WEBVTT 00:00.580 --> 00:03.776 - Now for today's engagement, Colonel Jackson 00:03.776 --> 00:05.530 will be giving a brief statement, 00:05.530 --> 00:08.220 and he'll be prepared to take questions. 00:08.220 --> 00:12.760 As a result of those questions, up to two follow-ups. 00:12.760 --> 00:15.440 He's got approximately 30 minutes 00:15.440 --> 00:17.250 for this time with us here. 00:17.250 --> 00:19.500 And of course, if there's any additional questions 00:19.500 --> 00:24.250 after that time, either myself or any other member 00:24.250 --> 00:27.600 of my team will be here to prepare to follow up with that. 00:27.600 --> 00:29.093 With that, Colonel Jackson. 00:35.180 --> 00:36.250 - Good morning. 00:36.250 --> 00:37.290 I'm Colonel Scott Jackson, 00:37.290 --> 00:40.470 the commander of the 1st Security Force Assistance Brigade. 00:40.470 --> 00:42.330 I appreciate the chance to talk with you all today 00:42.330 --> 00:45.550 about the appointment of the 1st SFAB here in Afghanistan. 00:45.550 --> 00:48.180 We are approaching our 100 days in Afghanistan milestone, 00:48.180 --> 00:50.700 and I would like to open up with a few things 00:50.700 --> 00:52.463 that I have learned in that period. 00:57.849 --> 00:58.682 Hold on a sec. 01:00.800 --> 01:02.050 We have an audio problem. 01:05.800 --> 01:06.650 - [Moderator] All right, Colonel Jackson, 01:06.650 --> 01:08.183 if you could get a soundcheck. 01:12.200 --> 01:13.580 - Yeah, this is Colonel Jackson, soundcheck, 01:13.580 --> 01:15.823 one, two, three, four, five, six. 01:18.050 --> 01:19.933 - [Moderator] Colonel Jackson, could you just stand by? 01:21.347 --> 01:24.050 - I'm wired up, I can hear Colonel Jackson. 01:24.050 --> 01:26.100 - All right. (laughs) 01:26.100 --> 01:29.263 Colonel Jackson, audio check, please. 01:33.326 --> 01:34.820 - [Scott] This is Colonel Scott Jackson, soundcheck, 01:34.820 --> 01:37.470 one, two, three, four, five, six. 01:37.470 --> 01:38.790 - Read you loud and clear, sir. 01:38.790 --> 01:40.523 Please go ahead with your statement. 01:44.070 --> 01:45.850 - Okay, if you don't mind, I'm gonna remove my earpiece 01:45.850 --> 01:46.900 while we go through this 'cause I'm getting 01:46.900 --> 01:47.800 a lot of feedback. 01:55.200 --> 01:56.360 Good morning. 01:56.360 --> 01:58.080 I'm Colonel Scott Jackson, the commander 01:58.080 --> 02:00.313 of the 1st Security Force Assistance Brigade, 02:01.393 --> 02:02.930 and I really appreciate this opportunity to talk to you 02:02.930 --> 02:05.700 today about our experiences here in Afghanistan. 02:05.700 --> 02:09.090 We are approaching our 100 days in Afghanistan milestone, 02:09.090 --> 02:10.670 and I would like to open up with some things 02:10.670 --> 02:12.370 that I have learned in that period. 02:12.370 --> 02:15.070 First, we've learned that our partners are excited 02:15.070 --> 02:18.010 to have us here in Afghanistan again. 02:18.010 --> 02:21.170 They appreciate our expertise, advice, 02:21.170 --> 02:23.500 and resources we bring to bear. 02:23.500 --> 02:26.040 The more senior leaders remember the benefits 02:26.040 --> 02:28.430 of U.S. advisers, but more importantly, 02:28.430 --> 02:30.240 they are very cognizant of the commitment 02:30.240 --> 02:32.473 which our presence symbolizes. 02:34.344 --> 02:36.820 To illustrate that, I would like to tell you 02:36.820 --> 02:38.300 about one of our brigade commanders, 02:38.300 --> 02:39.967 Brigadier General Raziq, the commander 02:39.967 --> 02:42.850 of the 4th Brigade of the 203rd Corps. 02:42.850 --> 02:44.560 In one of the first meetings with his adviser 02:44.560 --> 02:46.580 battalion commander, Brigadier General Raziq 02:46.580 --> 02:49.840 told his advisers that his, quote, advisers' safety 02:49.840 --> 02:52.290 was more important to him than his own sons. 02:52.290 --> 02:54.150 Now interestingly, he said this with his two sons 02:54.150 --> 02:55.540 in the same room. 02:55.540 --> 02:57.620 That is a very powerful statement in this culture, 02:57.620 --> 02:59.410 when it's particularly coming from a very experienced, 02:59.410 --> 03:01.720 honor-bound leader such as General Raziq. 03:01.720 --> 03:04.350 Secondly, we learned that we selected the right 03:04.350 --> 03:05.700 people for this mission. 03:05.700 --> 03:08.000 From the beginning, we have sought out technical 03:08.000 --> 03:10.880 and tactical experts who possess the right personalities 03:10.880 --> 03:13.340 to work alongside our partners, allowing them 03:13.340 --> 03:16.700 to take the lead, but always prepared to support. 03:16.700 --> 03:19.410 Shortly after our arrival here, Captain Jordan Smiley, 03:19.410 --> 03:20.950 from our 1st Battalion, was meeting with his 03:20.950 --> 03:23.850 kandak commander counterpart, and a kandak is comparable 03:23.850 --> 03:25.650 to a U.S. infantry battalion, 03:25.650 --> 03:28.180 when a portion of that kandak encountered the enemy. 03:28.180 --> 03:31.030 In the minutes that followed, Jordan directed and employed 03:31.030 --> 03:33.870 U.S. Army attack helicopters to enable the Afghan infantry 03:33.870 --> 03:36.910 to maneuver, killing three insurgents in the engagement, 03:36.910 --> 03:39.190 and, later, employed U.S. Air Force fighters to suppress 03:39.190 --> 03:41.370 another group of enemy, allowing the Afghan army 03:41.370 --> 03:43.780 to close with and destroy the enemy force. 03:43.780 --> 03:46.100 His quick application of his skill established 03:46.100 --> 03:49.040 instant credibility and cemented a professional relationship 03:49.040 --> 03:51.500 with his counterpart based on a mutual desire 03:51.500 --> 03:53.043 to see the Afghans succeed. 03:53.880 --> 03:56.400 Finally, we confirm that we have the right training 03:56.400 --> 03:59.820 to prepare us to train, advise, assist, accompany, 03:59.820 --> 04:01.650 and enable our Afghan partners. 04:01.650 --> 04:03.695 The manner in which the SFAB operates requires a degree 04:03.695 --> 04:06.580 of specialized training, providing self-sufficiency 04:06.580 --> 04:08.960 in difficult and complex situations. 04:08.960 --> 04:11.810 Just a short couple of weeks ago, Staff Sergeant Bobby Cook, 04:11.810 --> 04:14.040 one of our combat medics in 6th Battalion, 04:14.040 --> 04:16.870 responded to a request for assistance from his partner unit, 04:16.870 --> 04:18.820 following an insurgent attack. 04:18.820 --> 04:20.996 Staff Sergeant Cook arrived at the Afghan aid station 04:20.996 --> 04:23.810 and assisted the Afghan medics with treatment 04:23.810 --> 04:25.490 of the gravely injured soldier. 04:25.490 --> 04:27.210 But after exhausting all their capabilities, 04:27.210 --> 04:28.520 they could do no more. 04:28.520 --> 04:31.690 Staff Sergeant Cook then stepped in, performed advanced 04:31.690 --> 04:34.660 life-saving measures typically only seen in our doctors 04:34.660 --> 04:36.150 and our physician assistants. 04:36.150 --> 04:38.140 He stabilized the patient and enabled 04:38.140 --> 04:40.210 his evacuation to a hospital. 04:40.210 --> 04:42.970 Staff Sergeant Cook saved that soldier and, in doing so, 04:42.970 --> 04:45.943 established a personal relationship that cannot be broken. 04:47.000 --> 04:49.137 To put these lessons and vignettes in context, 04:49.137 --> 04:51.630 I would like to briefly describe the road the 1st SFAB 04:51.630 --> 04:53.820 has followed to get to this point. 04:53.820 --> 04:56.270 The U.S. military has been doing combat advising in Iraq 04:56.270 --> 04:59.220 and Afghanistan for nearly two decades, using traditional 04:59.220 --> 05:02.600 military formations as the core of an ad hoc adviser effort 05:02.600 --> 05:05.370 at the expense of traditional combat readiness. 05:05.370 --> 05:07.840 Acknowledging that advising conventional foreign 05:07.840 --> 05:10.030 security force partners throughout the world, 05:10.030 --> 05:13.170 not just here in Afghanistan, is an enduring task, 05:13.170 --> 05:15.450 and to develop and preserve readiness in our brigade 05:15.450 --> 05:18.400 combat teams, Army leadership directed the formation 05:18.400 --> 05:21.210 of six SFABs, the first of which was formed 05:21.210 --> 05:23.450 at Fort Benning, Georgia, last summer. 05:23.450 --> 05:25.570 As we began our training last summer, the United States 05:25.570 --> 05:28.490 announced the South Asia strategy, a critical component 05:28.490 --> 05:31.590 of which was increased tactical-level advising. 05:31.590 --> 05:34.210 The Army directed our units to prepare for an early 05:34.210 --> 05:36.850 2018 deployment to support that strategy, 05:36.850 --> 05:39.010 and we modified our recruiting and training programs 05:39.010 --> 05:40.410 to ensure we would be ready. 05:41.670 --> 05:43.809 In the nine months that followed, we recruited, 05:43.809 --> 05:46.910 trained, and assimilated more than 800 soldiers, 05:46.910 --> 05:49.550 received over 22,000 pieces of equipment, 05:49.550 --> 05:52.120 conducted two combat training center rotations, 05:52.120 --> 05:54.200 developed doctrine for this new capability, 05:54.200 --> 05:55.960 and formed original equipping strategies 05:55.960 --> 05:57.573 to meet our unique requirements. 05:58.420 --> 06:00.465 In March, we deployed to Afghanistan, 06:00.465 --> 06:02.810 intent to show our partners that we were not 06:02.810 --> 06:04.200 business as usual. 06:04.200 --> 06:06.830 We represented change and commitment in the form 06:06.830 --> 06:09.320 of the people that have volunteered for this mission. 06:09.320 --> 06:11.330 From the very beginning, our focus has been, 06:11.330 --> 06:14.010 and continues to be, identifying the right people 06:14.010 --> 06:17.050 whose conduct, appearance, actions, and values 06:17.050 --> 06:19.650 represent the best of America and its Army, 06:19.650 --> 06:22.150 providing a positive example of the military profession 06:22.150 --> 06:24.930 to our Afghan partners, helping them establish trust 06:24.930 --> 06:26.080 with the Afghan people. 06:27.400 --> 06:29.720 Since our arrival, we have deployed adviser teams 06:29.720 --> 06:31.830 to every Resolute Support regional command, 06:31.830 --> 06:34.130 and partnered them with Afghan army, police, 06:34.130 --> 06:37.280 and border force elements, ranging from kandak 06:37.280 --> 06:39.540 to Afghan brigades and police districts, 06:39.540 --> 06:41.000 and all the way up to Afghan corps, 06:41.000 --> 06:42.343 division, and police zones. 06:42.343 --> 06:45.100 We have provided not only ground-maneuver-focused teams, 06:45.100 --> 06:47.430 but also specialty teams focused on engineering, 06:47.430 --> 06:49.580 field artillery, military intelligence, 06:49.580 --> 06:51.373 logistics, and communications. 06:51.373 --> 06:54.270 Through echelons and functionality, the 1st SFAB 06:54.270 --> 06:56.040 has added extensive tactical depth 06:56.040 --> 06:58.950 to the overall Resolute Support advising mission. 06:58.950 --> 07:01.650 In the coming months, we will define success for the SFAB 07:01.650 --> 07:03.139 in terms of our partners. 07:03.139 --> 07:06.050 When we leave, our partners will be more technically 07:06.050 --> 07:08.960 and tactically capable, more offensive-minded, 07:08.960 --> 07:11.860 more self-sustaining, and deserving of the trust 07:11.860 --> 07:13.592 of the Afghan people. 07:13.592 --> 07:15.400 I would like to close the way I always do, 07:15.400 --> 07:17.890 with a proclamation of pride in what your soldiers 07:17.890 --> 07:20.160 have accomplished in getting here, but more importantly, 07:20.160 --> 07:22.760 what I know they will accomplish in the months ahead. 07:22.760 --> 07:24.920 These combat advisers were specially selected, 07:24.920 --> 07:27.800 specially trained, and specially equipped for this mission, 07:27.800 --> 07:29.370 and they are fully prepared, 07:29.370 --> 07:31.189 and I'm very proud to serve with them. 07:31.189 --> 07:33.390 And in the spirit of Ramadan here in Afghanistan, 07:33.390 --> 07:35.440 I'd like to wish all of you Eid Mubarak. 07:35.440 --> 07:37.370 And I'll be happy to take your questions. 07:37.370 --> 07:39.930 But if you'll indulge me just one personal thing, 07:39.930 --> 07:42.620 my son's birthday is in two days, and I know he's watching, 07:42.620 --> 07:45.520 so I just wanted to tell him thank you and happy birthday. 07:46.743 --> 07:49.920 - As we move forward with the questions, 07:49.920 --> 07:52.130 being the new member of the team, I'd ask you all 07:52.130 --> 07:54.900 when called upon if you all could simply full name 07:54.900 --> 07:57.420 and agency so that both myself and as well 07:57.420 --> 07:59.840 the outlying station can have all your information. 07:59.840 --> 08:00.804 Yes, ma'am? 08:00.804 --> 08:04.220 - Hi, hi, Scott, it's Lita Baldor with AP. 08:04.220 --> 08:05.353 Good to see you again. 08:07.220 --> 08:08.823 A couple questions for you. 08:10.040 --> 08:12.804 When we saw you a few months back, 08:12.804 --> 08:16.100 we asked you how you'd be able to judge some success, 08:16.100 --> 08:18.770 and I just wanna maybe toss some of your words back at you 08:18.770 --> 08:21.810 and see what you've seen so far. 08:21.810 --> 08:25.940 You said if you do your job right, in four to five months, 08:25.940 --> 08:30.940 the Afghans will be able to get into an unequal fight 08:32.220 --> 08:34.440 and that they would be able to apply pressure 08:34.440 --> 08:35.823 against the enemy, 08:36.948 --> 08:41.948 have victory, and be able to effectively use resources. 08:43.300 --> 08:45.950 So the first part of my question is, can you tell me 08:45.950 --> 08:50.930 where that stands, how you measure the Afghan forces now? 08:50.930 --> 08:53.623 And then I have a second follow-up. 08:57.560 --> 08:58.393 - Okay. 08:59.780 --> 09:03.590 So Lita, I appreciate you coming back to my own words. 09:03.590 --> 09:06.210 My three measures that I talked to you several months ago, 09:06.210 --> 09:08.360 unequal fights, maintaining pressure against the enemy, 09:08.360 --> 09:09.590 and effectively use the resources, 09:09.590 --> 09:12.090 I think we're making great progress along all those lines, 09:12.090 --> 09:14.430 and I'll highlight a couple ideas. 09:14.430 --> 09:16.160 So we talk about an unequal fight. 09:16.160 --> 09:18.320 Back in my office we said, what is an unequal fight? 09:18.320 --> 09:19.940 Well, it's not person-on-person. 09:19.940 --> 09:21.750 It's systems against people. 09:21.750 --> 09:24.570 And I'll tell you, in the less than a hundred days 09:24.570 --> 09:27.030 we've been here, across our SFAB formation, 09:27.030 --> 09:29.570 across the country, we've seen examples of where the Afghans 09:29.570 --> 09:31.380 are taking the fight to the enemy. 09:31.380 --> 09:33.740 They're using their own organic resources 09:33.740 --> 09:36.540 to fight against the enemy, their own attack aviation, 09:36.540 --> 09:39.860 their own air force, their own artillery, and utilizing 09:39.860 --> 09:43.054 their own ground maneuver to put the enemy in a bad spot. 09:43.054 --> 09:46.260 One of the things that we've observed in my own area 09:46.260 --> 09:49.050 of operations is that the enemy can't hold terrain. 09:49.050 --> 09:51.740 They may attack a location, they may temporarily seize it, 09:51.740 --> 09:54.160 raid it, in fact, but they never stay, 09:54.160 --> 09:56.440 because they know if they stay, then they're asking 09:56.440 --> 09:58.150 for a fight that they can't handle. 09:58.150 --> 10:00.740 And as far as pressure goes, I'll kind of go back 10:00.740 --> 10:02.790 to my first comment, yes, the enemy is applying, 10:02.790 --> 10:05.040 I'm sorry, the ANA and the ANP 10:05.040 --> 10:07.030 are applying pressure to the enemy. 10:07.030 --> 10:09.320 They're present, they're present where the people live, 10:09.320 --> 10:10.920 they're maintaining their ground, 10:10.920 --> 10:13.280 and they're keeping the enemy on their toes. 10:13.280 --> 10:15.130 As far as effective use of resources, 10:17.204 --> 10:18.820 we were just talking about that with some folks today. 10:18.820 --> 10:21.750 And the Army's been doing this, as of tomorrow, 10:21.750 --> 10:24.080 for 243 years, the U.S. Army. 10:24.080 --> 10:26.080 And so we've learned a lot in those 243 years. 10:26.080 --> 10:28.360 The Afghan army is much newer than that, 10:28.360 --> 10:30.410 so they're learning every single day. 10:30.410 --> 10:32.650 And so the things that we're teaching them now 10:32.650 --> 10:34.510 honestly are things that U.S. Army has learned 10:34.510 --> 10:37.120 in the last couple decades, effective use of resources, 10:37.120 --> 10:39.560 effective implementation of systems, 10:39.560 --> 10:42.830 computerized tracking tools, whether be core IMS 10:42.830 --> 10:45.410 or their new personnel system, all go to a more 10:45.410 --> 10:47.247 efficient use of their personal capital 10:47.247 --> 10:49.120 and their material capital within the army, 10:49.120 --> 10:51.470 and they're making great strides in doing that. 10:53.620 --> 10:56.220 - The second part is, your successor, as you know, 10:56.220 --> 10:59.270 is getting teed up, getting ready to start preparing 10:59.270 --> 11:01.570 to come in and replace you. 11:01.570 --> 11:05.530 What recommendations are you going to make for any changes 11:05.530 --> 11:09.060 either in the training or the size or the makeup 11:09.060 --> 11:11.150 of the brigade when it goes in? 11:11.150 --> 11:14.510 And does this reflect any potential changes 11:14.510 --> 11:16.900 on the new fight, which is now apparently 11:16.900 --> 11:18.303 focused against ISIS? 11:22.080 --> 11:22.913 - Hmm. 11:23.920 --> 11:25.797 So first off, Lita, I think the, 11:27.760 --> 11:28.593 what you consider a foregone conclusion of, 11:29.519 --> 11:31.200 you know, my predecessor is still TBD. 11:31.200 --> 11:34.450 So I'll defer that to Forces Command 11:34.450 --> 11:35.670 and back in the Department of the Army. 11:35.670 --> 11:38.020 But what I could share with you, though, is that, you know, 11:38.020 --> 11:40.720 we view, in 1st SFAB, one of our primary missions 11:40.720 --> 11:43.150 is to set the conditions for whoever follows behind us. 11:43.150 --> 11:45.570 So we have a very robust 11:45.570 --> 11:49.370 and systematic means of capturing lessons learned, 11:49.370 --> 11:51.120 transmitting that back to the United States 11:51.120 --> 11:52.770 and back to Forces Command and the other 11:52.770 --> 11:56.760 appropriate agencies to assess what are the right 11:56.760 --> 11:58.630 adjustments for Afghanistan and what may be the right 11:58.630 --> 12:00.440 adjustments for more of a worldwide deployment. 12:00.440 --> 12:03.300 So we are capturing a lot of lessons. 12:03.300 --> 12:05.610 I think, to summarize what we've learned so far 12:05.610 --> 12:08.540 is that I think the Army got it right with 1st SFAB. 12:08.540 --> 12:11.350 The organization of our small unit teams and our battalions 12:11.350 --> 12:13.870 and our brigade is a good fit, 12:13.870 --> 12:15.660 and I think it's a very flexible fit. 12:15.660 --> 12:18.549 I think the operations that we talk through, 12:18.549 --> 12:20.430 as a matter of fact, the last time you and I spoke, 12:20.430 --> 12:21.980 when you were here in Afghanistan, we talked about 12:21.980 --> 12:25.020 some of the changes in how we moved around the battlefield. 12:25.020 --> 12:27.480 It just goes to the adaptability and the flexibility 12:27.480 --> 12:30.380 of our formations, when you can take a battalion 12:30.380 --> 12:32.700 that's in one area with one mission, and then, 12:32.700 --> 12:34.290 because the priorities on the ground change, 12:34.290 --> 12:36.720 move it to another area with a different kind of mission, 12:36.720 --> 12:38.240 and it fires on all cylinders. 12:38.240 --> 12:42.010 So I am very confident that we are at the 90-plus 12:42.010 --> 12:45.290 percent solution, to use an anecdotal number. 12:45.290 --> 12:47.080 But, again, all that's being pushed back, 12:47.080 --> 12:49.860 it's being assessed, and we'll see how it goes. 12:49.860 --> 12:53.220 Now, I would comment on your last assertion there that, 12:53.220 --> 12:57.500 you know, as it changed the evolution of ISIS, 12:57.500 --> 12:59.370 that is not a conclusion, that is not something 12:59.370 --> 13:02.553 I can speak to, so I would not wanna permanently affix it 13:02.553 --> 13:04.723 to an SFAB mission at this point. 13:05.560 --> 13:06.843 - [Moderator] Voice of America, okay. 13:06.843 --> 13:09.960 - Thank you, Colonel, Carla Babb with Voice of America. 13:09.960 --> 13:12.830 I just wanted to follow up, 'cause you said 13:12.830 --> 13:16.820 you were learning the right adjustments. 13:16.820 --> 13:18.930 So I was wondering if you could give an example 13:18.930 --> 13:21.380 of an adjustment that was made while on the ground. 13:21.380 --> 13:24.450 And then, also, I have a follow, 13:24.450 --> 13:26.263 but I'll let you answer that first. 13:29.358 --> 13:31.500 - Okay. 13:31.500 --> 13:33.840 Well, ma'am, I'll tell you, the biggest adjustment 13:33.840 --> 13:37.680 kind of goes to the overall, you know, modus operandi, 13:37.680 --> 13:39.067 if you will, of the SFAB. 13:39.067 --> 13:42.220 So if you followed our train-up back home, 13:42.220 --> 13:44.440 and particularly at JRTC, we kind of viewed 13:44.440 --> 13:47.060 the potential mission set across a spectrum of advising. 13:47.060 --> 13:50.170 You know, on one side, on the one side of the spectrum, 13:50.170 --> 13:52.999 you could have a very distant advising, 13:52.999 --> 13:57.273 a FOB-based, more advisory kind of thing. 13:57.273 --> 13:59.300 But then, on the other, far right-hand side of the spectrum 13:59.300 --> 14:02.390 could be a much more integrated mission set 14:02.390 --> 14:04.100 that focuses on a company and an enabling. 14:04.100 --> 14:05.870 In some ways you could say, hey, look, we're going 14:05.870 --> 14:08.581 on joint patrols with them and going on the objective. 14:08.581 --> 14:10.913 We chose to train to the harder standard. 14:10.913 --> 14:14.745 And so, if you saw our JRTC rotation before we deployed 14:14.745 --> 14:17.157 at Fort Polk, it was very much on that far right 14:17.157 --> 14:18.140 end of the spectrum. 14:18.140 --> 14:21.530 We train to the harder standard of being side-by-side 14:21.530 --> 14:24.800 with the Afghans and moving out on operations with them. 14:24.800 --> 14:28.070 And now, to go to your question about adjustments, 14:28.070 --> 14:30.321 what we found here in Afghanistan was that 14:30.321 --> 14:34.080 that's not necessarily, that is not always necessary. 14:34.080 --> 14:37.900 The 1st SFAB and all my teams, we'd go where we have to go 14:37.900 --> 14:40.420 in order to achieve the effects with our partners. 14:40.420 --> 14:43.300 Sometimes, that's on our FOB, dependent upon 14:43.300 --> 14:44.280 what we're trying to advise. 14:44.280 --> 14:46.290 Sometimes it's at the unit headquarters. 14:46.290 --> 14:48.950 Sometimes that may be at a forward secured location 14:48.950 --> 14:50.486 with our partner headquarters. 14:50.486 --> 14:52.920 And in very limited situations currently, 14:52.920 --> 14:54.280 yeah, it could be with the partner force. 14:54.280 --> 14:56.719 So what we've learned and the adjustment we've made 14:56.719 --> 14:59.780 is kind of a mental shift of, you know, hey, 14:59.780 --> 15:02.820 we're not getting stuck on being outside the wire. 15:02.820 --> 15:05.341 We go where we can best do our job, 15:05.341 --> 15:07.810 and that really equates to where the decision-makers are at. 15:07.810 --> 15:09.970 So that's what drives what our scheme of maneuver 15:09.970 --> 15:10.803 is on the ground. 15:10.803 --> 15:12.932 So it's a very flexible organization, 15:12.932 --> 15:16.580 mentally as well as physically and capabilities-wise, 15:16.580 --> 15:18.890 and so that gives us the degree to move 15:19.742 --> 15:21.410 across the battlefield, if you will, 15:21.410 --> 15:23.590 and change our advisory concepts. 15:23.590 --> 15:24.423 - Thank you, Colonel. 15:24.423 --> 15:27.803 And then my follow is, because you had mentioned 15:27.803 --> 15:30.430 that you're preparing the situation for the people 15:30.430 --> 15:33.529 to follow you, you wouldn't quite get into whether or not 15:33.529 --> 15:36.600 the goal is gonna be shifting to fight more towards ISIS. 15:36.600 --> 15:40.640 So what is the goal for the SFAB? 15:40.640 --> 15:43.990 Especially as you do this turnover for this fighting season, 15:43.990 --> 15:45.540 what do you hope to accomplish? 15:49.350 --> 15:51.520 - Yeah, so simply put, the goal is to make our partners 15:51.520 --> 15:53.390 better in every measurable way. 15:53.390 --> 15:56.790 So every unit is different, so the metrics, if you will, 15:56.790 --> 15:58.660 for every organization we partner with is gonna be 15:58.660 --> 16:00.610 different, and the objectives are gonna be different. 16:00.610 --> 16:03.970 But our guys have a very simple view on their mission. 16:03.970 --> 16:06.250 It's do an assessment of their organization, 16:06.250 --> 16:09.160 their partnered organization, establish a solid relationship 16:09.160 --> 16:11.520 with that organization, represent the United States well, 16:11.520 --> 16:13.040 and then make your partner better 16:13.040 --> 16:15.100 and make them self-sustainable. 16:15.100 --> 16:19.820 We're not into creating more artificial dependencies, okay? 16:19.820 --> 16:21.620 We're into making them more self-sufficient, 16:21.620 --> 16:22.740 so that is our objective. 16:22.740 --> 16:26.310 And as we roll through this fighting season, 16:26.310 --> 16:28.950 to echo our commander over here in Afghanistan, 16:28.950 --> 16:31.420 our goal is to set the conditions for reconciliation, 16:31.420 --> 16:33.350 from the fighting season perspective. 16:33.350 --> 16:35.000 - Okay, thanks, and I guess making them better 16:35.000 --> 16:37.080 would make them have the ability 16:37.080 --> 16:38.733 to accomplish their own goals. 16:40.640 --> 16:42.010 The people who you were working with, 16:42.010 --> 16:44.310 what are their goals for this fighting season? 16:49.180 --> 16:51.333 - Well, obviously, on a tactical level, 16:52.490 --> 16:55.480 our partner forces are obviously focused in the near term, 16:55.480 --> 16:57.440 on the elections in October. 16:57.440 --> 16:59.670 So they wanna establish local security for the population, 16:59.670 --> 17:02.280 make sure they feel secure, make sure that they feel 17:02.280 --> 17:05.310 that they can vote, from a security perspective. 17:05.310 --> 17:07.670 And that is their, I'll say, their midterm 17:07.670 --> 17:09.500 tactical objective that they're focused on right now 17:09.500 --> 17:10.750 for this fighting season. 17:11.990 --> 17:12.823 - [Moderator] Sir? 17:12.823 --> 17:15.450 - I'm Tom Squitieri with Talk Media News, good morning. 17:15.450 --> 17:17.740 I want to expand on Carla's first question. 17:17.740 --> 17:20.600 Sir, in your opening remarks, you mentioned 17:20.600 --> 17:24.010 about how the SFABs are brand new, they're stood up, 17:24.010 --> 17:25.420 you had to get, you picked the equipment, 17:25.420 --> 17:26.710 et cetera, et cetera. 17:26.710 --> 17:30.420 What adjustments and what changes have you made 17:30.420 --> 17:33.400 from that initial moment, let's say, we want this piece 17:33.400 --> 17:35.500 of equipment, this type of soldier, 17:35.500 --> 17:37.490 this type of participant, to now? 17:37.490 --> 17:40.132 In other words, to stand up the next SFAB, 17:40.132 --> 17:42.680 what changes and adjustments and improvements 17:42.680 --> 17:45.310 have you been able to make now that the 1st SFAB 17:45.310 --> 17:46.363 is out and running? 17:53.510 --> 17:55.937 - Besides the conceptual change we talked about as far as, 17:55.937 --> 17:58.973 you know, the flexibility to advise across the spectrum, 18:00.580 --> 18:04.060 we have identified that our initial thoughts about 18:04.060 --> 18:06.470 distributed communications is essential. 18:06.470 --> 18:08.800 So we've gone back to the Army and reinforced the need 18:08.800 --> 18:12.730 that, as an organization, the SFAB needs to have the ability 18:12.730 --> 18:14.870 to execute mission command across 18:14.870 --> 18:16.670 a very large, distributed footprint. 18:18.000 --> 18:22.199 I've also addressed the fact that as a brigade, we're not, 18:22.199 --> 18:25.260 as employed in Afghanistan, we're not employed 18:25.260 --> 18:26.690 and we don't operate as a brigade. 18:26.690 --> 18:30.270 We operate as a collection of teams supporting each one 18:30.270 --> 18:32.830 of the NATO regional commands. 18:32.830 --> 18:35.267 And so that changes the way in which we do business. 18:35.267 --> 18:37.460 That changes some of the systems that operate 18:37.460 --> 18:40.540 inside of our mission command centers in order to facilitate 18:40.540 --> 18:44.080 that disaggregated mission command approach, 18:44.080 --> 18:45.850 are the two biggest ones I'd highlight. 18:45.850 --> 18:48.840 - When you thought about the soldiers who would participate 18:48.840 --> 18:51.080 in SFAB, they're all volunteers, we've been told that, 18:51.080 --> 18:53.080 you reiterated that this morning. 18:53.080 --> 18:56.090 When you thought about, this is the ideal soldier 18:56.090 --> 18:59.880 who we need to have in an SFAB, before the 1st SFAB 18:59.880 --> 19:03.930 was stood up, now, what did you see then 19:03.930 --> 19:06.100 as the ideal soldier, and what do you see now 19:06.100 --> 19:07.253 as the ideal soldier? 19:12.430 --> 19:13.560 - Well, I don't want to sound like I'm bragging, 19:13.560 --> 19:16.003 but I think I got it right before we left. 19:17.659 --> 19:20.270 When we recruited the 1st SFAB, we were looking for soldiers 19:20.270 --> 19:23.590 that were technically competent, tactically competent, 19:23.590 --> 19:25.190 had the right personality set. 19:25.190 --> 19:27.020 And it was really based around two things, 19:27.020 --> 19:31.730 of patience and empathy, as kind of the core model. 19:31.730 --> 19:34.060 We were looking for soldiers that were physically fit, 19:34.060 --> 19:38.100 capable of some hardship and longer mission sets. 19:38.100 --> 19:41.215 And I think our operations in Afghanistan right now 19:41.215 --> 19:44.960 have borne out that assessment and those requirements. 19:44.960 --> 19:48.240 What you see are guys like 19:48.240 --> 19:50.210 Specialist Promotable Wallen, 19:50.210 --> 19:51.120 you know, I'll highlight him. 19:51.120 --> 19:52.260 So he's in our 2nd Battalion. 19:52.260 --> 19:55.020 He's a medic, so he's a junior enlisted medic 19:55.020 --> 19:56.540 that we brought into the organization. 19:56.540 --> 19:59.086 He's now, as of yesterday, he was promoted to Sergeant. 19:59.086 --> 20:01.900 On his own initiative, he identified a need 20:01.900 --> 20:04.140 for additional medical training within his kandak 20:04.140 --> 20:05.040 that he was advising. 20:05.040 --> 20:08.010 He developed his own POI, he resourced it appropriately, 20:08.010 --> 20:10.741 developed his own training plan, brought in the Afghans 20:10.741 --> 20:14.180 to train them, and has now promulgated 20:14.180 --> 20:15.620 his knowledge across his kandak. 20:15.620 --> 20:19.120 That's the kind of self-starting, junior-level leaders 20:19.120 --> 20:20.340 that we wanted in this organization, 20:20.340 --> 20:21.750 and that's the ones we recruited. 20:21.750 --> 20:22.980 I talked about Jordan Smiley, 20:22.980 --> 20:24.806 I talked about Staff Sergeant Cook. 20:24.806 --> 20:26.541 That's the kind of kids we recruited, 20:26.541 --> 20:28.080 and that's the kind of kids that our missions 20:28.080 --> 20:29.220 have shown that we need. 20:29.220 --> 20:30.130 And I think we got that right. 20:30.130 --> 20:33.130 So again, I'm not bragging, but I think we did get it right. 20:34.403 --> 20:36.080 - [Moderator] Go ahead now. 20:36.080 --> 20:38.150 - Hey, sir, it's Corey Dickstein with Stars & Stripes. 20:38.150 --> 20:41.504 Good to see you, appreciate you doing this. 20:41.504 --> 20:43.840 I wanted to ask you, 20:43.840 --> 20:46.030 last time you and I talked, 20:46.030 --> 20:49.070 you and some of your other soldiers had mentioned how 20:49.070 --> 20:51.496 it would probably take some time to reach out to 20:51.496 --> 20:55.950 some of the kandaks, some of the large organizations 20:56.961 --> 20:58.111 in the ANA and the ANP. 20:59.207 --> 21:03.210 Wanted to see what, how far into that process, 21:03.210 --> 21:06.506 have you guys reached out to, you know, most everybody 21:06.506 --> 21:08.870 that you wanna reach out to at this point? 21:08.870 --> 21:10.550 And what are you finding? 21:10.550 --> 21:15.550 What shape are the Afghan fighting units in 21:15.770 --> 21:19.023 when you found them, I guess, would be my question. 21:22.530 --> 21:24.620 - Okay, well, Corey, before I get to the answer 21:24.620 --> 21:27.070 to your question, I will first wish you congratulations 21:27.070 --> 21:28.270 on your recent nuptials. 21:29.310 --> 21:30.650 Matt and I were talking earlier today. 21:30.650 --> 21:32.290 It was amazing, it seems like you just got married, 21:32.290 --> 21:34.750 and you're already back at work, so I won't counsel you 21:34.750 --> 21:37.210 on that one yet, but sometime you deserve a honeymoon. 21:37.210 --> 21:40.290 With respect to your questions, so where are we at? 21:40.290 --> 21:43.540 So I'll start off with this right off the top. 21:43.540 --> 21:46.630 We are 100% obligated as far as the force structure. 21:46.630 --> 21:49.620 I have no idle force structure in this brigade. 21:49.620 --> 21:51.840 Every team that is designed to work at the kandak 21:51.840 --> 21:54.000 or brigade level is functioning at the kandak 21:54.000 --> 21:54.923 or brigade level. 21:55.840 --> 21:57.280 All of our battalions are engaged 21:57.280 --> 21:58.970 at the brigade level, per design. 21:58.970 --> 22:00.930 And I would also offer, most of our battalions 22:00.930 --> 22:03.323 are actually partnered with multiple brigades. 22:04.170 --> 22:06.290 In the brigade headquarters itself, we're partnered 22:06.290 --> 22:07.860 with our core headquarters, as designed, 22:07.860 --> 22:09.690 and we're also executing a lot of other 22:09.690 --> 22:11.130 supplementary mission command duties. 22:11.130 --> 22:14.210 So I would say, to go to your question about where are we 22:14.210 --> 22:19.210 at on this thing, 100% fully engaged across the formation. 22:21.060 --> 22:23.140 And I'm sorry, I got distracted by your nuptial thought, 22:23.140 --> 22:25.220 so what was the second half of your question? 22:25.220 --> 22:27.403 - Well, thank you, sir, I really appreciate it. 22:28.840 --> 22:31.970 I guess I just wanted to see, when you guys first got there, 22:31.970 --> 22:33.103 what did you find? 22:33.990 --> 22:37.290 Were the kandaks in good fighting shape? 22:37.290 --> 22:38.690 Or did they need a lot of work? 22:38.690 --> 22:41.853 Or is it still a big work in progress? 22:45.820 --> 22:46.840 - Yeah, thank you, Corey. 22:46.840 --> 22:49.090 Thank you for clarifying that one. 22:49.090 --> 22:49.970 So what did we find? 22:49.970 --> 22:53.850 So as we got out to kandak formations, within the first 22:53.850 --> 22:57.470 few weeks of being here, we found that the junior leadership 22:57.470 --> 23:00.250 at the kandak level was hungry. 23:00.250 --> 23:03.820 They were excited to have us back and they were ready to go. 23:03.820 --> 23:05.750 What they lacked, and I kind of referred to this 23:05.750 --> 23:08.650 in a previous response, what they lacked 23:08.650 --> 23:10.130 was some of the support at the higher, 23:10.130 --> 23:13.000 systemic, institutional development inside the house. 23:13.000 --> 23:17.640 We found some challenges in logistics. 23:17.640 --> 23:20.640 We found some challenges in maintenance and supply. 23:20.640 --> 23:24.130 But the good news is that those are things that the SFAB 23:24.130 --> 23:26.620 are really optimized to fix, 'cause as you and I 23:26.620 --> 23:29.270 have discussed previously, the beauty of the SFAB 23:29.270 --> 23:33.200 is the depth that the SFAB advisory network brings. 23:33.200 --> 23:35.950 And so while we've got guys like Jordan Smiley and Dave Zac 23:35.950 --> 23:38.380 and those kind of guys working at the kandak level, 23:38.380 --> 23:41.180 identifying these problems, then you have officers above 23:41.180 --> 23:43.080 and you have teams above 'em working at the brigade level 23:43.080 --> 23:46.250 that support that kandak, that can then take that problem 23:46.250 --> 23:47.660 and work it with their counterparts. 23:47.660 --> 23:49.110 And when the solution exists above them, 23:49.110 --> 23:51.150 we have advisers up there that can help to fix it. 23:51.150 --> 23:53.260 So I'll just give you a brief example. 23:53.260 --> 23:56.730 One of our CAT team leaders, a guy named Oleg Greene, 23:56.730 --> 23:59.010 flew out to one of our kandaks, 23:59.010 --> 24:00.320 and I'll, I won't tell you where, 24:00.320 --> 24:01.400 for the sake of operational security. 24:01.400 --> 24:05.350 But he recently flew out, spent about 10 hours 24:05.350 --> 24:07.291 on the ground with his kandak commander and his kandak 24:07.291 --> 24:10.120 at their own little kandak FOB. 24:10.120 --> 24:12.010 They did their own little assessment of the environment, 24:12.010 --> 24:13.390 started working with the kandak commander, 24:13.390 --> 24:14.930 figuring out what his requirements were. 24:14.930 --> 24:17.280 And he identified that, although he had two functioning 24:17.280 --> 24:20.550 mortar tubes, he had no mortar ammo. 24:20.550 --> 24:23.250 He had shot the last of it and it had not been replaced. 24:23.250 --> 24:25.844 He also found that he had six Humvees that were 24:25.844 --> 24:28.610 non-mission-capable at the time and needed repair. 24:28.610 --> 24:30.360 Now repair parts were supposedly available, 24:30.360 --> 24:32.170 but they had not been pushed out to him. 24:32.170 --> 24:34.270 And then, so, when he came back, he reported that up 24:34.270 --> 24:36.620 through the advisory network, and the brigade team 24:36.620 --> 24:38.350 got involved, and the brigade reached across 24:38.350 --> 24:41.250 to the Afghan brigades and said, hey, here's the problems, 24:41.250 --> 24:43.440 you need mortar ammo, you need trucks fixed. 24:43.440 --> 24:45.880 And they reached up to the corps, where the resources exist, 24:45.880 --> 24:48.474 and my corps advising team then got involved 24:48.474 --> 24:50.040 and started pushing that stuff down. 24:50.040 --> 24:53.760 Within 24 hours, the corps, not us, but the corps, 24:53.760 --> 24:56.060 had pushed out mortar ammunition to that kandak. 24:56.060 --> 24:58.720 And within 48 hours, we had six Humvees repaired 24:58.720 --> 25:00.860 and back in the fight, all because of the power 25:00.860 --> 25:01.720 of the advisory network. 25:01.720 --> 25:04.540 So again, the leadership at the lowest level 25:04.540 --> 25:05.900 knew what they needed to do. 25:05.900 --> 25:07.688 They had a plan, they're ready to fight. 25:07.688 --> 25:09.690 And I'll tell you, that same kandak 25:09.690 --> 25:11.700 has got plans for the future. 25:11.700 --> 25:13.750 And now, with the assistance of the advisory network, 25:13.750 --> 25:15.650 they're properly supported from above. 25:17.850 --> 25:18.920 - [Moderator] Go ahead. 25:18.920 --> 25:20.070 - Hi, Colonel, thank you for doing this. 25:20.070 --> 25:21.830 Ryan Browne with CNN. 25:21.830 --> 25:25.390 Just two questions, one on kind of the role 25:25.390 --> 25:27.915 or the security of the advisers. 25:27.915 --> 25:31.380 Have the advisers at the kandak level or the brigade level 25:31.380 --> 25:33.990 from the SFABs, have any of them come under direct fire 25:33.990 --> 25:37.550 or engaged in any firefights, kind of in self-defense, 25:37.550 --> 25:39.400 as part of their advisory duties? 25:39.400 --> 25:41.410 And also, part of that, there was a lot of reports 25:41.410 --> 25:45.620 that vetting of some of the partner forces had kinda held up 25:45.620 --> 25:48.440 the deployment of some of the SFAB advisers, 25:48.440 --> 25:50.520 fears of green-on-blue, and that. 25:50.520 --> 25:53.140 So you said you've been there 100 days. 25:53.140 --> 25:55.930 I guess, how long did that process delay advisers 25:55.930 --> 25:57.200 actually reaching their units? 25:57.200 --> 25:59.050 I know you said you're 100% obligated now, 25:59.050 --> 26:00.783 but was there a bit of a delay? 26:02.964 --> 26:04.540 - Hmm. 26:04.540 --> 26:05.850 Okay. 26:05.850 --> 26:07.015 So Brian, thank you for that. 26:07.015 --> 26:09.330 The first part, your first question, regarding direct fire. 26:09.330 --> 26:13.460 So thankfully, no, no advisers have come under direct fire 26:13.460 --> 26:14.903 in any way, shape or form. 26:15.780 --> 26:17.530 With regard to C.I. vetting, I know there was some 26:17.530 --> 26:19.110 recent attention to that. 26:19.110 --> 26:21.160 The short answer is that C.I. vetting was never 26:21.160 --> 26:23.350 an obstacle to advising, okay? 26:23.350 --> 26:26.363 Upon our arrival, conditions were set for advising. 26:27.710 --> 26:30.560 And I think, if you'll bear with me, 26:30.560 --> 26:33.440 militarily, it makes sense to kind of start at the top 26:33.440 --> 26:34.670 and work your way down. 26:34.670 --> 26:36.340 Establish those relations at the top, 26:36.340 --> 26:39.750 establish ground rules, develop an overall assessment 26:39.750 --> 26:41.760 of an organization, and we started working down. 26:41.760 --> 26:43.760 And so when we arrived, those conditions were set. 26:43.760 --> 26:45.640 We were able to start moving. 26:45.640 --> 26:48.370 And as we worked our way down the echelon inside 26:48.370 --> 26:50.700 that Afghan formation, and we expanded out the C.I. 26:50.700 --> 26:53.430 vetting piece, there was no, really, effective delay. 26:53.430 --> 26:55.450 I'll tell you, as the commander of the SFAB, 26:55.450 --> 26:57.860 I would not have wanted to put advisers in a kandak 26:57.860 --> 27:00.410 on day one, okay, because I don't think the conditions 27:00.410 --> 27:03.200 would have been set from the larger adviser network. 27:03.200 --> 27:06.540 So again, short answer is there was no delay in my mind. 27:06.540 --> 27:08.410 It was a natural progression. 27:08.410 --> 27:12.400 And as I'm sure you could guess, C.I. vetting, first off, 27:12.400 --> 27:14.280 is a thing that's gonna be continually, 27:14.280 --> 27:15.540 it's gonna go on continually. 27:15.540 --> 27:17.670 People are gonna rotate in and out of formations. 27:17.670 --> 27:20.040 People are gonna get brought into the formations 27:20.040 --> 27:21.270 as a replacement, they're gonna have to be vetted. 27:21.270 --> 27:23.010 So we're gonna continually be doing this. 27:23.010 --> 27:25.210 But we have procedures and we have policies 27:25.210 --> 27:26.290 to mitigate that turbulence. 27:26.290 --> 27:28.580 So it is not a problem, 27:28.580 --> 27:31.860 and nor is it an obstacle to operations. 27:31.860 --> 27:33.560 And with respect to green-on-blue, 27:34.420 --> 27:36.460 as with any threat in the environment, 27:36.460 --> 27:38.330 whether it be direct fire threat, indirect fire, 27:38.330 --> 27:40.200 VBIED, suicide, whatever the case might be, 27:40.200 --> 27:42.090 it is a threat of the environment, and as the commander 27:42.090 --> 27:44.300 of this organization, I take all threats seriously, 27:44.300 --> 27:46.126 and I assess all threats. 27:46.126 --> 27:49.870 And right now, yes, green-on-blue could be a threat, 27:49.870 --> 27:54.660 but we have not had, we have not had a single incident. 27:54.660 --> 27:55.990 And I will tell you honestly, we have had 27:55.990 --> 27:59.090 our Afghan partners come to us with intelligence 27:59.090 --> 28:01.470 that preempted potential attacks, 28:01.470 --> 28:03.840 and they have been proactively taking care 28:03.840 --> 28:05.340 of their own problems. 28:05.340 --> 28:07.730 - Great, thank you, and just to follow up on that, 28:07.730 --> 28:09.360 so I know you said you didn't wanna start 28:09.360 --> 28:11.180 at the kandak level right away. 28:11.180 --> 28:12.803 I guess, how many days, 28:13.860 --> 28:16.870 how long have you been advising at the kandak level? 28:16.870 --> 28:20.040 And roughly, if you could answer this, how many kandaks 28:20.040 --> 28:23.360 have received SFAB advisory support? 28:23.360 --> 28:25.110 And how do you determine locations? 28:25.110 --> 28:28.596 I mean, there was reports that Farah, after the Farah city 28:28.596 --> 28:32.030 was almost overrun, that SFAB was quickly deployed there 28:32.030 --> 28:35.480 in response, but there hadn't been none there before. 28:35.480 --> 28:38.370 We also were told recently that SFAB team was sent 28:38.370 --> 28:42.170 to the capital in Kabul because of all these VBIED attacks, 28:42.170 --> 28:44.600 suicide attacks, not necessarily something that was part 28:44.600 --> 28:45.870 of the original concept. 28:45.870 --> 28:48.760 So how is that determined, and I guess, how many, 28:48.760 --> 28:50.410 how long have you been advising at the kandak level, 28:50.410 --> 28:51.243 and how many kandaks? 28:51.243 --> 28:53.183 Sorry, I know that's a multi-parter. 28:53.183 --> 28:55.433 (laughing) 28:57.070 --> 28:58.880 - No worries, I got it. 28:58.880 --> 29:00.760 Another three-part question, I understand. 29:00.760 --> 29:03.070 So how long did it take us to get to kandak level. 29:03.070 --> 29:04.770 We were there within a matter of, you know, 29:04.770 --> 29:06.647 a small number of weeks. 29:06.647 --> 29:08.570 And to be honest with you, I had areas where I had 29:08.570 --> 29:11.250 kandak advisers working within the first two weeks 29:11.250 --> 29:12.780 upon their arrival. 29:12.780 --> 29:14.940 Again, I go back to my initial comment. 29:14.940 --> 29:16.040 This was not an obstacle. 29:16.040 --> 29:17.830 This was part of the deliberate plan 29:17.830 --> 29:20.920 to establish our adviser network. 29:20.920 --> 29:24.160 With respect to locations, so where do we put advisers? 29:24.160 --> 29:25.800 Well, the simple answer there is it's driven 29:25.800 --> 29:27.230 by military priorities. 29:27.230 --> 29:29.620 Military priorities are established by the commander 29:29.620 --> 29:32.100 of Resolute Support in conjunction with the DCOS Ops, 29:32.100 --> 29:33.340 Major General Poppas. 29:33.340 --> 29:37.300 And so they identify where the advisory efforts need to go 29:37.300 --> 29:40.080 to support Afghan operations, okay? 29:40.080 --> 29:42.430 So where the Afghans go, we go, and where their priority 29:42.430 --> 29:45.360 of effort is, is where our priority of effort is at. 29:45.360 --> 29:47.640 You referenced the relocation to Kabul. 29:47.640 --> 29:50.380 That was based upon a reassessment of priorities, 29:50.380 --> 29:51.220 based upon the environment. 29:51.220 --> 29:55.210 And I'm very proud of how our organization reacted. 29:55.210 --> 29:58.370 Within a matter of hours, we had things in motion 29:58.370 --> 30:01.810 to begin the planning process, to get forces up into Kabul, 30:01.810 --> 30:05.410 and within a matter of days we had forces in Kabul, 30:05.410 --> 30:07.520 and we were operating shortly thereafter. 30:07.520 --> 30:09.700 So again, very proud of what they did. 30:09.700 --> 30:12.440 I think it shows the testimony of the kind of people 30:12.440 --> 30:14.750 we pull into this organization, and the ability 30:14.750 --> 30:17.987 to support the commanders' priorities and objectives. 30:17.987 --> 30:20.180 - [Ryan] And just how many kandaks, roughly? 30:20.180 --> 30:21.013 Oh, sorry. 30:23.260 --> 30:24.850 - Yeah, so if you look on the fact sheet, 30:24.850 --> 30:26.380 it says right on the very top third. 30:26.380 --> 30:29.980 So right now we're at, I think the last count was 26 kandaks 30:31.690 --> 30:34.003 have crossed our SFAB formation. 30:35.474 --> 30:38.620 - And we're close to the end of the time. 30:38.620 --> 30:40.010 We've got time for one more. 30:40.010 --> 30:41.300 NBC, go ahead. 30:41.300 --> 30:42.913 - Hey, this is Courtney Kube from NBC. 30:42.913 --> 30:44.350 I have a nine-part question. 30:44.350 --> 30:45.329 I'm just kidding. 30:45.329 --> 30:46.162 (laughing) 30:46.162 --> 30:48.313 I have one quick follow-on for Ryan's. 30:50.330 --> 30:52.720 I'm just curious, you said that, when you were talking 30:52.720 --> 30:55.050 about green-on-blue, you mentioned that your Afghan partners 30:55.050 --> 30:56.920 had come to you with intelligence. 30:56.920 --> 30:59.350 Does that mean that people that you're training 30:59.350 --> 31:00.800 have come to you saying that they're concerned 31:00.800 --> 31:03.730 about some sort of infiltration or potential attack 31:03.730 --> 31:06.293 by Afghan military that you're training? 31:10.540 --> 31:13.803 - So, Courtney, I'll give you this as an answer. 31:14.790 --> 31:18.300 Every one of our commanders, the guy I work with, 31:18.300 --> 31:19.560 every one of the Afghan commanders 31:19.560 --> 31:21.960 that my battalion commanders work with, on day one, 31:21.960 --> 31:26.020 they as a, uniformly said the most important thing to them 31:26.020 --> 31:27.800 is the safety of their advisers. 31:27.800 --> 31:32.190 They understand, culturally and, honestly, militarily, 31:32.190 --> 31:33.420 the value of our safety. 31:33.420 --> 31:36.320 And as you know, I mean, a factor of Pashtunwali 31:36.320 --> 31:37.270 is hospitality, right? 31:37.270 --> 31:39.580 So it's ingrained in their hospitality, 31:39.580 --> 31:42.080 in their culture of protecting their guests. 31:42.080 --> 31:44.190 And we are viewed as guests in their organization. 31:44.190 --> 31:46.870 So I do feel very comfortable with that. 31:46.870 --> 31:50.250 So they have a vested interest in taking care of us, 31:50.250 --> 31:51.930 again, culturally and militarily. 31:51.930 --> 31:54.080 And so yes, the Afghans have come to us and said 31:54.080 --> 31:55.620 we have a concern about this guy. 31:55.620 --> 31:56.940 But at the same time they say they have a concern 31:56.940 --> 32:00.210 about the guy, they've already taken care of the problem. 32:00.210 --> 32:01.520 And so they have dealt with it. 32:01.520 --> 32:03.190 They have means to, you know, 32:03.190 --> 32:06.340 their own intelligence means to take care of these kinds 32:06.340 --> 32:07.913 of insurgent threats. 32:09.250 --> 32:11.593 They've been very good at it, very good. 32:14.260 --> 32:16.833 - I know that it's very early in the process 32:16.833 --> 32:19.780 of the ceasefire. 32:19.780 --> 32:22.410 But I just have to ask, in the 24 or 48 hours, however long, 32:22.410 --> 32:26.930 since it's been in effect, have you seen any changes at all 32:26.930 --> 32:28.980 that you can speak to in the area? 32:28.980 --> 32:33.980 Anything sort of tangible, security-wise, or anything? 32:34.930 --> 32:36.673 I know it just started, but. 32:40.750 --> 32:42.900 - Yeah, well, Courtney, I think it's important that I defer 32:42.900 --> 32:45.800 an overall assessment of the ceasefire to the commander 32:45.800 --> 32:49.290 of RS and more importantly, the government of Afghanistan. 32:49.290 --> 32:51.513 But what I can tell you is inside the SFAB, 32:52.552 --> 32:55.147 just as with the rest of us, we're fully behind 32:55.147 --> 32:59.470 the government of Afghanistan in executing this ceasefire. 32:59.470 --> 33:01.870 Our formations continue to do their primary mission, 33:01.870 --> 33:04.260 which is train, advise, assist. 33:04.260 --> 33:05.830 And that is exactly what we're doing. 33:05.830 --> 33:08.750 A ceasefire is a military operation, by definition. 33:08.750 --> 33:10.750 There are military aspects that have to be thought through 33:10.750 --> 33:12.130 and planned and then executed, 33:12.130 --> 33:13.150 and that's what we're doing now. 33:13.150 --> 33:15.990 So we're still joined at the hip, if you will, 33:15.990 --> 33:18.330 with our Afghan partners as they work through 33:18.330 --> 33:20.380 this complicated process of the ceasefire. 33:20.380 --> 33:22.550 But again, to answer your question directly, 33:22.550 --> 33:24.070 I'd have to defer an overall assessment 33:24.070 --> 33:25.543 back to commander of RS. 33:27.070 --> 33:28.530 - Okay. - Thank you. 33:28.530 --> 33:30.910 - All right, well sir, that wraps up the time. 33:30.910 --> 33:32.320 Do you have anything you wanna add 33:32.320 --> 33:33.620 for the group that's here? 33:37.890 --> 33:39.183 - Well, first of all, I want to say, again, thank you. 33:39.183 --> 33:40.590 It's a great opportunity. 33:40.590 --> 33:42.130 I mean, as a commander, anytime you get a chance 33:42.130 --> 33:44.252 to talk about your organization, it's a great day. 33:44.252 --> 33:46.220 And I appreciate it, 33:46.220 --> 33:48.300 despite the nine-part question from Courtney. 33:48.300 --> 33:50.760 But I would like to, I'll wrap up briefly and just say, 33:50.760 --> 33:53.790 hey, look, I'm really excited about this opportunity 33:53.790 --> 33:55.960 to be involved in what's going on over here in Afghanistan, 33:55.960 --> 33:58.340 and I say I as part of the 1st SFAB. 33:58.340 --> 34:00.890 All of us are volunteers in this organization. 34:00.890 --> 34:01.780 We wanted to do this. 34:01.780 --> 34:03.130 We believe in this mission. 34:04.070 --> 34:06.310 And we, as a collective organization, are very proud 34:06.310 --> 34:08.310 of what we're doing, and I, as an individual, 34:08.310 --> 34:09.210 are very proud of them. 34:09.210 --> 34:11.980 So thank you again for your time today. 34:11.980 --> 34:13.380 - Colonel Jackson, thank you very much, 34:13.380 --> 34:15.280 and that concludes today's press briefing. 34:15.280 --> 34:16.113 Thank you.