44,330
session . I look forward to the 

390
00:14:44,330 --> 00:14:46,980
classified discussion later . The 

391
00:14:46,980 --> 00:14:49,202
United States military remains the most 

392
00:14:49,202 --> 00:14:51,147
powerful and professional force in 

393
00:14:51,147 --> 00:14:52,924
history . However , I'd like to 

394
00:14:52,924 --> 00:14:55,270
reiterate our competitive advantage is 

395
00:14:55,280 --> 00:14:58,070
eroding and I believe our greatest risk 

396
00:14:58,080 --> 00:15:00,080
for the United States stems from an 

397
00:15:00,080 --> 00:15:02,302
inability to adapt at the pace required 

398
00:15:02,302 --> 00:15:04,524
by the changing strategic environment . 

399
00:15:04,524 --> 00:15:06,469
Our commands and the Department of 

400
00:15:06,469 --> 00:15:08,636
Defense need your continued support to 

401
00:15:08,636 --> 00:15:10,636
outpace the rapid gains made by our 

402
00:15:10,636 --> 00:15:12,580
competitors . On behalf of all the 

403
00:15:12,580 --> 00:15:14,802
soldiers , sailors , airmen , marines , 

404
00:15:14,802 --> 00:15:16,636
guardians coast coast is and the 

405
00:15:16,636 --> 00:15:18,858
civilians at NORAD north com . I'd like 

406
00:15:18,858 --> 00:15:20,802
to thank the subcommittee for your 

407
00:15:20,802 --> 00:15:22,802
steadfast support for all those who 

408
00:15:22,802 --> 00:15:24,913
defend our nation . I look forward to 

409
00:15:24,913 --> 00:15:28,280
your questions . Thank you . And our 

410
00:15:28,280 --> 00:15:31,640
next witness is General James Dickinson . 

411
00:15:31,640 --> 00:15:33,751
And I want to say , as was said , for 

412
00:15:33,751 --> 00:15:35,751
General Van Herk , this is probably 

413
00:15:35,751 --> 00:15:37,680
your last testimony before this 

414
00:15:37,680 --> 00:15:40,750
subcommittee and you will be missed and 

415
00:15:40,750 --> 00:15:42,861
we want to thank you for your decades 

416
00:15:42,861 --> 00:15:45,050
of service , including most recently 

417
00:15:45,050 --> 00:15:47,161
the standing up in the shepherding of 

418
00:15:47,161 --> 00:15:50,110
Space command . So the Commander of U S 

419
00:15:50,110 --> 00:15:52,443
Space Command , General James Dickinson , 

420
00:15:53,840 --> 00:15:55,673
thank you , Chairman Lamborn and 

421
00:15:55,673 --> 00:15:57,951
ranking member Molten . Good afternoon . 

422
00:15:57,951 --> 00:16:00,173
Ladies and gentlemen of the committee , 

423
00:16:00,173 --> 00:16:01,951
it remains my distinct honor to 

424
00:16:01,951 --> 00:16:03,618
represent the 18,000 military 

425
00:16:03,618 --> 00:16:05,673
servicemen and women , civilians and 

426
00:16:05,673 --> 00:16:07,784
families of U S Space Command who are 

427
00:16:07,784 --> 00:16:09,896
serving our great nation today around 

428
00:16:09,896 --> 00:16:11,618
the world . Thank you for this 

429
00:16:11,618 --> 00:16:13,562
opportunity to testify before this 

430
00:16:13,562 --> 00:16:15,784
committee , I look forward to both this 

431
00:16:15,784 --> 00:16:18,007
session as well as the closed session . 

432
00:16:18,007 --> 00:16:20,173
I am proud to lead such a talented and 

433
00:16:20,173 --> 00:16:21,896
patriotic group of joint space 

434
00:16:21,896 --> 00:16:23,784
professionals , their expertise , 

435
00:16:23,784 --> 00:16:26,007
diversity and creativity , underpin our 

436
00:16:26,007 --> 00:16:28,140
strength and effectiveness of all the 

437
00:16:28,140 --> 00:16:30,310
elements of space power . Our most 

438
00:16:30,310 --> 00:16:33,380
valued asset is and always will be our 

439
00:16:33,380 --> 00:16:35,470
great people . My provisional 

440
00:16:35,470 --> 00:16:37,137
headquarters achieved initial 

441
00:16:37,137 --> 00:16:39,081
operational capability in just two 

442
00:16:39,081 --> 00:16:40,770
years and we will reach full 

443
00:16:40,770 --> 00:16:42,714
operational capability through the 

444
00:16:42,714 --> 00:16:45,380
disciplined initiative of our people . 

445
00:16:45,830 --> 00:16:48,570
Space power enables our way of life and 

446
00:16:48,570 --> 00:16:50,792
is a critical component of our national 

447
00:16:50,792 --> 00:16:53,014
security . I want to thank Congress for 

448
00:16:53,014 --> 00:16:54,848
its support to advance America's 

449
00:16:54,848 --> 00:16:57,800
primacy and space . We must maintain 

450
00:16:57,800 --> 00:16:59,967
our position of advantage in the space 

451
00:16:59,967 --> 00:17:01,578
domain and ensure it remains 

452
00:17:01,578 --> 00:17:04,820
sustainable , safe , stable and secure . 

453
00:17:05,410 --> 00:17:07,630
The joint force relies on space based 

454
00:17:07,630 --> 00:17:09,640
capabilities to project and employ 

455
00:17:09,640 --> 00:17:12,400
power . China and Russia consider this 

456
00:17:12,410 --> 00:17:15,580
dependency , a soft underbelly and seek 

457
00:17:15,580 --> 00:17:17,770
to exploit it . They intend to limit 

458
00:17:17,770 --> 00:17:20,740
our access to space during crisis and 

459
00:17:20,740 --> 00:17:22,573
conflict and they are failing in 

460
00:17:22,573 --> 00:17:24,700
capabilities to that effect . Today , 

461
00:17:25,250 --> 00:17:26,980
our strategic competitors , 

462
00:17:26,990 --> 00:17:29,460
irresponsible actions have transformed 

463
00:17:29,460 --> 00:17:33,450
space into a contested domain . We must 

464
00:17:33,450 --> 00:17:35,561
prevent today's strategic competition 

465
00:17:35,561 --> 00:17:37,783
from growing into a conflict in space . 

466
00:17:37,783 --> 00:17:40,117
We achieve this by deterring aggression , 

467
00:17:40,117 --> 00:17:42,117
defending national interests and if 

468
00:17:42,117 --> 00:17:44,890
necessary , prevailing in any domain , 

469
00:17:44,940 --> 00:17:47,320
us , Space command contributes to 

470
00:17:47,320 --> 00:17:49,320
integrated deterrence by preserving 

471
00:17:49,320 --> 00:17:51,240
freedom of action in space and by 

472
00:17:51,240 --> 00:17:53,640
providing critical support to the rest 

473
00:17:53,640 --> 00:17:56,630
of the joint force . Our mission spans 

474
00:17:56,640 --> 00:17:59,150
the spectrum of conflict and in every 

475
00:17:59,150 --> 00:18:01,760
domain . For example , we are creating 

476
00:18:01,760 --> 00:18:03,871
concepts to further integrate space , 

477
00:18:03,871 --> 00:18:05,649
cyber and special operations to 

478
00:18:05,649 --> 00:18:08,170
generate asymmetrical advantages around 

479
00:18:08,170 --> 00:18:10,450
the globe . Additionally , our protect 

480
00:18:10,450 --> 00:18:12,561
and defend mission involves all three 

481
00:18:12,561 --> 00:18:14,700
segments of the space architecture , 

482
00:18:14,860 --> 00:18:17,770
the ground link and space an approach 

483
00:18:17,770 --> 00:18:21,200
that requires all domain solutions . My 

484
00:18:21,200 --> 00:18:23,490
commands planning horizon is short , it 

485
00:18:23,490 --> 00:18:25,440
is near term . We must be ready to 

486
00:18:25,440 --> 00:18:27,710
fight today because the threat will not 

487
00:18:27,710 --> 00:18:30,300
wait to this end . We are leveraging 

488
00:18:30,300 --> 00:18:32,133
the joint force , our allies and 

489
00:18:32,133 --> 00:18:34,300
partners to integrate and maximize the 

490
00:18:34,300 --> 00:18:36,356
capabilities that we have today . At 

491
00:18:36,356 --> 00:18:38,522
the same time , we look forward to the 

492
00:18:38,522 --> 00:18:40,744
capabilities of services are developing 

493
00:18:40,744 --> 00:18:43,240
for the future fight . As we observe in 

494
00:18:43,250 --> 00:18:45,930
Ukraine , commercial space assets are a 

495
00:18:45,930 --> 00:18:48,820
significant force multiplier for years . 

496
00:18:48,820 --> 00:18:50,876
Our commercial mission partners have 

497
00:18:50,876 --> 00:18:53,042
augmented our satellite communications 

498
00:18:53,042 --> 00:18:55,209
and provided enhancements to our space 

499
00:18:55,209 --> 00:18:57,153
Domain awareness sensor networks . 

500
00:18:57,153 --> 00:18:59,264
Commercial integration is critical to 

501
00:18:59,264 --> 00:19:02,050
mission success . So today's hearing 

502
00:19:02,050 --> 00:19:04,880
reasserts the United states' resolve to 

503
00:19:04,880 --> 00:19:07,102
maintain our leadership and position of 

504
00:19:07,102 --> 00:19:09,680
advantage in the space domain . But 

505
00:19:09,680 --> 00:19:11,513
before I address the committee's 

506
00:19:11,513 --> 00:19:13,736
questions , I just want to emphasize to 

507
00:19:13,736 --> 00:19:15,902
the American people . My pledge that U 

508
00:19:15,902 --> 00:19:18,069
S Space Command will ensure that there 

509
00:19:18,069 --> 00:19:20,124
is never a day without space . Thank 

510
00:19:20,124 --> 00:19:23,610
you . Thank you . And the last of our 

511
00:19:23,610 --> 00:19:25,777
four witnesses will be General Anthony 

512
00:19:25,777 --> 00:19:28,220
Cotton , the Commander of United States 

513
00:19:28,230 --> 00:19:31,880
Strategic Command . Good afternoon , 

514
00:19:31,880 --> 00:19:33,810
Chairman Lamborn , ranking member 

515
00:19:33,810 --> 00:19:35,866
Moulton and distinguished members of 

516
00:19:35,866 --> 00:19:37,754
the committee . I appreciate this 

517
00:19:37,754 --> 00:19:40,680
opportunity to testify next to SD Plum , 

518
00:19:41,350 --> 00:19:43,710
General Van Herk and General Dickinson . 

519
00:19:43,710 --> 00:19:45,821
And I thank the comedian Congress for 

520
00:19:45,821 --> 00:19:47,988
its support for our national defense . 

521
00:19:47,988 --> 00:19:50,520
First , I along with my command , 

522
00:19:50,520 --> 00:19:52,800
senior enlisted leader , Sergeant Major 

523
00:19:52,800 --> 00:19:56,200
Howard Kramer , want to ensure you and 

524
00:19:56,200 --> 00:19:58,840
the American people that United States 

525
00:19:58,840 --> 00:20:01,120
Strategic Command is ready today , 

526
00:20:01,940 --> 00:20:04,162
ready to defend our nation , defend our 

527
00:20:04,162 --> 00:20:07,440
allies and respond decisively if our 

528
00:20:07,440 --> 00:20:11,200
adversaries miscalculate as we speak , 

529
00:20:11,200 --> 00:20:13,450
there are command watch standards at 

530
00:20:13,450 --> 00:20:15,300
their stations , missile ears , 

531
00:20:15,300 --> 00:20:18,560
maintainers , security forces on alert , 

532
00:20:18,570 --> 00:20:21,740
submariners on patrol , aircrew on duty , 

533
00:20:21,750 --> 00:20:24,200
standing guard , the men and women of 

534
00:20:24,200 --> 00:20:26,422
the United States Strategic Command are 

535
00:20:26,422 --> 00:20:28,440
the foundation for the capabilities 

536
00:20:28,440 --> 00:20:30,496
that underpin our nation's strategic 

537
00:20:30,496 --> 00:20:32,670
deterrence . They do this in an 

538
00:20:32,670 --> 00:20:34,892
environment that continues to grow more 

539
00:20:34,892 --> 00:20:37,490
complex and challenging Russia's 

540
00:20:37,490 --> 00:20:39,990
invasion of a sovereign . Ukraine is an 

541
00:20:39,990 --> 00:20:42,046
attempt to undermine the rules based 

542
00:20:42,046 --> 00:20:44,157
international order with conventional 

543
00:20:44,157 --> 00:20:45,934
force backed by nuclear . Saber 

544
00:20:50,280 --> 00:20:52,870
President Putin's strategic objectives . 

545
00:20:52,880 --> 00:20:55,690
Strategic command is monitoring for any 

546
00:20:55,700 --> 00:20:59,550
indication relation , how this conflict 

547
00:20:59,550 --> 00:21:01,717
unfolds and eventually ends will shape 

548
00:21:01,717 --> 00:21:03,828
the strategic environment for decades 

549
00:21:03,828 --> 00:21:06,550
to come . We see the People's Republic 

550
00:21:06,550 --> 00:21:09,270
of China continuing to rapidly expand 

551
00:21:09,280 --> 00:21:12,070
its nuclear capabilities . The prc's 

552
00:21:12,070 --> 00:21:15,040
actions are wholly inconsistent with 

553
00:21:15,040 --> 00:21:17,130
its long professed policy of minimum 

554
00:21:17,130 --> 00:21:19,780
deterrence . I reported to Congress in 

555
00:21:19,780 --> 00:21:21,720
May that the number of land based 

556
00:21:21,730 --> 00:21:23,674
intercontinental ballistic missile 

557
00:21:23,674 --> 00:21:26,730
launchers in the PRC now exceeds that 

558
00:21:26,740 --> 00:21:29,500
of the United States along with its 

559
00:21:29,500 --> 00:21:31,910
significant modernization expansion of 

560
00:21:31,910 --> 00:21:34,270
conventional capabilities . The PRC is 

561
00:21:34,280 --> 00:21:36,620
also investing heavily in lower yield 

562
00:21:36,710 --> 00:21:39,840
precision weapons with theater range is 

563
00:21:39,850 --> 00:21:43,010
a new generation of mobile missiles and 

564
00:21:43,010 --> 00:21:45,050
hypersonic glide vehicle with 

565
00:21:45,050 --> 00:21:47,328
fractional orbital bombardment systems . 

566
00:21:47,328 --> 00:21:50,160
The PRC'S nuclear modernization provide 

567
00:21:50,170 --> 00:21:52,890
it with an alarming number of offensive 

568
00:21:52,900 --> 00:21:55,011
options that can negatively shape the 

569
00:21:55,011 --> 00:21:57,178
environment before and during a crisis 

570
00:21:57,178 --> 00:22:00,130
or conflict . North Korea continues to 

571
00:22:00,130 --> 00:22:02,280
be a road actor and poses a threat to 

572
00:22:02,280 --> 00:22:04,224
the United States and our allies . 

573
00:22:04,740 --> 00:22:06,907
North Korea conducted an unprecedented 

574
00:22:06,907 --> 00:22:10,330
number of missile launches in 2022 And 

575
00:22:10,330 --> 00:22:12,274
its new intercontinental ballistic 

576
00:22:12,274 --> 00:22:14,250
missile referred to as the K in 28 

577
00:22:14,260 --> 00:22:16,960
highlights that the strategic challenge 

578
00:22:16,970 --> 00:22:19,192
and security challenge will continue to 

579
00:22:19,192 --> 00:22:21,460
grow . We are meeting today's 

580
00:22:21,460 --> 00:22:23,516
challenges though through integrated 

581
00:22:23,516 --> 00:22:25,738
deterrence , the cornerstone of the N D 

582
00:22:25,738 --> 00:22:28,250
S , our unmatched network of allies is 

583
00:22:28,250 --> 00:22:29,917
a key component of integrated 

584
00:22:29,917 --> 00:22:32,083
deterrence and these relationships are 

585
00:22:32,083 --> 00:22:34,250
underpinned by our extended deterrence 

586
00:22:34,250 --> 00:22:36,860
commitments . These commitments are 

587
00:22:36,870 --> 00:22:40,250
enabled by a safe , secure , effective 

588
00:22:40,260 --> 00:22:42,980
and credible nuclear deterrent . The 

589
00:22:42,980 --> 00:22:45,147
credibility of our extended deterrence 

590
00:22:45,147 --> 00:22:47,190
commitments is not only part of the 

591
00:22:47,190 --> 00:22:49,301
nations aren't clad commitment to our 

592
00:22:49,301 --> 00:22:52,630
allies but has also been essential in 

593
00:22:52,630 --> 00:22:54,741
limiting the proliferation of nuclear 

594
00:22:54,741 --> 00:22:57,530
weapons . The nation's nuclear forces 

595
00:22:57,530 --> 00:22:59,474
underpin integrated deterrence and 

596
00:22:59,474 --> 00:23:01,419
enable the US , our allies and our 

597
00:23:01,419 --> 00:23:03,419
partners to confront aggressive and 

598
00:23:03,419 --> 00:23:06,080
coercive behavior to ensure continued 

599
00:23:06,080 --> 00:23:08,050
ability to serve as a bedrock of 

600
00:23:08,050 --> 00:23:09,760
integrated deterrence were 

601
00:23:09,760 --> 00:23:12,240
recapitalizing every leg of the nuclear 

602
00:23:12,240 --> 00:23:14,630
triad and the nuclear Command Control 

603
00:23:14,630 --> 00:23:16,741
and communications spectrum , as well 

604
00:23:16,741 --> 00:23:19,019
as addressing electromagnetic spectrum . 

605
00:23:20,050 --> 00:23:22,161
These long term investments are going 

606
00:23:22,161 --> 00:23:24,330
to be absolutely required for us to 

607
00:23:24,330 --> 00:23:26,497
make sure that we have a predictable , 

608
00:23:26,497 --> 00:23:30,150
stable and efficient nuclear force . 

609
00:23:32,520 --> 00:23:34,687
Finally , I want to start as I ended , 

610
00:23:36,600 --> 00:23:39,260
our people are the foundation of every 

611
00:23:39,260 --> 00:23:41,160
capability that enables strategic 

612
00:23:41,160 --> 00:23:42,938
deterrence . I'm proud to serve 

613
00:23:42,938 --> 00:23:44,882
alongside the soldiers , sailors , 

614
00:23:44,882 --> 00:23:47,580
airmen , marines , and guardians , and 

615
00:23:47,580 --> 00:23:50,210
our civilians at stratcom . Very 

616
00:23:50,210 --> 00:23:51,932
appreciative of everything the 

617
00:23:51,932 --> 00:23:54,099
committee and Congress is doing for us 

618
00:23:54,099 --> 00:23:56,266
along those goals and it's an honor to 

619
00:23:56,266 --> 00:23:58,210
be here and I look forward to your 

620
00:23:58,210 --> 00:24:00,930
questions . Thank you , general and you 

621
00:24:00,930 --> 00:24:03,830
did mention hypersonic vehicles . This 

622
00:24:03,830 --> 00:24:05,941
subcommittee will be having a hearing 

623
00:24:05,941 --> 00:24:08,520
on that subject Friday morning at 9:00 

624
00:24:08,530 --> 00:24:10,641
and like the one here today , it will 

625
00:24:10,641 --> 00:24:13,020
be a public hearing , followed by a 

626
00:24:13,030 --> 00:24:16,590
classified hearing afterwards . So we 

627
00:24:16,590 --> 00:24:19,400
will start with questions and with the 

628
00:24:19,400 --> 00:24:21,830
first round of questions , um We'll see 

629
00:24:21,830 --> 00:24:23,941
if we have time for a second round or 

630
00:24:23,941 --> 00:24:27,570
not , we do have votes at 5 30 which 

631
00:24:27,570 --> 00:24:29,570
means we should be able to have our 

632
00:24:29,570 --> 00:24:32,350
classified session at 4 30 it's the 

633
00:24:32,350 --> 00:24:35,910
skiff is occupied until then . Um 

634
00:24:35,920 --> 00:24:38,170
Well , before we have to go for votes 

635
00:24:38,180 --> 00:24:39,870
and should be able to wrap up 

636
00:24:39,870 --> 00:24:42,100
everything by that time . Thank you all 

637
00:24:42,100 --> 00:24:45,180
again for being here . Uh Dr Plumb 

638
00:24:45,190 --> 00:24:48,300
various open source outlets along with 

639
00:24:48,300 --> 00:24:51,400
a very detailed Bloomberg story from 

640
00:24:51,400 --> 00:24:53,070
last week reported how Russia 

641
00:24:53,070 --> 00:24:56,190
specifically Ross Adam is providing 

642
00:24:56,190 --> 00:24:58,290
highly enriched uranium for Chinese 

643
00:24:58,290 --> 00:25:00,480
fast breeder reactors . These reactors 

644
00:25:00,490 --> 00:25:02,601
will almost certainly help accelerate 

645
00:25:02,601 --> 00:25:04,823
the pace of the Chinese nuclear weapons 

646
00:25:04,823 --> 00:25:06,768
program by producing weapons grade 

647
00:25:06,768 --> 00:25:08,640
plutonium . How concerned is the 

648
00:25:08,640 --> 00:25:10,960
department that rose , Adam is helping 

649
00:25:10,960 --> 00:25:13,100
China accelerate the pace of its 

650
00:25:13,110 --> 00:25:14,710
nuclear weapons program ? 

651
00:25:16,240 --> 00:25:19,310
Uh Thank you , Congressman . It's it's 

652
00:25:19,310 --> 00:25:21,580
very troubling uh to see Russia and 

653
00:25:21,580 --> 00:25:24,360
China cooperating on this . Uh They may 

654
00:25:24,360 --> 00:25:26,920
have uh talking points around it but 

655
00:25:26,920 --> 00:25:29,142
there's no getting around the fact that 

656
00:25:29,142 --> 00:25:31,087
breeder reactors are plutonium and 

657
00:25:31,087 --> 00:25:33,198
plutonium is for weapons . So I think 

658
00:25:33,198 --> 00:25:35,142
the department is concerned and of 

659
00:25:35,142 --> 00:25:37,198
course it matches our concerns about 

660
00:25:37,198 --> 00:25:39,920
China's increased uh expansion of its 

661
00:25:39,920 --> 00:25:42,142
nuclear forces as well because you need 

662
00:25:42,142 --> 00:25:44,031
more plutonium for more weapons . 

663
00:25:44,650 --> 00:25:48,430
General cotton . Uh This highlights the 

664
00:25:48,440 --> 00:25:51,380
concern that we all share about China's 

665
00:25:51,390 --> 00:25:54,200
seeming nuclear breakout . It was 

666
00:25:54,200 --> 00:25:56,089
mentioned that they have now more 

667
00:25:56,089 --> 00:25:58,590
launchers than the U S and they're 

668
00:25:58,590 --> 00:26:01,690
working on warheads as well . So the 

669
00:26:01,690 --> 00:26:03,820
number of targets we have to hold at 

670
00:26:03,820 --> 00:26:06,910
risk is rapidly growing because of 

671
00:26:06,910 --> 00:26:08,854
China's nuclear breakout . But the 

672
00:26:08,854 --> 00:26:10,577
forces available to you remain 

673
00:26:10,577 --> 00:26:13,080
unchanged . How does the department 

674
00:26:13,090 --> 00:26:17,020
reconcile this chairman ? Thank you 

675
00:26:17,020 --> 00:26:19,240
for the question . I think as we 

676
00:26:19,250 --> 00:26:21,472
discussed last week , one of the things 

677
00:26:21,472 --> 00:26:23,528
and if you could hold the microphone 

678
00:26:23,528 --> 00:26:25,750
just a little closer . Thank you . Does 

679
00:26:25,750 --> 00:26:28,560
that work , sir ? There we go . One of 

680
00:26:28,560 --> 00:26:30,960
the things that actually the NPR gives 

681
00:26:30,960 --> 00:26:34,570
us an opportunity to do um is have a 

682
00:26:34,570 --> 00:26:36,570
conversation on strategy and have a 

683
00:26:36,570 --> 00:26:39,990
conversation on force posture . 

684
00:26:40,590 --> 00:26:42,868
And as a conversation we had last week , 

685
00:26:42,868 --> 00:26:45,034
I think that conversation's gonna have 

686
00:26:45,034 --> 00:26:48,470
to be had when we talk about the forces 

687
00:26:48,470 --> 00:26:51,210
that we currently have today . Um That , 

688
00:26:51,220 --> 00:26:53,442
that force that we have today was based 

689
00:26:53,442 --> 00:26:57,440
on a adversary of 

690
00:26:57,440 --> 00:26:59,662
which for the first time in the history 

691
00:26:59,662 --> 00:27:01,718
of the United States of America , we 

692
00:27:01,718 --> 00:27:04,050
now have two that are nuclear pure 

693
00:27:04,050 --> 00:27:06,272
adversaries . Now , we're going to have 

694
00:27:06,272 --> 00:27:08,494
to have this conversation in regards to 

695
00:27:08,494 --> 00:27:10,661
what does it look like now , as far as 

696
00:27:10,670 --> 00:27:13,640
force posture moving forward ? Thank 

697
00:27:13,640 --> 00:27:15,270
you . And that's a critical 

698
00:27:15,280 --> 00:27:17,391
conversation we'll all be having here 

699
00:27:17,391 --> 00:27:19,224
in the subcommittee and the full 

700
00:27:19,224 --> 00:27:22,560
committee as well on the issue of 

701
00:27:22,570 --> 00:27:24,920
electromagnetic spectrum operations 

702
00:27:24,920 --> 00:27:28,720
general . Uh Can you describe or let me 

703
00:27:28,720 --> 00:27:30,831
back up as I emphasized in my opening 

704
00:27:30,831 --> 00:27:32,830
statement , I think D O D needs to 

705
00:27:32,840 --> 00:27:35,210
commit to fixing electromagnetic 

706
00:27:35,210 --> 00:27:37,266
spectrum operations and plugging the 

707
00:27:37,266 --> 00:27:39,600
holes identified in the northern edge 

708
00:27:39,610 --> 00:27:42,400
exercise . I understand that this has 

709
00:27:42,400 --> 00:27:44,456
the attention of Secretary Hicks and 

710
00:27:44,456 --> 00:27:46,590
Admiral Grading . I hope that we will 

711
00:27:46,590 --> 00:27:49,230
have good progress on this . Can you 

712
00:27:49,230 --> 00:27:51,500
describe some of the ways that stratcom 

713
00:27:51,500 --> 00:27:53,540
relies on spectrum to support your 

714
00:27:53,540 --> 00:27:55,429
missions and what are some of the 

715
00:27:55,429 --> 00:27:58,040
future spectrum that uh spectrum 

716
00:27:58,040 --> 00:28:00,270
warfighter needs that will be essential 

717
00:28:00,270 --> 00:28:02,492
to competing with Russia and China on a 

718
00:28:02,492 --> 00:28:04,500
future battlefield if necessary . 

719
00:28:05,720 --> 00:28:07,998
Chairman . Thank you for that question . 

720
00:28:08,130 --> 00:28:10,019
You know , I don't think it's any 

721
00:28:10,019 --> 00:28:12,230
different than the requirements that 

722
00:28:12,230 --> 00:28:14,460
are with my fellow commanders that are 

723
00:28:14,460 --> 00:28:17,250
here . Stratcom depends on E M S to 

724
00:28:17,250 --> 00:28:19,320
successfully provide deterrence and 

725
00:28:19,320 --> 00:28:21,600
deliver decisive response . When called 

726
00:28:21,600 --> 00:28:24,470
upon the things that I worry about is 

727
00:28:24,470 --> 00:28:26,692
we need to ensure that we have spectrum 

728
00:28:26,692 --> 00:28:28,900
for employment of forces to maintain 

729
00:28:28,900 --> 00:28:30,890
situational awareness , to assure 

730
00:28:30,890 --> 00:28:33,620
communications via all domain space , 

731
00:28:33,620 --> 00:28:36,230
maritime , air and land and to assure 

732
00:28:36,230 --> 00:28:37,897
positioning with P and T with 

733
00:28:37,897 --> 00:28:40,230
positional navigation systems . Um What 

734
00:28:40,230 --> 00:28:43,910
we're doing within stratcom is 

735
00:28:43,920 --> 00:28:46,850
my top priority is to execute the D O D 

736
00:28:46,850 --> 00:28:48,650
E M s superiority strategy 

737
00:28:48,650 --> 00:28:51,800
implementation plan . What we're gonna 

738
00:28:51,800 --> 00:28:53,856
do is we're actually in the midst of 

739
00:28:53,856 --> 00:28:56,440
standing up a two star joint E M s 

740
00:28:56,450 --> 00:28:59,250
operation center known as the JEC 

741
00:28:59,260 --> 00:29:02,930
Direct Report to me . Um that raises 

742
00:29:02,930 --> 00:29:05,070
and aggregates force readiness across 

743
00:29:05,070 --> 00:29:07,290
the department . We'll continue to 

744
00:29:07,290 --> 00:29:08,846
ensure that the joint force 

745
00:29:08,846 --> 00:29:11,560
appropriately is organized and equipped 

746
00:29:11,570 --> 00:29:15,250
to handle E M S I am responsibility to , 

747
00:29:15,260 --> 00:29:18,310
for advocating the proper training when 

748
00:29:18,310 --> 00:29:20,990
it comes to E M S . Um And as we said , 

749
00:29:20,990 --> 00:29:23,046
like when I had my conversation with 

750
00:29:23,046 --> 00:29:24,823
you last week , what makes this 

751
00:29:24,823 --> 00:29:28,470
particularly helpful to me is the fact 

752
00:29:28,470 --> 00:29:31,580
that my direct report um will be the 

753
00:29:31,590 --> 00:29:34,010
Deputy Secretary of Defense who can 

754
00:29:34,010 --> 00:29:37,220
direct services to take action . Okay , 

755
00:29:37,220 --> 00:29:39,387
thank you . And I have a little follow 

756
00:29:39,387 --> 00:29:41,553
up on that issue and then I'll turn it 

757
00:29:41,553 --> 00:29:44,950
over to others . Um The 3.123 point 45 

758
00:29:44,950 --> 00:29:47,230
gigahertz band of radio frequency 

759
00:29:47,230 --> 00:29:49,620
spectrum is being studied by D O D and 

760
00:29:49,620 --> 00:29:51,342
the Department of Commerce for 

761
00:29:51,342 --> 00:29:53,630
consideration for auction by the FCC . 

762
00:29:53,640 --> 00:29:55,584
Can you speak to the value of this 

763
00:29:55,584 --> 00:29:59,200
specific band for target discrimination 

764
00:29:59,210 --> 00:30:01,720
at range in the atmosphere for from 

765
00:30:01,720 --> 00:30:05,300
everything from missile defense to 

766
00:30:05,300 --> 00:30:07,960
tracking Chinese spy balloons which has 

767
00:30:07,960 --> 00:30:11,140
been in the news and Dr 

768
00:30:11,310 --> 00:30:14,320
you and general cotton , please . Well , 

769
00:30:14,320 --> 00:30:16,487
from my perspective , it's , it's what 

770
00:30:16,487 --> 00:30:18,487
I have just mentioned as far as the 

771
00:30:18,487 --> 00:30:20,598
things that are required for me to be 

772
00:30:20,598 --> 00:30:22,376
able to execute and , and , and 

773
00:30:22,376 --> 00:30:26,020
exercise and employ the forces . Um I , 

774
00:30:26,020 --> 00:30:28,960
I think if we lose 

775
00:30:29,900 --> 00:30:32,500
that spectrum , all of those things I 

776
00:30:32,500 --> 00:30:35,260
had articulated to you that is required 

777
00:30:35,260 --> 00:30:37,190
for me for force employment , for 

778
00:30:37,190 --> 00:30:39,680
maintaining situational awareness , for 

779
00:30:39,680 --> 00:30:41,860
having assured navigation and timing 

780
00:30:41,870 --> 00:30:44,110
and assured comms um that could 

781
00:30:44,110 --> 00:30:46,800
potentially be lost . Um And I would , 

782
00:30:46,810 --> 00:30:49,880
I would yield to Dr Dr Plan for further 

783
00:30:49,880 --> 00:30:53,550
questions . Thanks Congressman . That 

784
00:30:53,550 --> 00:30:55,730
particular portion of the band , the S 

785
00:30:55,730 --> 00:30:57,920
band there from 312345 is absolutely 

786
00:30:57,920 --> 00:31:01,020
essential for D O D operations . Uh The 

787
00:31:01,020 --> 00:31:03,020
Department of Fence is conducting a 

788
00:31:03,020 --> 00:31:05,131
study with the Department of Commerce 

789
00:31:05,131 --> 00:31:07,390
on whether we can share that spectrum . 

790
00:31:07,400 --> 00:31:09,720
Uh for D O D , we need to be able to 

791
00:31:09,720 --> 00:31:11,942
maintain our operational capability and 

792
00:31:11,942 --> 00:31:14,164
readiness in any result . And I'll just 

793
00:31:14,164 --> 00:31:16,600
say , uh we've looked at what it might 

794
00:31:16,600 --> 00:31:18,544
take to vacate by which , I mean , 

795
00:31:18,544 --> 00:31:20,767
leave that band and go somewhere else . 

796
00:31:20,767 --> 00:31:22,933
We don't know where else we would go . 

797
00:31:22,933 --> 00:31:25,580
Uh And it would cost easily 100 and $20 

798
00:31:25,580 --> 00:31:27,636
billion probably more just to create 

799
00:31:27,636 --> 00:31:29,858
the pieces . But that isn't the same as 

800
00:31:29,858 --> 00:31:32,080
getting the studies in the physics done 

801
00:31:32,080 --> 00:31:34,302
or the recapitalization . It could take 

802
00:31:34,302 --> 00:31:36,080
easily 20 years . It's a really 

803
00:31:36,080 --> 00:31:38,136
difficult problem for us . And so we 

804
00:31:38,136 --> 00:31:40,302
think that the only viable way forward 

805
00:31:40,302 --> 00:31:42,524
is there some way to share so D O D can 

806
00:31:42,524 --> 00:31:44,858
operate there . And so other , you know , 

807
00:31:44,858 --> 00:31:43,790
commercial companies might be able to 

808
00:31:43,790 --> 00:31:46,123
use that as well without impeding on us . 

809
00:31:46,123 --> 00:31:48,012
Did you say 100 and 20 million or 

810
00:31:48,012 --> 00:31:50,234
billion ? That's billion with A B ? And 

811
00:31:50,234 --> 00:31:52,457
that's kind of our low estimate . And I 

812
00:31:52,457 --> 00:31:52,170
don't want that to be confused with 

813
00:31:52,170 --> 00:31:54,170
what it would actually cost because 

814
00:31:54,170 --> 00:31:56,170
that's really just if you look what 

815
00:31:56,170 --> 00:31:58,503
would it cost to make a new Aegis radar , 

816
00:31:58,503 --> 00:31:58,310
but that's not the same as figuring out 

817
00:31:58,310 --> 00:32:00,366
the physics and all the testing that 

818
00:32:00,366 --> 00:32:02,477
would go into figuring out what bands 

819
00:32:02,477 --> 00:32:01,970
we would have to use it in , let alone 

820
00:32:01,970 --> 00:32:04,137
the decades of experience we have with 

821
00:32:04,137 --> 00:32:06,137
the equipment now to understand how 

822
00:32:06,137 --> 00:32:08,660
they work . Okay , thank you , both . 

823
00:32:08,670 --> 00:32:11,140
Turn it over to Representative Moulton . 

824
00:32:11,150 --> 00:32:13,150
Thank you , Mr Chairman . Uh Let me 

825
00:32:13,150 --> 00:32:15,150
begin with an apology to General 

826
00:32:15,150 --> 00:32:17,372
Dickinson . I did not know that this is 

827
00:32:17,372 --> 00:32:19,580
your last hearing before us as well . 

828
00:32:19,590 --> 00:32:21,812
Uh I understand you've been serving for 

829
00:32:21,812 --> 00:32:25,570
38 years . So you've , you've outdone 

830
00:32:25,580 --> 00:32:29,170
uh your seat made by to thank you for 

831
00:32:29,170 --> 00:32:31,226
your incredible service . You're the 

832
00:32:31,226 --> 00:32:33,540
senior air defense artillery officer uh 

833
00:32:33,550 --> 00:32:35,850
in the United States Army today . And , 

834
00:32:35,850 --> 00:32:38,072
and that's a job that for a long time , 

835
00:32:38,072 --> 00:32:40,239
we didn't think was terribly important 

836
00:32:40,239 --> 00:32:42,294
because of our air superiority . And 

837
00:32:42,294 --> 00:32:44,072
now we realize how unbelievably 

838
00:32:44,072 --> 00:32:46,072
critical it is . So we've been very 

839
00:32:46,072 --> 00:32:48,239
lucky to have you . We're grateful for 

840
00:32:48,239 --> 00:32:50,072
your service . And I think I can 

841
00:32:50,072 --> 00:32:52,183
confidently say that we will probably 

842
00:32:52,183 --> 00:32:54,294
miss you more than you will miss us , 

843
00:32:54,440 --> 00:32:56,620
but good luck . Um 

844
00:32:58,170 --> 00:33:02,030
Let me start with this . Uh This is 

845
00:33:02,030 --> 00:33:04,197
for uh for General Dickinson , for you 

846
00:33:04,197 --> 00:33:07,030
and for Dr Plum , Over 10 years ago , 

847
00:33:07,030 --> 00:33:09,270
the joint operational access concept 

848
00:33:09,280 --> 00:33:11,890
predicted that quote , a logical 

849
00:33:11,890 --> 00:33:15,140
opening operation to any anti access 

850
00:33:15,140 --> 00:33:18,250
campaign China against the United 

851
00:33:18,250 --> 00:33:21,510
States is to neutralize us space assets 

852
00:33:21,520 --> 00:33:23,730
because space plays such a critical 

853
00:33:23,730 --> 00:33:26,450
role in enabling operations on the 

854
00:33:26,450 --> 00:33:30,120
Earth service . Um Dr Plum , General 

855
00:33:30,120 --> 00:33:32,176
Dickinson , do you believe this is a 

856
00:33:32,176 --> 00:33:33,509
reasonable assessment ? 

857
00:33:37,250 --> 00:33:39,306
First , of all . Thank you for those 

858
00:33:39,306 --> 00:33:41,250
kind remarks . As you , as you get 

859
00:33:41,250 --> 00:33:43,361
ready to ask the question . It's been 

860
00:33:43,361 --> 00:33:45,472
an honor to serve in the U S military 

861
00:33:45,472 --> 00:33:47,639
for 38 years . Uh to your question . I 

862
00:33:47,639 --> 00:33:49,472
think we just have to look quite 

863
00:33:49,472 --> 00:33:51,583
frankly at some of the P L A writings 

864
00:33:51,583 --> 00:33:53,417
on doctrine and strategy that do 

865
00:33:53,417 --> 00:33:55,639
suggest what you just mentioned , which 

866
00:33:55,639 --> 00:33:57,250
is that the reconnaissance , 

867
00:33:57,250 --> 00:33:59,417
communications , navigation , and even 

868
00:33:59,417 --> 00:34:01,472
early warning satellites could , I'm 

869
00:34:01,472 --> 00:34:03,639
not saying will could be among the the 

870
00:34:03,639 --> 00:34:05,750
first targets to be attacked . And so 

871
00:34:05,750 --> 00:34:07,861
it just in concordance with their own 

872
00:34:07,861 --> 00:34:10,083
strategy , their own doctrine , we have 

873
00:34:10,083 --> 00:34:12,139
reason to believe that that might be 

874
00:34:12,139 --> 00:34:14,306
the case and Dr Plummer is nodding his 

875
00:34:14,306 --> 00:34:16,028
head , so I'll take that as an 

876
00:34:16,028 --> 00:34:19,010
agreement . Um So if war with China 

877
00:34:19,010 --> 00:34:22,370
could start in space , then deterring 

878
00:34:22,380 --> 00:34:25,900
war with China seems to require having 

879
00:34:25,900 --> 00:34:28,630
an effective space deterrent . Do you 

880
00:34:28,630 --> 00:34:30,940
agree ? I do agree with that . And one 

881
00:34:30,940 --> 00:34:33,480
of the challenges with deterrence is 

882
00:34:33,490 --> 00:34:35,280
it's not just enough to have 

883
00:34:35,290 --> 00:34:37,490
capabilities that exceed your 

884
00:34:37,490 --> 00:34:39,712
adversary's capabilities . They have to 

885
00:34:39,712 --> 00:34:41,768
believe that right ? I mean , we can 

886
00:34:41,768 --> 00:34:43,934
look back and say , you know , we knew 

887
00:34:43,934 --> 00:34:45,990
we would be able to get together the 

888
00:34:45,990 --> 00:34:47,879
most remarkable coalition of NATO 

889
00:34:47,879 --> 00:34:50,101
allies since World War Two to push back 

890
00:34:50,101 --> 00:34:53,250
Russia out of Ukraine . But the problem 

891
00:34:53,250 --> 00:34:55,700
is that Vladimir Putin did not believe 

892
00:34:55,700 --> 00:34:57,990
that before he started this war . And 

893
00:34:57,990 --> 00:35:00,600
so we did not effectively deter prevent 

894
00:35:00,600 --> 00:35:03,350
this war from happening . So Dr Plumb 

895
00:35:03,350 --> 00:35:06,100
Press , we could start with you . We're 

896
00:35:06,100 --> 00:35:08,740
developing some exquisite space 

897
00:35:08,740 --> 00:35:10,910
capabilities that you are overseeing . 

898
00:35:10,920 --> 00:35:13,750
But how do we effectively communicate 

899
00:35:13,750 --> 00:35:16,740
this to our adversaries so that they 

900
00:35:16,740 --> 00:35:20,170
believe it ? Thanks Congressman . I 

901
00:35:20,170 --> 00:35:22,337
would say just to start with , I think 

902
00:35:22,337 --> 00:35:25,580
they , they know that well , we have 

903
00:35:25,580 --> 00:35:27,636
space superiority right now and they 

904
00:35:27,636 --> 00:35:29,691
know that this is not an opportunity 

905
00:35:29,691 --> 00:35:32,024
for them to move forward . And our goal , 

906
00:35:32,024 --> 00:35:30,990
the Department of Defense is to make 

907
00:35:30,990 --> 00:35:34,210
sure that really every day that 

908
00:35:34,220 --> 00:35:36,500
President G wakes up is not the day 

909
00:35:36,500 --> 00:35:38,722
that he thinks this is worth an attempt 

910
00:35:38,722 --> 00:35:40,889
to go after Taiwan . And we use Taiwan 

911
00:35:40,889 --> 00:35:43,111
as our pacing scenario . I think it's a 

912
00:35:43,111 --> 00:35:42,790
good frame of reference regardless of 

913
00:35:42,790 --> 00:35:45,660
the actual scenario we play out . Um 

914
00:35:45,670 --> 00:35:47,570
I'll just say on , I think you're 

915
00:35:47,570 --> 00:35:49,459
getting to the reveal , concealed 

916
00:35:49,459 --> 00:35:51,459
question and I actually think uh we 

917
00:35:51,459 --> 00:35:54,470
should not overlook uh statecraft as 

918
00:35:54,470 --> 00:35:56,470
well , right . So we do communicate 

919
00:35:57,080 --> 00:35:59,320
back and forth between nations and they 

920
00:35:59,320 --> 00:36:01,510
use their statecraft to see or to try 

921
00:36:01,510 --> 00:36:03,288
to discern what we're doing . I 

922
00:36:03,288 --> 00:36:05,510
personally believe there is great value 

923
00:36:05,510 --> 00:36:08,610
in some ambiguity . Um But your point 

924
00:36:08,610 --> 00:36:10,777
is well taken . General Dickinson , do 

925
00:36:10,777 --> 00:36:12,721
you have ? I know you've worked in 

926
00:36:12,721 --> 00:36:14,943
particular on declassifying some of the 

927
00:36:14,943 --> 00:36:16,721
work that we're doing to better 

928
00:36:16,721 --> 00:36:18,832
communicate this to our adversaries . 

929
00:36:18,832 --> 00:36:20,888
Do you have anything to add ? Yeah , 

930
00:36:20,888 --> 00:36:23,054
that , that is one of the areas within 

931
00:36:23,054 --> 00:36:22,850
the command that we're looking very 

932
00:36:22,850 --> 00:36:25,460
closely at is how do we get to uh you 

933
00:36:25,460 --> 00:36:27,571
mentioned the allies and partners and 

934
00:36:27,571 --> 00:36:29,682
how critical they are not only in the 

935
00:36:29,682 --> 00:36:31,904
space domain and what we do there , but 

936
00:36:31,904 --> 00:36:34,127
the other domains as well . And so when 

937
00:36:34,127 --> 00:36:36,238
we look to integrate and operate with 

938
00:36:36,238 --> 00:36:38,460
the allies and partners , it's critical 

939
00:36:38,460 --> 00:36:40,682
that we take a very close look at , you 

940
00:36:40,682 --> 00:36:42,404
know , over classification and 

941
00:36:42,404 --> 00:36:44,460
classification period so that we can 

942
00:36:44,460 --> 00:36:46,516
share necessary information with our 

943
00:36:46,516 --> 00:36:48,738
allies and partners . And we're working 

944
00:36:48,738 --> 00:36:48,420
on that every day . And us space 

945
00:36:48,420 --> 00:36:50,690
command , we've had a couple of uh 

946
00:36:50,700 --> 00:36:52,811
areas where we've had some success in 

947
00:36:52,811 --> 00:36:55,180
that . Like for example , uh we run 

948
00:36:55,190 --> 00:36:57,357
operation Olympic defender every day , 

949
00:36:57,357 --> 00:36:59,357
which is really the operations that 

950
00:36:59,357 --> 00:37:00,690
does our space enabling 

951
00:37:00,690 --> 00:37:02,801
responsibilities to the joint force . 

952
00:37:02,801 --> 00:37:04,801
Uh Each and every day that has been 

953
00:37:04,880 --> 00:37:06,970
traditionally held at a , at a no 

954
00:37:06,970 --> 00:37:08,970
foreign level . And just within the 

955
00:37:08,970 --> 00:37:11,026
last year , we've been able to start 

956
00:37:11,026 --> 00:37:13,081
sharing that with the five eyes . Uh 

957
00:37:13,081 --> 00:37:14,970
There's many other examples , but 

958
00:37:14,970 --> 00:37:14,780
that's , that's one in particular that 

959
00:37:14,780 --> 00:37:16,891
I think is worth noting . Thank you , 

960
00:37:16,891 --> 00:37:19,169
General Dickens . Another question for , 

961
00:37:19,169 --> 00:37:22,050
for you as everyone on this committee , 

962
00:37:22,050 --> 00:37:25,090
well knows the D O D has not invested 

963
00:37:25,090 --> 00:37:27,550
sufficiently in space until quite 

964
00:37:27,560 --> 00:37:30,730
recently . My question is , will the 

965
00:37:30,730 --> 00:37:33,700
budget that we receive tomorrow have 

966
00:37:33,710 --> 00:37:37,390
enough in it to uh protect , defend and 

967
00:37:37,390 --> 00:37:40,710
reconstitute our space assets and , and 

968
00:37:40,710 --> 00:37:42,920
where should we invest more ? Well , 

969
00:37:42,930 --> 00:37:45,110
first of all , I would say , since we 

970
00:37:45,110 --> 00:37:47,320
have stood up in 2019 as a combat 

971
00:37:47,320 --> 00:37:50,430
command , the Congress's support to 

972
00:37:50,430 --> 00:37:52,652
what we're doing . And I even mentioned 

973
00:37:52,652 --> 00:37:54,874
it in my opening statement where I said 

974
00:37:54,874 --> 00:37:57,097
helping us sustain primacy in the space 

975
00:37:57,097 --> 00:37:59,208
domain has been very good and I thank 

976
00:37:59,208 --> 00:38:01,319
thank the Congress for the monies and 

977
00:38:01,319 --> 00:38:03,652
the resources that are going towards us . 

978
00:38:03,652 --> 00:38:05,819
In that effect . The command has had a 

979
00:38:05,819 --> 00:38:07,819
good opportunity over the last four 

980
00:38:07,819 --> 00:38:09,930
years as well to start developing the 

981
00:38:09,930 --> 00:38:12,041
requirements that we need and support 

982
00:38:12,041 --> 00:38:14,152
of our operations . And we've , we've 

983
00:38:14,152 --> 00:38:16,374
done a lot of that . We've been able to 

984
00:38:16,374 --> 00:38:18,097
codify that through the normal 

985
00:38:18,097 --> 00:38:20,041
processes within the department in 

986
00:38:20,041 --> 00:38:22,208
terms of identifying requirements . Uh 

987
00:38:22,208 --> 00:38:24,440
I C D s , for example , John's uh 

988
00:38:24,450 --> 00:38:26,850
apples those kinds of normal functions 

989
00:38:26,850 --> 00:38:28,794
within the command to put a demand 

990
00:38:28,794 --> 00:38:30,850
signal if you will on the department 

991
00:38:30,850 --> 00:38:32,794
and what we will need in the space 

992
00:38:32,794 --> 00:38:35,128
domain . So I'm , I'm pleased with that . 

993
00:38:35,128 --> 00:38:37,239
And uh again , I think if you look at 

994
00:38:37,239 --> 00:38:39,461
what one of my , my number one priority 

995
00:38:39,461 --> 00:38:41,572
is in terms of what more do I need is 

996
00:38:41,572 --> 00:38:43,794
the ability to increase my space domain 

997
00:38:43,794 --> 00:38:46,750
awareness . So as we look to today and 

998
00:38:46,750 --> 00:38:48,806
into the future and with the growing 

999
00:38:48,806 --> 00:38:50,917
congestion , if you will in the space 

1000
00:38:50,917 --> 00:38:53,270
domain , with regards to current 

1001
00:38:53,270 --> 00:38:55,159
satellites operating satellites , 

1002
00:38:55,159 --> 00:38:57,550
defunct satellites , debris itself , 

1003
00:38:57,560 --> 00:38:59,727
it's becoming a bigger challenge to be 

1004
00:38:59,727 --> 00:39:01,838
able to do that . We have to have the 

1005
00:39:01,838 --> 00:39:03,782
capabilities to be able to see and 

1006
00:39:03,782 --> 00:39:05,782
characterize what's going on in the 

1007
00:39:05,782 --> 00:39:07,949
space domain . So top priority for the 

1008
00:39:07,949 --> 00:39:10,116
command right now is to make sure that 

1009
00:39:10,116 --> 00:39:09,960
we increase that . And I can go into 

1010
00:39:09,960 --> 00:39:11,720
details if you like on Howard 

1011
00:39:11,720 --> 00:39:13,609
approaching that . No , it's very 

1012
00:39:13,609 --> 00:39:15,776
helpful and , and a message that we've 

1013
00:39:15,776 --> 00:39:17,887
heard loud and clear from General Van 

1014
00:39:17,887 --> 00:39:19,664
Herk is the domain awareness is 

1015
00:39:19,664 --> 00:39:21,831
absolutely critical and something that 

1016
00:39:21,831 --> 00:39:21,820
we need to , to improve . So he maybe 

1017
00:39:21,820 --> 00:39:24,042
two years your junior , but he's , he's 

1018
00:39:24,042 --> 00:39:26,153
very much following in your footsteps 

1019
00:39:26,153 --> 00:39:28,153
on that and that on that count . Uh 

1020
00:39:28,153 --> 00:39:30,940
General Cotton final question . Um uh 

1021
00:39:31,180 --> 00:39:33,480
Mr Banks , I guess he's departed for a 

1022
00:39:33,480 --> 00:39:35,750
time , but he and I co chair the future 

1023
00:39:35,750 --> 00:39:38,850
defense task force . And we looked at a 

1024
00:39:38,850 --> 00:39:41,550
lot of things across the spectrum of 

1025
00:39:41,560 --> 00:39:44,640
war fighting and um you know , try to 

1026
00:39:44,640 --> 00:39:46,696
determine where we need to be in the 

1027
00:39:46,696 --> 00:39:48,807
future . And of course , we focused a 

1028
00:39:48,807 --> 00:39:50,862
lot of technology and the technology 

1029
00:39:50,862 --> 00:39:52,918
that we need to invest in um to keep 

1030
00:39:52,918 --> 00:39:55,140
pace uh with our adversaries across the 

1031
00:39:55,140 --> 00:39:57,370
globe . But another point that we made 

1032
00:39:57,370 --> 00:39:59,426
is it's not enough just to invest in 

1033
00:39:59,426 --> 00:40:01,314
technology . You have to know how 

1034
00:40:01,314 --> 00:40:03,481
you're gonna use that technology . And 

1035
00:40:03,481 --> 00:40:05,648
sometimes in the past , we've made the 

1036
00:40:05,648 --> 00:40:07,481
mistake of pursuing a technology 

1037
00:40:07,481 --> 00:40:09,703
because it seems like the hot new thing 

1038
00:40:09,703 --> 00:40:11,926
without having a clear understanding of 

1039
00:40:11,926 --> 00:40:11,380
how we might actually employ that 

1040
00:40:11,380 --> 00:40:13,602
technology and therefore sometimes that 

1041
00:40:13,602 --> 00:40:15,900
money goes to waste . So we're putting 

1042
00:40:15,900 --> 00:40:18,067
a lot of money into hypersonic . But I 

1043
00:40:18,067 --> 00:40:21,690
asked this question . Uh but I asked 

1044
00:40:21,690 --> 00:40:25,390
this question recently , last year of , 

1045
00:40:25,400 --> 00:40:27,456
of some of your , of your colleagues 

1046
00:40:27,456 --> 00:40:29,567
and people at the department , how do 

1047
00:40:29,567 --> 00:40:32,540
you actually plan to employ hypersonic 

1048
00:40:32,540 --> 00:40:34,680
weapons where we can invest a lot of 

1049
00:40:34,680 --> 00:40:36,791
them because China has them too ? But 

1050
00:40:36,791 --> 00:40:39,124
how do you actually plan to employ them ? 

1051
00:40:39,124 --> 00:40:41,236
What are the operational concepts for 

1052
00:40:41,236 --> 00:40:43,347
the use of hypersonic weapons ? And I 

1053
00:40:43,347 --> 00:40:44,958
can tell you , we got a very 

1054
00:40:44,958 --> 00:40:47,236
dissatisfying answer . A lot of stairs , 

1055
00:40:47,236 --> 00:40:49,402
a lot of blank stares saying we're not 

1056
00:40:49,402 --> 00:40:51,730
quite sure yet . Well , that's not a 

1057
00:40:51,730 --> 00:40:53,897
good enough reason to invest them . So 

1058
00:40:53,897 --> 00:40:56,008
tell us how your thinking has evolved 

1059
00:40:56,008 --> 00:40:58,890
on the employment of hypersonic and why 

1060
00:40:58,900 --> 00:41:00,956
you explain to the American people , 

1061
00:41:00,956 --> 00:41:03,067
why it's critical that we put such an 

1062
00:41:03,067 --> 00:41:05,320
enormous amount of money into these new 

1063
00:41:05,320 --> 00:41:06,320
weapons systems ? 

1064
00:41:09,990 --> 00:41:12,240
Thank you . Ranking . I think the , the 

1065
00:41:12,240 --> 00:41:14,610
answer to that is , is simple . Our 

1066
00:41:14,610 --> 00:41:16,554
adversaries already have them as a 

1067
00:41:16,554 --> 00:41:18,710
baseline . So they're using them as 

1068
00:41:18,720 --> 00:41:20,664
they're using them as a deterrence 

1069
00:41:20,664 --> 00:41:24,250
already . Um When it comes to us 

1070
00:41:24,260 --> 00:41:27,080
within stratcom , one of the things 

1071
00:41:27,080 --> 00:41:30,110
that we're already doing is uh we're 

1072
00:41:30,110 --> 00:41:33,770
prepared to , to accept uh 

1073
00:41:33,780 --> 00:41:37,210
utilizing hypersonic weapons as a 

1074
00:41:37,210 --> 00:41:40,050
strategic deterrent weapon because it 

1075
00:41:40,050 --> 00:41:43,850
has strategic effects . Um So one of 

1076
00:41:43,850 --> 00:41:45,961
the things that , that we're thinking 

1077
00:41:45,961 --> 00:41:48,183
through on my staff and that , that I'm 

1078
00:41:48,183 --> 00:41:50,950
having my team do is to understand 

1079
00:41:50,960 --> 00:41:52,849
knowing that we're gonna have low 

1080
00:41:52,849 --> 00:41:55,740
density , high demand assets at the 

1081
00:41:55,740 --> 00:41:58,710
beginning that we can help in the 

1082
00:41:58,710 --> 00:42:00,821
planning and understanding and how we 

1083
00:42:00,821 --> 00:42:02,877
want to execute those weapons , just 

1084
00:42:02,877 --> 00:42:05,099
like we do any other strategic weapon . 

1085
00:42:05,099 --> 00:42:07,580
That's not to say that when the cash 

1086
00:42:07,590 --> 00:42:10,020
gets a lot larger that it has to stay 

1087
00:42:10,020 --> 00:42:12,420
that way . But from my , my vantage 

1088
00:42:12,420 --> 00:42:15,640
point as a strategic deterrent um 

1089
00:42:16,450 --> 00:42:18,561
lead , if you will from , from , from 

1090
00:42:18,561 --> 00:42:22,070
stratcom , um I see that as the , the 

1091
00:42:22,080 --> 00:42:24,247
entering argument on what I want to be 

1092
00:42:24,247 --> 00:42:26,730
able to do and utilize and oh by the 

1093
00:42:26,730 --> 00:42:29,290
way , the complementary factors of what 

1094
00:42:29,300 --> 00:42:31,920
it can do uh with the , with the 

1095
00:42:31,920 --> 00:42:35,200
nuclear force as well as just strategic 

1096
00:42:35,200 --> 00:42:37,144
deterrence at large . So there's a 

1097
00:42:37,144 --> 00:42:40,090
nuclear deterrent aspect to this where 

1098
00:42:40,090 --> 00:42:42,690
hypersonic can be complementary to some 

1099
00:42:42,690 --> 00:42:45,260
of the effects that we would do um in 

1100
00:42:45,260 --> 00:42:47,860
our planning as well as what you would 

1101
00:42:47,860 --> 00:42:50,193
see from conventional long range strike . 

1102
00:42:50,193 --> 00:42:52,471
Let me ask one quick corollary to that . 

1103
00:42:52,471 --> 00:42:56,200
Uh a lot of uh theorists about nuclear 

1104
00:42:56,200 --> 00:42:58,920
weapons would argue that the weapons 

1105
00:42:58,920 --> 00:43:00,864
that we've had for some time , the 

1106
00:43:00,864 --> 00:43:02,864
triad including I C B M s which are 

1107
00:43:02,864 --> 00:43:04,698
sort of horrific and concept are 

1108
00:43:04,698 --> 00:43:06,920
actually stabilizing weapons . I mean , 

1109
00:43:06,920 --> 00:43:08,864
they've prevented , they've helped 

1110
00:43:08,864 --> 00:43:11,510
prevent war between our super uh super 

1111
00:43:11,510 --> 00:43:13,970
powers for , for decades . Do you 

1112
00:43:13,970 --> 00:43:15,930
believe that hypersonic are a 

1113
00:43:15,930 --> 00:43:19,470
stabilizing or destabilizing strategic 

1114
00:43:19,470 --> 00:43:22,970
weapon ? I see hypersonic weapons just 

1115
00:43:22,970 --> 00:43:25,192
like I see the I C B M S as stabilizing 

1116
00:43:25,192 --> 00:43:27,414
weapons . Okay . Well , I will tell you 

1117
00:43:27,414 --> 00:43:29,470
a lot of people disagree and I think 

1118
00:43:29,470 --> 00:43:28,520
this is something we need to get to the 

1119
00:43:28,520 --> 00:43:30,920
bottom of . Thank you very much . And 

1120
00:43:30,930 --> 00:43:34,730
uh Mr Chairman Representative Turner . 

1121
00:43:35,030 --> 00:43:37,180
Well , I certainly think that 

1122
00:43:37,190 --> 00:43:39,357
hypersonic weapons in the hands of our 

1123
00:43:39,357 --> 00:43:42,020
adversaries are destabilizing , um , 

1124
00:43:42,030 --> 00:43:44,760
the uh cotton you . And I had the 

1125
00:43:44,760 --> 00:43:47,270
opportunity to talk about the concerns 

1126
00:43:47,280 --> 00:43:49,760
of Russia stepping out of new start . 

1127
00:43:49,770 --> 00:43:53,550
Um United States took several steps um 

1128
00:43:53,560 --> 00:43:56,120
to comply with new start . 

1129
00:43:57,180 --> 00:44:00,620
Um , the , um , I for one 

1130
00:44:00,630 --> 00:44:02,940
believe that if they step out of new 

1131
00:44:02,940 --> 00:44:05,218
start , we should not give them a pass . 

1132
00:44:05,218 --> 00:44:06,996
We shouldn't say we're going to 

1133
00:44:06,996 --> 00:44:09,162
continue to comply and stay within new 

1134
00:44:09,162 --> 00:44:11,440
start and you can do whatever you want . 

1135
00:44:11,440 --> 00:44:13,496
Um That means of course , that we're 

1136
00:44:13,496 --> 00:44:15,329
going to have to up our game for 

1137
00:44:15,329 --> 00:44:17,496
deterrence because if they're going to 

1138
00:44:17,496 --> 00:44:20,790
expand their nuclear uh inventory , but 

1139
00:44:20,790 --> 00:44:22,901
also continue to expand their nuclear 

1140
00:44:22,901 --> 00:44:24,623
weapons capabilities , which I 

1141
00:44:24,623 --> 00:44:26,512
personally believe are many first 

1142
00:44:26,512 --> 00:44:28,457
strike weapon capabilities . We're 

1143
00:44:28,457 --> 00:44:30,568
gonna have to look at RE Merv , we're 

1144
00:44:30,568 --> 00:44:32,623
gonna have to be looking at the , at 

1145
00:44:32,623 --> 00:44:35,010
the B one , the B 52 . How do we ensure 

1146
00:44:35,020 --> 00:44:37,650
the dual capability and the uh 

1147
00:44:38,180 --> 00:44:41,020
Prevalence of the F- 35 and certainly 

1148
00:44:41,020 --> 00:44:44,360
the expeditious um , completion and 

1149
00:44:44,360 --> 00:44:47,160
deployment of the B- 21 . My question 

1150
00:44:47,160 --> 00:44:49,490
to you is as we look out at all the 

1151
00:44:49,490 --> 00:44:51,601
things that we need to do , let's say 

1152
00:44:51,601 --> 00:44:53,768
there we wake up tomorrow and there is 

1153
00:44:53,768 --> 00:44:56,080
no new start . Are there things the 

1154
00:44:56,080 --> 00:44:58,920
United States could and should do in 

1155
00:44:58,920 --> 00:45:00,976
response to that , that could ensure 

1156
00:45:00,976 --> 00:45:03,198
our deterrence of our adversary that is 

1157
00:45:03,198 --> 00:45:05,087
self declared , which is Russia . 

1158
00:45:06,670 --> 00:45:08,892
Thanks for that , that question , sir . 

1159
00:45:08,892 --> 00:45:12,010
First of all , nuclear responsible 

1160
00:45:12,010 --> 00:45:14,780
nuclear parties stick to the treaties 

1161
00:45:14,780 --> 00:45:17,980
that they signed up for . Um , 

1162
00:45:17,990 --> 00:45:20,290
suspending an S T um , from the 

1163
00:45:20,290 --> 00:45:22,234
restaurant's perspective , from my 

1164
00:45:22,234 --> 00:45:24,630
perspective is irresponsible . That 

1165
00:45:24,630 --> 00:45:27,580
being said , my responsibility is to be 

1166
00:45:27,580 --> 00:45:29,413
able to offer flexible deterrent 

1167
00:45:29,413 --> 00:45:33,330
options to the president . Um And we've 

1168
00:45:33,330 --> 00:45:35,600
already , we've already worked and , 

1169
00:45:35,600 --> 00:45:38,060
and have always worked in stratcom to 

1170
00:45:38,060 --> 00:45:40,160
be able to offer flexible deterrent 

1171
00:45:40,170 --> 00:45:42,740
options when required . So to answer 

1172
00:45:42,740 --> 00:45:44,684
your question , flexible deterrent 

1173
00:45:44,684 --> 00:45:46,684
options are always available to the 

1174
00:45:46,684 --> 00:45:49,160
president of United States . Excellent 

1175
00:45:49,170 --> 00:45:52,480
job van hurt . Um We've 

1176
00:45:52,480 --> 00:45:55,180
obviously had an , a 

1177
00:45:55,920 --> 00:45:58,190
relatively robust conversation 

1178
00:45:58,200 --> 00:46:00,900
nationwide about our capabilities to , 

1179
00:46:00,910 --> 00:46:03,970
to see and understand threats and 

1180
00:46:03,970 --> 00:46:07,390
warnings uh to uh 

1181
00:46:07,400 --> 00:46:09,750
the United States and North America . 

1182
00:46:10,310 --> 00:46:12,710
Um We are also in the process of 

1183
00:46:12,710 --> 00:46:14,599
reinvesting because some of these 

1184
00:46:14,599 --> 00:46:16,720
systems are very old and of course , 

1185
00:46:16,720 --> 00:46:20,020
some of these systems now with the um 

1186
00:46:20,030 --> 00:46:22,460
with China's having China , having 

1187
00:46:22,460 --> 00:46:26,110
chosen to test a hypersonic 

1188
00:46:26,120 --> 00:46:28,780
weapon that orbits the earth that looks 

1189
00:46:28,780 --> 00:46:31,000
like it's something that could be um 

1190
00:46:31,010 --> 00:46:34,120
remain in orbit and be a space to 

1191
00:46:34,120 --> 00:46:37,940
ground weapon and for which um all 

1192
00:46:37,940 --> 00:46:40,680
indications are of their intentions to 

1193
00:46:40,680 --> 00:46:42,736
perhaps make this a nuclear weapon . 

1194
00:46:42,736 --> 00:46:44,958
We're gonna have to look at , how do we 

1195
00:46:44,958 --> 00:46:48,140
see better how do we , um , get greater 

1196
00:46:48,140 --> 00:46:50,840
fidelity . How do we look at areas 

1197
00:46:50,840 --> 00:46:52,970
where we might have blind spots ? But 

1198
00:46:52,970 --> 00:46:55,137
the next step we're gonna have to look 

1199
00:46:55,137 --> 00:46:59,100
at is as China increases its nuclear 

1200
00:46:59,100 --> 00:47:01,322
weapons capabilities in China and , and 

1201
00:47:01,322 --> 00:47:03,378
Russia increases its nuclear weapons 

1202
00:47:03,378 --> 00:47:05,489
capability , that we're gonna be sort 

1203
00:47:05,489 --> 00:47:07,656
of beyond a world that's just mutually 

1204
00:47:07,656 --> 00:47:09,878
assured destruction and deterrence of , 

1205
00:47:09,878 --> 00:47:11,933
we have nuclear weapons and you have 

1206
00:47:11,933 --> 00:47:11,860
nuclear weapons . China is building 

1207
00:47:11,860 --> 00:47:13,971
them at such a pace that it's clearly 

1208
00:47:13,971 --> 00:47:16,138
not just their territorial integrity , 

1209
00:47:16,138 --> 00:47:18,304
that they're , they're concerned about 

1210
00:47:18,304 --> 00:47:20,416
their building them at , at this pace 

1211
00:47:20,416 --> 00:47:22,638
where we can even see in non classified 

1212
00:47:22,638 --> 00:47:26,400
areas , their new I C B M S areas . Um 

1213
00:47:26,410 --> 00:47:28,521
If we're gonna go beyond deterrence , 

1214
00:47:28,521 --> 00:47:30,854
we're gonna have to add missile defense . 

1215
00:47:30,854 --> 00:47:33,077
We're gonna have to add missile defense 

1216
00:47:33,077 --> 00:47:32,050
and we're gonna have to add it in a 

1217
00:47:32,050 --> 00:47:34,950
robust fashion where we look at China 

1218
00:47:34,950 --> 00:47:38,760
and Russia as perhaps perpetrators 

1219
00:47:40,120 --> 00:47:42,090
to do . So , we're gonna have to 

1220
00:47:42,100 --> 00:47:45,360
upgrade um what we look at for radars 

1221
00:47:45,360 --> 00:47:47,471
and sensing for North America . Could 

1222
00:47:47,471 --> 00:47:49,582
you speak for a minute about what our 

1223
00:47:49,582 --> 00:47:51,304
current system is , what we're 

1224
00:47:51,304 --> 00:47:53,527
currently planning on doing for upgrade 

1225
00:47:53,527 --> 00:47:55,749
and what would that leap look like that 

1226
00:47:55,749 --> 00:47:55,730
we would have to do in order to be able 

1227
00:47:55,730 --> 00:47:57,841
to integrated missile defense for the 

1228
00:47:57,841 --> 00:48:00,700
United States ? Yeah , thank , thank 

1229
00:48:00,700 --> 00:48:03,033
you for the questions first to be clear . 

1230
00:48:03,033 --> 00:48:05,144
Um Our missile defense today does not 

1231
00:48:05,144 --> 00:48:07,170
from a policy perspective , defend 

1232
00:48:07,170 --> 00:48:09,380
against Chinese , this is a question 

1233
00:48:09,390 --> 00:48:12,090
okay Chinese or Russian radar question . 

1234
00:48:12,100 --> 00:48:15,820
So uh first , I'm concerned and very 

1235
00:48:15,820 --> 00:48:18,080
challenged for domain awareness , I'll 

1236
00:48:18,080 --> 00:48:20,520
start with hypersonic . Uh If you can't 

1237
00:48:20,520 --> 00:48:22,353
see hypersonic , it's hard to do 

1238
00:48:22,353 --> 00:48:24,242
continuity of government and it's 

1239
00:48:24,242 --> 00:48:26,242
certainly hard to , to protect your 

1240
00:48:26,242 --> 00:48:26,170
nuclear posture . So therefore , I 

1241
00:48:26,170 --> 00:48:28,730
would say that would be destabilizing 

1242
00:48:28,730 --> 00:48:31,450
or road our strategic stability from a 

1243
00:48:31,460 --> 00:48:33,460
standpoint of not being able to see 

1244
00:48:33,460 --> 00:48:35,682
them from the way forward . I would ask 

1245
00:48:35,682 --> 00:48:37,849
two things for radars over the horizon 

1246
00:48:37,849 --> 00:48:40,182
radars . We need those soon as possible . 

1247
00:48:40,182 --> 00:48:42,127
10 years to field over the horizon 

1248
00:48:42,127 --> 00:48:44,238
radars does not make sense . Then the 

1249
00:48:44,238 --> 00:48:46,404
question becomes , what do you do with 

1250
00:48:46,404 --> 00:48:46,200
the data and information from those 

1251
00:48:46,200 --> 00:48:48,420
over the horizon radars that needs to 

1252
00:48:48,420 --> 00:48:50,364
feed an integrated air and missile 

1253
00:48:50,364 --> 00:48:52,420
defense system that ultimately feeds 

1254
00:48:52,420 --> 00:48:54,660
some type of a endgame effect . Er that 

1255
00:48:54,660 --> 00:48:56,549
could be non kinetic or kinetic . 

1256
00:48:56,549 --> 00:48:58,520
Either one , this problem is much 

1257
00:48:58,520 --> 00:49:00,742
larger than radars , by the way , it is 

1258
00:49:00,742 --> 00:49:03,790
also the P leo uh us based forces 

1259
00:49:03,790 --> 00:49:06,012
feeling to give us domain awareness for 

1260
00:49:06,012 --> 00:49:08,179
hypersonic and other missile systems . 

1261
00:49:08,610 --> 00:49:12,540
Thank you . Thank you Mr Garamendi . 

1262
00:49:15,840 --> 00:49:18,062
Thank you , Mr Chairman . Thank you for 

1263
00:49:18,062 --> 00:49:20,284
the meeting and congratulations on your 

1264
00:49:20,284 --> 00:49:22,451
chairmanship and Mr Moulton , the same 

1265
00:49:22,451 --> 00:49:26,040
on the ranking . Um fascinating 

1266
00:49:26,040 --> 00:49:28,650
discussion thus far , I'm gonna ask the 

1267
00:49:28,650 --> 00:49:30,761
big question , a question that's been 

1268
00:49:30,761 --> 00:49:32,539
on my mind since I came to this 

1269
00:49:32,539 --> 00:49:34,850
committee and that is uh gentlemen , 

1270
00:49:34,850 --> 00:49:37,700
are we now the United States engaged in 

1271
00:49:37,700 --> 00:49:41,690
a new nuclear arms race . Mr Plum 

1272
00:49:41,690 --> 00:49:43,857
and then on down the line . Yes . No , 

1273
00:49:43,857 --> 00:49:45,301
and qualify if you want . 

1274
00:49:48,520 --> 00:49:52,220
Thanks congressman . I , I don't 

1275
00:49:52,220 --> 00:49:54,387
think I would characterize it as a new 

1276
00:49:54,387 --> 00:49:57,030
nuclear arms race based on current 

1277
00:49:57,030 --> 00:49:58,697
numbers and based on what the 

1278
00:49:58,697 --> 00:50:00,808
historical arms race looked like when 

1279
00:50:00,808 --> 00:50:03,030
the numbers were , you know , multiples 

1280
00:50:03,030 --> 00:50:05,030
of this , a different , a different 

1281
00:50:05,030 --> 00:50:06,863
kind , maybe a capabilities race 

1282
00:50:06,863 --> 00:50:09,030
perhaps . I don't know if that's quite 

1283
00:50:09,030 --> 00:50:10,808
the same as nuclear inventory . 

1284
00:50:10,808 --> 00:50:12,919
Cotton's new strategic weapon similar 

1285
00:50:12,919 --> 00:50:14,863
to national , similar to a nuclear 

1286
00:50:14,863 --> 00:50:16,530
weapon , otherwise known as a 

1287
00:50:16,530 --> 00:50:19,010
hypersonic . I think that's what he 

1288
00:50:19,010 --> 00:50:20,010
just said . 

1289
00:50:22,630 --> 00:50:24,741
Correct . General Cotton , didn't you 

1290
00:50:24,741 --> 00:50:28,690
just say that ? I said that if you were 

1291
00:50:28,690 --> 00:50:30,968
to ask what we could use as far as can , 

1292
00:50:30,968 --> 00:50:33,510
can a hypersonic be seen as a strategic 

1293
00:50:33,520 --> 00:50:36,260
weapon ? And then you went on to say 

1294
00:50:37,060 --> 00:50:40,940
part of the nuclear , I said it could 

1295
00:50:40,940 --> 00:50:44,540
be complementary to our , our nuclear 

1296
00:50:44,540 --> 00:50:47,190
forces . In other words , part thereof . 

1297
00:50:48,630 --> 00:50:50,570
No , because sir , we still use 

1298
00:50:50,570 --> 00:50:53,460
conventional forces uh to complement 

1299
00:50:53,470 --> 00:50:55,330
our , our nuclear forces today . 

1300
00:50:57,680 --> 00:51:01,130
So it is not a strategic weapon . 

1301
00:51:02,800 --> 00:51:05,640
You can have conventional weapons as 

1302
00:51:05,640 --> 00:51:07,750
opposed to just nuclear strategic 

1303
00:51:07,750 --> 00:51:09,920
weapons is , is what I was alluding to 

1304
00:51:09,930 --> 00:51:12,670
similar to a high mar being a strategic 

1305
00:51:14,900 --> 00:51:18,110
weapon . I guess I want to know where 

1306
00:51:18,110 --> 00:51:20,830
you're going here . Are we going to 

1307
00:51:20,840 --> 00:51:23,810
consider the hypersonic weapon being 

1308
00:51:23,810 --> 00:51:27,590
part of our strategic defense systems 

1309
00:51:31,110 --> 00:51:34,370
as we consider the nuclear triad to be 

1310
00:51:34,470 --> 00:51:36,200
part of our strategic . 

1311
00:51:40,620 --> 00:51:43,050
So congressman , I'd say the word 

1312
00:51:43,050 --> 00:51:45,550
strategic Cotton , general cotton , you 

1313
00:51:45,550 --> 00:51:47,772
raised this issue . What's the answer ? 

1314
00:51:48,290 --> 00:51:51,150
What I'm saying is strategic deterrence 

1315
00:51:51,160 --> 00:51:53,650
is not just nuclear , strategic 

1316
00:51:53,650 --> 00:51:55,470
deterrence can also be through 

1317
00:51:55,470 --> 00:51:57,960
conventional means . We do it every day 

1318
00:51:57,960 --> 00:51:59,904
today . Then why did you raise the 

1319
00:51:59,904 --> 00:52:01,738
question of the hypersonic being 

1320
00:52:01,738 --> 00:52:04,240
specifically in that array ? I did not . 

1321
00:52:04,250 --> 00:52:07,470
I said it could actually complement uh 

1322
00:52:09,860 --> 00:52:13,810
enough of that . Um We've 

1323
00:52:13,810 --> 00:52:16,870
got this issue of the slick , um which 

1324
00:52:16,870 --> 00:52:20,760
is a strange name . Uh The United 

1325
00:52:20,760 --> 00:52:22,970
States already deploys a low yield 

1326
00:52:22,970 --> 00:52:26,610
warhead , 76 2 on submarine based 

1327
00:52:26,610 --> 00:52:30,120
missiles . And we have the B- 

1328
00:52:30,120 --> 00:52:33,920
61-12 low yield and we have , we 

1329
00:52:33,920 --> 00:52:36,031
will soon , I suppose or someday have 

1330
00:52:36,031 --> 00:52:38,031
an L S R O that's nuclear capable . 

1331
00:52:39,830 --> 00:52:41,720
Why do we need a slick ? Um 

1332
00:52:43,680 --> 00:52:45,847
Which one of you want to answer that , 

1333
00:52:45,847 --> 00:52:48,340
I guess Mr Plum 

1334
00:52:49,460 --> 00:52:51,571
uh Congressman , the administration's 

1335
00:52:51,571 --> 00:52:55,520
position is that we do not . Oh , well , 

1336
00:52:55,520 --> 00:52:57,464
the administer the Congress thinks 

1337
00:52:57,464 --> 00:53:01,170
differently , unfortunately . So we're , 

1338
00:53:01,170 --> 00:53:04,620
and what does that mean for our nuclear 

1339
00:53:05,470 --> 00:53:08,720
submarines that are presently not 

1340
00:53:08,810 --> 00:53:12,000
necessarily stationed at 

1341
00:53:12,930 --> 00:53:16,510
ports where nuclear weapons 

1342
00:53:16,510 --> 00:53:20,140
are allowed ? It changes 

1343
00:53:20,140 --> 00:53:22,140
everything , doesn't it , if we put 

1344
00:53:22,140 --> 00:53:25,570
this on our attack submarines ? Uh 

1345
00:53:25,580 --> 00:53:27,890
Congressman to , to be fair that , you 

1346
00:53:27,890 --> 00:53:30,001
know , I was a fast tech submariner , 

1347
00:53:30,001 --> 00:53:32,001
fast attack submarines used to have 

1348
00:53:32,001 --> 00:53:34,168
nuclear cruise missiles on them . They 

1349
00:53:34,168 --> 00:53:36,223
were removed by presidential nuclear 

1350
00:53:36,223 --> 00:53:38,334
initiatives years ago , just as I was 

1351
00:53:38,334 --> 00:53:40,501
editing the force So , I don't know if 

1352
00:53:40,501 --> 00:53:42,668
it would change everything . I guess I 

1353
00:53:42,668 --> 00:53:44,834
would argue that it would not , but it 

1354
00:53:44,834 --> 00:53:44,340
would certainly change some things . 

1355
00:53:45,110 --> 00:53:48,120
What things I , I'm , you know , some 

1356
00:53:48,120 --> 00:53:51,220
nations are not , uh , keen on having 

1357
00:53:51,220 --> 00:53:53,331
nuclear weapons in their ports . So , 

1358
00:53:53,331 --> 00:53:55,220
kind of from a ports standpoint , 

1359
00:53:55,220 --> 00:53:57,387
that's a problem . We wouldn't be able 

1360
00:53:57,387 --> 00:53:59,553
to use those submarines . Couldn't use 

1361
00:53:59,553 --> 00:54:01,664
Gordon or Norfolk . They'd have to go 

1362
00:54:01,664 --> 00:54:03,442
to a different , I wouldn't , I 

1363
00:54:03,442 --> 00:54:05,664
wouldn't be willing to say that , sir . 

1364
00:54:05,664 --> 00:54:05,620
But additional investments would be 

1365
00:54:05,620 --> 00:54:07,564
required if they were going to use 

1366
00:54:07,564 --> 00:54:10,590
their naval ports . My time is expired . 

1367
00:54:10,590 --> 00:54:13,310
Thank you , Holly , your back , Mr 

1368
00:54:13,310 --> 00:54:15,930
Wilson . Thank you very much , chairman 

1369
00:54:15,930 --> 00:54:18,097
Doug Lamborn and ranking member , Seth 

1370
00:54:18,097 --> 00:54:20,263
Moulton . Look forward to working with 

1371
00:54:20,263 --> 00:54:22,486
you and your leadership and we've got a 

1372
00:54:22,486 --> 00:54:24,041
great team and truly , it's 

1373
00:54:24,041 --> 00:54:26,208
significantly bipartisan . So I'm just 

1374
00:54:26,208 --> 00:54:28,319
grateful to be here now . It's really 

1375
00:54:28,319 --> 00:54:30,319
humbling . OK , to look out there . 

1376
00:54:30,319 --> 00:54:32,374
I've never seen this many stars 24 . 

1377
00:54:32,374 --> 00:54:34,597
And so you've done a good job the first 

1378
00:54:34,597 --> 00:54:36,652
meeting and , but thank you for your 

1379
00:54:36,652 --> 00:54:38,652
service and I truly appreciate your 

1380
00:54:38,652 --> 00:54:40,874
service . My dad served in the 14th Air 

1381
00:54:40,874 --> 00:54:43,780
Force Flying Tigers to liberate China 

1382
00:54:43,790 --> 00:54:46,140
and Kunming Chengdu , Sichuan , China . 

1383
00:54:46,150 --> 00:54:48,510
Uh So I appreciate that and then I'm 

1384
00:54:48,510 --> 00:54:51,030
really grateful uh General Dickerson 

1385
00:54:51,040 --> 00:54:53,500
Dickinson , you beat me by seven years 

1386
00:54:53,510 --> 00:54:55,680
uh in terms of the number of years 

1387
00:54:55,680 --> 00:54:57,736
service . And so I appreciate that . 

1388
00:54:57,736 --> 00:54:59,847
Although I'm grateful my oldest son , 

1389
00:54:59,847 --> 00:55:02,013
Alan is Field artillery received a C A 

1390
00:55:02,013 --> 00:55:04,030
B in his service in Iraq . So I 

1391
00:55:04,030 --> 00:55:06,400
appreciate that branch . And then I'm 

1392
00:55:06,400 --> 00:55:09,110
all service behind you . My second sons , 

1393
00:55:09,110 --> 00:55:11,720
a doctor in the Navy and the third son 

1394
00:55:11,720 --> 00:55:14,140
is signal and youngest and engineer 

1395
00:55:14,150 --> 00:55:16,080
having served in Iraq , Egypt and 

1396
00:55:16,090 --> 00:55:18,090
Afghanistan . So thank you for your 

1397
00:55:18,090 --> 00:55:21,940
service with that general cotton . The 

1398
00:55:21,950 --> 00:55:24,080
uh communities in South Carolina's 

1399
00:55:24,080 --> 00:55:26,280
second district uh and are adjacent 

1400
00:55:26,280 --> 00:55:28,336
communities in Georgia are extremely 

1401
00:55:28,336 --> 00:55:30,113
supportive of the plutonium pit 

1402
00:55:30,113 --> 00:55:32,480
production mission at the Savannah 

1403
00:55:32,480 --> 00:55:34,647
River site , the Savannah River site , 

1404
00:55:34,647 --> 00:55:36,924
which with its workforce and expertise , 

1405
00:55:36,924 --> 00:55:39,147
expertise is ideally suited to complete 

1406
00:55:39,147 --> 00:55:41,369
this important mission that is so vital 

1407
00:55:41,369 --> 00:55:43,620
for national security . Maintaining an 

1408
00:55:43,630 --> 00:55:45,880
enacted levels of funding for the 

1409
00:55:45,880 --> 00:55:48,300
Savannah River . Plutonium processing 

1410
00:55:48,300 --> 00:55:50,356
facility is necessary to ensure that 

1411
00:55:50,356 --> 00:55:52,310
our nation can reach our nuclear 

1412
00:55:52,310 --> 00:55:54,680
modernization needs and maintain an 

1413
00:55:54,680 --> 00:55:56,902
effective nuclear deterrent . In fact , 

1414
00:55:56,902 --> 00:55:58,847
Congressman Moulton was absolutely 

1415
00:55:58,847 --> 00:56:00,791
correct . We've got to have a real 

1416
00:56:00,791 --> 00:56:04,110
deterrent that the enemy understand Uh 

1417
00:56:04,120 --> 00:56:06,550
that they are very effective as 

1418
00:56:06,550 --> 00:56:10,170
February 2023 . The show 

1419
00:56:10,170 --> 00:56:12,010
Nuclear Security Administration 

1420
00:56:12,010 --> 00:56:14,121
notified Congress that will be unable 

1421
00:56:14,121 --> 00:56:16,066
to meet the congressional mandated 

1422
00:56:16,066 --> 00:56:17,954
timelines to achieve a rate of 30 

1423
00:56:17,954 --> 00:56:20,920
plutonium pits by 2026 or achieve the 

1424
00:56:20,930 --> 00:56:23,770
80 pits per year . Congress mandated by 

1425
00:56:23,770 --> 00:56:27,400
2030 . The question as the NNSA will 

1426
00:56:27,400 --> 00:56:29,622
not be able to meet the requirements of 

1427
00:56:29,622 --> 00:56:31,844
reducing 80 pits per year by 2030 . How 

1428
00:56:31,844 --> 00:56:34,067
critical is it that we do everything we 

1429
00:56:34,067 --> 00:56:36,480
can to minimize the delay and reach the 

1430
00:56:36,480 --> 00:56:38,390
requirement as soon as we can . 

1431
00:56:40,630 --> 00:56:42,852
Carson Wilson's nice seeing you again , 

1432
00:56:42,852 --> 00:56:46,070
sir . Um Bottom line , it's critically 

1433
00:56:46,070 --> 00:56:50,040
important . Um 80 pits per year that 

1434
00:56:50,050 --> 00:56:52,860
2030 statutory requirement has not 

1435
00:56:52,860 --> 00:56:55,950
changed when it comes to delivery for 

1436
00:56:55,950 --> 00:56:58,640
us . Um we are working hand in hand 

1437
00:56:58,650 --> 00:57:02,170
with our , with our partners in NSA to , 

1438
00:57:02,170 --> 00:57:04,226
to understand how they'll be able to 

1439
00:57:04,226 --> 00:57:06,337
achieve that . But it , it is , it is 

1440
00:57:06,337 --> 00:57:08,559
actually crucial and critical for us to 

1441
00:57:08,559 --> 00:57:10,559
make sure that they can get . It is 

1442
00:57:10,559 --> 00:57:12,614
close to meeting that requirement as 

1443
00:57:12,614 --> 00:57:14,670
they can . Well , I'd like to assure 

1444
00:57:14,670 --> 00:57:16,837
you that the citizens of Central South 

1445
00:57:16,837 --> 00:57:20,410
Carolina and CSR A into Georgia are 

1446
00:57:20,410 --> 00:57:22,560
ready to back this up in every way . 

1447
00:57:22,720 --> 00:57:25,620
And general Van Herk rising threat of 

1448
00:57:25,620 --> 00:57:28,720
China , acute threat of Russia , the 

1449
00:57:28,730 --> 00:57:31,490
unabated threat of Iran building inter 

1450
00:57:31,520 --> 00:57:33,464
continental ballistic missiles and 

1451
00:57:33,464 --> 00:57:35,780
unstable North Korea with the capacity 

1452
00:57:35,780 --> 00:57:38,002
to deliver long range missile threats , 

1453
00:57:38,002 --> 00:57:39,960
continue a greater , to develop a 

1454
00:57:39,960 --> 00:57:42,870
greater capability and capacity with 

1455
00:57:42,870 --> 00:57:45,380
the intent to strike uh the United 

1456
00:57:45,380 --> 00:57:47,560
States and our allies . How concerned 

1457
00:57:47,560 --> 00:57:49,560
are you about the continued missile 

1458
00:57:49,560 --> 00:57:51,560
development and production is NORAD 

1459
00:57:51,560 --> 00:57:55,340
preparing adequately to deter , detect , 

1460
00:57:55,350 --> 00:57:57,294
deny and protect the homeland from 

1461
00:57:57,294 --> 00:58:01,110
threats . Congressman , I'm encouraged 

1462
00:58:01,110 --> 00:58:03,890
with recent uh funding for NORAD 

1463
00:58:03,890 --> 00:58:06,890
modernization , specific ballistic 

1464
00:58:06,890 --> 00:58:10,040
missile threat . Um The basic ballistic 

1465
00:58:10,040 --> 00:58:11,929
missile threat from D P R K , I'm 

1466
00:58:11,929 --> 00:58:13,984
confident today in my threat warning 

1467
00:58:13,984 --> 00:58:16,151
and attack assessment capabilities and 

1468
00:58:16,151 --> 00:58:18,340
also to defend in my north com hat 

1469
00:58:18,350 --> 00:58:20,350
against a limited attack . I'm very 

1470
00:58:20,350 --> 00:58:22,517
concerned by the numbers I see and the 

1471
00:58:22,517 --> 00:58:25,950
capacity out of DPRK today . Uh As far 

1472
00:58:25,950 --> 00:58:28,172
as the total numbers that they actually 

1473
00:58:28,172 --> 00:58:30,006
have produced and are capable of 

1474
00:58:30,006 --> 00:58:32,228
potentially launching at our homeland . 

1475
00:58:32,228 --> 00:58:34,339
Well , please keep us advised what we 

1476
00:58:34,339 --> 00:58:36,283
can do to , to reach and match the 

1477
00:58:36,283 --> 00:58:38,506
threat and General Dickinson with China 

1478
00:58:38,506 --> 00:58:40,617
continuing to strengthen its military 

1479
00:58:40,617 --> 00:58:43,130
space capabilities . Um If China were 

1480
00:58:43,130 --> 00:58:45,520
to conduct an illegal invasion of 

1481
00:58:45,530 --> 00:58:47,900
Taiwan , uh what would be the 

1482
00:58:47,900 --> 00:58:50,380
implications of these satellites and 

1483
00:58:50,380 --> 00:58:52,269
and would they be a threat to the 

1484
00:58:52,269 --> 00:58:56,110
United States Congressman ? 

1485
00:58:56,110 --> 00:58:58,332
First of all , thank you for those kind 

1486
00:58:58,332 --> 00:59:00,221
of remarks as you began . Uh your 

1487
00:59:00,221 --> 00:59:02,280
question period , I would , I would 

1488
00:59:02,280 --> 00:59:04,447
just tell you that uh you know , space 

1489
00:59:04,447 --> 00:59:06,870
is global in nature and so in 

1490
00:59:06,870 --> 00:59:09,037
particular for us , us , space Command 

1491
00:59:09,037 --> 00:59:11,203
for the Department of Defense . So any 

1492
00:59:11,203 --> 00:59:13,370
regional conflict , if you will , will 

1493
00:59:13,370 --> 00:59:15,510
depend upon space and utilize space 

1494
00:59:15,520 --> 00:59:19,110
assets , uh both blue in both China as 

1495
00:59:19,110 --> 00:59:22,320
well as China . So uh I think what we 

1496
00:59:22,320 --> 00:59:25,770
would say would be a , a use because we 

1497
00:59:25,770 --> 00:59:27,492
know China is leveraging space 

1498
00:59:27,492 --> 00:59:29,714
capabilities . Now , they've watched us 

1499
00:59:29,714 --> 00:59:31,770
for many , many years , more than 20 

1500
00:59:31,770 --> 00:59:33,620
years and how , how space based 

1501
00:59:33,620 --> 00:59:35,564
capabilities facilitate our global 

1502
00:59:35,564 --> 00:59:37,731
reach and our global ability to employ 

1503
00:59:37,731 --> 00:59:39,676
forces . So I think we could see a 

1504
00:59:39,676 --> 00:59:42,280
similar thing with , with China . Thank 

1505
00:59:42,280 --> 00:59:44,224
you , each of you . Thank you , Mr 

1506
00:59:44,224 --> 00:59:46,950
Chairman Representative Carbajal . 

1507
00:59:47,710 --> 00:59:49,932
Thank you Mr Chair and thank you to all 

1508
00:59:49,932 --> 00:59:51,821
the witnesses for being here . Uh 

1509
00:59:51,821 --> 00:59:53,988
General Van Herk , General Dickinson , 

1510
00:59:53,988 --> 00:59:55,877
thank you for your service to our 

1511
00:59:55,877 --> 00:59:58,840
country . Um Reminds me of that movie , 

1512
00:59:58,840 --> 01:00:01,450
a few good men . We wanted you on that 

1513
01:00:01,450 --> 01:00:04,620
wall . Now you're leaving . But if 

1514
01:00:04,630 --> 01:00:07,970
uh General Cotton is any indication of 

1515
01:00:07,970 --> 01:00:10,081
the bench we have and the people that 

1516
01:00:10,081 --> 01:00:12,480
are ascending uh to the capacities that 

1517
01:00:12,480 --> 01:00:14,591
you will leave behind . I think we're 

1518
01:00:14,591 --> 01:00:18,580
in good hands . Um Secretary Plum , we 

1519
01:00:18,580 --> 01:00:20,530
just wrote Mr Plum instead of Dr 

1520
01:00:20,530 --> 01:00:23,260
Plummer or assistant secretary . I 

1521
01:00:23,260 --> 01:00:25,371
think we need to correct that because 

1522
01:00:25,371 --> 01:00:28,240
we need to give you your due . Um Again , 

1523
01:00:28,240 --> 01:00:30,184
thank you for being here . General 

1524
01:00:30,184 --> 01:00:32,073
Dickinson Space activity from the 

1525
01:00:32,073 --> 01:00:34,230
Department of Defense , the United 

1526
01:00:34,230 --> 01:00:36,230
States commercial sector as well as 

1527
01:00:36,230 --> 01:00:38,710
partners , allies and competitors is 

1528
01:00:38,710 --> 01:00:41,120
growing . And in the next few years , a 

1529
01:00:41,120 --> 01:00:43,176
significant number of satellites are 

1530
01:00:43,176 --> 01:00:45,270
planned to be launched into orbit 

1531
01:00:45,280 --> 01:00:48,200
particularly in Leo as the launch 

1532
01:00:48,200 --> 01:00:50,256
industry continues to grow and other 

1533
01:00:50,256 --> 01:00:52,200
countries develop their own launch 

1534
01:00:52,200 --> 01:00:54,190
capabilities . It is reasonable to 

1535
01:00:54,190 --> 01:00:56,412
believe that there will be more traffic 

1536
01:00:56,412 --> 01:00:58,940
in space , not to mention debris , will 

1537
01:00:58,940 --> 01:01:01,107
this increased traffic post challenges 

1538
01:01:01,107 --> 01:01:03,840
to space domain awareness and a space 

1539
01:01:03,840 --> 01:01:05,420
come prepared for this 

1540
01:01:08,060 --> 01:01:10,227
congressman ? Thanks for those words , 

1541
01:01:10,227 --> 01:01:12,300
kind words as we started out . Um I 

1542
01:01:12,300 --> 01:01:14,750
would tell you that frankly , yes , 

1543
01:01:14,750 --> 01:01:17,200
that presents a challenge to us as we 

1544
01:01:17,200 --> 01:01:19,367
watch . And I think we might all agree 

1545
01:01:19,367 --> 01:01:21,367
that watching the commercial market 

1546
01:01:21,367 --> 01:01:23,880
around the world . Start showing a lot 

1547
01:01:23,880 --> 01:01:26,047
of interest in space and wanting to be 

1548
01:01:26,047 --> 01:01:27,840
part of the space community , 

1549
01:01:27,840 --> 01:01:30,550
spacefaring nations were watching it 

1550
01:01:30,550 --> 01:01:32,830
grow . We see it every day . I'll give 

1551
01:01:32,840 --> 01:01:34,784
Statistic just to think about . In 

1552
01:01:34,784 --> 01:01:36,951
terms of when this command stood up in 

1553
01:01:36,951 --> 01:01:40,130
2019 , we tracked about 25,000 pieces 

1554
01:01:40,130 --> 01:01:42,280
of debris , old satellites , new 

1555
01:01:42,280 --> 01:01:45,180
satellites in the space domain . Today , 

1556
01:01:45,190 --> 01:01:47,920
we're up over 48,000 . So you can see 

1557
01:01:47,920 --> 01:01:50,050
that the growth that you mentioned 

1558
01:01:50,050 --> 01:01:52,680
earlier and how that is creating a more 

1559
01:01:52,690 --> 01:01:55,320
congested domain . So as we look at 

1560
01:01:55,320 --> 01:01:57,320
that , there's two things I want to 

1561
01:01:57,320 --> 01:01:59,431
point out that we're working on right 

1562
01:01:59,431 --> 01:02:01,542
now . One as I mentioned earlier , my 

1563
01:02:01,542 --> 01:02:03,431
top priority is to increase space 

1564
01:02:03,431 --> 01:02:05,542
Domain awareness and how I do that is 

1565
01:02:05,542 --> 01:02:07,709
through commercial integration as well 

1566
01:02:07,709 --> 01:02:09,709
as bringing on non traditional type 

1567
01:02:09,709 --> 01:02:11,820
assets that we haven't used before to 

1568
01:02:11,820 --> 01:02:13,431
look into the space Domain , 

1569
01:02:13,431 --> 01:02:15,487
specifically uh air defense radars , 

1570
01:02:15,487 --> 01:02:17,820
missile defense radars around the world , 

1571
01:02:17,820 --> 01:02:20,042
both maritime , as well as ground based 

1572
01:02:20,042 --> 01:02:22,210
uh leveraging the commercial market . 

1573
01:02:22,390 --> 01:02:24,501
The other thing we're looking at very 

1574
01:02:24,501 --> 01:02:26,557
carefully is you know how we will do 

1575
01:02:26,557 --> 01:02:28,723
that transition with the Department of 

1576
01:02:28,723 --> 01:02:30,779
Commerce for them to start doing the 

1577
01:02:30,779 --> 01:02:33,100
space traffic management functions that 

1578
01:02:33,100 --> 01:02:34,930
are required to do Space Domain 

1579
01:02:34,930 --> 01:02:36,986
Awareness . I think when you look at 

1580
01:02:36,986 --> 01:02:38,986
the size as I described of how much 

1581
01:02:38,986 --> 01:02:41,208
it's populated , how much it's grown in 

1582
01:02:41,208 --> 01:02:42,986
numbers , we're gonna need this 

1583
01:02:42,986 --> 01:02:45,152
department of commerce to do that type 

1584
01:02:45,152 --> 01:02:47,319
of civil type of operations to account 

1585
01:02:47,319 --> 01:02:49,430
for the debris and things that are on 

1586
01:02:49,430 --> 01:02:52,030
on orbit . So that will allow me to use 

1587
01:02:52,030 --> 01:02:53,750
the assets that I have to do 

1588
01:02:53,760 --> 01:02:55,927
characterization of things that I need 

1589
01:02:55,927 --> 01:02:58,149
to look at that aren't necessarily just 

1590
01:02:58,149 --> 01:03:00,371
civil or pieces of debris . So in other 

1591
01:03:00,371 --> 01:03:02,538
words , I'll have a better opportunity 

1592
01:03:02,538 --> 01:03:04,704
with the resources I have to do better 

1593
01:03:04,704 --> 01:03:06,871
characterization of the space domain . 

1594
01:03:06,871 --> 01:03:09,038
Thank you , General Dickinson . As the 

1595
01:03:09,038 --> 01:03:11,204
number of launches continues to grow , 

1596
01:03:11,204 --> 01:03:13,316
can you speak to how you envision the 

1597
01:03:13,316 --> 01:03:15,316
space force range of the future and 

1598
01:03:15,316 --> 01:03:17,740
ensuring access to launch ranges meet 

1599
01:03:17,740 --> 01:03:19,940
your needs as the combat combatant 

1600
01:03:19,950 --> 01:03:22,260
combatant commander responsible for 

1601
01:03:22,260 --> 01:03:24,840
space , particularly particularly when 

1602
01:03:24,840 --> 01:03:27,810
it comes to responsive space capability . 

1603
01:03:27,820 --> 01:03:30,250
And how can the department further help 

1604
01:03:30,260 --> 01:03:33,790
ensure access to ranges ? Congressman ? 

1605
01:03:33,790 --> 01:03:35,957
I think a robust launch infrastructure 

1606
01:03:35,957 --> 01:03:38,123
and responsive launch capabilities are 

1607
01:03:38,123 --> 01:03:40,346
absolutely essential to our assured use 

1608
01:03:40,346 --> 01:03:42,457
of space which remains a top national 

1609
01:03:42,457 --> 01:03:45,230
security priority . Uh The launched 

1610
01:03:45,240 --> 01:03:47,462
stations themselves , launch facilities 

1611
01:03:47,462 --> 01:03:49,720
is critical to the tactical responsive 

1612
01:03:49,720 --> 01:03:51,776
space , but I will tell you it's not 

1613
01:03:51,776 --> 01:03:53,720
just the only piece to it , it's a 

1614
01:03:53,720 --> 01:03:55,776
piece to it . The other pieces are , 

1615
01:03:55,776 --> 01:03:58,010
you know , having more assets on orbit 

1616
01:03:58,020 --> 01:04:00,131
that that can be looked at to provide 

1617
01:04:00,131 --> 01:04:02,353
capabilities . It's also what's on each 

1618
01:04:02,353 --> 01:04:04,409
of the satellites that go up and how 

1619
01:04:04,409 --> 01:04:06,242
quickly those can be actually uh 

1620
01:04:06,242 --> 01:04:10,110
deployed upon a rapid uh rapid 

1621
01:04:10,120 --> 01:04:12,250
response launch type capability . So 

1622
01:04:12,250 --> 01:04:14,028
it's really kind of those three 

1623
01:04:14,028 --> 01:04:16,194
together . But the launch of structure 

1624
01:04:16,194 --> 01:04:18,250
is absolutely critical to what we're 

1625
01:04:18,250 --> 01:04:20,194
gonna do today and in the future , 

1626
01:04:20,194 --> 01:04:22,194
thank you , Doctor Plum and General 

1627
01:04:22,194 --> 01:04:24,361
Contin . I have limited time now , but 

1628
01:04:24,361 --> 01:04:26,472
I'm concerned by Russia's decision to 

1629
01:04:26,472 --> 01:04:28,694
suspend implementation of the new start 

1630
01:04:28,694 --> 01:04:30,806
treaty . In your statement , you note 

1631
01:04:30,806 --> 01:04:32,861
the continued degradation of Russian 

1632
01:04:32,861 --> 01:04:34,917
conventional capabilities in Ukraine 

1633
01:04:34,917 --> 01:04:37,083
will likely increase Russia's reliance 

1634
01:04:37,083 --> 01:04:39,250
on its nuclear arsenal . Can you speak 

1635
01:04:39,250 --> 01:04:41,083
to the role Russia's failures in 

1636
01:04:41,083 --> 01:04:43,500
Ukraine played in their decision to 

1637
01:04:43,510 --> 01:04:46,540
suspend new start ? And how important 

1638
01:04:46,540 --> 01:04:49,390
is it for us to maintain our commitment 

1639
01:04:49,390 --> 01:04:50,834
to the new start treaty ? 

1640
01:04:52,820 --> 01:04:56,390
Thanks . Thanks Congressman . I I uh 

1641
01:04:56,980 --> 01:04:59,170
I will say , I do think that the more 

1642
01:04:59,180 --> 01:05:01,124
Russia shows that his conventional 

1643
01:05:01,124 --> 01:05:03,450
forces are being degraded or not up to 

1644
01:05:03,450 --> 01:05:05,617
par than they do rely on more and more 

1645
01:05:05,617 --> 01:05:07,783
on nuclear weapons . I do think that's 

1646
01:05:07,783 --> 01:05:09,783
a hallmark of a conventionally weak 

1647
01:05:09,783 --> 01:05:11,950
state that has to rely more on nuclear 

1648
01:05:11,950 --> 01:05:14,172
weapons as their conventional forces uh 

1649
01:05:14,200 --> 01:05:16,367
uh fail in the field or continue to be 

1650
01:05:16,367 --> 01:05:18,950
degraded against Ukraine . In this case , 

1651
01:05:18,990 --> 01:05:22,950
I am not convinced sir , that the 

1652
01:05:22,960 --> 01:05:25,182
problems Russia's face in the field are 

1653
01:05:25,182 --> 01:05:27,516
directly related to the new start piece . 

1654
01:05:27,516 --> 01:05:29,860
There's a lot of political uh and 

1655
01:05:29,860 --> 01:05:31,860
narrative pieces inside the Russian 

1656
01:05:31,860 --> 01:05:34,082
government inside Putin's mind that may 

1657
01:05:34,082 --> 01:05:36,060
be more related to this . Uh It is 

1658
01:05:36,060 --> 01:05:38,420
troubling nonetheless , I will just say 

1659
01:05:38,420 --> 01:05:40,660
at the top of the meeting , a few , I 

1660
01:05:40,660 --> 01:05:42,660
forget who but someone noted it was 

1661
01:05:42,660 --> 01:05:45,440
Congressman land born on . Uh but there 

1662
01:05:45,750 --> 01:05:47,694
have stopped their suspended their 

1663
01:05:47,694 --> 01:05:49,861
notifications . This is new . This has 

1664
01:05:49,861 --> 01:05:52,083
just happened in the last couple really 

1665
01:05:52,083 --> 01:05:54,250
the last week . And so we can see what 

1666
01:05:54,250 --> 01:05:56,139
they're doing . They're uh we are 

1667
01:05:56,139 --> 01:05:58,250
looking at this closely to understand 

1668
01:05:58,250 --> 01:05:58,210
what that means for us . Thank you . 

1669
01:05:58,210 --> 01:06:00,099
Amount of time . General Cotton . 

1670
01:06:00,099 --> 01:06:02,321
You're saved by the bell . This chair I 

1671
01:06:02,321 --> 01:06:05,990
yield back . Thank you , Dr Thank you , 

1672
01:06:05,990 --> 01:06:07,712
Chairman . I'd like to join my 

1673
01:06:07,712 --> 01:06:09,823
colleagues and , and thanking General 

1674
01:06:09,823 --> 01:06:12,260
Van Herk and General Dickinson for your 

1675
01:06:12,260 --> 01:06:14,520
commitment and , and your contribution 

1676
01:06:14,520 --> 01:06:16,464
service to our country . And don't 

1677
01:06:16,464 --> 01:06:18,631
worry , General Cotton , we appreciate 

1678
01:06:18,631 --> 01:06:20,687
you too and you'll get your day . Uh 

1679
01:06:20,687 --> 01:06:22,631
but it seems like we have too many 

1680
01:06:22,631 --> 01:06:25,330
hearings and Mr Plum , we have too many 

1681
01:06:25,340 --> 01:06:28,010
hearings now where it seems like our 

1682
01:06:28,020 --> 01:06:30,187
were talking about how our adversaries 

1683
01:06:30,187 --> 01:06:32,353
are looking in the rear view mirror at 

1684
01:06:32,353 --> 01:06:34,520
us when it comes to hypersonic weapons 

1685
01:06:34,520 --> 01:06:36,970
or expansion and modernization of 

1686
01:06:36,980 --> 01:06:38,990
nuclear forces . And that's very 

1687
01:06:38,990 --> 01:06:41,700
concerning . So uh General Cotton , I 

1688
01:06:41,700 --> 01:06:44,350
wanted to let you for a minute if you 

1689
01:06:44,350 --> 01:06:47,890
would describe how delays in 

1690
01:06:47,900 --> 01:06:49,970
modernization programs impact your 

1691
01:06:49,970 --> 01:06:52,090
ability to field sufficient forces in 

1692
01:06:52,090 --> 01:06:54,070
the future . And are there steps 

1693
01:06:54,070 --> 01:06:56,720
stratcom can take now to better hedge 

1694
01:06:56,720 --> 01:06:58,609
against the possibility that some 

1695
01:06:58,609 --> 01:07:00,498
programs do not deliver on time ? 

1696
01:07:02,440 --> 01:07:04,218
Congressman ? Thank you for the 

1697
01:07:04,218 --> 01:07:06,218
question . Uh First of all , what , 

1698
01:07:06,218 --> 01:07:08,530
what it , what it shows us and the , 

1699
01:07:08,540 --> 01:07:10,720
the ability of us being , having a 

1700
01:07:10,720 --> 01:07:13,170
triad uh shows that , that , that 

1701
01:07:13,170 --> 01:07:16,070
strategic theory works because what a 

1702
01:07:16,070 --> 01:07:19,830
triad does , it allows me to be 

1703
01:07:19,830 --> 01:07:23,080
able to balance amongst the three legs . 

1704
01:07:23,090 --> 01:07:25,368
Those three legs have to work together . 

1705
01:07:25,368 --> 01:07:27,534
Some folks try to talk about the triad 

1706
01:07:27,534 --> 01:07:29,868
in stovepipes , they are not stovepipes . 

1707
01:07:29,868 --> 01:07:32,790
Um So the balancing of being able to 

1708
01:07:32,790 --> 01:07:34,901
understand and , and , and what we're 

1709
01:07:34,901 --> 01:07:37,290
facing today is the legacy systems 

1710
01:07:37,290 --> 01:07:39,012
across the triad are all being 

1711
01:07:39,012 --> 01:07:41,360
modernized . That's a good thing . Um 

1712
01:07:41,370 --> 01:07:43,780
But to your point , how do we balance 

1713
01:07:43,780 --> 01:07:46,350
as we make that transition ? Um The 

1714
01:07:46,350 --> 01:07:48,800
other good news is the legacy systems 

1715
01:07:48,800 --> 01:07:50,800
are safe , they're secure , they're 

1716
01:07:50,800 --> 01:07:52,967
effective and they're credible today . 

1717
01:07:52,967 --> 01:07:56,960
So we constantly look at all three legs 

1718
01:07:56,960 --> 01:07:59,040
to ensure that we can balance , to 

1719
01:07:59,040 --> 01:08:02,060
ensure that we can cover to your point . 

1720
01:08:02,070 --> 01:08:04,340
Um And , and make sure we have an 

1721
01:08:04,340 --> 01:08:06,507
effective deterrent . Would you say if 

1722
01:08:06,507 --> 01:08:08,590
we stay on our current modernization 

1723
01:08:08,590 --> 01:08:11,380
trajectory ? Will the president , the 

1724
01:08:11,380 --> 01:08:13,830
Stratcom commander ? If it's not , you 

1725
01:08:13,830 --> 01:08:15,997
have the capabilities , they will need 

1726
01:08:15,997 --> 01:08:18,108
to deter both Russia and China if our 

1727
01:08:18,108 --> 01:08:19,886
intel on their modernization uh 

1728
01:08:19,886 --> 01:08:22,052
continues at the current pace . Say in 

1729
01:08:22,052 --> 01:08:25,630
2030 sir , I think 

1730
01:08:25,640 --> 01:08:28,780
I said it in an earlier statement . I 

1731
01:08:28,780 --> 01:08:32,470
think um we probably need to have a 

1732
01:08:32,470 --> 01:08:36,310
conversation in regards to uh strategy 

1733
01:08:36,310 --> 01:08:38,740
as well as forced posture to ensure 

1734
01:08:38,740 --> 01:08:41,620
that we can , that we can make sure we 

1735
01:08:41,620 --> 01:08:44,610
have what we need in regards to , I 

1736
01:08:44,610 --> 01:08:46,832
would say probably the mid thirties and 

1737
01:08:46,832 --> 01:08:48,777
beyond the transition to our newer 

1738
01:08:48,777 --> 01:08:50,832
weapons systems are happening in the 

1739
01:08:50,832 --> 01:08:52,888
time frame that you just mentioned . 

1740
01:08:52,888 --> 01:08:55,110
And I think I can deliver as long as we 

1741
01:08:55,110 --> 01:08:58,760
stay um in in alignment and , 

1742
01:08:58,770 --> 01:09:01,410
and , and produce and deliver the 

1743
01:09:01,410 --> 01:09:03,632
weapons systems , the new modernization 

1744
01:09:03,632 --> 01:09:05,688
systems um as close to on time as we 

1745
01:09:05,688 --> 01:09:07,740
can . Okay . Shifting gears just a 

1746
01:09:07,740 --> 01:09:11,010
little bit . Um we had a 

1747
01:09:11,020 --> 01:09:14,580
conversation uh regarding 

1748
01:09:14,590 --> 01:09:17,930
non strategic nuclear weapons and uh 

1749
01:09:17,940 --> 01:09:20,280
how many non strategic nuclear weapons 

1750
01:09:20,280 --> 01:09:23,340
does Russia have ? And in what ways is 

1751
01:09:23,340 --> 01:09:25,770
their arsenal expanding and expecting 

1752
01:09:25,770 --> 01:09:29,720
to expand ? So I have 

1753
01:09:29,720 --> 01:09:31,887
to take that for the record to get you 

1754
01:09:31,887 --> 01:09:34,850
the exact number . Um But by definition , 

1755
01:09:34,850 --> 01:09:36,683
non strategic nuclear weapons or 

1756
01:09:36,683 --> 01:09:38,739
anything that that is not counted in 

1757
01:09:38,739 --> 01:09:41,790
new start ? Okay . Um What , what is 

1758
01:09:41,790 --> 01:09:43,970
your assessment of Russia's motivation 

1759
01:09:43,970 --> 01:09:46,081
for investing so heavily in these non 

1760
01:09:46,081 --> 01:09:48,230
strategic low yield nuclear weapons ? 

1761
01:09:48,240 --> 01:09:51,520
And uh do they detect a gap in our 

1762
01:09:51,520 --> 01:09:53,687
deterrent that they believe can derive 

1763
01:09:53,687 --> 01:09:55,853
a military advantage from exploiting ? 

1764
01:09:58,090 --> 01:10:00,620
I think it is based based on their 

1765
01:10:00,620 --> 01:10:04,210
strategic theories on the utilization 

1766
01:10:04,220 --> 01:10:06,920
that it is below threshold where they 

1767
01:10:06,920 --> 01:10:09,040
can actually utilize non strategic 

1768
01:10:09,040 --> 01:10:11,040
nuclear weapons or tactical nuclear 

1769
01:10:11,040 --> 01:10:14,090
weapons . Okay . Um 

1770
01:10:15,490 --> 01:10:17,712
General Van Herk , I had a question for 

1771
01:10:17,712 --> 01:10:19,823
this morning on North Korea's missile 

1772
01:10:19,823 --> 01:10:21,934
capabilities , but we'll address that 

1773
01:10:21,934 --> 01:10:23,990
in the next closed session . So with 

1774
01:10:23,990 --> 01:10:26,101
that I yield back . Okay . Now to one 

1775
01:10:26,101 --> 01:10:28,910
of our new members of the subcommittee , 

1776
01:10:28,920 --> 01:10:31,090
Representative Hoolahan new to the 

1777
01:10:31,090 --> 01:10:33,510
subcommittee , but not new to this , uh 

1778
01:10:33,520 --> 01:10:35,576
served in the air force myself . And 

1779
01:10:35,576 --> 01:10:37,631
this is what I did when I was in the 

1780
01:10:37,631 --> 01:10:40,170
Air Force as a 30 something years ago . 

1781
01:10:40,170 --> 01:10:42,170
So I'm grateful to be here with you 

1782
01:10:42,170 --> 01:10:44,640
guys today . Um My questions are for 

1783
01:10:44,640 --> 01:10:46,790
General Cotton and for General Dix 

1784
01:10:46,800 --> 01:10:49,880
Dickinson and Dr Plumb General of and 

1785
01:10:49,880 --> 01:10:52,010
her , we asked questions at the last 

1786
01:10:52,020 --> 01:10:54,600
calls , a meeting . So maybe we will 

1787
01:10:54,600 --> 01:10:56,550
skip that today and , and maybe 

1788
01:10:56,550 --> 01:10:58,550
something in the classified session 

1789
01:10:58,550 --> 01:11:00,661
first for General Cotton . Three days 

1790
01:11:00,661 --> 01:11:02,772
ago , reports emerged that the PRC is 

1791
01:11:02,772 --> 01:11:05,520
increasing their defense budget by 7.2% 

1792
01:11:05,520 --> 01:11:07,576
next year . And we already know , as 

1793
01:11:07,576 --> 01:11:09,631
you said , in your written testimony 

1794
01:11:09,631 --> 01:11:11,576
that the PRC has rapidly increased 

1795
01:11:11,576 --> 01:11:13,464
their supply of both warheads and 

1796
01:11:13,464 --> 01:11:15,687
missiles with the expectation that they 

1797
01:11:15,687 --> 01:11:17,798
will control about 1000 warheads over 

1798
01:11:17,798 --> 01:11:19,853
the next decade . So as commander of 

1799
01:11:19,853 --> 01:11:22,640
the Strategic Strategic Command , I 

1800
01:11:22,640 --> 01:11:24,640
guess having , you know , spent the 

1801
01:11:24,640 --> 01:11:27,180
next 30 years working in industry with 

1802
01:11:27,180 --> 01:11:29,130
KPI S and learning to measure what 

1803
01:11:29,130 --> 01:11:31,430
matters , what matters to you . How do 

1804
01:11:31,430 --> 01:11:34,020
you measure success with strategic 

1805
01:11:34,020 --> 01:11:35,853
deterrence ? Is it the number of 

1806
01:11:35,853 --> 01:11:38,020
warheads ? Is it the size or is it the 

1807
01:11:38,020 --> 01:11:39,964
range or is it compare against our 

1808
01:11:39,964 --> 01:11:42,187
pacing threat or is it something else , 

1809
01:11:42,187 --> 01:11:44,464
as you mentioned , that's a balance of , 

1810
01:11:44,464 --> 01:11:46,520
of non nuclear and , and , and other 

1811
01:11:46,520 --> 01:11:49,000
assets as well ? Do you believe that we 

1812
01:11:49,000 --> 01:11:50,889
have to outspend or have a larger 

1813
01:11:50,889 --> 01:11:53,111
missile supply than the PRC to maintain 

1814
01:11:53,111 --> 01:11:55,167
our effective levels of deterrence . 

1815
01:11:57,410 --> 01:12:00,530
Carson . Thank you so much and that 

1816
01:12:00,540 --> 01:12:04,420
your Air force veteran . Um 

1817
01:12:05,650 --> 01:12:07,940
I think it's a little bit of , of all 

1818
01:12:07,940 --> 01:12:10,107
the above . And what I mean by that is 

1819
01:12:10,107 --> 01:12:12,440
the definition of strategic , excuse me , 

1820
01:12:12,440 --> 01:12:14,551
of deterrence . From my perspective , 

1821
01:12:14,551 --> 01:12:16,710
for me , deterrence is about first 

1822
01:12:16,710 --> 01:12:19,200
understanding what the adversary values 

1823
01:12:19,970 --> 01:12:22,192
and when you understand what the , what 

1824
01:12:22,192 --> 01:12:24,120
the adversary values ensuring the 

1825
01:12:24,120 --> 01:12:26,231
adversary understands that the action 

1826
01:12:26,231 --> 01:12:30,210
you impose . Um that imposition is 

1827
01:12:30,210 --> 01:12:33,510
so great that they will not risk what 

1828
01:12:33,510 --> 01:12:37,400
they value . Um I think uh incredible 

1829
01:12:37,400 --> 01:12:39,400
start for that and what we're doing 

1830
01:12:39,400 --> 01:12:41,622
right now with the modernization of our 

1831
01:12:41,622 --> 01:12:44,200
nuclear forces um is a start to that . 

1832
01:12:44,210 --> 01:12:47,650
Um I agree with you . I 

1833
01:12:47,650 --> 01:12:51,340
think um adding different capabilities 

1834
01:12:51,340 --> 01:12:53,760
that we were talking about today um 

1835
01:12:53,760 --> 01:12:56,290
from a strategic deterrence perspective 

1836
01:12:56,300 --> 01:12:58,244
is also something that needs to be 

1837
01:12:58,244 --> 01:13:00,440
added in that calculus . Thank you . I 

1838
01:13:00,440 --> 01:13:02,551
appreciate your , your brevity and in 

1839
01:13:02,551 --> 01:13:04,662
your answer . So it allows me time to 

1840
01:13:04,662 --> 01:13:07,490
ask uh Dr Plumb a question as we're 

1841
01:13:07,490 --> 01:13:09,712
rightfully focusing more of our time on 

1842
01:13:09,712 --> 01:13:11,768
space and improving our security and 

1843
01:13:11,768 --> 01:13:13,823
collaboration space . We are running 

1844
01:13:13,823 --> 01:13:15,712
into some issues working with our 

1845
01:13:15,712 --> 01:13:17,934
allies due to the tendency that many of 

1846
01:13:17,934 --> 01:13:20,101
us have to over classify space related 

1847
01:13:20,101 --> 01:13:21,934
information . And Representative 

1848
01:13:21,934 --> 01:13:24,101
Moulton asked about this to the fiscal 

1849
01:13:24,101 --> 01:13:25,823
year 22 nd A required that the 

1850
01:13:25,823 --> 01:13:28,046
secretary would conduct a review of the 

1851
01:13:28,046 --> 01:13:30,157
classified programs under space force 

1852
01:13:30,157 --> 01:13:32,046
to determine whether any level of 

1853
01:13:32,046 --> 01:13:34,212
classification of the program could be 

1854
01:13:34,212 --> 01:13:36,157
changed to a lower level or if the 

1855
01:13:36,157 --> 01:13:38,046
program could be declassified and 

1856
01:13:38,046 --> 01:13:40,046
reported back to us . Dr Plumb . My 

1857
01:13:40,046 --> 01:13:42,101
understanding is that report was due 

1858
01:13:42,101 --> 01:13:43,712
last April . Do you have any 

1859
01:13:43,712 --> 01:13:45,934
expectation of when we might be able to 

1860
01:13:45,934 --> 01:13:49,790
get that report ? Um Thanks , uh 

1861
01:13:49,800 --> 01:13:51,911
congresswoman , I first , let me just 

1862
01:13:51,911 --> 01:13:55,070
say I've got three CS for my A S D 

1863
01:13:55,070 --> 01:13:57,310
space hat that I wear all related to 

1864
01:13:57,310 --> 01:13:59,870
space . I , I'm interested in space 

1865
01:13:59,870 --> 01:14:02,450
control . I'm interested in uh space 

1866
01:14:02,450 --> 01:14:04,783
cooperation with allies which you raise . 

1867
01:14:04,783 --> 01:14:06,870
And uh both of those are also 

1868
01:14:06,870 --> 01:14:09,030
contingent on kind of our tendency to 

1869
01:14:09,030 --> 01:14:12,730
over classify uh space . It really does 

1870
01:14:12,730 --> 01:14:14,897
make it hard to share information with 

1871
01:14:14,897 --> 01:14:17,119
our allies . Uh General Dickinson and I 

1872
01:14:17,119 --> 01:14:19,286
have been to New Zealand to talk about 

1873
01:14:19,286 --> 01:14:21,452
this with some of our closest allies . 

1874
01:14:21,452 --> 01:14:23,563
As a matter of fact , um I will say , 

1875
01:14:23,563 --> 01:14:25,660
uh I'm aware that the report was due 

1876
01:14:25,660 --> 01:14:27,771
then it's actually a pretty herculean 

1877
01:14:27,771 --> 01:14:29,780
task . Uh The Deputy Secretary of 

1878
01:14:29,780 --> 01:14:33,700
Defense has uh started last year , 

1879
01:14:33,700 --> 01:14:35,700
a sap reform effort . It might have 

1880
01:14:35,700 --> 01:14:37,644
been me before that , but which is 

1881
01:14:37,644 --> 01:14:41,010
coming to a , at least a new stage . Uh 

1882
01:14:41,660 --> 01:14:43,771
I don't think any of those things , I 

1883
01:14:43,771 --> 01:14:45,827
don't expect any of those things are 

1884
01:14:45,827 --> 01:14:47,993
gonna become unclassified , but we are 

1885
01:14:47,993 --> 01:14:49,993
hoping to find ways to better share 

1886
01:14:49,993 --> 01:14:52,049
information with industry just as an 

1887
01:14:52,049 --> 01:14:51,970
example . Another partner , we don't 

1888
01:14:51,970 --> 01:14:53,914
talk about as much . Do we have an 

1889
01:14:53,914 --> 01:14:56,248
estimation on when that report would be ? 

1890
01:14:56,248 --> 01:14:59,180
Do ? I don't have a great one for you , 

1891
01:14:59,180 --> 01:15:01,600
but I'm hoping for later this year . I 

1892
01:15:01,600 --> 01:15:03,656
look forward to following up on that 

1893
01:15:03,656 --> 01:15:05,656
with that . And with my last half a 

1894
01:15:05,656 --> 01:15:07,878
minute , General Dickinson , you talked 

1895
01:15:07,878 --> 01:15:09,600
a little bit about sort of the 

1896
01:15:09,600 --> 01:15:11,600
implications about working with our 

1897
01:15:11,600 --> 01:15:13,656
allies and , and Dr Plummer talked a 

1898
01:15:13,656 --> 01:15:13,270
little bit about industry , but I'm 

1899
01:15:13,270 --> 01:15:15,603
also thinking about the American people , 

1900
01:15:15,603 --> 01:15:17,548
a lot of what has effectively been 

1901
01:15:17,548 --> 01:15:19,659
effective about Ukraine has been that 

1902
01:15:19,659 --> 01:15:21,770
release of information by the 

1903
01:15:21,770 --> 01:15:23,992
administration and others that has been 

1904
01:15:23,992 --> 01:15:26,326
sanitized and is allowed to be advanced , 

1905
01:15:26,326 --> 01:15:28,381
you know , to the American public to 

1906
01:15:28,381 --> 01:15:30,437
help them understand space and Space 

1907
01:15:30,437 --> 01:15:32,659
Force and Space command is one of those 

1908
01:15:32,659 --> 01:15:34,492
problems where people just don't 

1909
01:15:34,492 --> 01:15:36,714
understand its impact . I know I've run 

1910
01:15:36,714 --> 01:15:38,714
out of time , but I'd be interested 

1911
01:15:38,714 --> 01:15:40,770
perhaps afterwards and learning more 

1912
01:15:40,770 --> 01:15:42,603
from you about whether you think 

1913
01:15:42,603 --> 01:15:44,659
there's an appetite or an ability to 

1914
01:15:44,659 --> 01:15:44,440
have that information available to the 

1915
01:15:44,440 --> 01:15:46,980
American public and more in a more uh 

1916
01:15:47,200 --> 01:15:49,420
abundant way and more sanitized way . 

1917
01:15:49,420 --> 01:15:52,150
And I'm sorry , and I yield back . Okay . 

1918
01:15:52,150 --> 01:15:54,206
And now we have another new member , 

1919
01:15:54,206 --> 01:15:56,317
although not new to this issue , just 

1920
01:15:56,317 --> 01:15:58,539
like Representative Julia is not new to 

1921
01:15:58,539 --> 01:16:00,761
this issue and that's uh Representative 

1922
01:16:00,761 --> 01:16:02,483
Bacon . I'm glad to be on this 

1923
01:16:02,483 --> 01:16:02,250
committee . Thank you . I want to 

1924
01:16:02,250 --> 01:16:04,194
welcome all , all four of you here 

1925
01:16:04,194 --> 01:16:06,306
today . We appreciate your leadership 

1926
01:16:06,306 --> 01:16:08,306
and what you do . I want to welcome 

1927
01:16:08,306 --> 01:16:10,528
General Van Herk and Gerald Dickinson . 

1928
01:16:10,528 --> 01:16:12,750
Oh , maha , when you retire and you can 

1929
01:16:12,750 --> 01:16:14,806
join Gerald Cotten , who's been well 

1930
01:16:14,806 --> 01:16:17,028
received and , and welcome there . So , 

1931
01:16:17,028 --> 01:16:16,520
but congratulations to both and we 

1932
01:16:16,520 --> 01:16:19,100
thank you . I volunteer to be on the 

1933
01:16:19,100 --> 01:16:21,267
Strategic Forces Committee to focus on 

1934
01:16:21,267 --> 01:16:24,100
N C three . Cotton . Knows we're 

1935
01:16:24,100 --> 01:16:26,267
investing in the triad . I think we're 

1936
01:16:26,267 --> 01:16:28,322
on a great glide path for success to 

1937
01:16:28,322 --> 01:16:30,378
modernize all three of those legs of 

1938
01:16:30,378 --> 01:16:32,433
the triad . I am concerned about the 

1939
01:16:32,433 --> 01:16:34,544
survivability of R N C three . I know 

1940
01:16:34,544 --> 01:16:36,600
stratcom and R D O D . So working on 

1941
01:16:36,600 --> 01:16:38,878
the comm systems and the architectures , 

1942
01:16:38,878 --> 01:16:40,878
but the area that I'm focused on is 

1943
01:16:40,878 --> 01:16:42,989
worried about is the survivability of 

1944
01:16:42,989 --> 01:16:44,933
command with hypersonic and cruise 

1945
01:16:44,933 --> 01:16:47,044
missiles , perhaps submarines off our 

1946
01:16:47,044 --> 01:16:48,989
coast at some point . Again , it's 

1947
01:16:48,989 --> 01:16:50,656
harder to ensure that command 

1948
01:16:50,656 --> 01:16:52,822
authorities can survive a first strike 

1949
01:16:52,822 --> 01:16:55,044
and conduct a second , a second counter 

1950
01:16:55,044 --> 01:16:57,267
strike . I want to have 100% confidence 

1951
01:16:57,267 --> 01:16:59,990
that the Russians and Chinese have 100% 

1952
01:16:59,990 --> 01:17:01,934
confidence that we can do a second 

1953
01:17:01,934 --> 01:17:04,212
strike because that ensures deterrence . 

1954
01:17:04,212 --> 01:17:06,490
And that's ultimately what we're about . 

1955
01:17:06,490 --> 01:17:08,768
Job number one is strategic deterrence . 

1956
01:17:08,768 --> 01:17:10,934
So with that , Gerald Cotten , can you 

1957
01:17:10,934 --> 01:17:12,990
share your thoughts on what parts of 

1958
01:17:12,990 --> 01:17:12,880
our deterrence are alert and our 

1959
01:17:12,880 --> 01:17:15,047
readiness posture that you're watching 

1960
01:17:15,047 --> 01:17:16,991
most closely and what elements you 

1961
01:17:16,991 --> 01:17:19,213
believe may warrant more attention from 

1962
01:17:19,213 --> 01:17:20,324
us and more funding 

1963
01:17:23,570 --> 01:17:25,792
Congressman bacon . Thank you so much . 

1964
01:17:25,792 --> 01:17:29,450
For the question . It's all of it . Um 

1965
01:17:30,450 --> 01:17:33,180
No , I look at 

1966
01:17:34,230 --> 01:17:37,690
R E six B fleet . I look at our E four 

1967
01:17:37,690 --> 01:17:40,400
B fleet . I look at the mission 

1968
01:17:40,410 --> 01:17:44,020
readiness of , of those fleets . I look 

1969
01:17:44,020 --> 01:17:46,610
at our submarine fleet as well as the I 

1970
01:17:46,610 --> 01:17:49,230
C B M leg and our bomber fleet to 

1971
01:17:49,230 --> 01:17:52,800
include um um all of the bomber 

1972
01:17:52,800 --> 01:17:54,633
forces , not just those that are 

1973
01:17:54,633 --> 01:17:57,460
directly assigned , which is the B 52 

1974
01:17:58,240 --> 01:18:02,200
the B and the B two . Um We , 

1975
01:18:02,210 --> 01:18:04,890
we carefully manage that congressman to 

1976
01:18:04,890 --> 01:18:07,560
make sure that that that were , 

1977
01:18:09,070 --> 01:18:11,500
that we're confident that we can do 

1978
01:18:11,500 --> 01:18:13,667
exactly what you're what you're saying 

1979
01:18:13,667 --> 01:18:16,120
in regards of being able to disperse 

1980
01:18:16,120 --> 01:18:18,176
when we need to disperse and get the 

1981
01:18:18,176 --> 01:18:20,398
locations of safety when we need to get 

1982
01:18:20,398 --> 01:18:22,970
the locations of safety . A lot of this 

1983
01:18:22,970 --> 01:18:25,500
is predicated on strategic warning , 

1984
01:18:26,060 --> 01:18:28,480
but I'm an intel officer by trade and 

1985
01:18:28,490 --> 01:18:30,657
historian . I love reading history and 

1986
01:18:30,657 --> 01:18:32,768
more often than not , adversaries are 

1987
01:18:32,768 --> 01:18:34,823
caught flat footed . So I'm just , I 

1988
01:18:34,823 --> 01:18:37,046
want to ensure that we have it baked in 

1989
01:18:37,046 --> 01:18:38,601
every day that we have that 

1990
01:18:38,601 --> 01:18:40,490
survivability there . A follow up 

1991
01:18:40,490 --> 01:18:42,657
question with you John Continent . How 

1992
01:18:42,657 --> 01:18:44,768
is our house , the Nuclear Enterprise 

1993
01:18:44,768 --> 01:18:46,934
Center at office working to design the 

1994
01:18:46,934 --> 01:18:49,101
next generation C three architecture . 

1995
01:18:49,101 --> 01:18:51,268
And how does it work informing D U D N 

1996
01:18:51,268 --> 01:18:53,379
C three modernization ? Thank you for 

1997
01:18:53,379 --> 01:18:55,800
that question . Excuse me . You know , 

1998
01:18:55,800 --> 01:18:58,690
as , as I , as I took command on the 

1999
01:18:58,700 --> 01:19:01,290
ninth of December , 11 of the things 

2000
01:19:01,290 --> 01:19:04,900
that we did on the 12th of December was 

2001
01:19:04,900 --> 01:19:06,844
we created a cross functional team 

2002
01:19:06,844 --> 01:19:08,789
within the command to really get . 

2003
01:19:08,789 --> 01:19:11,780
After how do we describe um the 

2004
01:19:11,780 --> 01:19:13,780
incredible things that are going on 

2005
01:19:13,780 --> 01:19:15,870
within the N C three portfolio and 

2006
01:19:15,870 --> 01:19:18,037
describe it to be frank to the members 

2007
01:19:18,037 --> 01:19:20,259
of Congress and to my own bosses within 

2008
01:19:20,259 --> 01:19:22,790
the department . So one of the things 

2009
01:19:22,790 --> 01:19:26,730
that we're doing is we're changing what 

2010
01:19:26,730 --> 01:19:28,930
we would call an ov one strategy to 

2011
01:19:28,930 --> 01:19:31,610
describe what we're doing within the 

2012
01:19:31,620 --> 01:19:33,870
architecture . And I've directed our 

2013
01:19:33,870 --> 01:19:35,870
team to come out with what we would 

2014
01:19:35,870 --> 01:19:37,926
call a roadmap construct , construct 

2015
01:19:37,926 --> 01:19:41,540
struck uh to better describe the 

2016
01:19:41,550 --> 01:19:44,530
dollars and investments and , and , and 

2017
01:19:44,530 --> 01:19:46,863
everything else that's happening within , 

2018
01:19:46,863 --> 01:19:48,919
within the enterprise , um its still 

2019
01:19:48,919 --> 01:19:51,540
nascent , but we'll be ready to present 

2020
01:19:51,540 --> 01:19:53,930
that to , to my bosses in the Pentagon 

2021
01:19:53,930 --> 01:19:56,950
as well as uh to the members here 

2022
01:19:56,950 --> 01:20:00,000
shortly . But there is a lot of work 

2023
01:20:00,000 --> 01:20:02,111
that is going on with the next gen NC 

2024
01:20:02,111 --> 01:20:05,280
three implementation plan . And I look 

2025
01:20:05,280 --> 01:20:07,447
forward to being able to describe that 

2026
01:20:07,447 --> 01:20:09,669
to have a question for Gerald Dickinson 

2027
01:20:09,669 --> 01:20:12,840
before I do . Um before my focus on N C 

2028
01:20:12,840 --> 01:20:15,062
three , I've been working on electronic 

2029
01:20:15,062 --> 01:20:17,284
warfare . I really appreciate the great 

2030
01:20:17,284 --> 01:20:19,340
work stratcom and the whole D O D is 

2031
01:20:19,340 --> 01:20:21,562
doing on it . It's a an area that we've 

2032
01:20:21,562 --> 01:20:23,784
fallen behind on . So I appreciate your 

2033
01:20:23,784 --> 01:20:23,420
focus on that as well as Stratcom , 

2034
01:20:23,430 --> 01:20:25,652
John Dickinson . Well , I have about 30 

2035
01:20:25,652 --> 01:20:27,874
seconds left . Can you explain a little 

2036
01:20:27,874 --> 01:20:30,097
more about the dynamic space operations 

2037
01:20:30,097 --> 01:20:33,240
and your requirements ? Thank you , 

2038
01:20:33,240 --> 01:20:35,073
Congressman . So , dynamic space 

2039
01:20:35,073 --> 01:20:37,920
operations is a , is the concept where 

2040
01:20:37,930 --> 01:20:39,930
we get to the point where we're not 

2041
01:20:39,930 --> 01:20:43,360
having to worry about uh consumables 

2042
01:20:43,360 --> 01:20:45,527
that might be on spacecraft . In other 

2043
01:20:45,527 --> 01:20:47,600
words , we need to be able to have 

2044
01:20:47,610 --> 01:20:50,720
dynamics space capabilities that don't 

2045
01:20:50,730 --> 01:20:53,380
you , an operator or a war fighter can 

2046
01:20:53,380 --> 01:20:56,570
actually use that in the actual context 

2047
01:20:56,570 --> 01:20:58,514
or the tactics they want to employ 

2048
01:20:58,514 --> 01:21:00,181
without having to worry about 

2049
01:21:00,181 --> 01:21:02,348
replenishment , whether it's a battery 

2050
01:21:02,348 --> 01:21:04,681
drain , whether it's a fuel consumption , 

2051
01:21:04,681 --> 01:21:06,903
something along the lines where you can 

2052
01:21:06,903 --> 01:21:08,403
refuel , be able to have a 

2053
01:21:08,403 --> 01:21:10,514
replenishment of that capability . So 

2054
01:21:10,514 --> 01:21:12,570
you can use it not only today but in 

2055
01:21:12,570 --> 01:21:14,348
the future and then when you're 

2056
01:21:14,348 --> 01:21:16,459
actually doing operations that you're 

2057
01:21:16,459 --> 01:21:18,626
not limited in what you can do because 

2058
01:21:18,626 --> 01:21:22,320
of that . Thank you . And for 

2059
01:21:22,320 --> 01:21:24,510
everyone's situational awareness , I 

2060
01:21:24,510 --> 01:21:28,330
have asked joint staff OSD and stratcom 

2061
01:21:28,330 --> 01:21:30,540
to put together a classified NC three 

2062
01:21:30,540 --> 01:21:34,030
brief for members . So be looking for a 

2063
01:21:34,030 --> 01:21:37,560
notice coming soon . I was gonna ask 

2064
01:21:37,560 --> 01:21:39,671
Representative Norcross , he wants to 

2065
01:21:39,671 --> 01:21:41,560
defer so representatives strong . 

2066
01:21:41,560 --> 01:21:43,782
You're next . Thank you , Mr Chairman . 

2067
01:21:43,782 --> 01:21:45,980
It is an honor when I get to see a 

2068
01:21:45,980 --> 01:21:48,147
panel of generals who have spent a lot 

2069
01:21:48,147 --> 01:21:50,680
of time in my hometown of Huntsville , 

2070
01:21:50,680 --> 01:21:53,280
Alabama Redstone Arsenal , uh where I 

2071
01:21:53,280 --> 01:21:55,530
served 26 years on the Madison County 

2072
01:21:55,530 --> 01:21:57,308
Commission . The last 10 as the 

2073
01:21:57,308 --> 01:21:59,419
chairman , General Dickinson Redstone 

2074
01:21:59,419 --> 01:22:01,474
Arsenal in the surrounding community 

2075
01:22:01,474 --> 01:22:03,586
was sorry to see you leave S M D C in 

2076
01:22:03,586 --> 01:22:06,000
2019 . We're proud of everything you've 

2077
01:22:06,000 --> 01:22:09,360
done for the U S Space Command . Your 

2078
01:22:09,360 --> 01:22:11,500
successor , General Dan Cobbler has 

2079
01:22:11,500 --> 01:22:13,722
done a fantastic job as well and I know 

2080
01:22:13,722 --> 01:22:15,910
General Cotton will agree . General 

2081
01:22:15,910 --> 01:22:18,132
Cotton . Thank you for taking time from 

2082
01:22:18,132 --> 01:22:20,354
your schedule to come by my office last 

2083
01:22:20,354 --> 01:22:22,850
week and give me a brief in our 

2084
01:22:22,850 --> 01:22:24,517
discussion . You stressed the 

2085
01:22:24,517 --> 01:22:26,461
importance of guaranteeing the U S 

2086
01:22:26,461 --> 01:22:29,330
strategic forces are safe , secure , 

2087
01:22:29,340 --> 01:22:33,240
effective and credible . This 

2088
01:22:33,240 --> 01:22:35,073
applies to the three legs of the 

2089
01:22:35,073 --> 01:22:37,060
nuclear triad and nuclear command 

2090
01:22:37,060 --> 01:22:39,430
control and communications . Can you 

2091
01:22:39,430 --> 01:22:41,320
briefly summarize what strategic 

2092
01:22:41,320 --> 01:22:44,540
command is doing to ensure that all 

2093
01:22:44,550 --> 01:22:47,080
ongoing modernization efforts and our 

2094
01:22:47,080 --> 01:22:49,191
strategic forces and capabilities are 

2095
01:22:49,191 --> 01:22:52,580
safe , secure , effective and credible 

2096
01:22:55,630 --> 01:22:57,630
congressman . Strong . Thank you so 

2097
01:22:57,630 --> 01:22:59,852
much and I had a great opportunity . It 

2098
01:22:59,852 --> 01:23:02,019
was a great time talking with you last 

2099
01:23:02,019 --> 01:23:04,019
week . You know , there's , there's 

2100
01:23:04,019 --> 01:23:06,186
nothing more sacred than ensuring that 

2101
01:23:06,186 --> 01:23:08,297
we have a safe , secure and effective 

2102
01:23:08,297 --> 01:23:12,200
um and credible nuclear deterrent . Um 

2103
01:23:12,210 --> 01:23:14,432
Just because of the weapons system that 

2104
01:23:14,432 --> 01:23:17,380
we're describing themselves . Um when 

2105
01:23:17,380 --> 01:23:19,810
we talk about the men and women that 

2106
01:23:19,810 --> 01:23:21,866
are , are working those systems each 

2107
01:23:21,866 --> 01:23:23,810
and every day and the training and 

2108
01:23:23,810 --> 01:23:25,810
readiness that goes um and ensuring 

2109
01:23:25,810 --> 01:23:28,360
that they are ready to , to do their 

2110
01:23:28,360 --> 01:23:32,010
job . Um That's paramount for us . 

2111
01:23:32,710 --> 01:23:36,510
So I oversee the service 

2112
01:23:36,510 --> 01:23:39,410
components um that have that mission 

2113
01:23:39,410 --> 01:23:42,040
set every day , um , to ensure that 

2114
01:23:42,040 --> 01:23:44,151
they're properly trained and properly 

2115
01:23:44,151 --> 01:23:47,740
equipped and have the means to be able 

2116
01:23:47,740 --> 01:23:49,518
to deliver effects when they're 

2117
01:23:49,518 --> 01:23:51,740
required to do so . Thank you , General 

2118
01:23:51,740 --> 01:23:53,962
Doctor Plum . As you know , my hometown 

2119
01:23:53,962 --> 01:23:56,184
of Rocket City USA Huntsville , Alabama 

2120
01:23:56,184 --> 01:23:58,129
is a haven for traditional defense 

2121
01:23:58,129 --> 01:24:00,129
contractors and commercial industry 

2122
01:24:00,129 --> 01:24:02,073
alike as the Department of Defense 

2123
01:24:02,073 --> 01:24:04,184
continues to increase its reliance on 

2124
01:24:04,184 --> 01:24:06,296
commercial partners in space . I have 

2125
01:24:06,296 --> 01:24:08,518
two questions . One , what does the D O 

2126
01:24:08,518 --> 01:24:10,573
D doing to ensure there's no foreign 

2127
01:24:10,573 --> 01:24:12,740
adversary influence on commercial 

2128
01:24:12,740 --> 01:24:16,160
partners and their dual use service or 

2129
01:24:16,160 --> 01:24:19,340
technology to what are authorities ? 

2130
01:24:19,340 --> 01:24:22,180
Does the D O D have to safely integrate 

2131
01:24:22,180 --> 01:24:24,013
commercial partners into current 

2132
01:24:24,013 --> 01:24:27,610
architectures and information sharing ? 

2133
01:24:29,150 --> 01:24:33,070
Thank you , Congressman . Um uh 

2134
01:24:33,080 --> 01:24:36,130
So two part questions . So first , uh I 

2135
01:24:36,140 --> 01:24:38,196
think if I have you , right , you're 

2136
01:24:38,196 --> 01:24:40,100
asking about supply chain . Uh So 

2137
01:24:40,100 --> 01:24:42,590
obviously , uh or if not , obviously , 

2138
01:24:42,590 --> 01:24:44,830
let me just stress how important supply 

2139
01:24:44,830 --> 01:24:46,941
chain and tragedies to the Department 

2140
01:24:46,941 --> 01:24:48,608
of Defense for any really any 

2141
01:24:48,608 --> 01:24:50,830
capability , but certainly any high end 

2142
01:24:50,830 --> 01:24:50,790
capability . And that is the thing that 

2143
01:24:50,790 --> 01:24:52,901
the department takes seriously and uh 

2144
01:24:52,901 --> 01:24:55,560
works on every day . Uh Your second 

2145
01:24:55,560 --> 01:24:57,616
question is authorities , I think on 

2146
01:24:57,616 --> 01:25:00,370
integrating commercial into . So it's a 

2147
01:25:00,370 --> 01:25:02,830
good question . I think uh I'm not 

2148
01:25:02,830 --> 01:25:04,997
aware of any authority limitations . I 

2149
01:25:04,997 --> 01:25:07,350
think it is very clear to those of us 

2150
01:25:07,350 --> 01:25:09,294
at the table and anyone working on 

2151
01:25:09,294 --> 01:25:13,290
space at the uh uh industry , right ? 

2152
01:25:13,300 --> 01:25:15,356
Commercial providers are moving at a 

2153
01:25:15,356 --> 01:25:17,356
pace that's probably rapid than the 

2154
01:25:17,356 --> 01:25:19,356
Department of Defense typically can 

2155
01:25:19,356 --> 01:25:19,140
move at . And so we're trying to 

2156
01:25:19,140 --> 01:25:21,520
harness that uh and see how we can use 

2157
01:25:21,520 --> 01:25:23,687
that to our advantage . We are looking 

2158
01:25:23,687 --> 01:25:25,909
at different ways we can use commercial 

2159
01:25:25,909 --> 01:25:27,964
space . There are some missions that 

2160
01:25:27,964 --> 01:25:30,187
are probably almost completely could be 

2161
01:25:30,187 --> 01:25:29,960
filled by commercial and there's some 

2162
01:25:29,960 --> 01:25:32,690
that are very unique to D O D . Uh I'll 

2163
01:25:32,690 --> 01:25:34,523
just say , I think their general 

2164
01:25:34,523 --> 01:25:36,690
approach going forward and I'm not the 

2165
01:25:36,690 --> 01:25:38,801
acquisition authority here , sir , is 

2166
01:25:38,801 --> 01:25:40,746
that we should buy what we can and 

2167
01:25:40,746 --> 01:25:42,746
build what we have to . Thank you , 

2168
01:25:42,746 --> 01:25:44,801
Doctor Plum General Dickinson . I've 

2169
01:25:44,801 --> 01:25:47,023
heard a lot of talk about dynamic space 

2170
01:25:47,023 --> 01:25:49,134
operations and maneuvering satellites 

2171
01:25:49,134 --> 01:25:51,180
without regret . Can you explain on 

2172
01:25:51,180 --> 01:25:53,970
what your requirements are for this and 

2173
01:25:53,970 --> 01:25:56,530
how it intersects with ensuring robust 

2174
01:25:56,530 --> 01:25:59,140
and redundant situational awareness 

2175
01:25:59,140 --> 01:26:02,040
capabilities ? Thank you , Congressman 

2176
01:26:02,040 --> 01:26:04,207
and good to see you . Thanks for those 

2177
01:26:04,207 --> 01:26:07,240
kind words . Um I would say for dynamic 

2178
01:26:07,240 --> 01:26:09,690
space operations , we were still 

2179
01:26:09,700 --> 01:26:11,867
looking at crafting our requirements , 

2180
01:26:11,867 --> 01:26:13,978
drafting our requirements , what that 

2181
01:26:13,978 --> 01:26:16,200
really means and being able to describe 

2182
01:26:16,200 --> 01:26:18,089
that . But in , in essence , as I 

2183
01:26:18,089 --> 01:26:20,311
mentioned earlier , it is being able to 

2184
01:26:20,311 --> 01:26:23,470
maneuver on orbit in any manner that we 

2185
01:26:23,470 --> 01:26:25,637
need to given the situation and not be 

2186
01:26:25,637 --> 01:26:29,350
constrained by fuel , electricity , 

2187
01:26:29,350 --> 01:26:31,406
batteries , whatever the consumables 

2188
01:26:31,406 --> 01:26:33,770
might be on that particular spacecraft 

2189
01:26:33,770 --> 01:26:36,110
or that particular capability . So , 

2190
01:26:36,110 --> 01:26:38,332
like in other domains where you're able 

2191
01:26:38,332 --> 01:26:40,780
to refuel trucks and tanks and aircraft , 

2192
01:26:40,790 --> 01:26:43,012
we need to be able to do the same thing 

2193
01:26:43,012 --> 01:26:45,179
in space . Thank you . I thank each of 

2194
01:26:45,179 --> 01:26:47,512
you for being here . Are you in my time ? 

2195
01:26:47,512 --> 01:26:50,260
Representative North Cross Best ? 

2196
01:26:51,700 --> 01:26:55,610
Oh , in a moment about 

2197
01:26:55,610 --> 01:26:58,790
to recess and go up to 23 37 for the 

2198
01:26:58,790 --> 01:27:00,568
conclusion of this hearing in a 

2199
01:27:00,568 --> 01:27:03,500
classified setting . I have one quick 

2200
01:27:03,500 --> 01:27:06,300
follow up on something you said General 

2201
01:27:06,300 --> 01:27:09,580
Dickinson earlier . Uh You talked about 

2202
01:27:09,590 --> 01:27:12,940
achieving initial operating 

2203
01:27:12,940 --> 01:27:14,662
capability at your provisional 

2204
01:27:14,662 --> 01:27:16,718
headquarters at Peterson Space Force 

2205
01:27:16,718 --> 01:27:19,080
Base . Um I know that reaching full 

2206
01:27:19,090 --> 01:27:20,923
operational capability is a high 

2207
01:27:20,923 --> 01:27:23,990
priority . Uh but there have been 

2208
01:27:23,990 --> 01:27:27,080
complications regarding space command's 

2209
01:27:27,080 --> 01:27:29,590
permanent headquarters and where will 

2210
01:27:29,590 --> 01:27:31,590
be located ? Can you talk about the 

2211
01:27:31,590 --> 01:27:35,210
readiness challenges you face ? Should 

2212
01:27:35,220 --> 01:27:37,053
those headquarters be moved from 

2213
01:27:37,053 --> 01:27:39,720
Colorado Springs and the additional 

2214
01:27:39,720 --> 01:27:41,387
time that would be involved ? 

2215
01:27:44,130 --> 01:27:47,090
German , I did uh say I've reached IOC 

2216
01:27:47,090 --> 01:27:49,312
initial operational capability a couple 

2217
01:27:49,312 --> 01:27:51,312
of years ago and we're on the glide 

2218
01:27:51,312 --> 01:27:53,257
path right now moving aggressively 

2219
01:27:53,257 --> 01:27:55,479
towards full operational capability and 

2220
01:27:55,479 --> 01:27:57,312
the provisional headquarters and 

2221
01:27:57,312 --> 01:27:59,479
infrastructure that I have in Colorado 

2222
01:27:59,479 --> 01:28:01,701
Springs right now . Uh To me , it's all 

2223
01:28:01,701 --> 01:28:03,868
about readiness , it's all about being 

2224
01:28:03,868 --> 01:28:05,979
able to , to do the mission sets that 

2225
01:28:05,979 --> 01:28:05,640
I've been given by the President of 

2226
01:28:05,640 --> 01:28:08,100
United States . And so as we move with 

2227
01:28:08,100 --> 01:28:10,470
re sourcing both infrastructure as well 

2228
01:28:10,470 --> 01:28:12,860
as people which are the most important 

2229
01:28:12,860 --> 01:28:14,860
part of the command we're moving in 

2230
01:28:14,860 --> 01:28:15,860
that direction . 

2231
01:28:18,700 --> 01:28:20,756
Alright , thank you . We will now go 

2232
01:28:20,756 --> 01:28:22,700
into recess and reconvene in a few 

2233
01:28:22,700 --> 01:28:23,070
moments in 23 ,