WEBVTT 00:00.340 --> 00:02.396 Thank you . Cheryl is recognized for 00:02.396 --> 00:04.562 five minutes . Thank you . Mr Chairman 00:04.562 --> 00:06.562 General Milley . Secretary Austin . 00:06.562 --> 00:08.618 Thank you for your commitment to our 00:08.618 --> 00:10.673 armed forces and your service to our 00:10.673 --> 00:12.562 country . Gentlemen , both of you 00:12.562 --> 00:14.784 briefly touched on long range precision 00:14.784 --> 00:16.951 and hypersonic fires in your testimony 00:16.951 --> 00:18.618 and the important role such a 00:18.618 --> 00:20.507 capability would play not only an 00:20.507 --> 00:22.396 integrated deterrence but also an 00:22.396 --> 00:24.229 enabling success in multi domain 00:24.229 --> 00:26.740 operations as we worked swiftly to 00:26.740 --> 00:28.730 modernize the joint force more 00:28.730 --> 00:30.860 specifically our long range fires , 00:30.860 --> 00:33.540 platforms . What ground based platforms 00:33.540 --> 00:35.550 can commanders depend on to provide 00:35.550 --> 00:38.230 that capability ? And how if at all has 00:38.230 --> 00:39.952 the range displayed by Russian 00:39.952 --> 00:42.063 artillery and their war of aggression 00:42.063 --> 00:44.300 in Ukraine changed that thinking how's 00:44.300 --> 00:46.522 the department planning to increase our 00:46.522 --> 00:48.133 range without increasing our 00:48.133 --> 00:50.244 vulnerability to ground based missile 00:50.244 --> 00:53.910 defense systems ? Thanks congresswoman . 00:53.910 --> 00:57.000 The we've got a number of long range 00:57.070 --> 01:00.210 systems in the inventory today . Um but 01:00.210 --> 01:02.580 what the army in particular but also 01:02.580 --> 01:04.630 the Marine Corps working on our 01:04.630 --> 01:07.450 experimental long range fire systems . 01:07.700 --> 01:10.080 Those are rocket , uh some of hyper 01:10.090 --> 01:12.520 hyper sonic uh and some are tube 01:12.520 --> 01:15.840 artillery and these go very very long 01:15.840 --> 01:18.007 range . I won't get into . We can have 01:18.007 --> 01:19.673 a team come over and give you 01:19.673 --> 01:21.618 classified briefing on some of the 01:21.618 --> 01:21.560 experimental things that are going on . 01:21.570 --> 01:23.910 But we recognize that long range and 01:23.910 --> 01:26.132 long range precision fires and even put 01:26.132 --> 01:28.243 that caveat on it are critical to the 01:28.243 --> 01:30.354 future operational environment that's 01:30.354 --> 01:32.299 proven true over and over and over 01:32.299 --> 01:34.521 again and the ability to maneuver based 01:34.521 --> 01:36.743 military uh and for maneuver . You have 01:36.743 --> 01:38.770 to have fires plus the movement the 01:38.780 --> 01:41.400 mobility of the force uh combined gives 01:41.400 --> 01:43.622 you maneuver at the lower levels of the 01:43.622 --> 01:46.070 tactical level . Uh So we want to make 01:46.070 --> 01:48.780 sure that we have dominance in fires . 01:48.790 --> 01:51.180 We are that's that's one of the 01:51.190 --> 01:53.900 critical areas of development in each 01:53.900 --> 01:55.956 of the services but particularly the 01:55.956 --> 01:59.200 ground services and General Milley . 01:59.200 --> 02:01.311 Would you consider the strategic long 02:01.311 --> 02:03.533 range cannon an asset that would enable 02:03.533 --> 02:05.478 combatant commanders to succeed in 02:05.478 --> 02:07.700 multi domain operations ? Yes . In fact 02:07.700 --> 02:09.867 that yes , it's it's the basis of what 02:09.867 --> 02:12.089 the army is calling . Multi domain task 02:12.089 --> 02:14.256 force and what the marines are calling 02:14.256 --> 02:16.311 the littoral regiments are those are 02:16.311 --> 02:18.422 those is that cannon system ? So that 02:18.422 --> 02:21.650 is a um if you let's use the scenario 02:21.650 --> 02:23.820 of the south china seas with those 02:23.820 --> 02:26.510 capabilities based off shore based long 02:26.510 --> 02:28.600 range precision munitions , uh they 02:28.600 --> 02:30.544 should be able to do a significant 02:30.544 --> 02:32.767 amount of damage to any surface fleet , 02:32.767 --> 02:35.510 perhaps chinese surface fleet . So the 02:35.520 --> 02:37.640 point is , is that that system , that 02:37.640 --> 02:39.807 particular system you mentioned is one 02:39.807 --> 02:41.862 of those in experimental development 02:41.862 --> 02:43.918 and it will be a key to a future war 02:43.918 --> 02:46.084 fight . And as the army modernizes its 02:46.084 --> 02:48.196 indirect fire capabilities . Will the 02:48.196 --> 02:50.084 slur contribute to the integrated 02:50.084 --> 02:52.307 deterrence model ? And can you speak on 02:52.307 --> 02:54.473 the importance that further developing 02:54.473 --> 02:56.307 a capability like that will have 02:56.307 --> 02:58.418 towards establishing a modern force , 02:58.418 --> 03:00.418 you spoke a little bit about um for 03:00.418 --> 03:02.529 example in china , how important that 03:02.529 --> 03:04.751 is . Yes , I think um this this will be 03:04.751 --> 03:06.862 a lengthy conversation but we have to 03:06.862 --> 03:08.918 start with the operating environment 03:08.918 --> 03:11.140 we're gonna operate in and the changing 03:11.140 --> 03:13.196 character of war that chairman smith 03:13.196 --> 03:15.029 mentioned up front once we fully 03:15.029 --> 03:17.140 analyze that and understand that what 03:17.140 --> 03:19.140 we derived a set of attributes that 03:19.140 --> 03:20.973 come for each of the services in 03:20.973 --> 03:23.084 particular the joint force combined . 03:23.084 --> 03:25.084 Uh Speaking of that , would that be 03:25.084 --> 03:25.020 appropriate for the Marine corps as 03:25.020 --> 03:27.530 well ? And they're absolutely yes . So 03:27.660 --> 03:29.960 and what the marines are doing is 03:29.960 --> 03:32.127 upgrading therefore . And I'm aware of 03:32.127 --> 03:34.071 the debate that's ongoing with the 03:34.071 --> 03:36.182 marines but what they're trying to do 03:36.182 --> 03:38.404 is tailor the marines to optimize their 03:38.404 --> 03:40.516 capability as part of the joint force 03:40.516 --> 03:42.738 in a future operating environment under 03:42.738 --> 03:44.627 changed character of war . Uh And 03:44.627 --> 03:46.849 there's a lot of nuance to that , which 03:46.849 --> 03:49.071 would be much beyond the time available 03:49.071 --> 03:51.182 here . But the key is the development 03:51.182 --> 03:53.404 of the doctrine , the organization that 03:53.404 --> 03:55.516 the personnel , the training , all of 03:55.516 --> 03:57.627 those things in combination to set us 03:57.627 --> 04:00.230 up For operations in the 20s 30s . And 04:00.230 --> 04:02.286 that's what this budget is all about 04:02.286 --> 04:04.063 actually . Well , thank you , I 04:04.063 --> 04:06.830 appreciate that . And um with the 04:06.830 --> 04:09.030 army's extended range cannon artillery 04:09.030 --> 04:11.250 system that was designed to close the 04:11.250 --> 04:13.472 capabilities gap between the US and our 04:13.472 --> 04:15.639 adversaries . Is there a plan to field 04:15.639 --> 04:18.000 a toad extended range version of the 04:18.020 --> 04:21.880 mic triple seven um the M triple seven . 04:21.880 --> 04:24.270 I'm well there is a , there is already 04:24.270 --> 04:27.370 a 155 extended range toad version . So 04:27.370 --> 04:29.370 I think the short answer is yes but 04:29.370 --> 04:31.370 that's not the system we're talking 04:31.370 --> 04:33.426 about . We're talking about the long 04:33.426 --> 04:35.648 range precision fires that the that the 04:35.648 --> 04:35.630 army is developing . That that's not 04:35.630 --> 04:37.880 fielded yet in in at scale there's some 04:37.880 --> 04:39.936 experimental units that are using it 04:39.936 --> 04:42.102 right now . They did some recent tests 04:42.102 --> 04:44.269 at white sands which have proven quite 04:44.269 --> 04:46.380 successful . Um But that's not yet in 04:46.380 --> 04:48.940 the in the field and then as we work to 04:48.940 --> 04:50.829 build the capabilities within our 04:50.829 --> 04:52.884 within our hypersonic suite is there 04:52.884 --> 04:55.051 not a need for a land based long range 04:55.051 --> 04:57.273 surface to surface artillery asset that 04:57.273 --> 04:59.630 is more cost effective than the common 04:59.630 --> 05:02.070 hypersonic glide body and is readily 05:02.070 --> 05:03.959 available to combatant commanders 05:03.959 --> 05:06.181 seeking to strike critical targets such 05:06.181 --> 05:08.348 as headquarters maintenance apologized 05:08.348 --> 05:10.530 general Ladies time how the army is 05:10.530 --> 05:12.940 developing that . Thank you . Mr Green 05:12.940 --> 05:14.996 is right now . Thank you mr Chairman 05:14.996 --> 05:17.162 and thank the ranking member and thank 05:17.162 --> 05:19.218 our witnesses for being here today . 05:19.218 --> 05:21.218 And I want to again echo my amazing 05:21.218 --> 05:23.384 opportunity to bump into H minus there 05:23.384 --> 05:25.384 in Poland and and see your previous 05:25.384 --> 05:27.440 unit that you commanded in in a in a 05:27.440 --> 05:29.551 unit that I commanded . I'll tell you 05:29.551 --> 05:31.662 they're doing fantastic work . And so 05:31.662 --> 05:33.773 is Kevin Sharp the brigade from 101st 05:33.773 --> 05:35.940 they're just doing outstanding stuff . 05:35.940 --> 05:39.650 Um brief comment . You know 4% 05:40.140 --> 05:42.660 Raise for troops and an 8% inflation 05:42.660 --> 05:45.430 environment isn't a raise . Um I wish 05:45.430 --> 05:47.652 we could rethink that and certainly I'm 05:47.652 --> 05:49.597 sure there will be amendments that 05:49.597 --> 05:51.763 address it also on the top line number 05:51.763 --> 05:53.874 4% and an 8% inflation is is really a 05:53.874 --> 05:55.763 cut . Um I just want to make that 05:55.763 --> 05:59.230 comment . Mr McCord a quick comment for 05:59.230 --> 06:02.120 you . I I saw a statement that you had 06:02.120 --> 06:04.287 made . The budget was written prior to 06:04.287 --> 06:06.509 the Ukrainian invasion and could not be 06:06.509 --> 06:09.520 adjusted to include that . I want to 06:09.520 --> 06:11.490 tell you that I am and I'm talking 06:11.490 --> 06:13.601 specifically about making adjustments 06:13.601 --> 06:15.601 due to what's going on in Ukraine . 06:16.020 --> 06:18.187 There's not a company in America where 06:18.540 --> 06:20.707 the board of directors would allow the 06:20.707 --> 06:23.030 Ceo to say that the speed of business 06:23.030 --> 06:25.920 is the speed of now and the pentagon 06:25.920 --> 06:27.698 has got to move at the speed of 06:27.698 --> 06:29.940 business the speed of now and so you 06:29.940 --> 06:32.162 know in a few weeks that this thing has 06:32.162 --> 06:34.329 been going on . I would think that the 06:34.329 --> 06:36.440 adjustments could be made . Secretary 06:36.440 --> 06:38.496 Austin quick question for you who is 06:38.496 --> 06:40.718 advising the president that it's a good 06:40.718 --> 06:42.662 idea to allow the war criminals in 06:42.662 --> 06:44.773 Russia to build a nuclear reactor for 06:44.773 --> 06:48.370 Iran in the J . C . P . O . A . 06:48.370 --> 06:51.730 The uh current negotiations would allow 06:51.730 --> 06:54.240 Russia to build a nuclear reactor to 06:54.240 --> 06:56.462 the tune of $10 billion . These are the 06:56.462 --> 06:58.980 guys that you know have done these 06:58.980 --> 07:01.036 horrible things in Ukraine and we're 07:01.036 --> 07:03.180 here letting them at least right now 07:03.180 --> 07:05.013 considering letting them build a 07:05.013 --> 07:08.720 nuclear reactor there . I mean there 07:08.720 --> 07:11.600 are a number of people that are leading 07:11.600 --> 07:13.822 that process of course , you know , our 07:13.822 --> 07:16.760 national Security Advisor plus um as 07:16.760 --> 07:18.760 you know the State Department is is 07:18.760 --> 07:20.980 leading the , let me ask you is I mean 07:20.980 --> 07:22.869 is there somebody at D O D saying 07:22.869 --> 07:25.490 that's a good idea ? Do you think it's 07:25.490 --> 07:28.150 a good idea ? No , that's no , we we we 07:28.160 --> 07:30.216 have not provided any counsel to the 07:30.216 --> 07:32.327 president on building and I would ask 07:32.327 --> 07:34.493 you to do that . I think it's a really 07:34.493 --> 07:36.493 bad idea . Uh I want to talk legacy 07:36.493 --> 07:38.716 Systems general Milley with you if it's 07:38.716 --> 07:40.771 if it's okay , we've had discussions 07:40.771 --> 07:43.104 before about phasing out legacy systems , 07:43.104 --> 07:44.938 bringing in new systems with the 07:44.938 --> 07:46.771 capability to overcome those and 07:46.771 --> 07:48.493 amplify on them . I'm a little 07:48.493 --> 07:50.493 concerned about about J STARS . You 07:50.493 --> 07:52.438 know , we army guys , we love that 07:52.438 --> 07:56.360 program , it helps us . Um and there's 07:56.370 --> 07:59.240 I guess talking this budget of uh the 07:59.240 --> 08:01.573 Air Force wanting to get rid of J STARS , 08:01.573 --> 08:04.090 I'd love to hear your thoughts on and 08:04.090 --> 08:06.201 maybe we have to go into a classified 08:06.201 --> 08:08.034 setting . Is there going to be a 08:08.034 --> 08:10.750 capability gap if that thing goes away ? 08:12.740 --> 08:15.440 Well , first chase like you just saw is 08:15.440 --> 08:18.670 a great system but this budget and the 08:18.670 --> 08:21.130 National Defense strategy is optimizing 08:21.130 --> 08:22.963 for the pacing threat , the most 08:22.963 --> 08:25.074 significant strategic challenge , the 08:25.074 --> 08:27.241 United States china and then the acute 08:27.241 --> 08:29.297 challenge of acute threat , which is 08:29.297 --> 08:31.352 Russia , J Stars is not a Survivable 08:31.352 --> 08:33.510 aircraft in that type of environment 08:33.510 --> 08:36.580 against that high end threat . Uh , so 08:36.580 --> 08:39.000 that's 0.1 point two in terms of the 08:39.000 --> 08:41.056 capability that J Stars does bring , 08:41.056 --> 08:43.111 which is the ability to battle track 08:43.111 --> 08:45.167 movements , etcetera on the ground . 08:45.167 --> 08:48.050 That so I'm sorry , That's right . And 08:48.240 --> 08:50.780 uh that capability will exist in a 08:50.780 --> 08:52.780 different form and from a different 08:52.780 --> 08:54.947 platform , but for that I have to take 08:54.947 --> 08:57.113 it to a different session . So there's 08:57.113 --> 08:59.113 no capability loss with that with J 08:59.113 --> 09:01.169 stars going away , I don't know , no 09:01.169 --> 09:03.391 significant capability lost relative to 09:03.391 --> 09:05.613 china and Russia . If you wanted to use 09:05.613 --> 09:05.190 J stars in a lower intensity 09:05.190 --> 09:07.079 environment , then there would be 09:07.079 --> 09:09.412 because the J stars would be going away . 09:09.412 --> 09:11.634 But our we're optimizing for china than 09:11.634 --> 09:13.746 Russia , I may um then asked for that 09:13.746 --> 09:15.912 classified discussion . So we can kind 09:15.912 --> 09:18.580 of go into that one quick thought about 09:18.580 --> 09:21.850 this legacy Fall off and the 09:21.860 --> 09:24.027 implementation of the new systems that 09:24.027 --> 09:25.638 are 5 , 6 years out . I know 09:25.638 --> 09:27.693 Congressman Whitman has talked about 09:27.693 --> 09:29.920 this challenge . I'm aware that there's 09:29.920 --> 09:32.460 this strategic deterrence fund that 09:32.460 --> 09:34.800 hasn't been used for years . I'd love 09:34.810 --> 09:36.866 to get some details on that . If you 09:36.866 --> 09:38.930 all have it because we could protect 09:38.930 --> 09:40.930 the guys across the aisle who don't 09:40.930 --> 09:42.708 necessarily want to see massive 09:42.708 --> 09:44.930 increases in the budget . We could fund 09:44.930 --> 09:46.819 some of the R and D for these new 09:46.819 --> 09:46.510 projects through that and it would be 09:46.510 --> 09:48.800 similar to the way we did the Yoko uh 09:48.800 --> 09:51.022 and and sort of put money over there to 09:51.022 --> 09:54.560 to I would ask that be considered . 09:55.140 --> 09:56.918 And even speaking to some of my 09:56.918 --> 09:59.140 democrat colleagues , they think that'd 09:59.140 --> 10:01.362 be a great idea about future systems so 10:01.362 --> 10:03.029 that that we can maintain the 10:03.029 --> 10:05.196 capabilities in that gap period . Keep 10:05.196 --> 10:07.084 legacy systems around long enough 10:07.084 --> 10:09.196 afford them in the current budget and 10:09.196 --> 10:11.362 pay for the new systems in a different 10:11.362 --> 10:13.529 strategic fund . And if you could look 10:13.529 --> 10:15.640 into that and get back with my office 10:15.640 --> 10:15.460 would be great . Thank you . Thank you . 10:15.640 --> 10:17.751 Gentleman has expired . MR escobar is 10:17.751 --> 10:19.973 recognized for five minutes . Thank you 10:19.973 --> 10:22.140 Mr Chairman for this important hearing 10:22.140 --> 10:24.029 and thank you Secretary Austin in 10:24.029 --> 10:26.251 General Milley for your service and for 10:26.251 --> 10:28.560 your time before us today I have the 10:28.560 --> 10:30.880 honor and privilege of serving 10:30.890 --> 10:33.110 representing el paso texas , home to 10:33.110 --> 10:35.590 Fort Bliss , America's second largest 10:35.590 --> 10:37.830 military installation and the largest 10:37.830 --> 10:40.010 joint mobilization force generation 10:40.010 --> 10:43.050 installations in the army , home to the 10:43.050 --> 10:45.060 first armored division and joint 10:45.060 --> 10:47.610 modernization command . I'm so pleased 10:47.610 --> 10:50.630 to see $15 million in the budget for a 10:50.630 --> 10:53.040 new fire station at Fort Bliss and will 10:53.040 --> 10:55.040 work to ensure that that funding is 10:55.040 --> 10:57.690 included in this year's N . D . A Fort 10:57.690 --> 10:59.857 Bliss . It's people and infrastructure 10:59.857 --> 11:01.579 are critical to our military's 11:01.579 --> 11:04.080 readiness . From my first day as the 11:04.080 --> 11:06.270 congresswoman for this great military 11:06.270 --> 11:08.381 installation . I've advocated for the 11:08.381 --> 11:10.530 investments needed for our assets and 11:10.530 --> 11:12.570 missions . I'm going to do it again 11:12.570 --> 11:14.670 here today . There are two 11:14.670 --> 11:16.837 infrastructure priorities that we need 11:16.837 --> 11:19.270 to fund critical to our readiness . The 11:19.270 --> 11:21.500 first is a modest investment in a 11:21.500 --> 11:23.280 railhead . The current rail 11:23.280 --> 11:25.502 infrastructure and design is a limiting 11:25.502 --> 11:27.280 factor in efficient movement of 11:27.280 --> 11:29.113 military equipment in support of 11:29.113 --> 11:31.360 deployments , punting on providing 11:31.360 --> 11:33.193 funding for the railhead further 11:33.193 --> 11:35.082 degrades Fort Bliss is ability to 11:35.082 --> 11:37.700 mobilize and demobilize troops that 11:37.700 --> 11:39.930 come from every corner of the country 11:39.940 --> 11:42.162 because of the installations mission as 11:42.162 --> 11:44.510 a joint mobilization force generation 11:44.510 --> 11:47.510 installation . Fort Hood has a similar 11:47.510 --> 11:49.680 number of assets and missions , but a 11:49.680 --> 11:52.230 larger railhead Bliss is doing the best 11:52.230 --> 11:54.341 they can , but a larger railhead will 11:54.341 --> 11:56.674 allow them to better meet the D . O . D . 11:56.674 --> 11:58.786 Shift to meet the challenges of today 11:58.786 --> 12:01.300 and tomorrow . Namely china . The 12:01.300 --> 12:03.670 second is the need for new barracks . 12:03.680 --> 12:05.902 I've been in the barracks at Fort Bliss 12:05.902 --> 12:08.124 and can tell you they are in poor shape 12:08.124 --> 12:11.200 and inadequately cooled in a desert 12:11.210 --> 12:13.266 environment like el paso where we've 12:13.266 --> 12:16.110 had more record breaking triple digit 12:16.120 --> 12:19.020 temperatures each year . As a result of 12:19.020 --> 12:21.210 the climate crisis , the barracks can 12:21.210 --> 12:23.120 become so hot . I can easily see 12:23.120 --> 12:25.990 someone passing out as a result , I 12:25.990 --> 12:27.657 know there's some 3D printing 12:27.657 --> 12:29.657 innovation going on , but I want to 12:29.657 --> 12:31.870 emphasize that degraded living spaces 12:31.870 --> 12:33.870 and substandard facilities that are 12:33.870 --> 12:36.740 installations lowers morale , increases 12:36.740 --> 12:39.140 health and safety risks and negatively 12:39.150 --> 12:41.360 impacts retention , which in turn 12:41.370 --> 12:44.680 affects our readiness . I provide these 12:44.680 --> 12:46.902 two examples in order to make sure that 12:46.902 --> 12:49.124 Fort Bliss remains top of mind to you . 12:49.124 --> 12:51.000 And also to point out that our 12:51.000 --> 12:53.110 readiness is directly tied to the 12:53.110 --> 12:55.520 infrastructure we have here at home at 12:55.520 --> 12:57.520 key installations like Fort Bliss , 12:57.740 --> 13:00.140 Secretary Austin and General Milley . 13:00.150 --> 13:02.372 Could you talk about where you see Fort 13:02.372 --> 13:04.372 Bliss fitting into the department's 13:04.372 --> 13:06.150 plans for addressing the pacing 13:06.150 --> 13:08.300 challenge with china and modernizing 13:08.300 --> 13:12.250 our military ? Well as 13:12.250 --> 13:14.940 you if you as you've said , Fort Bliss 13:15.740 --> 13:16.580 has 13:19.040 --> 13:22.560 houses some of our most capable 13:22.560 --> 13:24.880 forces there with their armored forces 13:24.880 --> 13:27.520 and also some air defense capability . 13:27.520 --> 13:30.510 So it is an important installation to 13:30.510 --> 13:34.250 us in . I I 13:34.250 --> 13:36.306 share your concerns with making sure 13:36.306 --> 13:37.780 that we have the right 13:40.340 --> 13:42.900 facilities for our troops and and make 13:42.900 --> 13:45.178 sure that our troops are taken care of . 13:45.178 --> 13:47.233 That's very , very important to me . 13:47.233 --> 13:49.400 We'll make sure that we go back and uh 13:49.400 --> 13:51.590 and work with the army to see where 13:51.590 --> 13:53.757 things stand in the priority and get a 13:53.757 --> 13:55.812 better understanding of when and how 13:55.812 --> 13:58.470 these things are funded . And I would 13:58.470 --> 14:00.637 just echo what the secretary said four 14:00.637 --> 14:02.692 plus is a strategic platform for the 14:02.692 --> 14:04.640 deployment of uh some really 14:04.640 --> 14:06.473 significant combat power and the 14:06.473 --> 14:08.696 armored division that's their uh and as 14:08.696 --> 14:10.862 mentioned through many previous member 14:10.862 --> 14:12.918 comments about the importance of air 14:12.918 --> 14:15.029 defense systems , Patriot and so on . 14:15.029 --> 14:17.140 That's all done at Fort Bliss then of 14:17.140 --> 14:19.140 course , you know , as well as I do 14:19.140 --> 14:21.307 that for publicity , Jason white sands 14:21.307 --> 14:23.362 missile range , a lot of testing for 14:23.362 --> 14:25.584 modernization has done there . Uh So we 14:25.584 --> 14:25.000 want to make sure that the railheads 14:25.000 --> 14:27.111 are good so they can deploy the force 14:27.111 --> 14:29.167 we want to make sure the barracks is 14:29.167 --> 14:31.278 squared away to ensure that the force 14:31.278 --> 14:33.500 itself is being taken care of so we can 14:33.500 --> 14:35.556 achieve those strategic objectives . 14:35.556 --> 14:35.330 I'll get with the Chief of Staff of the 14:35.330 --> 14:38.380 Army . I wasn't as you know , former 14:38.380 --> 14:40.491 chief of staff of the army , I wasn't 14:40.491 --> 14:42.491 tracking the barracks at Bliss have 14:42.491 --> 14:44.658 deteriorated that bad . But let me let 14:44.658 --> 14:44.260 me get back to you on an answer for 14:44.260 --> 14:46.093 that , appreciate it . And in my 14:46.093 --> 14:48.204 remaining 30 seconds , I just want to 14:48.204 --> 14:50.204 emphasize as we've heard some of my 14:50.204 --> 14:52.371 colleagues talk about legacy systems . 14:52.371 --> 14:54.371 Um , it's really on Congress . It's 14:54.371 --> 14:56.593 important to us that we heed the advice 14:56.593 --> 14:59.100 that you've given us um in classified 14:59.100 --> 15:02.870 and unclassified settings about the 15:02.870 --> 15:06.190 need to invest in the right way . My 15:06.190 --> 15:08.301 time is up . I yield back . Thank you 15:08.301 --> 15:10.523 both . And by the way , invite you both 15:10.523 --> 15:12.579 would be honored to host you at Fort 15:12.579 --> 15:14.634 Bliss . Mr Chairman . I yield back . 15:14.634 --> 15:16.746 Thank you . Mr Carl is recognized for 15:16.746 --> 15:18.801 five minutes . Thank you Mr Chairman 15:18.801 --> 15:21.023 and thank you gentlemen for willingness 15:21.023 --> 15:20.380 to come in here and speak to us . I've 15:20.380 --> 15:22.713 got three quick points and one question . 15:22.713 --> 15:24.658 So you know , when you get to me , 15:24.658 --> 15:26.769 you're at the end of the line so that 15:26.769 --> 15:28.936 that's the good news . Uh , you know , 15:28.936 --> 15:31.047 on this defense budget . I personally 15:31.047 --> 15:33.213 am tired of the defense budget process 15:33.213 --> 15:35.436 that does not supply our troops or meet 15:35.436 --> 15:38.290 our global , global defensive needs . 15:38.300 --> 15:41.280 For example , reducing our naval fleet 15:41.290 --> 15:43.123 in order to stretch insufficient 15:43.123 --> 15:45.870 personnel across fewer ships indicates 15:45.870 --> 15:47.814 how backwards our defense spending 15:47.814 --> 15:50.740 approach has become . Second point . 15:50.920 --> 15:53.390 Our withdrawal of Afghanistan indicates 15:53.390 --> 15:56.970 a completely avoidable , avoidable uh 15:56.980 --> 15:59.147 failure of leadership and has made the 15:59.147 --> 16:02.220 world and our homeland less safe rather 16:02.220 --> 16:04.750 than more safe . And the 3rd point , 16:05.340 --> 16:07.860 our refueling capability is essential , 16:08.540 --> 16:10.318 especially given the challenges 16:10.318 --> 16:12.400 presented by the in tow the indo 16:12.400 --> 16:15.540 pacific last year . In the same setting , 16:15.650 --> 16:18.860 we had this conversation asked you both , 16:19.340 --> 16:22.360 General Milley , I asked you both 16:23.040 --> 16:26.130 Where we are essentially on , on the 16:26.130 --> 16:29.440 circumstances with the KC 46 , we were 16:29.440 --> 16:33.030 briefed last week That the KC 46 16:33.070 --> 16:36.450 is capable of refueling 86% of our 16:36.450 --> 16:39.350 aircraft . would anyone in this room by 16:39.350 --> 16:42.870 a car with the idea of it working 86% 16:42.870 --> 16:45.970 of the time And not 100% of the time . 16:46.340 --> 16:49.210 So my frustration is really with this K . 16:49.210 --> 16:51.960 C . And my question , General Milley 16:51.960 --> 16:55.720 and and and General Austin . I asked 16:55.720 --> 16:57.800 both of you , why are we not moving 16:57.800 --> 17:00.220 forward with the next generation tanker ? 17:00.220 --> 17:02.890 The L . M . X . T , which I understand 17:02.890 --> 17:04.946 is serving us quite well in europe . 17:09.540 --> 17:11.970 Yeah , thanks for that . I , well , 17:11.970 --> 17:15.680 first on your comments about 17:15.690 --> 17:18.010 refueling in general . Uh that is a 17:18.010 --> 17:20.610 strategic capability that we've got to 17:20.610 --> 17:24.160 sustain improve because the the legs of 17:24.160 --> 17:26.360 aircraft especially over the pacific 17:26.740 --> 17:29.170 are too short on a single tank of gas 17:29.180 --> 17:31.560 to be involved in the chinese war fight , 17:31.940 --> 17:35.060 given that the chinese do have anti 17:35.060 --> 17:38.680 access capabilities . uh 17:38.680 --> 17:41.060 .1.2 is the survivability of those 17:41.060 --> 17:43.650 aircraft is every bit as important as 17:43.650 --> 17:45.761 their ability to refuel an aircraft . 17:45.761 --> 17:47.817 So those are particularly vulnerable 17:47.817 --> 17:49.983 aircraft . So those two things have to 17:49.983 --> 17:52.261 be worked on in this particular budget . 17:52.261 --> 17:52.150 Uh If memory serves me right , I think 17:52.150 --> 17:55.160 there's a 15 K C 46 is uh 17:55.540 --> 17:58.470 as part of this we are phasing out some 17:58.470 --> 18:01.220 KC 1 35 and I agree with you on the on 18:01.220 --> 18:03.442 the L . M . X . Piece . I think that is 18:03.442 --> 18:06.380 the next generation . Uh we need to uh 18:06.390 --> 18:08.630 get going with that because that is 18:08.640 --> 18:11.070 more survivable and it handles a 18:11.080 --> 18:13.191 greater ability to refuel the fleet . 18:13.191 --> 18:15.358 So I'm not in disagreement with any of 18:15.358 --> 18:17.302 that , but refueling is a critical 18:17.302 --> 18:19.469 strategic capability that we have . Uh 18:19.469 --> 18:21.691 And if you take it back to our american 18:21.691 --> 18:24.710 way of war , um what what makes us so 18:24.710 --> 18:26.432 much different than many other 18:26.432 --> 18:28.432 countries is our ability to project 18:28.432 --> 18:31.570 combat power very rapidly at great 18:31.570 --> 18:33.700 distances from continental United 18:33.700 --> 18:36.340 States and refueling along with the 18:36.340 --> 18:38.396 maritime fleet along with many other 18:38.396 --> 18:40.507 capabilities are what enable us to do 18:40.507 --> 18:42.229 that . So that's a key area of 18:42.229 --> 18:44.396 investment that we need to continue to 18:44.396 --> 18:47.610 do . Thank you sir . I agree with what 18:47.610 --> 18:50.210 the chairman has said , uh , refueling 18:50.210 --> 18:52.920 capability is a significant part of our 18:52.920 --> 18:55.240 strategic advantage . Uh , and we have 18:55.240 --> 18:57.407 to make sure that we , we maintain the 18:57.407 --> 19:00.180 capability to fuel refuel all of our 19:00.180 --> 19:02.920 aircraft . And so for a period of time 19:02.930 --> 19:05.097 we'll need to make sure we have a kind 19:05.097 --> 19:07.450 of a blend of , of capability . So 19:07.460 --> 19:09.682 until we get some of the problems fixed 19:09.682 --> 19:13.060 on the , on the , On the 46 but 19:13.070 --> 19:15.126 investing in the next generation , I 19:15.126 --> 19:17.348 think it's the right thing to do . So I 19:17.348 --> 19:19.330 agree with with what you've , what 19:19.330 --> 19:21.663 you've raised her . Thank you gentlemen . 19:21.663 --> 19:24.590 Now you're my time . Mr Golden is 19:24.590 --> 19:28.530 recognized . Thank you . Secretary 19:28.530 --> 19:30.641 Austin and General Miller , thank you 19:30.641 --> 19:32.808 for being here today and thank you for 19:32.808 --> 19:34.586 your lifetime of service to the 19:34.586 --> 19:36.920 country's defense . Um , you know , 19:36.930 --> 19:38.874 sitting here for now , three hours 19:38.874 --> 19:41.760 similar to the way that you to have , 19:41.770 --> 19:44.050 It occurs to me that these hearings 19:44.050 --> 19:46.161 obviously are very important . That's 19:46.161 --> 19:49.010 why we do them . That the oversight is 19:49.010 --> 19:51.480 critical . The debate , I think can be 19:51.480 --> 19:54.000 a real source of strength in the policy 19:54.000 --> 19:56.360 making process when done correctly and 19:56.370 --> 20:00.360 done . I think in general act of 20:00.370 --> 20:02.300 good faith , we've also seen some 20:02.300 --> 20:04.633 examples where perhaps it's not helpful , 20:04.633 --> 20:06.800 uh , in regards to the message you can 20:06.800 --> 20:09.180 send to the world to our , our friends 20:09.180 --> 20:11.440 and our foes , uh , and most 20:11.440 --> 20:14.550 importantly to the american people in 20:14.550 --> 20:16.717 regards to that . I want to talk about 20:16.717 --> 20:18.661 something we really haven't talked 20:18.661 --> 20:20.883 about today and that's a recent opinion 20:20.883 --> 20:23.050 piece in the Wall Street Journal . You 20:23.050 --> 20:24.939 may have seen written by a former 20:24.939 --> 20:27.410 member of Congress as well as a former 20:27.420 --> 20:30.610 secretary of a cabinet of a different 20:30.610 --> 20:32.770 presidential administration passed . 20:33.940 --> 20:36.107 And what's concerning about it I think 20:36.107 --> 20:38.200 is the message that it sends to the 20:38.200 --> 20:40.640 american people uh and two others who 20:40.640 --> 20:42.807 are paying attention . And this has to 20:42.807 --> 20:44.862 do with the commandant of the Marine 20:44.862 --> 20:48.810 Corps Current Force Redesign . I wanted 20:48.810 --> 20:51.460 to ask a couple of questions about this 20:51.790 --> 20:54.123 and I'm gonna start with General Milley . 20:54.420 --> 20:56.850 It says here that there are people out 20:56.850 --> 20:58.710 there who are feeling that it is 20:58.710 --> 21:01.890 unclear particularly for people with 21:01.890 --> 21:04.057 experience in military planning . What 21:04.057 --> 21:05.946 formal review in coordination was 21:05.946 --> 21:07.834 required of the common commandant 21:07.834 --> 21:10.800 before his words . The author of this 21:10.800 --> 21:12.800 opinion piece before the commandant 21:12.800 --> 21:15.600 unilaterally announced a policy that 21:15.600 --> 21:18.220 would alter the Marine Corps . It goes 21:18.220 --> 21:21.180 on to say that the law doesn't give the 21:21.180 --> 21:23.510 commandant carte blanc to make 21:23.510 --> 21:25.566 significant changes in for structure 21:25.566 --> 21:27.677 but rather Title 10 provides that the 21:27.677 --> 21:29.899 commandant performs its duty subject to 21:29.899 --> 21:32.066 the authority direction and control of 21:32.066 --> 21:34.288 the Secretary of the Navy , who also by 21:34.288 --> 21:36.454 the way uh is subject to the authority 21:36.454 --> 21:36.300 direction and control of the Secretary 21:36.300 --> 21:38.189 of Defense and then finally , the 21:38.189 --> 21:40.411 president retains ultimate authority as 21:40.411 --> 21:43.430 commander in chief . Ah The next 21:43.430 --> 21:45.580 paragraph here says that there's a 21:45.590 --> 21:48.080 problem in a restructuring of this 21:48.080 --> 21:51.030 scale having moved through without full 21:51.030 --> 21:53.130 consideration and debate in front of 21:53.130 --> 21:55.450 the proper offices within the pentagon 21:55.460 --> 21:57.950 such as the Defense Resource Board or 21:57.950 --> 22:00.530 others and that a formal approval by 22:00.530 --> 22:02.920 the sec def should have been conducted 22:02.920 --> 22:05.031 before it was sent to the White House 22:05.031 --> 22:07.031 for further review and then sent to 22:07.031 --> 22:09.142 Congress for oversight hearings . The 22:09.142 --> 22:11.253 last thing I would point out that the 22:11.253 --> 22:13.930 opinion piece asserts that This 22:13.930 --> 22:15.874 announcement was made during COVID 22:15.874 --> 22:17.986 making it difficult for congressional 22:17.986 --> 22:20.097 oversight to take place . And I think 22:20.097 --> 22:22.208 perhaps for you , General Milley most 22:22.208 --> 22:24.430 concerning . It asserts that due to the 22:24.430 --> 22:26.374 chaos that existed in the Pentagon 22:26.374 --> 22:28.560 during the 2020 campaign year And post 22:28.560 --> 22:31.390 election turbulence that perhaps this 22:31.390 --> 22:35.230 proposal has just floated through uh 22:35.240 --> 22:37.296 through improper channels . And so I 22:37.296 --> 22:39.462 wanted to ask you , you've been around 22:39.462 --> 22:41.740 in this position since October of 2019 . 22:41.740 --> 22:43.962 Do you have any concern along the way , 22:43.962 --> 22:45.690 having had this re force this 22:45.690 --> 22:49.080 restructure announced In March of 2020 22:49.080 --> 22:51.710 that the proper process has not been 22:51.710 --> 22:54.970 followed ? No . And I read the piece by 22:54.970 --> 22:56.803 Senator Webb and I have enormous 22:56.803 --> 22:58.914 respect for Senator Webb by the way , 22:58.914 --> 23:00.859 it has to have a Navy cross Winter 23:00.859 --> 23:02.803 Marine veteran , a tremendous Navy 23:02.803 --> 23:05.140 Secretary et cetera . I read the piece 23:05.150 --> 23:07.260 uh and Dave Berger the commandant 23:07.260 --> 23:10.500 Marine Corps General burger . Uh he 23:10.510 --> 23:12.677 pretty rigorously thought this through 23:12.677 --> 23:15.320 with the the Marine Corps staff and the 23:15.320 --> 23:17.740 Navy staff And he he did brief it up 23:17.740 --> 23:19.740 through various elements within the 23:19.740 --> 23:21.740 Department of Defense . I can't say 23:21.740 --> 23:23.629 about the White House piece . I I 23:23.629 --> 23:25.740 assume he does hearings as well . I'm 23:25.740 --> 23:27.907 assuming that the oversight committees 23:27.907 --> 23:29.851 have heard it many times about the 23:29.851 --> 23:31.907 restructuring of marine and marine , 23:31.907 --> 23:34.129 you know , 2030 plan . But let's take a 23:34.129 --> 23:36.351 look just for a second . What what is , 23:36.351 --> 23:38.684 what are they actually doing materially , 23:38.684 --> 23:38.180 What are they physically doing ? You 23:38.180 --> 23:40.300 know , reducing by three infantry 23:40.300 --> 23:42.740 battalions . That certainly there's 23:42.740 --> 23:44.907 only 31 infantry battalions and Marine 23:44.907 --> 23:46.962 Corps . So it's not a large force to 23:46.962 --> 23:49.129 begin with . Let me , we're almost out 23:49.129 --> 23:49.060 of time . Let me just say , I think 23:49.060 --> 23:51.360 it's important you were aware of course 23:51.360 --> 23:53.416 that the Marine Corps was absolutely 23:53.416 --> 23:55.416 aware that they've been in front of 23:55.416 --> 23:57.582 Congress for oversight . We were aware 23:57.582 --> 23:59.416 and I'm also aware of the alumni 23:59.416 --> 24:01.582 community of the Marine Corps is quite 24:01.582 --> 24:01.390 upset about it . The Secretary of the 24:01.390 --> 24:03.557 Navy under multiple administrations is 24:03.557 --> 24:05.334 aware of this and approved it . 24:05.334 --> 24:07.612 Obviously it was green lighted to come . 24:07.612 --> 24:09.723 I believe the answer is just all that 24:09.723 --> 24:09.510 and you're committed to ensuring that 24:09.510 --> 24:11.710 that proper processes followed going 24:11.710 --> 24:13.543 forward because my understanding 24:13.543 --> 24:15.877 Marines is as they're implementing this , 24:15.877 --> 24:17.766 they're also flexible and they're 24:17.766 --> 24:19.766 they're learning lessons and making 24:19.766 --> 24:21.988 adjustments correct . So totally I have 24:21.988 --> 24:21.500 no problem with the process that was 24:21.500 --> 24:23.500 followed and that may not have come 24:23.500 --> 24:25.611 clear to the senator or others out in 24:25.611 --> 24:27.722 the alumni community , but inside the 24:27.722 --> 24:29.889 pentagon it's my belief anyway because 24:29.889 --> 24:32.111 I saw it and so did many members of the 24:32.111 --> 24:31.930 Department of Defense . And I know the 24:31.930 --> 24:34.160 committees of oversights are so I think 24:34.160 --> 24:36.720 that part of the process is important . 24:36.720 --> 24:38.960 Point . Thank you . Thank you Mr Rogers 24:39.540 --> 24:41.651 Madam Chair . I ask unanimous consent 24:41.651 --> 24:43.762 that all committee members have three 24:43.762 --> 24:45.873 legislative days to revise and extend 24:45.873 --> 24:47.929 my remarks and to include extraneous 24:47.929 --> 24:49.929 materials into the record . Without 24:49.929 --> 24:52.380 objection . So ordered Mr moore Mr 24:52.380 --> 24:54.602 moore is recognized . Thank you Chair . 24:54.602 --> 24:57.170 Thank you . And remember The F- 35 24:57.170 --> 24:59.340 Joint Strike Fighter Strengthens 24:59.340 --> 25:01.410 National Security , enhances global 25:01.410 --> 25:03.632 partnerships and powers economic growth 25:03.632 --> 25:05.688 across our nation . I agree with Air 25:05.688 --> 25:08.650 Force Chiefs Chief of Staff Brown , The 25:08.650 --> 25:10.817 F- 35 is indeed the cornerstone of Air 25:10.817 --> 25:13.039 Force modernization remains remains the 25:13.039 --> 25:15.206 most lethal . Survivable and connected 25:15.206 --> 25:17.428 fighter in the world , giving pilots an 25:17.428 --> 25:19.428 advantage against any adversary and 25:19.428 --> 25:21.594 then most importantly enabling them to 25:21.594 --> 25:21.050 execute their mission to come home 25:21.050 --> 25:23.850 safely . At Hill Air Force Base in Utah 25:23.860 --> 25:26.027 are three 88th Fighter wing is the Air 25:26.027 --> 25:28.193 Force First active duty combat capable 25:28.193 --> 25:30.360 F 35 a lightning unit Right now , F 30 25:30.360 --> 25:32.800 five's from the base is 34 squadron 25:32.810 --> 25:34.643 have been deployed to Germany in 25:34.643 --> 25:36.588 response to Russia's aggression in 25:36.588 --> 25:38.810 Ukraine . However , I am concerned that 25:38.810 --> 25:38.740 these fifth generation aircraft have 25:38.740 --> 25:40.930 not consistently been accompanied with 25:40.940 --> 25:43.107 equally modern and advanced weaponry . 25:43.240 --> 25:45.018 The weaponry to accompany fifth 25:45.018 --> 25:47.184 generation aircraft must include cyber 25:47.184 --> 25:49.296 and electronic warfare capabilities , 25:49.296 --> 25:51.462 superior radars and sensors , unmanned 25:51.462 --> 25:53.629 capabilities and the ability to defeat 25:53.629 --> 25:55.740 rapidly relocate herbal targets in an 25:55.740 --> 25:57.518 anti access environment from my 25:57.518 --> 25:59.573 understanding Jazz um and Laura's um 25:59.573 --> 26:01.796 and the standard attack weapon can help 26:01.796 --> 26:03.907 they have 35 reach its full potential 26:03.907 --> 26:05.907 As 5th Generation Fighter Secretary 26:05.907 --> 26:08.073 Austin again , thank you all for being 26:08.073 --> 26:10.073 here and for your service . Can you 26:10.073 --> 26:12.296 provide an update on the implementation 26:12.296 --> 26:14.518 of advanced weaponry for the F- 35 with 26:14.518 --> 26:16.629 battle management capabilities needed 26:16.629 --> 26:18.296 to to address an increasingly 26:18.296 --> 26:20.573 adversarial adversarial threats ? Yeah , 26:20.573 --> 26:22.573 so we're we're working hard to make 26:22.573 --> 26:25.650 sure that that , you know , we do in 26:25.650 --> 26:28.920 fact achieve the upgrades going forward 26:28.920 --> 26:31.031 that you mentioned and we are able to 26:31.630 --> 26:33.760 to integrate the capabilities from 26:33.770 --> 26:37.330 cyber in uh and information 26:37.330 --> 26:40.040 that that you mentioned ? That's that's 26:40.040 --> 26:42.151 a work in progress . We will continue 26:42.151 --> 26:44.373 to invest in precision guided munitions 26:44.373 --> 26:46.096 because that's really , really 26:46.096 --> 26:48.151 important to us . And you've seen us 26:48.151 --> 26:50.040 invest in in the upgrade of those 26:50.040 --> 26:52.262 precision guided munitions to make sure 26:52.262 --> 26:54.800 that they're survivable . And I like to 26:54.800 --> 26:57.022 look at it , and you know as I dig into 26:57.022 --> 26:59.078 this with my team and and some of my 26:59.078 --> 27:01.244 stakeholders back home , I like to you 27:01.244 --> 27:03.356 make a comparison with an $80 million 27:03.356 --> 27:05.390 dollar plane That we are putting 50 27:05.390 --> 27:07.820 year old weapons weapons technology 27:07.820 --> 27:10.450 into um important piece , especially as 27:10.450 --> 27:12.980 we talk about the budget today . Do you 27:12.980 --> 27:15.091 think there has been enough attention 27:15.091 --> 27:17.258 given to the weaponry available to the 27:17.258 --> 27:20.990 F- 35 . One of my priorities uh , is to 27:20.990 --> 27:23.460 ensure that we continue to invest in 27:23.460 --> 27:25.900 the , the upgrade of our , of our P G . 27:25.900 --> 27:27.678 M s and that we have sufficient 27:27.678 --> 27:30.230 quantities of PGM s on hand , so we're 27:30.230 --> 27:32.341 going to continue to invest in this . 27:32.940 --> 27:35.780 Um , my , my last question is related 27:35.780 --> 27:37.450 to um , 27:39.140 --> 27:42.560 the number , the number of F 30 27:42.560 --> 27:44.671 five's , the D . O . D is insistent . 27:44.671 --> 27:48.550 It still plans to seek a total of 1763 . 27:48.550 --> 27:51.680 F 30 five's . However , at a rate of 33 27:51.680 --> 27:53.569 per year , that would take half a 27:53.569 --> 27:57.560 century , How is it decreased F 35 x 27:57.560 --> 27:59.880 35 by justified to meet the needs of 27:59.890 --> 28:03.410 peer competition . And , you know , the 28:03.420 --> 28:07.010 very apparent and obvious adversarial A . 28:07.010 --> 28:09.066 O . R . S that are increasing across 28:09.066 --> 28:11.177 our globe . Just kind of comment on , 28:11.177 --> 28:13.343 are we , are we doing enough on this S 28:13.343 --> 28:15.454 F 35 by and by decreasing it , are we 28:15.454 --> 28:17.788 ready , are we ready for the next fight ? 28:17.788 --> 28:19.899 So , pure competition is exactly what 28:19.899 --> 28:21.899 we have in mind and we want to make 28:21.899 --> 28:23.843 sure that we have the right mix of 28:23.843 --> 28:26.010 capabilities in in the inventory as we 28:26.010 --> 28:28.232 go forward . And as you look across the 28:28.232 --> 28:30.454 fit up , You'll see that we , we invest 28:30.454 --> 28:34.280 in F- 35s in a significant way . But 28:34.290 --> 28:37.990 uh , the F- 35 and the uh , the F- 22 28:37.990 --> 28:41.230 have uh , specific roles in the , in 28:41.230 --> 28:43.286 the fight , uh , and they are very , 28:43.286 --> 28:45.174 very capable aircraft , but other 28:45.174 --> 28:47.286 aircraft are also relevant and uh and 28:47.286 --> 28:49.286 so we want to make sure we have the 28:49.286 --> 28:51.452 right mix . I've been impressed with , 28:51.740 --> 28:53.684 you know , one of the , one of the 28:53.684 --> 28:55.907 highlights of this role I'm in my first 28:55.907 --> 28:57.684 term of Congress and one of the 28:57.684 --> 28:59.740 highlights is getting be interacting 28:59.740 --> 29:01.796 individually with the pilots back on 29:01.796 --> 29:03.907 our Air Force base . I think a lot of 29:03.907 --> 29:06.129 us have that that that chance to go and 29:06.129 --> 29:08.129 and hear their perspective and they 29:08.129 --> 29:10.129 have such incredible ideas and such 29:10.129 --> 29:12.073 closeness to these , these weapons 29:12.073 --> 29:14.240 systems . Um , and uh I I know there's 29:14.240 --> 29:16.800 a real strong desire for , for their 29:16.800 --> 29:18.920 voice to be heard and the airmen as 29:18.920 --> 29:21.031 they work on these every day and just 29:21.031 --> 29:23.198 will constantly encourage , there's no 29:23.198 --> 29:23.150 question here , I just want to 29:23.150 --> 29:25.372 constantly encourage our leadership and 29:25.372 --> 29:27.594 our committee to be thinking about what 29:27.594 --> 29:30.280 that direct base level input is and how 29:30.280 --> 29:32.280 important that that is because they 29:32.280 --> 29:34.447 have amazing ideas and I've and I just 29:34.447 --> 29:36.391 wanted to to take this opportunity 29:36.391 --> 29:36.020 amidst the terminal going on in the 29:36.020 --> 29:38.131 world to thank them for their service 29:38.131 --> 29:40.242 and and really appreciate from , from 29:40.242 --> 29:42.409 every base , but particularly um where 29:42.409 --> 29:44.630 we have , you know , assets deployed 29:44.630 --> 29:46.741 from from , from ogden Utah right now 29:46.741 --> 29:50.140 and Layton , thank you deal back Mrs 29:50.140 --> 29:53.530 Loria is recognized . Well , thank you 29:53.530 --> 29:55.752 General Milley , I noticed earlier in a 29:55.752 --> 29:59.240 comment to Mr Bacon um you said 29:59.250 --> 30:01.250 that I don't think we're taking too 30:01.250 --> 30:03.390 much risk with regards to china and 30:03.390 --> 30:05.830 Russia . Um So one of the things that 30:05.830 --> 30:08.052 when we look at the budget , we look at 30:08.052 --> 30:10.163 what's in it , what's not in it , The 30:10.163 --> 30:12.274 things that are unfunded requirements 30:12.274 --> 30:14.274 list , there's risk associated with 30:14.274 --> 30:13.740 each of those choices that were made 30:13.750 --> 30:16.670 based off of the top line . Um And what 30:16.670 --> 30:18.726 you've included in the budget coming 30:18.726 --> 30:20.670 over to us and I know that entitle 30:20.670 --> 30:22.670 tenant requires the Chairman's Risk 30:22.670 --> 30:24.726 assessment , which would normally be 30:24.726 --> 30:26.837 submitted annually by february 15th . 30:26.837 --> 30:28.559 Um Have you submitted the risk 30:28.559 --> 30:30.890 assessment this year ? Have not 30:30.890 --> 30:32.779 typically in sequence that goes ? 30:32.779 --> 30:34.612 National Security strategy , the 30:34.612 --> 30:36.501 National Defense Strategy and the 30:36.501 --> 30:38.501 National Military strategy than the 30:38.501 --> 30:38.020 budget then the Chairman's risk 30:38.020 --> 30:41.880 assessment . So um but anyway , um I 30:41.890 --> 30:44.001 have it um it's in draft and it would 30:44.001 --> 30:46.840 be submitted shortly . Uh So talk risk 30:46.840 --> 30:48.896 for just a second . So the way we do 30:48.896 --> 30:51.007 that , the way I do it and the way we 30:51.007 --> 30:53.340 have as the department has done it well , 30:53.340 --> 30:55.507 the joint staff has done it um is take 30:55.507 --> 30:57.396 a look at the probability and the 30:57.396 --> 30:59.396 consequence of a specific event and 30:59.396 --> 31:01.618 then measured against the risk to force 31:01.618 --> 31:03.784 risk admission , Evaluate against time 31:03.784 --> 31:05.896 and the cost of troops . How much are 31:05.896 --> 31:05.540 you gonna lose in terms of audience ? 31:05.540 --> 31:07.596 So can I jump in really quickly . So 31:07.596 --> 31:09.373 when was the last time the risk 31:09.373 --> 31:11.540 assessment was done ? It was two years 31:11.540 --> 31:13.707 ago . Okay . Right , so August of 2020 31:13.707 --> 31:15.970 asking also perhaps why it wasn't done 31:15.970 --> 31:17.859 last year , but I've reviewed the 31:17.859 --> 31:19.803 previous risk assessments and they 31:19.803 --> 31:21.803 don't really follow the format that 31:21.803 --> 31:23.859 you're stating . And also They don't 31:23.859 --> 31:26.137 really follow . The format is required , 31:26.137 --> 31:25.910 entitled 10 and include all of the 31:25.910 --> 31:29.020 elements in them that are necessary , 31:29.020 --> 31:30.964 which I think was written that way 31:30.964 --> 31:32.853 because that allows us to to make 31:32.853 --> 31:35.230 decisions um perhaps adding additional 31:35.230 --> 31:38.250 resources to the defense budget . Um So 31:38.260 --> 31:40.427 go ahead , please . I'm sorry . Okay , 31:40.427 --> 31:42.316 I'll do better on rewriting it in 31:42.316 --> 31:44.427 accordance with the formats . But but 31:44.427 --> 31:46.810 my point being is the substance of any 31:46.810 --> 31:49.760 risk assessment that we do is relative 31:49.760 --> 31:51.780 to that . So the probability we're 31:51.780 --> 31:54.480 evaluating risk in this for this budget 31:54.490 --> 31:58.310 in this . Nds relative to china uh and 31:58.320 --> 32:01.550 Russia uh and specific to china . 32:01.940 --> 32:05.390 I when I said in my comment to uh mr 32:05.390 --> 32:09.100 Bacon earlier about uh the I don't 32:09.100 --> 32:11.570 think it's too much risk . I think that 32:11.570 --> 32:13.848 we've mitigated risk relative to china . 32:13.848 --> 32:16.020 And I think that the probability of 32:16.020 --> 32:18.780 armed conflict with china , the 32:18.790 --> 32:20.790 consequence would be high , but the 32:20.790 --> 32:22.790 probability is not high in the near 32:22.790 --> 32:25.123 term in terms of this particular budget . 32:25.123 --> 32:27.290 Uh Now , as you get in the out years , 32:27.290 --> 32:29.401 as you get in the out years , what do 32:29.401 --> 32:31.568 you think that the out years is beyond 32:31.568 --> 32:33.623 five years . So beyond that does not 32:33.623 --> 32:33.580 concur what we've heard from Adam 32:33.590 --> 32:35.923 Davidson and what Admiral Davidson said , 32:35.923 --> 32:38.146 and Admiral Aquilino said was they said 32:38.146 --> 32:41.620 that the probability Or the capability 32:41.630 --> 32:43.990 of China to attack Taiwan is going to 32:43.990 --> 32:46.480 be 2027 capability not probability . 32:46.740 --> 32:48.907 And and that is exactly what president 32:48.907 --> 32:51.129 she charged his military to do . Well I 32:51.129 --> 32:53.240 would say that myself and many others 32:53.240 --> 32:55.351 on this committee interpreted Admiral 32:55.351 --> 32:54.650 Aquilino and Davidson statements 32:54.650 --> 32:56.706 differently . But as we're limited , 32:56.706 --> 32:58.928 they were interpreted differently . But 32:58.928 --> 33:00.983 what they said was The capability to 33:00.983 --> 33:03.039 attack Taiwan was to be developed by 33:03.039 --> 33:04.817 2027 . That's not the same as a 33:04.817 --> 33:06.983 decision to attack . I think that they 33:06.983 --> 33:06.630 said that there was a high probability 33:06.630 --> 33:08.686 within the next six years now , five 33:08.686 --> 33:10.852 years . And I've had that conversation 33:11.140 --> 33:13.362 but just so that we can get through the 33:13.362 --> 33:15.196 question about so You know , the 33:15.196 --> 33:17.307 purpose is to see how the current and 33:17.307 --> 33:19.529 future risk changes with regards to the 33:19.529 --> 33:21.751 budget that's submitted and so with the 33:21.751 --> 33:23.807 budget priorities , the trade offs , 33:23.807 --> 33:23.540 the physical constraints . And so 33:23.540 --> 33:25.596 there's some things in here . I mean 33:25.596 --> 33:27.484 we're d coming 24 ships were only 33:27.484 --> 33:29.596 building eight , you say nine . We're 33:29.596 --> 33:29.460 delaying the laws for the Marine Corps 33:29.460 --> 33:31.571 to come to the fight in the pacific , 33:31.571 --> 33:33.682 we're not maximizing our shipbuilding 33:33.682 --> 33:35.682 capacity . We could build 15 Ddgs . 33:35.682 --> 33:35.360 We're only building 10 . We're stopping 33:35.360 --> 33:37.582 the LPD production line . We're pushing 33:37.582 --> 33:39.416 out the L . H . A . The unfunded 33:39.416 --> 33:41.582 requirements list . Risk like what are 33:41.582 --> 33:43.804 the things that can prevent an invasion 33:43.804 --> 33:46.027 of Taiwan ? You know it's the bottom of 33:46.027 --> 33:47.971 the unfunded requirements list for 33:47.971 --> 33:49.860 offensive mining is the Air force 33:49.860 --> 33:49.540 investing in long range anti surface 33:49.540 --> 33:51.651 missiles are as um , you know , these 33:51.651 --> 33:53.762 things that in my mind our priorities 33:53.762 --> 33:55.984 to accomplish our goals or some of them 33:55.984 --> 33:57.651 not even funded or not funded 33:57.651 --> 33:59.873 sufficiently . So you've made decisions 33:59.873 --> 34:01.929 there to fund this , but put this on 34:01.929 --> 34:03.929 the unfunded requirements list . So 34:03.929 --> 34:06.151 there's a risk . So that is what I feel 34:06.151 --> 34:07.984 is not being communicated to the 34:07.984 --> 34:10.040 committee And you're here requesting 34:10.040 --> 34:11.984 $773 billion . And I feel like you 34:11.984 --> 34:14.151 haven't provided , you know , the most 34:14.151 --> 34:16.040 basic information necessary to to 34:16.040 --> 34:18.040 understand what this budget will or 34:18.040 --> 34:20.830 will not do for the defense . Well , 34:20.840 --> 34:23.062 there's 30 seconds left . So as quickly 34:23.062 --> 34:24.729 as I can , I don't think that 34:24.729 --> 34:26.951 Decommissioning ships that are 30 years 34:26.951 --> 34:29.062 old that have no relevance to a fight 34:29.062 --> 34:31.007 against China or limited relevance 34:31.007 --> 34:33.173 don't have time in 30 seconds to cover 34:33.173 --> 34:36.150 this topic . But I do think that I'm 34:36.150 --> 34:38.261 looking forward to reading about that 34:38.261 --> 34:40.094 in the risk assessment when it's 34:40.094 --> 34:42.317 submitted soon . So thank you . I don't 34:42.317 --> 34:44.539 think it's excessive risk . MRS Vice is 34:44.539 --> 34:46.483 recognized . Thank you want to say 34:46.483 --> 34:48.594 thank you to Secretary Austin General 34:48.594 --> 34:50.150 Milley for spending it . An 34:50.150 --> 34:52.206 extraordinary amount of time with us 34:52.206 --> 34:54.428 today , Secretary Austin , I understand 34:54.428 --> 34:56.317 that the Air Force plans to begin 34:56.317 --> 34:58.320 phasing out a number of the E three 34:58.320 --> 35:01.690 century aircraft in 2023 . As you know , 35:01.690 --> 35:03.579 this is an important platform for 35:03.579 --> 35:05.746 command and control , target detection 35:05.746 --> 35:07.920 and battle management . I am concerned 35:07.920 --> 35:09.864 that if we phase out this aircraft 35:09.864 --> 35:12.031 without the replacement of the E seven 35:12.031 --> 35:14.260 online , then we will lose critically 35:14.260 --> 35:16.340 needed combat capability . I'm also 35:16.340 --> 35:18.396 concerned that bases like Tinker Air 35:18.396 --> 35:20.507 Force Base would experience a decline 35:20.507 --> 35:22.618 in associated institutional knowledge 35:22.618 --> 35:24.970 readiness and workforce proficiency if 35:24.970 --> 35:27.760 we can't transition this workforce To 35:27.760 --> 35:30.470 the E seven concurrently secretary , 35:30.470 --> 35:32.414 can you tell me how the department 35:32.414 --> 35:34.770 plans to fill the gap capability gap of 35:34.770 --> 35:36.603 the E three aircraft if they are 35:36.603 --> 35:38.826 retired without a replacement in hand ? 35:39.140 --> 35:41.370 Yeah . So we'll need to manage the 35:41.370 --> 35:43.426 transition to make sure that we have 35:43.426 --> 35:45.648 adequate capability on hand as we bring 35:45.648 --> 35:47.870 on new capabilities . But at the at the 35:47.870 --> 35:50.092 current time we're talking about taking 35:50.092 --> 35:52.740 out E 3s before those E seven or even 35:52.750 --> 35:56.530 being built . Yeah , so uh , and there 35:56.530 --> 36:00.370 are other platforms and ways to 36:00.380 --> 36:02.158 uh , to give us the situational 36:02.158 --> 36:04.269 awareness that that we need and we'll 36:04.269 --> 36:06.420 leverage those platforms but we'll 36:06.420 --> 36:08.640 continue to manage uh , you know , the 36:08.640 --> 36:10.807 transition to ensure that we have what 36:10.807 --> 36:12.960 we need to be relevant in the fight 36:12.970 --> 36:15.320 going forward . Are you suggesting that 36:15.320 --> 36:17.640 there is some other platform that's 36:17.640 --> 36:19.650 being considered to replace the 36:19.650 --> 36:21.872 capability of the E three ? There are a 36:21.872 --> 36:23.928 number of platforms that will use to 36:23.928 --> 36:25.928 create the situational awareness or 36:25.928 --> 36:28.150 provide situational awareness that that 36:28.150 --> 36:30.372 you've alluded to , but an aircraft may 36:30.372 --> 36:32.550 not be it a number of capabilities . 36:33.530 --> 36:35.808 Thank you . Like many of my colleagues , 36:35.808 --> 36:38.320 I feel that the defense budget um in 36:38.320 --> 36:41.640 some cases inadequately um addresses 36:41.640 --> 36:43.862 the threats that we're facing today . I 36:43.862 --> 36:45.973 very much appreciate , appreciate the 36:45.973 --> 36:48.084 pay increases for our service members 36:48.084 --> 36:49.862 in the budget , but as has been 36:49.862 --> 36:51.751 mentioned many times over the pay 36:51.751 --> 36:53.807 increase does not actually cover the 36:53.807 --> 36:55.751 current cost of inflation . That's 36:55.751 --> 36:57.862 essentially a pay cut for our service 36:57.862 --> 36:59.862 members and their families with the 36:59.862 --> 37:02.084 recent technological breakthroughs made 37:02.084 --> 37:01.700 by china and the growing military 37:01.700 --> 37:04.170 budget of our foreign adversaries . Um 37:04.180 --> 37:06.291 Do you think the president's budget , 37:06.291 --> 37:08.624 which fails to keep pace with inflation , 37:08.624 --> 37:10.791 is appropriate and adequate to counter 37:10.791 --> 37:12.624 these rising threats ? This is a 37:12.624 --> 37:15.540 significant budget uh and it provides 37:15.540 --> 37:17.750 us the capability , the ability to go 37:17.750 --> 37:19.639 after the capabilities we need to 37:19.680 --> 37:21.790 support our warfighting concepts and 37:21.790 --> 37:24.250 our strategy overall a significant 37:24.250 --> 37:28.020 budget . I want to piggyback 37:28.030 --> 37:30.160 off of representative laureate 37:30.170 --> 37:33.130 mentioned with the risk assessment um 37:33.140 --> 37:35.251 and General Milley , if you'd like to 37:35.251 --> 37:37.251 comment on this piece of this , the 37:37.251 --> 37:39.196 conversation has really focused on 37:39.196 --> 37:41.750 military readiness and or um , you know , 37:41.750 --> 37:44.290 military equipment , how much emphasis 37:44.300 --> 37:46.810 are we putting on cyber and space ? I 37:46.810 --> 37:49.032 think that's a piece that in some cases 37:49.032 --> 37:51.450 maybe being put on the back burner . I 37:51.530 --> 37:53.730 Remember in the opening testimony , I 37:53.730 --> 37:55.952 think there's $2 billion dollars that's 37:55.952 --> 37:58.180 being invested . Um , but but how much 37:58.180 --> 38:01.020 are we really um focused on ensuring 38:01.020 --> 38:03.076 that we have the proper capabilities 38:03.076 --> 38:05.298 from a cyber and space perspective this 38:05.298 --> 38:08.580 budget is putting in 27 billion , I 38:08.580 --> 38:12.540 think it is uh into space . Uh that's 38:13.330 --> 38:15.330 the space specific and then there's 38:15.330 --> 38:17.441 probably additional monies throughout 38:17.441 --> 38:19.441 the Air force and Space Command and 38:19.441 --> 38:21.663 Space Force Beyond that , 27 and then I 38:21.663 --> 38:23.941 think it's 11 or 12 billion into cyber . 38:23.941 --> 38:25.997 So I think that's pretty significant 38:25.997 --> 38:28.163 investments in both of those domains . 38:28.720 --> 38:30.640 Any any comments ? Uh Secretary 38:30.910 --> 38:34.470 Chairman's got it exactly right . 27.6 38:34.480 --> 38:37.990 billion in space In over $11 billion 38:37.990 --> 38:41.730 two billion for Ai is 38:41.740 --> 38:45.140 adequate ? I do , I do 38:45.620 --> 38:49.430 okay , thank you . I yield back Mr 38:49.430 --> 38:52.980 Panetta is recognized . Thank you madam . 38:52.980 --> 38:55.147 Chair gentlemen , Good morning , thank 38:55.147 --> 38:57.369 you for your service . And of course of 38:57.369 --> 38:59.424 course thank you for being here . Um 38:59.424 --> 39:01.313 Obviously I think the invasion of 39:01.313 --> 39:03.424 Ukraine is pretty much I believe it's 39:03.424 --> 39:05.369 revitalized democracies and as the 39:05.369 --> 39:07.424 administration and president said it 39:07.424 --> 39:09.536 strengthened our NATO's resolve . And 39:09.536 --> 39:11.536 we've seen that basically , and the 39:11.536 --> 39:13.480 fact that you're seeing other NATO 39:13.480 --> 39:15.424 countries beefing up their force , 39:15.424 --> 39:17.424 their forces and that includes what 39:17.424 --> 39:19.536 we're doing in regards to the defense 39:19.536 --> 39:22.710 budget that you submitted . Uh the 813 39:22.710 --> 39:25.410 billion very very large on its face . 39:25.420 --> 39:27.587 However , when you look at it compared 39:27.587 --> 39:29.642 to this year's budget , it's just 2% 39:29.642 --> 39:33.500 more . Uh Also you take 39:33.500 --> 39:36.390 into account inflation and the 2.5% of 39:36.390 --> 39:38.223 our budget , which is sort of an 39:38.223 --> 39:40.334 optimistic number . Some are actually 39:40.334 --> 39:42.570 saying that it's going to be a real 39:42.570 --> 39:45.330 terms cut in regards to defense 39:45.330 --> 39:48.240 spending And that Congress is going to 39:48.240 --> 39:50.296 have to do what it did this year and 39:50.296 --> 39:52.940 add probably close to $30 billion . 39:53.420 --> 39:55.980 Moreover , the budget does not take 39:55.980 --> 39:58.450 into account what's spent on nukes , 39:58.450 --> 40:00.570 what's spent on resettling of afghans 40:00.570 --> 40:04.520 and our help with Ukraine at this point . 40:05.410 --> 40:07.354 Additionally , the release of this 40:07.354 --> 40:09.354 budget is before the release of the 40:09.354 --> 40:11.470 National Security strategy . So just 40:11.470 --> 40:14.040 quickly um combined with the inflation 40:14.040 --> 40:16.262 rate one , do you think this is a cut ? 40:16.262 --> 40:18.318 This is going to be a cut in defense 40:18.318 --> 40:20.540 spending and to because it doesn't take 40:20.540 --> 40:22.484 into account the National security 40:22.484 --> 40:24.651 strategy , will we need to review this 40:24.651 --> 40:27.270 budget at a later time . Thanks 40:27.320 --> 40:30.190 Congressman . We we actually built this 40:30.190 --> 40:32.357 budget based upon our National Defense 40:32.357 --> 40:34.820 strategy uh in a national defense 40:34.820 --> 40:36.598 strategy as you know , has been 40:36.598 --> 40:40.150 released . Uh And uh and again we made 40:40.160 --> 40:42.850 a significant effort to ensure that 40:42.860 --> 40:44.916 this budget gave us the capabilities 40:44.916 --> 40:47.249 that we needed to execute that strategy . 40:47.249 --> 40:50.440 So um so to answer your question , Yes . 40:50.440 --> 40:52.190 And I do think again this is a 40:52.190 --> 40:54.990 substantial budget uh and it gives us 40:54.990 --> 40:56.657 the ability to go after those 40:56.657 --> 40:58.823 capabilities understood in regards and 40:58.823 --> 41:01.250 thank you for that . Uh Mr Secretary , 41:01.260 --> 41:04.310 in regards to um NATO looking at the 41:04.310 --> 41:06.970 Diana project , which I'm sure you're 41:06.970 --> 41:08.914 very aware of which , you know , I 41:08.914 --> 41:10.692 believe will will reinforce the 41:10.692 --> 41:13.040 transatlantic cooperation and important 41:13.040 --> 41:15.096 areas like hypersonic weapons and of 41:15.096 --> 41:17.570 course space technology . Uh Secretary 41:17.570 --> 41:19.737 Austin , do you believe that the Diana 41:19.737 --> 41:21.792 project offers the type of framework 41:21.792 --> 41:24.790 that we need to improve and refine 41:24.800 --> 41:26.911 NATO's capabilities to design , build 41:26.911 --> 41:28.744 and validate our missile defense 41:28.744 --> 41:31.300 programs . I do . It's one of a number 41:31.300 --> 41:35.030 of things that that will provide NATO 41:35.030 --> 41:37.140 the ability to to be forward looking 41:37.140 --> 41:39.307 and of course , you know , we'll go in 41:39.307 --> 41:42.420 and NATO will go in and review its 41:42.420 --> 41:44.420 requirements and and concepts going 41:44.420 --> 41:47.450 forward . So . But in terms of us the 41:47.450 --> 41:50.420 United States of America , we routinely 41:50.420 --> 41:54.240 work with allies and partners to and as 41:54.240 --> 41:56.910 we develop additional capabilities and 41:56.910 --> 41:59.970 I appointed to Aucas earlier on uh that 41:59.970 --> 42:02.192 not only is focused on development of a 42:02.192 --> 42:04.770 submarine but also working with our 42:04.780 --> 42:08.610 partner in developing um technologies 42:08.610 --> 42:11.430 and Ai and and uh and hypersonic and 42:11.430 --> 42:14.410 other things . Great . And in regards 42:14.420 --> 42:16.870 obviously you've heard um a number of 42:16.870 --> 42:18.981 questions in this hearing and another 42:18.981 --> 42:21.037 hearings or at least I have heard uh 42:21.037 --> 42:23.092 many of my colleagues talk about the 42:23.092 --> 42:25.259 deterrence . Do you believe that Diana 42:25.259 --> 42:27.290 will help our NATO allies as we 42:27.300 --> 42:29.320 continue to face ? Obviously the 42:29.320 --> 42:31.320 challenges but fortify a collective 42:31.320 --> 42:34.600 deterrent . Well what will help us most 42:34.610 --> 42:36.670 going forward is is our ability to 42:36.670 --> 42:40.040 remain united uh and uh and committed 42:40.040 --> 42:43.620 to uh defending excuse me , NATO 42:43.620 --> 42:45.930 territory . Again , there are a number 42:45.930 --> 42:47.986 of things that go into this equation 42:48.300 --> 42:50.467 sharing of information , for example , 42:50.467 --> 42:52.411 is one of those things which which 42:52.411 --> 42:55.880 enabled us to create transparency and 42:55.880 --> 42:59.270 and and and bolster confidence uh , and 42:59.280 --> 43:01.290 and led to what we're seeing , uh , 43:01.300 --> 43:04.680 excuse me and NATO right now . And 43:04.680 --> 43:06.513 that's largely apart . Uh , it's 43:06.513 --> 43:08.736 largely a measure of what the President 43:08.736 --> 43:12.280 is . Decision early on to do things to 43:12.290 --> 43:15.550 help us be able to share insights and 43:15.550 --> 43:17.550 information with our partners . And 43:17.550 --> 43:19.760 that transparency has uh , has really 43:19.770 --> 43:21.992 has really been helpful to us . Great , 43:21.992 --> 43:24.159 thank you . Mr Secretary . Thank you . 43:24.159 --> 43:26.381 Gentlemen . Mr Chairman . Mr Chairman , 43:26.381 --> 43:28.603 are you back ? Thank you . Mr Mclean is 43:28.603 --> 43:30.937 recognized for five minutes . Thank you . 43:30.937 --> 43:33.159 Mr Chairman and thank you all for being 43:33.159 --> 43:35.326 here . I really appreciate it . Um , I 43:35.326 --> 43:37.214 want to follow up on MS . Loria's 43:37.214 --> 43:40.360 question . Um , when as it pertains to 43:40.360 --> 43:43.170 risk . When do you think will have the 43:43.170 --> 43:45.430 risk assessment piece done ? 43:47.400 --> 43:49.567 Yeah , that's my responsibility to get 43:49.567 --> 43:51.567 that done . Get it submitted to the 43:51.567 --> 43:53.733 Secretary and the President . Probably 43:53.733 --> 43:56.067 my guess is in the next couple of weeks . 43:56.067 --> 43:58.178 And then okay , if you go through the 43:58.178 --> 43:57.770 risk that gets submitted to you as well , 43:57.770 --> 43:59.881 it's not just to the Secretary of the 43:59.881 --> 44:02.103 President . Thank you . If in that risk 44:02.103 --> 44:04.700 assessment , we find some glaring risks 44:04.700 --> 44:07.170 that maybe we didn't foresee at that 44:07.170 --> 44:09.281 time . I'm assuming we will make some 44:09.281 --> 44:12.990 changes to the budget . That's part of 44:12.990 --> 44:16.300 the idea is for to submit it to the 44:16.310 --> 44:18.477 Secretary and the President and to the 44:18.477 --> 44:21.590 Congress that if there are errors or 44:21.590 --> 44:23.701 glare , glaring errors but not errors 44:23.701 --> 44:25.923 but significant risk because it's , I'm 44:25.923 --> 44:28.210 trying to wrap my head has to be 44:28.210 --> 44:30.470 covered by the mitigating factors of 44:30.470 --> 44:32.692 the budget . I'm trying to wrap my head 44:32.692 --> 44:34.803 around how we put together a budget , 44:34.803 --> 44:36.859 but we don't really have a good risk 44:36.859 --> 44:38.470 assessment . Am I , am I not 44:38.470 --> 44:40.803 understanding that correctly ? So we do . 44:40.990 --> 44:43.980 I participate in in in the budget and 44:43.990 --> 44:46.690 my staff does as well . So there is a 44:46.700 --> 44:48.756 iterative process of risk assessment 44:48.756 --> 44:50.922 throughout so we have a general idea . 44:50.922 --> 44:53.144 Okay , thank you sir . Then I need some 44:53.144 --> 44:55.256 clarification from both of you on the 44:55.256 --> 44:57.422 President's budget requests for combat 44:57.422 --> 44:59.960 vehicles . Can you explain the army's 44:59.960 --> 45:02.580 rationale for the precipitous drop in 45:02.580 --> 45:05.690 vehicle procurement , specifically the 45:05.700 --> 45:09.170 Abrams tank . And what risks are we 45:09.170 --> 45:12.600 incurring with that drop in 45:12.600 --> 45:15.540 procurement of the Abrams tanks ? Well , 45:15.540 --> 45:17.484 first we've got about four or 5000 45:17.484 --> 45:19.750 tanks in the inventory . So again , 45:19.750 --> 45:23.010 it's relative to uh , the national 45:23.010 --> 45:25.110 Defense strategy and and we are 45:25.110 --> 45:27.900 optimizing the military for a fight 45:27.900 --> 45:30.011 that will occur sometime if it occurs 45:30.011 --> 45:32.067 at all . Hopefully never does in the 45:32.067 --> 45:35.660 twenties thirties . Uh and uh tanks may 45:35.660 --> 45:38.150 or may not probably not play a very 45:38.150 --> 45:40.150 significant role in the war against 45:40.150 --> 45:42.270 china in the twenties thirties . What 45:42.270 --> 45:44.437 will play a really significant role be 45:44.437 --> 45:47.230 space and cyber but also air defense 45:47.230 --> 45:49.610 systems , long range precision fires , 45:49.890 --> 45:52.001 naval capabilities and air capability 45:52.001 --> 45:55.550 and a ground war with china . 45:57.090 --> 45:59.310 The ground will have uh the ground 45:59.310 --> 46:02.290 forces , Marine and Army will play an 46:02.290 --> 46:04.780 important role but the dominant role we 46:04.780 --> 46:07.830 played by the air and maritime forces 46:07.840 --> 46:09.840 with that then the air force is the 46:09.840 --> 46:12.340 oldest smallest and least ready in its 46:12.340 --> 46:14.210 entire history . The Air Force 46:14.210 --> 46:16.210 leadership has repeatedly explained 46:16.210 --> 46:18.620 that they need to procure at least 72 46:18.620 --> 46:22.540 fighter aircraft . Um However in 23 46:22.540 --> 46:24.651 D . O . D . Budget cuts the Air Force 46:24.651 --> 46:26.930 new tactical combat aircraft only to 46:26.930 --> 46:30.780 buy 57 . So with the future being in 46:30.780 --> 46:32.836 air and space where we really need , 46:32.836 --> 46:36.630 why are we Not fulfilling the 72 ? Why 46:36.630 --> 46:40.040 are we only procuring 57 ? If that's 46:40.050 --> 46:42.890 the future ? I thought it was a minor 46:42.890 --> 46:45.510 point . That was 61 . But well let's 46:45.510 --> 46:47.680 even say it's 61 it's still less than 46:47.680 --> 46:50.060 one unrequested . Right ? Yeah . The 46:50.070 --> 46:53.680 Air Force opted to want to buy and 46:53.680 --> 46:55.980 purchase and return that money for to 46:55.980 --> 46:58.340 build a block for F 35 which is the 46:58.340 --> 47:00.562 most advanced of the versions . Right ? 47:00.562 --> 47:03.250 So the ones that are being chosen not 47:03.250 --> 47:06.720 to buy uh Those are blocked threes . So 47:07.020 --> 47:09.800 we we want to get the most advanced 47:10.180 --> 47:12.560 versions of these aircraft . The F 35 47:12.560 --> 47:14.504 is gonna be the quarterback of the 47:14.504 --> 47:16.338 joint force in a fight uh In the 47:16.338 --> 47:18.171 Western pacific that aircraft is 47:18.171 --> 47:20.116 critical . We want the most modern 47:20.116 --> 47:22.116 capabilities and that's what that's 47:22.116 --> 47:24.227 what we're purchasing . So we're just 47:24.227 --> 47:23.810 we're taking the same money . Were just 47:23.810 --> 47:25.754 referring it to a different that's 47:25.900 --> 47:27.956 that's the idea behind what CQ Brown 47:27.956 --> 47:30.580 and Secretary of the Air Force has 47:30.580 --> 47:33.100 decided to . And just an overall 47:33.100 --> 47:36.210 question last minute is 47:37.180 --> 47:39.930 It appears with inflation being , you 47:39.930 --> 47:42.152 know , 8% in our budget being less than 47:42.152 --> 47:44.152 inflation . You know , we we've all 47:44.152 --> 47:46.263 talked about it and we're not keeping 47:46.263 --> 47:48.319 up with inflation . One of the risks 47:48.319 --> 47:50.486 that I'm assuming that we're assessing 47:50.486 --> 47:53.290 is the risks on how we look to our 47:53.300 --> 47:57.030 adversaries and our allies in terms 47:57.040 --> 48:00.290 of our our budget 48:01.070 --> 48:04.020 weakness . And I say that is if I look 48:04.030 --> 48:06.197 at china for example , which is one of 48:06.197 --> 48:08.520 our major adversaries , right ? They 48:08.520 --> 48:11.040 are spending maybe even overspending . 48:11.050 --> 48:14.550 Some could argue we are cutting back . 48:14.560 --> 48:16.782 What message do you think that sends to 48:16.782 --> 48:20.220 our allies and adversaries , sir ? Yeah . 48:20.230 --> 48:22.250 So I don't I don't think we are . I 48:22.260 --> 48:24.204 don't think we're cutting back . I 48:24.204 --> 48:26.260 think this is a substantial budget . 48:26.260 --> 48:26.170 703 quarters of a trillion dollars . A 48:26.170 --> 48:28.392 lot of money . The chinese are spending 48:28.392 --> 48:32.280 about 500,000,000,560 billion or so on 48:32.280 --> 48:34.447 their announced budget . If you factor 48:34.447 --> 48:36.890 in things like the ladies time has 48:36.890 --> 48:39.700 expired . Mr horse fruit is recognized 48:39.700 --> 48:41.867 for five minutes . Thank you so much . 48:41.867 --> 48:43.700 Mr Chairman and thank you to our 48:43.700 --> 48:45.867 witnesses . Uh Secretary Austin . It's 48:45.867 --> 48:47.867 my understanding that the Air force 48:47.867 --> 48:49.644 intends to submit a legislative 48:49.644 --> 48:51.811 proposal this year requesting expanded 48:51.811 --> 48:53.990 usage of the Nevada test and training 48:53.990 --> 48:56.390 range located in my district . This new 48:56.390 --> 48:58.446 proposal would come amid the ongoing 48:58.446 --> 49:00.470 effort by the navy to reach an 49:00.470 --> 49:02.303 accessible compromise with local 49:02.303 --> 49:04.750 stakeholders regarding modernization of 49:04.750 --> 49:08.390 the falun range training complex . I 49:08.390 --> 49:10.612 am deeply concerned and I want to bring 49:10.612 --> 49:12.501 to your attention that the Nevada 49:12.501 --> 49:15.290 delegation has still not been consulted 49:15.290 --> 49:17.401 on the Nevada test and training range 49:17.401 --> 49:19.530 proposal or been given details 49:19.530 --> 49:22.030 regarding the Air Force's plan . So my 49:22.030 --> 49:24.420 question is , when will the Air Force 49:24.430 --> 49:26.486 share their proposal with the Nevada 49:26.486 --> 49:28.630 delegation in our constituents ? And 49:28.630 --> 49:30.630 can you commit to ensuring that the 49:30.630 --> 49:32.960 department works collaboratively with 49:32.960 --> 49:35.090 our delegation as well as our local 49:35.090 --> 49:38.190 state and tribal leaders to develop an 49:38.190 --> 49:41.760 accessible proposal for joint use in 49:41.760 --> 49:44.870 the Nevada test and training range on 49:44.870 --> 49:47.250 the the first part of the question in 49:47.250 --> 49:50.500 terms of when they intend to share , um 49:50.870 --> 49:52.981 I'll take that for the record and get 49:52.981 --> 49:55.259 back to you on what what their plan is . 49:55.259 --> 49:58.950 And yes , we you know , you have my 49:58.950 --> 50:00.894 commitment to make sure that we're 50:00.894 --> 50:03.061 transparent and and what we're doing . 50:03.061 --> 50:04.950 Thank you sir , I look forward to 50:04.950 --> 50:07.006 working with you . I'd like to shift 50:07.006 --> 50:09.172 now to the small community of remotely 50:09.172 --> 50:11.339 piloted aircraft crews shouldering the 50:11.339 --> 50:13.450 burden of over the horizon operations 50:13.450 --> 50:15.672 in the Middle East and around the world 50:15.672 --> 50:17.894 as the Air Force works to identify ways 50:17.894 --> 50:20.061 to improve quality of life for our P a 50:20.061 --> 50:22.006 cruise . I want to ensure that the 50:22.006 --> 50:24.172 department is leveraging all available 50:24.172 --> 50:26.280 tools already at at its disposal . 50:26.560 --> 50:28.560 Secretary Austin has the department 50:28.560 --> 50:31.030 considered expanding the combat zone 50:31.040 --> 50:34.210 tax exclusion to RP A cruise flying in 50:34.210 --> 50:36.780 support of named combat operations , 50:37.160 --> 50:39.330 giving their direct participation in 50:39.330 --> 50:41.490 these operations . Would you support 50:41.500 --> 50:45.170 this expansion ? Well , in terms of 50:45.170 --> 50:47.370 expanding the combat zone , that's a 50:47.380 --> 50:49.720 that's a thing that's , you know , it's 50:49.720 --> 50:51.498 relevant to the area that we're 50:51.498 --> 50:53.664 actually fighting in and that's that's 50:53.664 --> 50:55.720 physical space on the ground . As to 50:55.720 --> 50:59.600 whether or not we we provide credit 50:59.610 --> 51:02.210 to the troops that are engaged in 51:02.210 --> 51:04.543 activities . There is a different issue . 51:04.543 --> 51:06.710 I know it's one that the Air Force has 51:06.710 --> 51:09.580 taken up before . I certainly support 51:11.060 --> 51:13.680 rewarding and awarding those those uh 51:13.690 --> 51:16.730 airmen soldiers , sailors that had that 51:16.740 --> 51:20.210 have participated in meaningful ways . 51:20.220 --> 51:23.020 Appropriately . Thank you . General 51:23.020 --> 51:25.131 Milley , given the unique burdens and 51:25.131 --> 51:27.242 stressors faced by our P . A cruise , 51:27.242 --> 51:29.131 would you commit to exploring the 51:29.131 --> 51:31.380 expansion of this program ? The Special 51:31.380 --> 51:33.650 Operations Command's preservation of 51:33.650 --> 51:36.210 the force and family program to include 51:36.210 --> 51:38.560 ArpA crews , flying and support of 51:38.560 --> 51:41.250 combat operations ? I'll absolutely 51:41.250 --> 51:43.083 take a look at that . Along with 51:43.083 --> 51:45.028 Secretary Absolutely . Thank you . 51:45.460 --> 51:47.600 Changing subjects In recent months . 51:47.600 --> 51:50.260 We've seen a concerning rise in attacks 51:50.270 --> 51:53.330 on LGBT rights and statehouses across 51:53.330 --> 51:55.720 the country . These include efforts to 51:55.720 --> 51:58.130 deny life saving medical care to our 51:58.130 --> 52:00.186 most vulnerable youth and a range of 52:00.186 --> 52:02.880 other potentially deadly policies ? 52:03.150 --> 52:05.206 Secretary Austin . What steps is the 52:05.206 --> 52:07.640 department taking to shield active duty 52:07.640 --> 52:09.696 service members and their dependants 52:09.800 --> 52:12.090 from these hateful attacks and our 52:12.090 --> 52:14.490 state laws denying or restricting 52:14.500 --> 52:17.060 gender . Affirming care considered 52:17.060 --> 52:19.180 during the PCS process for service 52:19.180 --> 52:21.750 members with impacted dependence . 52:23.250 --> 52:25.417 Yeah , they're so there there are some 52:25.417 --> 52:29.100 there is some litigation ongoing with 52:29.100 --> 52:31.770 respect to a couple of states here and 52:31.770 --> 52:35.040 and and and this particular issue and 52:35.040 --> 52:37.040 so I won't comment on that . What I 52:37.040 --> 52:39.096 will say is that and you've heard me 52:39.096 --> 52:41.580 say this and demonstrate this before 52:41.590 --> 52:45.360 that all of our troops are important to 52:45.360 --> 52:47.670 us there at the top of my priority in 52:47.670 --> 52:49.726 terms of their health and well being 52:49.726 --> 52:51.892 and and we want to provide opportunity 52:51.892 --> 52:54.620 for everybody who's qualified to serve 52:54.630 --> 52:57.180 in our military and and everything that 52:57.180 --> 52:59.600 we've done . Uh you know up to this 52:59.600 --> 53:01.990 point reflects that we'll continue to 53:01.990 --> 53:04.480 do everything within our power to take 53:04.480 --> 53:07.430 care of our of our population . So just 53:07.430 --> 53:09.541 related to that in my final moments , 53:09.541 --> 53:12.190 it's my understanding that in 2021 D . 53:12.190 --> 53:14.680 O . D . Issued only about 4000 53:14.680 --> 53:17.470 prescriptions for prep . Uh despite the 53:17.470 --> 53:20.580 fact that HIV HIV infection rate among 53:20.590 --> 53:23.000 active duty service members has nearly 53:23.000 --> 53:25.222 doubled . So what steps has the D . O . 53:25.222 --> 53:28.060 D . Taken to improve access to prep 53:28.790 --> 53:32.720 two ? Our service members . Yeah , 53:32.720 --> 53:36.640 I can't answer that question . Uh but 53:36.640 --> 53:38.640 but I will take it for the record . 53:38.640 --> 53:40.751 I'll get back to you on on what we're 53:40.751 --> 53:42.862 doing or not doing in N . D . O . D . 53:42.862 --> 53:44.918 Thank you . Thank you so much . Time 53:44.918 --> 53:47.029 has expired . Mr Wilson is recognized 53:47.029 --> 53:48.807 for five minutes . Thank you Mr 53:48.807 --> 53:48.790 Chairman and thank you for being here 53:48.790 --> 53:52.690 today as a 31 year army veteran myself . 53:52.700 --> 53:54.890 As a grateful father of four service 53:54.890 --> 53:57.112 members who have served in Iraq , Egypt 53:57.112 --> 53:59.334 and Afghanistan . I want you to succeed 53:59.750 --> 54:02.780 And that's why I'm concerned . Uh , as 54:02.780 --> 54:04.947 Sean Hannity has pointed out that uh , 54:04.947 --> 54:07.280 correctly identified that we're in day 54:07.290 --> 54:10.940 234 since the murder of 13 54:10.950 --> 54:13.230 Americans service members in 54:13.230 --> 54:16.110 Afghanistan as we left American 54:16.120 --> 54:19.920 personnel uh , Americans behind . I 54:19.920 --> 54:23.500 hope that you both can by 54:23.500 --> 54:26.710 immediately providing help to Ukraine 54:26.720 --> 54:29.920 now the most advanced military 54:29.920 --> 54:32.087 equipment for a victory for the people 54:32.087 --> 54:34.170 of Ukraine . We need to show our 54:34.170 --> 54:37.190 resolve and show our success uh for the 54:37.190 --> 54:39.246 very brave people of Ukraine who are 54:39.246 --> 54:42.640 just uh remarkably pushing back against 54:42.650 --> 54:45.470 Putin with that in mind . General 54:45.470 --> 54:47.192 Austin . The front page of the 54:47.192 --> 54:50.350 Washington post Provided on February 28 . 54:50.360 --> 54:53.780 It's uh , speaks for itself that uh 54:53.790 --> 54:56.830 Putin is threatening uh , he's a war 54:56.830 --> 54:58.886 criminal . I believe the families of 54:58.886 --> 55:00.886 America and our allies with nuclear 55:00.886 --> 55:03.430 weapons modernization of our strategic 55:03.430 --> 55:05.380 nuclear stockpiles should be a top 55:05.380 --> 55:07.610 priority moving forward . We cannot 55:07.610 --> 55:10.130 expect to deter Putin when the nuclear 55:10.130 --> 55:12.019 capabilities are lagging behind . 55:12.019 --> 55:14.360 There's Putin's recent invasion of 55:14.360 --> 55:16.360 Ukraine , which included threats of 55:16.360 --> 55:18.470 first strike nuclear attack toward 55:18.470 --> 55:20.359 America and our allies , elevated 55:20.359 --> 55:21.970 nuclear modernization on the 55:21.970 --> 55:24.026 department's priority list . Can you 55:24.026 --> 55:26.248 explain the importance of modernization 55:26.248 --> 55:28.970 for deterrence ? Thanks . Uh sorry , 55:28.970 --> 55:31.260 it's it's absolutely critical , as 55:31.260 --> 55:33.427 you've heard me say before , the triad 55:33.427 --> 55:35.690 has served us well over the years . And 55:35.690 --> 55:37.468 my goal is to make sure that it 55:37.468 --> 55:39.468 continues to do so . And that's why 55:39.468 --> 55:41.740 we've invested 30 for over $34 billion 55:41.740 --> 55:43.640 in this budget uh towards the 55:43.640 --> 55:45.529 modernization of our triumphs and 55:45.529 --> 55:47.751 indeed what you're saying peace through 55:47.751 --> 55:50.550 strength works uh and uh and also 55:50.550 --> 55:54.060 general in May 2018 N . N . S . A . 55:54.340 --> 55:56.450 Announced that it would pursue a new 55:56.450 --> 55:58.720 approach . The plutonium pit production 55:58.720 --> 56:00.720 split between the facilities at Los 56:00.720 --> 56:02.776 Alamos and the Savannah River site . 56:03.630 --> 56:06.410 The war criminal Putin has the ability 56:06.410 --> 56:08.540 to produce plutonium pits . Yet the 56:08.540 --> 56:10.207 United States currently lacks 56:10.207 --> 56:12.207 disability . Does the Department of 56:12.207 --> 56:14.207 Defense continue to support the two 56:14.207 --> 56:16.262 sides solution for the plutonium pit 56:16.262 --> 56:18.484 production ? How can we recently expect 56:18.484 --> 56:20.262 that this vital program will be 56:20.262 --> 56:21.929 adequately supported when the 56:21.929 --> 56:23.984 department's budget request does not 56:23.984 --> 56:25.984 even exceed the rate of inflation ? 56:26.730 --> 56:28.674 Well , I can assure you that we're 56:28.674 --> 56:30.970 gonna we're gonna make sure that that 56:30.970 --> 56:33.380 we have the capability that we require 56:33.380 --> 56:36.560 to make sure that our our triad remains 56:36.560 --> 56:38.940 functional and safe . And so this is a 56:38.940 --> 56:41.051 thing that will continue to invest in 56:41.051 --> 56:45.050 but will maintain the capability to to 56:45.050 --> 56:47.106 do what needs to be done and the two 56:47.106 --> 56:49.440 sites solution to with the capabilities 56:49.440 --> 56:51.770 of Los Alamos in Savannah River that 56:51.780 --> 56:53.947 that's critical that it be two sites . 56:54.130 --> 56:56.550 Well , it's what's critical is that we 56:56.550 --> 56:58.717 maintain the capability that that that 56:58.717 --> 57:00.717 we need . And again , as we look at 57:00.717 --> 57:02.939 things going forward , You know , we'll 57:02.939 --> 57:05.161 make , we'll make the right decisions . 57:05.161 --> 57:07.328 But my my commitment to you is that we 57:07.328 --> 57:09.439 will , we will make sure that we have 57:09.439 --> 57:11.217 the right capability , adequate 57:11.217 --> 57:13.328 capability to be successful . And the 57:13.328 --> 57:15.383 American people need to know many of 57:15.383 --> 57:17.661 the pits that we have are 60 years old . 57:17.661 --> 57:19.717 And so this is something that's just 57:19.717 --> 57:21.606 got to be done in the two sides . 57:21.606 --> 57:21.210 Solution wouldn't really work to the 57:21.210 --> 57:23.450 benefit of the American people . Uh and 57:23.450 --> 57:25.561 the final question general gruesomely 57:25.561 --> 57:27.728 are treasured ally India , the world's 57:27.728 --> 57:30.690 largest democracy is choosing to align 57:30.690 --> 57:33.650 itself with the Kremlin by choosing 57:33.650 --> 57:35.761 Russian weapons systems over american 57:35.761 --> 57:38.130 and allied options . What weapons 57:38.130 --> 57:40.500 platforms could we offer through the 57:40.500 --> 57:42.740 foreign military sales program that 57:42.740 --> 57:44.573 would incentivize Russian indian 57:44.573 --> 57:47.500 leaders to eject Putin in a line with 57:47.510 --> 57:51.380 its natural allies of democracy . Well , 57:51.380 --> 57:53.436 as you know , we we have the finance 57:53.436 --> 57:55.491 weapons systems in the world and the 57:55.491 --> 57:57.547 most advanced weapons systems in the 57:57.547 --> 57:57.460 world . And so we have a range of 57:57.460 --> 58:01.030 capabilities that that we can provide 58:01.420 --> 58:05.090 uh , offer . We continue to work with 58:05.100 --> 58:07.990 with them to ensure that they 58:07.990 --> 58:10.190 understand that uh , you know , it's 58:10.190 --> 58:12.357 not in their best we believe that it's 58:12.357 --> 58:14.523 not in their best interest to continue 58:14.523 --> 58:16.579 to invest in Russian equipment . And 58:16.579 --> 58:18.960 and our requirement going forward is 58:18.960 --> 58:22.740 that , you know , they they downscale 58:22.750 --> 58:25.180 um the types of equipment that they're 58:25.180 --> 58:28.250 investing in uh and uh and look to 58:28.250 --> 58:30.870 invest more in the types of things that 58:30.870 --> 58:33.240 will make us continue to be compatible . 58:33.620 --> 58:35.787 Well , I look forward to continuing to 58:35.787 --> 58:38.009 work with the great people of India and 58:38.009 --> 58:40.009 what a great ally they can be if we 58:40.009 --> 58:42.120 eliminate some of the restrictions on 58:42.120 --> 58:44.064 sales . Thank you . I yield back . 58:44.220 --> 58:46.442 Thank you . MS Jacobs is recognized for 58:46.442 --> 58:48.550 five minutes . Well , thank you . Mr 58:48.550 --> 58:50.606 Chair and thank you secretary Austin 58:50.606 --> 58:52.661 and General Milley for coming to the 58:52.661 --> 58:54.550 committee to talk about the FY 23 58:54.550 --> 58:56.661 budget request . Uh You know , I know 58:56.661 --> 58:58.606 there's been a lot of conversation 58:58.606 --> 59:00.772 about the budget and whether it's what 59:00.772 --> 59:02.828 we need in my initial assessment , I 59:02.828 --> 59:04.661 believe this budget is more than 59:04.661 --> 59:06.828 adequate and I look forward to working 59:06.828 --> 59:08.828 with you on what an adequate budget 59:08.828 --> 59:10.883 looks like moving forward . So , you 59:10.883 --> 59:13.050 know , we've talked a lot about what , 59:13.050 --> 59:15.272 how much money we're spending and , you 59:15.272 --> 59:14.260 know , I want to talk a little bit 59:14.260 --> 59:16.427 about what we're spending money on . I 59:16.427 --> 59:18.482 think it's clear that so many of our 59:18.482 --> 59:20.427 doctrines and our policies and our 59:20.427 --> 59:22.316 weapons systems were designed for 59:22.316 --> 59:24.538 threats and challenges that happened in 59:24.538 --> 59:26.760 the past , but not necessarily the ones 59:26.760 --> 59:28.704 that we're facing now and into the 59:28.704 --> 59:30.927 future . And so , you know , I actually 59:30.927 --> 59:32.982 think the current war in Ukraine has 59:32.982 --> 59:35.093 shown the utility of low cost weapons 59:35.093 --> 59:37.204 over large expensive legacy systems . 59:37.204 --> 59:39.316 And so Secretary Austin , what do you 59:39.316 --> 59:41.482 think the main lessons are for the U . 59:41.482 --> 59:43.704 S . And how successful Ukraine has been 59:43.704 --> 59:45.871 in fighting back a Russian force . And 59:45.871 --> 59:45.730 how do you think that should impact the 59:45.730 --> 59:47.897 way D . O . D . Does business ? I know 59:47.897 --> 59:50.008 Chairman smith touched on this in its 59:50.008 --> 59:52.063 opening , but I really want to drill 59:52.063 --> 59:54.119 down on if in light of Ukraine , you 59:54.119 --> 59:56.286 think the department should focus more 59:56.286 --> 59:56.160 on low cost weapons and less on new 59:56.160 --> 59:58.104 expensive and often overly complex 59:58.104 --> 59:59.993 platforms that are often not even 59:59.993 --> 01:00:02.104 survivable in high end environments . 01:00:03.810 --> 01:00:05.810 You know , many of the weapons that 01:00:05.810 --> 01:00:08.180 have been effective , you know , are 01:00:08.180 --> 01:00:11.100 not necessarily low cost , but but we 01:00:11.100 --> 01:00:12.989 have been able to provide them in 01:00:12.989 --> 01:00:14.767 sufficient quantities to make a 01:00:14.767 --> 01:00:16.933 significant significant difference . A 01:00:16.933 --> 01:00:18.933 lot of credit goes to the Ukrainian 01:00:18.933 --> 01:00:21.400 people for you know , their their will 01:00:21.400 --> 01:00:24.220 to fight , their determination and 01:00:24.240 --> 01:00:26.880 their willingness to sacrifice . But 01:00:26.880 --> 01:00:29.650 given all of that , you know , they had 01:00:29.650 --> 01:00:32.030 when the time came , uh you know , the 01:00:32.030 --> 01:00:34.252 elements , the right kinds of equipment 01:00:34.252 --> 01:00:36.474 to be able to make a difference on that 01:00:36.474 --> 01:00:38.920 battlefield . Uh , and and we've been 01:00:38.920 --> 01:00:42.030 pouring it in on a daily basis and 01:00:42.030 --> 01:00:44.660 increasing the not only the quantity 01:00:44.660 --> 01:00:47.030 but the quality of capability that 01:00:47.030 --> 01:00:49.690 we've been providing . So there are 01:00:49.690 --> 01:00:51.857 some lessons to be learned in terms of 01:00:51.857 --> 01:00:54.420 commitment leadership , uh tactics , 01:00:54.420 --> 01:00:56.642 techniques and procedures , logistics , 01:00:56.642 --> 01:00:58.698 uh integration of different types of 01:00:58.698 --> 01:01:00.642 platforms , you know , a number of 01:01:00.642 --> 01:01:02.698 lessons across the board , but a key 01:01:02.698 --> 01:01:05.320 lesson is that , you know , if you pay 01:01:05.320 --> 01:01:07.376 attention to the right things and do 01:01:07.376 --> 01:01:09.487 the right things armed with the right 01:01:09.487 --> 01:01:11.653 equipment , you know , a smaller force 01:01:11.653 --> 01:01:13.876 can be very , very effective and that's 01:01:13.876 --> 01:01:16.030 what we're seeing today . So . 01:01:17.710 --> 01:01:20.490 Well , thank you . And um I do think 01:01:20.490 --> 01:01:22.546 they're low cost relative to some of 01:01:22.546 --> 01:01:24.601 the high end alternatives that we're 01:01:24.601 --> 01:01:26.601 talking about here today . Uh and I 01:01:26.601 --> 01:01:28.768 think it shows some of the real limits 01:01:28.768 --> 01:01:30.601 of the high end systems that for 01:01:30.601 --> 01:01:32.768 instance Russia had . So I'm moving on 01:01:32.768 --> 01:01:34.934 to the next topic . Secretary Austin , 01:01:34.934 --> 01:01:36.990 I and many other members of Congress 01:01:36.990 --> 01:01:39.046 are looking forward to reviewing the 01:01:39.046 --> 01:01:41.268 report on civilian casualties . And I'm 01:01:41.268 --> 01:01:43.323 very appreciative That you've called 01:01:43.323 --> 01:01:45.379 for a thorough review and have taken 01:01:45.379 --> 01:01:47.434 this very seriously . Um so just two 01:01:47.434 --> 01:01:49.657 quick requests related to that review . 01:01:49.657 --> 01:01:51.879 First , a few of my colleagues sent you 01:01:51.879 --> 01:01:53.712 a letter specifically focused on 01:01:53.712 --> 01:01:55.823 questions related to the strike first 01:01:55.823 --> 01:01:55.140 reported by the New York Times , which 01:01:55.140 --> 01:01:58.630 took place in Baku Syria in 2019 . Can 01:01:58.630 --> 01:02:00.574 you commit to us today that we can 01:02:00.574 --> 01:02:02.908 expect a prompt response to that letter ? 01:02:02.908 --> 01:02:05.074 Given the seriousness of the questions 01:02:05.074 --> 01:02:07.019 raised by public reporting ? Yes , 01:02:07.019 --> 01:02:09.640 thank you very much . And Secondly , 01:02:09.650 --> 01:02:12.330 General Mackenzie a few weeks ago um 01:02:12.340 --> 01:02:15.560 mentioned a list of 10 concrete steps 01:02:15.560 --> 01:02:17.670 centcom has taken to reduce civilian 01:02:17.670 --> 01:02:19.670 casualties . General Mackenzie 01:02:19.670 --> 01:02:21.781 personally promised me at the hearing 01:02:21.781 --> 01:02:23.892 that he'd be transmitting that report 01:02:23.892 --> 01:02:25.837 to my team shortly but we have not 01:02:25.837 --> 01:02:25.830 received it . So can you please assist 01:02:25.830 --> 01:02:28.100 in urging centcom to promptly provide 01:02:28.100 --> 01:02:30.980 that list to the committee ? Okay . I 01:02:30.980 --> 01:02:33.147 certainly would like to see it as well 01:02:33.147 --> 01:02:35.590 but I I certainly will do that well . 01:02:35.590 --> 01:02:37.534 Thank you . And finally , based on 01:02:37.534 --> 01:02:39.534 information from Ngos and the media 01:02:39.534 --> 01:02:41.534 such as the new york Times civilian 01:02:41.534 --> 01:02:43.701 casualty files is D . O . D . Planning 01:02:43.701 --> 01:02:45.590 to revisit cases that were likely 01:02:45.590 --> 01:02:47.646 prematurely dismissed as a result of 01:02:47.646 --> 01:02:50.800 faulty initial assessments . At this 01:02:50.800 --> 01:02:53.460 point , we don't have an intent to to 01:02:53.460 --> 01:02:57.240 re litigate cases or that from before 01:02:57.250 --> 01:03:00.910 over . Okay . Well I I think that it's 01:03:00.910 --> 01:03:03.077 important that you do so since we know 01:03:03.077 --> 01:03:05.021 in so many of these instances that 01:03:05.021 --> 01:03:07.450 we've seen some really horrific cases 01:03:07.450 --> 01:03:09.490 that the initial assessment was 01:03:09.500 --> 01:03:11.750 declined . Uh and so we were never able 01:03:11.750 --> 01:03:14.580 to get more information on that . Um 01:03:14.590 --> 01:03:16.590 and with that Mr Chairman , I yield 01:03:16.590 --> 01:03:18.368 back . Thank you . Mr Fallon is 01:03:18.368 --> 01:03:20.850 recognized for five minutes . Thank you . 01:03:20.850 --> 01:03:22.961 Mr Chair . Thank you . General Milley 01:03:22.961 --> 01:03:25.183 Secretary Austin Mr . Record , you know 01:03:25.183 --> 01:03:28.200 inflation is at 8% . And The 01:03:28.200 --> 01:03:30.830 president's proposed budget , $18,813 01:03:30.830 --> 01:03:33.320 billion 4% increase year over years . 01:03:33.320 --> 01:03:35.042 Which means in real dollars in 01:03:35.042 --> 01:03:36.931 purchasing power of course it's a 01:03:36.931 --> 01:03:39.264 reduction may be as much as $30 billion . 01:03:39.264 --> 01:03:41.376 And then a world ruled you know where 01:03:41.376 --> 01:03:43.431 the Taliban is ruling in Afghanistan 01:03:43.431 --> 01:03:45.376 after humility and withdrawal were 01:03:45.376 --> 01:03:47.431 witness to the largest land invasion 01:03:47.431 --> 01:03:47.430 we've seen in europe since World War 01:03:47.430 --> 01:03:49.319 two and the saber rattling of the 01:03:49.319 --> 01:03:51.650 communist chinese over the last 01:03:51.650 --> 01:03:53.872 particularly the last year , Where they 01:03:53.872 --> 01:03:55.983 increase their defense spending by 7% 01:03:55.983 --> 01:03:58.420 and are also using ever more increasing 01:03:58.420 --> 01:04:00.531 and aggressive rhetoric when it comes 01:04:00.531 --> 01:04:02.587 to as they see it . They're renegade 01:04:02.587 --> 01:04:04.642 province of Taiwan . And given these 01:04:04.642 --> 01:04:06.830 and a host of other threats that we're 01:04:06.830 --> 01:04:09.280 facing in this real world , Uh to 01:04:09.280 --> 01:04:11.391 embark on a path to reduce the number 01:04:11.391 --> 01:04:13.558 of operational ships in our Navy by 24 01:04:13.558 --> 01:04:15.669 vessels over the next five years . To 01:04:15.669 --> 01:04:17.613 reduce our active duty army to the 01:04:17.613 --> 01:04:19.669 smallest size since World War II and 01:04:19.669 --> 01:04:21.891 overall to reduce our active duty force 01:04:21.891 --> 01:04:24.169 by about a point percentage and a half . 01:04:24.169 --> 01:04:23.940 I just don't think that's the right 01:04:23.940 --> 01:04:25.884 path . And it's concerning to me . 01:04:26.090 --> 01:04:28.340 Secretary Austin at the beginning of 01:04:28.340 --> 01:04:30.396 November last year , ranking members 01:04:30.396 --> 01:04:32.600 Rogers and Turner lead a letter that 01:04:32.600 --> 01:04:34.680 myself and a total of 15 members of 01:04:34.680 --> 01:04:36.569 this committee . Sign , it's this 01:04:36.569 --> 01:04:38.791 letter right here . We signed on urging 01:04:38.791 --> 01:04:40.902 the president and your administration 01:04:40.902 --> 01:04:42.870 to do two things considering the 01:04:42.870 --> 01:04:44.926 massing that we saw of troops in the 01:04:44.926 --> 01:04:47.320 open source reporting of the sizeable 01:04:47.540 --> 01:04:49.429 Russian presence on the Ukrainian 01:04:49.429 --> 01:04:51.596 border and their equipment and I think 01:04:51.596 --> 01:04:53.540 every any level headed fair minded 01:04:53.540 --> 01:04:55.373 observer would have seen that if 01:04:55.373 --> 01:04:57.373 innovation wasn't imminent , it was 01:04:57.373 --> 01:04:59.707 highly likely . We asked for two things . 01:04:59.707 --> 01:05:01.707 One to send a significant amount of 01:05:01.707 --> 01:05:03.818 lethal aid to the Ukraine immediately 01:05:04.190 --> 01:05:07.100 and to to deploy a military presence in 01:05:07.100 --> 01:05:09.100 the Black Sea . So take Secretary 01:05:09.100 --> 01:05:11.850 Austin . Um What was the total dollar 01:05:11.850 --> 01:05:14.550 amount of new lethal aid ? That was 01:05:14.560 --> 01:05:16.060 because I know we sent the 01:05:16.060 --> 01:05:18.116 administration sent 60 , I think $60 01:05:18.116 --> 01:05:20.860 million September of last year . What 01:05:20.860 --> 01:05:23.120 was the total of new lethal aid that 01:05:23.120 --> 01:05:25.287 was sent to the Ukraine in november of 01:05:25.287 --> 01:05:27.287 last year ? Well I'll just tell you 01:05:27.287 --> 01:05:29.287 that over , you know , prior to the 01:05:29.287 --> 01:05:31.398 invasion , the total amount over time 01:05:31.398 --> 01:05:33.287 that we provided to Ukraine was a 01:05:33.287 --> 01:05:35.176 billion dollars . And what is the 01:05:35.176 --> 01:05:37.342 invasion ? We've also provided another 01:05:37.342 --> 01:05:39.509 billion dollars . Do you don't know in 01:05:39.509 --> 01:05:41.564 november of what that number was ? I 01:05:41.564 --> 01:05:43.676 don't know how it , how it breaks out 01:05:43.676 --> 01:05:45.676 in in november versus any other any 01:05:45.676 --> 01:05:47.676 other month . Because my concern is 01:05:47.676 --> 01:05:49.898 that uh , that letter wasn't heated and 01:05:49.898 --> 01:05:49.800 we dragged our feet and exclusively for 01:05:49.800 --> 01:05:53.070 no reason . Uh Secretary , what is 01:05:53.070 --> 01:05:55.380 the total number of ships we currently 01:05:55.380 --> 01:05:59.340 have in the Black Sea current 01:05:59.340 --> 01:06:01.562 U . S . Ships in the Black Sea . Okay . 01:06:01.562 --> 01:06:03.562 Because we historically have kept a 01:06:03.562 --> 01:06:05.562 presence in the Black Sea , is that 01:06:05.562 --> 01:06:07.590 correct ? Fair to say ? We have , I 01:06:07.590 --> 01:06:09.757 mean the presence has ebbed and flowed 01:06:09.757 --> 01:06:11.701 over time but there has not been a 01:06:11.701 --> 01:06:13.812 permanent presence in the Black Sea , 01:06:13.812 --> 01:06:15.950 but in 2021 is it true that we had 12 01:06:15.950 --> 01:06:18.117 ships in the Black Sea for a total and 01:06:18.117 --> 01:06:20.283 aggregate of 100 and 82 days . We were 01:06:20.283 --> 01:06:22.006 rotating in and out on various 01:06:22.006 --> 01:06:24.283 exercises working with partner nations . 01:06:24.283 --> 01:06:26.506 Yes . So my , my concern is simply that 01:06:26.506 --> 01:06:28.672 we see this mass build up , you know , 01:06:28.672 --> 01:06:31.020 the Russians and we had a presence in 01:06:31.020 --> 01:06:32.964 the Black Sea . And now we have no 01:06:32.964 --> 01:06:35.187 presence at all . And it's almost as if 01:06:35.187 --> 01:06:37.298 we're cutting tail and running rather 01:06:37.298 --> 01:06:37.240 than trying to deter a very evil man 01:06:37.250 --> 01:06:39.370 and the actions that he's taken and , 01:06:39.370 --> 01:06:41.426 you know , our worst nightmares from 01:06:41.426 --> 01:06:43.648 last november have , you know , come to 01:06:43.648 --> 01:06:47.200 come to pass , please cocktail and 01:06:47.200 --> 01:06:50.260 running things as you would expect . I 01:06:50.260 --> 01:06:52.371 don't think your microphone , I don't 01:06:52.371 --> 01:06:54.093 think your microphone is on Mr 01:06:54.093 --> 01:06:56.093 Secretary , you know , it's hard to 01:06:56.093 --> 01:06:58.149 Yeah , if I could just Well , that's 01:06:58.149 --> 01:07:00.482 what critics would say . I'm not saying , 01:07:00.482 --> 01:07:02.538 you know , because we , I think in a 01:07:02.538 --> 01:07:04.760 large measure , we're allowing Putin to 01:07:04.760 --> 01:07:06.816 deter us and not deter him . So , so 01:07:06.816 --> 01:07:06.620 what , what you've seen , you know , I 01:07:06.620 --> 01:07:09.690 want in , you know , the day after he 01:07:09.690 --> 01:07:12.020 invaded , you know , we had forces 01:07:12.020 --> 01:07:15.010 flowing to the Baltics states to the 01:07:15.010 --> 01:07:17.360 eastern flank , you know , within 24 01:07:17.360 --> 01:07:20.680 hours to reassure and deter . We had 01:07:20.680 --> 01:07:23.380 aircraft , flying police in policing 01:07:23.390 --> 01:07:25.840 missions in , uh , in Romania and 01:07:25.840 --> 01:07:29.540 Poland Right away within 24 hours . And 01:07:29.540 --> 01:07:33.210 so Putin In his , his best 01:07:33.210 --> 01:07:35.432 estimate was , was that it was going to 01:07:35.432 --> 01:07:37.543 take months for NATO to uh , to react 01:07:37.543 --> 01:07:39.377 or respond to move forces to the 01:07:39.377 --> 01:07:41.266 Eastern Flank , but we were there 01:07:41.266 --> 01:07:44.160 within within you know , 24 hours . So 01:07:44.170 --> 01:07:46.003 that's far from cutting tail and 01:07:46.003 --> 01:07:48.050 running . And not to mention the 01:07:48.050 --> 01:07:50.106 incredible capabilities that we have 01:07:50.106 --> 01:07:52.700 been providing to the Ukrainians who 01:07:53.380 --> 01:07:56.540 have taken it that that assistance that 01:07:56.540 --> 01:07:58.651 we provided along with our allies and 01:07:58.651 --> 01:08:00.707 partners and used it to get effect . 01:08:00.707 --> 01:08:02.818 And and and Secretary I just with the 01:08:02.818 --> 01:08:05.040 little time I have remaining so we have 01:08:05.040 --> 01:08:07.318 no presence right now in the Black Sea . 01:08:07.318 --> 01:08:09.373 That's the bottom line though . Um I 01:08:09.373 --> 01:08:11.540 went on a code l just recently and one 01:08:11.540 --> 01:08:13.707 of the I found it interesting that the 01:08:13.707 --> 01:08:15.873 Romanian Prime Minister said that when 01:08:15.873 --> 01:08:18.040 I asked him should we keep a our bases 01:08:18.040 --> 01:08:20.151 in eastern europe permanent , he said 01:08:20.151 --> 01:08:22.262 he didn't think we had any choice . I 01:08:22.262 --> 01:08:21.730 wanted you to comment on that if you 01:08:21.730 --> 01:08:23.900 could , Gentleman's time has expired . 01:08:23.910 --> 01:08:27.700 So we've got one more question . I I 01:08:27.700 --> 01:08:29.700 have some questions . I want to get 01:08:29.700 --> 01:08:31.867 before we get done here and then we're 01:08:31.867 --> 01:08:31.570 done . Mr moulton is gonna be the last 01:08:31.570 --> 01:08:33.459 question . So we'll be done short 01:08:33.459 --> 01:08:35.459 shortly after two . So if anybody's 01:08:35.459 --> 01:08:37.459 looking around out there , um We're 01:08:37.459 --> 01:08:39.348 done after Mr moulton . I want to 01:08:39.348 --> 01:08:41.403 follow up on the sub launched cruise 01:08:41.403 --> 01:08:43.459 missile because we're probably gonna 01:08:43.459 --> 01:08:45.292 have an argument over this and I 01:08:45.292 --> 01:08:47.459 understand that you know , the general 01:08:47.459 --> 01:08:50.230 position is more is better . But I 01:08:50.230 --> 01:08:52.480 don't Mr Courtney needs some I think 01:08:52.490 --> 01:08:54.657 pretty well thought out comments about 01:08:54.657 --> 01:08:56.980 the impact of turning our attack 01:08:56.980 --> 01:08:59.280 submarines into nuclear launch 01:08:59.290 --> 01:09:01.512 submarines and how that would undermine 01:09:01.512 --> 01:09:03.623 other other missions would complicate 01:09:03.623 --> 01:09:06.220 the ability to get in there um for them 01:09:06.220 --> 01:09:08.387 to do what they're they're designed to 01:09:08.387 --> 01:09:10.553 do . It also potentially has an impact 01:09:10.553 --> 01:09:12.442 on the Aucas deal because the the 01:09:12.442 --> 01:09:14.442 Australians are pretty clear on the 01:09:14.442 --> 01:09:16.498 fact they don't want to be launching 01:09:16.498 --> 01:09:18.664 nuclear weapons off of the submarine . 01:09:18.664 --> 01:09:20.887 So , and we are building the long range 01:09:20.887 --> 01:09:23.300 standoff weapon um granted that's up in 01:09:23.300 --> 01:09:25.633 the air , not underground under the sea , 01:09:25.633 --> 01:09:27.356 um , but it has a very similar 01:09:27.356 --> 01:09:30.180 capability . So other than just , well , 01:09:30.180 --> 01:09:32.180 what the hell ? We may as well have 01:09:32.180 --> 01:09:34.520 more um , how do we overcome those 01:09:34.520 --> 01:09:36.742 concerns about the impact it would have 01:09:36.742 --> 01:09:38.576 and what the attacks submissions 01:09:38.576 --> 01:09:40.687 already are in the wisdom of building 01:09:40.687 --> 01:09:42.798 this missile And general miller , you 01:09:42.798 --> 01:09:44.853 sort of state your position that you 01:09:44.853 --> 01:09:47.980 want the missile . So how do those 01:09:47.980 --> 01:09:51.810 arguments not undermine that ? There's 01:09:51.820 --> 01:09:55.040 uh , Was there a 01:09:55.040 --> 01:09:58.100 5050 some odd attack subs in the system 01:09:58.110 --> 01:10:00.054 that's what we're talking about is 01:10:00.054 --> 01:10:02.000 building or developing a piece of 01:10:02.000 --> 01:10:05.480 munition and and uh , ammo granted its 01:10:05.480 --> 01:10:08.860 nuclear . But uh so the the weapon 01:10:08.860 --> 01:10:11.980 itself wouldn't be necessarily on each 01:10:11.990 --> 01:10:14.430 of those subs . So some of those subs a 01:10:14.430 --> 01:10:16.440 small percentage may have a mission 01:10:16.440 --> 01:10:18.950 change ? Uh , the others would not . So 01:10:18.950 --> 01:10:20.783 I think it's a fair comment from 01:10:20.783 --> 01:10:23.410 Congressman Court about it . But I I 01:10:23.410 --> 01:10:26.290 don't I don't buy that is in terms of 01:10:26.660 --> 01:10:28.327 uh the overall , I think that 01:10:28.327 --> 01:10:30.549 presenting the president this President 01:10:30.549 --> 01:10:32.716 of future President with options , But 01:10:32.716 --> 01:10:34.771 it's also a moot point . I'm here to 01:10:34.771 --> 01:10:36.771 defend the President's budget . The 01:10:36.771 --> 01:10:36.500 President's already made a decision . I 01:10:36.500 --> 01:10:39.150 mean , this is not actually a moot 01:10:39.150 --> 01:10:41.390 point . Well , I mean , we're still 01:10:41.390 --> 01:10:43.557 going to fight about it up here . So , 01:10:43.557 --> 01:10:45.779 Okay , so that's why I'm trying to make 01:10:45.779 --> 01:10:45.620 sure we have the argument . But but 01:10:45.620 --> 01:10:47.787 look at , I support the NPR , which is 01:10:47.787 --> 01:10:50.710 part of the NDS and um , and we have a 01:10:50.710 --> 01:10:54.570 lot of nuclear capability . So no foe 01:10:54.580 --> 01:10:56.136 of the United States should 01:10:56.136 --> 01:10:58.810 underestimate our capability because of 01:10:58.810 --> 01:11:01.960 a slick amend a decision to to produce 01:11:01.960 --> 01:11:04.170 or not produce a slick amend Our 01:11:04.170 --> 01:11:06.059 nuclear capability is much , much 01:11:06.059 --> 01:11:08.337 bigger than that . It is . As you know , 01:11:08.337 --> 01:11:10.630 a triad and the amount of throw weight 01:11:10.630 --> 01:11:12.810 we have the money yield we have in all 01:11:12.810 --> 01:11:14.977 kinds of different weapons systems and 01:11:14.977 --> 01:11:17.088 nuclear weapons systems is enormous . 01:11:17.088 --> 01:11:18.977 And so no adversary of the United 01:11:18.977 --> 01:11:20.754 States should underestimate our 01:11:20.754 --> 01:11:22.977 capability . Will is a different matter 01:11:22.977 --> 01:11:24.699 whether you use it or not is a 01:11:24.699 --> 01:11:24.650 different matter , those political 01:11:24.650 --> 01:11:26.820 decisions . But our capability , our 01:11:26.820 --> 01:11:28.820 nuclear capability is significant . 01:11:28.820 --> 01:11:31.160 It's assured , it's capable and in this 01:11:31.160 --> 01:11:33.104 budget and a future budget or past 01:11:33.104 --> 01:11:34.827 budgets . We are continuing to 01:11:34.827 --> 01:11:36.750 recapitalize that system . So I 01:11:36.750 --> 01:11:38.694 wouldn't get overly hung up on the 01:11:38.694 --> 01:11:40.528 slick of men because our nuclear 01:11:40.528 --> 01:11:42.583 capability writ large . The triad is 01:11:42.583 --> 01:11:44.750 very capable uh , to defend the United 01:11:44.750 --> 01:11:46.972 States . And that's good . I will point 01:11:46.972 --> 01:11:49.194 out that you can tell there are members 01:11:49.194 --> 01:11:49.170 of this committee who will get overly 01:11:49.170 --> 01:11:51.392 hung up on it . Um , so we're trying to 01:11:51.392 --> 01:11:53.614 work through that and make sure we have 01:11:53.614 --> 01:11:55.892 the arguments clear and in front of us . 01:11:55.892 --> 01:11:58.130 And I , you know , I'm not a submarine 01:11:58.140 --> 01:11:59.751 person by any stretch of the 01:11:59.751 --> 01:12:01.418 imagination . But from what I 01:12:01.418 --> 01:12:03.473 understand , if you're talking about 01:12:03.473 --> 01:12:05.807 handling nuclear weapons on a submarine , 01:12:05.807 --> 01:12:08.000 that is an entirely different thing in 01:12:08.000 --> 01:12:10.333 terms of how you have to train the crew , 01:12:10.333 --> 01:12:12.278 prepare the crew . And even if the 01:12:12.278 --> 01:12:14.000 nuclear weapons aren't on that 01:12:14.000 --> 01:12:16.167 particular submarine , that would have 01:12:16.167 --> 01:12:18.222 to be certified moment . And my only 01:12:18.222 --> 01:12:20.222 point is I'd like all presidents to 01:12:20.222 --> 01:12:22.167 have as many options as possible . 01:12:22.167 --> 01:12:24.333 That's all fair enough . Mr moulton is 01:12:24.333 --> 01:12:26.667 recognized for five minutes . Thank you . 01:12:26.667 --> 01:12:25.460 Mr Chairman , Gentlemen . Thank you 01:12:25.460 --> 01:12:27.682 very much for your continued service of 01:12:27.682 --> 01:12:29.904 the country and your stamina . You have 01:12:29.904 --> 01:12:32.260 the weight on your shoulders of 01:12:32.750 --> 01:12:34.750 protecting freedom around the globe 01:12:34.750 --> 01:12:36.694 while avoiding a nuclear war every 01:12:36.694 --> 01:12:38.750 single day . And that's not a weight 01:12:38.750 --> 01:12:40.972 that many would be able to bear . I was 01:12:40.972 --> 01:12:43.139 quite critical of the administration's 01:12:43.139 --> 01:12:44.917 handling of the withdrawal from 01:12:44.917 --> 01:12:47.083 Afghanistan . But I have to tell you , 01:12:47.083 --> 01:12:49.083 I think that the last two months of 01:12:49.083 --> 01:12:48.880 Putin's war in Ukraine , you've handled 01:12:48.880 --> 01:12:51.047 brilliantly and so I want to sincerely 01:12:51.047 --> 01:12:53.213 thank you for your leadership . That's 01:12:53.213 --> 01:12:55.380 been so critical to our priorities and 01:12:55.380 --> 01:12:57.658 to the success of the Ukrainian people . 01:12:57.658 --> 01:12:59.602 So thank you . The only consistent 01:12:59.602 --> 01:13:01.324 criticism that I've heard in a 01:13:01.324 --> 01:13:03.491 bipartisan way on the on the effort in 01:13:03.491 --> 01:13:05.491 Ukraine is just simply the speed at 01:13:05.491 --> 01:13:07.491 which things are moving . Um you've 01:13:07.491 --> 01:13:09.491 done all the right things . Um some 01:13:09.491 --> 01:13:11.491 people have said it could move more 01:13:11.491 --> 01:13:13.658 quickly and I think that reflects just 01:13:13.658 --> 01:13:15.880 a broader concern I have with with this 01:13:15.880 --> 01:13:15.350 budget that we're transforming the 01:13:15.350 --> 01:13:17.183 force we're modernizing , you're 01:13:17.183 --> 01:13:18.961 investing a lot in research and 01:13:18.961 --> 01:13:21.072 development . My question is , are we 01:13:21.072 --> 01:13:23.239 moving quickly enough . So I just have 01:13:23.239 --> 01:13:25.183 a couple of questions on that . Mr 01:13:25.183 --> 01:13:27.350 Secretary , you you've testified about 01:13:27.350 --> 01:13:29.517 the various innovation efforts and the 01:13:29.517 --> 01:13:31.850 and the duties investment in technology , 01:13:31.850 --> 01:13:33.961 but Defense Innovation University , D 01:13:33.961 --> 01:13:36.017 IU which has leveraged 25 billion in 01:13:36.017 --> 01:13:37.961 private r and d introduced 100 new 01:13:37.961 --> 01:13:40.017 suppliers to D O D from 37 states um 01:13:40.017 --> 01:13:43.030 has been cut in its budget for fy 22 2 . 01:13:43.040 --> 01:13:46.590 Why is that ? And is that a wise move 01:13:46.590 --> 01:13:48.701 for the future ? I think they've been 01:13:48.701 --> 01:13:51.950 incredibly successful . Well , we as we 01:13:51.950 --> 01:13:54.240 look across the landscape , we want to 01:13:54.240 --> 01:13:56.129 make sure that , you know , we're 01:13:56.129 --> 01:13:58.240 putting out dollars where we're going 01:13:58.240 --> 01:14:00.240 to get a good return . And d IU has 01:14:00.240 --> 01:14:02.407 done amazing work for us over time and 01:14:02.407 --> 01:14:04.573 and uh we want to make sure that we're 01:14:04.573 --> 01:14:07.510 also using other means to encourage 01:14:07.520 --> 01:14:10.170 initiative and bring new new 01:14:10.170 --> 01:14:13.250 capabilities on board and and and get 01:14:13.250 --> 01:14:15.810 the input of of entrepreneurs and small 01:14:15.810 --> 01:14:17.921 companies and that sort of business . 01:14:17.921 --> 01:14:20.650 But uh d Iu is important to us . It 01:14:20.650 --> 01:14:22.539 will remain important to us . And 01:14:22.539 --> 01:14:24.706 that's not a signal that we're phasing 01:14:24.706 --> 01:14:26.820 D IU out if that's what you know , Mr 01:14:26.820 --> 01:14:28.910 Secretary , I it's hard for me , 01:14:28.920 --> 01:14:30.809 especially as the co chair of the 01:14:30.809 --> 01:14:33.031 Future Defense Task Force from a couple 01:14:33.031 --> 01:14:34.976 of years ago to imagine you're not 01:14:34.976 --> 01:14:37.031 increasing the budget for D IU given 01:14:37.031 --> 01:14:39.142 their returns . Uh So I'd really like 01:14:39.142 --> 01:14:41.309 to I'd like to have a more detailed uh 01:14:41.309 --> 01:14:43.642 uh answer for the record please on that . 01:14:43.642 --> 01:14:45.864 And if there's an opportunity for us to 01:14:45.864 --> 01:14:45.700 increase the budget , that's something 01:14:45.700 --> 01:14:48.420 we'd like to do . Um In china gentlemen 01:14:48.420 --> 01:14:51.210 we've seen heavy divestment from the 01:14:51.220 --> 01:14:53.331 traditional land army . It was a good 01:14:53.331 --> 01:14:55.650 thing for us that China wasted a lot of 01:14:55.650 --> 01:14:57.706 time and effort on their million man 01:14:57.706 --> 01:14:59.983 army because it was not very effective . 01:14:59.983 --> 01:15:02.150 They've been pretty dramatic in taking 01:15:02.150 --> 01:15:04.206 money out of that , downsizing their 01:15:04.206 --> 01:15:05.983 force and putting it into other 01:15:05.983 --> 01:15:08.050 capabilities as you think about the 01:15:08.060 --> 01:15:10.116 overall structure of D . O . D . And 01:15:10.116 --> 01:15:14.030 the balance among the services . Are 01:15:14.030 --> 01:15:16.500 you adapting that balance to meet the 01:15:16.500 --> 01:15:19.120 threats from china and Russia or does 01:15:19.120 --> 01:15:21.310 each service within your budget 01:15:21.310 --> 01:15:23.421 essentially still get the same amount 01:15:23.421 --> 01:15:27.240 of money . I I can assure 01:15:27.240 --> 01:15:29.530 you that each service does not and 01:15:29.540 --> 01:15:33.320 that's always a an issue of the great 01:15:33.320 --> 01:15:35.740 debate but we're really going after the 01:15:35.740 --> 01:15:37.720 capabilities that we need that are 01:15:37.720 --> 01:15:40.350 relevant to this fight , that we could 01:15:40.350 --> 01:15:42.780 have in the future . And so you've seen 01:15:42.780 --> 01:15:45.002 significant investment and naval forces 01:15:45.002 --> 01:15:46.891 and also air forces , if you look 01:15:46.891 --> 01:15:48.891 across the fit up , that that trend 01:15:48.891 --> 01:15:52.610 continues . But it's not a , excuse me , 01:15:52.610 --> 01:15:54.666 it's not a cookie cutter approach by 01:15:54.666 --> 01:15:56.721 any stretch of the imagination . The 01:15:56.721 --> 01:15:58.888 secretary on the , on the same theme . 01:15:58.888 --> 01:16:00.888 Can you just , um , I know that the 01:16:00.888 --> 01:16:00.600 chairman asked this question at the 01:16:00.600 --> 01:16:02.767 beginning of the hearing , but can you 01:16:02.767 --> 01:16:05.120 give me two specific lessons that we 01:16:05.120 --> 01:16:07.530 have learned from Ukraine and explain 01:16:07.530 --> 01:16:09.560 how those lessons are reflected in 01:16:09.560 --> 01:16:12.910 changes in this budget ? So , you know , 01:16:12.920 --> 01:16:14.976 are you changing the amount of money 01:16:14.976 --> 01:16:17.031 that we're investing in artillery or 01:16:17.031 --> 01:16:19.087 armor or in drones or something like 01:16:19.087 --> 01:16:21.253 that , given the lessons we've seen on 01:16:21.253 --> 01:16:23.420 the ground in the last several weeks , 01:16:23.420 --> 01:16:25.587 uh , the lesson and again , it's still 01:16:25.587 --> 01:16:27.531 early and this is a month into the 01:16:27.531 --> 01:16:29.698 fight . And there will be lessons that 01:16:29.698 --> 01:16:32.030 that we take away from this . Um , but 01:16:32.030 --> 01:16:33.860 in terms of how it impacts our 01:16:33.860 --> 01:16:36.260 structure in our war fighting 01:16:36.270 --> 01:16:40.050 capabilities , we we don't 01:16:40.730 --> 01:16:42.674 there are no changes that we would 01:16:42.674 --> 01:16:44.730 desire to make at this point again ? 01:16:44.730 --> 01:16:46.730 Well , we'll see how this plays out 01:16:46.730 --> 01:16:48.897 over time . Mr . Chairman mask you the 01:16:48.897 --> 01:16:50.952 same question . Do you think that we 01:16:50.952 --> 01:16:50.790 should be making changes in our budget 01:16:50.790 --> 01:16:53.510 based on what we're seeing in Ukraine ? 01:16:53.520 --> 01:16:55.550 I might add the conflict Azerbaijan 01:16:55.550 --> 01:16:57.772 gave us a lot of lessons along the same 01:16:57.772 --> 01:17:01.250 lines . I'd say two things not 01:17:01.250 --> 01:17:03.361 necessary changes to the budget , but 01:17:03.361 --> 01:17:05.528 one is the fundamental significance of 01:17:05.528 --> 01:17:07.750 air defense systems in order to uh deny 01:17:07.750 --> 01:17:09.950 an opponent the ability to achieve air 01:17:09.950 --> 01:17:12.117 superiority of supremacy . That's been 01:17:12.117 --> 01:17:14.283 done by the Ukrainians . And it's been 01:17:14.283 --> 01:17:16.339 done with a huge amount of help from 01:17:16.339 --> 01:17:16.170 the United States , with Stingers 01:17:16.170 --> 01:17:18.410 etcetera , but also because of our 01:17:18.410 --> 01:17:20.577 intelligence feeds . So the second big 01:17:20.577 --> 01:17:23.300 lesson there is intelligence . Uh we 01:17:23.300 --> 01:17:25.530 have and I'm not going to go in an open 01:17:25.530 --> 01:17:27.586 hearing about the intelligence we've 01:17:27.586 --> 01:17:29.863 collected , how we did it and all that . 01:17:29.863 --> 01:17:33.460 But this war has arguably been 01:17:33.930 --> 01:17:37.130 uh the the most successful intelligence 01:17:37.130 --> 01:17:39.770 operation in military history . Uh and 01:17:39.770 --> 01:17:41.826 it's really tremendous . And someday 01:17:41.826 --> 01:17:43.937 that story will be told , I guess the 01:17:43.937 --> 01:17:46.590 third thing is the is to reinforce uh 01:17:46.600 --> 01:17:48.767 the United States doctoral methodology 01:17:48.767 --> 01:17:50.840 of mission command power down 01:17:50.850 --> 01:17:52.906 decentralized decision making to the 01:17:52.906 --> 01:17:55.310 lowest level possible . The Ukrainians 01:17:55.310 --> 01:17:57.532 have been trained on that over the last 01:17:57.532 --> 01:17:59.850 uh six years , actually longer than 01:17:59.850 --> 01:18:03.640 that has expired . Good 01:18:03.640 --> 01:18:05.751 answer . And this good place place to 01:18:05.751 --> 01:18:08.120 close , I think because in the 01:18:08.120 --> 01:18:10.398 President's budget as president budget , 01:18:10.398 --> 01:18:12.398 the President's budget , but it's a 01:18:12.398 --> 01:18:14.564 starting point . Not an ending point . 01:18:14.564 --> 01:18:16.620 Um So a lot of the things that we've 01:18:16.620 --> 01:18:18.564 talked about here and as we try to 01:18:18.564 --> 01:18:20.453 react to the lessons learned from 01:18:20.453 --> 01:18:22.620 Ukraine um conflict . You know , we we 01:18:22.620 --> 01:18:24.842 have a number of months here to to work 01:18:24.842 --> 01:18:26.509 our will legislatively and in 01:18:26.509 --> 01:18:28.453 cooperation with the Department of 01:18:28.453 --> 01:18:30.676 Defense and the president did to get to 01:18:30.676 --> 01:18:32.842 the right answer on this , but I think 01:18:32.842 --> 01:18:34.953 what mr moulton and a number of other 01:18:34.953 --> 01:18:37.064 people are talking about is is really 01:18:37.064 --> 01:18:36.820 important . Modernizing the force . 01:18:36.830 --> 01:18:39.052 We've talked about it for a long time . 01:18:39.052 --> 01:18:41.060 How do we , you know , B . G . Put 01:18:41.060 --> 01:18:42.838 ourselves in a position to take 01:18:42.838 --> 01:18:45.004 advantage of innovation more quickly ? 01:18:45.004 --> 01:18:47.060 Um and recognize how the battlefield 01:18:47.060 --> 01:18:49.338 has changed within the pentagon budget . 01:18:49.338 --> 01:18:51.338 As you know , it's a big process um 01:18:51.338 --> 01:18:50.740 sort of like painting the golden gate 01:18:50.740 --> 01:18:52.740 bridge , it's constant , you know , 01:18:52.740 --> 01:18:54.684 budget introduced requirements get 01:18:54.684 --> 01:18:56.907 locked in , you know , and Pentagon has 01:18:56.907 --> 01:18:58.970 built a system around the five year 01:18:58.970 --> 01:19:00.581 plan . You know , one of our 01:19:00.581 --> 01:19:02.637 frustrations on D . I . U . S . D IU 01:19:02.637 --> 01:19:05.420 does great research on ideas um and if 01:19:05.420 --> 01:19:07.500 they find something that works then 01:19:07.500 --> 01:19:09.611 they gotta wait two years before they 01:19:09.611 --> 01:19:11.722 can buy it in many instances . I know 01:19:11.722 --> 01:19:14.056 there is some fungible money to do that . 01:19:14.056 --> 01:19:15.944 Um but the length and the process 01:19:15.944 --> 01:19:18.110 involved undermines our ability to 01:19:18.120 --> 01:19:20.810 rapidly react . Um in terms of 01:19:20.810 --> 01:19:23.032 procurement acquisition , in terms of , 01:19:23.032 --> 01:19:24.699 you know , how we're going to 01:19:24.699 --> 01:19:26.810 prioritize things . We are working to 01:19:26.810 --> 01:19:28.977 try to help you speed that up . Um and 01:19:28.977 --> 01:19:31.199 that will be a lot of what we do in the 01:19:31.199 --> 01:19:30.750 next process . Of course , single most 01:19:30.750 --> 01:19:32.861 important things that we can get this 01:19:32.861 --> 01:19:34.861 done by October one . Um that would 01:19:34.861 --> 01:19:37.070 help you as well . Um gentlemen , you 01:19:37.070 --> 01:19:39.126 have anything to say for the for the 01:19:39.126 --> 01:19:41.348 good of the order . Um I will allow you 01:19:41.920 --> 01:19:43.920 closing comments if you have them . 01:19:45.520 --> 01:19:48.050 My only closing comment , Chairman is I 01:19:48.050 --> 01:19:51.120 want to thank the committee and uh and 01:19:51.120 --> 01:19:53.880 all of your colleagues at large for the 01:19:53.880 --> 01:19:56.102 tremendous support that you've given us 01:19:56.102 --> 01:19:58.213 the speed at which you've moved to uh 01:19:58.213 --> 01:20:01.430 to uh support our efforts especially 01:20:01.440 --> 01:20:04.690 here in with Ukraine here in the recent 01:20:04.690 --> 01:20:07.150 past and uh we'll continue this work . 01:20:07.160 --> 01:20:09.380 Uh This is not this is something that 01:20:09.390 --> 01:20:11.501 the chairman and I talked about every 01:20:11.501 --> 01:20:14.510 day and uh so this is not something 01:20:14.510 --> 01:20:16.399 that's been passed off to a staff 01:20:16.399 --> 01:20:19.900 officer at a lower level . This has our 01:20:19.910 --> 01:20:22.520 continued focus and we remain in 01:20:22.520 --> 01:20:25.010 contact with our with our counterparts 01:20:25.010 --> 01:20:26.843 in Ukraine here . They've done , 01:20:26.843 --> 01:20:29.720 they've performed . Mhm and 01:20:29.730 --> 01:20:31.680 magnificently and I think they'll 01:20:31.680 --> 01:20:34.770 continue that work . I would also point 01:20:34.780 --> 01:20:36.880 to the fact that the you know what 01:20:36.880 --> 01:20:39.102 you're seeing with NATO right now is no 01:20:39.102 --> 01:20:42.390 accident . The President uh and all the 01:20:42.390 --> 01:20:44.612 cabinet members have really leaned into 01:20:44.612 --> 01:20:46.680 the two , uh making sure that we are 01:20:46.680 --> 01:20:48.470 transparent with NATO . We do 01:20:48.470 --> 01:20:50.880 everything we can to keep NATO unified . 01:20:50.890 --> 01:20:53.670 And uh and I think well I don't think I 01:20:53.670 --> 01:20:57.060 know that our our colleagues in in 01:20:57.060 --> 01:20:59.120 europe , really appreciate our 01:20:59.120 --> 01:21:01.287 leadership and what we've done to help 01:21:01.287 --> 01:21:03.398 them . Thank you sir . Thank you . We 01:21:03.398 --> 01:21:05.509 were very much . I'm sorry , Chairman 01:21:05.509 --> 01:21:07.564 Malik . And you know . Ditto I would 01:21:07.564 --> 01:21:09.620 like to thank the committee for your 01:21:09.620 --> 01:21:12.270 continued support as well . Um and and 01:21:12.270 --> 01:21:14.381 I want to re emphasize what I said in 01:21:14.381 --> 01:21:16.437 the opening statement . We we are at 01:21:16.437 --> 01:21:18.740 literally in my view a pivot point and 01:21:18.740 --> 01:21:21.470 the geo strategic history of europe for 01:21:21.470 --> 01:21:23.637 sure . And perhaps the globe with this 01:21:23.637 --> 01:21:25.803 invasion of Ukraine . Uh and we've got 01:21:25.803 --> 01:21:28.026 to do everything we can that's possible 01:21:28.026 --> 01:21:30.026 without going to war with Russia to 01:21:30.026 --> 01:21:32.248 ensure that the Ukrainian people remain 01:21:32.248 --> 01:21:34.192 free and sovereign . That's really 01:21:34.192 --> 01:21:36.414 critically important to uh to to global 01:21:36.414 --> 01:21:38.637 security . And the third and last point 01:21:38.637 --> 01:21:40.692 is I'm enormously proud of what this 01:21:40.692 --> 01:21:43.026 joint forces all about every single day . 01:21:43.026 --> 01:21:45.192 These guys come to work . Uh they work 01:21:45.192 --> 01:21:44.980 hard to defend their country and 01:21:44.980 --> 01:21:46.813 they're they're doing a selfless 01:21:46.813 --> 01:21:48.758 service uh for the defense of this 01:21:48.758 --> 01:21:50.924 nation and support of the constitution 01:21:50.924 --> 01:21:50.920 and nothing could make me prouder than 01:21:50.950 --> 01:21:53.117 what our soldiers , sailors , airmen , 01:21:53.117 --> 01:21:55.228 marines and guardians do every single 01:21:55.228 --> 01:21:57.450 day day in and day out . Yeah , we will 01:21:57.450 --> 01:21:59.450 emphasize those last few points the 01:21:59.450 --> 01:22:01.672 Secretary and Chairman billy made , you 01:22:01.672 --> 01:22:03.839 know , one that the hard work that has 01:22:03.839 --> 01:22:05.950 gone in from Secretary Austin and the 01:22:05.950 --> 01:22:08.061 entire body administration to to pull 01:22:08.061 --> 01:22:10.061 this coalition together to have the 01:22:10.061 --> 01:22:12.117 response and then second what you're 01:22:12.117 --> 01:22:13.950 seeing in Ukraine , we have been 01:22:13.950 --> 01:22:16.061 working to train the Ukrainians for a 01:22:16.061 --> 01:22:18.006 very long time . Um It shows so we 01:22:18.006 --> 01:22:20.228 should be very proud of that . Um and I 01:22:20.228 --> 01:22:22.450 do also want to thank the committee , I 01:22:22.450 --> 01:22:24.672 think with with one notable exception . 01:22:24.672 --> 01:22:24.410 Um This was a very , very good 01:22:24.420 --> 01:22:26.642 discussion of the issues and what we're 01:22:26.642 --> 01:22:28.476 looking for , and as far as that 01:22:28.476 --> 01:22:30.698 notable exception goes , um I looked it 01:22:30.698 --> 01:22:32.753 up sadly , I don't have the power to 01:22:32.753 --> 01:22:34.864 simply take a member's time away . Uh 01:22:34.864 --> 01:22:36.976 So if they're going , they're going . 01:22:36.976 --> 01:22:39.031 But other than that , I I think this 01:22:39.031 --> 01:22:38.610 committee did a really good job of 01:22:38.610 --> 01:22:40.721 analyzing the issues . Um As I said , 01:22:40.721 --> 01:22:42.832 this is the start of the process . Um 01:22:42.832 --> 01:22:44.999 We got a lot of work to do between now 01:22:44.999 --> 01:22:47.110 and when we produce the final product 01:22:47.110 --> 01:22:49.332 and look forward to working with all of 01:22:49.332 --> 01:22:48.360 you to get that done to the best of our 01:22:48.360 --> 01:22:50.082 ability . And with that we are 01:22:50.082 --> 01:22:50.620 adjourned .