1 00:00:01,340 --> 00:00:02,340 mhm . 2 00:00:05,440 --> 00:00:07,662 Afternoon , everybody . Sorry for being 3 00:00:07,662 --> 00:00:10,160 a couple minutes late here . Okay ? 4 00:00:10,640 --> 00:00:13,390 Yeah . Okay . Just a couple of things 5 00:00:13,390 --> 00:00:15,970 at the top , if you don't mind . Right 6 00:00:15,970 --> 00:00:18,026 now , as we speak , the secretary is 7 00:00:18,026 --> 00:00:20,410 upstairs for the very first meeting of 8 00:00:20,410 --> 00:00:23,350 the Defense Department China Task Force . 9 00:00:23,660 --> 00:00:26,770 He's providing some initial guidance to 10 00:00:26,770 --> 00:00:28,937 an outstanding team of 20 civilian and 11 00:00:28,937 --> 00:00:30,770 military experts from across the 12 00:00:30,770 --> 00:00:32,826 department , including the Office of 13 00:00:32,826 --> 00:00:34,881 the Secretary of Defense , the joint 14 00:00:34,881 --> 00:00:36,937 staff , each of the Armed Services , 15 00:00:36,937 --> 00:00:38,937 Combatant Commands and Intelligence 16 00:00:38,937 --> 00:00:41,159 Community . Today's meeting is intended 17 00:00:41,159 --> 00:00:43,270 to formalize the mission , timing and 18 00:00:43,270 --> 00:00:45,270 outputs of the task force , um , as 19 00:00:45,270 --> 00:00:47,492 they work towards a baseline assessment 20 00:00:47,492 --> 00:00:49,880 of , uh , department's policies , 21 00:00:49,890 --> 00:00:52,860 programs and processes on China related 22 00:00:52,860 --> 00:00:54,860 matters . That assessment will then 23 00:00:54,860 --> 00:00:57,250 inform the core objective of the task 24 00:00:57,250 --> 00:00:59,472 force , which is to identify a discrete 25 00:00:59,472 --> 00:01:01,583 set of top priorities and provide the 26 00:01:01,583 --> 00:01:03,750 secretary with specific and actionable 27 00:01:03,750 --> 00:01:05,917 recommendations and milestones to meet 28 00:01:05,917 --> 00:01:08,160 the China Challenge . As a reminder . 29 00:01:08,740 --> 00:01:10,740 This is what we're calling a sprint 30 00:01:10,740 --> 00:01:12,907 effort that will conclude in less than 31 00:01:12,907 --> 00:01:14,962 four months . The task force will be 32 00:01:14,962 --> 00:01:17,073 working with our interagency partners 33 00:01:17,073 --> 00:01:18,962 and consulting with Congress on a 34 00:01:18,962 --> 00:01:21,296 bipartisan basis throughout the process , 35 00:01:21,296 --> 00:01:23,018 much of their findings will be 36 00:01:23,018 --> 00:01:25,240 classified . I think we've talked about 37 00:01:25,240 --> 00:01:27,240 that before , but we'll provide you 38 00:01:27,240 --> 00:01:29,296 updates as we can on Ukraine today , 39 00:01:29,296 --> 00:01:32,570 the department is announcing a new $125 40 00:01:32,570 --> 00:01:34,348 million package for the Ukraine 41 00:01:34,348 --> 00:01:36,514 Security Assistance Initiative , which 42 00:01:36,514 --> 00:01:38,403 includes training , equipment and 43 00:01:38,403 --> 00:01:40,348 advisory efforts to help Ukraine's 44 00:01:40,348 --> 00:01:42,014 forces preserve the country's 45 00:01:42,014 --> 00:01:43,959 territorial integrity , secure its 46 00:01:43,959 --> 00:01:46,014 borders and improve interoperability 47 00:01:46,014 --> 00:01:48,126 with NATO . This action reaffirms the 48 00:01:48,126 --> 00:01:50,181 US commitment to providing defensive 49 00:01:50,181 --> 00:01:52,181 lethal weapons to enable Ukraine to 50 00:01:52,181 --> 00:01:54,348 more effectively defend itself against 51 00:01:54,348 --> 00:01:56,570 Russian aggression . We'll be releasing 52 00:01:56,570 --> 00:01:58,681 more details later today about this , 53 00:01:58,681 --> 00:02:00,459 so stay tuned for that . On the 54 00:02:00,459 --> 00:02:02,580 personal front , we have on voted 55 00:02:02,590 --> 00:02:04,923 another for employees here this morning , 56 00:02:04,923 --> 00:02:07,090 bringing our total to 82 . Among these 57 00:02:07,090 --> 00:02:09,034 joining the team is Lindsay Ford , 58 00:02:09,034 --> 00:02:11,090 deputy Assistant Secretary , defense 59 00:02:11,090 --> 00:02:13,368 for South and Southeast Asia . Alright , 60 00:02:13,368 --> 00:02:15,257 take some questions . Thank Bob , 61 00:02:15,257 --> 00:02:16,479 you're on the phone . 62 00:02:19,440 --> 00:02:23,320 Thank you . Uh , John , do you have any 63 00:02:23,320 --> 00:02:25,490 updated damage assessment from the air 64 00:02:25,490 --> 00:02:28,120 strike last week in Syria , including 65 00:02:28,120 --> 00:02:30,560 civilian casualties that you referenced 66 00:02:30,940 --> 00:02:34,120 and also a related question about the 67 00:02:34,130 --> 00:02:36,600 subsequent event in the Gulf of Oman , 68 00:02:36,600 --> 00:02:40,000 where Israel is now saying that Iran 69 00:02:40,000 --> 00:02:42,840 was responsible for that explosion 70 00:02:42,840 --> 00:02:44,840 aboard the ship . And I'm wondering 71 00:02:44,840 --> 00:02:47,062 whether the U . S . Has any evidence to 72 00:02:47,062 --> 00:02:50,900 support , um , the claim that Iran was 73 00:02:50,910 --> 00:02:53,760 responsible on the second question , 74 00:02:53,760 --> 00:02:56,150 Bob , I would point you to Israeli 75 00:02:56,150 --> 00:02:59,410 authorities to speak to that since the 76 00:02:59,420 --> 00:03:01,790 ship belonged to them . They've I know 77 00:03:01,790 --> 00:03:04,068 they've already been out there on that . 78 00:03:04,068 --> 00:03:05,734 I don't have any intelligence 79 00:03:05,734 --> 00:03:07,901 assessments on that to speak to you at 80 00:03:07,901 --> 00:03:10,012 the podium today on the on the battle 81 00:03:10,012 --> 00:03:11,734 damage assessment . Um , we've 82 00:03:11,734 --> 00:03:13,846 obviously seen a lot of reporting out 83 00:03:13,846 --> 00:03:15,846 there on numbers of casualties from 84 00:03:15,846 --> 00:03:18,068 Thursday's strike . What I can tell you 85 00:03:18,068 --> 00:03:20,160 is that , uh , we believe right now 86 00:03:20,640 --> 00:03:22,820 there was likely one militia member , 87 00:03:22,830 --> 00:03:25,910 remember killed and two militia members 88 00:03:25,920 --> 00:03:28,470 wounded . Um , and we'll continue to 89 00:03:28,470 --> 00:03:30,581 assess , as you know , we do . And if 90 00:03:30,581 --> 00:03:32,637 that changes , we will certainly let 91 00:03:32,637 --> 00:03:34,803 you know . But as of today , we assess 92 00:03:34,803 --> 00:03:37,040 one killed and two militia members 93 00:03:37,050 --> 00:03:39,970 wounded . Um , okay , you go into a 94 00:03:39,970 --> 00:03:42,820 room , Tom . I would ask a little bit 95 00:03:42,820 --> 00:03:44,709 more about the stand down and the 96 00:03:44,709 --> 00:03:46,709 documents the Pentagon put out . It 97 00:03:46,709 --> 00:03:48,931 says service members must reject active 98 00:03:48,931 --> 00:03:50,590 participation in extremist 99 00:03:50,590 --> 00:03:52,860 organizations , but still , mere 100 00:03:52,860 --> 00:03:55,810 membership is allowed and will you look 101 00:03:55,810 --> 00:03:57,670 into that ? Maybe banning mere 102 00:03:57,670 --> 00:03:59,837 membership . And is that something you 103 00:03:59,837 --> 00:04:01,837 can do ? Is that something Congress 104 00:04:01,837 --> 00:04:03,892 will have to weigh in on ? Uh , no , 105 00:04:03,892 --> 00:04:06,114 that's certainly within the secretary's 106 00:04:06,114 --> 00:04:08,860 authority to make that , uh , call , uh , 107 00:04:08,870 --> 00:04:11,400 if he wants to . Um , But you're right . 108 00:04:11,410 --> 00:04:13,299 And we talked about this before . 109 00:04:13,299 --> 00:04:15,243 Membership alone is not prohibited 110 00:04:15,243 --> 00:04:17,466 right now , but it is something . And I 111 00:04:17,466 --> 00:04:19,632 think the secretary has spoken to this 112 00:04:19,632 --> 00:04:21,854 that he is certainly willing to look at 113 00:04:21,854 --> 00:04:24,077 and to ask the question of the services 114 00:04:24,077 --> 00:04:26,040 as we move forward on this about 115 00:04:26,040 --> 00:04:29,100 whether or not membership alone would 116 00:04:29,100 --> 00:04:31,600 also be prohibited . It isn't right now 117 00:04:31,600 --> 00:04:35,060 what we continue to say is that 118 00:04:35,540 --> 00:04:39,170 activity based on this , uh , this kind 119 00:04:39,170 --> 00:04:41,610 of extreme ideology that is prejudicial 120 00:04:41,610 --> 00:04:43,650 to good order and discipline and or 121 00:04:44,040 --> 00:04:47,110 harms fellow teammates obviously can be 122 00:04:47,110 --> 00:04:49,166 punishable under the Uniform code of 123 00:04:49,166 --> 00:04:51,388 military justice . And that's still the 124 00:04:51,388 --> 00:04:53,443 case is going to wait till after the 125 00:04:53,443 --> 00:04:55,443 stand down to gather information to 126 00:04:55,443 --> 00:04:54,990 make a decision on that . I don't want 127 00:04:54,990 --> 00:04:57,250 to get ahead of the secretary's timing 128 00:04:57,260 --> 00:05:00,510 on this . Certainly , as we've said , 129 00:05:00,510 --> 00:05:02,677 one of the reasons he wanted to do the 130 00:05:02,677 --> 00:05:04,899 stand down was to solicit feedback from 131 00:05:04,899 --> 00:05:07,360 from the the troops . And and so he He 132 00:05:07,360 --> 00:05:10,690 certainly wants to get that over the 133 00:05:10,690 --> 00:05:13,420 next month or so , but I I wouldn't get 134 00:05:13,420 --> 00:05:15,587 ahead of timing on decisions he may or 135 00:05:15,587 --> 00:05:19,080 may not make , uh , let's see , uh , 136 00:05:19,090 --> 00:05:20,479 Phil Stewart , Reuters . 137 00:05:24,740 --> 00:05:26,860 Hey , John , real quick . The Saudis 138 00:05:26,860 --> 00:05:28,810 are saying that there was a new 139 00:05:28,820 --> 00:05:31,210 exercise that's been started with the , 140 00:05:31,220 --> 00:05:33,910 uh , Air Force dragon . Uh , exercise 141 00:05:33,910 --> 00:05:36,021 name is Dragon . They're saying , Was 142 00:05:36,021 --> 00:05:38,077 this just wondering whether this was 143 00:05:38,077 --> 00:05:39,688 preplanned ? If you have any 144 00:05:39,688 --> 00:05:41,799 information about it , whether or not 145 00:05:41,799 --> 00:05:43,910 this was in any way , I meant to show 146 00:05:43,910 --> 00:05:46,630 support for the Saudi military after 147 00:05:46,640 --> 00:05:48,807 the events last week And the release . 148 00:05:48,807 --> 00:05:51,029 The pathology report . Thanks . I don't 149 00:05:51,029 --> 00:05:53,029 have any details on that particular 150 00:05:53,029 --> 00:05:56,080 exercise . Uh , Phil , Um , but just 151 00:05:56,080 --> 00:05:58,247 broadly speaking , I'm just looking to 152 00:05:58,247 --> 00:06:00,469 see that I don't have anything specific 153 00:06:00,469 --> 00:06:02,802 on that exercise before I say that . Um , 154 00:06:02,802 --> 00:06:05,024 so let me take your question and see if 155 00:06:05,024 --> 00:06:07,136 we have anything about it that we can 156 00:06:07,136 --> 00:06:09,469 speak to . I've not seen anything on it , 157 00:06:09,469 --> 00:06:11,524 but just broadly speaking , as we've 158 00:06:11,524 --> 00:06:14,770 said before , we recognize that Saudi 159 00:06:14,770 --> 00:06:16,826 Arabia is a strategic partner in the 160 00:06:16,826 --> 00:06:18,826 region that we have obligations and 161 00:06:18,826 --> 00:06:21,410 commitments to help Saudi Arabia defend 162 00:06:21,410 --> 00:06:23,760 itself against attacks which continue 163 00:06:23,760 --> 00:06:26,000 to happen . Uh , from across that 164 00:06:26,010 --> 00:06:28,910 southern border with Yemen . Uh , and 165 00:06:28,910 --> 00:06:30,632 we take those responsibilities 166 00:06:30,632 --> 00:06:32,410 seriously . We do have a strong 167 00:06:32,410 --> 00:06:34,410 military military relationship with 168 00:06:34,410 --> 00:06:36,632 Saudi Arabia , and I I would expect you 169 00:06:36,632 --> 00:06:38,854 to see that that relationship continues 170 00:06:38,854 --> 00:06:38,170 for all the right reasons . But as for 171 00:06:38,170 --> 00:06:40,170 that specific exercise , Bill , I'm 172 00:06:40,170 --> 00:06:42,810 gonna have to get back to you far . I 173 00:06:42,820 --> 00:06:44,876 want to follow up on that . Now that 174 00:06:44,876 --> 00:06:47,042 the report has been made public to the 175 00:06:47,042 --> 00:06:49,890 world say that Mohammed bin Salman is 176 00:06:49,900 --> 00:06:52,460 was behind the killing of Mr Kosugi . 177 00:06:52,940 --> 00:06:56,320 What is what impact will there be if 178 00:06:56,330 --> 00:06:59,070 any on the U . S . Saudi military 179 00:06:59,080 --> 00:07:01,650 relationship ? Will there be any impact ? 180 00:07:02,140 --> 00:07:05,970 And if not , then what leverage does 181 00:07:05,970 --> 00:07:08,080 the U . S . Military have two other 182 00:07:08,090 --> 00:07:11,740 given his position in the country over 183 00:07:11,740 --> 00:07:13,851 their military ? What leverage do you 184 00:07:13,851 --> 00:07:16,018 have them with other militaries around 185 00:07:16,018 --> 00:07:18,970 the world that your relationship with 186 00:07:18,970 --> 00:07:21,790 them depends on their human rights 187 00:07:21,790 --> 00:07:24,250 records and not committing , you know , 188 00:07:24,740 --> 00:07:27,720 murders ? What leverage do you have or 189 00:07:27,730 --> 00:07:30,080 will your relationship be impacted ? 190 00:07:30,270 --> 00:07:32,520 Well , don't get ahead of decisions 191 00:07:32,520 --> 00:07:34,631 that have or haven't been made inside 192 00:07:34,631 --> 00:07:36,742 the military to military relationship 193 00:07:36,742 --> 00:07:38,631 that we have in Saudi Arabia . It 194 00:07:38,631 --> 00:07:40,687 remains robust , as it should remain 195 00:07:40,687 --> 00:07:43,780 robust . Um , but in the the issues 196 00:07:43,780 --> 00:07:46,830 over , sanctions and , um , and 197 00:07:46,830 --> 00:07:49,650 repercussions in , in light of , uh , 198 00:07:49,660 --> 00:07:52,400 Jamal's murder certainly remain an 199 00:07:52,400 --> 00:07:54,567 issue more for the White House and the 200 00:07:54,567 --> 00:07:56,678 State Department to speak to , except 201 00:07:56,678 --> 00:07:59,310 to say that we do when we have military 202 00:07:59,310 --> 00:08:01,310 relationships around the world . We 203 00:08:01,310 --> 00:08:03,143 certainly do make sure that they 204 00:08:03,143 --> 00:08:05,310 comport with the law because there are 205 00:08:05,310 --> 00:08:07,477 legal restrictions about some military 206 00:08:07,477 --> 00:08:09,532 support when it comes to rule of law 207 00:08:09,532 --> 00:08:12,170 and extra judicial activity . Um , and 208 00:08:12,170 --> 00:08:14,281 we make sure that those relationships 209 00:08:14,281 --> 00:08:16,392 comport with the law and with our own 210 00:08:16,392 --> 00:08:18,559 values and standards . But I won't get 211 00:08:18,559 --> 00:08:20,559 ahead of decisions yet that haven't 212 00:08:20,559 --> 00:08:22,781 been made . Well , then , let me follow 213 00:08:22,781 --> 00:08:25,390 up . Are you saying there are decisions ? 214 00:08:26,040 --> 00:08:29,660 Uh , on the table that's simply there 215 00:08:30,340 --> 00:08:32,562 on the table where final decisions have 216 00:08:32,562 --> 00:08:34,396 not been made ? Are any of these 217 00:08:34,396 --> 00:08:37,580 matters even on the table and for the 218 00:08:37,580 --> 00:08:41,410 Pentagon and I still find my 219 00:08:41,420 --> 00:08:44,180 self confused ? If the U . S military 220 00:08:44,180 --> 00:08:46,560 does not engage in relationships with 221 00:08:46,560 --> 00:08:48,727 countries that engage in extrajudicial 222 00:08:48,727 --> 00:08:51,300 killing and violation of human rights . 223 00:08:52,240 --> 00:08:54,462 What about to say that , Barb , that we 224 00:08:54,462 --> 00:08:57,090 don't ? I mean , uh , that . But there 225 00:08:57,090 --> 00:09:00,730 are certain legal limits to the 226 00:09:00,730 --> 00:09:03,400 kinds of support we can give two other 227 00:09:03,400 --> 00:09:07,370 militaries under the law , the Leahy 228 00:09:07,370 --> 00:09:11,230 Law . I'm not for shadowing anything in 229 00:09:11,230 --> 00:09:13,470 this case . And don't read into my 230 00:09:13,470 --> 00:09:15,940 answer that that I'm sort of signaling 231 00:09:15,940 --> 00:09:18,180 to you that there are some decisions 232 00:09:18,190 --> 00:09:20,670 about to be made . That's not what I 233 00:09:20,670 --> 00:09:24,020 meant at all . Uh , just that right now , 234 00:09:24,030 --> 00:09:26,252 I know of no changes to the military to 235 00:09:26,252 --> 00:09:28,200 military relationship , broadly 236 00:09:28,200 --> 00:09:30,290 speaking , And my White House 237 00:09:30,290 --> 00:09:32,346 colleagues spoke to this last week . 238 00:09:32,346 --> 00:09:34,320 Certainly the relationship from a 239 00:09:34,330 --> 00:09:37,250 bilateral perspective with Saudi Arabia 240 00:09:37,260 --> 00:09:39,480 is going to be different under this 241 00:09:39,480 --> 00:09:41,536 administration than it was under the 242 00:09:41,536 --> 00:09:43,758 last . And certainly that difference is 243 00:09:43,758 --> 00:09:46,240 going to be informed by , uh , what we 244 00:09:46,240 --> 00:09:49,250 now know . The intelligence report says , 245 00:09:50,240 --> 00:09:51,907 militarily speaking , we have 246 00:09:51,907 --> 00:09:55,020 obligations there , uh , in Saudi 247 00:09:55,020 --> 00:09:57,242 Arabia , and we're going to continue to 248 00:09:57,242 --> 00:09:59,464 meet those , um , I don't have anything 249 00:09:59,464 --> 00:10:02,030 specific , and I'm not signaling that 250 00:10:02,030 --> 00:10:04,030 there's gonna be . Does that answer 251 00:10:04,030 --> 00:10:08,030 your question ? Okay , um , let's 252 00:10:08,030 --> 00:10:10,010 see . Louis Martinez . 253 00:10:12,340 --> 00:10:14,340 Hey , John , You refer to the China 254 00:10:14,340 --> 00:10:16,870 effort as a China task force is a 255 00:10:16,870 --> 00:10:19,280 sprint effort . Um , the Global Posture 256 00:10:19,280 --> 00:10:22,650 Review is still going on . How would 257 00:10:22,650 --> 00:10:24,983 you characterize that as a super sprint ? 258 00:10:24,983 --> 00:10:28,170 And , um , when can we expect analysis 259 00:10:28,170 --> 00:10:29,892 of that with regards to Afghan 260 00:10:29,892 --> 00:10:31,960 Afghanistan , please ? Thanks . Um , 261 00:10:32,440 --> 00:10:36,350 it's the Yeah , I don't know that I 262 00:10:36,350 --> 00:10:38,294 would call it a super sprint . The 263 00:10:38,294 --> 00:10:40,517 Global Posture Review . We do expect to 264 00:10:40,517 --> 00:10:42,950 be completed by mid year . So in the 265 00:10:42,950 --> 00:10:45,660 summer time frame , um , everybody's 266 00:10:45,660 --> 00:10:47,827 working hard on that . I'm not . Won't 267 00:10:47,827 --> 00:10:50,049 get ahead of that . Um , the China Task 268 00:10:50,049 --> 00:10:52,880 Force , um , is really about policies , 269 00:10:52,880 --> 00:10:55,360 programs , uh , and procedures with 270 00:10:55,360 --> 00:10:58,170 respect to how the department treats 271 00:10:58,170 --> 00:11:00,770 the China challenge . And it is nested 272 00:11:00,770 --> 00:11:03,890 in and will be helping form the larger 273 00:11:03,890 --> 00:11:06,240 whole of government approach to China . 274 00:11:06,250 --> 00:11:08,417 And clearly , it's going to be looking 275 00:11:08,417 --> 00:11:10,583 at China from our unique perspective . 276 00:11:10,583 --> 00:11:12,694 At the Defense Department , there are 277 00:11:12,694 --> 00:11:12,580 other agencies across the government 278 00:11:12,580 --> 00:11:15,690 that also have bilateral issues . 279 00:11:15,700 --> 00:11:17,589 Whether it's trade , intellectual 280 00:11:17,589 --> 00:11:21,230 property , uh , economic , certainly 281 00:11:21,240 --> 00:11:24,390 diplomatic . They'll be looking at that 282 00:11:24,400 --> 00:11:26,733 relationship from their own perspective . 283 00:11:26,733 --> 00:11:28,870 What the Secretary wants Mr Ratner to 284 00:11:28,870 --> 00:11:31,720 do , I used to look at the pacing 285 00:11:31,720 --> 00:11:33,609 challenge that China poses to the 286 00:11:33,609 --> 00:11:35,720 department from our perspective . And 287 00:11:35,720 --> 00:11:37,776 what do we need to do , uh , to make 288 00:11:37,776 --> 00:11:40,109 sure we're ready to meet that challenge ? 289 00:11:40,109 --> 00:11:42,109 So it's It's not part of the Global 290 00:11:42,109 --> 00:11:44,220 Posture Review . Could something that 291 00:11:44,220 --> 00:11:46,164 they come up with help inform that 292 00:11:46,164 --> 00:11:48,498 review ? Uh , that's certainly possible . 293 00:11:48,498 --> 00:11:50,720 I won't get ahead of that , but it is a 294 00:11:50,720 --> 00:11:52,831 separate and distinct process . And I 295 00:11:52,831 --> 00:11:52,760 think you asked about Afghanistan . I 296 00:11:52,760 --> 00:11:54,982 don't have any updates on that at all . 297 00:11:54,982 --> 00:11:57,093 There is an inter agency review going 298 00:11:57,093 --> 00:11:59,149 on right now , as we talked about to 299 00:11:59,149 --> 00:12:01,260 look at the Doha agreement to look at 300 00:12:01,260 --> 00:12:03,482 the compliance with that agreement , to 301 00:12:03,482 --> 00:12:05,740 consider what , what decisions We need 302 00:12:05,740 --> 00:12:07,851 to make what's been the best national 303 00:12:07,851 --> 00:12:10,018 security interest of the United States 304 00:12:10,018 --> 00:12:09,890 and the American people with respect to 305 00:12:09,890 --> 00:12:12,057 Afghanistan . And we're just not there 306 00:12:12,057 --> 00:12:15,300 yet . Sure , um , back to 307 00:12:15,300 --> 00:12:17,530 extremism . Uh , as part of the stand 308 00:12:17,530 --> 00:12:19,586 down , the Navy is requiring all the 309 00:12:19,586 --> 00:12:21,252 sailors to retake the oath of 310 00:12:21,252 --> 00:12:23,474 enlistment , and I was wondering if the 311 00:12:23,474 --> 00:12:25,641 secretary has recommended to the other 312 00:12:25,641 --> 00:12:27,586 services that they also have their 313 00:12:27,586 --> 00:12:29,752 members retake their oath . And then I 314 00:12:29,752 --> 00:12:31,530 have a follow up . I know of no 315 00:12:31,530 --> 00:12:33,697 direction that he's given to the other 316 00:12:33,697 --> 00:12:33,500 services to to do that . But he's 317 00:12:33,500 --> 00:12:36,210 supportive of the Navy's direction in 318 00:12:36,210 --> 00:12:38,377 that regard . And if you looked at the 319 00:12:38,377 --> 00:12:40,960 video , uh , he specifically asked 320 00:12:41,540 --> 00:12:45,530 service members the whole workforce to 321 00:12:45,530 --> 00:12:47,810 think about their oath as they think 322 00:12:47,810 --> 00:12:49,950 about this stand down . But I know of 323 00:12:49,950 --> 00:12:52,172 no such direction to the other services 324 00:12:52,172 --> 00:12:54,394 to do that , Okay and then . Secondly , 325 00:12:54,740 --> 00:12:56,851 as you know , the recruiting commands 326 00:12:56,851 --> 00:12:59,018 play an important role in this , too . 327 00:12:59,018 --> 00:13:01,018 Is the secretary going to reach out 328 00:13:01,018 --> 00:13:03,129 separately to them ? I was looking in 329 00:13:03,129 --> 00:13:02,650 the guidance , and while there's 330 00:13:02,660 --> 00:13:04,860 general guidance overall , there's not 331 00:13:04,870 --> 00:13:06,830 specific for recruiters or for 332 00:13:06,830 --> 00:13:08,997 recruiting commands on how to actually 333 00:13:08,997 --> 00:13:11,163 weed out potentially extremists before 334 00:13:11,163 --> 00:13:14,470 they ever join . I don't I don't I know 335 00:13:14,470 --> 00:13:16,303 of no plans for him to reach out 336 00:13:16,303 --> 00:13:18,248 specifically point to point at his 337 00:13:18,248 --> 00:13:20,820 level to each recruiting command . But 338 00:13:20,830 --> 00:13:23,190 he has talked to the Chiefs , uh , and 339 00:13:23,190 --> 00:13:25,357 the acting Service secretaries about , 340 00:13:25,640 --> 00:13:28,590 um , in fact , they brought it up the 341 00:13:28,600 --> 00:13:31,620 mutual concerns on both sides about , 342 00:13:31,630 --> 00:13:34,880 um , the recruiting process and asking 343 00:13:34,880 --> 00:13:37,102 ourselves if we got this right . Are we 344 00:13:37,102 --> 00:13:38,991 doing enough of the right kind of 345 00:13:38,991 --> 00:13:41,102 vetting for potential recruits before 346 00:13:41,102 --> 00:13:43,269 they come in . Um , and are we able to 347 00:13:43,269 --> 00:13:45,436 catch that kind of activity to include 348 00:13:45,436 --> 00:13:47,380 looking at social media profiles ? 349 00:13:47,380 --> 00:13:49,324 There's a limit to what you can do 350 00:13:49,324 --> 00:13:51,380 legally because before they sign the 351 00:13:51,380 --> 00:13:53,436 dotted line and raise their hand and 352 00:13:53,436 --> 00:13:55,658 give that oath their private citizens . 353 00:13:55,658 --> 00:13:57,602 So there's some limits there , but 354 00:13:57,602 --> 00:13:57,560 they've all all of them , including the 355 00:13:57,560 --> 00:13:59,782 secretary , have asked themselves , You 356 00:13:59,782 --> 00:14:01,893 know , what more could we be doing to 357 00:14:01,893 --> 00:14:03,949 try to be able to catch some of this 358 00:14:03,949 --> 00:14:06,950 behavior before they come in again ? 359 00:14:07,010 --> 00:14:10,430 There's we have We have to 360 00:14:10,430 --> 00:14:13,170 assume that some people are becoming 361 00:14:13,170 --> 00:14:16,090 radicalized after they get in , and so 362 00:14:16,090 --> 00:14:18,670 that's a whole other , you know , set 363 00:14:18,670 --> 00:14:20,837 of issues that have to be dealt with . 364 00:14:20,837 --> 00:14:23,003 But I don't know that he's . I know he 365 00:14:23,003 --> 00:14:25,226 hasn't specifically reached out to each 366 00:14:25,226 --> 00:14:27,114 recruiting command of each of the 367 00:14:27,114 --> 00:14:28,837 services , but he has had that 368 00:14:28,837 --> 00:14:30,503 conversation with the service 369 00:14:30,503 --> 00:14:32,726 secretaries and the service chiefs . Do 370 00:14:32,726 --> 00:14:32,360 you think is part of the back and forth 371 00:14:32,360 --> 00:14:34,910 on what more can we do in this initial 372 00:14:34,910 --> 00:14:36,966 screening ? Will that be captured in 373 00:14:36,966 --> 00:14:38,966 any way are the service is going to 374 00:14:38,966 --> 00:14:41,132 come up with recommendations for their 375 00:14:41,132 --> 00:14:43,243 own recruiting commands . I would let 376 00:14:43,243 --> 00:14:45,299 the services speak for themselves on 377 00:14:45,299 --> 00:14:47,188 that . I mean , I the it would be 378 00:14:47,188 --> 00:14:49,410 inappropriate for me to to , uh , to 379 00:14:49,410 --> 00:14:51,520 speak for them here . Um , certainly 380 00:14:51,520 --> 00:14:53,520 the secretary is interested in what 381 00:14:53,520 --> 00:14:55,742 they learned , and and he and he agrees 382 00:14:55,742 --> 00:14:57,742 with them that this is something we 383 00:14:57,742 --> 00:14:59,909 should be looking at is the process of 384 00:14:59,909 --> 00:15:02,131 recruiting . Uh , but But what ? What ? 385 00:15:02,131 --> 00:15:04,353 You know what direction he hasn't given 386 00:15:04,353 --> 00:15:06,576 them direction to come back to him on a 387 00:15:06,576 --> 00:15:08,742 specific point , except to say that it 388 00:15:08,742 --> 00:15:10,964 is definitely an issue of concern . And 389 00:15:10,964 --> 00:15:13,187 again , I would let them speak for each 390 00:15:13,187 --> 00:15:14,964 of them on how how they want to 391 00:15:14,964 --> 00:15:17,460 approach the problem . As you know , uh , 392 00:15:18,340 --> 00:15:20,690 well , each service has title 10 393 00:15:20,700 --> 00:15:22,867 responsibilities for recruiting . They 394 00:15:22,867 --> 00:15:24,700 all do it a little differently . 395 00:15:24,700 --> 00:15:27,033 Particularly now in a covid environment . 396 00:15:27,033 --> 00:15:28,867 Much a lot of recruiting is done 397 00:15:28,867 --> 00:15:30,978 virtually for the safety of potential 398 00:15:30,978 --> 00:15:32,922 recruits and our recruiters . Each 399 00:15:32,922 --> 00:15:34,922 service does that differently to so 400 00:15:34,922 --> 00:15:37,033 again , the secretary doesn't want to 401 00:15:37,033 --> 00:15:39,033 be too prescriptive in terms of how 402 00:15:39,033 --> 00:15:41,270 they handle the onboarding of new 403 00:15:41,270 --> 00:15:43,159 personnel , except to say that he 404 00:15:43,159 --> 00:15:45,090 agrees with the chiefs and the 405 00:15:45,090 --> 00:15:47,090 secretary is that this is something 406 00:15:47,090 --> 00:15:49,450 that needs to be focused on . Okay , 407 00:15:49,450 --> 00:15:53,060 Caitlin . Hello . 408 00:15:53,640 --> 00:15:55,790 Um , my question is , last week , 409 00:15:55,790 --> 00:15:58,012 several senators asked for installation 410 00:15:58,012 --> 00:16:00,179 level vaccination rates to be publicly 411 00:16:00,179 --> 00:16:02,690 released and mr , uh , policies . I 412 00:16:02,690 --> 00:16:04,857 hope I pronounced his name correctly , 413 00:16:04,857 --> 00:16:06,912 said that the request was reasonable 414 00:16:06,912 --> 00:16:09,246 and he would look into and look into it . 415 00:16:09,246 --> 00:16:11,468 Can you provide any update on when this 416 00:16:11,468 --> 00:16:13,801 information will be publicized ? Thanks . 417 00:16:13,801 --> 00:16:16,023 Great question , Caitlin . I don't have 418 00:16:16,023 --> 00:16:18,079 an update for you , but but I I have 419 00:16:18,079 --> 00:16:19,912 spoken to Mr Silas and he we are 420 00:16:19,912 --> 00:16:22,134 working on , uh , on trying to get that 421 00:16:22,134 --> 00:16:24,357 information publicly , releasable , and 422 00:16:24,357 --> 00:16:26,468 I suspect we'll be able to relatively 423 00:16:26,468 --> 00:16:28,690 soon . It's just we gotta we gotta work 424 00:16:28,690 --> 00:16:28,540 through the details of that here in the 425 00:16:28,540 --> 00:16:31,960 room . Jen John , back to the airstrike 426 00:16:31,970 --> 00:16:35,270 in eastern Syria . The militia member 427 00:16:35,270 --> 00:16:37,970 that was killed . Was he Iranian , or 428 00:16:37,970 --> 00:16:41,230 do you know the nationality and the 429 00:16:41,240 --> 00:16:43,660 There's a report that the Iranians have 430 00:16:43,670 --> 00:16:46,620 revealed a new , uh , drone that looks 431 00:16:46,620 --> 00:16:48,787 very similar to an American predator . 432 00:16:49,140 --> 00:16:51,251 Do you have any reaction to that ? Is 433 00:16:51,251 --> 00:16:53,418 it stolen plans ? Is that why it looks 434 00:16:53,418 --> 00:16:55,473 so similar to an American predator ? 435 00:16:55,473 --> 00:16:57,473 Haven't seen the footage of that or 436 00:16:57,473 --> 00:16:59,696 even heard a report of that . So let me 437 00:16:59,696 --> 00:17:01,696 get back to you on that . I don't I 438 00:17:01,696 --> 00:17:03,862 don't have a good answer for you today 439 00:17:03,862 --> 00:17:05,807 on the damage assessment from that 440 00:17:05,807 --> 00:17:08,029 strike you mentioned Casualty . But was 441 00:17:08,029 --> 00:17:10,084 there any assessment as to sort of ? 442 00:17:10,084 --> 00:17:12,370 We're weapons . Part of that , Uh , I 443 00:17:12,370 --> 00:17:14,426 don't have any more detail than what 444 00:17:14,426 --> 00:17:16,370 I've given you . Which is the nine 445 00:17:16,370 --> 00:17:18,370 buildings destroyed . And then I've 446 00:17:18,370 --> 00:17:20,314 given you what we know today to be 447 00:17:20,314 --> 00:17:22,537 personnel casualties . One killed , two 448 00:17:22,537 --> 00:17:25,040 wounded . Respond to what some of the 449 00:17:25,050 --> 00:17:27,106 militant groups are saying . This is 450 00:17:27,106 --> 00:17:28,939 just a pinprick . It had real no 451 00:17:28,939 --> 00:17:31,106 operational effect on them . I haven't 452 00:17:31,106 --> 00:17:33,217 seen those comments . I would go back 453 00:17:33,217 --> 00:17:35,383 to what I said last week that this was 454 00:17:35,383 --> 00:17:37,383 really designed to do two things to 455 00:17:37,383 --> 00:17:37,110 remove that compound from their 456 00:17:37,110 --> 00:17:39,320 utilization of it , Um , as an entry 457 00:17:39,320 --> 00:17:41,670 control point from Syria into Iraq and 458 00:17:41,670 --> 00:17:43,892 to send a very strong signal that we're 459 00:17:43,892 --> 00:17:45,948 not going to tolerate attacks on our 460 00:17:45,948 --> 00:17:48,114 people and our Iraqi partners . Let me 461 00:17:48,114 --> 00:17:50,226 go out here to the phones . Sandman , 462 00:17:51,940 --> 00:17:53,884 thank you for having the chance to 463 00:17:53,884 --> 00:17:55,996 question uh , I have a question about 464 00:17:55,996 --> 00:17:58,270 the U . S . Forces in Korea . So what 465 00:17:58,270 --> 00:18:00,200 is your position regarding the re 466 00:18:00,200 --> 00:18:02,710 studying the largest scale ? U S South 467 00:18:02,710 --> 00:18:05,090 Korea in 20 minutes of exercise and 468 00:18:05,090 --> 00:18:07,034 related to that . How is preparing 469 00:18:07,034 --> 00:18:09,690 going on coming ? The spring exercise 470 00:18:09,690 --> 00:18:12,730 in the march . I didn't get your last 471 00:18:12,730 --> 00:18:15,090 question . Before I ask you to repeat 472 00:18:15,090 --> 00:18:17,257 it , let me answer your first one . As 473 00:18:17,257 --> 00:18:19,201 you know , we don't talk about the 474 00:18:19,201 --> 00:18:21,201 specifics of training events , uh , 475 00:18:21,201 --> 00:18:23,368 there on the peninsula , except to say 476 00:18:23,368 --> 00:18:25,534 broadly . Um , uh , as we've said many 477 00:18:25,534 --> 00:18:27,757 times , training and readiness there is 478 00:18:27,757 --> 00:18:29,979 of utmost importance to the secretary , 479 00:18:29,979 --> 00:18:31,868 to the entire military and to our 480 00:18:31,868 --> 00:18:33,923 alliance , which is , as we said , a 481 00:18:33,923 --> 00:18:36,690 linchpin in the region . Uh , and the 482 00:18:36,690 --> 00:18:38,930 training events that we are and will 483 00:18:38,930 --> 00:18:41,152 conduct are going to be in keeping with 484 00:18:41,152 --> 00:18:43,374 making sure we maintain a high level of 485 00:18:43,374 --> 00:18:45,486 readiness . Your second question . So 486 00:18:45,486 --> 00:18:48,400 how is it going on the spring military 487 00:18:48,400 --> 00:18:50,567 exercise practice between us and South 488 00:18:50,567 --> 00:18:54,410 Korea ? How is it going on ? Yeah , has 489 00:18:54,410 --> 00:18:57,300 preparation going on again ? I won't 490 00:18:57,300 --> 00:18:59,470 speak to the details of , uh , of 491 00:18:59,470 --> 00:19:02,630 training there on the peninsula again . 492 00:19:02,640 --> 00:19:04,720 I would add we have a very close 493 00:19:04,730 --> 00:19:07,070 relationship . Serious alliance 494 00:19:07,070 --> 00:19:09,480 security alliance with the Republic of 495 00:19:09,480 --> 00:19:11,591 Korea . We take those obligations and 496 00:19:11,591 --> 00:19:13,647 responsibilities seriously . And all 497 00:19:13,647 --> 00:19:15,813 the exercises and training events that 498 00:19:15,813 --> 00:19:18,036 we conduct on the peninsula are done in 499 00:19:18,036 --> 00:19:21,480 lockstep with our Korean colleagues and 500 00:19:21,480 --> 00:19:23,950 allies . Okay . Here in the room . Yeah , 501 00:19:24,990 --> 00:19:27,920 about the serious strike . So , last 502 00:19:27,920 --> 00:19:29,809 week you said nine buildings were 503 00:19:29,809 --> 00:19:31,531 destroyed . Two buildings were 504 00:19:31,531 --> 00:19:33,642 partially destroyed and out of them , 505 00:19:33,642 --> 00:19:35,587 just to militias were killed . One 506 00:19:35,587 --> 00:19:37,698 militias were killed and two militias 507 00:19:37,698 --> 00:19:39,698 were wounded . Do you think that at 508 00:19:39,698 --> 00:19:41,920 some point did strike with telegraph to 509 00:19:42,440 --> 00:19:44,940 the group ? Because such a large 510 00:19:44,940 --> 00:19:47,280 compound was destroyed and just two 511 00:19:47,280 --> 00:19:49,990 people were wounded and one killed ? Uh 512 00:19:49,990 --> 00:19:53,460 huh . I'm not . Are you asking me if 513 00:19:54,040 --> 00:19:56,100 if you that somebody might have 514 00:19:56,310 --> 00:19:58,780 telegraphed the strike the U . S . 515 00:19:58,780 --> 00:20:02,550 Strike Well , I we have no indication 516 00:20:02,550 --> 00:20:06,360 that that that that occurred . Okay ? 517 00:20:07,240 --> 00:20:09,710 Yeah . Yes . I have a two part question 518 00:20:09,710 --> 00:20:12,310 on vaccinations . Um , the first part 519 00:20:12,320 --> 00:20:14,560 is , um , there's been numbers coming 520 00:20:14,560 --> 00:20:16,782 out that a third of service members are 521 00:20:16,782 --> 00:20:18,949 refusing to get the vaccination . Um , 522 00:20:18,949 --> 00:20:21,800 what is Secretary Austin doing to 523 00:20:21,810 --> 00:20:24,900 motivate black service members or 524 00:20:24,900 --> 00:20:27,067 minority service members to want to do 525 00:20:27,067 --> 00:20:29,233 it ? Because a lot of the concerns are 526 00:20:29,233 --> 00:20:31,456 testing out different vaccines on black 527 00:20:31,456 --> 00:20:33,678 communities and the impact it's had . I 528 00:20:33,678 --> 00:20:35,567 know , he mentioned speaking with 529 00:20:35,567 --> 00:20:37,733 health care officials . But honestly , 530 00:20:37,733 --> 00:20:37,380 as you know as an African American 531 00:20:37,380 --> 00:20:39,720 myself , you know it's still in the 532 00:20:39,720 --> 00:20:41,720 back of our minds like , you know , 533 00:20:41,720 --> 00:20:43,831 kind of hesitant to do it . So that's 534 00:20:43,831 --> 00:20:45,609 the first question . And then , 535 00:20:45,609 --> 00:20:45,580 secondly , do you feel it's going to 536 00:20:45,580 --> 00:20:49,030 impact the force if you don't have 537 00:20:49,030 --> 00:20:51,363 service members getting the vaccination ? 538 00:20:51,363 --> 00:20:53,530 How is that going to impact them being 539 00:20:53,530 --> 00:20:55,697 able to deploy on a moment's notice if 540 00:20:55,697 --> 00:20:57,863 you have those who are refusing to get 541 00:20:57,863 --> 00:21:00,086 it ? So the secretary talked about this 542 00:21:00,086 --> 00:20:59,680 last week when we were out in Los 543 00:20:59,680 --> 00:21:01,847 Angeles , and he was asking a question 544 00:21:01,847 --> 00:21:03,958 very similar to the one that you just 545 00:21:03,958 --> 00:21:06,960 asked . And he's mindful that there are , 546 00:21:07,540 --> 00:21:11,360 uh , cultural and community concerns in 547 00:21:11,360 --> 00:21:14,490 many with many people of color about 548 00:21:14,500 --> 00:21:17,500 the vaccine . Some of it's based on on 549 00:21:17,510 --> 00:21:19,566 some painful history , and he and he 550 00:21:19,566 --> 00:21:22,080 mentioned that as well . Uh , that's 551 00:21:22,080 --> 00:21:24,247 one of the reasons he wanted to go see 552 00:21:24,247 --> 00:21:26,302 that site and to talk to people that 553 00:21:26,302 --> 00:21:29,620 were there . Uh , as he said , last 554 00:21:29,620 --> 00:21:31,731 week . And I think you saw him saying 555 00:21:31,731 --> 00:21:33,990 in his video he , uh , received the 556 00:21:33,990 --> 00:21:36,046 vaccine himself , and he felt it was 557 00:21:36,046 --> 00:21:38,101 important to let people know that he 558 00:21:38,101 --> 00:21:39,990 looked into it . He talked to his 559 00:21:39,990 --> 00:21:42,046 doctor . He talked to his family and 560 00:21:42,046 --> 00:21:41,320 decided it was the right thing to do 561 00:21:41,320 --> 00:21:44,610 for him and what he believes . And he 562 00:21:44,610 --> 00:21:46,832 said this also very , I think , plainly 563 00:21:46,832 --> 00:21:48,570 was that he believes we in the 564 00:21:48,570 --> 00:21:50,620 department need to do a better job 565 00:21:50,630 --> 00:21:53,150 providing the right kind of information 566 00:21:53,150 --> 00:21:55,039 and context , or at least getting 567 00:21:55,039 --> 00:21:57,350 people pointed to the right context and 568 00:21:57,350 --> 00:21:59,517 information about the vaccines so that 569 00:21:59,517 --> 00:22:01,517 they can make similar decisions for 570 00:22:01,517 --> 00:22:03,572 themselves . Talk to their doctors , 571 00:22:03,572 --> 00:22:05,683 ask about their own health conditions 572 00:22:05,683 --> 00:22:07,850 which may or may not play into whether 573 00:22:07,850 --> 00:22:10,017 they can get the vaccine . Um , and to 574 00:22:10,017 --> 00:22:12,017 try to make the best decisions that 575 00:22:12,017 --> 00:22:14,072 they can not just for themselves but 576 00:22:14,072 --> 00:22:13,580 for their families and , frankly , for 577 00:22:13,580 --> 00:22:15,802 the team . And this gets to your second 578 00:22:15,802 --> 00:22:17,969 question . I mean , I mean , it is all 579 00:22:17,969 --> 00:22:19,802 it is a team here , Uh , and the 580 00:22:19,802 --> 00:22:21,913 secretary again wants the information 581 00:22:21,913 --> 00:22:24,080 to get out as much as possible so that 582 00:22:24,080 --> 00:22:26,580 people can realize that ? Um , yes , 583 00:22:26,580 --> 00:22:28,850 it's a personal decision to get it or 584 00:22:28,850 --> 00:22:30,960 not to get it . In many cases , some 585 00:22:30,960 --> 00:22:33,182 people aren't allowed to get it because 586 00:22:33,182 --> 00:22:35,182 their doctors won't let them or pre 587 00:22:35,182 --> 00:22:37,127 existing conditions , that kind of 588 00:22:37,127 --> 00:22:39,071 thing . But in many cases , it's a 589 00:22:39,071 --> 00:22:38,950 personal decision . But it's also a 590 00:22:38,950 --> 00:22:41,117 decision , and this is what he wants . 591 00:22:41,117 --> 00:22:43,172 Service members remember that it's a 592 00:22:43,172 --> 00:22:45,339 decision that you're making . Also for 593 00:22:45,339 --> 00:22:47,561 your teammates , Uh , and for your unit 594 00:22:47,561 --> 00:22:49,783 readiness . Uh , so that's very much on 595 00:22:49,783 --> 00:22:51,670 his mind . We , you know , we've 596 00:22:51,680 --> 00:22:55,360 administered now 1,144,000 597 00:22:55,740 --> 00:22:59,600 697 doses out 598 00:22:59,600 --> 00:23:00,770 of one million 599 00:23:01,140 --> 00:23:05,100 275,925 doses that delivered . 600 00:23:05,100 --> 00:23:07,550 So they're not staying on the shelf 601 00:23:07,550 --> 00:23:10,210 very long . We get them and we put them 602 00:23:10,210 --> 00:23:12,530 into arms . Um , and , uh , you know , 603 00:23:12,530 --> 00:23:14,780 735,000 of those are initial dose is 604 00:23:14,780 --> 00:23:18,510 409,000 our second doses . Um , 605 00:23:18,520 --> 00:23:21,370 so we're going to continue to make 606 00:23:21,370 --> 00:23:24,320 these available in the proper schema , 607 00:23:24,330 --> 00:23:26,930 Uh , to those to those that most need 608 00:23:26,930 --> 00:23:29,097 it , including troops that are getting 609 00:23:29,097 --> 00:23:31,208 ready to deploy . That's very much on 610 00:23:31,208 --> 00:23:33,541 his mind is , if you're going to deploy , 611 00:23:33,541 --> 00:23:33,430 we want to make sure you have access to 612 00:23:33,430 --> 00:23:36,900 it before you go , so that so that you 613 00:23:36,900 --> 00:23:39,580 can so that you can properly protect 614 00:23:39,580 --> 00:23:41,747 your teammates and protect the country 615 00:23:41,747 --> 00:23:43,969 with the Johnson and Johnson , one that 616 00:23:43,969 --> 00:23:45,747 just got approved for emergency 617 00:23:45,747 --> 00:23:47,858 thoughts or is that gives us a little 618 00:23:47,858 --> 00:23:49,858 bit more flexibility . We expect to 619 00:23:49,858 --> 00:23:52,024 start getting those doses delivered to 620 00:23:52,024 --> 00:23:54,136 us in the next week or so and because 621 00:23:54,136 --> 00:23:54,010 it doesn't have the same refrigeration 622 00:23:54,010 --> 00:23:56,177 requirements and because it's a single 623 00:23:56,177 --> 00:23:58,399 dose vaccine with equal effectiveness , 624 00:23:58,600 --> 00:24:00,767 it will give us additional flexibility 625 00:24:00,767 --> 00:24:03,060 to take care of or to provide it to 626 00:24:03,840 --> 00:24:06,580 deploying and deployed troops . Well , 627 00:24:06,580 --> 00:24:08,636 that being said , though , for those 628 00:24:08,636 --> 00:24:10,469 who you say they need to get the 629 00:24:10,469 --> 00:24:12,524 vaccine before they deploy , if they 630 00:24:12,524 --> 00:24:14,747 say I don't want to get it or will they 631 00:24:14,747 --> 00:24:16,858 will there be repercussions , or will 632 00:24:16,858 --> 00:24:16,670 the military at some point say Okay , 633 00:24:16,670 --> 00:24:19,070 look , we have to require these folks 634 00:24:19,070 --> 00:24:21,070 to get vaccinations because if they 635 00:24:21,070 --> 00:24:23,126 don't , you're gonna If you run into 636 00:24:23,126 --> 00:24:25,348 that rut of someone saying , well , you 637 00:24:25,348 --> 00:24:25,260 know what ? I'm not gonna take the 638 00:24:25,260 --> 00:24:27,371 vaccination , but I'll still deploy . 639 00:24:27,371 --> 00:24:29,482 We don't tell them you have to get it 640 00:24:29,482 --> 00:24:31,593 before you deploy . But for deploying 641 00:24:31,593 --> 00:24:33,649 units , we make it available to them 642 00:24:33,649 --> 00:24:35,704 because it is still voluntary . Um , 643 00:24:35,704 --> 00:24:37,927 And again , part of our obligation here 644 00:24:37,927 --> 00:24:40,038 and the secretary spoke to this is to 645 00:24:40,038 --> 00:24:42,204 provide enough information so they can 646 00:24:42,204 --> 00:24:44,371 make the most informed decision . Um , 647 00:24:44,371 --> 00:24:46,482 we're not in a mandatory , uh , place 648 00:24:46,482 --> 00:24:48,649 right now . The secretary , you know , 649 00:24:48,649 --> 00:24:50,649 understands that , um , and because 650 00:24:50,649 --> 00:24:52,760 it's because it's voluntary , we want 651 00:24:52,760 --> 00:24:54,982 to make sure again that people have the 652 00:24:54,982 --> 00:24:57,149 right context on that . You talk about 653 00:24:57,149 --> 00:24:59,260 readiness . Let's say you're a member 654 00:24:59,260 --> 00:25:01,427 of a ready brigade of the 82nd who has 655 00:25:01,427 --> 00:25:03,593 to deploy very quickly . And let's say 656 00:25:03,593 --> 00:25:05,740 there's a cluster of soldiers in that 657 00:25:05,750 --> 00:25:07,694 unit that doesn't want to take the 658 00:25:07,694 --> 00:25:09,639 vaccine . Do you leave those folks 659 00:25:09,639 --> 00:25:11,750 behind and deploy ? What's the What's 660 00:25:11,750 --> 00:25:13,917 the way ahead on something like that ? 661 00:25:13,917 --> 00:25:16,139 Would you know those kinds of decisions 662 00:25:16,139 --> 00:25:18,306 would be made by unit commanders , not 663 00:25:18,306 --> 00:25:20,600 by the Pentagon , I mean , So I 664 00:25:20,600 --> 00:25:22,433 wouldn't you know , I I couldn't 665 00:25:22,433 --> 00:25:24,711 speculate on that kind of hypothetical . 666 00:25:24,711 --> 00:25:26,656 It's important to remember that in 667 00:25:26,656 --> 00:25:28,378 addition to making the vaccine 668 00:25:28,378 --> 00:25:30,378 available , that our commanders are 669 00:25:30,378 --> 00:25:32,322 also complying with CDC guidelines 670 00:25:32,322 --> 00:25:34,489 about social distancing and the use of 671 00:25:34,489 --> 00:25:36,544 masks . And I mean , the Nimitz just 672 00:25:36,544 --> 00:25:38,711 came home after 11 months . Uh , and I 673 00:25:38,711 --> 00:25:40,740 think they had a total of one covid 674 00:25:40,740 --> 00:25:43,018 case that they dealt with on an entire , 675 00:25:43,018 --> 00:25:46,220 uh , deployment . Uh , and they they 676 00:25:46,230 --> 00:25:48,119 there was not There were vaccines 677 00:25:48,119 --> 00:25:50,397 weren't part of that calculus for them . 678 00:25:50,397 --> 00:25:52,619 So there are things that commanders can 679 00:25:52,619 --> 00:25:54,841 do to minimize the risk , but it's left 680 00:25:54,841 --> 00:25:58,100 at the unit commander to work their way 681 00:25:58,100 --> 00:26:00,267 through that . Let me go to the phones 682 00:26:00,267 --> 00:26:04,230 here just a little bit . Noticed a 683 00:26:04,240 --> 00:26:08,130 difference . Since you have 704 684 00:26:08,130 --> 00:26:10,940 109,000 of the second shots , Have you 685 00:26:10,940 --> 00:26:13,051 noticed a drop in the number of covid 686 00:26:13,051 --> 00:26:15,450 cases within D o D Since the 687 00:26:15,840 --> 00:26:18,090 vaccination efforts started work , I 688 00:26:18,100 --> 00:26:21,260 uhh I don't know . I have to pull the 689 00:26:21,260 --> 00:26:24,600 data . Jim , I'm not sure if we've seen 690 00:26:24,600 --> 00:26:27,640 a a decrease in cases as a result of 691 00:26:27,720 --> 00:26:31,250 all these being administered , um , to 692 00:26:31,260 --> 00:26:33,482 be a selling point for these people who 693 00:26:33,482 --> 00:26:35,538 don't want to take it also Well , we 694 00:26:35,538 --> 00:26:37,482 certainly hope so that people will 695 00:26:37,482 --> 00:26:39,371 again see that these are safe and 696 00:26:39,371 --> 00:26:41,316 effective and the side effects are 697 00:26:41,316 --> 00:26:43,427 minimal and that their colleagues and 698 00:26:43,427 --> 00:26:45,593 teammates are vaccinating themselves . 699 00:26:45,640 --> 00:26:47,880 Um , total cumulative cases in the 700 00:26:47,880 --> 00:26:51,380 department of 250,597 . I don't have it 701 00:26:51,380 --> 00:26:53,540 broken down by a month , but and I 702 00:26:53,540 --> 00:26:56,270 don't have that specific piece of data . 703 00:26:56,740 --> 00:27:00,740 Laura Seligman . Hi , John . 704 00:27:00,740 --> 00:27:02,740 Thanks for doing this . Um , I just 705 00:27:02,740 --> 00:27:05,000 wanted to follow up on the peace about 706 00:27:05,000 --> 00:27:07,222 Ukraine . I'm just wondering if you can 707 00:27:07,222 --> 00:27:09,333 give us a little bit more information 708 00:27:09,333 --> 00:27:11,500 about what additional kinds of weapons 709 00:27:11,500 --> 00:27:14,220 and support your providing . I believe 710 00:27:14,230 --> 00:27:16,890 you're already it . Will it be anti 711 00:27:16,890 --> 00:27:19,740 ship missiles and patrol boats ? Will 712 00:27:19,740 --> 00:27:21,851 there be additional javelins that are 713 00:27:21,851 --> 00:27:23,684 given , um , and then what other 714 00:27:23,684 --> 00:27:25,796 efforts might be undertaken to ensure 715 00:27:25,796 --> 00:27:28,100 that the Ukrainian government is going 716 00:27:28,100 --> 00:27:31,900 after corruption ? Right . Uh , so good 717 00:27:31,900 --> 00:27:34,067 question . The package announced today 718 00:27:34,067 --> 00:27:36,178 will include to mark for armed patrol 719 00:27:36,178 --> 00:27:38,400 boats that will help Ukraine defend its 720 00:27:38,400 --> 00:27:40,567 territorial waters . That will include 721 00:27:40,567 --> 00:27:42,622 some training equipment and advisory 722 00:27:42,622 --> 00:27:44,733 efforts from us . Um , this would now 723 00:27:44,733 --> 00:27:46,789 make our commitment a total of eight 724 00:27:46,789 --> 00:27:50,770 patrol boats to in FY 21 FY 725 00:27:50,770 --> 00:27:52,870 20 and then four through military 726 00:27:52,870 --> 00:27:55,600 financing with state . Um , there are 727 00:27:55,600 --> 00:27:58,190 no javelin missiles included in this 728 00:27:58,190 --> 00:28:00,790 package . As I said , these , uh , that 729 00:28:00,800 --> 00:28:03,450 it was largely these patrol boats , um , 730 00:28:03,460 --> 00:28:07,360 and then to your other point . Laura , 731 00:28:07,360 --> 00:28:09,304 we obviously continue to encourage 732 00:28:09,304 --> 00:28:11,530 Ukraine to continue to enact reforms to 733 00:28:11,530 --> 00:28:14,570 modernize the defense sector in line 734 00:28:14,570 --> 00:28:16,626 with NATO principles and standards . 735 00:28:16,626 --> 00:28:18,626 And we obviously stand committed to 736 00:28:18,626 --> 00:28:21,110 helping assist Ukraine , uh , in 737 00:28:21,110 --> 00:28:23,330 implementing these reforms on civil 738 00:28:23,330 --> 00:28:25,330 military control and leadership and 739 00:28:25,330 --> 00:28:27,552 proper proper management of the their , 740 00:28:27,552 --> 00:28:30,560 uh , their defense . And if I could 741 00:28:30,560 --> 00:28:33,810 just follow up are as Ukraine paying us 742 00:28:33,810 --> 00:28:37,430 for the patrol boats , or are we doing 743 00:28:37,440 --> 00:28:39,860 them all through foreign military aid ? 744 00:28:40,340 --> 00:28:42,118 This is this is through foreign 745 00:28:42,118 --> 00:28:44,007 military financing with the State 746 00:28:44,007 --> 00:28:47,170 Department . David , you said 747 00:28:47,640 --> 00:28:50,160 vaccines are not mandatory yet . Um , 748 00:28:50,740 --> 00:28:52,962 as the department made a decision about 749 00:28:52,962 --> 00:28:55,250 whether they will become mandatory when 750 00:28:56,040 --> 00:28:59,760 when they get full FDA approval ? No . 751 00:29:01,040 --> 00:29:04,230 Yeah , we haven't . Still these are 752 00:29:04,230 --> 00:29:07,030 still under emergency authorization . 753 00:29:07,040 --> 00:29:10,240 And so right now they are . They're 754 00:29:10,260 --> 00:29:13,740 still voluntary . Devoted through . I'm 755 00:29:13,740 --> 00:29:15,629 not gonna say . Obviously , we're 756 00:29:15,840 --> 00:29:18,050 thinking about what happens when they 757 00:29:18,050 --> 00:29:20,106 become FDA approved . That certainly 758 00:29:20,106 --> 00:29:22,580 would make a decision . Uh , it would 759 00:29:22,580 --> 00:29:24,636 change the character of the decision 760 00:29:24,636 --> 00:29:26,858 making process about whether they could 761 00:29:26,858 --> 00:29:29,080 be mandatory or voluntary . But I don't 762 00:29:29,080 --> 00:29:31,302 want to get ahead of that process right 763 00:29:31,302 --> 00:29:35,180 now . Back fear going back , going 764 00:29:35,180 --> 00:29:38,670 back to the Saudi issue . Is it time to 765 00:29:38,680 --> 00:29:41,780 reconsider the measures that are taken 766 00:29:41,840 --> 00:29:44,970 to deny that the Houthi from receiving 767 00:29:44,970 --> 00:29:47,610 more arms from Iran ? And do you 768 00:29:47,610 --> 00:29:50,860 believe also that Saudi have enough to 769 00:29:50,860 --> 00:29:53,460 protect themselves and to also protect 770 00:29:53,460 --> 00:29:55,571 their citizens and the U . S . People 771 00:29:55,571 --> 00:29:57,682 who are living within their country ? 772 00:29:57,840 --> 00:30:01,190 Right of this one is the one who these 773 00:30:01,190 --> 00:30:04,720 are receiving arms and Saudi is under 774 00:30:04,720 --> 00:30:07,670 attack . The these are , 775 00:30:08,240 --> 00:30:11,850 um , continue to receive support . 776 00:30:11,860 --> 00:30:15,830 Um , from Iran . Um , and 777 00:30:15,840 --> 00:30:17,896 we're working with the international 778 00:30:17,896 --> 00:30:19,951 community to try to find a political 779 00:30:19,951 --> 00:30:23,350 end to this conflict and to , um uh , 780 00:30:23,840 --> 00:30:27,630 and to try to limit that support that 781 00:30:27,630 --> 00:30:31,310 they get . As for Saudi Arabia , um , 782 00:30:31,320 --> 00:30:33,209 again , I go back to what we said 783 00:30:33,209 --> 00:30:35,153 before . I mean , we have security 784 00:30:35,153 --> 00:30:37,264 commitments there to help them defend 785 00:30:37,264 --> 00:30:39,487 their territory , and it is still under 786 00:30:39,487 --> 00:30:41,487 attack , as we've seen in just just 787 00:30:41,487 --> 00:30:44,180 recent days . Um , and so we take that 788 00:30:44,190 --> 00:30:47,460 responsibility seriously . Okay . 789 00:30:47,840 --> 00:30:50,960 Uh , let me go back to the phones , 790 00:30:52,640 --> 00:30:55,170 dance the gallon PBS . Hi , John . 791 00:30:55,170 --> 00:30:58,200 Thanks . So I noticed that the charter 792 00:30:58,200 --> 00:31:00,422 or the memo that was released on Friday 793 00:31:00,422 --> 00:31:02,478 evening , um , for the Commission on 794 00:31:02,478 --> 00:31:04,300 Sexual Assault says a high risk 795 00:31:04,310 --> 00:31:06,440 installations report and its findings 796 00:31:06,440 --> 00:31:08,650 will be submitted . Um , can you tell 797 00:31:08,650 --> 00:31:10,420 us what is the definition of 798 00:31:10,430 --> 00:31:12,541 installations that are high risk ? Is 799 00:31:12,541 --> 00:31:14,541 there a precise definition ? How is 800 00:31:14,541 --> 00:31:16,950 that determined and , well d o d hold 801 00:31:16,950 --> 00:31:19,172 people accountable for these facilities 802 00:31:19,172 --> 00:31:21,061 being high risk ? I don't believe 803 00:31:21,061 --> 00:31:23,228 there's a specific definition for what 804 00:31:23,228 --> 00:31:25,430 is high risk at this point . That's , 805 00:31:25,440 --> 00:31:29,310 uh , I mean , we're working with each 806 00:31:29,310 --> 00:31:31,740 of the services to to look at 807 00:31:31,740 --> 00:31:33,780 themselves as to what installations 808 00:31:33,790 --> 00:31:37,310 they believe , uh , have or need to 809 00:31:37,310 --> 00:31:39,421 improve , have climate issues or need 810 00:31:39,421 --> 00:31:41,366 to improve climate issues . Uh , I 811 00:31:41,366 --> 00:31:43,310 don't know that there's a specific 812 00:31:43,310 --> 00:31:45,421 definition for for what is or what is 813 00:31:45,421 --> 00:31:47,310 it and and your second question , 814 00:31:47,640 --> 00:31:49,473 accountability . So if they find 815 00:31:49,473 --> 00:31:52,370 installations that are high risk , are 816 00:31:52,370 --> 00:31:54,481 they going to , you know , anyone can 817 00:31:54,481 --> 00:31:54,310 be held accountable for these 818 00:31:54,310 --> 00:31:56,532 installations being high risk ? I think 819 00:31:56,532 --> 00:31:58,588 it's going to depend on what we find 820 00:31:58,588 --> 00:32:00,754 that some of these installations Dan I 821 00:32:00,754 --> 00:32:02,921 mean some of , uh , some of the issues 822 00:32:02,921 --> 00:32:05,090 that might make an installation high 823 00:32:05,090 --> 00:32:07,920 risk , uh , can be solved by better 824 00:32:07,920 --> 00:32:11,770 programs , better policies . And , you 825 00:32:11,770 --> 00:32:14,620 know , there may be other situations . 826 00:32:14,630 --> 00:32:16,380 Uh , you know where leadership 827 00:32:16,380 --> 00:32:18,547 accountability has to be factored in . 828 00:32:18,547 --> 00:32:20,436 But I wouldn't get ahead of those 829 00:32:20,436 --> 00:32:23,080 decisions right now . Back . Thank you 830 00:32:23,080 --> 00:32:26,210 for taking my question . The previous 831 00:32:26,210 --> 00:32:28,610 administration expressed strong 832 00:32:28,620 --> 00:32:31,790 interest in deploying a lot based 833 00:32:31,800 --> 00:32:34,370 intermediate range missiles to the in 834 00:32:34,370 --> 00:32:36,400 the Pacific region after the Iron 835 00:32:36,410 --> 00:32:40,180 Pretty was terminated . What is abiding 836 00:32:40,190 --> 00:32:42,950 administration's position on this issue ? 837 00:32:42,960 --> 00:32:46,540 Do you continue to consider the blowing 838 00:32:46,550 --> 00:32:49,500 that capability to the in the past week ? 839 00:32:49,510 --> 00:32:52,060 Region . I think that that's the kind 840 00:32:52,060 --> 00:32:54,227 of thing that will we'll be looking at 841 00:32:54,227 --> 00:32:57,500 in our global posture review . And I 842 00:32:57,510 --> 00:33:00,490 think that all factors into what 843 00:33:00,500 --> 00:33:02,860 resources you're applying against what 844 00:33:02,860 --> 00:33:04,971 strategy and what part of the world . 845 00:33:04,971 --> 00:33:07,120 Uh , and I don't have anything to 846 00:33:07,120 --> 00:33:09,231 announce today with respect to that . 847 00:33:09,231 --> 00:33:11,560 But clearly our defensive posture , 848 00:33:12,040 --> 00:33:15,340 which includes not just people but 849 00:33:15,350 --> 00:33:17,350 resources and systems , will all be 850 00:33:17,350 --> 00:33:19,406 part of this global posture review . 851 00:33:19,406 --> 00:33:21,720 Okay , yes , they're following Tom's 852 00:33:21,720 --> 00:33:24,100 question when you're looking at small 853 00:33:24,100 --> 00:33:26,320 teams . Some of the Special Forces 854 00:33:26,330 --> 00:33:28,970 units that are sent What do you do for 855 00:33:28,980 --> 00:33:31,220 that unit ? Safety If , say , half the 856 00:33:31,220 --> 00:33:33,276 team doesn't want to get a vaccine , 857 00:33:33,276 --> 00:33:35,498 Does this whole team still deploy ? And 858 00:33:35,498 --> 00:33:37,720 are you really impacting readiness ? At 859 00:33:37,720 --> 00:33:39,498 that point , I won't get into a 860 00:33:39,498 --> 00:33:41,960 hypothetical terror . We haven't faced 861 00:33:42,440 --> 00:33:45,770 that issue yet . Uh , 862 00:33:47,440 --> 00:33:50,410 we can't make these members take the 863 00:33:50,410 --> 00:33:54,280 vaccine , but we can employ 864 00:33:54,290 --> 00:33:56,790 and do employ CDC guidelines to try to 865 00:33:56,790 --> 00:33:59,060 keep units safe . It just hasn't been 866 00:33:59,540 --> 00:34:01,651 that I'm aware of . We haven't had an 867 00:34:01,651 --> 00:34:04,130 issue specifically with a deploying 868 00:34:04,130 --> 00:34:07,500 unit in that regard . Uh , but again , 869 00:34:07,500 --> 00:34:09,722 I I wouldn't get ahead of the decisions 870 00:34:09,722 --> 00:34:11,944 that unit commanders might make going . 871 00:34:11,944 --> 00:34:14,056 Going forward , it just hasn't been , 872 00:34:14,056 --> 00:34:17,040 um , at this point , it hasn't had a 873 00:34:17,040 --> 00:34:20,350 specific impact that I'm aware of . Um , 874 00:34:20,360 --> 00:34:22,870 let me go back to the phones . Paul 875 00:34:22,870 --> 00:34:26,750 Shankman . Yeah . Hi , John . Uh , 876 00:34:26,760 --> 00:34:29,038 follow up to the question about Israel , 877 00:34:29,038 --> 00:34:31,149 and then I've got a separate question 878 00:34:31,149 --> 00:34:33,371 about Nigeria . Um , so there have been 879 00:34:33,371 --> 00:34:35,316 some reports that Israel conducted 880 00:34:35,316 --> 00:34:37,371 strikes in Syria against pro Iranian 881 00:34:37,371 --> 00:34:39,538 forces . I think that was last night . 882 00:34:39,538 --> 00:34:41,649 Um , did Israel coordinate those with 883 00:34:41,649 --> 00:34:43,816 the U . S . And should we see those as 884 00:34:43,816 --> 00:34:45,982 any sort of connection to the response 885 00:34:45,982 --> 00:34:47,982 to the U . S . Response we saw last 886 00:34:47,982 --> 00:34:50,149 week against Abu Kamal . Uh , I'd have 887 00:34:50,149 --> 00:34:52,371 to point you to the idea of to speak to 888 00:34:52,371 --> 00:34:54,538 their military operations . Paul , I'm 889 00:34:54,538 --> 00:34:57,520 not capable of doing that . Okay . And 890 00:34:57,520 --> 00:35:00,570 then on Nigeria , we saw what some are 891 00:35:00,570 --> 00:35:02,292 describing as the largest ever 892 00:35:02,292 --> 00:35:04,348 kidnapping of schoolgirls a few days 893 00:35:04,348 --> 00:35:07,310 ago . Um , the U . S . Military in 2014 894 00:35:07,320 --> 00:35:08,970 helped lead a pretty massive 895 00:35:08,970 --> 00:35:10,970 mobilization of resources to try to 896 00:35:10,970 --> 00:35:13,480 find a separate set of kidnapped girls . 897 00:35:13,480 --> 00:35:15,790 I believe that was during your your 898 00:35:15,790 --> 00:35:18,730 prior tenure as a spokesman . I wonder , 899 00:35:18,730 --> 00:35:21,440 is there any US involvement or plans 900 00:35:21,440 --> 00:35:23,662 for potential U . S involvement in this 901 00:35:23,662 --> 00:35:25,996 latest case ? And if not , um , why not ? 902 00:35:26,340 --> 00:35:28,507 I know of no operations right now with 903 00:35:28,507 --> 00:35:30,507 respect to that , Paul . And as you 904 00:35:30,507 --> 00:35:32,007 know , we're careful about 905 00:35:32,007 --> 00:35:34,229 hypothesizing on on future operations . 906 00:35:34,229 --> 00:35:36,450 I don't I don't have anything to 907 00:35:36,460 --> 00:35:40,400 announce on today . On that , Yeah . 908 00:35:40,510 --> 00:35:42,950 Again . Yes . I'd like to know about 909 00:35:42,950 --> 00:35:46,250 the FEMA response . So there were an 910 00:35:46,250 --> 00:35:50,110 initial 1000 troops that 911 00:35:50,120 --> 00:35:51,787 went out to help the sites in 912 00:35:51,787 --> 00:35:53,953 California . Are there any other plans 913 00:35:53,953 --> 00:35:56,009 yet for rollout sites and more troop 914 00:35:56,009 --> 00:35:59,080 levels ? Yep . So I've got , um if I 915 00:35:59,080 --> 00:36:00,580 can just find it in here . 916 00:36:03,030 --> 00:36:04,141 Yeah . Here we go . 917 00:36:05,930 --> 00:36:09,760 Um , so I think , you 918 00:36:09,760 --> 00:36:12,750 know , obviously we got the 919 00:36:14,330 --> 00:36:18,090 the site in California . 222 people . 920 00:36:18,090 --> 00:36:21,870 Source from the army . We have 25 921 00:36:21,880 --> 00:36:24,710 small team of 25 in New Jersey . 922 00:36:24,720 --> 00:36:28,460 Uh , and 2 25 923 00:36:28,470 --> 00:36:31,830 personnel teams , uh , as well in 924 00:36:31,840 --> 00:36:33,729 Trenton . Violent . Elizabeth and 925 00:36:33,729 --> 00:36:35,729 Camden . Those are sourced from the 926 00:36:35,729 --> 00:36:39,320 army and the navy . Um , uh , there are 927 00:36:39,320 --> 00:36:42,280 two small teams that are en route 928 00:36:42,290 --> 00:36:44,910 Queens into Brooklyn . That source from 929 00:36:44,910 --> 00:36:47,610 the Navy and the Air Force , Uh , in 930 00:36:47,610 --> 00:36:49,888 Texas . And I can get all this for you . 931 00:36:49,888 --> 00:36:52,040 Uh , there's a type one team . And to 932 00:36:52,040 --> 00:36:55,560 type two teams , um , those are sourced 933 00:36:55,560 --> 00:36:57,616 from the Air Force , Army and Marine 934 00:36:57,616 --> 00:36:59,782 Corps . Uh , we also have a small team 935 00:36:59,782 --> 00:37:01,949 of 25 sourced by the Army and the Navy 936 00:37:01,949 --> 00:37:04,060 and the Virgin Islands . Um , we have 937 00:37:04,630 --> 00:37:07,340 four type two teams . This is 139 938 00:37:07,340 --> 00:37:10,960 personnel that , um that would have 939 00:37:10,960 --> 00:37:13,890 been a sign , but not sourced in 940 00:37:13,890 --> 00:37:16,440 Florida . In sites in Miami , Tampa , 941 00:37:16,440 --> 00:37:19,340 Orlando and Jacksonville . One type one 942 00:37:19,340 --> 00:37:22,050 team . This is the big team of 222 943 00:37:22,430 --> 00:37:24,870 assigned but not sourced yet for 944 00:37:24,870 --> 00:37:27,010 Pennsylvania and another small team 945 00:37:27,010 --> 00:37:29,400 going to New Jersey , Uh , somewhere 946 00:37:29,400 --> 00:37:33,380 around the middle of March , Um , seems 947 00:37:33,380 --> 00:37:35,940 true for North Carolina . One type two 948 00:37:35,940 --> 00:37:38,370 team to go to Greensboro . Not sourced 949 00:37:38,370 --> 00:37:40,426 yet , So I don't have I don't have a 950 00:37:40,426 --> 00:37:42,670 sourcing on that , Uh , a likewise in 951 00:37:42,670 --> 00:37:44,503 Illinois , Another type one team 952 00:37:44,503 --> 00:37:46,740 heading to Chicago . But again , we 953 00:37:46,740 --> 00:37:48,907 don't have , uh , that source , and we 954 00:37:48,907 --> 00:37:51,250 don't have a time a time on it . Yeah , 955 00:37:51,430 --> 00:37:53,430 you have dates for any of those and 956 00:37:53,430 --> 00:37:55,597 total numbers of truth . As I said , I 957 00:37:55,597 --> 00:37:58,660 mean , I was Uhh . Yeah , yeah , 958 00:37:59,030 --> 00:38:01,660 On the North Carolina and Illinois , I 959 00:38:01,660 --> 00:38:04,740 don't have time frames for Florida . 960 00:38:04,750 --> 00:38:08,150 We are hoping to get them on the ground 961 00:38:08,160 --> 00:38:10,327 by the third . So that's the day after 962 00:38:10,327 --> 00:38:12,160 tomorrow saying with the team in 963 00:38:12,160 --> 00:38:14,100 Pennsylvania , the small , small 964 00:38:14,100 --> 00:38:16,322 additional team in New Jersey , we hope 965 00:38:16,322 --> 00:38:18,378 to have by the middle of the march . 966 00:38:18,378 --> 00:38:21,180 Okay . Thanks , Joe . Yeah . Last 967 00:38:21,180 --> 00:38:23,180 question to you , Joe . Thank you , 968 00:38:23,180 --> 00:38:25,236 John , following the strike in Syria 969 00:38:25,236 --> 00:38:26,902 last week , could you confirm 970 00:38:27,320 --> 00:38:29,487 additional security measures have been 971 00:38:29,487 --> 00:38:32,070 taken to protect the U . S . Embassy in 972 00:38:32,070 --> 00:38:35,110 Baghdad ? Our commanders and our 973 00:38:35,110 --> 00:38:37,530 ambassadors always have the right of 974 00:38:37,530 --> 00:38:39,530 self defense . And you know , Joe , 975 00:38:39,530 --> 00:38:41,530 that we don't talk about additional 976 00:38:41,530 --> 00:38:43,641 force protection measures that we put 977 00:38:43,641 --> 00:38:45,752 in place . But I think you can assume 978 00:38:45,770 --> 00:38:48,290 that our commanders and our and our 979 00:38:48,300 --> 00:38:50,467 lead diplomats anywhere in the world , 980 00:38:50,467 --> 00:38:52,522 but particularly in that part of the 981 00:38:52,522 --> 00:38:54,578 world will take all the actions that 982 00:38:54,578 --> 00:38:56,689 they need to do to protect our people 983 00:38:56,689 --> 00:38:58,744 in our infrastructure . Okay . Thank 984 00:38:58,744 --> 00:38:57,330 you .