WEBVTT

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Good afternoon and thank you for

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appearing today . The subcommittee

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welcomes today Under Secretary of

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Defense for Research and Engineering

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and Chief Technology Officer of the DOD

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Emil Michael , Deputy Assistant

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Secretary of the Army for Research and

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Technology , Mr . Chris Manning .

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Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy

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for Research Development Test and

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evaluation , Mr . Dave Tremper and

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Associate Deputy Assistant Secretary of

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the Air Force for Technology ,

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Engineering , and Product Support ,

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Doctor Janet C . Wolfson , thank you

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all very much . Our witnesses appear

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before us at a critical moment . China ,

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Russia , North Korea , and the weakened

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Iranian regime continued to threaten US

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interests , our forward forces , and

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the homeland . This subcommittee has

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heard extensive testimony on the

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challenges we face from China rapidly

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closing the gap in artificial

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intelligence to the risks posed by

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adversarial biotechnology . Today we

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are here to examine how the Department

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of the Services and the services are

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working together to research , develop ,

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and field the capabilities our

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warfighters need faster than our

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adversaries . In Ukraine . We have seen

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the timeline from innovation to

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battlefield use shrink from months to

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minutes . US small businesses can play

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the same role for our military , and I

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look forward to hearing how the

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department is leveraging their

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innovation and accelerating the

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transition of new technologies to the

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force . I also want to understand how

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lessons from recent conflicts are

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helping reduce the time it takes to

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deliver capability to the warfighter

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and how we can help move even faster .

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Our service members performed

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heroically during operations against

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the Iranian regime , and I would like

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to hear how the department's Science

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and Technology Enterprise contributed

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to that success . From the first combat

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use of the Lucas drone to advances in

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AI enabled systems , the United States

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cannot afford to fall behind in

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harnessing the innovation and

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entrepreneur . Etrepreneurial strength

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we have here at home on the topic of AI ,

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there are two areas I would like to

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understand . First , I want to know

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where we stand when it comes to

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harnessing the best of what America's

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frontier labs have to offer for our

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national defense . These labs offer our

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warfighters a key advantage on the

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battle space , and I want to understand .

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And how we are engaging with them to

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make sure we are integrating them to

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the greatest extent possible . Then ,

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second , I want to discuss leveraging

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autonomous systems . Thank you . And I

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will now turn to the ranking member ,

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Senator Slotkin . Thank you , Senator

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Ernst . Um , and sorry to make you wait

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there at the beginning . We were both

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voting so that we didn't have to

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interrupt you all again . Um , I'm , um ,

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super interested in this hearing and

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really appreciate everyone being

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willing to come and talk about this . I

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know that it's , um , often complicated

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to do that in an unclassified setting .

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Um , we had a classified briefing on .

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The classified AI race , particularly

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vis a vis China , uh , not so long ago ,

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but I think it's important that we

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start to have this conversation out in

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public , um , as much as we can because

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the public should be invested and

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understand that this is actually a race ,

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um , that , um , uh , uh , similar to

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races we've had in the past , such as

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the , the nuclear race , um , who gets

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to the most capable AI first does

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really matter , and I think people need

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to understand that , um , as they

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struggle to . Understand what AI is

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going to mean just back here at home .

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Um , as I understand it , the Chinese

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are about 6 to 12 months behind us , um ,

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which , um , sounds like both a little

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and a lot depending on how well you

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know this topic . Um , and I just , I

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think it's hard to overstate how AI is

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going to change how we fight wars , how

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we think and engage in conflict , who

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wins and what the definition of winning

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is , um , and unlike , um , warfare of

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the past . Um , this , um ,

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new kind of wave is being led by

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private sector companies . It's not ,

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um , government funded labs or research

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institutions that are coming up with

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all of this stuff . It's the private

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sector , um , a number of companies who

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are cutting edge , and you all in your

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various departments , um , have to

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manage those relationships and make

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sure we win , even though you don't

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control the things that go on at this

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private sector company . I really

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believe in our potential to win the

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fight , um , and I , I just will not

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give in to people who have , uh , like

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a dark cloud over , um , this race ,

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but I do think it's gonna come down to

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people , chips , and power , and , um ,

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making sure we have those key

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ingredients that we have the best

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people and ideas , the most capable

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chips , and we have power , meaning

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energy , in order to , um , support

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that future . Um , I , I will , um ,

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save my questions , uh , till our

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multiple rounds here , but I appreciate

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everyone and what you do . Um , we are

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all invested in a bipartisan way in

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being successful , so thanks for being

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here . Yes , thank you , ranking member ,

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and we will start now with the opening

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statements from our witnesses . We'll

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start with , uh , Secretary Michael ,

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and we'll just proceed across the , the

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dais here . So if you would , you're

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recognized for 5 minutes , Secretary .

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Thank you , Chair Ernst and Ranking

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Member Slackin and uh distinguished

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members of the committee when they get

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here . Um , I'm honored to appear along

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uh my esteemed colleagues , Doctor

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Janet Wolfson , uh , uh , Mr . David

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Tremper , and Mr . Chris Manning . Uh ,

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my mandate , mandate as the

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department's Chief Technology Officer

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is to ensure delivery of tangible ,

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decisive , and battlefield-ready

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technology to our military and to do it

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at velocity and scale . The urgency

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stems from the hard truth that if we do

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not maintain a dominant technological

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advantage , American service members

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will pay the price in combat . The

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reality is hardened , is heightened by

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the strategic environment we face . Uh ,

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our adversaries are investing heavily

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and moving with the purpose to surpass

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us in key technology areas that will

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define the , uh , the course of future

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conflicts , including AI , quantum ,

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munitions productions . Um , however ,

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we have , uh , uh , strategic national

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asset that our adversaries don't . We

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have a dynamic innovation ecosystem ,

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uh , comprised of unmatched talent and

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unlimited creativity and lots of

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capital markets to support those

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industries . My office remains focused

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on harnessing the full potential of our

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innovation ecosystem to serve the

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American warfighter . If you remember ,

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after I was confirmed last May , my

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first order of business was to restore

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focus on technologies that we need to

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maintain dominance on the battlefield .

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I inherited a list of 14 critical

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technology areas . Which really didn't

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prioritize anything . There were a

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laundry list that diluted our resources

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and inevitably slowed progress .

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Through rigorous data-driven analysis

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and in consultation with the military

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services and experts in the IC , I made

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the decision to pair that that list

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down to 6 key areas . Those include

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applied artificial intelligence , bio

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biomanufacturing , contested logistics

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technologies . Quantum and battlefield

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information dominance , scaled directed

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energy , which means cheap and

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proliferated uh proliferated and scaled

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hypersonics , which also means cheap

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and proliferate proliferated . The

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department is focusing its investments ,

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its talent , its leadership around

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these areas while the private sector

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crowds in capital to supercharge the

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process . I want to be clear that the

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other technologies such as space and

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microelectronics remain important . R&E

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will continue to carry out our

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statutory mandate to provide rigorous

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oversight across the department's R&D

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portfolios and ensure attention ,

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advocacy , and resources continue to be

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devoted to those areas . Um , as an

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example of this quick progress , we

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rolled out Gen AI.mil , which was the

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department's first , uh ,

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department-wide AI platform , which

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didn't exist before . And , uh , in

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just a few months , we've got 1.4

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million of our 3 million members use ,

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have used , uh , our Gen AI tools ,

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which is an incredible increase from

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the 80,000 before that . But we're not

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limiting that deployment on class

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networks alone , which is what Genia

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Mill , uh , Mill started on . We signed

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agreements with virtually all leading

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AI frontier models and infrastructure

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companies in the last few months to

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deploy their capabilities directly onto

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the department's classified networks .

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Um , We are also bringing innovation to

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production and acquisition of

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conventional weapons , enabling the

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return of mass effects through the

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employment of large numbers of less

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exquisite weapons systems from the

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deployment of Lucas drones , which

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we're able to try in theater and speed

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up the R&D process to make them a

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program of record . We've also signed

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deals with new entrants in the last

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week with 5 new companies to develop

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low-cost containerized cruise missiles

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and low-cost hypersonic missiles . Uh ,

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these are an evidence of our openness

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to new industry that will do fixed

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price , fixed cost , and fast delivery .

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So , as I noted earlier in our , in my

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remarks , uh , the innovation ecosystem

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now has a unity of effort in the , uh ,

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Department of War . We've consolidated

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the Chief Digital and AI Office , DIU ,

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DARPA , the Office of Strategic Capital ,

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SCO , and TRMC under my leadership .

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And that gives us the ability to reduce

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duplication and increase effort on the

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things we need to at the department .

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With that , I'll leave it to my

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colleagues . Thank you very much and Mr .

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Manning , you're recognized for 5

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minutes . Thank you , Chairman Ernst ,

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Ranking Member Slotkin , and

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distinguished members of the

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subcommittee . Thank you for the

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opportunity to testify today on the

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Army's Innovation Enterprise . It is an

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honor to represent the dedicated

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scientists , engineers , and

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acquisition professionals who work

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tirelessly to ensure that our soldiers

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remain the most lethal , protected ,

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and technologically advanced land force

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in the world . This is an exciting time

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for the army as we embark on a

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generational transformation of how we

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do business . The battlefield of today

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is hyper connected , highly contested ,

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and characterized by extremely rapid

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technology cycles . To dominate in this

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environment , the army cannot rely

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solely on acquisition methods of the

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past . We must fundamentally transform

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how we discover , develop , and deliver

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capabilities to the tactical edge . In

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coordination with the Department of War

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and our partners in Congress , the Army

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has undertaken a bold acquisition

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reform effort , aligning the systems of

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how we innovate , develop , and buy

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under portfolio acquisition executives .

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This reform ensures that every dollar

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spent on our applied science and

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technology enterprise is deliberately

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synchronized with requirements

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generation , development , and fielding .

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It allows us to get new overmatching

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capabilities out of research and into

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the hands of our soldiers more

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efficiently and effectively than ever

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before . Last year in coordination with

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Army leaders , we conducted a

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comprehensive review of the Army

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Science and Technology program

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identifying areas where the Army must

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keep or increase investments and areas

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where we should rely more on commercial

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sector innovation . As a result of this

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analysis , we began to realign funding

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through reprogramming , and you can see

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the full effect of this rebalancing in

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our FY 27 budget request . We increased

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S&T investments in areas such as long

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range fires , counter C5 ISRT , and

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counter UAS . We plan to capitalize on

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heavy commercial industry investment in

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areas such as C3 and autonomy . Overall ,

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the Army's S&T budget request for FY 27

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is 2.773 billion , uh , about 11%

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above our FY 26 request . The army

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faces competing needs which we work

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thoughtfully to balance . We must

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provide our soldiers today with

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advanced capabilities to meet the

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current threats without abandoning the

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long term fundamental research

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necessary to maintain our advantage for

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the next century . Our FY 27 budget

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requests acknowledges this reality .

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You will see we made reductions to our

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basic research program . We increased

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our funding requests for applied

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research S&T . We remain committed to a

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robust level of fundamental science .

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We've also continued to improve and

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expand the Army Research Risk

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assessment Program . This effort

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safeguards taxpayer funded research by

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ensuring Army investments flow to

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academic partners who are both

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scientifically credible and capable of

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maintaining secure research

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environments . As we've seen over the

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course of multiple conflicts across the

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world , product development cycles can

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be measured in weeks and days , not

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years . To address the need for extreme

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agility , the army shifted how we

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engage non-traditional defense

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contractors , startups , and commercial

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tech sector . We are taking the best

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practices on technology maturation in

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commercial industry and applying them

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to how we do business in the army . The

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newly launched Pathway for innovation

13:33.006 --> 13:34.950
and Technology , or PIT represents

13:34.950 --> 13:36.950
innovation in the dirt and operates

13:36.950 --> 13:39.117
under three guiding principles . Speed

13:39.117 --> 13:41.117
is more important than perfection .

13:41.117 --> 13:43.228
Early soldier iteration is critical ,

13:43.228 --> 13:45.394
and we must validate the demand signal

13:45.394 --> 13:47.672
before we make large scale investments .

13:47.672 --> 13:49.617
The pit ties together Army service

13:49.617 --> 13:51.728
component commands , Army corps , and

13:51.728 --> 13:53.739
Army divisions with the industry

13:53.739 --> 13:56.340
engagement efforts of Army Fuse . With

13:56.340 --> 13:58.118
this construct , the pit allows

13:58.118 --> 14:00.173
acquisition professionals to iterate

14:00.173 --> 14:02.284
directly with soldiers in the field ,

14:02.284 --> 14:04.619
turning tactical demand signals . Into

14:04.619 --> 14:06.640
fielded prototypes in months rather

14:07.039 --> 14:09.460
than years or decades while this new

14:09.460 --> 14:11.571
program is still working towards full

14:11.571 --> 14:13.738
operational capability , it is already

14:13.738 --> 14:15.849
starting to bear fruit . Finally , on

14:15.849 --> 14:18.182
behalf of the entire Army S&T community ,

14:18.182 --> 14:20.404
I would like to express my appreciation

14:20.404 --> 14:22.627
for the critical support this committee

14:22.627 --> 14:24.682
provides . We cannot succeed without

14:24.682 --> 14:26.349
you . Thank you again for the

14:26.349 --> 14:28.460
opportunity to testify today . I look

14:28.460 --> 14:27.859
forward to your questions . Thank you ,

14:27.909 --> 14:29.965
Mr . Manning . Mr . Trumper , you're

14:29.965 --> 14:32.590
recognized for 5 minutes . Chairwoman

14:32.590 --> 14:34.701
Ernst , Ranking Member Slotkin , uh ,

14:34.750 --> 14:36.972
thank you for the opportunity to appear

14:36.972 --> 14:39.083
before you today to address the state

14:39.083 --> 14:38.989
of the Department of the Navy's Science

14:38.989 --> 14:41.260
and Technology budget portfolio . The

14:41.270 --> 14:43.326
Department of the Navy S&T budget is

14:43.326 --> 14:45.492
essential for maintaining future naval

14:45.492 --> 14:47.437
power and national security amidst

14:47.437 --> 14:49.548
rapidly evolving global threats . The

14:49.548 --> 14:51.437
budget is aggressively focused on

14:51.437 --> 14:53.548
transitioning critical basic research

14:53.548 --> 14:55.492
to deliverable combat capabilities

14:55.492 --> 14:57.270
while ensuring a high return on

14:57.270 --> 14:59.103
investment through disciplined ,

14:59.103 --> 15:00.881
relevant , and rapid technology

15:00.881 --> 15:02.770
development and integration . The

15:02.770 --> 15:04.770
strategic landscape is transforming

15:04.770 --> 15:06.826
with relentless technological change

15:06.826 --> 15:08.437
and a new era of great power

15:08.437 --> 15:10.214
competition . Basic and applied

15:10.214 --> 15:12.326
research are instrumental in creating

15:12.326 --> 15:14.492
the scientific foundation for emerging

15:14.492 --> 15:16.492
naval concepts , technologies , and

15:16.492 --> 15:18.437
capabilities . Advanced technology

15:18.437 --> 15:20.659
development investments in future naval

15:20.659 --> 15:22.659
capabilities evolve that scientific

15:22.659 --> 15:24.603
research into new transition ready

15:24.603 --> 15:26.770
combat capabilities aligned with naval

15:26.770 --> 15:28.492
operational priorities , while

15:28.492 --> 15:30.270
investments in innovative naval

15:30.270 --> 15:32.492
prototypes translate that research into

15:32.492 --> 15:34.826
revolutionary naval combat capabilities .

15:34.826 --> 15:36.881
The DAN has recently established the

15:36.881 --> 15:38.992
Department of Navy Rapid Capabilities

15:38.992 --> 15:40.826
Office as our single accountable

15:40.826 --> 15:40.260
organization for accelerating the

15:40.260 --> 15:42.371
fielding of critical solutions to the

15:42.371 --> 15:44.538
fleet within a 3-year time frame . The

15:44.538 --> 15:46.940
RCO is intended to fail fast and

15:46.940 --> 15:49.162
iterate quickly with industry to ensure

15:49.162 --> 15:51.329
capabilities are tested and refined in

15:51.329 --> 15:53.662
operationally and relevant environments .

15:53.662 --> 15:55.384
The DAN RCO brings operational

15:55.384 --> 15:57.551
challenges directly to industry . This

15:57.551 --> 15:59.329
enables a parallel focus on new

15:59.329 --> 16:01.496
entrants and traditional primes to the

16:01.496 --> 16:03.440
defense industrial base , but also

16:03.440 --> 16:05.384
harnesses American innovation more

16:05.384 --> 16:07.162
effectively to deliver the best

16:07.162 --> 16:09.384
possible solutions to our warfighters .

16:09.384 --> 16:11.273
The D is also actively supporting

16:11.273 --> 16:12.884
defense innovation ecosystem

16:12.884 --> 16:14.996
transformation efforts spearheaded by

16:14.996 --> 16:16.773
Honorable Michael . In order to

16:16.773 --> 16:18.996
strengthen alignment across science and

16:18.996 --> 16:20.996
technology research and development

16:20.996 --> 16:22.773
organizations . Relatedly , the

16:22.773 --> 16:24.829
Department of the Navy is working to

16:24.829 --> 16:24.659
improve internal alignment of naval

16:24.659 --> 16:26.826
research and development establishment

16:26.826 --> 16:28.548
to best enable the new program

16:28.548 --> 16:30.381
acquisition executives , centric

16:30.381 --> 16:33.280
acquisition and uh enterprise strategy .

16:34.059 --> 16:36.115
Optimal alignment will ensure timely

16:36.115 --> 16:38.281
delivery of capability and operational

16:38.281 --> 16:40.170
support to the , to the fleet and

16:40.170 --> 16:42.281
Marine Corps while ensuring long-term

16:42.281 --> 16:44.337
health and stewardship of the NRDE .

16:44.549 --> 16:46.327
The NRDE depends on world-class

16:46.327 --> 16:48.216
facilities to develop and deliver

16:48.216 --> 16:50.382
capabilities . This infrastructure has

16:50.382 --> 16:52.549
been challenged by facilities that are

16:52.549 --> 16:52.469
exceedingly surpassing their

16:52.469 --> 16:54.413
traditional life expectancies with

16:54.413 --> 16:56.413
limited new investment due to other

16:56.413 --> 16:58.247
higher priority needs across the

16:58.247 --> 17:00.358
department . I'm thankful to Congress

17:00.358 --> 17:02.302
for recognizing this challenge and

17:02.302 --> 17:04.358
providing authorities that bring new

17:04.358 --> 17:06.525
and enhanced tools we can leverage . I

17:06.525 --> 17:08.691
am furthermore supportive of the lines

17:08.691 --> 17:10.636
of effort established in the FY 27

17:10.636 --> 17:12.858
annual five-year plan on improvement of

17:12.858 --> 17:14.691
Department of Defense innovative

17:14.691 --> 17:16.358
infrastructure that highlight

17:16.358 --> 17:18.525
additional opportunities to strengthen

17:18.525 --> 17:20.247
RDTNE labs and facilities . An

17:20.247 --> 17:22.136
effective NRDE enables successful

17:22.136 --> 17:24.080
transition of emerging science and

17:24.080 --> 17:26.302
technology from the laboratory into the

17:26.302 --> 17:28.469
hands of our sailors and marines . Key

17:28.469 --> 17:30.358
to that success is our ability to

17:30.358 --> 17:31.969
quickly translate scientific

17:31.969 --> 17:33.858
discoveries into and across naval

17:33.858 --> 17:36.025
operations systems and platforms . The

17:36.025 --> 17:35.909
Department of Navy is proactively

17:35.909 --> 17:37.631
aligning our activities across

17:37.631 --> 17:39.520
acquisition reform , requirements

17:39.520 --> 17:41.409
reform , and innovation ecosystem

17:41.409 --> 17:43.187
reform to streamline capability

17:43.187 --> 17:44.909
delivery and empower PAEs with

17:44.909 --> 17:47.076
flexibility to integrate new technical

17:47.076 --> 17:49.187
solutions as those solutions emerge .

17:49.540 --> 17:51.829
Critical to this accelerated capability

17:51.829 --> 17:53.551
delivery is seasoned technical

17:53.551 --> 17:55.619
workforce within our warfare centers

17:55.619 --> 17:57.563
which can shepherd S&T development

17:57.563 --> 18:00.189
within or outside the , the Department

18:00.189 --> 18:03.589
of War . To deliver

18:03.589 --> 18:05.811
survivable and sustainable capabilities

18:05.811 --> 18:08.033
within naval operational environments .

18:08.459 --> 18:10.570
The DAN is working to optimize access

18:10.570 --> 18:12.792
to an operation of our warfare center's

18:12.792 --> 18:14.848
engineering activities as a critical

18:14.848 --> 18:16.903
enabler for transition of innovative

18:16.903 --> 18:18.903
S&T and industry solutions into the

18:18.903 --> 18:20.737
hands of our warfighters . These

18:20.737 --> 18:22.515
efforts reflect the acquisition

18:22.515 --> 18:24.681
transformation strategy rebuilding the

18:24.681 --> 18:24.540
arsenal of freedom as directed by

18:24.540 --> 18:26.373
executive orders and authorities

18:26.373 --> 18:28.151
granted in the fiscal year 2026

18:28.180 --> 18:30.236
National Defense Authorization Act .

18:30.619 --> 18:32.508
The D is proactively aligning our

18:32.508 --> 18:34.675
activities to realize this acquisition

18:34.675 --> 18:36.786
requirements and innovation ecosystem

18:36.786 --> 18:38.841
reform while promoting competition ,

18:38.841 --> 18:41.063
incentivizing faster execution , taking

18:41.063 --> 18:42.952
calculated and shared risks , and

18:42.952 --> 18:45.008
leveraging new authorities to create

18:45.008 --> 18:47.175
acquisition flexibility to deliver the

18:47.175 --> 18:49.286
decisive capabilities our sailors and

18:49.286 --> 18:51.286
marines need to both win and ensure

18:51.286 --> 18:53.397
that we never fall behind . Thank you

18:53.397 --> 18:52.969
for your time and I look forward to

18:52.969 --> 18:55.160
your questions . Thank you very much .

18:55.260 --> 18:57.430
And now , uh , Doctor Wolfson , you're

18:57.430 --> 18:59.597
recognized for 5 minutes . Thank you ,

18:59.597 --> 19:01.763
Chair Ernst , Ranking Member Slotkin ,

19:01.763 --> 19:03.597
and Distinguished members of the

19:03.597 --> 19:05.819
subcommittee , and thank you , uh , for

19:05.819 --> 19:08.041
the opportunity to testify today on the

19:08.041 --> 19:10.097
Air Force's fiscal year 2027 science

19:10.097 --> 19:12.263
and technology budget request . We are

19:12.263 --> 19:14.208
proud to represent the Air Force's

19:14.208 --> 19:16.486
science and technology enterprise , uh ,

19:16.486 --> 19:18.208
working in full alignment with

19:18.208 --> 19:20.374
Honorable Michael , uh , to ensure the

19:20.374 --> 19:22.486
United States military and especially

19:22.486 --> 19:24.652
the United States Air Force maintain a

19:24.652 --> 19:26.819
decisive and overwhelming advantage in

19:26.819 --> 19:28.930
any and every domain of warfare . The

19:28.930 --> 19:31.097
Air Force Research Laboratory's mantra

19:31.097 --> 19:33.263
of one lab , two services captures the

19:33.263 --> 19:35.208
integrated nature of our mission ,

19:35.339 --> 19:37.450
supporting the critical air , space ,

19:37.450 --> 19:39.450
and cyberspace domains . Our fiscal

19:39.450 --> 19:42.140
year 2027 budget request is directly

19:42.140 --> 19:43.862
responsive to the department's

19:43.862 --> 19:45.540
priorities , making increased

19:45.540 --> 19:47.762
investment in critical technology areas

19:47.829 --> 19:49.885
and deconflicting our efforts across

19:49.885 --> 19:51.829
the services to focus on Air Force

19:51.829 --> 19:54.040
unique technology gaps . We are

19:54.040 --> 19:56.060
committed to delivering tangible

19:56.239 --> 19:58.017
battlefield-ready results for a

19:58.017 --> 20:00.880
warfighter at velocity and scale . To

20:00.880 --> 20:02.824
achieve this goal , we continue to

20:02.824 --> 20:04.936
invest and prioritize in investing in

20:04.936 --> 20:07.040
decisive military capabilities . Our

20:07.040 --> 20:09.760
fiscal year 2027 budget is focused on

20:09.760 --> 20:11.871
delivering the capabilities needed to

20:11.871 --> 20:14.160
deter conflict and decisively prevail

20:14.160 --> 20:16.479
in any battlefield scenario . The

20:16.479 --> 20:18.701
following investments represent some of

20:18.701 --> 20:20.535
our commitment to fielding those

20:20.535 --> 20:22.701
technologies that provide an advantage

20:22.701 --> 20:24.923
to the American warfighter . First , as

20:24.923 --> 20:26.979
a top modernization priority for the

20:26.979 --> 20:29.090
department , the Air Force is rapidly

20:29.090 --> 20:31.201
advancing offensive hypersonic strike

20:31.201 --> 20:33.312
capabilities and the layered defenses

20:33.312 --> 20:35.535
required to counter adversary systems .

20:35.535 --> 20:37.590
We are also focused on the materials

20:37.590 --> 20:39.646
and manufacturing advances needed to

20:39.646 --> 20:41.868
field those systems at scale , ensuring

20:41.868 --> 20:43.757
our warfighters have the tools to

20:43.757 --> 20:45.812
project power and hold any target at

20:45.812 --> 20:48.170
risk . Another area is ensuring

20:48.170 --> 20:50.226
dominance in the air domain and it's

20:50.226 --> 20:52.392
increasingly , increasingly reliant on

20:52.392 --> 20:54.503
resilient and high performance energy

20:54.503 --> 20:56.670
solutions such as advanced battery and

20:56.670 --> 20:58.781
energy storage . While the commercial

20:58.781 --> 21:00.726
sector continues to drive standard

21:00.726 --> 21:02.837
battery innovation , the Air Force is

21:02.837 --> 21:04.948
deliberately investing where industry

21:04.948 --> 21:07.003
will not , targeting the hard United

21:07.003 --> 21:09.003
States Air Force battery challenges

21:09.003 --> 21:11.337
inherent to extreme combat environments .

21:11.359 --> 21:13.150
We are prioritizing advanced

21:13.150 --> 21:15.150
specialized battery technologies to

21:15.150 --> 21:17.261
enhance the performance , endurance ,

21:17.261 --> 21:19.483
and reliability of critical operational

21:19.483 --> 21:21.829
systems from high altitude unmanned

21:21.829 --> 21:23.959
systems and platforms to forward

21:23.959 --> 21:26.140
deployed expeditionary equipment .

21:27.219 --> 21:29.330
Investing in nuclear delivery science

21:29.330 --> 21:31.579
and technology is also paramount , as

21:31.579 --> 21:33.801
all Department of War operational plans

21:33.801 --> 21:35.939
depend on a credible and reliable and

21:35.939 --> 21:38.119
effective nuclear deterrent . The

21:38.119 --> 21:40.008
United States Air Force's nuclear

21:40.008 --> 21:41.786
delivery science and technology

21:41.786 --> 21:43.619
programs focus on developing and

21:43.619 --> 21:45.560
reestablishing the specialized

21:45.560 --> 21:48.000
expertise , infrastructure , and

21:48.000 --> 21:50.500
nuclear delivery system capabilities

21:50.719 --> 21:52.663
needed to modernize and mature the

21:52.663 --> 21:54.608
science and technologies that will

21:54.608 --> 21:56.663
enable the Air Force to operate in a

21:56.663 --> 21:58.719
peer contested nuclear environment .

21:59.729 --> 22:02.170
Finally , the ability to fly , fix ,

22:02.410 --> 22:04.849
fight , our most advanced platforms is

22:04.849 --> 22:06.460
paramount to maintaining air

22:06.460 --> 22:08.410
superiority . The Air Force is

22:08.410 --> 22:10.521
addressing the sustainment challenges

22:10.521 --> 22:12.577
for our 5th generation fighter fleet

22:12.577 --> 22:14.466
across the entire platform , from

22:14.466 --> 22:16.410
canopies and airframes to advanced

22:16.410 --> 22:18.577
engine components . Crucially , we are

22:18.577 --> 22:20.799
optimizing fleet readiness by advancing

22:20.799 --> 22:22.489
non-destructive investigation

22:22.489 --> 22:24.689
capabilities . By investing in these

22:24.689 --> 22:26.949
technologies that improve reliability

22:27.130 --> 22:29.209
and reduce maintenance burdens , we

22:29.209 --> 22:31.209
ensure our most critical assets are

22:31.209 --> 22:33.320
ready to project power and defend our

22:33.320 --> 22:35.489
national interests . We are also

22:35.489 --> 22:37.910
revitalizing the innovation ecosystem ,

22:38.130 --> 22:40.074
accelerating the links between our

22:40.074 --> 22:41.797
organic science and technology

22:41.797 --> 22:43.963
enterprise , the commercial industrial

22:43.963 --> 22:46.074
base , and our acquisition programs .

22:46.074 --> 22:48.130
These enhancements to our technology

22:48.130 --> 22:50.186
transition and innovation ecosystems

22:50.186 --> 22:52.352
are essential to our efforts to evolve

22:52.352 --> 22:54.352
our acquisition engine , which will

22:54.352 --> 22:56.241
enhance our ability to identify ,

22:56.241 --> 22:58.186
evaluate , and recommend promising

22:58.186 --> 23:00.479
technologies for early adoption . Every

23:00.479 --> 23:02.939
investment we make and every technology

23:02.939 --> 23:05.020
we accelerate is done with a single

23:05.020 --> 23:07.099
purpose to serve the American

23:07.099 --> 23:09.619
warfighter . We are building a modern

23:09.619 --> 23:11.699
arsenal of freedom , and our men and

23:11.699 --> 23:13.810
women in uniform deserve nothing less

23:13.810 --> 23:15.699
than the very best technology our

23:15.699 --> 23:17.643
nation can produce . Distinguished

23:17.643 --> 23:19.866
members of the subcommittee , thank you

23:19.866 --> 23:21.810
again for your engagement on these

23:21.810 --> 23:23.977
critical issues and for your steadfast

23:23.977 --> 23:26.143
support of our service members and our

23:26.143 --> 23:27.866
technology . I look forward to

23:27.866 --> 23:30.088
answering any of your questions . Thank

23:30.088 --> 23:32.319
you again to our witnesses , and we

23:32.319 --> 23:35.199
will start now with uh the rounds of

23:35.199 --> 23:37.680
questions and answers and I'll

23:37.680 --> 23:40.410
recognize myself for five minutes and

23:40.410 --> 23:42.521
uh Secretary Michael we'll start with

23:42.521 --> 23:46.479
you . Uh you had stated that uh biomanu .

23:46.650 --> 23:48.719
Manufacturing is one of the six

23:48.719 --> 23:51.170
critical technology areas that you had

23:51.170 --> 23:54.979
personally selected in last year's NDAA ,

23:55.449 --> 23:58.050
Congress mandated the creation of the

23:58.050 --> 24:00.489
Biotechnology Management Office to

24:00.489 --> 24:02.790
ensure that the department can catch up

24:02.790 --> 24:05.540
to China . And that was an important

24:05.540 --> 24:08.339
step , but , um , a mandate if we don't

24:08.339 --> 24:10.450
have that leadership prioritization ,

24:10.939 --> 24:13.060
it really is just an organizational

24:13.060 --> 24:15.739
chart entry so we really need to see

24:15.739 --> 24:18.589
this move forward , um , Iowa State

24:18.589 --> 24:20.700
University , of course , um , my alma

24:20.700 --> 24:22.700
mater . Water is home to one of the

24:22.700 --> 24:25.319
department's Biomade pilot facilities ,

24:25.540 --> 24:29.420
and it's scheduled to open in 2027

24:29.609 --> 24:31.776
aligning with the department's broader

24:31.776 --> 24:35.380
sprint timeline and we really feel this

24:35.380 --> 24:38.920
is progress worth protecting . Uh , but

24:38.920 --> 24:41.400
GAO has found that the department plans

24:41.400 --> 24:44.040
to wind down two of its three major

24:44.040 --> 24:46.719
biomanufacturing initiatives by fiscal

24:46.719 --> 24:50.560
year 27 and fiscal year 28 , and

24:50.560 --> 24:52.171
the congressionally mandated

24:52.171 --> 24:55.119
biotechnology roadmap isn't expected

24:55.119 --> 24:57.734
until late . Later this year , so

24:57.734 --> 24:59.854
Undersecretary , how will you ensure

24:59.854 --> 25:02.354
the biotechnology management office

25:02.354 --> 25:05.234
becomes a genuine priority and how does

25:05.234 --> 25:08.484
the department plan to sustain momentum

25:08.724 --> 25:11.734
in bio manufacturing beyond uh those

25:11.734 --> 25:15.150
program end dates ? Uh , thank you ,

25:15.239 --> 25:17.560
Senator . Um , we have recently

25:17.560 --> 25:19.060
announced a leader for the

25:19.060 --> 25:21.282
Biotechnology Office reporting directly

25:21.282 --> 25:23.504
to the Deputy secretary . We've drafted

25:23.504 --> 25:25.838
the charter . We've shared it with , uh ,

25:25.838 --> 25:28.004
I believe your staff , uh , so that we

25:28.004 --> 25:30.116
can get comments from Congress and do

25:30.116 --> 25:31.893
we think that we have the right

25:31.893 --> 25:33.949
legislative intent embedded into the

25:33.949 --> 25:35.869
charter . Um , we also have the

25:35.869 --> 25:37.925
critical technology area in my group

25:37.925 --> 25:39.989
that will support that biotechnology

25:39.989 --> 25:42.211
office , so we think we're putting more

25:42.211 --> 25:44.433
resources into , to this and not making

25:44.433 --> 25:47.550
it just an organizational checkbox , um ,

25:47.670 --> 25:50.390
in terms of checking on the bio , uh ,

25:50.510 --> 25:52.621
the two facilities , I'll have to get

25:52.621 --> 25:54.788
back to you on that . I don't have the

25:54.788 --> 25:54.640
answer off the top of my head why those

25:54.640 --> 25:56.807
decisions were made , um , but we take

25:56.807 --> 25:58.973
this very seriously . I believe it's a

25:58.973 --> 26:01.029
threat vis a vis , uh , the progress

26:01.029 --> 26:03.084
that China's making on some of these

26:03.084 --> 26:05.307
technologies . Uh , and that's why it's

26:05.307 --> 26:07.418
one of my critical technology areas .

26:07.418 --> 26:07.390
No , and I thank you for that because

26:07.390 --> 26:10.619
when we talk about , um , emerging

26:10.630 --> 26:12.750
threats and capabilities , uh , we

26:12.750 --> 26:15.510
don't often talk in the biospace . It

26:15.510 --> 26:17.819
is really important that we do so , uh ,

26:18.189 --> 26:20.750
because if we're not engaging , you

26:20.750 --> 26:22.917
know , China is just going to get that

26:22.917 --> 26:24.972
much further ahead . So I appreciate

26:24.972 --> 26:27.139
that and look forward to continuing to

26:27.139 --> 26:29.306
working with you , uh , on that area .

26:29.306 --> 26:31.479
Um , we've also seen for more than a

26:31.479 --> 26:33.729
decade with , uh , the department of

26:33.729 --> 26:35.951
war that there seems to be an incessant

26:35.951 --> 26:38.250
ability of senior leaders to really

26:38.250 --> 26:41.069
ignore the importance of infrastructure ,

26:41.530 --> 26:44.510
and it's especially true when it comes

26:44.510 --> 26:47.689
to our labs . Uh , yet the department's

26:47.689 --> 26:50.250
only idea for , for fixing this is to

26:50.250 --> 26:53.189
raise the unspecified minor military

26:53.189 --> 26:56.189
construction threshold , and this is

26:56.189 --> 26:58.689
troubling considering the needs within

26:58.689 --> 27:01.250
the department are hundreds of millions

27:01.250 --> 27:04.449
of dollars to , uh , modernize that

27:04.449 --> 27:06.810
infrastructure , so . For all of our

27:06.810 --> 27:09.329
witnesses , uh , why do you think the

27:09.329 --> 27:11.385
department is failing to program for

27:11.385 --> 27:14.209
lab infrastructure ? Is it competing

27:14.209 --> 27:16.280
requirements ? Maybe just please go

27:16.280 --> 27:18.689
into that and , um , Doctor Wolfson

27:18.689 --> 27:20.911
will start at your end of the table and

27:20.911 --> 27:22.856
work our way across , and I have a

27:22.856 --> 27:24.967
minute and a half minutes remaining ,

27:24.967 --> 27:27.133
so if you could be brief . Excellent .

27:27.133 --> 27:29.133
I think the challenge really is the

27:29.133 --> 27:31.022
prioritization of near-term needs

27:31.022 --> 27:33.133
versus long term , uh , prospects . A

27:33.133 --> 27:35.189
lot of the lab infrastructure is not

27:35.189 --> 27:37.189
for this fight , but the , the next

27:37.189 --> 27:39.300
fight or the fight after that , which

27:39.300 --> 27:41.022
becomes challenging . The uh ,

27:41.022 --> 27:42.967
advancement to Major MilCon is our

27:42.967 --> 27:44.967
minor MLCon is actually a huge step

27:44.967 --> 27:47.133
forward that allows us to use our Flex

27:47.133 --> 27:49.300
4 funding . Um , for up to $15 million

27:49.300 --> 27:51.709
and many lab buildings and technology

27:51.709 --> 27:54.310
can be , uh , invested with those

27:54.310 --> 27:56.310
little bits of sums . In fact , for

27:56.310 --> 27:59.430
AFRL we have , um , $136 million that

27:59.430 --> 28:01.541
we have allocated for Flex 4 for next

28:01.541 --> 28:03.430
year that we could utilize that

28:03.430 --> 28:05.763
additional ceiling for . OK , thank you ,

28:05.763 --> 28:07.930
Mr . Trumpper . I , I will also double

28:07.930 --> 28:09.819
down on what , what , um , Doctor

28:09.819 --> 28:12.041
Wolfson just , just pointed out . The ,

28:12.041 --> 28:14.208
the Flex 4 funding has been critical .

28:14.208 --> 28:16.374
For the infras for us investing in our

28:16.374 --> 28:18.675
infrastructure and I will also uh

28:18.675 --> 28:20.564
completely agree that operational

28:20.564 --> 28:22.564
capabilities today and Milcon needs

28:22.564 --> 28:24.564
today , in addition to barracks and

28:24.564 --> 28:26.397
families and childcare needs are

28:26.397 --> 28:28.619
outweighing , um , our long term , uh ,

28:28.619 --> 28:30.731
S&T investments in infrastructure and

28:30.731 --> 28:32.834
so we find ourselves behind and but

28:33.604 --> 28:35.382
extremely appreciative of those

28:35.382 --> 28:37.548
authorities that we're getting through

28:37.548 --> 28:39.604
Flex 4 and even Section 233 that has

28:39.604 --> 28:41.771
allowed us to start investing in our .

28:41.771 --> 28:43.937
Thank you , Mr . Manning . For the for

28:43.937 --> 28:45.437
the army it's similar it's

28:45.437 --> 28:47.215
prioritization , uh , regarding

28:47.215 --> 28:49.326
barracks , family housing , daycare ,

28:49.326 --> 28:49.020
and then where do we get to labs again

28:49.020 --> 28:52.699
I'll echo Section 4123 that Flex 4 has

28:52.699 --> 28:54.866
been extremely helpful . We appreciate

28:54.939 --> 28:57.106
Congress , uh , providing that ability

28:57.106 --> 28:59.217
for us to do improve our facilities .

28:59.217 --> 29:01.550
And any additional thoughts , Secretary ,

29:01.550 --> 29:03.772
I'll just say that , um , in the recent

29:03.772 --> 29:05.939
NDAA you gave , uh , Congress was kind

29:05.939 --> 29:07.995
enough to give , uh , our office the

29:07.995 --> 29:10.050
ability to do some oversight so that

29:10.050 --> 29:12.050
allows us to work in tandem to look

29:12.050 --> 29:13.883
collectively of where we can get

29:13.883 --> 29:16.106
efficiencies , uh , with the spend that

29:16.106 --> 29:18.106
we need to make to upgrade the labs

29:18.106 --> 29:20.272
from the state that they're in , which

29:20.272 --> 29:22.161
is not great . OK , thank you . I

29:22.161 --> 29:24.050
appreciate the feedback , Senator

29:24.050 --> 29:26.106
Slotkin . Um , thank you , thank you

29:26.106 --> 29:28.530
for all being here . Um , you know , I ,

29:28.650 --> 29:30.890
I think that if we were , if our

29:30.890 --> 29:34.670
politics were healthy , this body

29:34.770 --> 29:37.329
would be dealing with AI and the coming

29:37.329 --> 29:41.310
impacts of AI . Every week

29:41.569 --> 29:43.736
we'd be having some conversation about

29:43.736 --> 29:45.736
the economic impacts , the military

29:45.736 --> 29:47.791
impacts , the intelligence impacts ,

29:47.791 --> 29:50.069
just the way that it's going to change ,

29:50.069 --> 29:52.236
um , our country , I think merits real

29:52.236 --> 29:54.458
conversation and there's an opportunity

29:54.458 --> 29:56.625
cost for us being , you know , up here

29:56.729 --> 29:59.062
fighting about the daily issues . We're ,

29:59.062 --> 30:01.285
we're missing some of the big strategic

30:01.285 --> 30:04.290
moves , um , and , um .

30:05.680 --> 30:08.319
Secretary Michael , can you help us

30:08.319 --> 30:10.430
understand and kind of in English for

30:10.430 --> 30:12.541
the public , since we are in public ,

30:12.541 --> 30:14.920
why is it important to win the AI , the

30:14.920 --> 30:18.040
classified AI race against China ? What

30:18.040 --> 30:20.920
would happen if China beat us to the

30:20.920 --> 30:23.359
punch ? Can you put that into words for

30:23.359 --> 30:25.520
us ? Yeah , I , I'll start with the

30:25.520 --> 30:27.464
national security implications and

30:27.464 --> 30:29.798
maybe some of the economic implications ,

30:29.798 --> 30:32.131
but from a national security standpoint .

30:32.420 --> 30:36.219
Um , this is another case of , uh ,

30:36.339 --> 30:38.395
our adversary , the main adversary ,

30:38.395 --> 30:41.380
China , you know , taking our IP from

30:41.380 --> 30:43.491
our American developed labs that have

30:43.491 --> 30:45.602
spent hundreds of billions of dollars

30:45.602 --> 30:47.769
by the end of the next couple of years

30:47.769 --> 30:49.780
between the cloud layer and the AI

30:49.780 --> 30:51.819
company layer . And they're they're

30:51.819 --> 30:54.152
quote unquote , distilling those models ,

30:54.152 --> 30:56.208
which means effectively copying them

30:56.208 --> 30:58.280
for a fraction of the price . Taking

30:58.280 --> 31:00.489
off the guardrails for them , which

31:00.489 --> 31:02.770
means they could be used in ways that

31:02.770 --> 31:04.992
they're not intended to be used , which

31:04.992 --> 31:07.214
is very dangerous for us , whether it's

31:07.214 --> 31:09.449
cyber , as a cyber weapon , as a

31:09.449 --> 31:11.338
biological weapon , as a chemical

31:11.338 --> 31:13.849
weapon . Uh , and when they can take

31:13.849 --> 31:15.571
those guardrails off and point

31:15.571 --> 31:17.682
essentially that AI against us , uh ,

31:17.682 --> 31:19.849
that's a very dangerous imbalance that

31:19.849 --> 31:22.030
I worry about a lot . Um , and when it

31:22.030 --> 31:25.540
comes to using AI to develop new

31:25.540 --> 31:28.310
weapons systems , um , they have a

31:28.310 --> 31:30.430
culture which permits or they can

31:30.430 --> 31:32.430
direct the government , the Chinese

31:32.430 --> 31:34.263
Communist Party can direct their

31:34.263 --> 31:36.374
industry , their AI industry to build

31:36.374 --> 31:38.430
whatever they want . Uh , we have to

31:38.430 --> 31:40.708
get on a better page with our domestic ,

31:40.708 --> 31:42.708
uh , partners in the AI industry to

31:42.708 --> 31:44.874
make sure that we're developing unique

31:44.874 --> 31:47.097
capabilities when it comes to physics ,

31:47.097 --> 31:49.208
aerodynamics , material science , all

31:49.208 --> 31:51.430
the things that could go in to make our

31:51.430 --> 31:53.486
defensive systems more lethal , more

31:53.486 --> 31:55.541
accurate , uh , uh , and so on . And

31:55.541 --> 31:57.263
then the last piece is from an

31:57.263 --> 31:59.152
intelligence standpoint , they're

31:59.152 --> 32:01.839
willing to use AI . Um , from an

32:01.839 --> 32:03.950
intelligence standpoint in a way that

32:03.950 --> 32:06.117
we haven't contemplated yet , and that

32:06.117 --> 32:08.339
gives them greater insight . We've seen

32:08.339 --> 32:10.395
intrusions from Sol Typhoon into our

32:10.395 --> 32:12.739
phone networks , into individual phones ,

32:13.079 --> 32:16.079
into our systems , um , and that could

32:16.079 --> 32:18.560
be sped up by AI and made more

32:18.560 --> 32:21.040
intrusive . And so the threat is real

32:21.040 --> 32:23.719
that we have to stay ahead . Uh , of

32:23.719 --> 32:26.119
our , of our adversaries in every

32:26.119 --> 32:28.229
dimension of AI , and that's part of

32:28.229 --> 32:30.479
why I believe the AI action plan to ,

32:30.880 --> 32:33.280
to make AI American companies stronger

32:33.280 --> 32:35.502
is really important . Yeah , I mean , I

32:35.502 --> 32:37.530
think , um , You know , this is the

32:37.530 --> 32:39.752
problem when we're , we're dealing with

32:39.752 --> 32:42.489
an adversary who doesn't have the rules

32:42.489 --> 32:45.530
that we so desperately believe in , um ,

32:45.650 --> 32:47.609
in a democracy and are trying to

32:47.609 --> 32:51.609
preserve , um , but , you know , how

32:51.609 --> 32:53.969
am I supposed to square , um , you know ,

32:54.089 --> 32:56.033
we want to beat the Chinese to the

32:56.033 --> 32:57.811
punch , but they don't have any

32:57.811 --> 32:59.811
guardrails and we need guardrails ,

33:00.010 --> 33:02.410
right ? I , that is , it is a , it's a

33:02.410 --> 33:05.699
conundrum . Um , but , you know , I , I

33:05.699 --> 33:07.755
introduced a piece of legislation on

33:07.755 --> 33:09.930
guard AI guardrails for the military ,

33:10.219 --> 33:13.719
not to , not to , um , unduly stifle

33:14.300 --> 33:16.411
development , but just to say that we

33:16.411 --> 33:19.260
should have a human being in the

33:19.260 --> 33:21.427
conversation we're making decisions of

33:21.427 --> 33:23.482
life and death . We shouldn't launch

33:23.482 --> 33:25.704
nuclear weapons without a human being ,

33:25.704 --> 33:27.649
uh , making that decision , and we

33:27.649 --> 33:29.704
shouldn't , you know , have domestic

33:29.704 --> 33:31.790
surveillance . All things that . The

33:31.790 --> 33:33.901
Chinese could decide to do tomorrow .

33:33.901 --> 33:36.699
So help me square how we keep our sort

33:36.699 --> 33:40.469
of values as a nation , but still win

33:40.469 --> 33:43.030
this race . Yeah , well , we have , so

33:43.030 --> 33:46.219
we have to stay ahead on chips ,

33:46.510 --> 33:49.430
power , innovation , and capital

33:49.430 --> 33:52.520
formation . And that that gives us this

33:52.520 --> 33:54.770
6 to 12 month lead and maybe we could

33:54.770 --> 33:57.010
extend it . In the last commerce NIT

33:57.010 --> 34:00.180
evaluation , our lead had increased by

34:00.180 --> 34:02.402
a few months against the Chinese , so ,

34:02.560 --> 34:05.520
Uh , and part of the reason for that is

34:05.520 --> 34:07.687
to try to prevent this IP theft that's

34:07.687 --> 34:09.742
happening . That's a big deal . This

34:09.742 --> 34:11.853
distillation attack thing is a , is a

34:11.853 --> 34:14.540
real problem , and we've coordinated as

34:14.540 --> 34:16.707
an administration with all the labs to

34:16.707 --> 34:18.540
try to help them prevent . These

34:18.540 --> 34:20.709
distillation attacks . We also have to

34:20.709 --> 34:22.653
prevent them from , uh , help them

34:22.653 --> 34:24.653
prevent , uh , operational security

34:24.653 --> 34:26.598
mishaps . There's a lot of foreign

34:26.598 --> 34:28.542
nationals that work at American AI

34:28.542 --> 34:30.709
companies that we have to be concerned

34:30.709 --> 34:32.653
about and have to help them secure

34:32.653 --> 34:34.820
their own networks on . And we have to

34:34.820 --> 34:36.987
work with them also , uh , on ensuring

34:36.987 --> 34:40.179
that the , the way that , um , uh ,

34:40.360 --> 34:42.479
there is a flow between researchers

34:42.479 --> 34:44.739
from our country to theirs . Um ,

34:44.868 --> 34:46.908
doesn't sort of , uh , you know ,

34:47.188 --> 34:49.466
release the secrets that we don't want ,

34:49.466 --> 34:51.466
uh , done , but it's going to be an

34:51.466 --> 34:53.410
ongoing challenge . There's no one

34:53.410 --> 34:55.632
solution to this . Yeah , I , I'll have

34:55.632 --> 34:57.744
more to say , but I yield back and my

34:57.744 --> 35:00.077
time's up . Thank you , Senator Shaheen .

35:00.179 --> 35:02.669
Thank you , um , Madam Chair , and

35:02.669 --> 35:05.030
thank you all for being here . Um ,

35:05.229 --> 35:07.030
Undersecretary Michael , the

35:07.030 --> 35:09.469
cross-functional team for anomalous

35:09.469 --> 35:12.260
health incidents is now under your

35:12.260 --> 35:16.189
portfolio and as we've discussed , I

35:16.189 --> 35:19.010
think before in the full committee , um ,

35:19.110 --> 35:21.166
many of us who have followed the AHI

35:21.166 --> 35:24.229
issue over the past really more than 6

35:24.229 --> 35:27.669
years now have had concerns that the

35:27.669 --> 35:30.989
shift . Um , places a more of a

35:30.989 --> 35:33.310
technical focus on an issue that really

35:33.310 --> 35:35.870
deals with not just care coordination

35:35.870 --> 35:38.203
but intelligence , attribution research ,

35:38.590 --> 35:40.923
heavy coordination with the interagency ,

35:41.189 --> 35:43.356
especially at a time when I understand

35:43.356 --> 35:45.411
there's breakthrough research , um ,

35:45.411 --> 35:48.310
related to attribution , and I was

35:48.310 --> 35:50.532
really surprised , I have to admit , to

35:50.532 --> 35:52.477
see that the budget request , um ,

35:52.477 --> 35:54.669
nearly triples the amount that we've

35:54.669 --> 35:56.310
seen in past years for the

35:56.310 --> 35:58.532
cross-functional team . So can you give

35:58.532 --> 36:01.260
us a little more detail about what ,

36:02.000 --> 36:05.159
where you hope the focus of this

36:05.159 --> 36:07.326
funding will be and what you're hoping

36:07.326 --> 36:11.080
to accomplish ? Yeah , um , I think the

36:11.080 --> 36:13.790
right place for this effort is , uh ,

36:13.919 --> 36:16.500
in research and engineering because ,

36:17.040 --> 36:20.760
uh , diagnosis and treatment for the

36:20.760 --> 36:23.820
victims is priority one . Priority two

36:23.820 --> 36:27.000
is attribution , and then 3 is policy .

36:27.370 --> 36:29.592
And we have to get the first part right

36:29.592 --> 36:31.648
to be able to do 2 and 3 . We're not

36:31.648 --> 36:33.870
gonna , we can walk and chew gum at the

36:33.870 --> 36:35.703
same time . So , our interagency

36:35.703 --> 36:37.870
collaboration has only increased since

36:37.870 --> 36:40.092
it's gotten to my team . We've gotten a

36:40.092 --> 36:42.810
large , uh , you know , the first major

36:42.810 --> 36:44.921
increase in collaboration from the IC

36:45.090 --> 36:48.899
on this . Um , And we've also followed

36:48.899 --> 36:50.955
congressional guidance for the first

36:50.955 --> 36:52.899
time where we have a two-star Navy

36:52.899 --> 36:55.060
SEALL MD as the military deputy on

36:55.060 --> 36:57.260
HAAHI . So we've staffed it up with

36:57.260 --> 36:59.427
some of the best and brightest minds .

36:59.459 --> 37:01.820
The , uh , budget increases so that we

37:01.820 --> 37:04.340
can do more of the real-world testing

37:04.340 --> 37:07.340
because we believe that um if we can

37:07.340 --> 37:09.020
confirm the science that's

37:09.020 --> 37:11.131
preliminarily been confirmed over the

37:11.131 --> 37:13.449
last few years , we can prevent we

37:13.449 --> 37:15.616
could develop countermeasures , we can

37:15.616 --> 37:17.899
do the treatments better . Uh , our

37:17.899 --> 37:19.979
databases will be stronger and we'll

37:19.979 --> 37:22.201
know how to teach the doctors at Walter

37:22.201 --> 37:24.423
Reed how to diagnose and treat better .

37:24.423 --> 37:26.423
So I think all those things are all

37:26.423 --> 37:28.757
good news stories for where this is now ,

37:28.757 --> 37:28.600
and that's why you see the budget

37:28.600 --> 37:30.459
increase request . Well , I look

37:30.459 --> 37:33.040
forward to the briefing , um , tomorrow

37:33.040 --> 37:35.219
and , uh , to hearing more about what

37:35.219 --> 37:37.330
you're doing . That's encouraging and

37:37.330 --> 37:39.820
hopefully , um , will answer some of

37:39.820 --> 37:41.987
the questions that we , I think you'll

37:41.987 --> 37:44.264
be pleased by the briefing . Thank you ,

37:44.264 --> 37:48.159
um . I wonder , um , I wanna also

37:48.260 --> 37:50.739
go to the SBIR program , something that

37:50.739 --> 37:52.820
um is near and dear to us in New

37:52.820 --> 37:55.020
Hampshire because um Senator , former

37:55.020 --> 37:57.699
Senator Rudman um introduced and passed

37:57.699 --> 37:59.699
that legislation and it really came

37:59.699 --> 38:01.755
from some of the innovation that was

38:01.755 --> 38:03.866
being done by small businesses in our

38:03.866 --> 38:06.860
state back in the 80s and it's really

38:06.860 --> 38:10.290
been , it's been a critical tool . But

38:11.270 --> 38:13.437
There have been some changes that have

38:13.437 --> 38:15.603
mandated that agencies implement a cap

38:15.603 --> 38:17.659
on the number of proposals a company

38:17.659 --> 38:20.229
can submit . I understand that Deputy

38:20.229 --> 38:24.149
Undersecretary Mazzo , am I pronouncing

38:24.149 --> 38:26.300
the name correctly , told the ranking

38:26.300 --> 38:28.467
member of the Small Business Committee

38:28.467 --> 38:30.633
that the cap would be implemented on a

38:30.633 --> 38:32.356
per-topic basis . Is that your

38:32.356 --> 38:34.300
understanding as well ? Yes , on a

38:34.300 --> 38:37.389
per-topic basis , so that , um , you

38:37.389 --> 38:40.600
know , we thought the Total cap on any

38:40.600 --> 38:42.767
entity was different than capping on a

38:42.767 --> 38:44.699
per topic basis , which had some

38:45.000 --> 38:47.167
benefits in reducing some of the abuse

38:47.167 --> 38:49.222
of the system , but gave everyone an

38:49.222 --> 38:51.899
opportunity to participate . Um , great ,

38:51.939 --> 38:53.717
I probably could have asked the

38:53.717 --> 38:55.883
chairwoman that question as well since

38:55.883 --> 38:58.217
she chairs the Small Business Committee ,

38:58.217 --> 39:00.610
um , but I'm glad to hear that that's

39:00.610 --> 39:02.979
the way it's being interpreted . Um ,

39:03.340 --> 39:05.489
my final question is really both for

39:05.489 --> 39:07.545
you , Undersecretary Michael and for

39:07.545 --> 39:09.711
Doctor Wolfson , and it has to do with

39:09.711 --> 39:12.000
PFAST destruction technology , um ,

39:12.020 --> 39:15.389
because . As you know , these have been

39:15.389 --> 39:18.919
really Numerous at US military

39:18.919 --> 39:21.969
compounds , um , Portsmouth , um , the

39:21.969 --> 39:24.136
former Pease Air Force Base was one of

39:24.136 --> 39:26.413
the first bases in the country to show ,

39:26.449 --> 39:30.239
um , PFASS in significant amounts in

39:30.239 --> 39:33.310
the groundwater in ways that affected ,

39:33.530 --> 39:36.929
um , children in particular , and there

39:36.929 --> 39:39.360
was a provision in last year's NDAA to

39:39.360 --> 39:41.416
authorize the use of new destruction

39:41.416 --> 39:43.889
technologies . So can you give us an

39:43.889 --> 39:46.790
update on . Um , what the department is

39:46.790 --> 39:48.957
thinking in terms of PFASS destruction

39:48.957 --> 39:51.234
and disposal , and maybe Doctor Wilson ,

39:51.234 --> 39:54.219
I'll ask you to go first . Uh , that is

39:54.219 --> 39:56.219
an excellent question and not in my

39:56.219 --> 39:58.330
area of expertise , so I'll take that

39:58.330 --> 40:00.497
as a QFR and get back to you with that

40:00.497 --> 40:02.820
answer . Then I will ask Undersecretary

40:02.820 --> 40:06.659
Michael if he can respond to that . I

40:06.659 --> 40:08.715
am sadly in the same position . I'll

40:08.715 --> 40:10.715
have to owe you an answer on that ,

40:10.715 --> 40:12.919
ma'am . OK , well . Good . I look

40:12.919 --> 40:16.290
forward to having those answers to the

40:16.290 --> 40:18.790
subcommittee . Thank you both . Yeah ,

40:18.909 --> 40:20.939
thank you and I , I do wanna , uh ,

40:20.949 --> 40:23.060
recognize Secretary Michael as well ,

40:23.060 --> 40:25.270
um , providing feedback for the SBIR

40:25.270 --> 40:28.689
STTR reauthorization , and we , uh ,

40:29.070 --> 40:31.237
really saw the department respond very

40:31.237 --> 40:33.348
quickly after the reauthorization and

40:33.348 --> 40:35.348
there were over 90 topics that were

40:35.348 --> 40:37.014
brought forward , uh , by the

40:37.014 --> 40:39.510
departments for competition so . Um ,

40:39.570 --> 40:41.626
thank you very much for that . Now I

40:41.626 --> 40:43.792
recognize Ranking Member Reed . Well ,

40:43.792 --> 40:45.626
thank you very much , uh , Madam

40:45.626 --> 40:48.370
Chairman , and I've got 3 basic

40:48.370 --> 40:50.592
questions I'd like to address to all of

40:50.592 --> 40:52.703
you . Uh , one , you're talking about

40:52.703 --> 40:54.703
your priorities , but I don't think

40:54.703 --> 40:57.290
you've put in your FY 27 budget

40:57.290 --> 40:59.889
requests for the record , and that

40:59.889 --> 41:02.209
would be useful . So if you could tell

41:02.209 --> 41:05.270
us what your budget requests are and .

41:05.780 --> 41:08.179
A comparison with last year , are you

41:08.179 --> 41:11.209
up ? Are you down ? And also , uh ,

41:11.219 --> 41:13.441
some of the areas where there are major

41:13.441 --> 41:15.497
funding increases and decreases . So

41:15.497 --> 41:17.830
Secretary Michael and run down the list ,

41:17.830 --> 41:19.860
please . Uh , it's been a confusing

41:19.860 --> 41:22.027
year for budget requests given how the

41:22.027 --> 41:24.249
budgets have gone with , uh , so I know

41:24.249 --> 41:26.360
you resonate with that , uh , ranking

41:26.360 --> 41:28.540
member , but , um , we submitted ours

41:28.540 --> 41:30.739
to , to our , our leadership at the

41:30.739 --> 41:32.850
Department of War . So we've done all

41:32.850 --> 41:35.072
the work on , at least at the component

41:35.072 --> 41:37.239
level . Uh , I don't know if it's with

41:37.239 --> 41:39.183
OMB now , but we've done at a high

41:39.183 --> 41:40.906
level , uh , on the RDT&E side

41:40.906 --> 41:43.072
defense-wide from my office , we asked

41:43.072 --> 41:45.017
for , uh , about a billion dollars

41:45.017 --> 41:47.219
increase from last year . Um , at the

41:47.219 --> 41:50.479
core , at the core RDTNE level , um ,

41:50.939 --> 41:53.161
and that's to fund certain programs and

41:53.161 --> 41:55.272
hypersonics and some of the key areas

41:55.272 --> 41:57.217
in the critical technology areas .

41:57.217 --> 41:59.439
Separate from that , you'll see two big

41:59.439 --> 42:01.439
requests on , um , compute power ,

42:02.020 --> 42:04.280
which we need for the AI arsenal ,

42:04.300 --> 42:06.522
essentially that we need to build . And

42:06.522 --> 42:09.530
for an autonomous warfare group where

42:09.530 --> 42:12.290
we're going to really coordinate our

42:12.290 --> 42:14.346
autonomous , which includes drones ,

42:14.346 --> 42:16.346
counter drones , and all the things

42:16.346 --> 42:18.512
that we need to fight sort of the next

42:18.512 --> 42:20.568
war , not the last war , right , and

42:20.568 --> 42:22.846
those requests are going to be armored .

42:23.239 --> 42:25.350
They're gonna be what , sir ? They're

42:25.350 --> 42:27.239
going to be recognized by OMB and

42:27.239 --> 42:30.320
included in , yes , we , yes , good .

42:31.050 --> 42:33.328
Mr . Manning , please . Uh , thank you ,

42:33.328 --> 42:35.439
Senator . Uh , the , the , I'll start

42:35.439 --> 42:38.449
with FY 26 . So in FY 26 , the Army

42:38.449 --> 42:41.530
requested $2.48 billion for Army S&T .

42:42.050 --> 42:45.429
Uh , our , uh , our FY 27 request ,

42:45.929 --> 42:48.969
uh , we submitted is $2.773 billion .

42:49.090 --> 42:51.570
So about 11% increase . I do want to

42:51.570 --> 42:53.737
note that , uh , Congress enacted over

42:53.737 --> 42:57.530
$4 billion in 26 for S&T . So we thank

42:57.530 --> 42:59.697
Congress for the bipartisan support to

42:59.697 --> 43:01.808
Army S&T . But you , you're confident

43:01.808 --> 43:04.489
you're gonna get that 11% increase . Uh ,

43:04.560 --> 43:06.671
yes , that's what , that's what we've

43:06.671 --> 43:08.838
submitted in the , in the budget . And

43:08.838 --> 43:10.893
then , uh , where's the big plus ups

43:10.893 --> 43:12.949
and the big decreases ? Yeah , the ,

43:12.949 --> 43:15.116
the big increases were in long range ,

43:15.116 --> 43:17.004
uh , fires , uh , counter UES and

43:17.004 --> 43:19.189
counter counter C5 ISRT , uh , areas

43:19.189 --> 43:21.790
where we took risk in our leverage ,

43:22.159 --> 43:23.881
planning or intend to leverage

43:23.881 --> 43:26.719
commercial investments , uh , are C3

43:26.719 --> 43:30.050
and autonomy . Mr . Tremper , please ,

43:30.489 --> 43:33.449
uh , yes , for the Navy . So in FY 26 ,

43:33.489 --> 43:37.209
our , our requested was 2.55 billion .

43:37.530 --> 43:41.100
In FY 27 our request was $2.408 billion .

43:41.209 --> 43:43.850
So approximately 5% decrease . Uh ,

43:44.929 --> 43:47.096
Part of that included a realignment of

43:47.096 --> 43:49.040
6.3 money into 64 . So when I talk

43:49.040 --> 43:51.373
about S&T , I'm talking about 61 to 6.3 .

43:51.373 --> 43:53.373
There was some realignment of 663 .

43:53.373 --> 43:54.929
Investment , which was more

43:54.929 --> 43:57.096
appropriately aligned to 6.4 , so that

43:57.096 --> 43:58.707
was removed . Uh , there's a

43:58.707 --> 44:00.873
significant emphasis right now in that

44:00.873 --> 44:02.873
integration space , right ? So that

44:02.873 --> 44:02.870
word integration becomes

44:02.870 --> 44:05.110
extraordinarily important for taking

44:05.110 --> 44:07.221
S&T and putting into the hands of the

44:07.221 --> 44:09.443
warfighter . So you start to see budget

44:09.443 --> 44:11.610
adjustments that are happening between

44:11.610 --> 44:13.721
the 6.1 , the 6.3 , and then emphasis

44:13.721 --> 44:15.943
happening into the 6.4 , which is where

44:15.943 --> 44:15.870
we do our prototyping and we get it

44:15.870 --> 44:18.610
into the hands of the operators . So

44:18.610 --> 44:20.929
the enacted for FY 26 was

44:20.929 --> 44:24.250
3.299 billion , so it's significantly

44:24.250 --> 44:26.028
more than requested and greatly

44:26.028 --> 44:27.861
appreciated those ads that would

44:27.861 --> 44:29.694
benefit from that . Our fight up

44:29.694 --> 44:31.750
profile for our BAE 1 through 3s has

44:31.750 --> 44:33.917
been pretty consistent within that 10%

44:33.917 --> 44:36.083
time frame , but really we're seeing a

44:36.083 --> 44:38.306
significant increase in the integration

44:38.306 --> 44:40.361
space on how do you take it from the

44:40.361 --> 44:42.417
lab to the war fighters , right ? So

44:42.417 --> 44:44.600
that lab . Warfighter and commander

44:44.600 --> 44:46.409
communication C23 exactly .

44:48.550 --> 44:50.709
Doctor Wilsonson , please . Yes , so

44:50.709 --> 44:52.876
that for the United States Air Force ,

44:52.876 --> 44:54.876
and again I'm only speaking for the

44:54.876 --> 44:54.709
United States Air Force , if you want

44:54.709 --> 44:56.931
the answer for the Space Force , we can

44:56.931 --> 44:59.153
take it as a as a QFR and bring it back

44:59.153 --> 45:01.699
for you . Um , our FY 26 , uh ,

45:01.820 --> 45:05.419
presidential budget was $2.534

45:05.419 --> 45:09.179
billion and for , uh , FY 27 , uh , our

45:09.179 --> 45:12.020
request is $2.78 billion so we have

45:12.020 --> 45:15.429
gone up . We're focusing , uh ,

45:15.439 --> 45:17.606
significant increases in hypersonics .

45:17.606 --> 45:19.939
Uh , we left our directed energy . Line ,

45:19.939 --> 45:22.106
um , where it should have been , where

45:22.106 --> 45:24.106
it has been , and we took some near

45:24.106 --> 45:26.050
term risk in bio manufacturing and

45:26.050 --> 45:27.995
autonomous AI for uh collaborative

45:27.995 --> 45:29.828
platforms . Uh , we're also very

45:29.828 --> 45:33.639
grateful for the $830 million in

45:33.639 --> 45:35.583
uh congressional interest items to

45:35.583 --> 45:37.806
support the S&T community and thank you

45:37.806 --> 45:39.917
very much for that . Glad you right ,

45:39.917 --> 45:43.080
and uh . I fondly recall the Air Force

45:43.080 --> 45:45.247
as the US Army Air Corps , but forgive

45:45.247 --> 45:48.929
me . Thank you . Thank you for

45:48.929 --> 45:51.096
joining us ranking member . Um , we'll

45:51.096 --> 45:53.199
go ahead and do another round , um ,

45:53.209 --> 45:56.649
and I just wanna double back on the

45:56.649 --> 45:59.570
labs for just a moment if each one of

45:59.570 --> 46:02.090
you could share maybe what is your

46:02.090 --> 46:05.850
number one unfunded priority when it

46:05.850 --> 46:08.729
comes to our lab infrastructure

46:08.729 --> 46:10.840
Secretary Michael , if you have input

46:10.840 --> 46:13.209
please first . I mean , most of the lab

46:13.209 --> 46:15.431
infrastructure spend is gonna come from

46:15.431 --> 46:17.653
the services , so I think it would be .

46:18.070 --> 46:20.181
to start with them , Mr . Manning for

46:20.181 --> 46:22.403
the Army . Thank you . Uh , thank you ,

46:22.403 --> 46:24.570
Senator . Uh , each year we submit our

46:24.570 --> 46:26.681
Section 282806 report of our unfunded

46:26.681 --> 46:28.903
lab infrastructure . Uh , I would go to

46:28.903 --> 46:31.014
that and go to the top of our list to

46:31.014 --> 46:33.014
be able to try it , so I don't have

46:33.014 --> 46:35.070
that with me specifically here . I'm

46:35.070 --> 46:37.292
happy to take a question for the record

46:37.292 --> 46:36.770
on that . OK , thank you , Mr . Trump .

46:37.610 --> 46:39.419
Uh , yeah , I , uh , so for our

46:39.419 --> 46:41.308
unfunded priority list , uh , our

46:41.308 --> 46:43.030
number one is a reconfigurable

46:43.030 --> 46:45.141
cybersecurity lab at Nywick Pacific ,

46:45.141 --> 46:47.419
uh , to address cybersecurity concerns .

46:47.419 --> 46:50.219
However , equally important to that is

46:50.219 --> 46:52.219
our number 2 , which is an

46:52.219 --> 46:54.060
electromagnetic and cyber

46:54.060 --> 46:55.838
countermeasure lab at the Naval

46:55.838 --> 46:58.004
Research Lab to support our counter C5

46:58.004 --> 46:59.671
ISR&T investments as spectrum

46:59.671 --> 47:02.500
electronic warfare , um , sensing our

47:02.500 --> 47:04.667
key priorities within our S&T strategy

47:04.667 --> 47:06.500
going forward . OK , wonderful .

47:06.500 --> 47:08.667
Wolfson , thank you . Uh , for the Air

47:08.667 --> 47:10.889
Force , we were lucky enough to make it

47:10.889 --> 47:12.944
onto our unfunded priority list . We

47:12.944 --> 47:15.056
are number 11 , um , and it's a human

47:15.056 --> 47:17.167
performance , uh , S&T lab on the DAF

47:17.167 --> 47:19.278
priority list . However , I will also

47:19.278 --> 47:21.500
reinforce what Mr . Manning said . Uh ,

47:21.500 --> 47:23.833
all the rest of our infrastructure , uh ,

47:23.833 --> 47:25.944
that did not make this list is listed

47:25.944 --> 47:27.833
in that same report , and that we

47:27.833 --> 47:30.000
provide to Congress every year . Thank

47:30.000 --> 47:32.167
you . Thank you very much . Um , we'll

47:32.167 --> 47:35.100
go back to AI and autonomous systems .

47:35.179 --> 47:37.290
Um , I think this is something that's

47:37.290 --> 47:39.290
really important to both , uh , the

47:39.290 --> 47:41.620
ranking member and I , but , uh , we do

47:41.620 --> 47:43.509
know that the department has been

47:43.509 --> 47:45.731
making major strides when it , it comes

47:45.731 --> 47:48.820
to AI and autonomous warfare , and I

47:48.820 --> 47:51.219
think large in part not just this

47:51.219 --> 47:53.552
subcommittee , but the entire committee .

47:53.552 --> 47:55.775
Uh , really supports the direction that

47:55.775 --> 47:58.020
we're heading , but as we're seeing the

47:58.020 --> 48:00.739
program scale , then the policy , just

48:00.739 --> 48:02.739
as , uh , Senator Slotkin has , has

48:02.739 --> 48:05.300
pointed out , the policy architecture

48:05.300 --> 48:08.949
really has to scale with it . And this

48:08.949 --> 48:11.350
is where we probably lag behind , but

48:11.629 --> 48:14.469
the department is requesting a massive

48:14.469 --> 48:17.469
increase for D , um , for those in the

48:17.469 --> 48:19.469
audience that may not know , is the

48:19.469 --> 48:21.790
Defense Autonomous Warfare Group , and

48:21.790 --> 48:24.229
it's going from the $225 million up to

48:24.229 --> 48:27.030
the $55 billion dollar mark for fiscal

48:27.030 --> 48:29.929
year 27 . And at the same time we're

48:29.929 --> 48:33.489
integrating the AI driven targeting

48:33.709 --> 48:36.459
with those autonomous munitions at a

48:36.459 --> 48:38.949
pace that DOD Directive

48:38.949 --> 48:42.010
3000.09 was not

48:42.510 --> 48:45.899
designed to contemplate , uh ,

48:45.909 --> 48:49.590
so , um , Secretary Michael has the

48:49.590 --> 48:52.270
department formally reviewed whether

48:52.270 --> 48:54.830
the current governance framework is

48:54.830 --> 48:57.810
actually keeping pace with dogs growth .

48:58.250 --> 49:00.583
And then how do we overcome that if not ?

49:00.939 --> 49:03.050
I , I think , um , I think we have to

49:03.050 --> 49:06.510
evolve that , um , uh , and I think the

49:06.510 --> 49:10.060
policy part of DOW takes the lead

49:10.060 --> 49:13.520
in , uh , amending or updating 3009 ,

49:13.560 --> 49:15.504
and we'll be part of that , but it

49:15.504 --> 49:17.449
absolutely needs updating not only

49:17.449 --> 49:19.449
because of the capability potential

49:19.449 --> 49:21.282
increase , because of the threat

49:21.282 --> 49:23.338
environment , what's possible by the

49:23.338 --> 49:25.504
adversary , uh , and partly because of

49:25.504 --> 49:27.560
the lessons we learned in Iran . You

49:27.560 --> 49:30.290
know , we want autonomous mind uh uh

49:30.290 --> 49:33.250
seeking um capabilities . We want

49:33.250 --> 49:36.520
autonomous mind uh defeat alternatives .

49:36.889 --> 49:39.389
Golden Dome has an autonomous element

49:39.389 --> 49:41.850
to it , a space-based interceptor that

49:41.850 --> 49:43.969
could take a , uh , you know , to

49:43.969 --> 49:45.913
hopefully get a Chinese hypersonic

49:45.913 --> 49:47.969
missile in the first . 90 seconds of

49:47.969 --> 49:50.136
launch before it separates into decoys

49:50.136 --> 49:52.247
and multiple munitions . So there are

49:52.247 --> 49:54.969
going to be different risk levels with

49:54.969 --> 49:57.191
autonomous , and we have to account for

49:57.191 --> 49:59.419
them in our policies . And my , my

49:59.419 --> 50:01.197
belief is that will change more

50:01.197 --> 50:03.363
frequently than it has in the past and

50:03.363 --> 50:05.586
it ought to . Has to be consistent with

50:05.586 --> 50:07.808
our values , consistent with the threat

50:07.808 --> 50:09.919
environment , and consistent with the

50:09.919 --> 50:09.860
technology development . Yeah , thank

50:09.860 --> 50:12.138
you . I , I absolutely agree with that .

50:12.138 --> 50:15.139
Um , we understand the urgency . We

50:15.139 --> 50:17.340
want to provide proper oversight of

50:17.340 --> 50:19.618
that . We don't want it to be taken as ,

50:20.639 --> 50:24.580
um , opposition to obtaining our

50:24.580 --> 50:27.429
goals . Uh , but we also understand

50:27.429 --> 50:29.550
that China and Russia , they have few

50:29.550 --> 50:32.149
less governance issues , uh , when it

50:32.149 --> 50:35.239
comes to autonomous systems and AI than

50:35.239 --> 50:37.729
we do , but we still do want to align

50:39.090 --> 50:42.030
to our values . So , um , I really

50:42.030 --> 50:44.141
appreciate that discussion and I will

50:44.141 --> 50:46.308
yield my time and we'll go next to the

50:46.308 --> 50:48.979
ranking member . Thank you . Um , yeah ,

50:49.300 --> 50:51.860
I mean , I think . What you're hearing

50:51.860 --> 50:54.580
is , is that there's a lot , there's a

50:54.580 --> 50:56.899
lot of questions about how this

50:56.899 --> 51:00.620
governance should be done . Um , and I

51:00.620 --> 51:02.676
am just keenly aware that unlike the

51:02.676 --> 51:04.898
nuclear race , right , who can get to a

51:04.898 --> 51:06.842
nuclear weapon first , right ? The

51:06.842 --> 51:09.669
Oppenheimer story . Um , where that

51:09.669 --> 51:11.780
research and all that funding and all

51:11.780 --> 51:13.947
that support and that development that

51:13.947 --> 51:16.113
went on in the middle of the desert to

51:16.113 --> 51:18.336
get us to a nuclear weapon was paid for

51:18.336 --> 51:20.558
by the US government , sponsored by the

51:20.558 --> 51:22.613
US government , not a private sector

51:22.613 --> 51:26.540
company . And Fast forward to today ,

51:26.840 --> 51:29.959
the private sector is really where the

51:29.959 --> 51:32.820
just powerful innovation is happening ,

51:33.280 --> 51:36.060
um , and it , I think it puts even more

51:36.320 --> 51:39.229
onus on all of us to have that

51:39.229 --> 51:41.562
conversation separate from each company .

51:41.562 --> 51:43.679
Um , on what the governance should be

51:43.679 --> 51:47.219
for AI , and I , I do not believe that

51:47.219 --> 51:49.386
in a private sector company should get

51:49.386 --> 51:51.520
to decide what the rules are , but I

51:51.520 --> 51:53.742
gotta be honest , I think it is part of

51:53.742 --> 51:55.631
our congressional role up here to

51:55.631 --> 51:57.820
provide left and right limits , um ,

51:57.959 --> 52:01.199
that provide some guidelines for how we

52:01.199 --> 52:04.139
govern this very new technology and

52:04.479 --> 52:06.590
just like Congress did in the nuclear

52:06.590 --> 52:09.659
age , right ? It wasn't like . Um , we

52:09.659 --> 52:11.770
just said , hey , private sector , go

52:11.770 --> 52:13.770
bonkers . We now discovered nuclear

52:13.770 --> 52:15.548
energy and nuclear weapons . No

52:15.548 --> 52:17.770
oversight needed from Congress . Let us

52:17.770 --> 52:20.340
know how it works out . It was given

52:20.340 --> 52:22.507
that it had the potential for life and

52:22.507 --> 52:25.280
death . It had real oversight from this

52:25.620 --> 52:28.540
body with input from everybody , but I

52:28.540 --> 52:31.179
just , I , I feel very strongly , and I ,

52:31.260 --> 52:34.060
I think , um , Also in that time ,

52:34.169 --> 52:36.391
right , it's not like before we started

52:36.391 --> 52:38.280
the arms control conversation , I

52:38.280 --> 52:40.280
trusted that the Soviet Union would

52:40.280 --> 52:42.447
always do the right thing with nukes .

52:42.447 --> 52:44.447
Of course , they were willing to do

52:44.447 --> 52:44.139
things that we weren't willing to do ,

52:44.219 --> 52:46.275
but I'm not willing to sacrifice our

52:46.275 --> 52:48.820
values with this next generation of

52:48.820 --> 52:50.876
technology and just say , well , the

52:50.876 --> 52:52.820
Chinese are going to do bad things

52:52.820 --> 52:54.764
towards us , so we should . Say no

52:54.764 --> 52:56.876
rules , and I was very glad to hear ,

52:56.876 --> 52:59.042
um , actually that President Trump and

52:59.042 --> 53:01.098
Xi Jinping actually did seem to talk

53:01.098 --> 53:03.098
about some sort of guardrails on AI

53:03.098 --> 53:05.669
even generally at the summit . Um , but

53:05.719 --> 53:07.941
I just want to go back , Undersecretary

53:07.941 --> 53:09.989
Michael to . Your comments and the

53:09.989 --> 53:12.267
importance of winning the race , right ?

53:12.267 --> 53:14.267
Because I , again , I think there's

53:14.267 --> 53:16.489
also bipartisan support for winning the

53:16.489 --> 53:18.656
race , um , and how important it is to

53:18.656 --> 53:21.219
get there first , um , and , um , your

53:21.219 --> 53:22.941
concerns about the Chinese and

53:22.941 --> 53:25.052
distillation and kind of stealing our

53:25.052 --> 53:27.330
AI models or learning and , and taking .

53:27.429 --> 53:29.596
So it's , you've , you've laid out how

53:29.596 --> 53:31.651
important it is to win , you've laid

53:31.651 --> 53:34.209
out how they're stealing , um . Um ,

53:34.469 --> 53:36.358
given the strategic importance of

53:36.358 --> 53:39.189
winning , I cannot for the life of me

53:39.189 --> 53:41.411
understand two decisions that have been

53:41.411 --> 53:44.510
made . Number one , the the decision ,

53:44.590 --> 53:47.949
excuse me , to sell Nvidia chips to the

53:47.949 --> 53:51.169
Chinese . Um , giving them not our most

53:51.169 --> 53:53.225
sophisticated , but some of our most

53:53.225 --> 53:55.336
sophisticated chips and chips they do

53:55.336 --> 53:58.790
not have . Um And then

53:58.790 --> 54:00.957
secondly , I do not understand picking

54:00.957 --> 54:03.179
a fight with one of the few companies ,

54:03.179 --> 54:05.068
anthropic , that's in all of your

54:05.068 --> 54:07.012
systems . All of you use anthropic

54:07.012 --> 54:09.510
right now . Um , to the point where

54:09.510 --> 54:11.566
we've named them a supply chain risk

54:11.566 --> 54:13.454
and all of you are supposed to be

54:13.454 --> 54:15.510
divesting from anthropic in the next

54:15.510 --> 54:18.310
two months . Help me understand .

54:19.260 --> 54:22.010
Um , given what you said about IP theft ,

54:22.300 --> 54:24.522
why we're selling them some of our most

54:24.522 --> 54:27.010
sophisticated chips and why we're

54:27.010 --> 54:29.969
kicking out one of the top 3 , and ,

54:30.050 --> 54:32.050
you know , AI companies from all of

54:32.050 --> 54:34.889
your classified systems . Yeah , so ,

54:34.969 --> 54:38.510
um , on the chips question , um ,

54:39.090 --> 54:42.169
the , uh , this is a bit , there's a

54:42.169 --> 54:44.391
debate within the technology industry ,

54:44.391 --> 54:47.850
which is , um , if you sell an

54:47.850 --> 54:50.790
adversary , uh , older chips , do you

54:50.790 --> 54:53.250
slow down their domestic production of

54:53.250 --> 54:55.330
equivalent chips because they become

54:55.330 --> 54:57.649
reliant on your technology ? That's one

54:57.649 --> 54:59.800
theory . And then the programming

54:59.800 --> 55:01.522
language on those chips to the

55:01.522 --> 55:03.744
developers , which are really important

55:03.744 --> 55:05.800
in AI because they develop on top of

55:05.800 --> 55:07.679
these chips and on top of these

55:07.679 --> 55:10.429
technology stacks . If they become used

55:10.429 --> 55:12.800
to the American stack , is that net

55:12.800 --> 55:14.840
better for the American AI profe

55:14.840 --> 55:17.850
proliferation . And that's a , that's a

55:17.850 --> 55:20.017
debate , and , and the White House has

55:20.017 --> 55:21.850
decided that if we gave them two

55:21.850 --> 55:23.929
versions behind chips , that we'd be

55:23.929 --> 55:26.330
able to preserve our , our dominance on

55:26.330 --> 55:29.649
the programming language and um make it

55:29.649 --> 55:31.649
less encouraging of them to develop

55:31.649 --> 55:33.649
their own domestic chip industry to

55:33.649 --> 55:35.871
catch up . But do you have any evidence

55:35.871 --> 55:37.871
based on what You said a minute ago

55:37.871 --> 55:40.093
about their theft , their rampant theft

55:40.093 --> 55:42.415
of IP , their rampant ability and

55:42.415 --> 55:45.425
desire to , you know , work backwards

55:45.425 --> 55:47.385
from our technology , from cars to

55:47.385 --> 55:50.225
drones to chips to whatever . What

55:50.225 --> 55:52.336
evidence do you have that giving them

55:52.336 --> 55:54.905
this technology gets them addicted

55:54.905 --> 55:58.135
rather than , um , they just steal it .

55:58.500 --> 56:01.080
And reverse engineer it for their own

56:01.080 --> 56:03.590
purposes . Well , it's , you can , it's

56:03.590 --> 56:06.239
very hard to reverse engineering in

56:06.239 --> 56:08.295
this particular category of chips is

56:08.295 --> 56:11.120
not , uh , possible given sort of the

56:11.120 --> 56:13.176
steps in the chain . You have TSMC ,

56:13.176 --> 56:15.231
the chip manufacturer . You have the

56:15.231 --> 56:17.509
lithography machines that make , there ,

56:17.509 --> 56:19.509
there's a , a whole chain of things

56:19.509 --> 56:21.620
that they would have to do to be able

56:21.620 --> 56:23.898
to reverse engineer and replicate that ,

56:23.898 --> 56:26.699
um . That being said , I think um the

56:26.699 --> 56:28.810
number of chips also matters . If you

56:28.810 --> 56:31.032
think about what one data center in the

56:31.032 --> 56:32.921
US has , the biggest one , it has

56:32.921 --> 56:36.050
250,000 chips in one data center . Uh ,

56:36.110 --> 56:38.221
the kind of chip numbers that we were

56:38.221 --> 56:40.739
talking about in total for export for a

56:40.739 --> 56:42.683
country that's 4 times our size in

56:42.683 --> 56:44.919
terms of population was less than that

56:45.020 --> 56:47.131
in one data center . So this wasn't ,

56:47.179 --> 56:49.179
it's not a sort of broad , hey , go

56:49.179 --> 56:51.401
sell everything to anyone at any time .

56:51.401 --> 56:53.457
And numbers matter in this , in this

56:53.457 --> 56:55.623
race , as you said before , the amount

56:55.623 --> 56:57.790
of electricity , the number of chips ,

56:57.790 --> 56:59.790
how many data centers we have , are

56:59.790 --> 57:02.012
they interconnected , and does the data

57:02.012 --> 57:04.179
flow in the right way to them ? So , I

57:04.179 --> 57:06.179
think this , it could be that we're

57:06.179 --> 57:08.179
making too much maybe of this one ,

57:08.469 --> 57:11.629
sort of fig leaf if it was . Um , but

57:11.629 --> 57:13.740
I'll , I wonder if you're open , I'll

57:13.740 --> 57:16.560
go to the second question . I'm , I'm

57:16.560 --> 57:18.782
over time here . Maybe we can come back

57:18.782 --> 57:20.893
to it and we'll , and we'll come back

57:20.893 --> 57:22.949
on ramp back . Thanks . Yeah , thank

57:22.949 --> 57:24.616
you , Senator Peters . You're

57:24.616 --> 57:26.616
recognized . I'm sure actually I'll

57:26.616 --> 57:26.530
probably come back to that question ,

57:26.669 --> 57:28.891
uh , so you'll have in my time , you'll

57:28.891 --> 57:31.002
be able to answer some of uh Senators

57:31.002 --> 57:32.780
Lakin , but I wanna talk , uh ,

57:32.780 --> 57:34.947
primarily right now about , um , our ,

57:34.947 --> 57:37.058
our need to deal with , uh , drones .

57:37.058 --> 57:39.169
Uh , and swarms . We had a discussion

57:39.169 --> 57:41.447
about some of this , uh , in my office ,

57:41.447 --> 57:43.502
but probably one of the key areas is

57:43.502 --> 57:45.336
deploying , uh , directed energy

57:45.336 --> 57:47.225
weapons is probably the , the way

57:47.225 --> 57:49.280
you're going to be able to , to deal

57:49.280 --> 57:48.669
with this . So if you could just tell

57:48.669 --> 57:50.891
the committee a little bit how you plan

57:50.891 --> 57:53.270
to , to mass produce directed energy in

57:53.270 --> 57:56.540
this field because it's , uh , um , you

57:56.570 --> 57:58.737
know , you can have drone versus drone

57:58.737 --> 58:00.514
warfare , other kinds of , uh ,

58:00.514 --> 58:02.681
countermeasures , but at least of what

58:02.681 --> 58:04.681
I have been seeing in , in tests is

58:04.681 --> 58:06.514
directed energy is going to be .

58:06.514 --> 58:08.750
Probably the major way in which we can

58:08.750 --> 58:10.917
deal with these weapons . So how do we

58:10.917 --> 58:12.917
accelerate that ? I think we're way

58:12.917 --> 58:15.028
behind right now . How do we catch up

58:15.028 --> 58:17.139
and make up for lost ground ? Yes , I

58:17.139 --> 58:19.139
think . A , a few things that we're

58:19.139 --> 58:21.300
doing . And I remember , uh , scale

58:21.300 --> 58:23.133
directed energy is one of my top

58:23.133 --> 58:25.300
critical technology areas . So it is a

58:25.300 --> 58:28.629
focus , uh , uh , by us . We the

58:28.629 --> 58:31.350
science for directed energy is largely

58:31.350 --> 58:33.572
done , and now we're in the engineering

58:33.572 --> 58:35.739
phase of it . So the engineer it , the

58:35.739 --> 58:38.072
engineering part of it makes it cheaper ,

58:38.072 --> 58:40.479
smaller , and more proliferated . Um ,

58:40.550 --> 58:43.209
and we've now have a suite of directed

58:43.209 --> 58:45.209
energy , uh , products that go from

58:45.209 --> 58:47.590
low-end to high-end . And now we have

58:47.590 --> 58:49.534
to scale production of those . The

58:49.534 --> 58:51.701
things that are helping that are the ,

58:51.701 --> 58:53.923
our golden dome because they have a big

58:53.923 --> 58:55.868
reliance on directed energy . Um ,

58:55.949 --> 58:58.116
certainly , our experience in Iran has

58:58.116 --> 59:00.949
also , um , doubled our interest in

59:00.949 --> 59:02.830
these systems . Same thing with

59:02.830 --> 59:04.886
high-powered microwave , although it

59:04.886 --> 59:06.941
has a different sort of mechanism of

59:06.941 --> 59:09.229
action than lasers . Um , but we've

59:09.229 --> 59:11.709
also developed a joint interagency Task

59:11.709 --> 59:14.310
Force 401 to collate all these

59:14.310 --> 59:16.477
different technologies so that we have

59:16.620 --> 59:19.379
Bigger demand signals which encourages

59:19.379 --> 59:21.379
industry to produce more and we get

59:21.379 --> 59:23.601
scale economies on that . But , but let

59:23.601 --> 59:25.657
me jump in . So I mean the , the DOD

59:25.657 --> 59:27.768
has set a timeline of 36 months for ,

59:27.768 --> 59:29.990
for accelerating this . It's like light

59:29.990 --> 59:32.046
years compared to what we've seen in

59:32.046 --> 59:34.101
the past . What's different ? What ,

59:34.101 --> 59:33.870
what , how are we gonna hit that ?

59:33.979 --> 59:36.035
Hopefully we do it even shorter than

59:36.035 --> 59:38.257
that , but . What are we actually doing

59:38.257 --> 59:40.340
different ? So there's a lot of the

59:40.340 --> 59:43.500
money allocated to Golden Dome is going

59:43.500 --> 59:47.219
to go to the fundamental engineering of

59:47.219 --> 59:49.386
these systems so that we can make them

59:49.386 --> 59:51.108
cheaper , and smaller and more

59:51.108 --> 59:53.330
proliferated . So that's a big change ,

59:53.330 --> 59:55.330
um , and because the commitment was

59:55.330 --> 59:57.497
made to the president that we're going

59:57.497 --> 59:59.608
to have a demonstration that includes

59:59.608 --> 01:00:01.552
directed energy in our golden dome

01:00:01.552 --> 01:00:03.719
architecture , there's a lot of energy

01:00:03.719 --> 01:00:03.419
going into that . When do you expect

01:00:03.419 --> 01:00:06.010
that to be ? Uh , well , we're gonna

01:00:06.010 --> 01:00:07.954
have multiple demonstrations . The

01:00:07.954 --> 01:00:09.954
primary demonstration where it , it

01:00:09.954 --> 01:00:12.177
demonstrates a lot of capabilities will

01:00:12.177 --> 01:00:14.780
be summer of 28 . Um , so we have a

01:00:14.780 --> 01:00:17.002
whole team on this . There's never been

01:00:17.002 --> 01:00:19.113
more effort in the department on this

01:00:19.113 --> 01:00:22.030
particular , um , capability . Uh , and ,

01:00:22.149 --> 01:00:24.205
you know , uh , uh , there's several

01:00:24.205 --> 01:00:26.316
companies that are emerging that have

01:00:26.316 --> 01:00:28.371
developed it , and several companies

01:00:28.371 --> 01:00:30.427
that are taking what they've already

01:00:30.427 --> 01:00:30.010
built and making it cheaper and better .

01:00:30.840 --> 01:00:33.062
OK , then I'm gonna follow up on , uh ,

01:00:33.062 --> 01:00:35.396
Senator Slotkin's question because , um ,

01:00:35.396 --> 01:00:37.396
uh , we've talked about this in the

01:00:37.396 --> 01:00:39.507
office as well is that , uh , we have

01:00:39.507 --> 01:00:41.729
to have access to all of these frontier

01:00:41.729 --> 01:00:43.618
models . We know what with , uh ,

01:00:43.618 --> 01:00:45.729
Mythos now , and Mythos , uh , coming

01:00:45.729 --> 01:00:48.007
out was a game changer in so many ways ,

01:00:48.007 --> 01:00:50.062
but that's not gonna be the last big

01:00:50.062 --> 01:00:49.760
one that comes out . There are gonna be

01:00:49.760 --> 01:00:51.816
others that are gonna come out . You

01:00:51.816 --> 01:00:53.538
know , how do you take certain

01:00:53.538 --> 01:00:55.704
companies off the table ? We , we need

01:00:55.704 --> 01:00:55.399
everybody on the table , everybody

01:00:55.399 --> 01:00:57.566
engaged . We shouldn't be calling some

01:00:57.566 --> 01:00:59.560
companies security risk and supply

01:00:59.560 --> 01:01:01.504
chain risk when they're the actual

01:01:01.504 --> 01:01:03.504
leaders in the world . We should be

01:01:03.504 --> 01:01:05.504
figuring out ways to make sure that

01:01:05.504 --> 01:01:07.671
we're working closely with them . Uh ,

01:01:07.671 --> 01:01:09.671
I , I have a lot of questions about

01:01:09.671 --> 01:01:09.270
what we've talked about in the office ,

01:01:09.350 --> 01:01:11.517
a lot of questions how that happened ,

01:01:11.517 --> 01:01:13.683
but give us some assurance that , uh ,

01:01:13.683 --> 01:01:15.683
we're gonna be making sure that our

01:01:15.683 --> 01:01:17.794
cyber warriors have the absolute best

01:01:17.794 --> 01:01:19.739
tools to take advantage of all the

01:01:19.739 --> 01:01:21.739
amazing American companies that are

01:01:21.739 --> 01:01:21.429
coming up with incredible new

01:01:21.429 --> 01:01:24.270
technologies . Yes , uh , well , 7 out

01:01:24.270 --> 01:01:26.370
of 8 companies we've signed up with

01:01:26.750 --> 01:01:29.070
before I got in this seat and I , I had

01:01:29.070 --> 01:01:30.737
the responsibility . We had 1

01:01:30.737 --> 01:01:32.959
partnership with one company . Now

01:01:32.959 --> 01:01:35.159
we've got 7 partnerships , including

01:01:35.159 --> 01:01:37.360
open source models , which are another

01:01:37.360 --> 01:01:39.471
vector that are very important , that

01:01:39.471 --> 01:01:41.693
are not closed source . Um , and all of

01:01:41.693 --> 01:01:43.693
them have agreed to the DOW terms ,

01:01:43.693 --> 01:01:45.693
which are all lawful use cases , so

01:01:45.693 --> 01:01:47.840
only 1 hasn't . And just to be , you

01:01:47.840 --> 01:01:49.951
know , be specific like I was in your

01:01:49.951 --> 01:01:52.173
office for the other members here , the

01:01:52.173 --> 01:01:54.396
things that we currently can't do under

01:01:54.396 --> 01:01:56.507
the contract with that , that company

01:01:56.507 --> 01:01:58.673
that we declared a supply chain risk .

01:01:58.673 --> 01:02:00.284
We are prohibited from doing

01:02:00.284 --> 01:02:02.396
battlefield management applications ,

01:02:02.396 --> 01:02:04.062
prohibited from doing weapons

01:02:04.062 --> 01:02:06.284
development , prohibited from directing

01:02:06.284 --> 01:02:08.229
interceptions like the Golden Dome

01:02:08.229 --> 01:02:10.284
scenario I gave , I gave you . We're

01:02:10.284 --> 01:02:12.229
prohibited from targeting military

01:02:12.229 --> 01:02:14.340
infrastructure , even of an adversary

01:02:14.340 --> 01:02:17.560
in a conflict . Uh , so those terms

01:02:17.560 --> 01:02:19.504
don't work for the warfighter . So

01:02:19.504 --> 01:02:21.616
maybe the technology is good , but if

01:02:21.616 --> 01:02:23.727
the terms of use don't match and they

01:02:23.727 --> 01:02:26.429
could shut the system off . If it's

01:02:26.429 --> 01:02:28.485
used in a way that they don't like ,

01:02:28.485 --> 01:02:30.596
that becomes a non-viable product for

01:02:30.596 --> 01:02:32.762
the warfighter . That's why I went out

01:02:32.762 --> 01:02:35.629
and made sure that uh OpenAI , SpaceX ,

01:02:35.830 --> 01:02:39.030
Microsoft , AWS , Nvidia , and

01:02:39.030 --> 01:02:41.350
Reflection AI are all partners on DOD

01:02:41.350 --> 01:02:43.572
on classified networks , so we have the

01:02:43.572 --> 01:02:46.459
best of all worlds . So I'd like to

01:02:46.459 --> 01:02:48.570
follow up because you mentioned areas

01:02:48.570 --> 01:02:50.626
there that was not been out there in

01:02:50.626 --> 01:02:52.348
public , uh , as to what those

01:02:52.348 --> 01:02:54.515
limitations are . Yeah , you discussed

01:02:54.515 --> 01:02:56.570
that we discussed in your office and

01:02:56.570 --> 01:02:58.737
we're working through how we could get

01:02:58.737 --> 01:03:00.737
you . There's some NDAs between the

01:03:00.737 --> 01:03:02.626
vendors on that contract that I'm

01:03:02.626 --> 01:03:04.848
reading from , uh , these terms so that

01:03:04.848 --> 01:03:07.070
if , if , if there's a way to do that ,

01:03:07.070 --> 01:03:09.181
we'd like to be able to you to see in

01:03:09.181 --> 01:03:08.899
black and white those contracts . I

01:03:08.899 --> 01:03:11.010
definitely want to see that . Is that

01:03:11.010 --> 01:03:12.955
something we can do . Yeah , I , I

01:03:12.955 --> 01:03:15.121
believe it's something we can do , but

01:03:15.121 --> 01:03:14.780
we have to just work with our OGC on

01:03:14.780 --> 01:03:16.836
that . When , when will I be able to

01:03:16.836 --> 01:03:19.058
see it ? Yeah , I , I was trying to get

01:03:19.058 --> 01:03:18.020
it to you . I just didn't know we have

01:03:18.020 --> 01:03:20.076
to go through some legal processes ,

01:03:20.076 --> 01:03:22.187
but I think we can do that as soon as

01:03:22.187 --> 01:03:24.298
possible . I have a public commitment

01:03:24.298 --> 01:03:24.179
now , so that's great . I appreciate

01:03:24.179 --> 01:03:26.235
that . Uh , it's a public commitment

01:03:26.235 --> 01:03:28.568
for me . I've brought it by the lawyers ,

01:03:28.568 --> 01:03:30.790
but yes , but I , I , I want you to see

01:03:30.790 --> 01:03:32.901
it . You , you know , anthropic could

01:03:32.901 --> 01:03:35.123
give permission any time to let you see

01:03:35.123 --> 01:03:37.068
it . OK , we'll talk . Thank you .

01:03:37.068 --> 01:03:39.050
Thank you , Madam Chair . OK , and

01:03:39.050 --> 01:03:42.729
we'll just do one final round . OK , um ,

01:03:42.820 --> 01:03:46.540
I , I'll double back on SBIR again . I

01:03:46.540 --> 01:03:48.762
wanna thank you . I'm glad we were able

01:03:48.762 --> 01:03:50.984
to get that over the finish line . Um ,

01:03:50.984 --> 01:03:53.040
I did spend a considerable amount of

01:03:53.040 --> 01:03:55.899
time on reauthorizing the SBIR and

01:03:55.899 --> 01:03:59.219
STTR , and I really do appreciate the

01:03:59.219 --> 01:04:01.330
department moving quickly , uh , once

01:04:01.330 --> 01:04:03.300
those programs came back online in

01:04:03.300 --> 01:04:05.580
April , and we want to be able to

01:04:05.580 --> 01:04:09.120
transition the best of the best , uh ,

01:04:09.219 --> 01:04:11.939
technologies to the warfighter as

01:04:11.939 --> 01:04:14.106
quickly as possible . That's long been

01:04:14.106 --> 01:04:17.810
my priority . And it's why we have

01:04:17.810 --> 01:04:19.830
now the creation of the strategic

01:04:19.830 --> 01:04:22.090
Breakthrough Awards so that we can

01:04:22.090 --> 01:04:24.709
rapidly scale the best technologies

01:04:24.929 --> 01:04:28.560
with buy-in from our acquisition

01:04:28.560 --> 01:04:30.929
officials and dog and the broader

01:04:30.929 --> 01:04:33.010
autonomous systems enterprise rely

01:04:33.010 --> 01:04:35.449
heavily on these non-traditional

01:04:35.449 --> 01:04:37.770
commercial vendors for the software and

01:04:37.770 --> 01:04:40.090
the hardware , uh , that will define

01:04:40.090 --> 01:04:43.300
the future war fighting edge . And

01:04:43.620 --> 01:04:46.010
those are often the exact companies

01:04:46.010 --> 01:04:48.066
that really need a little additional

01:04:48.066 --> 01:04:50.379
help with their runway uh to get it to

01:04:50.379 --> 01:04:52.280
the war fighters . So , um ,

01:04:52.540 --> 01:04:54.596
Undersecretary Michael , what are we

01:04:54.596 --> 01:04:56.596
doing to ensure that the transition

01:04:56.596 --> 01:04:59.260
pathway from that prototype . To actual

01:04:59.260 --> 01:05:02.540
production is actually functioning and

01:05:02.540 --> 01:05:05.520
then how can we better measure whether

01:05:05.739 --> 01:05:09.280
uh the FBI or reauthorization

01:05:09.530 --> 01:05:13.139
is meaningfully improving this

01:05:13.139 --> 01:05:16.850
process . Yeah , I mean , part of the

01:05:17.110 --> 01:05:19.790
insight that we had about unifying the

01:05:19.790 --> 01:05:23.790
innovation ecosystem was to have a

01:05:23.790 --> 01:05:26.012
place everywhere in the life cycle of a

01:05:26.012 --> 01:05:28.234
company , starting with Cybersitter all

01:05:28.234 --> 01:05:30.346
the way through a program of record ,

01:05:30.346 --> 01:05:32.790
and that gives me some visibility if

01:05:32.790 --> 01:05:34.846
something comes out of Cybersitter ,

01:05:34.846 --> 01:05:36.957
then maybe you could get to DIU , the

01:05:36.957 --> 01:05:39.012
Defense Innovation Unit , then maybe

01:05:39.012 --> 01:05:40.846
Afit , then the Office of , uh ,

01:05:40.846 --> 01:05:42.957
Strategic Capital . And then we could

01:05:42.957 --> 01:05:45.360
do tests and evaluations so that it can

01:05:45.459 --> 01:05:48.209
leap to the services without big gaps

01:05:48.209 --> 01:05:51.620
in time , the value of death , so . I

01:05:51.620 --> 01:05:53.842
now have visibility into all those sort

01:05:53.842 --> 01:05:55.899
of organizations and can ensure that

01:05:55.899 --> 01:05:57.843
I'm tracking a company all the way

01:05:57.843 --> 01:05:59.732
through . Good example of a cyber

01:05:59.732 --> 01:06:01.843
sitter company that's made it all the

01:06:01.843 --> 01:06:03.843
way through now is Castilian . They

01:06:03.843 --> 01:06:05.732
were a Cyber sitter company . Now

01:06:05.732 --> 01:06:08.066
they're developing low-cost hypersonics ,

01:06:08.066 --> 01:06:10.288
less than $500,000 per missile relative

01:06:10.288 --> 01:06:12.399
to the $50 million per missile we pay

01:06:12.399 --> 01:06:14.621
today . And those are good stories . So

01:06:14.621 --> 01:06:16.621
getting those stories out there and

01:06:16.621 --> 01:06:18.788
making sure that the services and each

01:06:18.788 --> 01:06:21.010
of these other funding sources that now

01:06:21.010 --> 01:06:23.066
I have some oversight on can see and

01:06:23.066 --> 01:06:25.459
take those weapons forward are , uh ,

01:06:25.469 --> 01:06:27.525
really , I think gonna compress this

01:06:27.525 --> 01:06:29.747
notion of valley of death and hopefully

01:06:29.747 --> 01:06:31.858
eliminate it . Yeah , wonderful . Any

01:06:31.858 --> 01:06:33.747
other input , um , from the other

01:06:33.747 --> 01:06:35.858
members today , Doctor Wolfson ? Uh ,

01:06:35.858 --> 01:06:38.080
yes , please . I . I just wanna say how

01:06:38.080 --> 01:06:37.860
grateful and thankful we are for the

01:06:37.860 --> 01:06:40.100
additional uh funding that you added in

01:06:40.100 --> 01:06:42.322
the new CIR Authorization Act . We have

01:06:42.322 --> 01:06:44.211
actually had some of that similar

01:06:44.211 --> 01:06:46.378
authority through our Stratify process

01:06:46.378 --> 01:06:48.544
which is uh CIR funding , uh , program

01:06:48.544 --> 01:06:50.600
of record funding , and then venture

01:06:50.600 --> 01:06:52.656
capital funding , um , and we've had

01:06:52.656 --> 01:06:54.544
that going for a while and I just

01:06:54.544 --> 01:06:54.219
wanted to tell you a couple of the big

01:06:54.219 --> 01:06:56.540
successes that , you know , reinforces

01:06:56.540 --> 01:06:58.596
what Honorable Emil . Um , Honorable

01:06:58.596 --> 01:07:00.800
Michael was saying , um , ARL was one

01:07:00.800 --> 01:07:03.239
of our first , uh , uh , organizations

01:07:03.239 --> 01:07:05.479
that utilized , uh , Stratf . Uh , they

01:07:05.479 --> 01:07:07.760
have since bought out another company

01:07:07.760 --> 01:07:09.927
that utilized Stratf called Blue Force

01:07:09.927 --> 01:07:11.649
Technology , and their current

01:07:11.649 --> 01:07:13.816
evaluation is about $61 billion . Um ,

01:07:13.909 --> 01:07:16.840
Shield AI started as an AFRL Stratfi ,

01:07:17.399 --> 01:07:20.080
um , that has also , um , helps develop

01:07:20.080 --> 01:07:22.600
our our autonomy for our combative

01:07:22.600 --> 01:07:24.600
collaborative . Of combative , um ,

01:07:24.600 --> 01:07:26.822
platforms and they're about $12 billion

01:07:26.822 --> 01:07:29.054
now and then also Castilian was one of

01:07:29.054 --> 01:07:33.024
our AFRL Air Force uh Strap 5 as well .

01:07:33.254 --> 01:07:35.421
Um , and is doing great things . So we

01:07:35.421 --> 01:07:37.476
are grateful for that capability and

01:07:37.476 --> 01:07:39.698
hope to continue to leverage it . Thank

01:07:39.698 --> 01:07:41.698
you very much , Mr . Trumper . Uh ,

01:07:41.698 --> 01:07:43.587
yeah , in fact , uh , during your

01:07:43.587 --> 01:07:45.698
opening statements , you both alluded

01:07:45.698 --> 01:07:47.865
to relationships with industry and how

01:07:47.865 --> 01:07:47.175
do we foster those and how do we , how

01:07:47.175 --> 01:07:49.231
do we do things faster . Uh , one of

01:07:49.231 --> 01:07:51.286
the , the big Navy commitments is in

01:07:51.286 --> 01:07:53.508
that integration space , and we look at

01:07:53.508 --> 01:07:55.675
our warfare centers distributed across

01:07:55.675 --> 01:07:57.842
the country as our seasoned experts on

01:07:57.842 --> 01:07:59.786
how do you operationalize things ,

01:07:59.786 --> 01:08:02.008
right ? If I have a , a technology that

01:08:02.008 --> 01:08:01.120
shows up , it's a non-traditional ,

01:08:01.199 --> 01:08:03.310
it's , it's an SBIR phase one , phase

01:08:03.310 --> 01:08:05.477
two . How do I then take that and make

01:08:05.477 --> 01:08:07.421
it Operationally useful . How do I

01:08:07.421 --> 01:08:09.532
bring it into that phase 3 ? How do I

01:08:09.532 --> 01:08:11.477
then measure success of my phase 3

01:08:11.477 --> 01:08:13.532
investments versus my phase one , my

01:08:13.532 --> 01:08:15.699
phase 3 non-Sier investments versus my

01:08:15.699 --> 01:08:17.643
phase 1 , phase 2 ? And what we're

01:08:17.643 --> 01:08:19.643
seeing is about a 2 to 1 investment

01:08:19.643 --> 01:08:21.866
return on investment , so 200% increase

01:08:21.866 --> 01:08:21.580
in phase 3 over what we invested in

01:08:21.580 --> 01:08:23.879
phase one . That integration space is

01:08:23.879 --> 01:08:26.046
key though for things like Castilian .

01:08:26.046 --> 01:08:28.046
The ability of those vendors to get

01:08:28.046 --> 01:08:30.560
access to ranges , to get access to

01:08:30.560 --> 01:08:32.393
engineering expertise within the

01:08:32.393 --> 01:08:34.560
government through Cratas , through uh

01:08:34.560 --> 01:08:36.782
commercial services agreements , allows

01:08:36.782 --> 01:08:38.727
them to understand the operational

01:08:38.727 --> 01:08:38.520
context of the technology they're going ,

01:08:38.600 --> 01:08:40.711
they're , they're , they're , they're

01:08:40.711 --> 01:08:42.767
bringing their technology into . And

01:08:42.767 --> 01:08:44.933
now you can weave in the survivability

01:08:44.933 --> 01:08:44.560
and sustainability that then

01:08:44.560 --> 01:08:46.560
streamlines the scalability through

01:08:46.560 --> 01:08:48.727
acquisition . So we're seeing a lot of

01:08:48.727 --> 01:08:50.838
success in , in those areas and , and

01:08:50.838 --> 01:08:53.171
in fact to the lab infrastructure point .

01:08:53.171 --> 01:08:55.393
Uh , the commercial services agreements

01:08:55.393 --> 01:08:57.560
where , uh , where a VC backed company

01:08:57.560 --> 01:08:59.727
is then creating an agreement with the

01:08:59.727 --> 01:09:01.782
government allows them to pay to use

01:09:01.782 --> 01:09:03.838
the infrastructure of the government

01:09:03.838 --> 01:09:05.727
which then gets put back into the

01:09:05.727 --> 01:09:07.893
government infrastructure . That's not

01:09:07.893 --> 01:09:07.318
government resources paying government

01:09:07.318 --> 01:09:09.599
infrastructure . That's VC resources

01:09:09.599 --> 01:09:11.599
being returned back into government

01:09:11.599 --> 01:09:13.655
infrastructure . So there's a lot of

01:09:13.655 --> 01:09:15.655
those private , uh , public-private

01:09:15.655 --> 01:09:17.655
partnership arrangements that we're

01:09:17.655 --> 01:09:19.821
seeing a lot of benefit from . SBIR is

01:09:19.821 --> 01:09:22.049
VC backed in terms of offering our

01:09:22.049 --> 01:09:23.882
engineering expertise to outside

01:09:23.882 --> 01:09:26.216
vendors . It's fantastic , Mr . Manning .

01:09:26.216 --> 01:09:28.450
Anything briefly ? Yes , uh , so we

01:09:28.450 --> 01:09:30.672
also recognize the importance of taking

01:09:30.672 --> 01:09:32.839
these small companies and getting them

01:09:32.839 --> 01:09:34.950
on a path scale and prior to our most

01:09:34.950 --> 01:09:36.894
recent acquisition reform , we'd .

01:09:36.894 --> 01:09:39.117
Launched a cyber catalyst program which

01:09:39.117 --> 01:09:41.174
uh part of that was small business

01:09:41.444 --> 01:09:43.845
partnered with a larger integrator part

01:09:43.845 --> 01:09:45.901
uh connected with , um , at the time

01:09:45.901 --> 01:09:47.789
program executive office money so

01:09:47.789 --> 01:09:49.678
resources in all three , everyone

01:09:49.678 --> 01:09:51.734
having skin in the game right at the

01:09:51.734 --> 01:09:53.956
beginning to go , hey , this is panning

01:09:53.956 --> 01:09:53.950
out . How do we take it to scale . Uh ,

01:09:54.069 --> 01:09:56.013
more recently with AC reform we've

01:09:56.013 --> 01:09:58.180
aligned our SIR program with Army Fuse

01:09:58.180 --> 01:10:00.430
connected to the pit , so we anticipate

01:10:00.430 --> 01:10:02.652
having those small businesses going and

01:10:02.652 --> 01:10:04.652
iterating with soldiers of the 18th

01:10:04.652 --> 01:10:06.486
Airborne Corps . And when we see

01:10:06.486 --> 01:10:08.708
promising technology , the pit director

01:10:08.708 --> 01:10:08.430
connecting with our portfolio

01:10:08.430 --> 01:10:10.541
acquisition executives to go , how do

01:10:10.541 --> 01:10:12.652
we get this on a path to rapidly take

01:10:12.652 --> 01:10:14.819
it to scale ? Thank you . OK , ranking

01:10:14.819 --> 01:10:17.810
member . Thanks . Um , Undersecretary

01:10:17.810 --> 01:10:19.977
Michael , just to continue our line of

01:10:19.977 --> 01:10:22.310
conversation , you know , I , I , again ,

01:10:22.310 --> 01:10:24.859
In , in a , in a , um , with a strong

01:10:24.859 --> 01:10:27.359
desire to win the AI race , it's hard

01:10:27.359 --> 01:10:30.620
to rationalize to , in my brain , the

01:10:30.620 --> 01:10:34.299
two decisions of agreeing to sell some

01:10:34.299 --> 01:10:36.188
of our most sophisticated chips ,

01:10:36.188 --> 01:10:39.330
Nvidia chips to the Chinese . And then

01:10:39.330 --> 01:10:41.108
secondly , picking a fight with

01:10:41.108 --> 01:10:42.997
Anthropic . And I , I know you've

01:10:42.997 --> 01:10:45.163
touched both of these , but , um , let

01:10:45.163 --> 01:10:47.386
me just ask on Anthropic as a follow-up

01:10:47.386 --> 01:10:50.370
and for others on the panel . Um , so

01:10:51.020 --> 01:10:53.819
this fight erupts between Secretary

01:10:53.819 --> 01:10:57.620
Hegseth and Anthropic . It somehow

01:10:57.620 --> 01:11:00.620
can't be worked out even though all of

01:11:00.620 --> 01:11:03.459
you up here use anthropic in your

01:11:03.459 --> 01:11:07.379
classified systems , um . Um

01:11:08.220 --> 01:11:10.387
They're , we've declared them a supply

01:11:10.387 --> 01:11:12.553
chain risk , and you've been told by ,

01:11:12.553 --> 01:11:14.979
I believe , August to wean yourself off

01:11:14.979 --> 01:11:17.799
and extricate them from your systems .

01:11:18.839 --> 01:11:22.450
Um , then they dropped the , the detail

01:11:22.450 --> 01:11:24.672
that they've invented this thing called

01:11:24.672 --> 01:11:27.006
Mythos , which is going to take us , um ,

01:11:27.006 --> 01:11:29.450
light years ahead on cyber threats in

01:11:29.450 --> 01:11:32.290
particular , and it's such a leap that

01:11:32.290 --> 01:11:34.012
they are actually testing this

01:11:34.012 --> 01:11:36.234
commercial product like a weapon . They

01:11:36.234 --> 01:11:38.012
are giving it to private sector

01:11:38.012 --> 01:11:40.068
companies , and I understand they're

01:11:40.068 --> 01:11:42.123
giving it to you all to test and try

01:11:42.123 --> 01:11:44.068
before they put it out on the open

01:11:44.068 --> 01:11:46.290
market because they're so worried about

01:11:46.290 --> 01:11:48.457
the vulnerabilities it will expose and

01:11:48.457 --> 01:11:50.512
the intended national security risks

01:11:50.512 --> 01:11:52.959
that come from that . Um , who knows

01:11:52.959 --> 01:11:55.237
the next thing they're going to invent ,

01:11:55.237 --> 01:11:56.903
but the Department of Defense

01:11:56.903 --> 01:11:59.126
apparently won't have access to it . So

01:11:59.126 --> 01:12:01.459
for , um , uh , uh , separate from , um ,

01:12:01.459 --> 01:12:03.626
Undersecretary Michael , for the , the

01:12:03.626 --> 01:12:05.903
three others representing the services ,

01:12:05.903 --> 01:12:08.520
are you currently using anthropic in

01:12:08.520 --> 01:12:11.930
your classified systems today ? And

01:12:12.350 --> 01:12:15.370
what is the cost , um , both in terms

01:12:15.370 --> 01:12:18.180
of capacity and money , since this is a

01:12:18.180 --> 01:12:20.709
budget hearing in pulling that out of

01:12:20.709 --> 01:12:23.270
your systems by the August deadline if

01:12:23.270 --> 01:12:25.437
you intend to meet those . Let's start

01:12:25.437 --> 01:12:28.169
with Mr . Manning . Uh , Senator , uh ,

01:12:28.259 --> 01:12:30.370
I'm , I'm aware that we're using some

01:12:31.020 --> 01:12:33.839
anthropic . We are in the process of

01:12:34.060 --> 01:12:36.227
assessing where all that is so that we

01:12:36.227 --> 01:12:38.338
could be in compliance with the , the

01:12:38.338 --> 01:12:40.560
direction from Department of War . Uh ,

01:12:40.560 --> 01:12:42.782
I would have to take a question for the

01:12:42.782 --> 01:12:44.449
record as to what the cost is

01:12:44.449 --> 01:12:46.338
associated with that . Yeah , I'd

01:12:46.338 --> 01:12:48.449
appreciate that . And if that's gonna

01:12:48.449 --> 01:12:47.910
be the answer that all of you are gonna

01:12:47.910 --> 01:12:49.799
have to say , I'll hold you to it

01:12:49.799 --> 01:12:51.910
because it is a budget hearing you're

01:12:51.910 --> 01:12:54.077
asking us for money and decisions that

01:12:54.077 --> 01:12:56.188
the Secretary of Defense have made is

01:12:56.188 --> 01:12:58.410
going to cost the American taxpayer and

01:12:58.410 --> 01:13:00.577
your budget's money . I'd like to know

01:13:00.577 --> 01:13:03.930
what that cost is , um , and , um , uh ,

01:13:04.529 --> 01:13:06.751
for the rest of you , are you currently

01:13:06.751 --> 01:13:08.696
using anthropic in your classified

01:13:08.696 --> 01:13:11.160
systems ? Um , and are you gonna meet

01:13:11.160 --> 01:13:13.640
the timeline to extricate it from your

01:13:13.640 --> 01:13:16.669
systems and at what cost ? Uh , yeah ,

01:13:16.790 --> 01:13:19.229
the Navy is also in that 180 day

01:13:19.229 --> 01:13:21.340
assessment period . I can't confirm ,

01:13:21.340 --> 01:13:23.396
uh , current use of anthropic in our

01:13:23.396 --> 01:13:25.618
classified systems , but , but we'll be

01:13:25.618 --> 01:13:27.618
happy to come back and provide that

01:13:27.618 --> 01:13:30.439
information . Same answer . We're still

01:13:30.439 --> 01:13:33.100
within that 180 period . We are

01:13:33.100 --> 01:13:35.267
identifying it . Once we've identified

01:13:35.267 --> 01:13:37.267
where it is , we'll understand what

01:13:37.267 --> 01:13:39.600
that cost and what those challenges are .

01:13:39.600 --> 01:13:41.767
OK , so I will , um , circle back with

01:13:41.767 --> 01:13:43.822
you all and expect to get that . I'd

01:13:43.822 --> 01:13:45.989
like to get that in a timely fashion .

01:13:45.989 --> 01:13:47.989
If you're in , you're asking us for

01:13:47.989 --> 01:13:47.979
money , it's budget season . We are

01:13:47.979 --> 01:13:50.459
going to mark up the NDAA , then you

01:13:50.459 --> 01:13:52.626
can get me your answers on what you're

01:13:52.626 --> 01:13:55.009
gonna cost the taxpayer . Um , and

01:13:55.020 --> 01:13:57.020
lastly , Undersecretary Michael , I

01:13:57.020 --> 01:13:59.220
would just say , um . What is

01:13:59.220 --> 01:14:01.660
complicated is that many of us , again ,

01:14:01.819 --> 01:14:03.819
both sides of the aisle desperately

01:14:03.819 --> 01:14:06.419
want to win the , the AI race against

01:14:06.419 --> 01:14:08.729
China , um , but there's just , it just

01:14:08.729 --> 01:14:10.990
feels like story after story around

01:14:10.990 --> 01:14:13.899
corruption . Um , um , every single

01:14:13.899 --> 01:14:16.121
week , and the story that came out this

01:14:16.121 --> 01:14:18.177
week is that the president bought or

01:14:18.177 --> 01:14:21.080
traded $5 million worth of Nvidia stock ,

01:14:21.169 --> 01:14:23.120
uh , you know , a week before he

01:14:23.120 --> 01:14:25.439
allowed the Department of Commerce to

01:14:25.439 --> 01:14:27.495
say that we could sell those chips .

01:14:27.600 --> 01:14:29.656
Those kinds of things speak to the .

01:14:29.656 --> 01:14:31.878
Perception of impropriety . I don't , I

01:14:31.878 --> 01:14:33.933
can't prove guilt or innocence , but

01:14:33.933 --> 01:14:35.933
the perception , and I know you got

01:14:35.933 --> 01:14:37.989
into it on the Hask side , um , with

01:14:37.989 --> 01:14:40.211
folks over there , um , I , I , can you

01:14:40.211 --> 01:14:42.294
just confirm for me , separate from

01:14:42.294 --> 01:14:44.405
paperwork and when you sign different

01:14:44.405 --> 01:14:46.072
things because we've had this

01:14:46.072 --> 01:14:48.595
discussion before , have you made money

01:14:48.595 --> 01:14:52.495
in your portfolio on AI stocks

01:14:52.495 --> 01:14:54.495
since taking a job with the federal

01:14:54.495 --> 01:14:57.694
government where you're in charge of AI ?

01:14:58.410 --> 01:15:00.830
Uh , I've recused myself from any

01:15:00.930 --> 01:15:03.041
company that I had a holding in , but

01:15:03.041 --> 01:15:05.299
have you made money ? By all accounts

01:15:05.299 --> 01:15:07.299
you've made a significant amount of

01:15:07.299 --> 01:15:09.521
money . It's public . I , I have , I've

01:15:09.521 --> 01:15:11.632
made money because I had to divest of

01:15:11.632 --> 01:15:13.799
all the stocks that I might have had a

01:15:13.799 --> 01:15:16.021
conflict in . So I had to , like , when

01:15:16.021 --> 01:15:18.243
you sell them , you , you sold all your

01:15:18.243 --> 01:15:20.188
stock from sold all my conflicting

01:15:20.188 --> 01:15:22.299
stock . And if , for those that the ,

01:15:22.299 --> 01:15:24.355
the OGE said you can keep them , you

01:15:24.355 --> 01:15:26.299
just have to , uh , recuse . I , I

01:15:26.299 --> 01:15:28.355
followed that faithfully . So do you

01:15:28.355 --> 01:15:30.355
have any AI stock in your portfolio

01:15:30.355 --> 01:15:32.521
right now ? I don't . OK , thank you .

01:15:32.521 --> 01:15:35.899
You're back . Thank you . I recognize

01:15:35.899 --> 01:15:38.232
Senator Kelly . Thank you , Madam Chair .

01:15:38.232 --> 01:15:41.580
Mr . Michael , under Title 10 US Code

01:15:41.580 --> 01:15:45.580
Section 3252 , the statute that your

01:15:45.580 --> 01:15:47.819
department invoked against anthropic

01:15:48.299 --> 01:15:52.250
has a supply chain risk . It's defined

01:15:52.540 --> 01:15:54.819
as the risk that an adversary may , and

01:15:54.819 --> 01:15:57.089
this is a quote , sabotage ,

01:15:57.339 --> 01:15:59.790
maliciously introduce unwanted function ,

01:16:00.220 --> 01:16:03.270
or otherwise subvert . And quote ,

01:16:03.379 --> 01:16:05.689
national security systems . That's the

01:16:05.689 --> 01:16:09.680
language that Congress chose , sabotage

01:16:09.680 --> 01:16:12.890
or subversion , language that implies

01:16:12.890 --> 01:16:15.009
the undermining of our national

01:16:15.009 --> 01:16:18.759
security . On an all , all-in podcast

01:16:18.759 --> 01:16:21.859
in March , you explained this in your

01:16:21.859 --> 01:16:24.220
own words , saying , and this is

01:16:24.220 --> 01:16:26.109
another quote here , what if this

01:16:26.109 --> 01:16:28.109
software went down , some guardrail

01:16:28.109 --> 01:16:31.259
kicked up , some refusal happened for

01:16:31.259 --> 01:16:33.740
the next fight like this one , and we

01:16:33.740 --> 01:16:36.259
left our people at risk . So that was

01:16:36.259 --> 01:16:38.779
the danger that you described , a

01:16:38.779 --> 01:16:41.459
mid-mission failure that would put

01:16:41.459 --> 01:16:44.470
American troops' lives in danger . Now ,

01:16:44.569 --> 01:16:46.902
here are the facts as we sit here today .

01:16:47.200 --> 01:16:49.970
Anthropic has been designated a supply

01:16:49.970 --> 01:16:52.649
supply chain risk . And your secretary ,

01:16:52.799 --> 01:16:55.160
Pete Hegseth called the decision final .

01:16:56.569 --> 01:16:58.791
The president has ordered every federal

01:16:58.791 --> 01:17:00.902
agency to stop using their products ,

01:17:00.902 --> 01:17:03.319
and yet US service members have used

01:17:03.319 --> 01:17:06.029
anthropic clawed in combat operations

01:17:06.029 --> 01:17:09.160
against Iran since the strikes began on

01:17:09.160 --> 01:17:10.859
February twenty-eighth . Your

01:17:10.859 --> 01:17:14.080
secretary's 180 day phase out has not

01:17:14.080 --> 01:17:16.770
expired . As of March 24th , your own

01:17:16.770 --> 01:17:19.310
Chief of Chief Information Officer

01:17:19.729 --> 01:17:21.896
Kirsten Davies testified to the Senate

01:17:21.896 --> 01:17:24.299
that Claude's use in US military

01:17:24.299 --> 01:17:27.529
operations in Iran was active right now .

01:17:28.660 --> 01:17:30.993
So I've got a question . It's two parts .

01:17:30.993 --> 01:17:33.189
Part one , if you are correct , If

01:17:33.189 --> 01:17:36.029
Anthropic's product is genuinely what

01:17:36.029 --> 01:17:39.379
Section 3252 contemplates , a national

01:17:39.379 --> 01:17:41.490
security supply chain risk capable of

01:17:41.490 --> 01:17:44.339
sabotage , subversion , or a mid-fight

01:17:44.339 --> 01:17:46.689
refusal that gets Americans killed ,

01:17:47.350 --> 01:17:49.390
how does your department justify

01:17:49.390 --> 01:17:51.446
leaving that product in the hands of

01:17:51.446 --> 01:17:54.629
our troops in an active conflict one

01:17:54.629 --> 01:17:57.979
second longer ? Uh ,

01:17:58.700 --> 01:18:00.867
when they were declared a supply chain

01:18:00.867 --> 01:18:04.339
risk , we stopped all updates permitted

01:18:04.339 --> 01:18:07.160
from , uh , that company , so we froze

01:18:07.160 --> 01:18:10.770
the code . And the cloud provider that

01:18:10.770 --> 01:18:13.950
it was hosted on froze any access so

01:18:13.950 --> 01:18:15.950
that no change could be made in the

01:18:15.950 --> 01:18:18.330
code , so there was no risk of any

01:18:18.330 --> 01:18:22.250
mid-battle change in the operations of

01:18:22.250 --> 01:18:24.417
that . But that also means there is no

01:18:24.417 --> 01:18:26.830
risk in the code as it was on the day

01:18:27.160 --> 01:18:29.950
that you said . It could be used

01:18:30.410 --> 01:18:32.577
against the troops in a way that could

01:18:32.577 --> 01:18:34.466
put them at risk . No , Senator ,

01:18:34.466 --> 01:18:36.810
because the , uh , before you came in ,

01:18:36.890 --> 01:18:39.001
I listed the things that were against

01:18:39.001 --> 01:18:41.057
their terms of service , uh , that ,

01:18:41.057 --> 01:18:43.709
for example , you were not allowed by

01:18:43.709 --> 01:18:45.709
their terms of service that we live

01:18:45.709 --> 01:18:47.376
under today to do battlefield

01:18:47.376 --> 01:18:49.431
management applications , target any

01:18:49.431 --> 01:18:51.709
military infrastructure of adversaries ,

01:18:51.930 --> 01:18:54.097
direct interceptions like of a drone .

01:18:54.220 --> 01:18:57.160
Uh , or develop weapons systems and we

01:18:57.160 --> 01:19:00.290
just that could still be built into the

01:19:00.290 --> 01:19:02.401
code , so we're just avoiding the use

01:19:02.401 --> 01:19:04.290
cases . Let me , let me ask you a

01:19:04.290 --> 01:19:06.512
second question though . If Anthropic's

01:19:06.512 --> 01:19:08.568
product is then , it seems like it's

01:19:08.568 --> 01:19:10.790
what , what you , what they're using is

01:19:10.790 --> 01:19:12.623
safe enough now to remain in our

01:19:12.623 --> 01:19:14.512
soldiers' hands in a shooting war

01:19:14.512 --> 01:19:16.679
against a foreign adversary . How does

01:19:16.679 --> 01:19:18.680
the department justify branding an

01:19:18.680 --> 01:19:22.319
American company a sabotage and

01:19:22.319 --> 01:19:26.140
subversion risk under a statute

01:19:26.419 --> 01:19:28.819
that Congress wrote for foreign spies ?

01:19:28.919 --> 01:19:31.879
It seems a little bit extreme , and one

01:19:31.879 --> 01:19:34.101
of these two things , you know , has to

01:19:34.101 --> 01:19:37.339
be wrong . And which is it ?

01:19:38.799 --> 01:19:42.100
Um , I The , the

01:19:42.100 --> 01:19:46.060
sophistication with which we use

01:19:46.060 --> 01:19:48.459
AI at the Department of War is very

01:19:48.459 --> 01:19:51.459
nascent right now . The way we use it

01:19:51.459 --> 01:19:53.859
is still very early days . What we're

01:19:53.859 --> 01:19:56.081
worried about with the terms of service

01:19:56.081 --> 01:19:58.248
that they had and their posture toward

01:19:58.248 --> 01:20:00.680
the department , which when they

01:20:00.680 --> 01:20:02.847
questioned the Maduro raid and whether

01:20:02.847 --> 01:20:05.180
their software was used inappropriately .

01:20:05.540 --> 01:20:07.651
Gave us the sense that this was not a

01:20:07.651 --> 01:20:10.049
reliable partner to deal with given

01:20:10.049 --> 01:20:12.930
their because they asked questions

01:20:12.930 --> 01:20:15.208
about how their product was being used ,

01:20:15.490 --> 01:20:18.609
that means that not reliable that in

01:20:18.609 --> 01:20:21.129
conjunction with their written terms of

01:20:21.129 --> 01:20:23.850
service which prevent the use cases

01:20:23.850 --> 01:20:25.950
that we would like to advance into

01:20:25.950 --> 01:20:28.009
battlefield management , directing

01:20:28.009 --> 01:20:30.049
interceptions , developing weapons

01:20:30.049 --> 01:20:32.049
systems . Well , here's the thing ,

01:20:32.049 --> 01:20:34.049
there seems to be a theme here that

01:20:34.049 --> 01:20:36.490
anybody who questions . This

01:20:36.540 --> 01:20:38.707
administration questions the Secretary

01:20:38.707 --> 01:20:41.430
of Defense , uh , offers some other

01:20:41.430 --> 01:20:45.189
route , uh , some other idea that

01:20:45.189 --> 01:20:47.830
isn't consistent with the leadership of

01:20:47.830 --> 01:20:50.439
the department . Uh , you know ,

01:20:50.520 --> 01:20:52.631
they're branded , in this case , this

01:20:52.631 --> 01:20:55.879
company branded as subversion risk and

01:20:55.879 --> 01:20:59.439
essentially fired . Because they

01:20:59.439 --> 01:21:01.740
started trying to have a discussion

01:21:02.200 --> 01:21:04.367
about , hey , what's , uh , you know ,

01:21:04.390 --> 01:21:06.557
what's the best use of this or why did

01:21:06.557 --> 01:21:09.120
you do this this way or that way . I

01:21:09.120 --> 01:21:11.342
think , you know , my , my view on this

01:21:11.342 --> 01:21:13.509
after , you know , a lot of , a lot of

01:21:13.509 --> 01:21:15.564
experience in the military and other

01:21:15.564 --> 01:21:17.564
government agencies , if you're not

01:21:17.564 --> 01:21:19.731
asking the hard questions , especially

01:21:19.731 --> 01:21:21.787
uphill . You're not getting the best

01:21:21.787 --> 01:21:23.676
out of your people and you're not

01:21:23.676 --> 01:21:25.676
getting the best decisions . And my

01:21:25.676 --> 01:21:27.842
concern here is you , is you branded a

01:21:27.842 --> 01:21:30.009
company , uh , in a way that's harmful

01:21:30.009 --> 01:21:32.342
for them and their employees , you know ,

01:21:32.342 --> 01:21:34.398
thousands of people that , that work

01:21:34.398 --> 01:21:36.189
there , but you also may have

01:21:36.330 --> 01:21:39.370
ultimately put our service members at

01:21:39.370 --> 01:21:41.410
risk if they are in fact the best

01:21:41.410 --> 01:21:43.410
company to provide these services .

01:21:43.770 --> 01:21:45.770
They seem to be . Thank you , Madam

01:21:45.770 --> 01:21:48.209
Chair . Can I , yes , and you may

01:21:48.209 --> 01:21:52.189
because um uh . Secretary Michael had

01:21:52.490 --> 01:21:55.890
listed now the uh partners that we do

01:21:55.890 --> 01:21:58.169
have that will be filling this gap ,

01:21:58.250 --> 01:22:00.250
but yes , I'd like you to respond .

01:22:00.370 --> 01:22:03.970
Senator , every other major AI company ,

01:22:04.290 --> 01:22:07.450
every single one agreed to our terms .

01:22:07.569 --> 01:22:09.729
So this wasn't about questioning

01:22:09.729 --> 01:22:12.169
whether we were , um , you know , they

01:22:12.169 --> 01:22:14.529
dared to question us . This is , we

01:22:14.529 --> 01:22:16.729
wanted to , to use their products for

01:22:16.729 --> 01:22:19.939
all lawful use cases . And Microsoft

01:22:19.939 --> 01:22:22.217
agreed to that . OpenAI agreed to that .

01:22:22.217 --> 01:22:24.328
Nvidia agreed to that . Google agreed

01:22:24.328 --> 01:22:26.495
to that . So every other company , how

01:22:26.495 --> 01:22:29.020
many of those were after Claude were

01:22:29.020 --> 01:22:31.076
all got fired . They , they were all

01:22:31.076 --> 01:22:33.187
after because we didn't , we only had

01:22:33.187 --> 01:22:35.464
one provider before we got in the seat .

01:22:35.464 --> 01:22:37.298
And when , when we looked at the

01:22:37.298 --> 01:22:39.464
contract of that provider , we said we

01:22:39.464 --> 01:22:41.631
can't grow with that . I think there's

01:22:41.631 --> 01:22:43.687
any chance they saw what happened to

01:22:43.687 --> 01:22:45.853
Claude , saw an opportunity , and then

01:22:45.853 --> 01:22:47.853
said , Well , I know what I have to

01:22:47.853 --> 01:22:50.020
agree to . Absolutely not . Um , maybe

01:22:50.020 --> 01:22:52.242
OpenAI , I'll , I'll , I'll retract and

01:22:52.242 --> 01:22:54.187
say maybe one company that sort of

01:22:54.187 --> 01:22:56.298
tried to slide in one of their direct

01:22:56.298 --> 01:22:56.140
competitors , but Google has been a

01:22:56.140 --> 01:22:58.196
longtime partner of the department ,

01:22:58.196 --> 01:23:00.307
Microsoft , Nvidia , real , built big

01:23:00.307 --> 01:23:02.084
companies with proper corporate

01:23:02.084 --> 01:23:04.196
governance , went through their legal

01:23:04.196 --> 01:23:06.362
teams , and agreed to our terms of all

01:23:06.362 --> 01:23:08.529
lawful use cases where Anthropic would

01:23:08.529 --> 01:23:10.418
not . So that should , should say

01:23:10.418 --> 01:23:12.251
something that our terms weren't

01:23:12.251 --> 01:23:14.418
unreasonable . We weren't trying to be

01:23:14.418 --> 01:23:16.584
unreasonable vis a vis any one partner

01:23:16.584 --> 01:23:18.473
for any specific reason that they

01:23:18.473 --> 01:23:20.640
didn't demonstrate themselves . Who do

01:23:20.640 --> 01:23:20.529
you think is best equipped to provide

01:23:20.529 --> 01:23:22.609
these services today ? It depends on

01:23:22.609 --> 01:23:24.665
the application . I'll give you some

01:23:24.665 --> 01:23:27.450
examples as to why . Um , Google , for

01:23:27.450 --> 01:23:29.569
example , has a lot of video imagery

01:23:29.569 --> 01:23:31.847
because of their YouTube and nest cams ,

01:23:31.847 --> 01:23:33.569
and therefore , from a robotic

01:23:33.569 --> 01:23:35.625
standpoint , they may provide better

01:23:35.625 --> 01:23:37.736
capability from an autonomous weapons

01:23:37.736 --> 01:23:39.919
standpoint . Um , Nvidia has an open

01:23:39.919 --> 01:23:42.141
source product , which is going to be a

01:23:42.141 --> 01:23:44.040
crowdsourced capability that can

01:23:44.040 --> 01:23:46.096
compete with the Chinese open source

01:23:46.096 --> 01:23:47.707
models , which are currently

01:23:47.707 --> 01:23:49.984
infiltrating a lot of the US companies .

01:23:49.984 --> 01:23:51.818
So , each of them have different

01:23:51.818 --> 01:23:53.818
capabilities , which is frankly why

01:23:53.818 --> 01:23:56.040
independent of anthropic , I would have

01:23:56.040 --> 01:23:55.979
ensured that we had multiple providers .

01:23:56.479 --> 01:23:58.423
Because the leaderboards change on

01:23:58.423 --> 01:24:00.535
these providers every few months , it

01:24:00.535 --> 01:24:02.479
wouldn't surprise me if next month

01:24:02.479 --> 01:24:04.590
you'd have OpenAI have a better cyber

01:24:04.590 --> 01:24:06.590
model than Methos . So for us to be

01:24:06.590 --> 01:24:08.646
responsible to the warfighter , I've

01:24:08.646 --> 01:24:10.868
got to have all the options possible as

01:24:10.868 --> 01:24:12.979
these models change and advance . And

01:24:12.979 --> 01:24:15.201
what do you do about Methos now because

01:24:15.201 --> 01:24:17.201
that's clawed . I think we'll start

01:24:17.201 --> 01:24:19.368
wrapping up . Yes , thank you . Yeah ,

01:24:19.368 --> 01:24:21.799
I , I think Methos is the first cyber

01:24:21.799 --> 01:24:24.080
weapon model . OpenEye will have a

01:24:24.080 --> 01:24:27.049
cyber weapon model . Jim and I will all

01:24:27.049 --> 01:24:29.160
this calendar year and then next year

01:24:29.160 --> 01:24:31.430
we'll be worrying about bio and chem

01:24:31.970 --> 01:24:34.192
models as they start to train them with

01:24:34.192 --> 01:24:36.303
science and physics and equations and

01:24:36.303 --> 01:24:38.414
and math , and we're going to have an

01:24:38.414 --> 01:24:40.192
ongoing discussion probably and

01:24:40.192 --> 01:24:42.248
hopefully with Congress about how we

01:24:42.248 --> 01:24:44.759
govern the rollout of these things that

01:24:44.759 --> 01:24:46.981
have good effects . Maybe they can cure

01:24:46.981 --> 01:24:49.049
diseases , but then they have bad

01:24:49.049 --> 01:24:51.216
effects when in , uh , in the hands of

01:24:51.216 --> 01:24:53.382
bad actors , and that's something that

01:24:53.382 --> 01:24:53.370
we're gonna have to deal with as a

01:24:53.370 --> 01:24:56.629
nation . Thank you . And I think uh

01:24:56.629 --> 01:25:00.569
this entire lesson is that I believe uh

01:25:00.870 --> 01:25:02.870
when the department was negotiating

01:25:02.870 --> 01:25:05.270
those contracts with anthropic we

01:25:05.270 --> 01:25:07.326
should have had the foresight or the

01:25:07.326 --> 01:25:09.048
department should have had the

01:25:09.048 --> 01:25:11.048
foresight to really question . Uh ,

01:25:11.048 --> 01:25:12.603
what was in those contracts

01:25:12.603 --> 01:25:14.603
unfortunately that was not done and

01:25:14.603 --> 01:25:16.714
we're in the situation we are today ,

01:25:16.714 --> 01:25:18.779
so I really appreciate all of our

01:25:18.779 --> 01:25:21.100
witnesses here today . This is an

01:25:21.100 --> 01:25:23.322
important discussion as we move forward

01:25:23.322 --> 01:25:26.279
with , uh , really ever evolving

01:25:26.279 --> 01:25:28.700
technology , uh , so really appreciate

01:25:28.700 --> 01:25:31.049
your presence and your testimony in

01:25:31.049 --> 01:25:33.160
front of the subcommittee on emerging

01:25:33.160 --> 01:25:35.382
threats and capabilities today and with

01:25:35.382 --> 01:25:38.419
that , uh , we call this hearing to a

01:25:38.419 --> 01:25:38.979
close .