WEBVTT

00:00.040 --> 00:02.096
Mr . Courtney is recognized for five

00:02.096 --> 00:04.096
minutes . Thank you Mr Chairman and

00:04.096 --> 00:06.207
thank you to the witnesses . Actually

00:06.207 --> 00:08.373
I'm going to continue down this path .

00:08.373 --> 00:10.780
Secretary in general and um Actually on

00:10.790 --> 00:12.734
June four we are going to have the

00:12.734 --> 00:13.734
killing for

00:13.734 --> 00:20.250
US .

00:20.640 --> 00:23.990
Uh the budget that came over and again

00:23.990 --> 00:25.990
I share seapower . So we look at it

00:25.990 --> 00:28.010
pretty closely . It's $6 billion

00:28.010 --> 00:30.650
dollars for Colombia . Again , that's

00:30.650 --> 00:33.440
the biggest number since this journey

00:33.440 --> 00:36.130
started back in 2008 . So the you know ,

00:36.130 --> 00:38.580
the commitment by the administration in

00:38.580 --> 00:40.747
your department in terms of really the

00:40.747 --> 00:43.800
most critical leg of the triad which is

00:43.800 --> 00:46.360
the sea based leg . I mean that's 70%

00:46.370 --> 00:48.630
of our strategic deterrence is carried

00:48.630 --> 00:52.110
on those platforms and the schedule is

00:52.110 --> 00:55.170
knife edge . We there's no um really

00:55.180 --> 00:58.200
margin for for delay in terms of moving

00:58.200 --> 00:59.922
that forward . And this budget

00:59.922 --> 01:02.089
certainly reflects that . I would also

01:02.089 --> 01:04.680
note um on page seven general of your

01:04.680 --> 01:07.120
testimony , you noted the fact that the

01:07.120 --> 01:09.231
budget invests in the industrial base

01:09.231 --> 01:11.342
to support fleet modernization and on

01:11.342 --> 01:13.509
time delivery of the columbus columbus

01:13.509 --> 01:16.310
class submarine and there's $538

01:16.310 --> 01:18.254
million for supplier development ,

01:18.254 --> 01:20.421
submarine supplier development as well

01:20.421 --> 01:22.870
as 227 for submarine workforce

01:22.870 --> 01:24.981
development which means that the navy

01:24.981 --> 01:26.981
now is in the position of trying to

01:26.981 --> 01:29.940
boost welders , electricians ship

01:29.940 --> 01:32.310
rights uh , pipe fitters . I mean when

01:32.310 --> 01:34.477
we look at really the challenge that's

01:34.477 --> 01:36.820
being faced for Colombia and frankly

01:36.820 --> 01:39.120
ship ship building across it really is

01:39.120 --> 01:41.009
a workforce issue . And I've been

01:41.009 --> 01:43.120
around for a while , those numbers in

01:43.120 --> 01:45.176
terms of D . O . D . Investment into

01:45.176 --> 01:47.287
workforce . We've never seen anything

01:47.287 --> 01:49.342
that robust and I was just wondering

01:49.342 --> 01:51.453
maybe if you want to maybe enlarge on

01:51.453 --> 01:53.564
your comment in the testimony general

01:53.564 --> 01:57.240
in terms of that initiative , I I

01:57.240 --> 01:59.970
just would underline that our submarine

01:59.970 --> 02:02.810
force in the in the joint force As we

02:02.810 --> 02:04.921
look to the future changing character

02:04.921 --> 02:07.032
of war and then operating environment

02:07.032 --> 02:10.110
uh in the 20s 30s 2040s and beyond the

02:10.110 --> 02:12.640
submarine force is the most lethal .

02:12.650 --> 02:14.317
The most capable and the most

02:14.317 --> 02:16.930
survivable . Uh part of the joint force

02:16.930 --> 02:18.708
that's out there . So continued

02:18.708 --> 02:20.430
investment in the sub force is

02:20.430 --> 02:22.486
fundamental to the nation's security

02:22.640 --> 02:24.640
and reaching beyond really just the

02:24.650 --> 02:27.030
navy's sort of box in terms of reaching

02:27.030 --> 02:29.141
out into the industrial base in a way

02:29.141 --> 02:31.141
that this budget does . Again , the

02:31.141 --> 02:33.252
president back in december designated

02:33.252 --> 02:35.474
the submarine workforce as essential in

02:35.474 --> 02:37.530
a defense production act . Executive

02:37.530 --> 02:39.474
order was at the end of december ,

02:39.474 --> 02:41.586
which again , I don't think I've ever

02:41.586 --> 02:43.790
seen that any other sort of production

02:44.130 --> 02:47.360
platform that we have . The

02:48.040 --> 02:50.210
at one point . I just go back to the

02:50.210 --> 02:52.377
question of the low yield missiles . I

02:52.377 --> 02:54.377
would note that the nuclear posture

02:54.377 --> 02:56.321
review does provide that low yield

02:56.321 --> 02:59.030
missiles will be deployed on ballistic

02:59.030 --> 03:01.086
submarines . Again , the question of

03:01.086 --> 03:03.030
slick um is really whether they're

03:03.030 --> 03:04.752
going to be extended to attack

03:04.752 --> 03:06.919
submarines . And I would just tell you

03:06.919 --> 03:09.030
representing a district with a lot of

03:09.030 --> 03:11.086
submariners that issue of changing ,

03:11.086 --> 03:12.808
really , the mission of attack

03:12.808 --> 03:15.141
submarines is something that is greatly ,

03:15.141 --> 03:17.470
um , in dispute . And I think the

03:17.480 --> 03:19.702
administration made the right choice in

03:19.702 --> 03:21.536
terms of keeping the attack subs

03:21.536 --> 03:23.647
focused on their main mission , which

03:23.647 --> 03:25.813
is to have an agile mobile . The queen

03:25.813 --> 03:28.110
on the chessboard as Admiral Rough had

03:28.110 --> 03:30.650
used to call them . And I think putting

03:31.040 --> 03:32.873
tactical weapons on their really

03:32.873 --> 03:36.280
changes it in a really clunky way in

03:36.280 --> 03:38.680
terms of moving forward . I would note

03:38.680 --> 03:40.736
also that the , the budget that came

03:40.736 --> 03:43.780
over in terms of shipbuilding is about

03:43.790 --> 03:47.180
$28 billion . That's the first time in

03:47.180 --> 03:49.402
six years where we've had a president's

03:49.402 --> 03:51.624
budget that's come over higher than the

03:51.624 --> 03:53.847
prior year's enacted level . You know ,

03:53.847 --> 03:56.069
that may sound like sort of a green eye

03:56.069 --> 03:58.402
shade sort of comment , but the fact is ,

03:58.402 --> 04:00.236
we're not beginning , you know ,

04:00.236 --> 04:02.236
underground or below zero with this

04:02.236 --> 04:04.180
budget this year . In terms of the

04:04.180 --> 04:06.124
committee . This is the first time

04:06.124 --> 04:08.291
we've actually seen investment in ship

04:08.291 --> 04:10.291
construction that's higher than the

04:10.291 --> 04:12.458
prior year . And , and again , I think

04:12.458 --> 04:14.458
that shows , you know , that you're

04:14.458 --> 04:16.680
committed to , you know , really making

04:16.680 --> 04:16.620
sure that we have the fleet of the

04:16.620 --> 04:18.453
future . That's there . It's not

04:18.453 --> 04:20.676
perfect . I think Gerald burgers made a

04:20.676 --> 04:22.787
really good argument for , you know ,

04:22.787 --> 04:25.550
the LPD program to get looked at . And

04:25.550 --> 04:27.494
I know that's on his unfunded um ,

04:27.494 --> 04:29.606
requirements list . And and again , I

04:29.606 --> 04:31.661
think that's something we're , we're

04:31.661 --> 04:33.883
certainly gonna take a very strong look

04:33.883 --> 04:37.040
at . And um , and lastly , you know ,

04:37.040 --> 04:38.873
the sealift component , which is

04:38.873 --> 04:41.096
mentioned in your testimony , it's only

04:41.096 --> 04:43.318
two boats . We've got to do better than

04:43.318 --> 04:45.373
that . I , you know , again from the

04:45.373 --> 04:47.540
army , that sealift is not just a navy

04:47.540 --> 04:47.450
program , it's really for the whole

04:47.450 --> 04:49.740
service and 16 seconds left , maybe you

04:49.740 --> 04:52.018
could sort of respond to that question ?

04:54.240 --> 04:57.990
Well , certainly it is important and uh ,

04:58.000 --> 05:00.111
we we acknowledge that and you'll see

05:00.111 --> 05:02.220
uh , if you look as you look at the

05:02.220 --> 05:04.220
budget , you know , the investments

05:04.220 --> 05:06.276
investments that we've made begin to

05:06.276 --> 05:08.553
reflect that . And again , I apologize .

05:08.553 --> 05:10.664
Mr Courtney said , yeah , horribly on

05:10.664 --> 05:12.664
that one . So we'll have we'll have

05:12.664 --> 05:14.887
we'll have to get that for the record .

05:14.887 --> 05:14.610
Um , the gentleman's time has expired .

05:14.620 --> 05:17.280
Um , Mr Whitman is recognized for five

05:17.280 --> 05:19.280
minutes . Thank you . Mr Chairman ,

05:19.280 --> 05:21.613
gentlemen , thanks for joining us today .

05:21.613 --> 05:21.420
Thanks so much for your service to our

05:21.420 --> 05:24.060
nation . Secretary Austin last March ,

05:24.070 --> 05:25.848
windowpane . Com Commander Phil

05:25.848 --> 05:28.460
Davidson said that he saw that china is

05:28.460 --> 05:30.970
making every preparation For a

05:30.970 --> 05:33.800
confrontation over Taiwan by 2027 .

05:34.240 --> 05:36.073
Current indo pay com Commander .

05:36.073 --> 05:38.510
Admiral Aquilino said the same thing .

05:38.510 --> 05:40.710
Former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo

05:40.720 --> 05:43.630
agreed . In fact General Milley has

05:43.630 --> 05:46.700
previously stated this , we're going to

05:46.700 --> 05:48.811
have to have a much larger fleet than

05:48.811 --> 05:50.978
we have today . If we're serious about

05:50.978 --> 05:53.089
great power competition and deterring

05:53.089 --> 05:55.144
great power war and if we're serious

05:55.144 --> 05:56.867
about dominant capability over

05:56.867 --> 05:58.811
something like china or some other

05:58.811 --> 05:58.650
power that has significant capability .

05:59.740 --> 06:02.360
Secretary Austin , do you agree that we

06:02.360 --> 06:04.670
should be preparing for a showdown with

06:04.670 --> 06:06.360
Taiwan in this decade ?

06:08.740 --> 06:12.070
I agree that we should have the right

06:12.080 --> 06:15.900
capabilities to be able to not only be

06:15.900 --> 06:18.810
relevant in deterring future

06:18.810 --> 06:21.040
adversaries but also dominant on the

06:21.040 --> 06:23.350
future battlefield and we are investing

06:23.350 --> 06:25.683
in in those capabilities in this budget .

06:26.440 --> 06:28.790
Thank you . General Milley . The Navy

06:28.790 --> 06:32.340
today has 297 ships and this budget

06:32.340 --> 06:34.880
request will reduce our fleet to 280 by

06:34.880 --> 06:38.730
2027 . If you look at where we are in

06:38.730 --> 06:41.470
relation to the chinese , Our budget

06:41.480 --> 06:43.258
and number of ships have shrunk

06:43.258 --> 06:45.480
continually over the past two decades ,

06:45.570 --> 06:49.480
we have gone from 318 ships Down 2 -

06:49.480 --> 06:51.870
97 today . During the same period of

06:51.870 --> 06:55.090
time , China has gone from 210 ships to

06:55.090 --> 06:59.080
360 ships . The odds Budget

06:59.080 --> 07:01.900
will further shrink that to to 80 The

07:01.900 --> 07:04.940
ODS owned china Power Report projects

07:05.270 --> 07:09.260
that china will have 460 ships by 2030 .

07:09.640 --> 07:11.700
In this latest budget request , the

07:11.700 --> 07:14.860
Navy proposes to retire 24 ships and

07:14.860 --> 07:17.110
build eight ships . I'm not a

07:17.110 --> 07:19.332
mathematician , but it seems like to me

07:19.332 --> 07:21.499
you can't do addition by subtraction .

07:21.499 --> 07:23.666
This seems to be grossly irresponsible

07:23.666 --> 07:27.140
and completely completely denies the

07:27.140 --> 07:29.860
reality of what we are facing . General

07:29.860 --> 07:32.200
Milley and your professional military

07:32.200 --> 07:34.780
judgment does our shipbuilding plan

07:35.240 --> 07:37.462
accurately reflect the investments that

07:37.462 --> 07:39.573
we need to make in naval capacity and

07:39.573 --> 07:42.180
capabilities that we need to deter the

07:42.180 --> 07:45.230
chinese in the years and decades to

07:45.230 --> 07:48.690
come . Well , let me make a couple of

07:48.690 --> 07:50.857
comments . Congressman , thank you for

07:50.857 --> 07:53.530
that First . I think it's important to

07:53.530 --> 07:55.740
focus on capability . So capacity

07:55.740 --> 07:58.073
matters . Numbers matter , mass matters .

07:58.100 --> 08:00.156
And I'm on board with all that . But

08:00.156 --> 08:02.267
capability matters and the ships that

08:02.267 --> 08:04.378
were retiring the 20 some odd the two

08:04.378 --> 08:06.544
dozen ships that are coming out of the

08:06.544 --> 08:08.822
inventory in in this particular budget .

08:08.822 --> 08:10.822
Uh the Navy has assessed us uh very

08:10.822 --> 08:13.100
high maintenance costs high to sustain .

08:13.100 --> 08:14.933
Uh and the cost is exceeding the

08:14.933 --> 08:14.840
benefit of those ships staying on

08:14.840 --> 08:16.840
active duty sort of thing . And the

08:16.840 --> 08:18.784
nine ships that were procuring the

08:18.784 --> 08:21.320
capability of those ships is the most

08:21.320 --> 08:23.590
modern in the fleet . So uh you know ,

08:23.590 --> 08:25.312
the capability versus capacity

08:25.312 --> 08:27.423
arguments there . I'm always in favor

08:27.423 --> 08:29.757
of great numbers . I think that's great .

08:29.757 --> 08:31.757
But I would bias towards capability

08:31.757 --> 08:33.970
rather than just sheer numbers . It is

08:33.970 --> 08:36.030
a fair argument about the number of

08:36.030 --> 08:38.252
ships the chinese have and it even gets

08:38.252 --> 08:40.252
worse if you think about our global

08:40.252 --> 08:43.000
commitment versus say the U . S . Fleet .

08:43.000 --> 08:45.222
That's in the western pacific or in the

08:45.222 --> 08:47.222
pacific to the numbers are even the

08:47.222 --> 08:49.389
ratios are even worse . But again it's

08:49.389 --> 08:51.111
capability versus capacity And

08:51.111 --> 08:53.278
cautioned folks to to go down into the

08:53.278 --> 08:55.333
detail about what our ships can do ,

08:55.333 --> 08:57.667
what the training of our sailors can do ,

08:57.667 --> 08:59.620
what our tactics are , what our

08:59.620 --> 09:01.842
technologies are on our ships . I think

09:01.842 --> 09:03.953
there's a fundamental and significant

09:03.953 --> 09:06.009
advantage to us relative to china on

09:06.009 --> 09:08.231
that capability . But generally I don't

09:08.231 --> 09:10.231
deny that our ships are great . Our

09:10.231 --> 09:12.398
sailors are great . But you do have to

09:12.398 --> 09:14.453
look at this in terms of magnitude ,

09:14.453 --> 09:16.620
quantity has a quality , all of all of

09:16.620 --> 09:18.676
its own . And if we're going down to

09:18.676 --> 09:20.842
280 and they're at 460 are great ships

09:20.842 --> 09:23.009
can only be in one place at one time ,

09:23.009 --> 09:25.176
they can only engage so many targets .

09:25.176 --> 09:27.398
Have a hard time figuring out how their

09:27.398 --> 09:27.030
trajectory of China going in this

09:27.030 --> 09:29.030
direction and the trajectory of the

09:29.030 --> 09:31.030
United States going in the opposite

09:31.030 --> 09:33.141
direction . It's almost impossible to

09:33.141 --> 09:35.086
make an argument to say that we're

09:35.086 --> 09:37.197
gonna build enough capability in nine

09:37.197 --> 09:39.363
ships to displace the chinese and that

09:39.363 --> 09:41.308
nine ships are going to be able to

09:41.308 --> 09:43.530
replace the the Capacity and capability

09:43.530 --> 09:45.697
in 24 ships . You know , like I said ,

09:45.697 --> 09:48.060
I'm not a I'm not a mathematician , but

09:48.070 --> 09:50.181
it just seems like to me you can't do

09:50.181 --> 09:53.370
addition by subtraction . I'm not gonna

09:53.380 --> 09:55.980
get a big argument budget because I I'm

09:55.980 --> 09:58.147
on the side of mass matters , quantity

09:58.147 --> 10:00.424
has a quality all and so on , etcetera .

10:00.424 --> 10:02.369
But you can't buy everything , you

10:02.369 --> 10:04.536
can't be everything to everyone at all

10:04.536 --> 10:06.591
times . Right . So there has to be a

10:06.591 --> 10:06.140
balanced in the in the budget . And I

10:06.140 --> 10:08.050
think this particular budget is

10:08.050 --> 10:11.430
divesting uh in the Navy's . I think

10:11.440 --> 10:13.662
some really quality analysis there that

10:13.662 --> 10:15.884
they are divesting of ships that are of

10:15.884 --> 10:18.107
marginal utility in the future . Combat

10:18.107 --> 10:20.329
environment against china and investing

10:20.329 --> 10:22.530
in the nine ships that do have great

10:22.530 --> 10:24.970
quality Germans time has has expired .

10:24.980 --> 10:27.091
Um I will say we also on this issue ,

10:27.091 --> 10:29.370
shipbuilding capacity matters . I mean

10:29.370 --> 10:31.370
basically do we have the industrial

10:31.370 --> 10:33.370
base to support that even if we put

10:33.370 --> 10:35.481
them in the budget , My understanding

10:35.481 --> 10:37.537
is we we don't so that that that's a

10:37.537 --> 10:39.759
different challenge as well in terms of

10:39.759 --> 10:41.481
workforce . uh mr Garamendi is

10:41.481 --> 10:43.814
recognized for five minutes . Thank you .

10:43.814 --> 10:46.000
Let me start with a thank you for the

10:46.000 --> 10:48.222
good work you've been doing with regard

10:48.222 --> 10:51.100
to Ukraine pushing the necessary

10:51.110 --> 10:53.380
equipment into Ukraine . It's an

10:53.380 --> 10:55.547
extraordinary piece of work and you're

10:55.547 --> 10:57.650
to be congratulated and thanked for

10:57.650 --> 11:01.450
that work . Also , the work

11:01.460 --> 11:04.750
Secretary Austin in General Millie

11:05.340 --> 11:08.440
in rebuilding our relationships with

11:08.440 --> 11:10.820
NATO . They were virtually destroyed in

11:10.820 --> 11:13.050
the previous four years of the of the

11:13.060 --> 11:15.460
previous administration very rapidly

11:15.460 --> 11:17.880
rebuilt . And I think that may very

11:17.880 --> 11:20.200
well be Secretary Austin , part of your

11:20.210 --> 11:23.070
integrated deterrence strategy . Is

11:23.070 --> 11:27.060
that correct ? Our allies ? It is part

11:27.060 --> 11:29.350
of the significant part of the of our

11:29.840 --> 11:32.290
our strategy . Integrated deterrence

11:32.300 --> 11:35.580
means using all of the capability and

11:35.580 --> 11:38.400
capacity that's resident in all of the

11:38.400 --> 11:40.344
warfighting domains , air , land ,

11:40.400 --> 11:43.860
space , uh cyber

11:44.240 --> 11:46.880
see and and networking those

11:46.880 --> 11:49.047
capabilities in new and different ways

11:49.047 --> 11:52.950
that really give us tremendous uh power

11:52.950 --> 11:56.360
and also make sure that we remain a

11:56.370 --> 11:59.890
dominant combat capable force . Uh and

11:59.900 --> 12:01.678
a big part of that is using the

12:01.678 --> 12:04.020
capability and capacity of our allies

12:04.020 --> 12:06.131
as well . And uh and you're seeing us

12:06.131 --> 12:09.670
do that in uh in NATO as we speak and

12:09.670 --> 12:11.726
you'll see us continue to do that in

12:11.726 --> 12:14.060
the end of pacific . But I think uh I

12:14.060 --> 12:15.949
think we've done that in the past

12:15.949 --> 12:18.171
certainly , but we want to increase our

12:18.171 --> 12:20.393
our efforts going forward . And I think

12:20.393 --> 12:22.560
I point to Aucas again , as one of the

12:22.560 --> 12:24.671
one of the types of things that we're

12:24.671 --> 12:26.838
doing to uh leverage the capability of

12:26.838 --> 12:30.090
our of our alleys building on that

12:30.520 --> 12:32.880
and on what Mr Courtney was raising

12:32.880 --> 12:36.480
with regard to see lift . It's clear

12:36.480 --> 12:39.550
that we are in a position now to not be

12:39.550 --> 12:43.210
able to support our efforts in the

12:43.250 --> 12:45.528
Western pacific should it be necessary .

12:46.800 --> 12:49.180
And it doesn't appear to be based upon

12:49.180 --> 12:51.810
the previous discussion money to build

12:51.810 --> 12:53.860
the ships to provide the sealift

12:53.870 --> 12:57.870
capacity . A quick comment if you would

12:57.870 --> 13:00.960
on a strategy that would utilize the

13:01.840 --> 13:05.580
current Jones act fleet in its

13:05.580 --> 13:08.350
fullness , making it militarily useful ,

13:08.840 --> 13:12.800
subsidizing adding to the the

13:12.810 --> 13:14.977
strength of the ships when necessary ,

13:14.977 --> 13:16.810
repurposing them and making them

13:16.810 --> 13:18.977
available much as we currently do with

13:18.977 --> 13:21.120
the craft program , the airline

13:21.120 --> 13:23.176
industry If you'd care to comment on

13:23.176 --> 13:25.287
that kind of a strategy that would be

13:25.287 --> 13:29.140
using all of the assets of the United

13:29.140 --> 13:31.710
States , including our maritime assets .

13:31.720 --> 13:33.998
Absolutely . And that's what you would ,

13:33.998 --> 13:37.550
we would we would hope to do in , in

13:37.550 --> 13:39.606
the case of need . You've seen us do

13:39.606 --> 13:41.606
that as you pointed out with , with

13:41.606 --> 13:43.828
aircraft . That's the thing that , that

13:43.828 --> 13:46.960
gives us the ability to punch above our

13:46.960 --> 13:49.960
weight class . And , uh , in our , our ,

13:51.440 --> 13:53.790
our country has always responded to our

13:53.790 --> 13:55.734
request in times of needs . Well ,

13:55.734 --> 13:57.846
we'll be working on that , a national

13:57.846 --> 14:00.068
maritime security program in the coming

14:00.068 --> 14:02.580
months ahead of us . A final point has

14:02.580 --> 14:05.800
to do with maintaining and repairing

14:05.800 --> 14:08.760
all of the things that we have . We

14:08.760 --> 14:11.940
don't do that so well are government

14:11.950 --> 14:14.660
owned shipyards are antiquated . I'm

14:14.660 --> 14:17.550
looking for the investment in that .

14:17.560 --> 14:19.620
Also in the depots mentioned earlier

14:19.620 --> 14:22.760
the issues of the arsenals .

14:23.540 --> 14:26.180
If you'd care to comment on that

14:26.190 --> 14:29.100
general Miley or Millie or Secretary

14:29.100 --> 14:31.730
Austin . Thanks sir . That's a , that's

14:31.730 --> 14:34.050
a great question . And I think you'll

14:34.050 --> 14:36.060
see in this budget at $1.7 billion

14:36.060 --> 14:38.120
dollar investment , uh , in our , in

14:38.120 --> 14:40.570
our public shipyards . And , uh , and

14:40.580 --> 14:43.420
that , uh , that begins to , uh , to

14:43.420 --> 14:45.420
get after some of the things that ,

14:45.420 --> 14:47.587
that you've mentioned . This is really

14:47.587 --> 14:49.809
important to make sure that we have the

14:49.809 --> 14:52.087
capability , but they're not only , uh ,

14:52.087 --> 14:54.198
build the kinds of ships that we need

14:54.198 --> 14:56.420
going forward , but also sustained them

14:56.420 --> 14:59.950
as well . As you pointed out , the

15:01.040 --> 15:03.990
but we're not there yet , that level of

15:03.990 --> 15:06.110
investment in the government yards or

15:06.110 --> 15:09.160
the public yards , I would probably not

15:09.170 --> 15:11.580
be sufficient to maintain the ships

15:12.310 --> 15:14.421
that we need to keep them at sea . We

15:14.421 --> 15:16.588
can build more and more ships , but if

15:16.588 --> 15:18.810
we cannot keep them at sea because they

15:18.810 --> 15:20.921
cannot be maintained in a orderly and

15:20.921 --> 15:24.090
quick way , it doesn't do much for us .

15:24.290 --> 15:26.550
I absolutely agree with you , sir . And

15:26.560 --> 15:28.727
you know , that's why I said , this is

15:28.727 --> 15:32.460
this is this is a good , a good

15:32.460 --> 15:34.900
start , a good uh , a couple of steps

15:34.900 --> 15:37.011
forward , but we need more investment

15:37.011 --> 15:39.178
going forward for the committee here .

15:39.178 --> 15:41.344
We may want to consider this how we're

15:41.344 --> 15:43.289
going to invest in maintaining our

15:43.289 --> 15:45.289
ships at sea . Gentleman's time has

15:45.289 --> 15:47.650
expired . Mr scott is recognized for

15:47.650 --> 15:49.928
five minutes . Thank you . Mr Chairman ,

15:49.928 --> 15:52.094
Gentlemen , thank you for being here .

15:52.094 --> 15:54.261
I want to speak briefly about indo bay

15:54.261 --> 15:56.206
calm . It is over half the world's

15:56.206 --> 15:58.550
population . Um , Ukraine puts 50

15:58.550 --> 16:00.661
million metric tons of corn and wheat

16:00.661 --> 16:02.661
into the export markets . Russia is

16:02.661 --> 16:04.550
also responsible for a tremendous

16:04.550 --> 16:06.494
amount of wheat going into the the

16:06.494 --> 16:08.272
global food supply . Russia has

16:08.272 --> 16:10.161
recently prohibited the export of

16:10.161 --> 16:12.272
sunflower seed . It seems that Russia

16:12.272 --> 16:16.190
is now using food um , literally

16:16.190 --> 16:19.980
as a weapon of war . I

16:19.980 --> 16:23.270
just wanted to make sure that at the D .

16:23.270 --> 16:25.381
O . D . We're paying attention to the

16:25.381 --> 16:29.090
potential for a significant reduction

16:29.090 --> 16:32.160
in the global food supply and what that

16:32.160 --> 16:34.800
means for the end up a com region where

16:34.810 --> 16:36.977
Ukraine is the largest supplier of the

16:36.977 --> 16:40.500
U . N . World Food Program . Are those

16:40.500 --> 16:43.880
assessments being done by D . A . Or

16:43.880 --> 16:46.280
any other type of analyzing agency with

16:46.280 --> 16:48.224
regard to the potential unrest and

16:48.224 --> 16:51.930
instability in um the

16:51.930 --> 16:55.890
nDP calm region . Those

16:55.890 --> 16:59.580
assessments continue to be uh done sir .

16:59.580 --> 17:02.400
And and this has been a focus that is a

17:02.400 --> 17:04.760
focus of our government uh and uh

17:04.770 --> 17:07.110
across the inter agency , you know a

17:07.110 --> 17:09.640
number of agencies are looking at this

17:09.650 --> 17:12.150
but uh but we certainly share your

17:12.150 --> 17:15.810
concern . I just I want to um

17:15.820 --> 17:17.987
that that part of the world and really

17:17.987 --> 17:19.931
the global economy , the Black Sea

17:19.931 --> 17:21.931
region is something that the United

17:21.931 --> 17:23.931
States tornado has seemed to have a

17:23.931 --> 17:26.153
strategy for . And I do hope that as we

17:26.153 --> 17:28.930
push forward we will develop a strategy

17:28.930 --> 17:32.850
for the Black Sea region . The the

17:32.850 --> 17:34.961
importance of that with regard to the

17:34.961 --> 17:37.017
world food supply . I don't think it

17:37.017 --> 17:38.970
can be um overestimated . There's

17:38.970 --> 17:41.192
another country in that region that I'm

17:41.192 --> 17:43.359
extremely concerned about . That's the

17:43.359 --> 17:45.192
country of Georgia . They have a

17:45.192 --> 17:44.810
partnership with the Georgia National

17:44.810 --> 17:46.490
Guard , One of the many state

17:46.490 --> 17:49.160
partnerships that we have . Um

17:50.340 --> 17:52.507
what are we doing with regard to those

17:52.507 --> 17:56.040
partnerships to make sure that over the

17:56.040 --> 17:57.873
long term those partnerships are

17:57.873 --> 18:01.730
strengthened and using uh

18:01.740 --> 18:04.700
their ability to help fund putting the

18:04.700 --> 18:06.867
weapons systems in the region where we

18:06.867 --> 18:08.978
where we need them . In other words ,

18:08.978 --> 18:11.311
as we talk about , we're going to fight ,

18:11.311 --> 18:13.533
we fight by with and through partners .

18:13.533 --> 18:15.533
And I want to make sure that we are

18:15.533 --> 18:18.190
using those partnerships to get um the

18:18.190 --> 18:21.770
weapons in the region in such a manner

18:21.770 --> 18:23.826
that the U . S . Does not pay all of

18:23.826 --> 18:25.050
the all of the cost .

18:29.640 --> 18:32.100
You know , we can continue to do uh

18:32.110 --> 18:34.550
great work in countries like Georgia

18:34.550 --> 18:36.717
and I was there a couple of months ago

18:36.717 --> 18:38.772
and I did get a chance to go out and

18:38.772 --> 18:40.994
visit with our troops that are actually

18:40.994 --> 18:43.106
doing some of that training that that

18:43.106 --> 18:45.328
you mentioned , this is invaluable . It

18:45.328 --> 18:48.430
it provides us great capabilities uh

18:48.430 --> 18:50.860
and uh and so we we will continue to

18:50.860 --> 18:52.930
invest in this in terms of specific

18:52.930 --> 18:55.041
needs of countries will work those on

18:55.041 --> 18:57.660
on a case by case individual basis .

18:57.670 --> 19:01.350
But are the the value of our

19:01.350 --> 19:05.090
troops engaging with with countries in

19:05.090 --> 19:07.680
the region cannot be overstated . They

19:07.680 --> 19:10.390
are doing a tremendous job . one of one

19:10.390 --> 19:14.080
of my concerns Mr Secretary is is when

19:14.080 --> 19:17.210
we divest um equipment in in the United

19:17.210 --> 19:19.850
States , I think the a 10 is probably

19:19.850 --> 19:23.380
the best example . This is a weapons

19:23.380 --> 19:25.158
system that the D . O . D . Has

19:25.158 --> 19:27.269
requested be that we divest from over

19:27.269 --> 19:30.140
the last several years and at least as

19:30.140 --> 19:32.251
long as I can remember being a member

19:32.251 --> 19:34.440
of Congress . Yet when we look at the

19:34.440 --> 19:36.329
european theater right now , it's

19:36.329 --> 19:39.070
clearly a weapons system that if people

19:39.070 --> 19:41.237
who share our interests and our values

19:41.237 --> 19:43.950
had them , they would be doing even

19:43.950 --> 19:46.260
better in the war against Russia .

19:48.340 --> 19:50.062
The D . O . T . S position and

19:50.062 --> 19:52.118
investment in the past has basically

19:52.118 --> 19:54.007
been that you just get rid of the

19:54.007 --> 19:56.460
weapons system . His deity changed

19:56.460 --> 19:58.630
there thought process on that so that

19:58.630 --> 20:01.080
when we divest from a weapons system or

20:01.080 --> 20:03.080
we're going to now allow people who

20:03.080 --> 20:05.136
share our interests and our values ,

20:05.136 --> 20:06.913
the opportunity to purchase and

20:06.913 --> 20:10.670
maintain that system . We have

20:10.670 --> 20:13.580
over time provided capabilities that we

20:13.590 --> 20:16.600
no longer uh , used to to other

20:16.600 --> 20:20.310
countries . Um , and in every case ,

20:20.320 --> 20:22.890
in terms of a high end capability , I

20:22.890 --> 20:25.001
think you have to start with a with a

20:25.001 --> 20:27.770
threat . And if you if they use this

20:27.780 --> 20:30.080
piece of equipment or this , this

20:30.080 --> 20:32.630
system or capability in that

20:32.630 --> 20:35.160
environment is will it be relevant ? Uh ,

20:35.160 --> 20:37.216
and so as we look at the air defense

20:37.216 --> 20:39.327
systems that we can expect Georgia to

20:39.327 --> 20:41.530
to encounter , We look at the capable

20:41.540 --> 20:43.960
training that's required . We look at

20:43.960 --> 20:46.670
the , you know , the the maintenance

20:46.670 --> 20:48.948
capabilities and those sorts of things .

20:48.948 --> 20:50.614
All of that goes into into an

20:50.614 --> 20:52.781
assessment to to see whether or not it

20:52.781 --> 20:54.837
makes sense to to actually do that .

20:54.837 --> 20:57.003
But certainly you make a great point .

20:57.003 --> 20:59.003
This time has expired . MR spear is

20:59.003 --> 21:00.837
recognized for five minutes . Mr

21:00.837 --> 21:02.837
Chairman . Thank you . Thank you to

21:02.837 --> 21:04.726
both Secretary Austin and General

21:04.726 --> 21:06.670
Milley for extraordinary work . Um

21:06.670 --> 21:09.410
First Secretary Austin last year , you

21:09.410 --> 21:11.521
made a commitment that you would deal

21:11.521 --> 21:13.688
with the issue of sexual assault . You

21:13.688 --> 21:15.910
actually delivered on that commitment .

21:15.910 --> 21:17.966
Thank you very much for the military

21:17.966 --> 21:20.270
justice reform we've seen . But um as

21:20.270 --> 21:22.810
you I believe agree sexual harassment

21:22.810 --> 21:24.921
needs to be taken out of the chain of

21:24.921 --> 21:26.643
command as well because sexual

21:26.643 --> 21:28.810
harassment begets sexual assault . And

21:28.810 --> 21:30.754
it appeared to be taken out on the

21:30.754 --> 21:32.866
Senate side because they were getting

21:32.866 --> 21:34.921
signals from the department , I hope

21:34.921 --> 21:37.150
this year that we can count on you to

21:37.150 --> 21:39.372
make that case to our Senate colleagues

21:39.372 --> 21:41.483
about the importance of taking sexual

21:41.483 --> 21:43.594
harassment out of the chain as well .

21:45.740 --> 21:47.930
Well , as you said , I I think this uh

21:47.940 --> 21:50.960
this the entire issue is is one that's

21:50.970 --> 21:53.090
uh that's very important to us and

21:53.090 --> 21:55.201
we'll continue to do the right things

21:55.201 --> 21:57.423
in terms of making sure that we provide

21:57.423 --> 21:59.646
the right environment for our troops to

21:59.646 --> 22:01.757
operate in and we'll continue to work

22:01.757 --> 22:04.260
to achieve the objectives that we've

22:04.260 --> 22:08.080
outlined in terms of our reform of

22:08.080 --> 22:11.410
our of our U . C . M . J . And I really

22:11.410 --> 22:15.040
appreciate your support in in uh in in

22:15.040 --> 22:17.390
the past year . To thank you , let me

22:17.390 --> 22:20.720
move on . Um , I'm troubled by the 41%

22:20.730 --> 22:23.430
increase in deaths by suicide by our

22:23.430 --> 22:25.708
service members in the past five years .

22:25.708 --> 22:27.930
I know you are as well . There are many

22:27.930 --> 22:29.708
factors including uptempo toxic

22:29.708 --> 22:31.930
climates and financial insecurity . But

22:31.930 --> 22:34.041
having talked to the widows talked to

22:34.041 --> 22:36.910
the parents of those soldiers and

22:36.920 --> 22:38.920
airmen in particular who have taken

22:38.920 --> 22:41.350
their lives . Um The biggest problem is

22:41.350 --> 22:44.980
the lack of behavioral health expertise

22:44.990 --> 22:47.370
in the system . We are woefully

22:47.380 --> 22:50.510
underserved in that regard . And

22:51.540 --> 22:53.720
I'm going with Senator Sullivan to

22:53.730 --> 22:56.540
Alaska this month . I know we're going

22:56.540 --> 22:58.429
to hear that . That's part of the

22:58.429 --> 23:00.429
problem . You can't wait two months

23:00.429 --> 23:03.140
when you are exhibiting Suicidal

23:03.140 --> 23:06.280
ideation . Now , your department , your

23:06.280 --> 23:08.280
defense health agency has said it's

23:08.280 --> 23:10.391
going to take them to 2024 to come up

23:10.740 --> 23:13.520
with the number that is necessary to

23:13.520 --> 23:16.240
provide these services to our service

23:16.240 --> 23:19.370
members . Imagine if Kaiser or

23:19.380 --> 23:21.760
providence told their board that it was

23:21.760 --> 23:24.120
going to take them two years to

23:24.130 --> 23:27.210
determine um what the number of

23:27.210 --> 23:29.321
providers that was necessary to serve

23:29.321 --> 23:31.488
their patients , they would be fired .

23:31.488 --> 23:33.654
Um what are you going to be able to do

23:33.654 --> 23:35.599
to light a fire under the military

23:35.599 --> 23:38.350
health system leadership to get a plan

23:38.360 --> 23:40.471
in place . And the numbers identified

23:40.780 --> 23:42.836
as well as you've heard me say in my

23:42.836 --> 23:44.947
opening statement , this is something

23:44.947 --> 23:47.058
that's uh that's very important to me

23:47.058 --> 23:49.169
and our department remains focused on

23:49.169 --> 23:51.502
it . As you know , we've with your help .

23:51.502 --> 23:53.391
We stood up an independent review

23:53.391 --> 23:55.502
commission to look at how we're doing

23:55.502 --> 23:58.270
across across the department and to

23:58.270 --> 24:00.860
look at the resources that we need and

24:00.860 --> 24:03.680
how we can speed up resources uh to uh

24:03.690 --> 24:05.760
to make them available to uh to our

24:05.760 --> 24:07.950
troops and our families um In the

24:07.950 --> 24:10.850
meantime we're we're going to use every

24:10.860 --> 24:13.082
resource that's available to us . We're

24:13.082 --> 24:15.450
going to increase our our use of

24:15.450 --> 24:18.960
telehealth care . Uh And and and again

24:18.970 --> 24:21.450
I think this is very important and

24:21.450 --> 24:23.450
we're going to stay focused on it .

24:23.450 --> 24:25.590
Thank you . General Milley , the

24:25.590 --> 24:27.646
government accountability office has

24:27.646 --> 24:29.812
repeatedly shown that the surface navy

24:29.812 --> 24:33.480
is critically undermanned And some

24:33.480 --> 24:37.150
6000 sailors undermanned . Yet the

24:37.160 --> 24:38.827
budget requests . The Navy is

24:38.827 --> 24:40.716
decreasing their end strength and

24:40.716 --> 24:42.716
requesting more ships . The G . L .

24:42.716 --> 24:44.950
reports that sailors are working 80-100

24:44.950 --> 24:47.061
hours per week and sleeping less than

24:47.061 --> 24:49.172
six hours at night and are struggling

24:49.172 --> 24:51.339
with mental help . Um we saw it on the

24:51.339 --> 24:54.790
Fitzgerald . Uh we've seen it in the

24:54.800 --> 24:57.690
ship that was um destroyed , the $4

24:57.690 --> 25:01.300
billion San Diego . What are we going

25:01.300 --> 25:03.244
to do to get the navy to take this

25:03.244 --> 25:07.040
seriously Congressman

25:07.050 --> 25:09.050
1st ? I think the Navy does take it

25:09.050 --> 25:12.070
seriously . The solution doesn't it's

25:12.070 --> 25:14.126
not a simple solution has to do with

25:14.126 --> 25:17.670
optempo . The navy is got , I don't

25:17.670 --> 25:20.410
know , they're they're just under 1 to

25:20.410 --> 25:22.577
2 op tempo for their ships . The fleet

25:22.577 --> 25:24.688
at sea . Uh So they're running hard .

25:24.688 --> 25:27.160
Uh And we ask an awful lot of our navy

25:27.160 --> 25:29.000
as we do the army and Air Force

25:29.000 --> 25:31.222
etcetera . But the navy is particularly

25:31.222 --> 25:33.278
stressed because we extend ships and

25:33.278 --> 25:35.444
they're out there for extended periods

25:35.444 --> 25:37.389
of time etcetera . And as you note

25:37.389 --> 25:39.389
there , the numbers are lower there

25:39.389 --> 25:41.700
manning levels are lower per ship than

25:41.700 --> 25:43.700
optimally manned . Uh , so that's a

25:43.700 --> 25:45.867
problem . They are taking it serious .

25:45.867 --> 25:47.978
But it's not something that the chain

25:47.978 --> 25:50.089
of command of the Navy leadership has

25:50.089 --> 25:52.200
not taken serious with respect to the

25:52.200 --> 25:51.260
behavioral health piece . I couldn't

25:51.260 --> 25:52.927
agree with you more . I think

25:52.927 --> 25:54.816
behavioral health specialists are

25:54.816 --> 25:56.927
critical to part of the problem or to

25:56.927 --> 25:58.982
solve the problem . But I would also

25:58.982 --> 26:01.149
emphasize the chain of command . There

26:01.149 --> 26:03.204
is a behavioral health specialist in

26:03.204 --> 26:05.371
every squad . In every team . In every

26:05.371 --> 26:07.820
small group leader time has expired .

26:07.820 --> 26:09.931
Thanks to hold the answer there . And

26:09.931 --> 26:11.764
Mr brooks is recognized for five

26:11.764 --> 26:13.931
minutes . Thank you Mr Chairman . This

26:13.931 --> 26:15.931
past year we've seen in Afghanistan

26:15.931 --> 26:18.320
withdrawal debacle Russia invade the

26:18.320 --> 26:21.100
Ukraine china , threatening a nuclear

26:21.100 --> 26:23.700
attack on Japan if Japan helps defend

26:23.700 --> 26:25.756
Taiwan against the communist chinese

26:25.756 --> 26:27.850
attack . And that brings me to my

26:27.850 --> 26:29.628
question for General Milley and

26:29.628 --> 26:32.090
Secretary Austin , in your professional

26:32.090 --> 26:34.270
opinion over the past year , is the

26:34.270 --> 26:37.260
world a more dangerous place , A less

26:37.260 --> 26:39.371
dangerous place ? Or about the same .

26:39.371 --> 26:42.510
General Milley . Thanks congressman .

26:42.510 --> 26:45.130
As I said in my opening statement , it

26:45.130 --> 26:48.650
is my observation , my analysis that

26:48.650 --> 26:50.761
the world is becoming more unstable ,

26:50.761 --> 26:53.510
not less unstable . Secretary Austin

26:53.510 --> 26:56.490
are unstable . And we're trending

26:56.490 --> 26:58.546
towards greater instability . What's

26:58.546 --> 27:01.770
that Now ? The consumer price index is

27:01.780 --> 27:05.040
um increasing at a 7.9% rate ,

27:05.040 --> 27:06.929
according to the official federal

27:06.929 --> 27:09.350
government statistics . Of course

27:09.350 --> 27:11.572
that's an estimate . My personal belief

27:11.572 --> 27:13.517
is it's probably worse than that .

27:13.517 --> 27:15.572
Certainly talking anecdotally to the

27:15.572 --> 27:17.628
people in my district . They believe

27:17.628 --> 27:19.850
that it's worse than that . What is the

27:19.850 --> 27:22.072
inflation rate for our national defense

27:22.072 --> 27:25.240
cost , Manpower , bullets , fuel

27:25.280 --> 27:27.380
everything that comprises national

27:27.380 --> 27:29.436
offense ? What is the inflation rate

27:29.436 --> 27:32.460
for those items ? General Milley .

27:34.140 --> 27:36.250
Well , first I defer to mike McCord

27:36.250 --> 27:38.400
down here as an expert , but the this

27:38.400 --> 27:41.370
budget assumes an inflation rate Of

27:41.370 --> 27:43.700
2.2% which is obviously incorrect

27:43.710 --> 27:46.600
because it's almost 8% And uh it might

27:46.600 --> 27:48.767
go up might go down but most forecasts

27:48.767 --> 27:50.767
indicate it's going to go up and it

27:50.767 --> 27:52.822
could level out at nine or 10% . Who

27:52.822 --> 27:54.878
knows ? But it's clearly higher than

27:54.878 --> 27:57.156
what the assumption was in this budget .

27:57.156 --> 27:59.211
When you say it assumes a 2.2% . Are

27:59.211 --> 28:01.433
you talking about a 2.2% consumer price

28:01.433 --> 28:03.656
index inflation rate , which is what we

28:03.656 --> 28:05.600
commonly look at . Are you talking

28:05.600 --> 28:07.544
about a 2.2% increase for national

28:07.544 --> 28:09.840
defense costs ? It's the c . p . I .

28:09.850 --> 28:13.520
They the budget assumes 2.2%

28:13.530 --> 28:16.810
inflation rate c . p . i . Uh inflation

28:16.810 --> 28:19.360
rate . But when when the official rate

28:19.360 --> 28:22.750
is 7.9% , why are we

28:22.750 --> 28:25.770
assuming 2.2% ? Because the budget was

28:25.770 --> 28:28.530
produced quite a while ago . Those

28:28.530 --> 28:30.530
calculations were made prior to the

28:30.530 --> 28:32.752
current inflation rate . That's correct

28:32.752 --> 28:34.586
And I'd ask Mike McCord , Make a

28:34.586 --> 28:36.641
comment on the specifics . You would

28:36.641 --> 28:38.641
agree , would you not then that the

28:38.641 --> 28:40.697
assumption at least according to the

28:40.697 --> 28:42.808
official federal government inflation

28:42.808 --> 28:44.919
rate is over 5% wrong , congressman ,

28:44.919 --> 28:46.752
congressman . We don't we in the

28:46.752 --> 28:48.974
department offense don't use have never

28:48.974 --> 28:50.919
used the C . P . I . As as what is

28:50.919 --> 28:53.086
relevant for what . Mr McCord . Let me

28:53.086 --> 28:55.197
ask you the question then what is the

28:55.197 --> 28:57.363
inflation rate for the things that the

28:57.363 --> 28:59.419
military has to purchase in order to

28:59.419 --> 29:01.474
provide adequate national security ?

29:01.474 --> 29:03.697
What we saw last year was 4% and that's

29:03.697 --> 29:05.808
what we built into the West . What we

29:05.808 --> 29:05.550
built into our pricing going forward

29:05.550 --> 29:08.920
was to get that 2% up to 4% . So what

29:08.920 --> 29:11.031
is your degree of confidence that the

29:11.031 --> 29:13.198
4% rate is going to hold true ? That's

29:13.198 --> 29:15.364
an unknown congressman . Obviously the

29:15.364 --> 29:17.364
fiscal year calculation that you're

29:17.364 --> 29:19.420
citing and the general million we're

29:19.420 --> 29:21.364
discussing is of course starts six

29:21.364 --> 29:23.587
months from now and ends 18 months from

29:23.587 --> 29:25.809
now . So a lot can happen up or down uh

29:25.809 --> 29:28.480
to affect that . Well , let me add some

29:28.490 --> 29:32.230
uh comment and then some data . If we

29:32.230 --> 29:34.360
don't know what the

29:35.720 --> 29:38.680
inflation rate is for National Defense

29:38.680 --> 29:41.340
procured products , then we can't

29:41.340 --> 29:43.340
really know whether the president's

29:43.340 --> 29:46.260
budget strengthens or weakens America's

29:46.260 --> 29:48.680
national security in an environment

29:48.680 --> 29:50.847
that both general Milley and Secretary

29:50.847 --> 29:52.736
Austin I believe is becoming more

29:52.736 --> 29:54.650
dangerous , not the same or less

29:54.650 --> 29:57.060
dangerous . And I just looked up a

29:57.060 --> 29:59.227
couple of items that I hope that y'all

29:59.227 --> 30:00.949
would take into account as you

30:00.949 --> 30:03.060
determine what ultimately will be the

30:03.060 --> 30:05.310
budget that the president would support

30:05.310 --> 30:08.070
for national security Over the past two

30:08.070 --> 30:11.850
years , from January of 2022 , January

30:11.850 --> 30:15.750
of 2022 , Crude oil has gone up

30:15.750 --> 30:18.990
137% . Now , that's a big ticket item

30:18.990 --> 30:22.350
in national defense , Wholesale gas .

30:22.350 --> 30:24.350
Another big ticket item in national

30:24.350 --> 30:27.740
offense has gone up 39% . Wholesale

30:27.740 --> 30:30.950
diesel has gone up 37% .

30:31.440 --> 30:33.830
There are probably other fuels like jet

30:33.830 --> 30:36.052
fuels or what have you , uh , that have

30:36.052 --> 30:38.530
gone up significantly . So I would hope

30:38.530 --> 30:40.697
that y'all would take all these things

30:40.697 --> 30:42.940
into account and increase our defense

30:42.940 --> 30:45.200
spending in order to at least hold our

30:45.200 --> 30:48.070
own in real purchasing power . And then

30:48.070 --> 30:50.230
I'll add this final note . Uh , if I

30:50.230 --> 30:52.286
recall correctly , you're looking at

30:52.286 --> 30:54.700
about a 4.6% pay raise for our military

30:54.700 --> 30:57.450
personnel . Is that what I heard ? Well ,

30:57.450 --> 31:01.020
if 4.6% is it , Given

31:01.030 --> 31:03.980
that the consumer price index has gone

31:03.990 --> 31:07.720
up 7.9 Do the math . That comes out to

31:07.720 --> 31:10.670
a 3.3% pay cut for our military

31:10.670 --> 31:12.892
personnel . Thank you . Mr . Chairman I

31:12.892 --> 31:15.114
yield back . Thank you . Mr Norcross is

31:15.114 --> 31:17.448
recognized for five minutes . Thank you .

31:17.448 --> 31:19.670
Chairman . And I just want to follow up

31:19.670 --> 31:21.781
on some of the previous conversations

31:21.781 --> 31:23.892
when we start having the conversation

31:23.892 --> 31:26.750
of what we have available to us in our

31:26.750 --> 31:29.650
stockpiles . There is probably not a

31:29.650 --> 31:31.810
day that goes by since the Russian

31:31.810 --> 31:33.921
Ukrainian conflict started that we're

31:33.921 --> 31:36.088
not talking about sending javelins and

31:36.088 --> 31:38.620
stingers . Uh , but I want to back up a

31:38.620 --> 31:41.000
little bit . We have a strategic

31:41.000 --> 31:43.160
stockpile that has been formulated

31:43.160 --> 31:45.950
based on risk over the years . Uh ,

31:46.440 --> 31:48.551
General Milley , your assessment with

31:48.551 --> 31:50.773
respect to the weapons that we continue

31:50.773 --> 31:54.320
to supply , Ukraine the level of

31:54.320 --> 31:56.542
lethal aid that we can sustain . Are we

31:56.542 --> 31:59.830
anywhere close right now to

31:59.840 --> 32:03.460
depleting what we need as an assessment

32:03.460 --> 32:05.620
of risk for our own protection or

32:05.620 --> 32:09.180
potentially know what

32:09.180 --> 32:12.050
we've supplied ? Uh , is a wide variety

32:12.050 --> 32:15.380
of small arms munitions , machine guns ,

32:15.390 --> 32:17.334
um , grenades , grenade launcher ,

32:17.334 --> 32:19.980
etcetera and the two weapons systems

32:19.980 --> 32:22.470
that uh , that are most in the news of

32:22.470 --> 32:25.770
the javelin and the Stinger .

32:26.140 --> 32:28.140
Uh , Stinger doesn't get produced .

32:28.140 --> 32:30.084
There's no more production line on

32:30.084 --> 32:32.307
Stinger . Uh , and uh , with respect to

32:32.307 --> 32:34.529
javelin . No , we're not , we're not at

32:34.529 --> 32:36.473
our uh , we were still meeting our

32:36.473 --> 32:38.584
mission requirements for javelin . So

32:38.584 --> 32:40.529
we're not breaking breaking any of

32:40.529 --> 32:43.400
those red lines . So when we look at

32:43.410 --> 32:47.330
our single point failures or critical

32:47.330 --> 32:49.441
rare earth materials that go into the

32:49.441 --> 32:52.180
explosive , the accelerants , uh , our

32:52.180 --> 32:54.460
committee had a hearing earlier last

32:54.460 --> 32:57.260
week that talked about the , uh , the

32:57.260 --> 32:59.930
army's ongoing efforts to modernize the

32:59.930 --> 33:01.874
ammunition production facilities ,

33:01.874 --> 33:04.280
which it would be kind of calm at World

33:04.280 --> 33:06.720
War Two . And certainly over the next

33:06.720 --> 33:08.553
five years , they have a billion

33:08.553 --> 33:10.980
dollars that has been looked at is

33:10.980 --> 33:14.240
something that we understand is minimum ,

33:14.250 --> 33:17.360
given that uh that critical supply

33:17.360 --> 33:21.300
chain , one of the other issues in that

33:21.300 --> 33:23.890
supply chain is the human efforts . And

33:23.930 --> 33:26.152
Secretary Austin , this is where I like

33:26.152 --> 33:28.080
to get your feedback . You know ,

33:28.090 --> 33:31.160
buying America has always been a motto

33:31.160 --> 33:34.070
that most of us adhere to . Uh it has

33:34.070 --> 33:35.848
shown us over the course of the

33:35.848 --> 33:38.130
pandemic , how important that is for a

33:38.130 --> 33:41.790
variety of reasons . Uh you heard about

33:41.800 --> 33:44.840
the naval shipbuilding areas , but

33:44.840 --> 33:48.520
across the board we Miss Larkin led a

33:48.520 --> 33:50.687
task force about those critical supply

33:50.687 --> 33:54.160
chain and bringing up the workforce as

33:54.160 --> 33:57.200
you know , soldiers do not get born and

33:57.200 --> 33:59.470
trained overnight . It takes time , as

33:59.470 --> 34:02.350
does our industry for workforce .

34:04.440 --> 34:06.850
What are we doing to try to on shore

34:06.850 --> 34:09.760
some of those critical supply chain

34:09.760 --> 34:12.910
issues and build up what's made here in

34:12.910 --> 34:16.260
America versus across the globe .

34:18.240 --> 34:20.296
Yeah , so this has been a thanks for

34:20.296 --> 34:22.518
the question and it's it's been a point

34:22.518 --> 34:26.350
of , of emphasis emphasis for us over

34:26.350 --> 34:28.572
the last year , as you , you know , the

34:28.572 --> 34:30.940
President has really worked , is really

34:30.940 --> 34:34.730
working hard to onshore uh some of the

34:34.740 --> 34:38.370
key capabilities that that have caused

34:38.370 --> 34:40.370
us some concern with respect to our

34:40.370 --> 34:42.660
supply chains here , microelectronic

34:42.740 --> 34:45.050
and those kinds of things . So we're

34:45.050 --> 34:47.830
working with uh with industry to help

34:47.840 --> 34:50.062
try to see what we can do everything we

34:50.062 --> 34:52.230
can do to help onshore those

34:52.230 --> 34:54.452
capabilities and make sure that we have

34:54.452 --> 34:58.260
the ability to create critical things

34:58.270 --> 35:01.560
like microchips and that sort of stuff

35:01.560 --> 35:03.550
here in the States were far too

35:03.550 --> 35:06.910
dependent on foreign supplies there .

35:07.610 --> 35:10.060
And we should be sure to point out that

35:10.070 --> 35:12.200
our allies and partners are not the

35:12.200 --> 35:15.800
problem . It's those in 2nd and 3rd

35:15.810 --> 35:19.450
chain that creates the problem . Um And

35:19.450 --> 35:21.450
again just as you know , we have to

35:21.450 --> 35:23.617
build this industrial base in a way we

35:23.617 --> 35:26.490
can do it is to signal the industry how

35:26.490 --> 35:29.780
critically important it is that we give

35:29.780 --> 35:32.110
them the assurances . It's just not a

35:32.110 --> 35:34.350
one year . And without a yield back

35:36.640 --> 35:38.362
Thank you . Dr . Desjarlais is

35:38.362 --> 35:40.696
recognized for five minutes . Thank you .

35:40.696 --> 35:42.751
Chairman . General Million . In your

35:42.751 --> 35:44.918
opening statement , you began with the

35:44.918 --> 35:47.140
fact that we have the greatest military

35:47.140 --> 35:49.350
force on the planet and that we are

35:49.740 --> 35:51.990
prepared to defend ourselves and our

35:51.990 --> 35:54.510
allies and detour against aggression

35:55.440 --> 35:58.470
that didn't work in in Ukraine . What

35:58.470 --> 36:02.470
lessons have we learned in being

36:02.470 --> 36:04.081
perhaps more concerned about

36:04.081 --> 36:06.290
provocation of Vladimir Putin rather

36:06.290 --> 36:08.290
than deterring him . And how can we

36:08.290 --> 36:10.457
apply that when looking forward to the

36:10.457 --> 36:11.957
chinese threat to Taiwan ?

36:14.630 --> 36:17.510
Well , I think that with respect to um

36:17.740 --> 36:19.907
the Russian invasion of Ukraine , it's

36:19.907 --> 36:23.150
been longstanding objective of Putin

36:23.870 --> 36:26.490
and candidly short of the commitment of

36:26.490 --> 36:29.350
U . S . Military forces into Ukraine

36:29.350 --> 36:32.420
proper . Um I'm not sure he was

36:32.420 --> 36:34.670
deterrable . This has been a long term

36:34.680 --> 36:38.060
um objective of his um that that goes

36:38.060 --> 36:41.560
back years . So I think the idea of

36:41.570 --> 36:44.840
deterring Putin from invading

36:45.430 --> 36:48.500
Ukraine uh deterring them by the United

36:48.500 --> 36:51.030
States would have required the

36:51.030 --> 36:53.252
commitment of U . S . Military forces .

36:53.252 --> 36:55.197
And I think that would have risked

36:55.197 --> 36:57.252
armed conflict with Russia . Which I

36:57.252 --> 36:59.600
certainly would have advised . Okay uh

36:59.610 --> 37:02.060
you know the president's strategy at

37:02.060 --> 37:04.280
least publicly and his administration

37:04.280 --> 37:06.650
was to impose economic sanctions to

37:06.650 --> 37:08.880
deter Russia . So did you advise him

37:08.880 --> 37:10.880
that that was probably not going to

37:10.880 --> 37:13.102
work and this invasion was inevitable .

37:13.102 --> 37:16.690
Um The it's not my lane to comment on

37:16.690 --> 37:19.150
sanctions per se but sanctions have a

37:19.150 --> 37:21.500
very poor track record of deterring

37:21.510 --> 37:23.640
aggression . But they are a means of

37:23.640 --> 37:25.710
imposing significant cost . The

37:25.710 --> 37:27.932
objective of the sanctions is to impose

37:27.932 --> 37:30.240
significant costs if he invaded those

37:30.250 --> 37:32.306
significant costs . The sanctions in

37:32.306 --> 37:34.361
combination with the export controls

37:34.361 --> 37:36.417
are breaking the back of the Russian

37:36.417 --> 37:38.583
economy as we speak . Secretary Austin

37:39.130 --> 37:40.920
several members have brought up

37:40.930 --> 37:43.720
hypersonic weapons and you mentioned we

37:43.720 --> 37:46.980
have other options . But of the three

37:46.980 --> 37:49.202
countries currently fielding hypersonic

37:49.202 --> 37:51.258
glide weapons , Russia china and the

37:51.258 --> 37:53.258
United States who's leading in that

37:53.258 --> 37:56.220
capability . I don't know what the

37:56.230 --> 37:58.840
inventories over the chinese .

38:06.720 --> 38:08.942
Okay you must not be attending the same

38:08.942 --> 38:10.887
briefings . We are because clearly

38:10.887 --> 38:12.887
china seems to be out front . Um We

38:12.887 --> 38:14.950
don't have a current capability that

38:14.950 --> 38:17.172
can defend against hypersonic threats .

38:17.172 --> 38:18.172
Is that correct ?

38:21.020 --> 38:24.820
And that gap or that's the gap that the

38:24.820 --> 38:26.780
glide glide phase interceptor is

38:26.780 --> 38:29.950
supposed to feel correct . Okay . I

38:29.950 --> 38:32.172
heard some very concerning reports over

38:32.172 --> 38:34.339
the past week that the White House and

38:34.339 --> 38:34.250
the department may be slowing the

38:34.250 --> 38:35.972
development of the glide phase

38:35.972 --> 38:37.750
interceptor . Can you confirm ?

38:43.510 --> 38:44.510
What's that ?

38:52.920 --> 38:54.864
Yeah , we remain on track with our

38:54.864 --> 38:56.864
program and as you can see from the

38:56.864 --> 38:58.710
budget , we we're investing a

38:58.720 --> 39:00.720
significant amount of money for the

39:00.720 --> 39:04.460
defense of um um

39:04.470 --> 39:06.692
for missile defense . Okay . We brought

39:06.692 --> 39:08.692
up undersea capabilities and Russia

39:08.692 --> 39:10.470
currently has a nuclear capable

39:10.470 --> 39:12.470
submarine launched cruise missile ,

39:12.470 --> 39:16.270
correct . Russia has . I'm sorry to

39:16.270 --> 39:18.270
interrupt . But they have a nuclear

39:18.270 --> 39:20.159
capable submarine launched cruise

39:20.159 --> 39:22.214
missile , correct ? That's correct .

39:22.214 --> 39:24.437
Alright . Uh President biden's suggests

39:24.437 --> 39:26.381
that we cut our own capability for

39:26.381 --> 39:28.381
nuclear capable sea launched cruise

39:28.381 --> 39:27.820
missiles . And that's correct as well .

39:27.820 --> 39:30.860
Right . You can see what we're

39:30.860 --> 39:33.120
investing in is $34 billion in our in

39:33.120 --> 39:35.453
our nuclear triad here . General Milley ,

39:35.453 --> 39:37.287
you you commented that your best

39:37.287 --> 39:39.398
medical advice is that we should keep

39:39.398 --> 39:41.610
this capability . Uh Admiral Richards

39:41.620 --> 39:44.220
general Walters . I think Van Herk has

39:44.220 --> 39:46.276
mentioned that Secretary Austin , do

39:46.276 --> 39:48.276
you agree with your colleagues that

39:48.276 --> 39:50.276
this is a capability that we should

39:50.276 --> 39:52.740
focus on to help ? Uh limit the

39:52.740 --> 39:54.907
asymmetry we have when it comes to the

39:54.907 --> 39:56.573
delivery of low yield nuclear

39:56.573 --> 39:58.629
capability . Is this a slick them in

39:58.629 --> 40:01.490
that you're referring to ? Yes . Um you

40:01.490 --> 40:03.490
know , the marginal capability that

40:03.490 --> 40:06.450
this uh this provides uh is far

40:06.450 --> 40:09.050
outweighed by the cost . And so we have

40:09.060 --> 40:11.116
the ability of colleagues to provide

40:11.116 --> 40:13.282
options to the president with a number

40:13.282 --> 40:15.504
of means . So Well , the one thing that

40:15.504 --> 40:17.504
we hope is that regardless of which

40:17.504 --> 40:19.560
party is in power in the White House

40:19.560 --> 40:21.870
that our our military advisers like

40:21.870 --> 40:23.814
yourselves look at this through an

40:23.814 --> 40:26.037
objective lens and we had concern about

40:26.037 --> 40:28.500
uh the department losing focus on our

40:28.500 --> 40:30.830
lethal capability and focusing on more

40:30.830 --> 40:32.886
of a woke military hope . That's not

40:32.886 --> 40:35.052
the case . And and it seems like a lot

40:35.052 --> 40:37.163
of us are agreement on capabilities ,

40:37.163 --> 40:39.219
but President biden is not listening

40:39.219 --> 40:41.330
congressman . This is the most lethal

40:41.330 --> 40:43.497
force on the planet and it will remain

40:43.497 --> 40:45.719
that way and we will continue to invest

40:45.719 --> 40:47.774
in the things that we need to remain

40:47.774 --> 40:47.440
dominant on the battlefield .

40:47.810 --> 40:50.730
Gentleman's time has expired . Mr Jago

40:52.210 --> 40:54.377
Secretary Austin , can you explain the

40:54.377 --> 40:56.488
concept of integrated deterrence in a

40:56.488 --> 40:58.654
little more detail ? And are there any

40:58.654 --> 40:58.350
examples where we had , we would have

40:58.350 --> 41:00.600
seen it succeeds thus far , especially

41:00.600 --> 41:03.720
if there's any NATO examples , I think

41:03.720 --> 41:05.831
you heard me say a bit earlier , that

41:05.840 --> 41:08.510
integrated deterrence , it really means

41:08.520 --> 41:10.960
uh using all the capability and

41:10.960 --> 41:13.580
capacity in all of the warfighting

41:13.580 --> 41:16.420
domains , air land , sea cyber and

41:16.420 --> 41:19.280
space and and linking and networking

41:19.280 --> 41:21.750
those capabilities together in new ways

41:21.750 --> 41:24.350
to provide to create synergies and

41:24.350 --> 41:26.572
you're seeing us do that in a number of

41:26.572 --> 41:29.960
areas . It also involves leveraging the

41:29.960 --> 41:31.904
capability and the capacity of our

41:31.904 --> 41:33.738
allies . And again , I mentioned

41:33.738 --> 41:35.960
earlier that uh that we've done that in

41:35.960 --> 41:38.182
the past , but we need to do that a lot

41:38.182 --> 41:40.670
better . Not only air , land and sea ,

41:40.680 --> 41:43.140
but also in space and cyber . And many

41:43.140 --> 41:44.862
of our allies have significant

41:44.862 --> 41:46.362
capability there as well .

41:49.170 --> 41:51.337
It was just to follow up on that . One

41:51.337 --> 41:54.190
of the things I was very happy and that

41:54.190 --> 41:56.246
you had in your written marks of the

41:56.246 --> 41:58.246
steps were taken with the allies to

41:58.246 --> 42:00.246
bolster NATO's eastern flicked . In

42:00.246 --> 42:02.301
fact , one of my proudest moments in

42:02.301 --> 42:01.960
Congress thus far as securing an

42:01.960 --> 42:03.960
authorization for the Baltic secure

42:03.960 --> 42:05.849
initiative , which revised target

42:05.849 --> 42:07.960
defense systems to Estonia Latvia and

42:07.960 --> 42:09.904
Lithuania including an air defense

42:09.904 --> 42:11.960
ammunition . And see for I . S . R .

42:11.960 --> 42:14.127
Across these abilities or others . Are

42:14.127 --> 42:13.850
there particular areas where you would

42:13.850 --> 42:16.017
like to deepen defense and military to

42:16.017 --> 42:18.239
military cooperation between the United

42:18.239 --> 42:20.239
States and the Baltic countries and

42:20.239 --> 42:22.239
which capabilities do you think are

42:22.239 --> 42:24.406
most important for ? The Baltic states

42:24.406 --> 42:26.406
prioritize well , some of them have

42:26.406 --> 42:28.870
some uh pretty uh significant

42:28.870 --> 42:31.037
capabilities in cyber and I think they

42:31.037 --> 42:34.820
can add to our already robust inventory

42:34.820 --> 42:37.610
here . But but I I think uh things like

42:37.610 --> 42:40.460
cyber uh , in air and missile defense ,

42:40.460 --> 42:43.410
we'd like to see them to to to uh begin

42:43.410 --> 42:45.577
to develop more capabilities there and

42:45.577 --> 42:47.577
work together with their with their

42:47.577 --> 42:49.632
neighbors to link those capabilities

42:49.632 --> 42:52.870
together . Thank you . And then uh rub

42:52.880 --> 42:55.510
secretary also again , uh , you

42:55.510 --> 42:57.677
referenced Gray zone multiple times in

42:57.677 --> 42:59.677
your written testimony , noting our

42:59.677 --> 43:01.899
competitors , malign activities in it .

43:01.899 --> 43:04.121
One of my greatest concerns is Russia's

43:04.121 --> 43:06.343
ability to exploit the gray zone and to

43:06.343 --> 43:06.320
conduct targeted disinformation

43:06.320 --> 43:08.042
operations , spreading Putin's

43:08.042 --> 43:10.098
propaganda and blatant lies over the

43:10.098 --> 43:12.153
long term . I'm also concerned about

43:12.153 --> 43:14.320
the lessons that china is drawing from

43:14.320 --> 43:16.542
Russia and the space itself . Could you

43:16.542 --> 43:18.598
show your perspective how our forces

43:18.598 --> 43:20.820
can be more effective operating in this

43:20.820 --> 43:22.987
gray zone of conflict ? What short and

43:22.987 --> 43:25.153
long term steps should we be taking to

43:25.153 --> 43:24.690
counter this malign influence from

43:24.690 --> 43:27.050
Russia right now and from china to as

43:27.050 --> 43:28.994
it becomes more adept at spreading

43:28.994 --> 43:31.161
disinformation , operating in the gray

43:31.161 --> 43:34.410
zone , we we have been no

43:34.900 --> 43:38.090
very active and , you know , before the

43:38.090 --> 43:40.500
onset of hostilities here with with the

43:40.500 --> 43:42.667
Ukrainians and helping them with their

43:42.667 --> 43:44.667
cyber capabilities and helping them

43:44.667 --> 43:48.010
develop methods to to begin to counter

43:48.400 --> 43:50.622
some of the activity in the gray zone .

43:50.750 --> 43:52.690
And we can see this is a learning

43:52.690 --> 43:55.100
process . We continue to learn thus far .

43:55.100 --> 43:57.156
I think we've been very effective in

43:57.156 --> 43:59.267
helping them . And uh , and they have

43:59.267 --> 44:01.970
been able to uh , to push back on a

44:01.980 --> 44:04.430
number of unhelpful narratives and stay

44:04.430 --> 44:06.541
ahead of the power curve . Actually ,

44:06.541 --> 44:08.708
so there are there will be a number of

44:08.708 --> 44:10.763
lessons learned coming out of this .

44:10.763 --> 44:12.930
But I think , uh , I think we've grown

44:12.930 --> 44:15.510
in our awareness uh , in terms of what

44:15.510 --> 44:18.010
it takes to be able to begin to be

44:18.010 --> 44:20.730
effective in countering unhelpful

44:20.730 --> 44:22.841
narratives in the information space .

44:23.290 --> 44:26.250
Thank you . And then , lastly , uh ,

44:26.260 --> 44:28.371
what's a matter of time ? I'd like to

44:28.371 --> 44:30.371
talk to you about the civilian harm

44:30.371 --> 44:32.427
mitigation response action plan . As

44:32.427 --> 44:34.593
you all know , civilian harm caused by

44:34.593 --> 44:34.320
us military operations , risks are

44:34.320 --> 44:36.653
legitimate overseas legitimacy overseas ,

44:36.653 --> 44:38.820
including what we've already seen with

44:38.820 --> 44:41.930
the reaction to Russia . Ah So it was

44:41.930 --> 44:43.819
probably a letter with a bunch of

44:43.819 --> 44:45.986
members . My understanding is that the

44:45.986 --> 44:48.041
review review is still ongoing under

44:48.041 --> 44:50.152
the 90 day window that you directed .

44:50.152 --> 44:52.152
But you share any insights you have

44:52.152 --> 44:54.319
learned so far from this process . I'm

44:54.319 --> 44:56.486
not prepared to share insights at this

44:56.486 --> 44:58.708
point . I would just the only insight I

44:58.708 --> 45:00.930
have is that the , you know , the folks

45:00.930 --> 45:04.700
that we've assemble 22 work on

45:04.700 --> 45:07.230
this are very detailed and very

45:07.230 --> 45:09.452
committed to doing this the right way .

45:10.160 --> 45:12.590
And these are people from a number of

45:12.590 --> 45:15.050
communities to include the the the

45:15.050 --> 45:18.620
active war fighters . Uh and and uh so

45:18.630 --> 45:20.963
we still have work to do . And you know ,

45:20.963 --> 45:24.600
the the at the

45:25.190 --> 45:28.720
Review is about 30 days uh

45:29.290 --> 45:33.290
out in terms of the the

45:33.290 --> 45:35.720
brief out of the of the review . So

45:36.090 --> 45:38.090
once that's done , I'll be happy to

45:38.090 --> 45:40.110
share any any insights and lessons

45:40.110 --> 45:41.970
learned from this , but and also

45:41.980 --> 45:44.730
prescribed by way ahead . Right , thank

45:44.730 --> 45:47.030
you . Come back my time . Thank you .

45:47.040 --> 45:49.373
Mr Kelly is recognized for five minutes .

45:49.373 --> 45:51.429
Thank you . Mr Chairman . One of the

45:51.429 --> 45:53.707
things that I'm really concerned about .

45:53.707 --> 45:55.818
Secretary Austin and General Milley ,

45:55.818 --> 45:57.651
is that across the D . O . D . I

45:57.651 --> 45:59.762
continually hear people talk about uh

45:59.762 --> 46:01.707
divesting of things for future for

46:01.707 --> 46:03.929
future things , future capabilities for

46:03.929 --> 46:06.151
current and General Milley , I've heard

46:06.151 --> 46:08.429
you say this , I learned this from you .

46:08.429 --> 46:10.596
We have to be able to fight today with

46:10.596 --> 46:12.484
the things fight tonight with the

46:12.484 --> 46:14.651
things that we have right now . And so

46:14.651 --> 46:16.596
I see that we're talking about the

46:16.596 --> 46:18.707
Marine Corps says they need 31 AM feb

46:18.707 --> 46:20.651
sips . Yet we're saying we're only

46:20.651 --> 46:22.429
going to give you 24 we're only

46:22.429 --> 46:24.651
building nine ships and we're divesting

46:24.651 --> 46:26.651
of 24 capabilities . It's a sliding

46:26.651 --> 46:29.730
scale of risk . K C 40 sixes are not

46:29.730 --> 46:31.841
coming online , not providing all the

46:31.841 --> 46:33.897
capabilities need in a timely enough

46:33.897 --> 46:35.952
manner . But yet we're talking about

46:35.952 --> 46:38.200
divesting of the KC 1 35 . So , so we

46:38.200 --> 46:40.730
continue to divest in thinking the same

46:40.730 --> 46:42.897
thing with the slick . Um , if we have

46:42.897 --> 46:45.008
another capability that provides that

46:45.008 --> 46:47.230
same thing in the same region , then we

46:47.230 --> 46:49.286
need to do that . So listen , I know

46:49.286 --> 46:51.563
everybody's heart's in the right place ,

46:51.563 --> 46:53.563
but I just think we have to be very

46:53.563 --> 46:55.786
careful now . We have a war with Russia

46:55.786 --> 46:58.008
and Ukraine and re looking these things

46:58.008 --> 47:00.174
to see , do we have the capabilities ?

47:00.174 --> 47:02.286
Should , should the world ask that we

47:02.286 --> 47:04.341
fight two wars on two fronts whether

47:04.341 --> 47:06.508
that ships and current capabilities or

47:06.508 --> 47:08.563
refueling aircraft . The other thing

47:08.563 --> 47:10.786
I'm extremely concerned about Secretary

47:10.786 --> 47:09.980
Austin and I think this is something

47:09.980 --> 47:12.310
you can fix is our merchant marine

47:12.310 --> 47:14.800
fleet , our ability to move ships ,

47:14.810 --> 47:18.560
troops , uh , equipment , uh ,

47:18.570 --> 47:21.280
fuel all kind of logistics . We keep

47:21.280 --> 47:23.391
pushing that . That's not just a navy

47:23.391 --> 47:25.447
function . It's the army that has to

47:25.447 --> 47:27.391
have those goods , it's the Marine

47:27.391 --> 47:29.502
Corps . And so we really have to look

47:29.502 --> 47:29.490
at this and we have to invest in our

47:29.490 --> 47:31.712
merchant marine fleet to be able to get

47:31.712 --> 47:33.823
us what we need when we do , what are

47:33.823 --> 47:35.879
you doing to get our merchant marine

47:35.879 --> 47:38.046
fleet set at a D O . D level ? Because

47:38.046 --> 47:40.212
I can tell you the services are always

47:40.212 --> 47:40.090
going to say the other one needs to pay

47:40.090 --> 47:41.090
for it .

47:43.880 --> 47:47.800
Well , we have not invested any ,

47:48.380 --> 47:51.020
any invested any money in this budget

47:51.030 --> 47:53.252
towards the merchant marine fleet . But

47:53.252 --> 47:55.474
you make some good points , but we need

47:55.474 --> 47:57.697
to , you would agree that that logistic

47:57.697 --> 47:59.863
chain . I mean the reason the Russians

47:59.863 --> 47:59.630
are getting their tail kicked in

47:59.630 --> 48:01.519
Ukraine right now is a logistical

48:01.519 --> 48:03.574
failure . And if we don't plan to do

48:03.574 --> 48:05.797
logistics , I promise you , it will not

48:05.797 --> 48:08.050
happen . I want to go back with KC 1 35

48:08.060 --> 48:10.180
or you will , are you willing General

48:10.180 --> 48:12.490
Milley , Secretary Austin to relook the

48:12.490 --> 48:15.110
divestiture of KC 1 35 until we have

48:15.120 --> 48:18.220
adequate capability to refuel to , to

48:18.230 --> 48:20.490
both . Windowpane , calm and also

48:20.490 --> 48:22.712
europe . Are you willing to relook that

48:22.712 --> 48:24.323
and not divest until we have

48:24.323 --> 48:25.657
capabilities replaced .

48:30.370 --> 48:32.537
I would be happy to relook anything in

48:32.537 --> 48:34.759
the budget that you want me to relook .

48:34.759 --> 48:34.490
And I'll take a look at that and get

48:34.490 --> 48:36.712
with the air force and make sure that I

48:36.712 --> 48:38.657
clearly understand the divestiture

48:38.657 --> 48:40.890
logic in the in the production rates of

48:40.890 --> 48:43.420
the KC- 46 . And then I just really

48:43.420 --> 48:45.710
hope you will relook the ship plan . I

48:45.710 --> 48:47.766
mean the marines say they need 31 AM

48:47.766 --> 48:49.988
Febreze yet . D . O . D says we're only

48:49.988 --> 48:52.043
going to give you 24 I disagree with

48:52.043 --> 48:54.210
the Chairman a little bit on this . We

48:54.210 --> 48:56.432
do have the capability to produce those

48:56.432 --> 48:56.400
ships , but it's about keeping the

48:56.400 --> 48:58.567
workforce engaged and making sure that

48:58.567 --> 49:00.733
we have a timeline and we don't change

49:00.733 --> 49:02.844
that every year so that they can plan

49:02.844 --> 49:05.067
out having the right industrial base at

49:05.067 --> 49:07.344
the right time . So I hope we will get ,

49:07.344 --> 49:09.567
I haven't seen a ship plan in two years

49:09.567 --> 49:11.622
from the Navy and that is one of the

49:11.622 --> 49:13.733
requirements that they're supposed to

49:13.733 --> 49:13.630
do . We need that in order to do our

49:13.630 --> 49:16.260
job . Thanks for that . And that's

49:16.260 --> 49:19.780
forthcoming . Um and also they they've

49:19.780 --> 49:22.370
done an amphibian review uh and that's

49:22.370 --> 49:24.481
forthcoming as well . And once that's

49:24.481 --> 49:26.900
done , I think uh we'll have greater

49:26.900 --> 49:29.011
insights into what what the Secretary

49:29.011 --> 49:31.233
of the Navy really believes that credit

49:31.233 --> 49:33.560
the requirements are . I would just

49:33.560 --> 49:35.560
point to the fact that I know , you

49:35.560 --> 49:37.560
know this that we're investing $2.6

49:37.560 --> 49:40.160
billion in uh in AM Fibs uh in this ,

49:40.170 --> 49:42.448
in this budget . Am fibs are important .

49:42.448 --> 49:44.503
There's no question about it . We're

49:44.503 --> 49:46.726
gonna make sure that mr secretary and I

49:46.726 --> 49:46.590
hate to interrupt , but I got one

49:46.590 --> 49:48.646
minute and I got one more question I

49:48.646 --> 49:50.701
really want to talk about . I really

49:50.701 --> 49:52.812
just hope you guys are the adviser to

49:52.812 --> 49:54.701
not just the president but to the

49:54.701 --> 49:56.923
nation and making sure that we have the

49:56.923 --> 49:58.923
right risk of fighting today versus

49:58.923 --> 50:00.923
future capabilities that we have to

50:00.923 --> 50:02.979
have to win future wars . And I just

50:02.979 --> 50:05.034
hope that we'll relook some of those

50:05.034 --> 50:07.146
things . Final point , I want to talk

50:07.146 --> 50:06.300
about , there's a little bit of

50:06.300 --> 50:08.467
movement right now and I just ask that

50:08.467 --> 50:10.940
both of y'all weigh in on this um to

50:10.940 --> 50:14.330
make gold star families uh to include a

50:14.330 --> 50:16.552
gold star to make them someone who dies

50:16.552 --> 50:18.774
in service . If I die of a heart attack

50:18.774 --> 50:20.886
while I'm doing guardrail , my family

50:20.886 --> 50:23.108
is not a Gold star family . I shouldn't

50:23.108 --> 50:25.386
get a purple heart for having an A . T .

50:25.386 --> 50:27.608
V . Wreck downrange . Uh that is not to

50:27.608 --> 50:30.010
denigrate anyone from not doing that .

50:30.010 --> 50:31.899
We love all our service members ,

50:31.899 --> 50:33.954
however they die . But I really hope

50:33.954 --> 50:36.010
you'll look hard and making sure our

50:36.010 --> 50:37.954
Gold Star families , our Gold star

50:37.954 --> 50:40.066
families who are lost in combat and I

50:40.066 --> 50:42.177
am doing that personally doing that .

50:42.177 --> 50:44.232
Today is gold star spouses date gold

50:44.232 --> 50:46.890
Star family day by the way and there's

50:46.900 --> 50:48.844
nothing probably more important or

50:48.844 --> 50:51.011
sacred than to make sure that we honor

50:51.011 --> 50:53.122
those fallen in combat in the defense

50:53.122 --> 50:55.067
of this nation . So I'm looking at

50:55.067 --> 50:56.956
gentleman's time has expired . Mr

50:56.956 --> 50:59.289
Carvajal is recognized for five minutes .

50:59.289 --> 51:01.344
Thank you . Mr Chair . I apologize .

51:01.344 --> 51:03.511
Hold on . We'll start just saying um ,

51:03.511 --> 51:05.678
the witnesses need a 15 minute break ,

51:05.678 --> 51:07.900
which we're going to take at 11 30 . So

51:07.900 --> 51:10.067
we'll go to Mr Kirby Hall and the next

51:10.067 --> 51:09.330
Republican , then we'll take a 15

51:09.330 --> 51:11.140
minute break . After those two

51:11.150 --> 51:13.372
questioners . Mr Carvajal is recognized

51:13.372 --> 51:15.483
for five minutes . Thank you Mr Chair

51:15.483 --> 51:17.594
and thank you to both of you for your

51:17.594 --> 51:19.483
exceptional leadership throughout

51:19.483 --> 51:21.650
Russia's unprovoked war on Ukraine . I

51:21.650 --> 51:23.817
want to take a moment to highlight the

51:23.817 --> 51:25.872
California's National Guard's unique

51:25.872 --> 51:28.039
and exceptional support to the Ukraine

51:28.039 --> 51:30.039
military through the National Guard

51:30.039 --> 51:32.450
State Partnership program , California

51:32.450 --> 51:34.750
has been partnered With Ukraine since

51:34.750 --> 51:38.220
1993 and since 2000 California ,

51:38.220 --> 51:40.331
Ukraine soldiers have participated in

51:40.331 --> 51:44.170
over 330 military 330 military

51:44.180 --> 51:46.610
events , including training exercises

51:46.610 --> 51:49.400
at Camp Roberts located in my district

51:49.400 --> 51:52.040
in san luis Obispo County General

51:52.040 --> 51:53.929
Milley . How has California State

51:53.929 --> 51:56.230
Partnership program with Ukraine helped

51:56.230 --> 51:58.341
improve the capabilities of Ukrainian

51:58.341 --> 52:00.890
forces to fight against the Russian

52:00.890 --> 52:04.560
invasion . I mentioned it , I

52:04.560 --> 52:06.782
think upfront about the training effort

52:06.782 --> 52:08.893
that's been going on since 2014 ? The

52:08.893 --> 52:10.782
California guards been intimately

52:10.782 --> 52:13.004
involved in that , What , so what's the

52:13.004 --> 52:15.370
result of that . So over eight years .

52:15.850 --> 52:17.628
Uh , the Ukrainian military has

52:17.628 --> 52:19.294
reformed itself , developed a

52:19.294 --> 52:21.490
noncommissioned officer corps uh , and

52:21.490 --> 52:24.530
adopted the the US doctrinal concept of

52:24.530 --> 52:26.308
Mission command , decentralized

52:26.308 --> 52:28.308
decision making at the lowest level

52:28.308 --> 52:30.530
that's effective at making the decision

52:30.530 --> 52:32.580
and that's a direct result of the

52:32.580 --> 52:34.580
efforts of the California Guard and

52:34.580 --> 52:36.580
what they've done with Ukraine . Uh

52:36.580 --> 52:38.802
more recently I'll just use this as one

52:38.802 --> 52:40.969
vignette as an example of the value of

52:40.969 --> 52:42.858
the program . Um , the connective

52:42.858 --> 52:44.969
tissue , the the the human connection

52:44.969 --> 52:47.136
between the Ukrainian military and the

52:47.136 --> 52:49.390
California Guard has proven

52:49.400 --> 52:51.770
extraordinary to the point where the

52:51.770 --> 52:53.840
tag of California still maintains

52:53.850 --> 52:55.517
almost daily contact with his

52:55.517 --> 52:57.739
counterparts , even though they're half

52:57.739 --> 52:59.406
a world away , that's been an

52:59.406 --> 53:01.461
invaluable source of communication ,

53:01.461 --> 53:03.239
intelligence development uh and

53:03.239 --> 53:05.294
transmission of information back and

53:05.294 --> 53:07.406
forth . So it's things like that that

53:07.406 --> 53:09.294
are intangibles in war , but they

53:09.294 --> 53:08.850
proved extraordinarily valuable in the

53:08.850 --> 53:11.940
actual conduct of war . Thank you . The

53:11.940 --> 53:13.996
men and women serving in uniform are

53:13.996 --> 53:16.218
the backbone of our national security .

53:16.330 --> 53:18.552
I appreciate the department's increased

53:18.552 --> 53:21.090
investment in personnel needs one issue ,

53:21.090 --> 53:23.146
both of your statements touched upon

53:23.146 --> 53:25.312
that I have been working on to address

53:25.312 --> 53:27.479
is available and affordable child care

53:27.479 --> 53:29.368
for our military families . While

53:29.368 --> 53:31.257
construction of childcare . Child

53:31.257 --> 53:33.257
development centers is critical one

53:33.257 --> 53:35.312
deficiency that I hear when visiting

53:35.312 --> 53:37.479
installations is the lack of qualified

53:37.479 --> 53:39.870
childcare providers to meet the demand

53:40.450 --> 53:42.672
Secretary Austin , how's the department

53:42.672 --> 53:44.617
seeking to address the shortage of

53:44.617 --> 53:46.730
qualified childcare providers , you

53:46.730 --> 53:48.952
need additional authorities in order to

53:48.952 --> 53:50.897
hire the needed child care staff .

53:53.250 --> 53:55.100
Well , thanks sir . If we need

53:55.100 --> 53:56.989
additional authorities , we won't

53:56.989 --> 53:59.380
hesitate to ask for them . Uh This is

53:59.380 --> 54:02.250
something that I have my P . And R .

54:02.740 --> 54:05.290
Directorate , taking a hard look at and

54:05.290 --> 54:07.500
working with the the services and

54:07.500 --> 54:10.960
canvassing um installations .

54:10.970 --> 54:13.192
Uh This has been identified as an issue

54:13.192 --> 54:15.200
to us as well and we're trying to

54:15.210 --> 54:17.340
identify incentives that will help

54:17.340 --> 54:19.396
attract the right people and help us

54:19.396 --> 54:22.990
train and uh and equipped the right

54:22.990 --> 54:25.500
people to provide quality childcare .

54:26.140 --> 54:29.270
Okay . Another workforce . Uh Question

54:29.270 --> 54:31.440
Secretary Austin . Your testimony

54:31.440 --> 54:33.496
touches on the department's needs to

54:33.496 --> 54:35.440
improve its ability to attract and

54:35.440 --> 54:38.190
retain an innovation minded workforce

54:38.640 --> 54:40.710
for high skilled positions such as

54:40.710 --> 54:42.821
those that require specialized skills

54:42.821 --> 54:44.821
and credentials to meet digital and

54:44.821 --> 54:46.766
cyber security needs . How can the

54:46.766 --> 54:48.654
department better compete against

54:48.654 --> 54:52.070
private industry and the skill sets

54:52.070 --> 54:54.070
that you mentioned sir ? This is uh

54:54.070 --> 54:56.530
this is all this is tough because

54:56.540 --> 54:59.470
obviously uh you know , we can't

54:59.470 --> 55:01.414
compete with with the compensation

55:01.414 --> 55:03.580
packages that some of the big tech

55:03.580 --> 55:06.770
offers , but certainly that won't stop

55:06.770 --> 55:09.300
us from going after the right people

55:09.300 --> 55:12.640
with the right skill sets uh In in this

55:12.640 --> 55:15.810
is a this is a point of emphasis for us

55:15.820 --> 55:18.390
will continue to stay focused on it uh

55:18.400 --> 55:21.160
to include bringing on people who are

55:21.170 --> 55:23.680
currently employed by those agents of

55:23.680 --> 55:26.090
those companies to serve in our our

55:26.090 --> 55:28.360
garden and reserve forces as well .

55:29.440 --> 55:31.662
This committee has been very focused on

55:31.662 --> 55:33.829
the ongoing audit of the Department of

55:33.829 --> 55:35.662
Defense taxpayers . Department .

55:35.662 --> 55:37.829
Defense taxpayers deserve to know that

55:37.829 --> 55:39.884
while the top line funding level for

55:39.884 --> 55:41.996
our national security has increased ,

55:41.996 --> 55:44.218
the department is effectively executing

55:44.218 --> 55:46.329
its funding . Secretary Austin , What

55:46.329 --> 55:48.218
material weaknesses has the audit

55:48.218 --> 55:50.329
identified that have been the hardest

55:50.329 --> 55:52.570
to address department wide . And how

55:52.570 --> 55:55.710
are you working to address those ? Well ,

55:55.710 --> 55:57.890
you've you've seen me I think most

55:57.890 --> 56:00.160
recently put another letter out to the

56:00.160 --> 56:02.380
force emphasizing the importance of

56:02.390 --> 56:05.660
making sure that we have a clean audit

56:06.030 --> 56:08.700
going forward . And uh and this this is

56:08.700 --> 56:10.422
very important to me . This is

56:10.422 --> 56:13.140
something that Secretary McCord and I

56:13.140 --> 56:15.140
have worked on and will continue to

56:15.140 --> 56:17.196
work on . But I'm not satisfied that

56:17.196 --> 56:19.196
were there . But I apologize to the

56:19.196 --> 56:22.170
most time has expired . Mr Gallagher is

56:22.170 --> 56:24.503
recognized for five minutes . Thank you .

56:24.503 --> 56:26.614
Mr Chairman , Thank you , gentlemen .

56:26.614 --> 56:28.781
We have limited time . So I'm going to

56:28.781 --> 56:28.420
ask for a yes or no question probably

56:28.420 --> 56:30.587
unless otherwise indicated . Secretary

56:30.587 --> 56:32.809
Austin last week , General Walters told

56:32.809 --> 56:34.698
this committee that in the months

56:34.698 --> 56:36.531
leading up to february 24th , he

56:36.531 --> 56:38.531
considered himself part of an inter

56:38.531 --> 56:40.531
agency effort designed to deter and

56:40.531 --> 56:42.642
dissuade Vladimir Putin from invading

56:42.642 --> 56:45.410
Ukraine . Did you share general Walters

56:45.420 --> 56:48.010
goal ? Yes or no . Well , I hope

56:48.010 --> 56:50.232
general walter shared my goal since I'm

56:50.232 --> 56:52.660
the Secretary of Defense and uh and my

56:52.670 --> 56:54.860
my objectives were the number one

56:54.860 --> 56:57.660
defend this nation number to make sure

56:57.660 --> 56:59.604
that we did everything possible to

56:59.604 --> 57:02.560
unify uh and defend NATO if required .

57:02.570 --> 57:05.250
Number three flow security force

57:05.250 --> 57:07.990
assistance to to Ukraine . Uh and then

57:07.990 --> 57:10.730
number four manage escalation . So the

57:10.730 --> 57:12.930
goal was not to deter Putin from

57:12.930 --> 57:16.010
invading Ukraine . The I've just laid

57:16.010 --> 57:18.232
out what my goals were and certainly it

57:18.232 --> 57:20.288
did not include deterring Putin from

57:20.288 --> 57:22.399
invading Ukraine unless I missed it .

57:22.399 --> 57:24.510
It was an objective of the government

57:24.510 --> 57:26.677
to deter Putin . But as General Milley

57:26.677 --> 57:28.788
described it , it's very difficult to

57:28.788 --> 57:31.090
do unless you put forces on the ground .

57:31.100 --> 57:33.044
And that's a decision that we made

57:33.044 --> 57:35.480
earlier early in uh in the effort here ,

57:35.480 --> 57:37.591
that we're not going to put forces in

57:37.591 --> 57:39.591
Ukraine to fight Russia . It was an

57:39.591 --> 57:41.758
objective of the government . You have

57:41.758 --> 57:41.620
just reminded us that you are an

57:41.620 --> 57:43.620
important person in that government

57:43.620 --> 57:45.731
apparatus . As Secretary of Defense .

57:45.731 --> 57:48.050
Was it the goal of your policy or the

57:48.050 --> 57:50.328
government's policy for which you work .

57:50.328 --> 57:52.439
The President of the United States to

57:52.439 --> 57:54.606
deter Putin from invading Ukraine . It

57:54.606 --> 57:56.439
was a goal to deter him from the

57:56.439 --> 57:58.661
invading Ukraine . And if and if he did

57:58.661 --> 58:00.772
invade , it was a goal and still is a

58:00.772 --> 58:03.250
goal to impose , impose significant

58:03.250 --> 58:05.750
costs on Putin . And you're seeing that

58:05.750 --> 58:08.260
play out in ways that that Putin never

58:08.260 --> 58:10.640
imagined . And you you're seeing the

58:10.650 --> 58:14.370
Ukrainians resist , Putin in in an in

58:14.370 --> 58:16.480
incredible ways because we provided

58:16.480 --> 58:18.710
them some capability to do that , but

58:18.710 --> 58:20.932
also because they have the grit and the

58:20.932 --> 58:23.240
determination to fight to defend their

58:23.240 --> 58:25.296
country totally agree with the great

58:25.296 --> 58:27.462
determination they've shown , which is

58:27.462 --> 58:29.573
remarkable . So the goal was to deter

58:29.573 --> 58:31.796
Putin . Uh we did not achieve that goal

58:31.796 --> 58:33.907
Putin invaded anyway on February 24 .

58:33.907 --> 58:36.580
Do you share the assessment ? General

58:36.580 --> 58:38.469
Milley gave a little bit ago that

58:38.469 --> 58:40.680
perhaps Putin was simply un deterrable

58:40.800 --> 58:42.689
and therefore our our campaign of

58:42.689 --> 58:45.340
deterrence was bound to fail . I do not

58:45.340 --> 58:47.507
believe that our campaign has failed .

58:47.507 --> 58:50.180
This is still this is still in progress

58:50.190 --> 58:53.640
and there is a price to be paid by by

58:53.640 --> 58:56.900
Putin for what he's done . Got it . But

58:56.910 --> 58:59.890
we failed to deter Putin from invading

58:59.890 --> 59:02.600
Ukraine . I'm interested in whether you

59:02.600 --> 59:04.656
think there's anything we could have

59:04.656 --> 59:07.050
done , looking back hindsight's 2020 in

59:07.050 --> 59:09.270
the months leading up to february 24th

59:09.280 --> 59:11.290
two successfully deter him from

59:11.290 --> 59:13.346
invading Ukraine . And perhaps there

59:13.346 --> 59:15.568
isn't , I don't know , I'm just curious

59:15.568 --> 59:17.679
to get your opinion as General Milley

59:17.679 --> 59:19.790
pointed out . If you if we put forces

59:19.790 --> 59:22.480
into Ukraine to fight Putin , this

59:22.480 --> 59:24.480
would be a different story , but we

59:24.480 --> 59:26.591
made a decision that we weren't gonna

59:26.591 --> 59:28.758
do that and we made a decision for the

59:28.758 --> 59:30.647
right reasons and I support those

59:30.647 --> 59:32.702
decisions . So I I uh I think that's

59:32.702 --> 59:34.869
that's actually a very important point

59:34.869 --> 59:36.980
that perhaps if we had put hard power

59:36.980 --> 59:36.750
and american hard power in the path of

59:36.750 --> 59:38.861
Putin . That would have been the only

59:38.861 --> 59:41.028
thing that could have deterred him . I

59:41.028 --> 59:40.180
guess what I mentioned , does the

59:40.180 --> 59:42.402
analysis , does that same analysis hold

59:42.402 --> 59:45.860
true with respect to Taiwan would

59:45.870 --> 59:48.160
putting american forces on Taiwan

59:48.170 --> 59:50.170
increase or decrease the likelihood

59:50.170 --> 59:52.059
that she Jinping would attempt an

59:52.059 --> 59:54.114
invasion hypothetical . I think that

59:54.114 --> 59:57.740
it's you know , it's you know not

59:57.740 --> 01:00:00.310
advisable to to make direct comparisons

01:00:00.320 --> 01:00:03.280
between Ukraine and Taiwan . These are

01:00:03.290 --> 01:00:05.430
two completely different scenarios to

01:00:05.440 --> 01:00:07.940
two different theaters . And so

01:00:08.810 --> 01:00:11.500
so do you do you do you think then that

01:00:11.500 --> 01:00:14.270
what has happened in Ukraine is not

01:00:14.280 --> 01:00:17.110
connected has not impacted she's

01:00:17.110 --> 01:00:20.170
calculus with respect to Taiwan . No ,

01:00:20.170 --> 01:00:24.140
I have to I'm certain that you know , I

01:00:24.140 --> 01:00:26.196
don't want to speculate on what what

01:00:26.196 --> 01:00:28.450
what's in Mr xi's head . But certainly

01:00:28.460 --> 01:00:31.620
I think as the world looks at this uh

01:00:31.630 --> 01:00:34.250
they've uh they've been impressed by

01:00:34.250 --> 01:00:37.940
the um commitment the resolve

01:00:37.940 --> 01:00:41.360
of many countries in the world to

01:00:41.360 --> 01:00:44.130
resist uh that kind of behavior . So

01:00:44.510 --> 01:00:46.420
Would so would it be too far to

01:00:46.420 --> 01:00:48.087
characterize your view as the

01:00:48.087 --> 01:00:50.142
commitment and resolve on display by

01:00:50.142 --> 01:00:52.309
the Ukrainians and our NATO allies has

01:00:52.309 --> 01:00:54.476
made an invasion of Taiwan less likely

01:00:54.476 --> 01:00:56.587
than it was prior then likely than it

01:00:56.587 --> 01:00:59.810
was on February 23 . Is the commitment

01:00:59.820 --> 01:01:01.950
of the people of Taiwan . No , no

01:01:01.960 --> 01:01:04.182
that's just the gender , the commitment

01:01:04.182 --> 01:01:06.293
that you just referenced with respect

01:01:06.293 --> 01:01:09.120
to NATO and Ukraine had any impact on

01:01:09.130 --> 01:01:11.240
she's calculus in Taiwan and made an

01:01:11.240 --> 01:01:13.850
invasion more or less likely ? Well

01:01:13.860 --> 01:01:15.804
again I don't want to speculate on

01:01:15.804 --> 01:01:18.027
whether or not the invasion an invasion

01:01:18.027 --> 01:01:20.193
is likely or less likely . But again ,

01:01:20.193 --> 01:01:22.193
I would say that we just need to be

01:01:22.193 --> 01:01:24.416
careful about making direct comparisons

01:01:24.416 --> 01:01:26.582
between what's going on in Ukraine and

01:01:26.582 --> 01:01:28.916
what could happen in Taiwan . Thank you .

01:01:28.916 --> 01:01:31.027
Jameson has expired . We are going to

01:01:31.027 --> 01:01:33.249
take a 15 minute break . We're going to

01:01:33.249 --> 01:01:35.304
be back at , well I guess that would

01:01:35.304 --> 01:01:38.130
make it 11 47 . Mr Connor is next . So

01:01:38.130 --> 01:01:40.130
at 11 47 we'll go to Mr Connor and

01:01:40.130 --> 01:01:42.130
we'll proceed from there . We'll be

01:01:42.130 --> 01:01:42.030
right back .