WEBVTT

00:01.056 --> 00:03.430
- I call the meeting to order
and full committee hearing

00:03.430 --> 00:05.420
this morning on the
National Security Challenges

00:05.420 --> 00:09.040
and US Military Activity
in North and South America.

00:09.040 --> 00:11.270
Part of our ongoing series

00:11.270 --> 00:13.900
for this year to get ready
for the FY21 budget cycle

00:13.900 --> 00:17.480
basing this off of the budget
that the President submitted

00:17.480 --> 00:20.450
for FY21 and our
witnesses this morning are

00:20.450 --> 00:22.300
the honorable Kenneth Rapuano,

00:22.300 --> 00:23.580
Assistant Secretary of Defense

00:23.580 --> 00:26.140
for Homeland Defense and Global Security.

00:26.140 --> 00:28.900
Admiral Craig C. Faller,
who is the commander

00:28.900 --> 00:32.430
of US Southern Command and
General Terrence O'Shaughnessy,

00:32.430 --> 00:35.350
who is the commander
of US Northern Command.

00:35.350 --> 00:37.882
Thank you gentlemen for
being here this morning.

00:37.882 --> 00:40.600
We've discussed a number
of the issues surrounding

00:40.600 --> 00:42.020
the overall defense budget and I think

00:42.020 --> 00:43.790
that's the thing we're most interested in

00:43.790 --> 00:45.770
is how your piece fits into that.

00:45.770 --> 00:47.450
We've got the blank slate review,

00:47.450 --> 00:49.250
which is an attempt to
sort of look at everything

00:49.250 --> 00:52.300
within DOD and build out a strategy based

00:52.300 --> 00:55.170
on what's to come based
primarily on the premise

00:55.170 --> 00:57.268
that we're still stuck
in the past a little bit

00:57.268 --> 00:59.300
in terms of where we're
spending our money,

00:59.300 --> 01:01.650
where our priorities are and we need

01:01.650 --> 01:03.300
to shift those priorities.

01:03.300 --> 01:05.970
Now, as always, when
you're shifting priorities,

01:05.970 --> 01:09.880
it's very easy to focus on what
the new priority should be.

01:09.880 --> 01:12.120
The harder part is figuring
out what you're going

01:12.120 --> 01:14.910
to do less of to balance that out

01:15.780 --> 01:18.130
and we wanna see how that
strategy builds together.

01:18.130 --> 01:19.690
I understand that the blank slate review

01:19.690 --> 01:23.990
for year two commands is
not yet done at any rate.

01:23.990 --> 01:27.180
So we're curious what you see
in that what you would say,

01:27.180 --> 01:28.610
here's what we need to do more,

01:28.610 --> 01:30.390
here's what we need to do less.

01:30.390 --> 01:33.180
How can we balance that out?

01:33.180 --> 01:35.490
Obviously, on the NORTHCOM side,

01:35.490 --> 01:38.460
Homeland Security is
the number one priority

01:38.460 --> 01:40.590
so we're also particularly
curious how you work

01:40.590 --> 01:42.320
with the Department of Homeland Security,

01:42.320 --> 01:43.840
what your responsibilities are,

01:43.840 --> 01:45.320
what their responsibilities are

01:45.320 --> 01:47.350
how those things balance out

01:47.350 --> 01:49.820
and there's considerable
concern on the committee

01:49.820 --> 01:53.890
about the reprogramming
request that most impacts

01:53.890 --> 01:57.130
these two commands that took $3.8 billion

01:57.130 --> 01:59.310
out of existing procurement to put it

01:59.310 --> 02:03.720
into further building the
wall on the southern border.

02:03.720 --> 02:06.420
We're very concerned about
how those priorities were set

02:06.420 --> 02:09.920
and the impact that it
might have on the programs

02:09.920 --> 02:13.290
that were cut going forward
and it's worth noting also,

02:13.290 --> 02:17.000
that they're still to come $3.6 billion,

02:17.000 --> 02:19.760
which is supposed to be taken
out of MILCON and that's

02:19.760 --> 02:23.360
an addition to the 3.6 billion
that was taken last year.

02:23.360 --> 02:27.463
The impact that that is
gonna have is profound.

02:28.420 --> 02:30.570
We're concerned about that
would also be interested

02:30.570 --> 02:33.880
in various troop deployments
to the southern border

02:33.880 --> 02:37.150
and we know that typically
these are requests from DHS

02:37.150 --> 02:39.860
that are supposed to be reimbursed.

02:39.860 --> 02:41.500
They have not been being reimbursed.

02:41.500 --> 02:44.010
Where do you see those requests going?

02:44.010 --> 02:47.110
And do you see you getting
paid back for that?

02:47.110 --> 02:50.730
How do we balance the money
on all of those issues?

02:50.730 --> 02:52.520
And also, when it comes
to Homeland Security,

02:52.520 --> 02:54.870
we are concerned about
election interference,

02:54.870 --> 02:56.720
not just from Russia but from a variety

02:56.720 --> 02:59.700
of different countries
as we head towards 2020

02:59.700 --> 03:01.330
that's gonna be a major concern,

03:01.330 --> 03:03.530
what are you doing to prepare for that?

03:03.530 --> 03:06.540
And then, most importantly
overarching all of this

03:06.540 --> 03:09.740
is the coronavirus outbreak

03:09.740 --> 03:12.580
that is going to have a huge
impact on every community.

03:12.580 --> 03:14.930
If you you watch the press
conference yesterday,

03:14.930 --> 03:17.130
I think the smartest thing said is

03:17.130 --> 03:20.270
if it hasn't impacted you yet, it will.

03:20.270 --> 03:21.980
Being from the state of Washington,

03:21.980 --> 03:25.910
it started there first but
it is by no means done.

03:25.910 --> 03:29.070
We've seen it spread quickly
to New York yesterday,

03:29.070 --> 03:31.580
major problem in Massachusetts.

03:31.580 --> 03:34.620
If you understand the
epidemiology of this at all,

03:34.620 --> 03:36.600
it is going to put an enormous

03:36.600 --> 03:38.870
amount of pressure on our country.

03:38.870 --> 03:43.260
Now, primarily, that is not
the responsibility of DOD

03:43.260 --> 03:46.780
but certainly from a NORTHCOM perspective,

03:46.780 --> 03:48.870
we wanna know what you
could potentially do

03:48.870 --> 03:51.270
to contribute to meeting that threat

03:51.270 --> 03:53.980
and from the SOUTHCOM
perspective eventually,

03:53.980 --> 03:56.390
in all likelihood, it will be a factor

03:56.390 --> 03:59.150
in Latin America as well
and how it impacts that.

03:59.150 --> 04:01.623
So there are many
challenges I have laid out

04:01.623 --> 04:04.010
in a more detailed way
in my opening statement

04:04.010 --> 04:05.263
which I'll submit for the record.

04:05.263 --> 04:07.380
With that, I'll turn it
over to the Ranking Member,

04:07.380 --> 04:09.430
Mr. Thornberry for his opening statement.

04:10.510 --> 04:12.080
- Thank you, Mr. Chairman and let me join

04:12.080 --> 04:15.933
in welcoming all of our
witnesses here today.

04:16.860 --> 04:19.160
Like the other combatant commands,

04:19.160 --> 04:22.760
these two have a lot on their plate

04:22.760 --> 04:26.620
and it is absolutely part
of our responsibility

04:26.620 --> 04:29.230
to understand their budgetary needs

04:29.230 --> 04:32.040
and capabilities to meet
their responsibilities.

04:32.040 --> 04:33.960
I'm struck by the fact though that

04:33.960 --> 04:36.023
with these two commands as with others,

04:37.117 --> 04:41.090
extraneous events also get a vote

04:41.090 --> 04:43.760
and so in SOUTHCOM you got to watch

04:43.760 --> 04:45.830
and deal with what happens in Venezuela.

04:45.830 --> 04:48.680
With NORTHCOM, as you mentioned,

04:48.680 --> 04:51.330
what's the military
support for coronavirus?

04:51.330 --> 04:55.003
Not only now but how may
that develop in the future?

04:56.130 --> 05:01.130
That's part of, I think, the
specific challenging part

05:01.940 --> 05:04.500
of putting together a military budget.

05:04.500 --> 05:07.980
It's the other side, whatever
the other side is gets a vote

05:07.980 --> 05:11.620
and I appreciate the challenges that both

05:11.620 --> 05:14.870
of these commanders have with
a whole variety of issues

05:14.870 --> 05:17.070
and we'll look forward to their answers

05:17.070 --> 05:19.410
to our questions, I yield back.

05:19.410 --> 05:21.715
- [Adam] Thank you, Mr Rapuano.

05:21.715 --> 05:23.763
Assuming you're going first, go ahead.

05:24.850 --> 05:26.760
- Chairman Smith,
Ranking Member Thornberry

05:26.760 --> 05:28.800
distinguished members of the committee.

05:28.800 --> 05:31.260
Thank you for the
opportunity to testify today

05:31.260 --> 05:33.320
on the national security challenges faced

05:33.320 --> 05:35.980
by the United States and
the Department of Defense

05:35.980 --> 05:38.400
actions to meet these challenges.

05:38.400 --> 05:40.180
I'm honored to be here in the company

05:40.180 --> 05:42.470
of General O'Shaughnessy
the commander of NORAD

05:42.470 --> 05:45.530
and US Northern Command
and Admiral Faller,

05:45.530 --> 05:47.740
the commander of US Southern Command.

05:47.740 --> 05:50.010
I am the Principal Civilian Policy Advisor

05:50.010 --> 05:52.080
to the Secretary of Defense
and the undersecretary

05:52.080 --> 05:55.710
of defense for policy on
a diverse range of issues,

05:55.710 --> 05:57.450
including Homeland Defense,

05:57.450 --> 06:01.540
cyber, space, countering
weapons of mass destruction,

06:01.540 --> 06:05.200
mission assurance and defense
support to civil authorities.

06:05.200 --> 06:07.743
I'd like to emphasize
three key points today.

06:08.580 --> 06:12.100
The first is the US
homeland is not a sanctuary.

06:12.100 --> 06:13.930
Rather, the homeland is a target

06:13.930 --> 06:16.483
in a complex global security environment.

06:17.380 --> 06:20.810
Two, China and Russia are
using malign influence

06:20.810 --> 06:22.760
against the United
States and our neighbors

06:22.760 --> 06:25.130
to undermine regional security.

06:25.130 --> 06:28.390
And lastly, we have taken
action to ensure our nation

06:28.390 --> 06:31.193
and partners will prevail in
this security environment.

06:32.120 --> 06:34.420
China and Russia are seeking capabilities

06:34.420 --> 06:37.100
to win below the threshold
of armed conflict,

06:37.100 --> 06:40.150
to erode our national
security and prosperity.

06:40.150 --> 06:42.850
They are attempting to
undermine democratic governance,

06:42.850 --> 06:45.550
the rule of law, market driven economies

06:45.550 --> 06:48.810
and compliance with
international rules and norms.

06:48.810 --> 06:51.470
Our competitors' capabilities, strategies

06:51.470 --> 06:53.490
and actions underscore

06:53.490 --> 06:57.070
that we must anticipate
multi dimensional attacks

06:57.070 --> 07:02.070
on land, in the air, at sea,
in space and in cyberspace.

07:03.950 --> 07:06.760
Targeted not just against
our military forces

07:06.760 --> 07:10.320
but against our critical
infrastructure and our population,

07:10.320 --> 07:13.740
indeed our way of life at home and abroad.

07:13.740 --> 07:16.770
Should conflict arise,
China and Russia hope

07:16.770 --> 07:18.880
to prevent the US from intervening

07:18.880 --> 07:21.450
in the defense of our allies and partners.

07:21.450 --> 07:24.570
China's arsenal includes
anti satellite capabilities

07:24.570 --> 07:26.820
and advanced missile systems.

07:26.820 --> 07:28.670
China has also successfully tested

07:28.670 --> 07:31.390
hypersonic glide vehicles and claimed

07:31.390 --> 07:35.210
or created and militarized
islands in the South China Sea

07:35.210 --> 07:39.960
in its efforts to coerce the
US and our allies and partners.

07:39.960 --> 07:42.450
Although Russia poses
a different challenge,

07:42.450 --> 07:45.480
it too is developing
anti-satellite capabilities,

07:45.480 --> 07:48.030
advanced missile hypersonic glide vehicles

07:48.030 --> 07:50.113
and advanced cyber capabilities.

07:51.050 --> 07:53.570
Rogue regimes such as North Korea,

07:53.570 --> 07:56.410
Iran and Venezuela
continue to pose threats

07:56.410 --> 07:59.640
to the United States and
our allies and partners.

07:59.640 --> 08:01.820
Iran is investing significant resources

08:01.820 --> 08:04.500
on ballistic missile and
space launch capabilities

08:04.500 --> 08:07.980
which could lead to the
development of ICBM systems.

08:07.980 --> 08:10.670
With support from Russia, Cuba and China,

08:10.670 --> 08:13.780
the Maduro regime fails
to provide Venezuelans

08:13.780 --> 08:15.950
with sufficient food and medicine.

08:15.950 --> 08:18.390
In response, most
governments in the region

08:18.390 --> 08:21.920
have recognized Interim
President Juan Guaido

08:21.920 --> 08:24.700
as the legitimate leader of Venezuela.

08:24.700 --> 08:26.550
Despite our successes,

08:26.550 --> 08:29.260
terrorists, transnational
criminal organizations,

08:29.260 --> 08:32.740
cyber hackers and other
malicious non-state actors,

08:32.740 --> 08:36.600
threaten us with increasingly
sophisticated capabilities.

08:36.600 --> 08:38.107
We are countering threats to our nation

08:38.107 --> 08:40.050
and our regional partners.

08:40.050 --> 08:43.940
Our actions will deny adversary
benefits from aggression,

08:43.940 --> 08:46.640
impose costs on adversaries
should they commit acts

08:46.640 --> 08:48.690
of aggression against the United States

08:48.690 --> 08:50.760
and our strategic interests.

08:50.760 --> 08:53.800
These efforts in our
sustained regional engagement

08:53.800 --> 08:55.550
undermine our competitors' attempts

08:55.550 --> 08:58.840
to increase their
influence near US borders.

08:58.840 --> 09:02.440
The US is strengthening its
homeland missile defenses.

09:02.440 --> 09:06.160
DOD is developing a new
interceptor to meet future threats.

09:06.160 --> 09:08.750
We're developing a new
generation of advanced ground

09:08.750 --> 09:11.144
and space-based sensors to better detect,

09:11.144 --> 09:14.930
track and discriminate
enemy missile warheads.

09:14.930 --> 09:17.590
These capabilities will
enhance our ability

09:17.590 --> 09:21.450
to deny our adversaries
benefits from missile attack.

09:21.450 --> 09:25.670
Space Systems underpin virtually
every US weapon system.

09:25.670 --> 09:29.330
China and Russia both seek
to deny the US and our allies

09:29.330 --> 09:32.310
and partners the advantages of space.

09:32.310 --> 09:34.240
The US is responding to this threat

09:34.240 --> 09:36.630
by transforming our space enterprise

09:36.630 --> 09:39.880
and working closely with
our allies and partners.

09:39.880 --> 09:41.660
The President's budget requests

09:41.660 --> 09:44.720
provides 18 billion for space programs,

09:44.720 --> 09:46.800
including 111 million to support

09:46.800 --> 09:50.040
the establishment of the
new military service.

09:50.040 --> 09:52.820
The budget also funds the
new space combatant command,

09:52.820 --> 09:56.250
US Space Command and the
Space Development Agency

09:56.250 --> 09:58.530
which will accelerate and develop

09:58.530 --> 10:01.290
in filling of military space systems.

10:01.290 --> 10:05.220
New presidential policy
on cyberspace operations

10:05.220 --> 10:07.210
as well as statutory authority

10:07.210 --> 10:09.450
have enabled a proactive approach

10:09.450 --> 10:11.670
to competition in cyberspace.

10:11.670 --> 10:14.130
For example, Cyber Command engages

10:14.130 --> 10:16.110
in hunt forward operations,

10:16.110 --> 10:18.890
defensive cyber teams operating globally

10:18.890 --> 10:22.053
at the invitation of
our allies and partners.

10:22.940 --> 10:25.170
Working closely with our partners

10:25.170 --> 10:27.910
and informed by the
whole-of-nation approach

10:27.910 --> 10:29.170
similar to those framed

10:29.170 --> 10:31.740
by the Cyberspace
Solarium Commission Report

10:31.740 --> 10:34.640
issued today, we are maturing our concept

10:34.640 --> 10:38.430
of layered cyber deterrence.

10:38.430 --> 10:39.600
The department is focused

10:39.600 --> 10:43.190
on preventing WMD proliferation globally,

10:43.190 --> 10:45.520
and ensuring US military forces

10:45.520 --> 10:48.460
are prepared to respond to WMD incidents

10:48.460 --> 10:51.650
and operate in contaminated environments.

10:51.650 --> 10:53.750
We are working with our federal partners

10:53.750 --> 10:56.400
and with other public and
private sector partners

10:56.400 --> 10:58.820
to expand sharing of threat information

10:58.820 --> 11:00.810
that affects defense
critical infrastructure

11:00.810 --> 11:02.990
and the defense industrial base.

11:02.990 --> 11:05.810
DOD is better prepared to
assist civil authorities

11:05.810 --> 11:08.300
than at any other time
in our nation's history.

11:08.300 --> 11:12.690
In 2019, DOD responded to
113 requests for assistance.

11:12.690 --> 11:14.980
So far in 2020, DOD has responded

11:14.980 --> 11:17.090
to 20 requests for assistance.

11:17.090 --> 11:18.950
While the department's number one priority

11:18.950 --> 11:20.490
is defense of the homeland,

11:20.490 --> 11:22.960
we are also enhancing the
security of our allies

11:22.960 --> 11:25.000
and partners in the Western Hemisphere

11:25.000 --> 11:28.730
through several primary lines of effort.

11:28.730 --> 11:32.720
Working with partners to
limit malign influence,

11:32.720 --> 11:35.430
the authoritarian model

11:39.120 --> 11:41.890
offered by China and Russia uses economic,

11:41.890 --> 11:45.140
diplomatic and security
means to gain undue influence

11:45.140 --> 11:47.290
over the sovereign decisions of others.

11:47.290 --> 11:48.980
We are working with
our allies and partners

11:48.980 --> 11:50.253
to counter this threat.

11:51.560 --> 11:53.060
Collaboration with our partners,

11:53.060 --> 11:55.000
we are advancing defense relationships

11:55.000 --> 11:57.540
with our self funding partners
while continuing support

11:57.540 --> 12:00.060
for our traditional
training and equip programs

12:00.060 --> 12:03.150
focusing on strategic level cooperation.

12:03.150 --> 12:06.320
Sustaining defense cooperation
through institution building,

12:06.320 --> 12:07.810
our defense institution building

12:07.810 --> 12:10.930
is an increasingly important
aspect of our efforts.

12:10.930 --> 12:12.530
We seek to share experiences

12:12.530 --> 12:14.410
and help them implement processes

12:14.410 --> 12:15.930
that magnify the effectiveness

12:15.930 --> 12:19.783
and sustainability of all other
aspects of our cooperation.

12:21.520 --> 12:23.620
The Department of Defense
takes a global view

12:23.620 --> 12:25.670
of the challenges facing the nation,

12:25.670 --> 12:29.090
we continue to improve our
ability to defend the US homeland

12:29.090 --> 12:31.420
in all domains and develop capabilities

12:31.420 --> 12:34.030
to defend the nation's interests globally.

12:34.030 --> 12:36.300
I appreciate the critical
role Congress plays

12:36.300 --> 12:38.330
in ensuring the department is prepared

12:38.330 --> 12:42.360
to compete, deter and win
in every contested domain;

12:42.360 --> 12:45.150
air, land, space and cyberspace.

12:45.150 --> 12:47.668
I especially thank the men and women

12:47.668 --> 12:48.950
of the Department of
Defense and their families

12:48.950 --> 12:50.420
for all that they do every day

12:50.420 --> 12:52.230
to keep our nation safe and secure.

12:52.230 --> 12:53.280
Thank you.

12:53.280 --> 12:56.030
- [Adam] Thank you, General O'Shaughnessy.

12:56.030 --> 12:58.360
- Chairman Smith,
Ranking Member Thornberry

12:58.360 --> 12:59.970
and distinguished
members of the committee,

12:59.970 --> 13:01.480
I'm truly honored to be here today

13:01.480 --> 13:03.130
as the commander of US Northern Command

13:03.130 --> 13:06.130
and North American
Aerospace Defense Command.

13:06.130 --> 13:08.810
I'm also pleased to testify
alongside my cousin,

13:08.810 --> 13:11.050
Admiral Craig Faller, and Mr. Rapuano,

13:11.050 --> 13:13.620
both of whom I have great admiration for.

13:13.620 --> 13:15.100
And Chairman Smith with your concurrence,

13:15.100 --> 13:17.850
I'd like to submit my written
statement for the record.

13:20.840 --> 13:22.480
US NORTHCOM and NORAD are charged

13:22.480 --> 13:24.440
with executing a National
Defense Strategy's

13:24.440 --> 13:27.450
number one objective, defend the homeland.

13:27.450 --> 13:30.540
Our adversaries have
watched, learned and invested

13:30.540 --> 13:33.530
to offset our strengths while
exploiting our weaknesses.

13:33.530 --> 13:35.650
They have demonstrated
patterns of behavior

13:35.650 --> 13:38.290
that indicate their capability, capacity

13:38.290 --> 13:40.750
and intent to hold our homeland at risk

13:40.750 --> 13:43.090
below the nuclear threshold.

13:43.090 --> 13:45.510
The changing security
environment makes it clear

13:45.510 --> 13:48.190
that the Arctic is no
longer a fortress wall,

13:48.190 --> 13:50.980
and the oceans are no
longer protective moats.

13:50.980 --> 13:53.890
They are now avenues of
approach to the homeland,

13:53.890 --> 13:55.110
which highlights the increase

13:55.110 --> 13:57.990
in adversary presence in the Arctic.

13:57.990 --> 14:00.610
To meet this challenge, we
need to invest in a capable,

14:00.610 --> 14:03.690
persistent defense that
can deter adversaries,

14:03.690 --> 14:05.620
protect critical infrastructure,

14:05.620 --> 14:07.610
enable power projection forward

14:07.610 --> 14:09.710
and prevent homeland vulnerabilities

14:09.710 --> 14:10.863
from being exploited.

14:11.840 --> 14:14.040
To deter, detect and defeat the threats

14:14.040 --> 14:15.920
arrayed against the homeland today,

14:15.920 --> 14:19.030
US NORTHCOM and NORAD are
transforming our commands

14:19.030 --> 14:20.830
and our way of thinking.

14:20.830 --> 14:24.010
We cannot defend the nation
against 21st century threats

14:24.010 --> 14:26.430
with 20th century technology.

14:26.430 --> 14:28.440
We must be able to outpace our adversaries

14:28.440 --> 14:32.290
using a layered defense infused
with the latest technology.

14:32.290 --> 14:36.300
To do so, and to secure
our competitive advantage,

14:36.300 --> 14:37.410
we will continue to partner

14:37.410 --> 14:39.820
with our nation's defense
and commercial industry

14:39.820 --> 14:43.860
to transform rapidly evolving
scientific information

14:43.860 --> 14:47.690
into leading edge digital
age technology and the

14:47.690 --> 14:50.910
Strategic Homeland Integrated
Ecosystem for Layered Defense

14:50.910 --> 14:53.610
or what we call SHIELD is
the architecture we need

14:53.610 --> 14:57.220
to defend our homeland against
these advancing threats.

14:57.220 --> 15:00.390
As such, our layered defense
needs to establish awareness

15:00.390 --> 15:02.870
in all domains from below the oceans

15:02.870 --> 15:04.750
to the highest levels of space,

15:04.750 --> 15:08.830
including the unseen cyber
domain, which are all at risk.

15:08.830 --> 15:10.670
We need a layered
sensing grid with sensors

15:10.670 --> 15:13.270
in all domains which can
detect and track threats

15:13.270 --> 15:15.790
from their point of origin,
long before approaching

15:15.790 --> 15:17.410
our sovereign territory.

15:17.410 --> 15:18.930
In other words, it requires the ability

15:18.930 --> 15:20.980
to identify and eliminate the archers

15:20.980 --> 15:23.390
before the arrows are released.

15:23.390 --> 15:24.870
We need an adaptive architecture

15:24.870 --> 15:27.360
for joint all domain command and control,

15:27.360 --> 15:30.070
capable of using a myriad
of centers across the globe

15:30.070 --> 15:33.040
into accurate decision
quality threat information

15:33.040 --> 15:34.260
and at the speed of relevance

15:34.260 --> 15:36.530
for effective command and control.

15:36.530 --> 15:38.520
The Department of Defense with
the United States Air Force

15:38.520 --> 15:40.940
in the lead is using the 2021 budget

15:40.940 --> 15:42.700
to further this capability

15:42.700 --> 15:45.800
of joint all-domain command and control.

15:45.800 --> 15:47.350
And lastly, we need the ability

15:47.350 --> 15:49.460
to deploy, defeat mechanisms capable

15:49.460 --> 15:52.090
of neutralizing advanced weapon systems

15:52.090 --> 15:54.053
in order to defend our great homeland.

15:54.970 --> 15:56.620
We have put great effort into these areas

15:56.620 --> 15:59.590
such as Ballistic Missile
Defense and the need also exists

15:59.590 --> 16:01.370
to aggressive defeat additional threats

16:01.370 --> 16:03.300
to include the ever-growing cyber threat

16:03.300 --> 16:05.360
and the cruise missile threat.

16:05.360 --> 16:07.180
And consistent with these concepts,

16:07.180 --> 16:10.100
we are changing how we are
engaging with industry.

16:10.100 --> 16:11.590
We have shared our toughest challenges

16:11.590 --> 16:13.577
with our industry partners

16:13.577 --> 16:14.850
and have received an overwhelming response

16:14.850 --> 16:17.650
from not only traditional
defense contractors,

16:17.650 --> 16:20.130
but also small and large
commercial companies

16:20.130 --> 16:22.320
to leverage the military application

16:22.320 --> 16:25.580
of advancements we've seen
in the commercial industry.

16:25.580 --> 16:27.460
We are harnessing emerging, existing

16:27.460 --> 16:30.630
and rapidly evolving technology
to plug into our SHIELD,

16:30.630 --> 16:33.480
our architecture for Homeland Defense.

16:33.480 --> 16:35.410
However, more needs to
be done to keep pace

16:35.410 --> 16:37.580
with the advancing
threats to our homeland.

16:37.580 --> 16:39.460
We need to ensure we
have complete awareness

16:39.460 --> 16:42.410
of what is happening in and
around our sovereign territory.

16:43.970 --> 16:45.850
We are mindful the gravity of our mission

16:45.850 --> 16:48.020
and the trust you have placed in us.

16:48.020 --> 16:49.780
Aligned with the National Defense Strategy

16:49.780 --> 16:51.710
and capturing our sense of urgency.

16:51.710 --> 16:54.580
We at US NORTHCOM and
NORAD have declared 2020

16:54.580 --> 16:57.060
as a year of Homeland Defense
and are moving forward

16:57.060 --> 16:59.770
with the implementation of our SHIELD.

16:59.770 --> 17:01.310
You in the committee
should have great faith

17:01.310 --> 17:03.240
in the men and women at
US NORTHCOM and NORAD

17:03.240 --> 17:05.840
because together, we have the watch.

17:05.840 --> 17:06.850
Thank you for your support

17:06.850 --> 17:08.673
and I look forward to your questions.

17:12.280 --> 17:14.320
- Chairman Smith, Ranking
Member Thornberry,

17:14.320 --> 17:16.560
distinguished members, thank
you for the opportunity

17:16.560 --> 17:18.180
to testify today.

17:18.180 --> 17:20.640
I'm honored to be here
with Secretary Rapuano,

17:20.640 --> 17:23.800
and my friend, shipmate and
cousin, General O'Shaughnessy.

17:23.800 --> 17:27.190
We work very closely together
to defend the homeland,

17:27.190 --> 17:29.560
ensure there's no seams
between our regions

17:29.560 --> 17:31.460
because we certainly know the bad guys

17:32.770 --> 17:34.910
don't pay attention to seams.

17:34.910 --> 17:37.260
Last year, General
O'Shaughnessy and I traveled

17:37.260 --> 17:38.830
to Mexico City and Guatemala City

17:38.830 --> 17:42.680
to make that very point to
our friends and neighbors

17:42.680 --> 17:45.050
and joined by Ambassador Jean Manes

17:45.050 --> 17:48.970
former US ambassador to
Salvador and my civilian deputy,

17:48.970 --> 17:50.867
who brings with her a wealth
of knowledge about our region

17:50.867 --> 17:53.943
and a deep understanding
of China in our hemisphere.

17:55.220 --> 17:57.600
Western hemisphere is our shared home.

17:57.600 --> 17:59.030
It's our neighborhood.

17:59.030 --> 18:01.890
We're connected to the
nations here in every domain;

18:01.890 --> 18:05.660
sea, air, land, space,
cyber, and most importantly,

18:05.660 --> 18:07.270
with our values.

18:07.270 --> 18:10.360
Over the last year, I've seen
firsthand the opportunities

18:10.360 --> 18:12.660
and the challenges that
impact the security

18:12.660 --> 18:14.250
of our hemisphere.

18:14.250 --> 18:16.240
And we've also understand the urgency

18:16.240 --> 18:19.380
with which we must react
to those challenges.

18:19.380 --> 18:20.860
I've come to describe the challenges

18:20.860 --> 18:22.350
a vicious circle of threats

18:22.350 --> 18:25.210
that deliberately erodes
the stability and security

18:25.210 --> 18:27.220
in the region in our homeland.

18:27.220 --> 18:30.020
Vicious circles framed by systemic issues

18:30.020 --> 18:33.800
that face young democracies,
like weak institutions,

18:33.800 --> 18:35.900
corruption, that are exploited

18:35.900 --> 18:37.940
by transnational criminal organizations,

18:37.940 --> 18:41.493
a $90-billion-a-year
industry in this hemisphere.

18:43.010 --> 18:44.850
These institutions are often better funded

18:44.850 --> 18:46.970
than security organizations they face,

18:46.970 --> 18:49.820
and external state actors
that don't share our values;

18:49.820 --> 18:51.920
China, Russia and Iran

18:51.920 --> 18:55.000
and violent extremist
organizations exploit this.

18:55.000 --> 18:56.740
They're trying to advance their own ends

18:56.740 --> 18:59.573
at the expense of US and
partner nation security.

19:00.810 --> 19:04.100
In fact, the aha moment
for me, this past year

19:04.100 --> 19:06.210
has been the extent to which China

19:06.210 --> 19:08.070
is aggressively pursuing their interests

19:08.070 --> 19:10.010
right here in our neighborhood.

19:10.010 --> 19:12.770
Why would China invest in
critical infrastructure

19:12.770 --> 19:16.260
like deepwater ports and
large swaths of coastline

19:16.260 --> 19:19.210
within a two hour flight from Miami?

19:19.210 --> 19:21.870
Why would China wanna
lock up total interest

19:21.870 --> 19:24.140
in a space station in this hemisphere?

19:24.140 --> 19:26.120
They certainly recognize the importance

19:26.120 --> 19:29.370
of this part of the world and so must we.

19:29.370 --> 19:30.850
This vicious circle I described

19:30.850 --> 19:34.290
can be seen most acutely in
the tragedy that is Venezuela.

19:34.290 --> 19:36.790
Human suffering in this
once thriving democracy

19:36.790 --> 19:38.910
has driven nearly five million people

19:38.910 --> 19:40.880
to flee to neighboring countries,

19:40.880 --> 19:43.140
like Colombia, Peru, Ecuador, Brazil,

19:43.140 --> 19:45.033
Argentina, Chile and and more.

19:46.130 --> 19:49.110
These countries are absorbing the migrants

19:49.110 --> 19:51.330
and the strain that is
placed on their healthcare,

19:51.330 --> 19:53.630
education and security services.

19:53.630 --> 19:56.640
Colombia alone has spent over $2.5 billion

19:56.640 --> 19:59.520
in the last two years to support migrants.

19:59.520 --> 20:01.500
And while Russia, Cuba and China prop up

20:01.500 --> 20:03.480
the illegitimate Maduro dictatorship,

20:03.480 --> 20:04.900
the democracies of the world are looking

20:04.900 --> 20:08.050
for a way to get the Venezuelan
people what they deserve,

20:08.050 --> 20:10.163
a free and prosperous Venezuela.

20:11.010 --> 20:13.390
The best way to attack this
vicious circle is as a team,

20:13.390 --> 20:16.110
NORTHCOM, SOUTHCOM team,
our inter-agency team,

20:16.110 --> 20:19.150
our whole-of-nation team
and with our partners.

20:19.150 --> 20:21.616
In this neighborhood, a
little goes a long way

20:21.616 --> 20:23.170
and our partners are
willing to contribute,

20:23.170 --> 20:27.710
especially with US encouragement,
investment and presence.

20:27.710 --> 20:29.450
In recognition of the complex threats

20:29.450 --> 20:30.800
challenging our neighborhood,

20:30.800 --> 20:33.320
there will be an increase
in US military presence

20:33.320 --> 20:35.630
in the hemisphere later this year.

20:35.630 --> 20:38.340
This will include an
enhanced presence of ships,

20:38.340 --> 20:41.830
aircraft and security forces
to reassure our partners

20:41.830 --> 20:44.090
and prove US and partner readiness

20:44.090 --> 20:47.200
and interoperability
encounter a range of threats

20:47.200 --> 20:50.423
to include listed narco-terrorism.

20:51.290 --> 20:53.350
Last year our partners
played a critical role

20:53.350 --> 20:55.250
in 50% of our drug interdictions,

20:55.250 --> 20:57.223
up from 40% the year before.

20:58.060 --> 20:59.860
Getting our partners
in the game by training

20:59.860 --> 21:02.440
and equipping them through
security cooperation programs

21:02.440 --> 21:04.740
is exactly the right approach.

21:04.740 --> 21:07.640
These are threats affect all
of us here in our neighborhood,

21:07.640 --> 21:09.550
and we must tackle them together.

21:09.550 --> 21:12.580
Likewise, International Military
Education Training, IMET

21:12.580 --> 21:16.040
is a small investment that
yields long term returns.

21:16.040 --> 21:18.350
It builds lasting trusted relationships.

21:18.350 --> 21:21.150
As I speak, half our
region's chiefs of defense

21:21.150 --> 21:22.393
are graduates of IMET.

21:23.240 --> 21:27.160
Along with exercises,
exercises our North Star.

21:27.160 --> 21:29.410
I meant exercise and security cooperation

21:29.410 --> 21:32.540
are the last programs we
should consider cutting.

21:32.540 --> 21:34.970
Deployments like the United
States Naval Ship Comfort

21:34.970 --> 21:37.810
show the best outstretched
hand of America.

21:37.810 --> 21:41.130
The mission this year treated
nearly 68,000 patients,

21:41.130 --> 21:43.930
extending our enduring
promise as a trusted partner

21:43.930 --> 21:45.320
to the neighborhood.

21:45.320 --> 21:46.890
Thanks to the support of this committee,

21:46.890 --> 21:49.530
we also deployed a
Multi-Mission Support Vessel,

21:49.530 --> 21:53.780
acronym MMSV, a contracted innovative ship

21:53.780 --> 21:55.490
that is supporting counter drug detection

21:55.490 --> 21:58.380
and supporting our partners as a platform

21:58.380 --> 22:00.960
for their extended reach.

22:00.960 --> 22:03.560
The MMSV is using intelligence produced

22:03.560 --> 22:07.090
by Joint Interagency Task
Force South, JITF South.

22:07.090 --> 22:08.770
JITF South, located in Key West,

22:08.770 --> 22:11.250
our southern most base in
the continental United States

22:11.250 --> 22:13.760
is a strategic and significant value

22:13.760 --> 22:15.460
for defending a wide range of threats

22:15.460 --> 22:17.508
to our national security.

22:17.508 --> 22:19.530
And we are working to take
steps to improve the resiliency

22:19.530 --> 22:20.460
and the quality of life.

22:20.460 --> 22:23.490
They're one of the highest
cost regions in the nation.

22:23.490 --> 22:25.670
At our headquarters in
Miami, we are also working

22:25.670 --> 22:28.390
to address cost of living
and housing concerns

22:28.390 --> 22:30.450
that create hardships for our families.

22:30.450 --> 22:32.020
Mr Chairman, Ranking Member Thornberry,

22:32.020 --> 22:34.017
thank you for the opportunity today.

22:34.017 --> 22:36.960
The SOUTHCOM team appreciates
the support of Congress

22:36.960 --> 22:38.110
and the trust you place in us.

22:38.110 --> 22:40.450
I look forward to the questions.

22:40.450 --> 22:42.840
Thank you very much, I
just have two questions.

22:42.840 --> 22:46.510
Admiral Faller, can you give
us an update on Venezuela?

22:46.510 --> 22:48.600
How are China and Russia
potentially involved there?

22:48.600 --> 22:50.380
What are our interests there

22:50.380 --> 22:52.853
and how is it impacting the region?

22:55.040 --> 22:57.710
- Maduro regime continues
to cling to power

22:57.710 --> 23:00.020
and brutalize the population.

23:00.020 --> 23:04.530
Human Rights Report this year
listed a significant number

23:04.530 --> 23:07.700
of human rights abuses
by the Maduro regime.

23:07.700 --> 23:10.930
Maduro stays in power because
of the thousands of Cubans

23:10.930 --> 23:12.100
that protect and guard him

23:12.100 --> 23:15.690
and basically own the
intelligence service in Venezuela,

23:15.690 --> 23:17.620
Russia in the numbers of hundreds right

23:17.620 --> 23:21.620
in there alongside working to
upgrade air defense systems,

23:21.620 --> 23:25.890
Russian special forces
working to train Maduro forces

23:25.890 --> 23:27.330
and China to a lesser extent,

23:27.330 --> 23:29.600
but China is involved, particularly

23:29.600 --> 23:33.730
in some of the cyber areas,
working to their interest.

23:33.730 --> 23:37.060
Unfortunately, this has allowed
Maduro to cling to power

23:37.060 --> 23:39.380
and continue to brutalize the population.

23:39.380 --> 23:41.920
The narco traffickers have
taken advantage of this

23:41.920 --> 23:44.590
as well as ELN and FARC
dissidents terrorists.

23:44.590 --> 23:47.627
And that instability
along with the migrants

23:47.627 --> 23:49.850
has spawned instability out in the region,

23:49.850 --> 23:51.930
so credit to partners like the Columbia

23:51.930 --> 23:54.220
that they've handled it so well.

23:54.220 --> 23:56.160
- And that's not going
to change anytime soon.

23:56.160 --> 23:59.430
Maduro is pretty solidly
in power at this point

23:59.430 --> 24:00.620
would be your estimation?

24:00.620 --> 24:02.760
- Maduro is isolated and
continues to be isolated.

24:02.760 --> 24:05.290
International unity is there.

24:05.290 --> 24:07.850
We're continuing work
with a special liaison

24:07.850 --> 24:09.630
Elliott Abrams and State Department

24:09.630 --> 24:11.110
for the pressure campaign.

24:11.110 --> 24:15.210
Unfortunately, this transition
can't happen soon enough

24:15.210 --> 24:16.813
for the brutalized population.

24:17.780 --> 24:19.109
- Thank you.

24:19.109 --> 24:19.942
General O'Shaughnessy, could you tell us

24:19.942 --> 24:21.720
what your missile defense needs

24:21.720 --> 24:24.900
are here for your command, where it's at,

24:24.900 --> 24:27.433
what your needs are in the short term?

24:29.300 --> 24:30.470
- Thank you, Chairman for the opportunity

24:30.470 --> 24:32.187
to highlight some of the
work that we're doing

24:32.187 --> 24:36.380
and some of the work that
we need support in doing.

24:36.380 --> 24:38.080
First on the ballistic missile front,

24:38.080 --> 24:42.940
we have had some success now
on Next-Generation Interceptor.

24:42.940 --> 24:45.320
Obviously, we would
rather not be where we are

24:45.320 --> 24:49.130
relative to the RKV,
Redesigned Kill Vehicle.

24:49.130 --> 24:51.560
But now that we are, we made a decision

24:51.560 --> 24:53.660
to stop that program, start NGI.

24:53.660 --> 24:55.470
I'm happy to report just yesterday,

24:55.470 --> 24:58.070
we had the Joint Requirements
Oversight Council

24:58.070 --> 25:00.610
that successfully met to talk about

25:00.610 --> 25:04.070
how do we actually bring this
capability to bear sooner,

25:04.070 --> 25:06.020
one of the things we have to make sure

25:06.020 --> 25:08.600
that we understand is that
threat continues to advance.

25:08.600 --> 25:10.930
And so whilst we may have
delays in our program,

25:10.930 --> 25:13.050
the threat doesn't stop.

25:13.050 --> 25:15.960
As a result of the great
work we've done with MDA,

25:15.960 --> 25:18.470
to include the work with RNE

25:18.470 --> 25:20.410
and the ability to actually figure out

25:20.410 --> 25:22.430
what is the capability that we most need,

25:22.430 --> 25:25.270
and how can we bring it to
bear at the speed of relevance?

25:25.270 --> 25:27.130
And I think we've had some success there.

25:27.130 --> 25:29.530
Part of that is because
we're working with industry

25:29.530 --> 25:32.610
to understand what are the
long poles in the tent,

25:32.610 --> 25:34.040
what are the most challenging things

25:34.040 --> 25:36.740
that are driving a long
time acquisition program?

25:36.740 --> 25:39.530
And what are the things we
can do for the trade space

25:39.530 --> 25:41.980
where time is now a factor of risk,

25:41.980 --> 25:44.180
so that we can bring
that into the discussion.

25:44.180 --> 25:46.090
I'm happy to report we've
made progress on that front

25:46.090 --> 25:47.620
and we're gonna be able
to bring this capability

25:47.620 --> 25:50.210
to bear sooner, and I
look forward to the RFP

25:50.210 --> 25:51.200
ultimately being released

25:51.200 --> 25:53.250
and ultimately getting this capability.

25:53.250 --> 25:55.090
In the meantime, Chairman,
it's also important

25:55.090 --> 25:57.280
we continue to pursue other means

25:57.280 --> 25:59.860
to include our underlayer,
critically important

25:59.860 --> 26:04.630
as we have our GBIs, it's a
very capable system right now,

26:04.630 --> 26:07.630
we bring an underlayer, such
as bringing in SM-3 IIAs

26:07.630 --> 26:09.440
which we're gonna do a test in May

26:09.440 --> 26:12.720
to ensure that it can
defeat an ICBM threat.

26:12.720 --> 26:14.950
That brings tremendous
capability and opportunity

26:14.950 --> 26:17.770
and potential to what we
can bring to the homeland.

26:17.770 --> 26:20.760
Also looking at DAT,
and how can we use DAT

26:20.760 --> 26:22.280
for the protection of the home in ways

26:22.280 --> 26:24.260
that we haven't yet done?

26:24.260 --> 26:25.930
The combination of all those together

26:25.930 --> 26:27.750
with the work we're doing on our sensors,

26:27.750 --> 26:31.240
our radars to bring the
discrimination capability forward

26:31.240 --> 26:33.440
is gonna allow us to
maintain that advantage

26:33.440 --> 26:36.060
over our adversaries so I
can come to this committee

26:36.060 --> 26:38.150
and continue to tell
you that we can defend

26:38.150 --> 26:41.510
against ballistic missile
threats from a rogue nation.

26:41.510 --> 26:42.933
- Thank you, Mr. Thornberry.

26:45.280 --> 26:50.280
- Admiral, yesterday we had
CENTCOM and AFRICOM before us

26:50.610 --> 26:52.810
and one of the points I
think everybody agreed on

26:52.810 --> 26:56.500
is great power competition
occurs all over the world,

26:56.500 --> 26:58.600
including Africa, Middle East.

26:58.600 --> 27:01.500
You pointed out that China's very active

27:01.500 --> 27:04.163
in the southern hemisphere.

27:05.120 --> 27:08.860
But you also made the
point that cutting IMET

27:08.860 --> 27:13.180
and those sorts of training, exercises,

27:14.440 --> 27:16.070
providing military equipment

27:16.070 --> 27:18.270
doesn't seem to make much sense.

27:18.270 --> 27:19.430
That's my interpretation.

27:19.430 --> 27:23.540
Can you give us just a scale
of how much money you spending

27:23.540 --> 27:27.590
in your AOR on things like exercises

27:27.590 --> 27:30.600
and joint training and that sort of thing?

27:30.600 --> 27:33.453
And then what happens from
last year to this year?

27:36.460 --> 27:38.090
- The programs you mentioned IMET,

27:38.090 --> 27:40.930
the education program, exercise programs,

27:40.930 --> 27:44.460
security cooperation are pivotal programs,

27:44.460 --> 27:48.990
they're key, they are high
return investment options.

27:48.990 --> 27:51.180
As we look at the those programs,

27:51.180 --> 27:52.750
the IMET accounts have been solid

27:52.750 --> 27:55.090
with good support to increase IMET.

27:55.090 --> 27:56.520
We've asked for an increase.

27:56.520 --> 27:58.618
We may see a modest increase,

27:58.618 --> 28:00.800
11 million is what we spent last year,

28:00.800 --> 28:02.450
that's making a difference.

28:02.450 --> 28:05.280
The exercise program and
the security cooperation,

28:05.280 --> 28:07.660
they received cuts in
the defense-wide review

28:07.660 --> 28:09.147
across the department.

28:09.147 --> 28:13.450
The Joint Exercise Program
received a 10% reduction

28:13.450 --> 28:16.360
and the the security cooperation,

28:16.360 --> 28:18.680
our main Department of
Defense funded program,

28:18.680 --> 28:22.145
which is called 333, received,

28:22.145 --> 28:24.610
approximately, a 20% reduction

28:24.610 --> 28:27.010
that's been distributed
amongst the combatant commands.

28:27.010 --> 28:30.780
For me, the impact over this coming year

28:30.780 --> 28:34.910
will be at around 20%
reduction in our 333 money

28:34.910 --> 28:38.880
and that reduction will mean
we'll have to make some choices

28:38.880 --> 28:40.853
and have to defund some programs.

28:41.860 --> 28:43.940
And those programs that we will defund

28:43.940 --> 28:46.390
are likely ones that have made an impact

28:46.390 --> 28:48.820
that have increased our partners' ability

28:48.820 --> 28:50.913
to do things like counter narcotics.

28:52.566 --> 28:53.930
- You mentioned IMET has 11 million,

28:53.930 --> 28:57.060
what's the ballpark for putting
all those programs together

28:57.060 --> 28:58.763
in your AOR ballpark?

28:59.996 --> 29:03.190
- The ballpark for our needs
in those three programs,

29:03.190 --> 29:05.710
probably around 130 million per year,

29:05.710 --> 29:07.193
if you total it up.

29:09.273 --> 29:10.160
- I think it's helpful for us just to have

29:10.160 --> 29:12.693
a perspective on that.

29:14.380 --> 29:19.380
General, some coronavirus folks

29:19.390 --> 29:22.270
are being housed at military bases.

29:22.270 --> 29:24.450
My understanding is some folks coming off

29:24.450 --> 29:27.310
this latest cruise ship,
about 500 may go to Texas,

29:27.310 --> 29:29.403
500 to Georgia or something like that.

29:31.142 --> 29:36.053
Explain to us how you or the
department balances effect

29:37.140 --> 29:40.880
on military readiness
and the health and safety

29:40.880 --> 29:43.710
of our military folks versus the need

29:43.710 --> 29:47.990
to have some isolation for people

29:47.990 --> 29:49.170
who are coming off cruise ships

29:49.170 --> 29:50.810
or maybe in other circumstances.

29:50.810 --> 29:55.810
How do you know when it hurts our military

29:55.940 --> 29:58.073
more than it should?

29:58.910 --> 30:00.096
How do you balance?

30:00.096 --> 30:01.620
That's what I'm trying to get to.

30:01.620 --> 30:02.962
- Thank you, sir, thank
you for allowing me

30:02.962 --> 30:03.947
to highlight this.

30:03.947 --> 30:06.820
And let me first acknowledge
that we are, in fact,

30:06.820 --> 30:09.790
housing some US citizens

30:09.790 --> 30:12.470
as a result of the
passenger ship challenge

30:12.470 --> 30:14.010
that we're faced with and, and to me,

30:14.010 --> 30:16.800
this needs to be a
whole-of-nation response.

30:16.800 --> 30:18.300
Department of Defense is contributing

30:18.300 --> 30:19.680
to that whole-of-nation response

30:19.680 --> 30:21.540
to take care of our citizens.

30:21.540 --> 30:24.290
Specifically, the guidance we were given

30:24.290 --> 30:25.510
from the secretary of defense

30:25.510 --> 30:27.680
was the first priority is to ensure

30:27.680 --> 30:30.110
the safety of our military personnel

30:30.110 --> 30:31.320
and their families.

30:31.320 --> 30:33.060
The second priority we were given

30:33.060 --> 30:35.700
was to ensure that we
maintain our readiness,

30:35.700 --> 30:37.710
our ability to perform
our core mission set

30:37.710 --> 30:39.790
because of course, that can't be degraded.

30:39.790 --> 30:42.100
And then with that in mind,

30:42.100 --> 30:45.230
we look at what can we add to
the whole-of-nation response.

30:45.230 --> 30:46.840
In the particulars that you mentioned here

30:46.840 --> 30:49.650
we do have folks right
now at Travis, at Miramar,

30:49.650 --> 30:51.750
at Lackland and at Dobbins,

30:51.750 --> 30:55.223
that is actually rehabilitating
rooms that we've provided.

30:56.620 --> 30:58.620
HHS has been providing the actual,

30:58.620 --> 31:01.320
what we call wraparound service to that.

31:01.320 --> 31:04.870
In other words, we are not
providing the medical capability,

31:04.870 --> 31:07.990
we're not providing some
of those contract services.

31:07.990 --> 31:10.290
They're actually being provided by HHS.

31:10.290 --> 31:13.310
What that allows us to do is
we can provide them the rooms,

31:13.310 --> 31:16.260
we can maintain our ability to
take care of our own families

31:16.260 --> 31:18.130
and our own military
members and do the mission

31:18.130 --> 31:19.869
that we need to do.

31:19.869 --> 31:21.370
And I think it's a good balance
of where we are right now.

31:21.370 --> 31:23.810
We can contribute with no degradation

31:23.810 --> 31:25.960
to our ability to
perform our mission, sir.

31:28.830 --> 31:29.823
- [Adam] Mr. Larsen?

31:32.860 --> 31:34.160
- Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

31:35.460 --> 31:38.000
Mr. Rapuano and General O'Shaughnessy,

31:38.000 --> 31:39.820
I gave you heads up on this question,

31:39.820 --> 31:41.320
but I wanted to give to the record

31:41.320 --> 31:43.530
we had a call last night with
our governor in the state

31:43.530 --> 31:46.420
regarding the COVID-19
response in our state

31:46.420 --> 31:49.143
and continued need for help.

31:51.136 --> 31:53.348
And the question he had
and wanted to pass on

31:53.348 --> 31:54.181
and give some direction on this

31:54.181 --> 31:56.930
would be the ability or necessity

31:56.930 --> 32:01.670
of the NORTHCOM DOD to support response,

32:01.670 --> 32:05.670
if we need a surge capacity
for mobile hospital units.

32:05.670 --> 32:07.690
We're not making that request now

32:07.690 --> 32:10.970
but in the event that we
need to make that request,

32:10.970 --> 32:14.113
where does NORTHCOM or
DOD fit into that role?

32:16.110 --> 32:17.932
- So, the Department of Defense

32:17.932 --> 32:19.400
is working the whole government process

32:19.400 --> 32:23.270
managed by the President's
White House task force

32:23.270 --> 32:24.880
that is led by the Vice President,

32:24.880 --> 32:29.221
working very closely with CDC, HHS, DHS

32:29.221 --> 32:31.502
and the other agencies involved.

32:31.502 --> 32:35.540
CDC, HHS, they are the lead
for the domestic response.

32:35.540 --> 32:38.573
They are also the lead
for the medical response.

32:39.775 --> 32:40.760
There's very significant capacity

32:40.760 --> 32:42.700
that is available to them,

32:42.700 --> 32:45.303
working with the state and locals as well.

32:46.423 --> 32:50.720
DHS and FEMA also have
some levels of capability.

32:50.720 --> 32:53.800
The Department of Defense
for the force that we have

32:53.800 --> 32:57.520
has relatively limited medical capacity,

32:57.520 --> 33:00.899
particularly with regard to the importance

33:00.899 --> 33:03.022
of Force Health Protection for the force

33:03.022 --> 33:05.930
and their dependents and
their other beneficiaries,

33:05.930 --> 33:09.420
but also the potential
of contingency operations

33:09.420 --> 33:13.863
requiring additional medical
capabilities on top of that,

33:14.770 --> 33:16.880
so we're very cognizant of that balance.

33:16.880 --> 33:20.720
When you look at the low
density, high value elements,

33:20.720 --> 33:23.530
such as ICU beds and ventilators,

33:23.530 --> 33:25.010
the Department of Defense does not

33:25.010 --> 33:27.130
have a large number of those.

33:27.130 --> 33:31.313
That's not typically military
medicine type of capabilities.

33:32.292 --> 33:35.430
So there's not a surplus
of capability there.

33:35.430 --> 33:38.910
So again, we're working very
closely with CDC and HHS

33:38.910 --> 33:41.550
in terms of where we can best support

33:41.550 --> 33:43.520
and how we can limit the impact

33:43.520 --> 33:46.383
on defense readiness and capabilities.

33:47.679 --> 33:48.680
- All right, that's fair enough.

33:48.680 --> 33:52.310
We'll probably follow
up with you later on.

33:52.310 --> 33:54.670
We're trying to do our best to prepare

33:54.670 --> 33:58.883
and we are in contact with
the CDC and HHS as well.

33:59.810 --> 34:01.350
But our Emergency Operations Center

34:01.350 --> 34:04.183
is active at Camp Murray
in our state as well.

34:05.703 --> 34:07.939
Our local National Guard
folks are helping out.

34:07.939 --> 34:11.300
So to Rapuano, I have a
question as I'm also chair

34:11.300 --> 34:13.200
of the Aviation Subcommittee.

34:13.200 --> 34:17.050
It's been a priority for
me that the department,

34:17.050 --> 34:20.390
any department or agency,
with counter-UAS authority

34:20.390 --> 34:22.630
works hand in glove with FAA

34:22.630 --> 34:24.870
in implementing its
authority before deployment

34:24.870 --> 34:27.920
of counter-UAS technology at any location.

34:27.920 --> 34:32.300
Since we gave the DOD some
authorities last couple years

34:32.300 --> 34:36.470
on you counter-UAS, what
specific factors do you take

34:36.470 --> 34:39.700
into account before deploying
counter-UAS equipment

34:39.700 --> 34:41.150
at any given location

34:41.150 --> 34:43.300
given the use of civilian airspace

34:43.300 --> 34:46.607
in order to implement
and operate counter-UAS?

34:48.038 --> 34:49.270
- Absolutely, I'll give you an overview

34:49.270 --> 34:51.190
and then hand over to
General O'Shaughnessy--

34:51.190 --> 34:53.880
- [Larsen] You got a
minute and 41 seconds.

34:53.880 --> 34:55.760
- We work very closely with FAA.

34:55.760 --> 34:59.300
We do have authorities for
counter-UAS domestically.

34:59.300 --> 35:01.070
Those authorities are limited in terms

35:01.070 --> 35:05.518
of we have to take into account undue risk

35:05.518 --> 35:09.310
to civil aviation, other activities

35:09.310 --> 35:12.280
that are not threatening
to DOD facilities.

35:12.280 --> 35:15.970
So that is a process that is ongoing.

35:15.970 --> 35:18.736
And again, I'll just, in limited time,

35:18.736 --> 35:19.901
turn to General O'Shaughnessy

35:19.901 --> 35:21.400
to provide some additional--
- Thanks.

35:21.400 --> 35:24.510
- Sir, we have a very robust
relationship with the FAA.

35:24.510 --> 35:26.500
Steve Dixon and I have
met in multiple occasions

35:26.500 --> 35:29.672
to talk about these very issues

35:29.672 --> 35:32.290
and our staff work on
almost daily basis with this

35:32.290 --> 35:34.140
as well as with Department
of Homeland Security

35:34.140 --> 35:38.104
who plays an equally
critical role within this.

35:38.104 --> 35:39.192
And I would highlight though,

35:39.192 --> 35:40.400
we do have different perspectives.

35:40.400 --> 35:42.730
In some ways, the FAA
is concerned about that,

35:42.730 --> 35:45.200
that compliant operator
and the safety of flight

35:45.200 --> 35:46.270
of that compliant operator.

35:46.270 --> 35:48.940
We're more worried about
the non-compliant operators

35:48.940 --> 35:50.550
and how do we separate the non-compliant

35:50.550 --> 35:53.620
and potentially threat from
those that are doing things

35:53.620 --> 35:55.880
in accordance with the FAA rules.

35:55.880 --> 35:57.570
As we continue to work our way forward,

35:57.570 --> 36:00.080
this is a threat that
we really have to find

36:00.080 --> 36:02.400
the right balance between safety for those

36:02.400 --> 36:04.900
to be able to operate and
commercial businesses and whatnot

36:04.900 --> 36:07.453
that wanna expand the use of USSs as well.

36:08.760 --> 36:10.930
still at the same time
maintaining our ability

36:10.930 --> 36:12.410
to defend our critical installations

36:12.410 --> 36:15.170
as well as the national
critical infrastructure.

36:15.170 --> 36:16.560
I think that partnership is right.

36:16.560 --> 36:17.890
I think the authorities are right.

36:17.890 --> 36:20.240
I think we, from an investment standpoint,

36:20.240 --> 36:21.770
need to also look at those things

36:21.770 --> 36:23.990
that will allow both
and some of the systems

36:23.990 --> 36:27.090
we employ overseas aren't
quite as useful here at home,

36:27.090 --> 36:30.453
and we have to have the
continue operation of airfields,

36:31.829 --> 36:32.662
to include the commercial ones

36:32.662 --> 36:34.150
whilst being able to defend.

36:34.150 --> 36:35.820
So we need to invest continued

36:35.820 --> 36:37.878
within the commercial industry.

36:37.878 --> 36:39.535
- Great, I'll have some
follow up questions later.

36:39.535 --> 36:40.570
But thank you and I'll yield back, thanks.

36:40.570 --> 36:43.470
- Thank you, Mr. Turner.
- Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

36:43.470 --> 36:46.830
Secretary, Admiral, you both,
in your opening statements

36:46.830 --> 36:51.040
and in your written statements
reference China and Russia

36:51.040 --> 36:54.543
and their activities in South America.

36:55.405 --> 36:57.393
Secretary, you even talked
of malign influence.

36:58.240 --> 37:02.800
What tools do you see that
you have in the DOD portfolio

37:02.800 --> 37:05.310
or what other things
do we need to be doing

37:05.310 --> 37:08.320
to increase our influence in the area?

37:08.320 --> 37:11.140
Do we still have a competitive advantage,

37:11.140 --> 37:13.808
areas where we're not
competing that we should.

37:13.808 --> 37:15.663
What are you seeing and
advice would you give us?

37:20.933 --> 37:22.622
- Thank you for that important question.

37:22.622 --> 37:23.620
We still have the competitive advantage,

37:23.620 --> 37:25.800
but that advantage is eroding.

37:25.800 --> 37:28.450
Our competitive advantage
remains in our education system.

37:28.450 --> 37:31.250
Our partners want to educate with us.

37:31.250 --> 37:32.622
China's seeing that.

37:32.622 --> 37:34.390
Recent example, they offer five to one,

37:34.390 --> 37:37.260
so for often one slot to Carlisle,

37:37.260 --> 37:39.300
they've come in behind us to offer five

37:39.300 --> 37:40.833
to their version of Carlisle.

37:42.334 --> 37:43.510
Some of our partners are
taking them up on it.

37:43.510 --> 37:47.360
It seems to be a nice
vacation, but we are quality.

37:47.360 --> 37:49.340
So we'll take our quality any day.

37:49.340 --> 37:51.640
Our partners wanna exercise with us.

37:51.640 --> 37:53.787
Our partners wanna do exchanges with us,

37:53.787 --> 37:58.270
and our partners want to
be able to afford our gear,

37:58.270 --> 38:00.870
our equipments, the
best, built in America.

38:00.870 --> 38:05.140
Unfortunately, some of our
partners have financial issues.

38:05.140 --> 38:06.210
China's figured that out.

38:06.210 --> 38:10.050
They've come in and started
gifting large sums of gear,

38:10.050 --> 38:13.060
trucks, boats, to partners,

38:13.060 --> 38:15.773
recent conversation with Chief of Defense

38:15.773 --> 38:18.500
in a small Caribbean nation,

38:18.500 --> 38:20.829
he gets around to it and he says,

38:20.829 --> 38:22.610
"Yep, they only gave me
20 million last year."

38:22.610 --> 38:24.610
And I looked at my cheat sheet

38:24.610 --> 38:28.080
and it was about one million
across all our assistants

38:28.080 --> 38:29.550
in the mill-to-mill.

38:29.550 --> 38:31.120
We don't need outspend China.

38:31.120 --> 38:34.340
We just need to have enough and be present

38:34.340 --> 38:36.500
to continue that leverage in that access,

38:36.500 --> 38:38.590
presence and influence that we can bring

38:38.590 --> 38:40.543
as reliable, trusted partners.

38:44.704 --> 38:47.313
- So I would just amplify
Admiral Faller's points.

38:48.680 --> 38:52.668
We have unique differentiators
as the United States

38:52.668 --> 38:53.970
and in our alliance system.

38:53.970 --> 38:56.970
We, unlike the Chinese or the Russians

38:56.970 --> 39:01.970
have a very robust system of
alliance, allies and partners.

39:02.890 --> 39:06.340
We don't have to spend
them dollar per dollar.

39:06.340 --> 39:09.230
But we do need to be
resourcing these relationships

39:09.230 --> 39:12.710
and developing them in a
manner that makes clear

39:12.710 --> 39:15.780
where the benefits are
and over the long term,

39:15.780 --> 39:18.570
what is in the best
interest of these nations.

39:18.570 --> 39:20.190
And it's very difficult sometimes

39:20.190 --> 39:23.400
when you look at the immediate lay down

39:23.400 --> 39:25.950
of what resources the Chinese are offering

39:25.950 --> 39:28.630
with maybe long term payout in some areas,

39:28.630 --> 39:32.050
but it's increasingly, if you just review

39:32.050 --> 39:34.800
the inputs that are coming
out from around the world,

39:34.800 --> 39:37.620
it's increasingly understood by nations

39:37.620 --> 39:40.338
that this is a predatory policy,

39:40.338 --> 39:41.480
particularly the Chinese approach

39:41.480 --> 39:44.520
in terms of the loss leader up front

39:44.520 --> 39:47.360
and then that dependence on systems

39:47.360 --> 39:49.730
for which they do not
have the same control.

39:49.730 --> 39:52.810
So again, this is just how we can

39:52.810 --> 39:56.480
most thoughtfully apply not
the same amount of resources

39:56.480 --> 40:00.793
but increased resources to
address this important challenge.

40:01.850 --> 40:03.766
- General, you and I had the opportunity

40:03.766 --> 40:06.450
to talk yesterday of the huge investment

40:06.450 --> 40:08.820
that we're going to be undertaking.

40:08.820 --> 40:11.340
As we look to the National
Defense Authorization this year,

40:11.340 --> 40:14.750
we have areas of space
that we have to invest,

40:14.750 --> 40:18.310
in sensors, missile defense,
even our nuclear deterrent

40:18.310 --> 40:20.980
is one that's gonna require
a significant investment.

40:20.980 --> 40:23.380
You and I talked about your successors,

40:23.380 --> 40:26.010
if we don't make these investments,

40:26.010 --> 40:28.630
tell us what your concerns would be

40:28.630 --> 40:30.800
for your successors 10 years from now,

40:30.800 --> 40:34.503
if we falter and don't modernize
and invest in our systems.

40:35.460 --> 40:36.640
- Thank you for that opportunity

40:36.640 --> 40:39.870
to highlight these very important issues

40:39.870 --> 40:42.050
relative to our ability
to defend our homeland.

40:42.050 --> 40:44.060
I'll start with our
ballistic missile defense.

40:44.060 --> 40:45.370
We have a good program in place.

40:45.370 --> 40:46.450
We have a good plan in place.

40:46.450 --> 40:49.598
I think if we are able
to execute that program

40:49.598 --> 40:52.140
as we have it designed
with the underlayer,

40:52.140 --> 40:54.690
I think we'll be continue to maintain

40:54.690 --> 40:57.790
that competitive advantage
both capacity and capability

40:57.790 --> 40:59.620
to defend our nation
against a rogue nation,

40:59.620 --> 41:02.610
whether that be a future
development of capability in Iran

41:02.610 --> 41:05.560
or the current North
Korean threat that we face,

41:05.560 --> 41:07.030
I think we often have to think

41:07.030 --> 41:09.850
about the the peer
competitors that we have,

41:09.850 --> 41:11.240
Russia and China.

41:11.240 --> 41:12.890
And as we look at their actions

41:12.890 --> 41:15.210
and their activities and
what they're investing in,

41:15.210 --> 41:17.810
we want to make sure that we
are able to stay ahead of them

41:17.810 --> 41:20.000
relative to our ability
to defend our homeland.

41:20.000 --> 41:21.610
And it's not so much that we expect,

41:21.610 --> 41:24.990
for example, the Russians
to wake up in the morning

41:24.990 --> 41:26.970
and find that they're invading
the United States of America.

41:26.970 --> 41:28.180
That's not what we're saying.

41:28.180 --> 41:29.710
But there could be a regional crisis,

41:29.710 --> 41:32.730
for example, in Europe, that
then based on the nature

41:32.730 --> 41:35.810
of the capability, what
could very quickly expand

41:35.810 --> 41:37.250
to a global fight.

41:37.250 --> 41:41.500
And so as we see that we
could very well find ourselves

41:41.500 --> 41:43.210
where they are trying to hold us at risk,

41:43.210 --> 41:44.480
whether it be with cruise missiles,

41:44.480 --> 41:45.970
whether it be with cyber,

41:45.970 --> 41:49.100
whether it be the myriad of
capability that they have

41:49.100 --> 41:50.790
and they've been investing in.

41:50.790 --> 41:52.602
I think we have to look outside--

41:52.602 --> 41:53.910
- I'm sorry, I should
have said this upfront,

41:53.910 --> 41:56.257
when we get to the end, I try to stop it.

41:56.257 --> 41:57.760
So if you just wrap up quickly--

41:57.760 --> 42:00.210
- Yes, sir, we need to invest to maintain

42:00.210 --> 42:01.820
that competitive advantage

42:01.820 --> 42:03.820
in order to maintain our ability

42:03.820 --> 42:06.470
to defend ourselves against
all threats in all domains.

42:06.470 --> 42:08.427
- [Adam] Thank you. Mr. Langevin.

42:09.563 --> 42:10.800
- Thank you Mr. Chairman, Mr. Rapuano,

42:10.800 --> 42:12.720
General O'Shaughnessy and Admiral Faller.

42:12.720 --> 42:14.090
Thank you all for being here

42:14.090 --> 42:15.690
and your service to the country.

42:16.550 --> 42:17.970
Obviously, you all face unique challenges

42:17.970 --> 42:22.270
across the diplomatic,
information military

42:22.270 --> 42:27.160
and obviously, economic
domains and the Arctic,

42:27.160 --> 42:30.530
among one of them has
rapidly become a battleground

42:30.530 --> 42:32.070
in the great power competition

42:32.070 --> 42:34.193
that we talked about here today.

42:35.130 --> 42:37.930
Climate change is obviously
already exacerbating

42:37.930 --> 42:41.667
these challenges, as we
see increasing hostilities,

42:41.667 --> 42:44.550
more navigable waterways.

42:44.550 --> 42:47.120
My question is, General O'Shaughnessy,

42:47.120 --> 42:50.920
do you agree that climate
change is an aggregating factor

42:50.920 --> 42:51.913
in your theater?

42:53.810 --> 42:56.540
- Sir, what we're seeing
is diminished ice,

42:56.540 --> 42:59.730
increased usability of
some of the waterways,

42:59.730 --> 43:01.660
we see increased activity,

43:01.660 --> 43:04.590
we see some of the impacts
of the result of that,

43:04.590 --> 43:06.307
for example, some erosion.

43:06.307 --> 43:09.140
And those are all things that
we have to take into account.

43:09.140 --> 43:10.960
From my particular point of view,

43:10.960 --> 43:12.620
what I'm most concerned with is,

43:12.620 --> 43:15.760
as we do see our potential
adversaries increasing

43:15.760 --> 43:18.240
their capability and
capacity to take advantage

43:18.240 --> 43:20.610
of some of these more navigable waters.

43:20.610 --> 43:23.780
We also need to be able to
operate in that environment.

43:23.780 --> 43:26.980
I have a renewed invigoration to make sure

43:26.980 --> 43:29.853
that we are able to operate
in that Arctic environment.

43:30.879 --> 43:34.290
- So my question is how
is NORTHCOM factoring

43:34.290 --> 43:37.325
the implications for
changing climate dynamics

43:37.325 --> 43:39.610
in its military planning?

43:39.610 --> 43:41.620
- So specifically, what
we're doing is maintaining

43:41.620 --> 43:45.190
our ability to operate,
looking at all facets of it,

43:45.190 --> 43:46.750
whether it's our
infrastructure and make sure

43:46.750 --> 43:48.980
that we don't have impacts
to our infrastructure

43:48.980 --> 43:51.660
as a result of any changes that we see.

43:51.660 --> 43:54.410
But also because we
see more activity there

43:54.410 --> 43:58.200
because of the environmental
impacts that we're seeing.

43:58.200 --> 44:00.640
We also have to make
sure we have the ability

44:00.640 --> 44:03.300
to operate there that we have invest

44:03.300 --> 44:04.690
in things like communication,

44:04.690 --> 44:07.340
domain awareness, and infrastructure

44:07.340 --> 44:09.570
that will withstand those changes.

44:09.570 --> 44:10.403
- Thank you.

44:11.401 --> 44:13.289
Admiral Faller, anything
that you have to add,

44:13.289 --> 44:14.390
Mr. Rapuano?

44:14.390 --> 44:18.230
- The ability to rapidly
respond to events,

44:18.230 --> 44:22.700
whether it's a weather event
or an environmental event,

44:22.700 --> 44:25.110
terrorist attack, transnational
criminal organization

44:25.110 --> 44:26.616
is important.

44:26.616 --> 44:27.449
So we continue to watch that closely

44:27.449 --> 44:29.890
and ensure that our exercise programs,

44:29.890 --> 44:32.974
our security cooperation
programs emphasize

44:32.974 --> 44:35.100
the partners' capacity to do that,

44:35.100 --> 44:38.710
because as we see in some
of these massive hurricanes,

44:38.710 --> 44:41.770
no one nation has the
ability to do it alone.

44:41.770 --> 44:42.820
- Thank you, Admiral.

44:43.913 --> 44:46.460
Mr Rapuano, I wanna,
first of all, thank you,

44:46.460 --> 44:48.240
on another topic, for all the work

44:48.240 --> 44:50.780
that you've done in
the Solarium Commission

44:50.780 --> 44:52.680
over the past year.

44:52.680 --> 44:56.820
I was very proud to be part
of that commission as well,

44:56.820 --> 45:00.303
chaired by Senator King and
and Representative Gallagher.

45:01.390 --> 45:02.320
And very proud of the final product

45:02.320 --> 45:04.100
that's being released today.

45:04.100 --> 45:06.950
One of the major
recommendations that we make

45:06.950 --> 45:10.930
in report is strengthening
CISA at Homeland Security,

45:10.930 --> 45:13.760
to ensure that it has the
authorities and resources

45:13.760 --> 45:16.760
that it needs to perform
its Civil Defense mission.

45:16.760 --> 45:18.470
So Secretary Rapuano, do you agree

45:18.470 --> 45:20.633
with the Solarium Commission

45:20.633 --> 45:22.932
that we need to strengthen CISA.

45:22.932 --> 45:24.880
And can you explain why
the Department of Defense

45:24.880 --> 45:26.350
needs a strong partner

45:26.350 --> 45:27.800
at the Department of Homeland Security

45:27.800 --> 45:31.573
to protect the nation in cyberspace?

45:32.453 --> 45:33.950
And the last one, another
key recommendation

45:33.950 --> 45:36.107
is the importance of exercising,

45:36.107 --> 45:40.510
Secretary Rapuano and
General O'Shaughnessy,

45:40.510 --> 45:42.290
feel free to chime in of course.

45:42.290 --> 45:44.450
Can you detail how the department leads

45:44.450 --> 45:47.680
or participates in
national level exercises

45:47.680 --> 45:50.310
to better prepare us to act in situations

45:50.310 --> 45:54.063
where DOD assets are called on
to support civil authorities?

45:55.060 --> 45:56.580
- First, thank you very
much for the question,

45:56.580 --> 45:57.683
Congressman Langevin.

45:59.274 --> 46:02.940
The Solarium Commission
was a very fruitful

46:02.940 --> 46:06.070
and productive exercise
from our perspective

46:06.070 --> 46:11.070
in the very frank deliberate
in-depth discussions associated

46:11.440 --> 46:15.480
with the evolving growing cyber threat.

46:15.480 --> 46:17.910
And I think one of the
most critical outcomes

46:17.910 --> 46:22.910
from it was just strong coalescence,

46:23.570 --> 46:26.130
stronger emphatic understanding

46:26.130 --> 46:28.348
of the whole-of-government,
whole-of-nation context

46:28.348 --> 46:33.348
for which we must rely
on to be able to respond

46:33.660 --> 46:36.107
to growing cyber threats to us--

46:38.123 --> 46:42.890
- Comment on CISA.
- Specifically to CISA.

46:42.890 --> 46:45.310
CISA is the lead for DHS,

46:45.310 --> 46:47.680
which is lead Federal
Agency for responding

46:47.680 --> 46:52.170
and providing support to
industry critical infrastructure.

46:52.170 --> 46:57.170
CISA, of course, needs to be
resource to perform that role,

46:57.430 --> 46:59.460
and we understand with the growing threat

46:59.460 --> 47:01.507
there will be growing needs

47:01.507 --> 47:03.970
in terms of the resources required

47:03.970 --> 47:05.760
to effectively perform that mission

47:05.760 --> 47:08.520
and we are very supportive of CISA

47:08.520 --> 47:12.770
being provided the appropriate
resources to do that.

47:12.770 --> 47:15.193
- [Adam] Thank you. Mr Rogers.

47:16.430 --> 47:18.648
- Thank you, Mr Chairman, and
thank you all for being here

47:18.648 --> 47:20.421
and for your service our country.

47:20.421 --> 47:23.350
General O'Shaughnessy in
the president's budget,

47:23.350 --> 47:27.053
the Hawaii and Pacific
radars were canceled.

47:28.336 --> 47:29.839
My first question is why?

47:29.839 --> 47:31.040
My second question is what kind of gaps

47:31.040 --> 47:32.640
does this create in coverage?

47:32.640 --> 47:35.132
And my third question is
what are you going to do

47:35.132 --> 47:38.033
if the SBX is not at sea
when a threat arises?

47:41.437 --> 47:43.670
- Sir, just for clarification,

47:43.670 --> 47:46.970
we view that as being
postponed versus canceled,

47:46.970 --> 47:49.383
it is still a priority for us.

47:50.469 --> 47:53.326
There were some concerns
relative to the executability

47:53.326 --> 47:55.983
of the funding as our
SecDef has commented about.

47:58.206 --> 47:59.570
I will say from my perspective,

47:59.570 --> 48:01.690
with the SBX, we have the ability today

48:01.690 --> 48:06.250
to defend all of our defended
area to include Hawaii.

48:06.250 --> 48:08.670
What we would like to see
though is this continue

48:08.670 --> 48:11.760
to be looked at to see how it
fits into the overall system

48:11.760 --> 48:14.373
and our ability to execute that mission.

48:14.373 --> 48:16.590
To your point, with the
SBX, being obviously

48:16.590 --> 48:21.160
an at-sea platform and the risk
inherently involved in that,

48:21.160 --> 48:23.760
with respect to our vantage point,

48:23.760 --> 48:25.680
clearly we see PAYCOM has put it in

48:25.680 --> 48:28.640
as one of their unfunded priorities.

48:28.640 --> 48:30.440
And we certainly applaud that.

48:30.440 --> 48:32.360
They also have regional considerations

48:32.360 --> 48:35.960
besides the broader GBI execution

48:35.960 --> 48:38.439
from the regional missile defense.

48:38.439 --> 48:40.530
- For example?
- For example, as they look

48:40.530 --> 48:42.750
at the capability they
have with the other radars,

48:42.750 --> 48:45.250
the T-PY2, what they have at Guam,

48:45.250 --> 48:47.786
threats that they have in
the shorter range threat,

48:47.786 --> 48:50.200
not necessarily ICBMs that this
would contribute to as well

48:50.200 --> 48:53.283
beyond the NORTHCOM role in
that specific mission setting.

48:54.250 --> 48:56.830
- General, in your
testimony you say, quote,

48:56.830 --> 48:58.720
in order to reclaim
our strategic advantage

48:58.720 --> 49:00.960
in the high north, it's
critical we improve our ability

49:00.960 --> 49:02.990
to detect and track surface vessels

49:02.990 --> 49:05.840
and aircraft in our Arctic approaches

49:05.840 --> 49:09.300
and establish more reliable
secure communications

49:09.300 --> 49:11.200
for our joint board warfighters operating

49:11.200 --> 49:13.550
in the higher latitudes, close quote.

49:13.550 --> 49:16.270
What specific capabilities
would you like to see us develop

49:16.270 --> 49:19.070
to counter the increasing
threats from China and Russia?

49:20.264 --> 49:21.097
And is there something in particular

49:21.097 --> 49:23.170
you're working on together
that concerns you?

49:24.400 --> 49:25.590
- First, let me start with,

49:25.590 --> 49:27.694
we have to start with domain awareness.

49:27.694 --> 49:29.020
We have to understand what's operating

49:29.020 --> 49:32.350
in the approaches to our
sovereign airspace in territory,

49:32.350 --> 49:35.790
as well as within the confines
of our sovereign territory.

49:35.790 --> 49:38.390
We saw just yesterday, you
may have seen in the news,

49:38.390 --> 49:42.050
we had a Russian bomber 60
miles off the coast of Alaska,

49:42.050 --> 49:45.870
operating in one of our
ISACs exercises we have

49:45.870 --> 49:48.220
where our submarines actually
pop up out of the ice,

49:48.220 --> 49:50.282
that camp established for there,

49:50.282 --> 49:51.820
they were ordering about
2500 feet above that,

49:51.820 --> 49:53.700
and mind you, they were
loading with an F-22

49:53.700 --> 49:56.240
and an F-18 on their
wing when they did that,

49:56.240 --> 49:58.660
so we have to maintain
the ability to be able

49:58.660 --> 50:00.040
to react appropriately,

50:00.040 --> 50:02.260
not just for a strategic
messaging type event here,

50:02.260 --> 50:04.380
but potentially in the future,

50:04.380 --> 50:05.213
to actually defeat any threats,

50:05.213 --> 50:06.400
starts with domain awareness.

50:06.400 --> 50:08.250
And then you need ability
to command and control

50:08.250 --> 50:09.791
and to command and control,

50:09.791 --> 50:10.624
you have to be able to communicate.

50:10.624 --> 50:12.650
We have severe limitations to communicate

50:12.650 --> 50:14.860
in the Arctic, above about 65 degrees,

50:14.860 --> 50:17.010
it becomes limited, above about 70,

50:17.010 --> 50:18.290
it becomes severely limited except

50:18.290 --> 50:21.460
for our more exquisite capabilities.

50:21.460 --> 50:23.260
I think one of the things we can leverage

50:23.260 --> 50:25.710
is a commercial technology
that's out there.

50:25.710 --> 50:28.126
We see the proliferation of LEO,

50:28.126 --> 50:31.298
whether it be to a company
such as OneWeb, Starlink,

50:31.298 --> 50:32.710
we see amazing technology
that's gonna bring,

50:32.710 --> 50:34.910
literally broadband connectivity,

50:34.910 --> 50:36.310
the same you would have
in your home right now.

50:36.310 --> 50:38.920
You could actually
establish within the Arctic,

50:38.920 --> 50:43.270
very quickly, in a matter
of literally, a year or so.

50:43.270 --> 50:45.300
To me that would actually fast forward

50:45.300 --> 50:48.860
our ability to operate
within that very difficult,

50:48.860 --> 50:51.480
challenging battlespace
is having the ability

50:51.480 --> 50:52.810
to communicate.

50:52.810 --> 50:55.220
We have as our number one
unfunded priority list,

50:55.220 --> 50:58.700
Arctic communications to
leverage the commercial work

50:58.700 --> 51:00.580
in the proliferation of LEO I think

51:00.580 --> 51:03.122
would be a game changer,
not only for the military,

51:03.122 --> 51:04.970
but also for the civilian communities.

51:04.970 --> 51:05.803
- Great, thank you very much.

51:05.803 --> 51:06.680
Admiral, in your testimony,

51:06.680 --> 51:09.670
you talked about South
America's strategic location

51:09.670 --> 51:10.943
for space activity.

51:12.120 --> 51:14.800
Can you give us, and how
China's pursuing that?

51:14.800 --> 51:17.550
Can you give us some examples
of what you mean by that?

51:19.340 --> 51:23.140
- One space station China
has a virtual control over

51:23.140 --> 51:26.900
is what allowed China to land
on the dark side of the moon.

51:26.900 --> 51:28.654
- [Rogers] Is that the way in Argentina?

51:28.654 --> 51:30.320
- Yes, sir and that's an example.

51:30.320 --> 51:33.960
And so China sees this, as does Russia.

51:33.960 --> 51:38.190
And they're working to get
their inroads into that area.

51:38.190 --> 51:41.070
Fortunately, we're we're
pushing with countries,

51:41.070 --> 51:43.930
good partners like Brazil
to increase our access

51:43.930 --> 51:46.010
and our cooperation space.

51:46.010 --> 51:48.320
And I think there's some
real opportunity there

51:48.320 --> 51:50.330
with some of the agreements
we've signed with Brazil

51:50.330 --> 51:52.600
over the last year,
including this past Sunday,

51:52.600 --> 51:56.500
we signed a research development
agreement with Brazil

51:56.500 --> 51:58.540
that was put together quite rapidly,

51:58.540 --> 52:01.320
four types of agreements that allow

52:01.320 --> 52:03.140
a broad range of technology

52:03.140 --> 52:07.078
and defense cooperation that
could be included into space.

52:07.078 --> 52:08.880
- It's a very important point,

52:08.880 --> 52:11.140
I hope the committee takes
note of that China and Russia

52:11.140 --> 52:14.560
are both making great
efforts to get toehold

52:14.560 --> 52:17.160
in South and Central America
and we can't just ignore that.

52:17.160 --> 52:19.392
With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

52:19.392 --> 52:21.070
- Thank you. Mr. Norcross.

52:21.070 --> 52:22.273
- Thank you, Chairman.

52:23.112 --> 52:26.035
General, Admiral, Secretary,
thank you for being here.

52:26.035 --> 52:28.470
I want to talk a little
bit more about the Arctic.

52:28.470 --> 52:31.130
I happened to be up at ISACs this weekend

52:31.130 --> 52:33.773
and we all wave to the
Russians as they flew over.

52:34.740 --> 52:37.743
I just thought they were there
to see me but apparently not.

52:40.200 --> 52:42.540
We often talk about
the threat from Russia.

52:42.540 --> 52:45.540
Can you also talk about
the recent activities

52:45.540 --> 52:48.930
from China and what they're doing

52:48.930 --> 52:52.373
and why we should be concerned?

52:54.226 --> 52:55.106
- Yes, sir.

52:55.106 --> 52:56.250
Thank you again for
allowing me to highlight

52:56.250 --> 52:57.880
one of my most pressing concerns

52:57.880 --> 52:59.740
is really the Arctic and our ability

52:59.740 --> 53:01.930
to operate What we see
our adversaries doing,

53:01.930 --> 53:03.720
specifically to the China question,

53:03.720 --> 53:06.400
we see activity, for
example, the Xue Long,

53:06.400 --> 53:08.900
which is one of their scientific vessels,

53:08.900 --> 53:11.625
that is probably the preliminary work

53:11.625 --> 53:13.530
they're doing to bring up
military capability capacity

53:13.530 --> 53:15.540
to operate in the Arctic,

53:15.540 --> 53:17.050
we see that China declared themselves

53:17.050 --> 53:18.282
as a near-Arctic state,

53:18.282 --> 53:20.190
we see the economic investment
that they are doing.

53:20.190 --> 53:22.686
And we've seen in other areas of war

53:22.686 --> 53:24.820
with that course of economics
has a very nefarious intent

53:24.820 --> 53:26.680
behind it--
- But what specifically,

53:26.680 --> 53:28.820
if you could just point
out the other nations

53:28.820 --> 53:30.660
are investing in.

53:30.660 --> 53:34.670
- Well, obviously, Russia,
we see amazing activity

53:34.670 --> 53:37.320
on the Russian side, both
in their installations

53:37.320 --> 53:39.070
that they are rapidly improving,

53:39.070 --> 53:42.290
as well as just their ability
to operate in that environment

53:42.290 --> 53:45.250
with a very robust presence
and exercises and training.

53:45.250 --> 53:47.090
And I think from our vantage point,

53:47.090 --> 53:50.410
we also need to ensure we have the ability

53:50.410 --> 53:53.802
to operate in that what is
frankly, it's battlespace,

53:53.802 --> 53:55.490
we need to be able to
operate in that environment.

53:55.490 --> 53:58.480
I would use the analogy
that we can deploy a force

53:58.480 --> 54:00.780
anywhere in the world, we've
been very good at that,

54:00.780 --> 54:03.070
the United States of
America projecting power,

54:03.070 --> 54:04.560
you cannot deploy to the Arctic

54:04.560 --> 54:06.496
if you have not trained there,

54:06.496 --> 54:08.081
if you don't have the right kit,

54:08.081 --> 54:09.100
you don't have the right equipment,

54:09.100 --> 54:11.840
because it is such a harsh environment.

54:11.840 --> 54:13.640
We've been working
closely with the services

54:13.640 --> 54:15.960
to increase the activity we see,

54:15.960 --> 54:19.280
things like the training
ranges at the ranges in Alaska,

54:19.280 --> 54:22.270
like the JPARC range,
continuing to invest in those

54:22.270 --> 54:25.830
so we have a playing field
to go practice and scrimmage.

54:25.830 --> 54:29.190
We do see that as a
principal avenue of approach

54:29.190 --> 54:30.890
that we need to be able to defend.

54:32.067 --> 54:36.020
- So the Bering Strait is one
of the primary areas up there.

54:36.020 --> 54:40.253
We see that Russia is adding
some more missile assets

54:41.150 --> 54:42.123
to their side.

54:43.271 --> 54:46.363
What concern and how we countering those?

54:48.400 --> 54:50.760
- As you mentioned, the
deployment of the missiles

54:50.760 --> 54:54.160
to that very critical navigation point

54:54.160 --> 54:57.330
that is a choke point for
entry into the Arctic waters

54:57.330 --> 54:59.280
is absolutely critical.

54:59.280 --> 55:03.990
We need to have the ability to
maintain our presence there,

55:03.990 --> 55:06.350
even in a contested environment,

55:06.350 --> 55:08.670
those missiles can strike Alaska

55:08.670 --> 55:11.160
and our critical
infrastructure within Alaska

55:11.160 --> 55:13.480
with very little indications of warning.

55:13.480 --> 55:16.170
Therefore, we have to have
that persistent defense,

55:16.170 --> 55:17.820
that persistent domain awareness,

55:17.820 --> 55:19.070
that persistent command and control

55:19.070 --> 55:20.890
and persistent ability to defend,

55:20.890 --> 55:23.630
not be able to just deploy it
up there in a time of need,

55:23.630 --> 55:25.070
because we will not necessarily be able

55:25.070 --> 55:27.610
to get inside the
actions of our adversary.

55:27.610 --> 55:30.493
So we need to invest more in the Arctic.

55:32.355 --> 55:33.188
- Just to shift gears a little bit

55:33.188 --> 55:36.150
and we'll talk about the
defense of the homeland,

55:36.150 --> 55:38.790
with our lighter defense,
you had talked earlier

55:38.790 --> 55:43.780
about what we've done to
increase the capabilities.

55:43.780 --> 55:44.803
Hypersonics.

55:46.510 --> 55:49.560
How are we defending
against the hypersonics,

55:49.560 --> 55:51.660
particularly if it was a submarine launch?

55:53.490 --> 55:56.570
- So a couple points
I'd make on hypersonics;

55:56.570 --> 56:00.880
first, we find that the hypersonics,

56:00.880 --> 56:02.770
for example, what's
actually Russia has claimed

56:02.770 --> 56:04.720
and we see in place already,

56:04.720 --> 56:05.710
with Avangard missile,

56:05.710 --> 56:07.790
the hypersonic glide vehicle

56:07.790 --> 56:09.190
that has nuclear capability.

56:09.190 --> 56:12.260
Our biggest point on
the nuclear capability

56:12.260 --> 56:15.800
is that we need to be able
to give advanced warning.

56:15.800 --> 56:18.450
Because it flies in a
much different trajectory,

56:18.450 --> 56:20.110
it does not, unlike a ballistic missile,

56:20.110 --> 56:22.430
where you can get a radar on it

56:22.430 --> 56:23.850
and you know exactly where it's going,

56:23.850 --> 56:25.470
the hypersonic glide vehicle

56:25.470 --> 56:28.730
is unlike that, it has the
energy to go to multiple areas

56:28.730 --> 56:31.020
within the United States as an example.

56:31.020 --> 56:33.360
Maintaining custody of that
requires a different set

56:33.360 --> 56:35.070
of sensors to be able to do that.

56:35.070 --> 56:36.720
So we have to invest in
our domain awareness,

56:36.720 --> 56:39.600
those sensors that can do the hypersonics.

56:39.600 --> 56:41.090
That's for the glide vehicle.

56:41.090 --> 56:44.450
For cruise missiles that we
see, it shrinks the time,

56:44.450 --> 56:46.813
it shrinks the time you have to react.

56:47.676 --> 56:49.700
There is an investment
that we need to continue

56:49.700 --> 56:52.230
to make to stay ahead of this threat,

56:52.230 --> 56:54.010
that we can operate at
the speed of relevance

56:54.010 --> 56:55.370
relative to the threat that we see

56:55.370 --> 56:57.695
of these advancing cruise missiles.

56:57.695 --> 57:01.050
- In 26 seconds, talk
about the time difference

57:01.050 --> 57:05.570
in what you can in this environment,

57:05.570 --> 57:08.180
how much has that cut down
on the president's ability

57:08.180 --> 57:09.273
to make a decision?

57:10.790 --> 57:13.030
- It cuts down a lot,
it's the speed of it,

57:13.030 --> 57:15.116
and it's the energy that it has.

57:15.116 --> 57:15.949
It can go to multiple places.

57:15.949 --> 57:16.782
And that doesn't give you the ability

57:16.782 --> 57:20.470
to project that in a timely
manner for our senior leadership

57:20.470 --> 57:23.310
with our current capability,
we need to invest.

57:23.310 --> 57:25.573
- I yield back.
- Thank you. Miss Hartzler.

57:27.388 --> 57:28.795
- Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

57:28.795 --> 57:29.628
And thank you all for being here.

57:29.628 --> 57:32.270
And I didn't realize
you guys were cousins.

57:32.270 --> 57:35.373
Your grandparents must have
been so proud of you all.

57:36.950 --> 57:39.100
That's pretty amazing, pretty amazing.

57:39.100 --> 57:43.111
General O'Shaughnessy, I
wanted to start off talking

57:43.111 --> 57:45.160
about the F-15C Fleet.

57:45.160 --> 57:47.327
Last year's posture hearing,

57:47.327 --> 57:49.350
you testified on the importance
of modernizing the fleet

57:49.350 --> 57:52.390
for the Homeland Defense
and the deteriorating status

57:52.390 --> 57:54.130
the F-15 Sea Fleet and the urgency

57:54.130 --> 57:57.700
to replace these aircraft
was the primary driver

57:57.700 --> 58:00.670
for the establishment
of the F-15EX program.

58:00.670 --> 58:02.480
But this year's budget requests reduce

58:02.480 --> 58:04.760
the number F-15EX aircraft,

58:04.760 --> 58:07.650
Air Force plan to acquire from 18 to 12.

58:07.650 --> 58:09.900
So from a Homeland Defense perspective,

58:09.900 --> 58:13.560
is it still urgent to
replace the F-15 Sea Fleet?

58:13.560 --> 58:16.620
And what are the
vulnerabilities that we face

58:16.620 --> 58:18.770
if we don't quickly provide these units

58:18.770 --> 58:20.893
with capable and safe aircraft?

58:21.860 --> 58:23.270
- Ma'am, thank you for
letting me highlight that.

58:23.270 --> 58:25.620
First, as you mentioned, the F-15C

58:26.524 --> 58:27.910
has been an incredibly
important asset for us

58:27.910 --> 58:29.660
within the NORAD construct.

58:29.660 --> 58:32.040
The F-15EX, not only does it modernize it,

58:32.040 --> 58:33.560
and obviously an aging aircraft

58:33.560 --> 58:35.580
has a maintenance and
reliability problems,

58:35.580 --> 58:37.670
but it just brings capability,

58:37.670 --> 58:40.190
really applicable to us in
the Homeland Defense business.

58:40.190 --> 58:42.500
Specifically, it can carry
significantly more missiles

58:42.500 --> 58:43.940
and so that one aircraft can actually

58:43.940 --> 58:46.150
have much more of effect
relatively, for example,

58:46.150 --> 58:48.290
cruise missiles you're
trying to defend against.

58:48.290 --> 58:50.080
Second has increased radar capability.

58:50.080 --> 58:52.150
So with that capability allows you

58:52.150 --> 58:54.290
to see further out and be able to react

58:54.290 --> 58:57.050
to those lower radar
cross section threats.

58:57.050 --> 58:59.440
And the third, I'll use an
example of what you just saw

58:59.440 --> 59:02.610
a couple days ago with the
Russians flying over Alaska

59:02.610 --> 59:04.350
is the long lengths that we have to fly,

59:04.350 --> 59:06.940
750 miles from Elmendorf as an example,

59:06.940 --> 59:09.320
before we were able to
intercept that Llama.

59:09.320 --> 59:11.440
The F-15EX brings you that extended range,

59:11.440 --> 59:14.460
which allows us to get to the
archer not just the arrows.

59:14.460 --> 59:16.590
In other words, we can get to the bombers

59:16.590 --> 59:18.840
before they actually launch
those cruise missiles.

59:18.840 --> 59:20.500
So it really gives us flexibility.

59:20.500 --> 59:23.580
It gives us an incredible
increase in capability.

59:23.580 --> 59:25.790
So I would just continue to advocate

59:25.790 --> 59:29.150
for the advancement of that F-15C

59:29.150 --> 59:31.390
and transitioning over to the F-15X,

59:31.390 --> 59:32.523
as fast as possible.

59:33.643 --> 59:35.790
- Yeah, so what
vulnerabilities do you have?

59:35.790 --> 59:39.466
We're seeing the reduction
and the number of EXs

59:39.466 --> 59:40.299
that we're gonna purchase?

59:41.700 --> 59:42.720
- Well, it's just a question of what gets,

59:42.720 --> 59:44.930
obviously there'll be delay in purchasing,

59:44.930 --> 59:46.460
results in a delay and fielding.

59:46.460 --> 59:48.890
Now we will maintain the
current fleet of F-15Cs

59:49.836 --> 59:51.476
for longer as we as we continue to--

59:51.476 --> 59:52.409
- Is that possible?

59:52.409 --> 59:53.310
I mean, they're in really
bad shape, aren't they?

59:53.310 --> 59:54.400
I mean, could you give us an update

59:54.400 --> 59:56.670
on the status of the fleet.

59:56.670 --> 59:58.900
- They are but we have just an
amazing group of maintainers

59:58.900 --> 01:00:00.050
that work incredibly hard.

01:00:00.050 --> 01:00:02.700
I mean these aircraft, much like the F-16s

01:00:02.700 --> 01:00:05.280
are just older aircraft
but our maintainers

01:00:05.280 --> 01:00:09.320
are phenomenal, keep them
in operational status,

01:00:09.320 --> 01:00:11.140
but we are putting a stress on the system.

01:00:11.140 --> 01:00:13.610
I would just continue to advocate

01:00:13.610 --> 01:00:15.400
for replacement as soon as possible.

01:00:15.400 --> 01:00:17.350
- Thank you, Admiral Faller SOUTHCOM's,

01:00:18.238 --> 01:00:19.654
unfunded priorities list request

01:00:19.654 --> 01:00:22.200
funding for ISR capabilities
for drug interdiction

01:00:22.200 --> 01:00:23.610
and counter-drug activities.

01:00:23.610 --> 01:00:26.630
So what are your current ISR capabilities,

01:00:26.630 --> 01:00:29.570
requirements and shortfalls?

01:00:29.570 --> 01:00:31.100
And how will your mission be impacted

01:00:31.100 --> 01:00:34.443
if you're not provided with
adequate ISR capabilities?

01:00:35.370 --> 01:00:38.820
- The impact of the transnational
criminal organizations

01:00:38.820 --> 01:00:41.750
and drugs and illicit
things that they bring here

01:00:41.750 --> 01:00:45.490
to the United States, it's
a national security priority

01:00:45.490 --> 01:00:49.510
and it's a travesty and we
clearly need to do more.

01:00:49.510 --> 01:00:53.130
One of our gaps is intelligence and ISR

01:00:53.130 --> 01:00:54.950
gives us some of our best intelligence

01:00:54.950 --> 01:00:57.510
in our maritime patrol aircraft,

01:00:57.510 --> 01:01:01.440
unmanned aircraft and some
shorter range aircraft.

01:01:01.440 --> 01:01:03.370
So we have gaps in all that.

01:01:03.370 --> 01:01:06.540
Congress has been very good
with an ISR transfer form

01:01:06.540 --> 01:01:08.730
that has helped us fill those gaps.

01:01:08.730 --> 01:01:11.440
But still, we're trying
to cover down on an area

01:01:11.440 --> 01:01:14.830
the size of the United States
with a handful of assets.

01:01:14.830 --> 01:01:17.150
We also have gaps in ships,

01:01:17.150 --> 01:01:19.540
which we call those force packages;

01:01:19.540 --> 01:01:22.230
a helicopter, a ship, and its ability

01:01:22.230 --> 01:01:24.510
to search an area as well.

01:01:24.510 --> 01:01:27.018
And that's another significant gap.

01:01:27.018 --> 01:01:29.070
And I'd also illuminate the impact,

01:01:29.070 --> 01:01:33.090
security cooperation
funds have in this regime

01:01:33.090 --> 01:01:34.270
for a modest investment.

01:01:34.270 --> 01:01:37.010
For example, in El
Salvador special forces,

01:01:37.010 --> 01:01:41.157
we're able to extend the
security envelope hundreds

01:01:41.157 --> 01:01:42.140
of miles out into the ocean.

01:01:42.140 --> 01:01:44.469
- Sure, it's a huge task.

01:01:44.469 --> 01:01:48.380
How concerned are you with
the military's dependence

01:01:48.380 --> 01:01:53.380
on China to receive our
pharmaceutical products from them?

01:01:53.740 --> 01:01:56.520
As you know, America does
not make aspirin anymore.

01:01:56.520 --> 01:01:59.743
America does not make penicillin.

01:02:00.590 --> 01:02:04.091
90% of the drugs that we take here

01:02:04.091 --> 01:02:06.760
in our country, pharmaceutical
products come from China

01:02:06.760 --> 01:02:10.640
and 80% of those
components are China-based.

01:02:10.640 --> 01:02:14.570
And we see now they make all the syringes,

01:02:14.570 --> 01:02:16.510
they make our protective facemask

01:02:18.070 --> 01:02:20.330
and all of these things; the vaccines,

01:02:20.330 --> 01:02:21.660
antibiotics and pharmaceuticals

01:02:21.660 --> 01:02:25.252
that our military have come from China.

01:02:25.252 --> 01:02:28.310
With China being at existential threat,

01:02:28.310 --> 01:02:29.440
how concerned are you that they are

01:02:29.440 --> 01:02:32.540
our main source of medicine?
- And I apologize,

01:02:32.540 --> 01:02:34.780
but that's gonna have to
be taken for the record

01:02:34.780 --> 01:02:37.880
at this point, the
gentlelady is out of time.

01:02:37.880 --> 01:02:40.456
Mr Carbajal is recognized
for five minutes.

01:02:40.456 --> 01:02:41.339
- Thank you, Mr. Chair,

01:02:41.339 --> 01:02:43.690
and thank you to all you
three for being here.

01:02:43.690 --> 01:02:45.350
The political crisis in Venezuela

01:02:45.350 --> 01:02:48.080
has devastated the Venezuelan people

01:02:48.080 --> 01:02:51.050
and has led to an increase
in illicit activities

01:02:51.050 --> 01:02:53.143
such as drug trafficking.

01:02:54.524 --> 01:02:55.480
In addition, Venezuelan refugees

01:02:55.480 --> 01:02:58.760
have fled the country and
sought temporary residence

01:02:58.760 --> 01:03:02.070
in neighboring countries,
especially Colombia.

01:03:02.070 --> 01:03:04.770
Secretary Rapuano, what is your assessment

01:03:04.770 --> 01:03:08.440
on how the Venezuelan crisis
has impacted Colombia,

01:03:08.440 --> 01:03:10.830
Colombia security and stability?

01:03:10.830 --> 01:03:14.470
And how has the crisis
affected regional stability

01:03:14.470 --> 01:03:15.303
in general?

01:03:17.296 --> 01:03:18.129
- Well, I certainly can say generally

01:03:18.129 --> 01:03:22.810
that there has been a
significant impact in the region

01:03:22.810 --> 01:03:24.770
on a number of countries.

01:03:24.770 --> 01:03:28.280
So I think that this is
an ongoing challenge.

01:03:28.280 --> 01:03:30.080
It's a reason why it remains a priority

01:03:30.080 --> 01:03:31.890
for the president and the administration.

01:03:31.890 --> 01:03:36.890
And we are continuing
to increase the pressure

01:03:37.210 --> 01:03:40.580
so we can look for the appropriate changes

01:03:40.580 --> 01:03:43.330
in terms of the behaviors of
the Venezuelan Government.

01:03:44.970 --> 01:03:47.500
- Thank you, Admiral Faller,

01:03:47.500 --> 01:03:50.037
an important aspect to
strengthening regional security

01:03:50.037 --> 01:03:53.020
and SOUTHCOM is capacity building

01:03:53.020 --> 01:03:54.470
through sustained engagement.

01:03:55.781 --> 01:03:56.614
Can you provide the committee an update

01:03:56.614 --> 01:03:59.000
on ongoing capacity building efforts

01:03:59.000 --> 01:04:02.220
and also state what the biggest
operational barriers are

01:04:02.220 --> 01:04:04.073
for expanding these partnerships.

01:04:05.300 --> 01:04:07.645
- The security cooperation programs

01:04:07.645 --> 01:04:10.080
that we invest in are long term,

01:04:10.080 --> 01:04:13.706
high payoff investments for
the security right here at home

01:04:13.706 --> 01:04:14.830
and our partners, so we're helping

01:04:14.830 --> 01:04:17.230
them build stronger institutions

01:04:17.230 --> 01:04:20.180
so they can buffer their democracies

01:04:20.180 --> 01:04:23.320
from the shocks of transnational
criminal organizations

01:04:23.320 --> 01:04:26.910
and frankly, to gain
their positional advantage

01:04:26.910 --> 01:04:29.730
from the predatory practices
of wanna-be great powers

01:04:29.730 --> 01:04:31.000
like China and Russia.

01:04:31.000 --> 01:04:36.000
So it has a high impact and
it's not a large dollar amount.

01:04:36.060 --> 01:04:37.550
So we'll invest in programs,

01:04:37.550 --> 01:04:40.020
for example, to help a country set up

01:04:40.020 --> 01:04:42.140
an intelligence service from education,

01:04:42.140 --> 01:04:43.860
to doctrine, to a system

01:04:43.860 --> 01:04:45.830
so they can secure their own information,

01:04:45.830 --> 01:04:48.470
and then that allows
them to share it with us.

01:04:48.470 --> 01:04:51.830
And this is their area that
we focus on and prioritize on.

01:04:51.830 --> 01:04:54.100
- What are the barriers
to be more effective

01:04:54.100 --> 01:04:55.250
and doing more of that?

01:04:56.210 --> 01:04:58.927
- One of the barriers is stable funding.

01:04:58.927 --> 01:05:00.540
So what we found is when
we don't have have a budget

01:05:00.540 --> 01:05:04.050
that passes on time, we're
trying to do a year's worth

01:05:04.050 --> 01:05:05.900
of security cooperation activities

01:05:05.900 --> 01:05:07.600
in nine months or eight months.

01:05:07.600 --> 01:05:11.130
And then at the end of the
year, we often get scrutinized

01:05:11.130 --> 01:05:14.130
for our lack of good solid execution

01:05:14.130 --> 01:05:17.020
as we rush to get the money obligated.

01:05:17.020 --> 01:05:19.590
So multi-year money would be one,

01:05:19.590 --> 01:05:22.640
consistent funding levels would be another

01:05:22.640 --> 01:05:24.530
and authorities associated

01:05:24.530 --> 01:05:26.893
with those consistent funding levels.

01:05:27.810 --> 01:05:30.453
- Thank you, General O'Shaughnessy,

01:05:30.453 --> 01:05:32.820
I know this has been touched on a bit

01:05:32.820 --> 01:05:35.830
but I wanted to be a
little bit more poignant

01:05:35.830 --> 01:05:37.023
and specific with you.

01:05:38.237 --> 01:05:39.070
This week, the committee has discussed

01:05:39.070 --> 01:05:42.920
quite extensively great powers competition

01:05:42.920 --> 01:05:45.760
across the areas of responsibility.

01:05:45.760 --> 01:05:49.739
With that China and Russia
continue to invest heavily

01:05:49.739 --> 01:05:51.789
in the Arctic, as the Arctic increasingly

01:05:53.100 --> 01:05:55.683
is viewed as an arena for
geopolitical competition.

01:05:57.230 --> 01:05:58.620
In DOD's report to Congress,

01:05:58.620 --> 01:06:01.497
on its Defense Architecture
Strategy it states,

01:06:01.497 --> 01:06:03.027
"Russia and China are challenging

01:06:03.027 --> 01:06:05.967
"the rules based order in the Arctic."

01:06:07.095 --> 01:06:07.928
Can you elaborate on that?

01:06:07.928 --> 01:06:11.090
Does the US have sufficient strategy

01:06:11.090 --> 01:06:14.210
to counter Russian and
Chinese efforts in the Arctic

01:06:14.210 --> 01:06:16.713
with the underscoring of sufficient?

01:06:19.011 --> 01:06:21.110
- I think as a part of that answer

01:06:21.110 --> 01:06:23.750
is gonna be highlighting
the great work done

01:06:23.750 --> 01:06:28.750
to craft and deploy the
2019 DOD Arctic strategy,

01:06:30.390 --> 01:06:34.340
significant change from
the 2013 version thereof,

01:06:34.340 --> 01:06:38.779
with a real focus on a
secure and stable region,

01:06:38.779 --> 01:06:41.260
which the US national security
interests are safeguarded,

01:06:41.260 --> 01:06:43.516
the US homeland is defended,

01:06:43.516 --> 01:06:45.737
so it recognizes that
we must be in the Arctic

01:06:45.737 --> 01:06:46.914
to defend our homeland.

01:06:46.914 --> 01:06:48.379
And that nations work cooperatively

01:06:48.379 --> 01:06:49.360
to address these shared challenges.

01:06:49.360 --> 01:06:52.810
To your point in there, while
we do see some cooperation,

01:06:52.810 --> 01:06:56.120
we are seeing more and more of
this great power competition

01:06:56.120 --> 01:06:58.150
that has arrived in the Arctic.

01:06:58.150 --> 01:06:59.970
I'll use an example of what the Russians

01:06:59.970 --> 01:07:03.039
are doing with respect to
the northern sea route,

01:07:03.039 --> 01:07:03.872
where they are claiming that you need

01:07:03.872 --> 01:07:05.530
to use a Russian icebreaker,

01:07:05.530 --> 01:07:09.050
you need to use a Russian
pilot on your vessel.

01:07:09.050 --> 01:07:09.960
That is not in accordance

01:07:09.960 --> 01:07:11.990
with the rules based international order.

01:07:11.990 --> 01:07:15.850
I think we need to be
able to have a presence,

01:07:15.850 --> 01:07:17.230
have the ability to operate there,

01:07:17.230 --> 01:07:20.423
if we are going to be able
to show by example exactly

01:07:20.423 --> 01:07:24.393
our ability to operate in
these common navigable waters.

01:07:27.220 --> 01:07:30.040
- Do you feel we have sufficiency?

01:07:30.040 --> 01:07:32.240
- So what I would say is we
need to invest in the Arctic.

01:07:32.240 --> 01:07:35.580
I've seen an increase in that activity,

01:07:35.580 --> 01:07:37.800
and we need to invest in order

01:07:37.800 --> 01:07:39.403
to operate there significantly.

01:07:40.307 --> 01:07:42.790
- So we're not where we
wanna be as of right now?

01:07:42.790 --> 01:07:44.100
- The trajectory is in
the right direction,

01:07:44.100 --> 01:07:45.140
wanted to be done.

01:07:45.140 --> 01:07:46.170
- Thank you so much.

01:07:46.170 --> 01:07:47.380
Mr Chair, I yield back.

01:07:47.380 --> 01:07:48.863
- Thank you Mr. Wittman?

01:07:50.491 --> 01:07:52.340
- Thank Mr Chairman, I'd
like to thank our witnesses

01:07:52.340 --> 01:07:53.897
for joining us, General O'Shaughnessy.

01:07:53.897 --> 01:07:54.730
I wanna start with you.

01:07:54.730 --> 01:07:56.780
Recently, I have experienced

01:07:56.780 --> 01:08:00.473
and seen increased Russian
activity off the East Coast,

01:08:01.940 --> 01:08:04.290
And that is of deep concern.

01:08:04.290 --> 01:08:07.354
I understand the Navy has
stood up to Second Fleet

01:08:07.354 --> 01:08:09.593
as a counter to that
increased Russian aggression.

01:08:09.593 --> 01:08:13.400
But I'm concerned that we're
not adequately resourced

01:08:13.400 --> 01:08:15.420
to really address this the way we need to.

01:08:15.420 --> 01:08:17.880
You see the acquisition of sonar boom

01:08:17.880 --> 01:08:21.010
is been on the unfunded
requirements list for the Navy.

01:08:21.010 --> 01:08:23.660
You see P-8 Poseidon production,

01:08:23.660 --> 01:08:26.210
our anti-submarine warfare aircraft,

01:08:26.210 --> 01:08:28.020
that production being truncated.

01:08:28.020 --> 01:08:33.020
You also see now a delay
in the MQ-4 Triton program,

01:08:34.840 --> 01:08:37.510
all of those things cause concern to me.

01:08:37.510 --> 01:08:42.370
The Navy only has five
long range SURTASS vessels,

01:08:42.370 --> 01:08:46.200
which are critical in being able to deter

01:08:46.200 --> 01:08:50.431
and detect activity in the North Atlantic.

01:08:50.431 --> 01:08:52.860
We also see too that we're
on the opposite track

01:08:52.860 --> 01:08:55.570
on our submarine fleet,

01:08:55.570 --> 01:08:57.914
our attack submarines,

01:08:57.914 --> 01:09:00.630
where we are gonna go from
from a high of 52 today

01:09:00.630 --> 01:09:03.660
to a low of 41 by 2028

01:09:03.660 --> 01:09:06.078
in the Virginia-class submarine fleet.

01:09:06.078 --> 01:09:07.470
All of those things appear to me

01:09:07.470 --> 01:09:09.100
to be going in the opposite direction

01:09:09.100 --> 01:09:11.380
as we see increased Russian activity

01:09:11.380 --> 01:09:14.150
and aggression on the East Coast.

01:09:14.150 --> 01:09:16.170
Give me your perspective on the full scope

01:09:16.170 --> 01:09:17.960
of that Russian aggression.

01:09:17.960 --> 01:09:20.750
And are we properly resourced in position

01:09:20.750 --> 01:09:23.780
to be able to counter what we see,

01:09:23.780 --> 01:09:26.530
at least in the past two
years is pretty significant

01:09:26.530 --> 01:09:30.400
and continued presence
of the Russian fleet

01:09:30.400 --> 01:09:33.343
in the East Coast of the United States.

01:09:34.800 --> 01:09:37.060
- Thank you, sir for highlighting this.

01:09:37.060 --> 01:09:39.376
This is something that I think over time,

01:09:39.376 --> 01:09:43.330
we have been able to have the luxury

01:09:43.330 --> 01:09:45.822
of not having threats to the homeland

01:09:45.822 --> 01:09:47.710
that are literally right
off of our doorstep.

01:09:47.710 --> 01:09:50.774
That environment is rapidly
changing and has changed.

01:09:50.774 --> 01:09:54.900
We are correspondingly investing
in our ability to do that.

01:09:54.900 --> 01:09:58.210
But as of yet, we have not yet achieved

01:09:58.210 --> 01:10:00.599
the capability and capacity that we need

01:10:00.599 --> 01:10:01.460
to maintain that competitive advantage,

01:10:01.460 --> 01:10:03.760
to your specific points
and you highlight exactly

01:10:03.760 --> 01:10:06.150
the list that I would go down, ultimately.

01:10:06.150 --> 01:10:09.340
But I think the ability to
have that domain awareness.

01:10:09.340 --> 01:10:11.191
When I say domain awareness,

01:10:11.191 --> 01:10:12.330
it's not just radars that
can see the air domain.

01:10:12.330 --> 01:10:14.330
It's from the undersea,
the surface vessels

01:10:14.330 --> 01:10:15.470
and all the way up.

01:10:15.470 --> 01:10:18.550
That investment, not only
in the SURTASS capability,

01:10:18.550 --> 01:10:22.419
but also in the IUSS, the ability to have

01:10:22.419 --> 01:10:24.720
the sensors under the
water that can detect those

01:10:24.720 --> 01:10:27.120
in a persistent manner
are critically important.

01:10:27.120 --> 01:10:29.973
I think continue investment of Sonar boom,

01:10:29.973 --> 01:10:30.806
as you mentioned, we
employed a lot of them

01:10:30.806 --> 01:10:32.480
this last little bit,

01:10:32.480 --> 01:10:35.142
without getting into operational details

01:10:35.142 --> 01:10:37.520
and I actually got to go
down and talk to the crews,

01:10:37.520 --> 01:10:39.380
that were doing some
of those mission sets.

01:10:39.380 --> 01:10:41.450
And the good news is, they did not feel

01:10:41.450 --> 01:10:43.780
that they needed to be
limited in their ability

01:10:43.780 --> 01:10:46.740
to operate as a result
of the current status

01:10:46.740 --> 01:10:48.620
but we have to be mindful that,

01:10:48.620 --> 01:10:51.050
go in the future, invest
in that capability,

01:10:51.050 --> 01:10:52.280
that attributable capability

01:10:52.280 --> 01:10:56.010
that we need to have at
our disposal at any time.

01:10:56.010 --> 01:10:58.035
The broader point I would make

01:10:58.035 --> 01:11:00.010
to what you're saying is these threats

01:11:00.010 --> 01:11:03.440
that used to be global and other areas,

01:11:03.440 --> 01:11:06.222
they are now here on our doorsteps

01:11:06.222 --> 01:11:08.580
and we must be prepared
to defend against them.

01:11:08.580 --> 01:11:10.900
- Do you think that the
current budget request

01:11:10.900 --> 01:11:12.470
is a reasonable response

01:11:12.470 --> 01:11:14.320
to this increased Russian aggression?

01:11:15.250 --> 01:11:16.660
- Sure, we've worked really hard

01:11:16.660 --> 01:11:18.730
with the United States Navy on this.

01:11:18.730 --> 01:11:21.040
And I would highlight the fact

01:11:21.040 --> 01:11:23.470
that they have put significant investment

01:11:23.470 --> 01:11:25.840
into the Homeland Defense architecture,

01:11:25.840 --> 01:11:28.800
and the ability to be able to
defend ourselves here at home.

01:11:28.800 --> 01:11:31.860
We need to continue
that resourcing though.

01:11:31.860 --> 01:11:34.200
We can't be a one year,
two years and be done.

01:11:34.200 --> 01:11:36.231
This is a continued investment

01:11:36.231 --> 01:11:38.260
that we need to make things
besides the resources

01:11:38.260 --> 01:11:40.047
that you think about in a budget,

01:11:40.047 --> 01:11:40.880
but as you mentioned, Second Fleet

01:11:40.880 --> 01:11:43.682
that even just having our
ships operate out there,

01:11:43.682 --> 01:11:45.680
in that environment, it
used to be just training.

01:11:45.680 --> 01:11:48.793
Now it's actually
operational level commitment.

01:11:50.580 --> 01:11:52.400
- In addition to that, we also see,

01:11:52.400 --> 01:11:57.400
I think, continued threats
to our transoceanic cables,

01:11:58.420 --> 01:12:00.710
those are continual efforts

01:12:00.710 --> 01:12:03.980
that I think our
adversaries look to exploit.

01:12:03.980 --> 01:12:07.700
And as we went through
last year's back and forth

01:12:07.700 --> 01:12:09.220
in the Congress, we did put together

01:12:09.220 --> 01:12:11.539
a cable ship security program

01:12:11.539 --> 01:12:13.310
that says that we should
have some ships available

01:12:13.310 --> 01:12:15.740
if perchance, there is an activity

01:12:15.740 --> 01:12:18.372
against those transoceanic cables.

01:12:18.372 --> 01:12:20.585
My question would be,

01:12:20.585 --> 01:12:25.391
what else should we be
doing going forward?

01:12:25.391 --> 01:12:27.610
Is that threat a constant threat?

01:12:27.610 --> 01:12:29.770
Is it an increasing threat?

01:12:29.770 --> 01:12:32.120
What are the necessary
resources to make sure

01:12:32.120 --> 01:12:34.133
that we are addressing that threat?

01:12:35.390 --> 01:12:36.760
- I would quickly just say that yes,

01:12:36.760 --> 01:12:38.657
it is a consistent threat.

01:12:38.657 --> 01:12:39.490
And that's the way we have to look at it.

01:12:39.490 --> 01:12:40.674
We can't look at it something

01:12:40.674 --> 01:12:41.850
we would just apply during crisis.

01:12:41.850 --> 01:12:43.960
This is something, with so
much of our communications

01:12:43.960 --> 01:12:45.986
going through those undersea cables,

01:12:45.986 --> 01:12:47.010
we must do it in a persistent way.

01:12:47.010 --> 01:12:48.493
- Very good.

01:12:48.493 --> 01:12:50.207
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

01:12:50.207 --> 01:12:53.031
- Thank you, Miss Horn.
- Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

01:12:53.031 --> 01:12:54.587
Thank you, gentlemen,
for being here today.

01:12:54.587 --> 01:12:58.730
Following on some of the conversations

01:12:58.730 --> 01:13:00.660
that we've had, I wanna talk about,

01:13:00.660 --> 01:13:02.630
Admiral Fowler, the National Guard

01:13:02.630 --> 01:13:05.670
and the role they play,
especially in your AOR.

01:13:05.670 --> 01:13:08.080
I know that they played a critical role

01:13:08.080 --> 01:13:11.530
over this long period of the past 20 years

01:13:11.530 --> 01:13:13.090
of conflict or so.

01:13:13.090 --> 01:13:16.750
But I know that one of our
Guard units in Oklahoma

01:13:16.750 --> 01:13:20.360
is particularly active
along the Panama Canal.

01:13:20.360 --> 01:13:22.900
And I'd like for you
to speak about the role

01:13:22.900 --> 01:13:25.220
that the National Guard plays and units

01:13:25.220 --> 01:13:28.360
like the 137th play in
your area of responsibility

01:13:28.360 --> 01:13:30.550
around the Panama Canal
for a moment, please.

01:13:30.550 --> 01:13:33.420
- The state partnership
program with our National Guard

01:13:34.410 --> 01:13:37.550
is one of our main efforts
to build partner capacity

01:13:37.550 --> 01:13:39.700
and readiness for our Guard units.

01:13:39.700 --> 01:13:42.850
It has the advantage of
having a habitual relationship

01:13:42.850 --> 01:13:46.080
over time, over many
years that builds trust,

01:13:46.080 --> 01:13:47.910
and our investments in that program

01:13:47.910 --> 01:13:51.100
are good investments for
the security here at home

01:13:51.100 --> 01:13:51.933
and our partners.

01:13:51.933 --> 01:13:53.900
The Oklahoma Guard currently
is deployed to Colombia

01:13:53.900 --> 01:13:56.190
with two MC-12.

01:13:56.190 --> 01:13:58.930
These are deployed in partnership

01:13:58.930 --> 01:14:00.850
with Special Operations Command.

01:14:00.850 --> 01:14:03.040
We're supporting our Colombian partners

01:14:03.040 --> 01:14:05.787
who are in a tough fight with ISR.

01:14:07.010 --> 01:14:10.463
And that ISR has directly,
from those two units

01:14:10.463 --> 01:14:11.604
and I went down and visit them

01:14:11.604 --> 01:14:14.500
and visited them and it's
a real economy effort.

01:14:14.500 --> 01:14:17.780
There's about 40 of the guardsman there.

01:14:17.780 --> 01:14:20.680
They're motivated and
that has directly resulted

01:14:20.680 --> 01:14:23.991
in the Colombians being
able to action ELN,

01:14:23.991 --> 01:14:25.433
FARC dissidents, terrorists,

01:14:26.650 --> 01:14:27.483
and to get after narco-traffic,

01:14:27.483 --> 01:14:31.360
significantly making a
huge impact to those MC-12

01:14:31.360 --> 01:14:33.090
in Oklahoma Guard.

01:14:33.090 --> 01:14:35.320
- Speaking of ISR and following up on some

01:14:35.320 --> 01:14:37.030
of Ms. Hartzler's,

01:14:37.030 --> 01:14:39.430
Congresswoman Hartzler's
questions earlier.

01:14:39.430 --> 01:14:42.636
With the proposed change in the MC-12

01:14:42.636 --> 01:14:44.670
and the needs for ISR in drug interdiction

01:14:44.670 --> 01:14:48.730
and the work in South America.

01:14:48.730 --> 01:14:51.650
In this transition, do you see the ability

01:14:51.650 --> 01:14:53.953
to continue the ISR that you need?

01:14:55.330 --> 01:14:58.360
- Having the ability to
assist our partners develop

01:14:58.360 --> 01:15:00.360
their own ISR capabilities,

01:15:00.360 --> 01:15:01.840
it means we've got to be engaged,

01:15:01.840 --> 01:15:03.653
present, provide our leadership.

01:15:04.578 --> 01:15:05.803
And these types of deployments

01:15:05.803 --> 01:15:07.320
are extremely helpful to do that.

01:15:07.320 --> 01:15:10.830
And I would recommend
continuing these high payoff,

01:15:10.830 --> 01:15:14.858
low cost efforts such as the MC-12s

01:15:14.858 --> 01:15:15.780
that are with the Guard unit.

01:15:15.780 --> 01:15:18.571
As I understand it, those are slated

01:15:18.571 --> 01:15:21.720
to be taken out of service
with upcoming budgets.

01:15:21.720 --> 01:15:23.750
I think they're making the case right now

01:15:23.750 --> 01:15:25.660
as to why it makes a difference,

01:15:25.660 --> 01:15:28.290
both for the drugs that
are taken off the streets

01:15:28.290 --> 01:15:30.460
in Oklahoma and the rest of our states

01:15:30.460 --> 01:15:32.530
and to take that money out of the hand

01:15:33.560 --> 01:15:34.650
of narco-terrorists in our partners.

01:15:34.650 --> 01:15:36.120
- [Horn] So you see that
as a valuable mission?

01:15:36.120 --> 01:15:40.040
- It's extremely valuable
asset to have the ISR

01:15:40.040 --> 01:15:42.710
in theater with our partners?

01:15:42.710 --> 01:15:43.840
- Thank you.

01:15:43.840 --> 01:15:47.020
And Admiral Faller, one more area

01:15:47.020 --> 01:15:49.370
that I wanna discuss with you

01:15:49.370 --> 01:15:51.540
and that following on about the funding

01:15:51.540 --> 01:15:54.716
for narco-terrorism and the impact,

01:15:54.716 --> 01:15:57.930
the 333 funding authority is designed,

01:15:57.930 --> 01:16:00.074
of course to support programs

01:16:00.074 --> 01:16:01.443
that provide training and equipment

01:16:01.443 --> 01:16:03.500
to foreign countries to build
capacity of partner nations.

01:16:03.500 --> 01:16:05.929
I know we've touched on
this in several ways.

01:16:05.929 --> 01:16:10.733
But What challenges do you see
with the 333 funding process?

01:16:12.482 --> 01:16:13.960
- Well, clearly there's never enough money

01:16:13.960 --> 01:16:16.373
to do all the things the
department wants to do.

01:16:16.373 --> 01:16:17.589
And we've gotta make tough choices

01:16:17.589 --> 01:16:19.050
as Secretary of Defense
been clear about that.

01:16:19.050 --> 01:16:22.220
And we're all in to work
National Defense Strategy

01:16:22.220 --> 01:16:25.040
line of effort three, which
means we've got to account

01:16:25.912 --> 01:16:27.960
for every dollar of money we
spend an hour of our time.

01:16:27.960 --> 01:16:32.920
So as we look forward, this
security cooperation funds

01:16:32.920 --> 01:16:34.970
have got to be applied in a manner

01:16:34.970 --> 01:16:37.330
that directly impacts
the future challenges.

01:16:37.330 --> 01:16:39.780
Having a balance of these funds,

01:16:39.780 --> 01:16:42.107
to look at the global
fight is really important.

01:16:42.107 --> 01:16:45.420
And the overall funds is 1.1 billion.

01:16:45.420 --> 01:16:47.680
So it's a significant amount of money.

01:16:47.680 --> 01:16:50.000
Applying that globally
is really important.

01:16:50.000 --> 01:16:52.250
As we leverage for the future,

01:16:52.250 --> 01:16:54.100
is long term payoffs.

01:16:54.100 --> 01:16:56.797
And getting that right
is so important to us

01:16:56.797 --> 01:16:58.190
and our partners depend on,

01:16:58.190 --> 01:17:00.370
it's paying dividends here at home.

01:17:00.370 --> 01:17:01.710
- Thank you very much, Admiral Faller.

01:17:01.710 --> 01:17:03.250
I am almost out of time.

01:17:03.250 --> 01:17:04.793
So I yield back, Mr. Chairman.

01:17:05.771 --> 01:17:07.410
- Thank you. Mr Scott.

01:17:07.410 --> 01:17:08.960
- Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

01:17:08.960 --> 01:17:11.520
Admiral Faller, I think
you've been very kind

01:17:11.520 --> 01:17:13.122
with your comments.

01:17:13.122 --> 01:17:15.560
I think the fact of the
matter is DOD gives you

01:17:15.560 --> 01:17:17.510
what's left over ISR after they fulfill

01:17:20.220 --> 01:17:25.220
the other requests throughout
the various operating regions,

01:17:27.020 --> 01:17:32.020
and I wanna just ask all
of you this very quickly,

01:17:32.320 --> 01:17:35.200
just yes or no, should
defending the homeland

01:17:35.200 --> 01:17:38.131
include defending American citizens

01:17:38.131 --> 01:17:39.151
from narco-terrorists

01:17:39.151 --> 01:17:40.823
and transnational criminal organizations?

01:17:43.070 --> 01:17:43.903
Yes or no?

01:17:45.720 --> 01:17:48.003
- What's that?
- It's not a trick question.

01:17:49.536 --> 01:17:52.800
- Absolutely congressman.

01:17:52.800 --> 01:17:54.655
It's a threat to our homeland

01:17:54.655 --> 01:17:57.500
and the national security
strategy recognize it as such.

01:17:57.500 --> 01:17:58.333
- Absolutely.

01:18:01.920 --> 01:18:04.030
So SOUTHCOM's total operating
budget for fiscal year 20

01:18:04.030 --> 01:18:06.023
is $1.2 billion.

01:18:06.023 --> 01:18:09.150
Is that correct?
- That's correct, sir.

01:18:09.150 --> 01:18:11.264
- So to put that in perspective,

01:18:11.264 --> 01:18:13.164
we spent 14 times that in Afghanistan.

01:18:14.220 --> 01:18:16.453
- [Faller] I'm sure it's a higher number.

01:18:16.453 --> 01:18:17.286
I don't know--
- We spent 14 times that

01:18:17.286 --> 01:18:18.173
in Afghanistan.

01:18:19.679 --> 01:18:21.909
We have had 32 deaths in the United States

01:18:21.909 --> 01:18:24.120
from the coronavirus this
year, not to diminish that

01:18:24.120 --> 01:18:26.110
but this Congress, virtually
all of us walked out

01:18:26.110 --> 01:18:27.750
on the floor the other
day and appropriated

01:18:27.750 --> 01:18:31.700
over $8 billion for the corona virus,

01:18:31.700 --> 01:18:36.220
which has killed 32 people
so far in the United States.

01:18:36.220 --> 01:18:38.160
Again, not diminishing that

01:18:38.160 --> 01:18:41.493
but we lost 150 Americans
yesterday to drug overdoses.

01:18:43.192 --> 01:18:46.100
We'll lose over 5000 a
month to drug overdoses

01:18:46.100 --> 01:18:51.100
that are the end result of
Congress and quite honestly,

01:18:52.470 --> 01:18:56.620
administrations not prioritizing,

01:18:56.620 --> 01:18:59.730
defending the homeland
from narco-terrorists

01:18:59.730 --> 01:19:01.780
and transnational criminal organizations.

01:19:05.400 --> 01:19:08.340
So your total operating
budget is $1.2 billion.

01:19:08.340 --> 01:19:10.250
75 million of your budget is for

01:19:11.150 --> 01:19:14.498
theater security cooperation.

01:19:14.498 --> 01:19:16.470
General, that's the cost,

01:19:16.470 --> 01:19:18.243
that's less than one F-35.

01:19:19.530 --> 01:19:21.663
less than the cost of one F-35.

01:19:25.112 --> 01:19:26.308
In your written testimony,

01:19:26.308 --> 01:19:28.220
and this is what concerns me the most,

01:19:28.220 --> 01:19:32.591
you stated that you were
unable to act on 91%,

01:19:32.591 --> 01:19:37.020
91% of the shipments

01:19:37.020 --> 01:19:41.380
despite having actionable
intelligence and authority

01:19:41.380 --> 01:19:43.530
that a shipment of narcotics

01:19:43.530 --> 01:19:45.593
was coming into the United States.

01:19:47.170 --> 01:19:49.280
How much additional money would be needed

01:19:49.280 --> 01:19:52.893
to lower this figure to 10%?

01:19:54.388 --> 01:19:57.290
- We've taken a hard look at that.

01:19:57.290 --> 01:19:58.870
And as I've said in my opening statement,

01:19:58.870 --> 01:20:01.270
as a result of illuminating those gaps,

01:20:01.270 --> 01:20:04.700
we have received support from
the Department of Defense

01:20:04.700 --> 01:20:07.570
and clearly from the President's direction

01:20:07.570 --> 01:20:12.100
to increase our presence to
address the range of threats.

01:20:12.100 --> 01:20:14.835
It's an area the size
of the United States.

01:20:14.835 --> 01:20:16.300
So the number of assets
required to do that

01:20:16.300 --> 01:20:20.530
is significant; we're talking
in the dozens of ships

01:20:20.530 --> 01:20:23.510
and force packages, which is
why it's so important, sir,

01:20:23.510 --> 01:20:25.700
to get the partners in the game,

01:20:25.700 --> 01:20:27.250
getting the partners enabled,

01:20:27.250 --> 01:20:30.380
they're at 50% of the
interdictions right now

01:20:30.380 --> 01:20:34.307
with our continued leadership,

01:20:34.307 --> 01:20:38.210
and sometimes it's just
time and some resources

01:20:38.210 --> 01:20:40.987
and our whole of nation effort here,

01:20:40.987 --> 01:20:43.290
working with state INL and our DEA,

01:20:43.290 --> 01:20:46.603
we want to get those
partners into 60% this year.

01:20:49.187 --> 01:20:53.980
- My concern, as a whole,
more Americans are dying

01:20:53.980 --> 01:20:55.930
from the the actions

01:20:55.930 --> 01:20:57.730
of the transnational
criminal organizations

01:20:57.730 --> 01:20:59.330
and violent extremist organizations

01:20:59.330 --> 01:21:03.270
in the western hemisphere than any other,

01:21:03.270 --> 01:21:08.270
than any other identifiable
source, that number of 90%,

01:21:10.530 --> 01:21:14.862
the 90% range has not changed

01:21:14.862 --> 01:21:18.590
as much money as we have given to the DOD

01:21:18.590 --> 01:21:22.700
in increased funding
over the last 10 years,

01:21:22.700 --> 01:21:24.850
which has predominantly
been the end result

01:21:25.782 --> 01:21:26.923
of this committee.

01:21:28.800 --> 01:21:33.800
We're still allowing 90%
of the actionable items

01:21:34.720 --> 01:21:35.823
to come through.

01:21:36.840 --> 01:21:39.630
And so all of the
additional money we've given

01:21:39.630 --> 01:21:41.580
has been transferred to other priorities

01:21:41.580 --> 01:21:46.450
and not to the priority that
resulting in more deaths

01:21:46.450 --> 01:21:49.610
than any other area and
I'm almost out of time

01:21:49.610 --> 01:21:52.280
but I do hope other
members will go to SOUTHCOM

01:21:53.546 --> 01:21:56.230
and look at the small things

01:21:56.230 --> 01:21:58.779
that could be done for very small price,

01:21:58.779 --> 01:21:59.990
it would actually take
significant amounts of drugs

01:21:59.990 --> 01:22:01.900
off the streets of America.

01:22:01.900 --> 01:22:03.980
And as the chairman said,

01:22:03.980 --> 01:22:06.540
if it hasn't impacted you yet,

01:22:06.540 --> 01:22:09.489
and he was speaking on
the corona virus, it will,

01:22:09.489 --> 01:22:10.640
and I agree with him on that.

01:22:10.640 --> 01:22:11.839
But I'll promise you this,

01:22:11.839 --> 01:22:12.672
if you haven't been to
a funeral of somebody

01:22:12.672 --> 01:22:14.524
who died in your neighborhood
from a drug overdose,

01:22:14.524 --> 01:22:16.610
you're the lucky one.

01:22:16.610 --> 01:22:18.300
And I bet you that you will get to go

01:22:18.300 --> 01:22:19.800
over the next couple of years.

01:22:20.682 --> 01:22:21.882
Thank you for your work.

01:22:23.410 --> 01:22:25.421
And certainly I think
the gentleman is correct

01:22:25.421 --> 01:22:27.683
on the statistics, I would point out,

01:22:27.683 --> 01:22:29.640
we need to work on the supply
but at the end of the day,

01:22:29.640 --> 01:22:31.940
it's a demand problem.

01:22:31.940 --> 01:22:34.700
What drives the money, what drives,

01:22:34.700 --> 01:22:37.360
and you know, in SOUTHCOM and NORTHCOM,

01:22:37.360 --> 01:22:39.440
what they do to get
drugs into this country

01:22:39.440 --> 01:22:41.381
boggles the mind.

01:22:41.381 --> 01:22:43.000
They make submarines.

01:22:43.000 --> 01:22:47.960
I believe that a fake shark
was was once used to do this.

01:22:47.960 --> 01:22:50.875
We just heard about the
tunnels that are going

01:22:50.875 --> 01:22:53.160
under the wall that would make Hamas proud

01:22:53.160 --> 01:22:55.590
in terms of what they built there.

01:22:55.590 --> 01:22:58.963
And they put ladders over the top and why?

01:22:59.850 --> 01:23:01.030
Because of the money.

01:23:01.030 --> 01:23:04.070
There's a lot of money to
be made by selling drugs

01:23:04.070 --> 01:23:06.170
to Americans who demand them.

01:23:06.170 --> 01:23:09.454
So we need to really, if
that demand went away,

01:23:09.454 --> 01:23:11.690
that wouldn't be a problem.

01:23:11.690 --> 01:23:13.590
And I really feel in this country

01:23:13.590 --> 01:23:17.741
we do not focus enough on
why is the demand there

01:23:17.741 --> 01:23:19.365
and what can we do to reduce it?

01:23:19.365 --> 01:23:20.793
If the market dried up?

01:23:20.793 --> 01:23:22.500
Your guys's job would
be a lot, lot easier.

01:23:22.500 --> 01:23:24.570
So we need to work on both.

01:23:24.570 --> 01:23:26.270
With that, I'll yield to Mr. Gold.

01:23:29.388 --> 01:23:30.764
- Thank you, General O'Shaughnessy.

01:23:30.764 --> 01:23:32.880
I want to ask a follow
up to a lot of questions

01:23:32.880 --> 01:23:34.440
you got from people earlier

01:23:34.440 --> 01:23:37.990
about your operations in the Arctic,

01:23:37.990 --> 01:23:41.139
with Russia and China building
their presence out there.

01:23:41.139 --> 01:23:46.139
Recently, I was reading a
little bit of a conference.

01:23:47.140 --> 01:23:50.707
So Jim Webster from NAVSEA

01:23:50.707 --> 01:23:53.647
and the American Society
of Naval Engineers

01:23:53.647 --> 01:23:55.820
was talking about some of the struggles

01:23:55.820 --> 01:23:58.170
with hauls and the ability
to break through ice

01:23:59.098 --> 01:24:00.320
and navigate up there.

01:24:00.320 --> 01:24:05.320
Obviously, we need more Coast
Guard icebreakers and such.

01:24:05.320 --> 01:24:07.860
But he did make note that the destroyer,

01:24:07.860 --> 01:24:11.980
the DDG-51 haul performs
fairly well relative

01:24:11.980 --> 01:24:13.360
to a lot of other platforms

01:24:13.360 --> 01:24:15.730
that you might have up in that region.

01:24:15.730 --> 01:24:18.390
So just a more specific question

01:24:18.390 --> 01:24:22.152
about the DDG as you're
considering deterrence,

01:24:22.152 --> 01:24:26.360
and the role and requirement
for freedom of the seas

01:24:26.360 --> 01:24:29.465
that you have up in that
region as a mission.

01:24:29.465 --> 01:24:33.020
Are you thinking about
what kind of consideration

01:24:33.020 --> 01:24:36.245
are you giving to
leveraging the capabilities

01:24:36.245 --> 01:24:39.070
coming online in FY23,
with the Flight III-DDG,

01:24:40.050 --> 01:24:42.202
particularly where it's going to have

01:24:42.202 --> 01:24:44.270
the anti-air ballistic
missile defense capabilities

01:24:44.270 --> 01:24:45.120
added to it.

01:24:45.120 --> 01:24:47.320
Is that something that
you're looking to use

01:24:47.320 --> 01:24:48.220
up in that region?

01:24:49.799 --> 01:24:51.710
- Well, first, let me start
with the Polar Security Cutter,

01:24:51.710 --> 01:24:53.980
obviously, not within
a department defense.

01:24:53.980 --> 01:24:57.460
But our partners within
the Coast Guard need

01:24:57.460 --> 01:24:59.900
this capability, they need it soonest.

01:24:59.900 --> 01:25:02.199
And they need it robustly.

01:25:02.199 --> 01:25:04.980
Without that ice breaking capability,

01:25:04.980 --> 01:25:08.550
the other surface vessels
will not be able to operate.

01:25:08.550 --> 01:25:13.170
That said, our DDGs have
proven to be amazing platforms

01:25:13.170 --> 01:25:14.200
all over the globe.

01:25:14.200 --> 01:25:17.500
They will continue to
do so in those regions,

01:25:17.500 --> 01:25:19.110
especially as we see diminishing ice

01:25:19.110 --> 01:25:21.087
but they are not icebreakers.

01:25:21.087 --> 01:25:24.070
Therefore, they need the
appropriate operating environment.

01:25:24.070 --> 01:25:26.850
I applaud the Navy's efforts
over the last several years

01:25:26.850 --> 01:25:30.340
of really increasing their ventures

01:25:30.340 --> 01:25:33.090
into the high north, the Arctic,

01:25:33.090 --> 01:25:35.690
to actually get the crews out there.

01:25:35.690 --> 01:25:38.160
And they haven't been
for some period of time,

01:25:38.160 --> 01:25:40.036
to experience it, learn those lessons

01:25:40.036 --> 01:25:42.440
and make sure we have
the ability to operate

01:25:42.440 --> 01:25:43.920
in that environment.

01:25:43.920 --> 01:25:46.600
I applaud CNO and I applaud
all of the operators

01:25:46.600 --> 01:25:48.630
for going up there, whether
it be the Harrier stream in

01:25:48.630 --> 01:25:49.980
and others that we've seen,

01:25:51.408 --> 01:25:53.461
and I'm excited to see as
we look into the future,

01:25:53.461 --> 01:25:55.010
they are continuing that level of effort

01:25:55.010 --> 01:25:57.439
as are some of the other services

01:25:57.439 --> 01:25:58.524
to be able to operate in Arctic

01:25:58.524 --> 01:25:59.357
because if you're not actually doing it,

01:25:59.357 --> 01:26:02.000
you will not be prepared to
operate in that environment.

01:26:04.564 --> 01:26:07.030
- I appreciate that,
just thrown out there,

01:26:07.030 --> 01:26:08.860
one of the things that I was reading

01:26:08.860 --> 01:26:11.220
in this particular
write-up is lessons learned

01:26:11.220 --> 01:26:13.940
was something about
just old school tactics.

01:26:13.940 --> 01:26:16.440
I don't know that I quite
understand this as a marine

01:26:16.440 --> 01:26:18.650
and I didn't spend much
time on a navy ship,

01:26:18.650 --> 01:26:21.850
but they were talking about
bringing baseball caps

01:26:21.850 --> 01:26:26.766
to combat ice growing on
ships, Admiral Faller,

01:26:26.766 --> 01:26:28.200
I don't know, maybe that's
something you've heard.

01:26:28.200 --> 01:26:30.670
But I thought it was an
unusual lesson learned

01:26:30.670 --> 01:26:31.820
from training up there.

01:26:32.931 --> 01:26:34.104
So it's important to do that.

01:26:34.104 --> 01:26:34.937
Thank you.

01:26:36.480 --> 01:26:38.080
- [Woman] Thank you, Mr. Golden.