WEBVTT

00:03.150 --> 00:05.039
Subcommittee will come to order .

00:05.300 --> 00:08.020
Secretary Driscoll . General

00:09.430 --> 00:11.840
Lenave Welcome to both of you .

00:13.369 --> 00:15.425
I want to start by acknowledging the

00:15.425 --> 00:17.480
men and women of the US Army working

00:17.480 --> 00:20.350
every day . To defend our country

00:21.409 --> 00:24.549
and confront our allies . Their jobs

00:24.549 --> 00:28.399
are Very dangerous , but absolutely

00:28.399 --> 00:31.389
essential . And the sacrifices of

00:31.389 --> 00:34.029
272 soldiers wounded .

00:36.180 --> 00:38.409
And the 7 who gave their lives in

00:38.409 --> 00:42.259
Operation Epic Fury . will certainly

00:42.259 --> 00:43.315
not be forgotten .

00:51.169 --> 00:53.336
They are , of course , only the latest

00:53.490 --> 00:55.657
service members to be killed by Iran .

00:57.119 --> 00:59.959
In its decades-long war against America .

01:01.520 --> 01:05.230
Hopefully this will be the last . The

01:05.230 --> 01:07.452
subcommittee's job is to make sure that

01:07.452 --> 01:09.230
soldiers under your command are

01:09.230 --> 01:12.069
equipped to deter . And if necessary ,

01:13.839 --> 01:16.117
defeat threats to our global interests .

01:16.489 --> 01:19.339
Wherever they arrive . And a

01:19.339 --> 01:21.389
substantial increase in top line

01:21.389 --> 01:24.349
spending in the fiscal 27 requests .

01:25.510 --> 01:28.000
Certainly gives us the opportunity .

01:32.389 --> 01:34.650
However , the reliance of this budget

01:34.650 --> 01:38.290
request . A one time

01:38.290 --> 01:42.139
reconciliation spending . Is really

01:42.139 --> 01:46.019
quite a risky . A brooch . And

01:46.019 --> 01:48.519
the army's budget illustrates the risk

01:49.059 --> 01:51.569
pretty clearly . The majority of the

01:51.569 --> 01:54.010
funds the army requires for critical

01:54.010 --> 01:57.559
munitions . have been requested by OMB

01:57.559 --> 02:00.699
as mandatory spending instead of base

02:00.949 --> 02:04.790
discretionary spending . 24

02:04.790 --> 02:07.260
billion of the $36 billion the army

02:07.260 --> 02:10.539
spends on replenishing stocks of

02:10.539 --> 02:12.800
precision fires and interceptors .

02:14.020 --> 02:16.520
would come as a one-time slug of cash .

02:17.789 --> 02:20.089
And that's assuming reconciliation

02:20.270 --> 02:24.169
passes at all . These funds would have

02:24.169 --> 02:27.449
no protection against the short-term

02:27.449 --> 02:29.671
continuing resolutions that have become

02:29.671 --> 02:31.720
the norm . At the beginning of each

02:31.720 --> 02:35.639
fiscal year . Munitions are now

02:35.639 --> 02:38.600
ostensibly a top priority of the

02:38.600 --> 02:41.929
administration . The deputy secretary

02:41.929 --> 02:45.110
has rightly devoted enormous

02:45.570 --> 02:48.610
attention . and resources to the

02:48.610 --> 02:51.660
problem . One we should all

02:52.369 --> 02:56.029
know took many years to create . And

02:56.029 --> 02:58.500
it's going to take years of consistent

02:58.759 --> 03:02.649
funding to solve . And yet barely

03:02.649 --> 03:04.770
a third of the total munitions

03:04.770 --> 03:07.960
investments required by the army . are

03:07.960 --> 03:10.119
built into the full baseline budget .

03:11.399 --> 03:14.559
For all the talk about sending a clear

03:14.559 --> 03:18.399
demand signal to industry . It

03:18.399 --> 03:20.580
strikes me as an unnecessary risk .

03:22.309 --> 03:24.309
And I'll need to hear more from you

03:24.309 --> 03:26.389
about how this approach can possibly

03:26.389 --> 03:28.820
align with the long-term task ahead of

03:28.820 --> 03:32.789
us of restoring munitions in

03:32.789 --> 03:35.809
the industrial base in our country .

03:37.460 --> 03:39.238
The nature of modern warfare is

03:39.238 --> 03:41.404
changing . Recent events in the Middle

03:41.404 --> 03:44.179
East suggest the US military may not be

03:44.179 --> 03:48.089
adapting as quickly as necessary . That

03:48.089 --> 03:50.360
said , I appreciate the Army's efforts

03:50.360 --> 03:53.429
to identify . And apply the lessons

03:53.429 --> 03:55.839
learned from Ukraine . To the Middle

03:55.839 --> 03:59.259
East Mr . Secretary , I appreciate your

03:59.259 --> 04:01.537
willingness to call it like you see it ,

04:01.537 --> 04:03.648
and I think you were absolutely right

04:03.648 --> 04:05.815
to identify the battlefield innovation

04:05.815 --> 04:08.699
taking place in Ukraine . To Silicon

04:08.699 --> 04:10.899
Valley . Of warfare .

04:12.559 --> 04:15.559
Likewise , members of the subcommittee

04:15.559 --> 04:18.320
were recently briefed . By General

04:18.320 --> 04:20.376
Chris Donahue and Lieutenant General

04:20.376 --> 04:24.260
Curtis Baizard . It was clear they too

04:24.260 --> 04:26.510
understand the path to drone dominance

04:27.019 --> 04:28.908
runs through partnership with the

04:28.908 --> 04:31.880
world's foremost experts in drone

04:32.140 --> 04:36.079
warfare , Ukraine . This

04:36.079 --> 04:38.510
fact is so clear that it's difficult to

04:38.510 --> 04:41.279
understand why more senior officials at

04:41.279 --> 04:43.168
the Pentagon , particularly those

04:43.168 --> 04:45.501
directly responsible for Ukraine policy ,

04:46.140 --> 04:49.739
Or military modernization . I followed

04:49.739 --> 04:52.640
the example of you and General George

04:52.640 --> 04:54.880
said back in November by actually

04:54.880 --> 04:58.089
seeing . The battle lab attacked it .

04:59.339 --> 05:01.839
Technical and industrial innovation

05:02.679 --> 05:06.230
firsthand , Kevin Midler . Regrettably ,

05:06.390 --> 05:09.149
General George was recently fired and

05:09.149 --> 05:12.739
understood both of these . Innovating ,

05:13.000 --> 05:15.179
reform-minded combat veterans .

05:16.350 --> 05:18.089
Sadly set to retire .

05:20.320 --> 05:22.679
Pretty clear to me that America doesn't

05:22.679 --> 05:25.200
stand to gain from opting out of the

05:25.200 --> 05:29.140
latest battlefield lessons . Or

05:29.140 --> 05:32.179
the sort of cooperation with Ukraine .

05:33.179 --> 05:36.380
On drone technology . that our allies

05:36.380 --> 05:38.779
in the Gulf are urgently embracing .

05:41.940 --> 05:44.899
And making modest investments in this

05:44.899 --> 05:47.420
cooperation to ensure that US soldiers

05:47.420 --> 05:50.709
have access . The latest battle-proven

05:50.709 --> 05:54.619
lessons in technology . As they forge

05:54.619 --> 05:58.549
new doctrine . Seems like money well

05:58.549 --> 06:02.010
spent to me . That's why I'm concerned

06:02.010 --> 06:04.010
that the vast majority of funds the

06:04.010 --> 06:05.970
department requested for drone and

06:05.970 --> 06:09.420
counter drone capabilities . would once

06:09.420 --> 06:12.989
again come in the form of One-off

06:13.589 --> 06:17.350
reconciliation . Which might

06:17.350 --> 06:20.910
not better If adapting to this

06:20.910 --> 06:23.350
reality of modern warfare is a priority ,

06:23.510 --> 06:26.649
as department leaders say it is . And

06:26.649 --> 06:28.816
we ought to prove it by making room in

06:28.816 --> 06:31.010
a full base budget .

06:32.640 --> 06:34.751
I want to hear from you about how the

06:34.751 --> 06:37.010
army values ties with capable partners

06:37.010 --> 06:39.829
like Ukraine . And about what our

06:39.829 --> 06:42.920
troops Yet out of engagement with

06:42.920 --> 06:45.540
frontline NATO allies as well .

06:47.230 --> 06:50.529
These relationships . repay US

06:50.529 --> 06:52.399
investments and then some .

06:54.769 --> 06:58.450
But they're under strain unnecessarily .

06:59.350 --> 07:01.640
Threats to allies like Denmark and

07:01.640 --> 07:04.040
surprise force posture changes that

07:04.040 --> 07:07.950
affect Model host allies like Poland .

07:09.329 --> 07:13.119
He self-defeating . So ,

07:13.269 --> 07:16.029
Mr . Secretary General , I look forward

07:16.029 --> 07:17.973
to hearing your views on these and

07:17.973 --> 07:20.690
other topics . We'll turn to you

07:20.690 --> 07:22.820
momentarily for opening statements .

07:23.170 --> 07:25.337
Let me turn first to Senator Collins .

07:25.609 --> 07:27.720
Thank you , Chairman McConnell , uh ,

07:27.720 --> 07:29.998
and thank you , Secretary Driscoll and ,

07:29.998 --> 07:32.053
uh , General Lane for appearing here

07:32.053 --> 07:34.109
today . Um , the Army's total budget

07:34.109 --> 07:36.165
request for the upcoming fiscal year

07:36.165 --> 07:39.119
$253 billion and nearly 30% increase

07:39.440 --> 07:42.220
over last year . Um , let me , um ,

07:42.480 --> 07:44.702
agree with the chairman at the outset ,

07:44.702 --> 07:46.924
um , that as we reflect on Memorial Day

07:46.924 --> 07:48.869
and the service and sacrifice of

07:48.869 --> 07:50.869
generations of men and women of the

07:50.869 --> 07:52.813
United States Army , uh , I too am

07:52.813 --> 07:54.980
grateful for those who fall in service

07:54.980 --> 07:57.147
to our nation . Uh , I'm from a family

07:57.147 --> 07:59.369
with a long tradition of army service .

07:59.369 --> 08:01.702
Uh , my father , my uncles , my brother ,

08:01.702 --> 08:03.813
my sister-in-law . One might ask what

08:03.813 --> 08:03.149
I'm doing on this side of the

08:03.149 --> 08:05.829
microphone , as they often did , uh ,

08:05.950 --> 08:08.117
and I am , uh , eternally grateful for

08:08.117 --> 08:10.117
the role the United States Army has

08:10.117 --> 08:12.339
played in fighting for and securing our

08:12.339 --> 08:14.394
freedom over the 250 years , uh , of

08:14.394 --> 08:16.790
our republic . Um , as we as a

08:16.790 --> 08:18.957
subcommittee better analyze and try to

08:18.957 --> 08:21.179
understand this budget request , uh , I

08:21.179 --> 08:24.000
wanna focus on a few things , um . The

08:24.000 --> 08:26.278
focus of senior leadership in the army ,

08:26.690 --> 08:28.579
uh , our work with allies and our

08:28.579 --> 08:30.801
posture in critical priority theaters ,

08:31.070 --> 08:32.681
uh , drone and counter drone

08:32.681 --> 08:34.792
technologies and munitions in each of

08:34.792 --> 08:37.014
these areas in both budget and policy ,

08:37.014 --> 08:39.200
I see reason to be encouraged , and

08:39.200 --> 08:41.200
reasons to be deeply troubled , and

08:41.200 --> 08:43.090
I'll speak to both . Um , as for

08:43.090 --> 08:45.312
leadership focus , Secretary Driscoll ,

08:45.312 --> 08:47.423
you've brought real energy , uh , and

08:47.423 --> 08:49.646
new thinking to the army , uh , and the

08:49.646 --> 08:51.868
imperative to adapt is palpable , and I

08:51.868 --> 08:54.090
commend you for that . Um , at the same

08:54.090 --> 08:56.257
time , the Secretary of Defense , uh ,

08:56.309 --> 08:58.090
has fired abruptly and without

08:58.090 --> 09:00.034
explanation and in my view without

09:00.034 --> 09:02.710
cause , uh , General Randy George , uh ,

09:02.830 --> 09:05.349
a decades-long , uh , respected senior

09:05.349 --> 09:08.770
leader , um , and many others , um ,

09:09.109 --> 09:11.950
and my concern is that , uh , other

09:11.950 --> 09:14.172
effective senior officers seem on their

09:14.172 --> 09:16.283
way to retirement rather than further

09:16.283 --> 09:18.339
leadership , um , to acting Chief of

09:18.339 --> 09:20.506
Staff Lane , I look forward to working

09:20.506 --> 09:22.450
with you in your new role . But my

09:22.450 --> 09:24.172
first point here is I'm deeply

09:24.172 --> 09:25.950
concerned that some of our most

09:25.950 --> 09:27.894
experienced uniformed officers are

09:27.894 --> 09:29.783
being forced out without cause or

09:29.783 --> 09:32.006
explanation , and that the senior ranks

09:32.006 --> 09:33.950
are constantly having to look over

09:33.950 --> 09:35.783
their shoulder rather than being

09:35.783 --> 09:37.617
evaluated on the merits of their

09:37.617 --> 09:39.672
progress . Um , the recent firing of

09:39.672 --> 09:41.839
the Chief of chaplains , Major General

09:41.839 --> 09:41.690
William Greene , is something that also

09:41.690 --> 09:44.130
caused me great concern . I've had no

09:44.130 --> 09:46.090
explanation . Uh , this has never

09:46.090 --> 09:48.034
happened in our nation's history .

09:48.609 --> 09:50.331
Secretary Driscoll , I've been

09:50.331 --> 09:52.498
encouraged by your recent comments and

09:52.498 --> 09:54.665
other hearings about the centrality of

09:54.665 --> 09:56.831
Ukraine in shaping and determining the

09:56.831 --> 09:58.942
future of warfare , and I'm heartened

09:58.942 --> 10:01.165
to hear your emphasis on the importance

10:01.165 --> 10:03.387
of ensuring our military supports those

10:03.387 --> 10:05.442
innovations and integrates them into

10:05.442 --> 10:07.498
our arsenal , our training , and our

10:07.498 --> 10:09.665
doctrine . This is urgent in my view .

10:09.665 --> 10:11.776
But cutting against those goals , the

10:11.776 --> 10:13.942
administration is pressing for Ukraine

10:13.942 --> 10:16.165
to surrender at the negotiating table ,

10:16.165 --> 10:18.276
that which Putin can't achieve on the

10:18.276 --> 10:18.119
battlefield . I think we are

10:18.119 --> 10:21.179
undermining our own . Position of

10:21.179 --> 10:23.580
partnership with Ukraine . Um , in

10:23.580 --> 10:25.302
recent weeks , our president's

10:25.302 --> 10:27.413
continued to send damaging signals to

10:27.413 --> 10:29.580
our allies and worse yet , encouraging

10:29.580 --> 10:31.469
signals to our adversaries . Um ,

10:31.469 --> 10:33.358
inexplicably , the administration

10:33.358 --> 10:35.580
announced the abrupt withdrawal of 5000

10:35.580 --> 10:37.691
troops from Germany and followed this

10:37.691 --> 10:39.913
up with another announcement , we would

10:39.913 --> 10:41.636
be halting the deployment of a

10:41.636 --> 10:43.469
rotational brigade to Poland , a

10:43.469 --> 10:45.580
crucial partner . In Europe's eastern

10:45.580 --> 10:47.747
flank that has dramatically stepped up

10:47.747 --> 10:49.969
its investment in our shared security ,

10:49.969 --> 10:52.179
Congress was not consulted . According

10:52.179 --> 10:54.235
to some press accounts , neither was

10:54.235 --> 10:57.419
Poland . Um , so we still do not

10:57.419 --> 10:59.586
understand whether these announcements

10:59.586 --> 11:01.752
are distinct or connected and what the

11:01.752 --> 11:03.863
timing and posture was . I think most

11:03.863 --> 11:06.086
importantly it sends the worst possible

11:06.086 --> 11:08.308
signal to Russia about our commitment ,

11:08.308 --> 11:10.530
our competence , and our combat power .

11:10.530 --> 11:12.419
And this isn't just a question of

11:12.419 --> 11:14.641
numbers , it's about capabilities . The

11:14.641 --> 11:16.863
army has also quietly turned off a long

11:16.863 --> 11:18.808
range fires battalion scheduled to

11:18.808 --> 11:20.919
deploy to Germany this summer . A key

11:20.919 --> 11:23.141
element of our ongoing deterrence . You

11:23.141 --> 11:25.308
know as well as I do , our presence in

11:25.308 --> 11:27.363
Europe and our relationship with our

11:27.363 --> 11:29.586
European allies is crucial to deterring

11:29.586 --> 11:31.475
Russia . For anyone who questions

11:31.475 --> 11:33.586
whether Russia is our adversary , let

11:33.586 --> 11:36.059
me review some recent facts . Russia is

11:36.059 --> 11:38.900
actively aiding and abetting Iran in

11:38.900 --> 11:41.010
targeting and killing US service

11:41.010 --> 11:43.380
members , passing weapons , targeting

11:43.380 --> 11:45.602
assistance , intelligence , and broader

11:45.602 --> 11:47.769
support . Russia is giving North Korea

11:47.909 --> 11:50.710
critical lifelines and some critical

11:50.710 --> 11:52.599
technology , and we know that the

11:52.599 --> 11:54.654
degree of cooperation with our chief

11:54.654 --> 11:56.429
adversary , China is steadily

11:56.429 --> 11:58.869
increasing . The administration has

11:58.869 --> 12:01.091
lagged in spending funding appropriated

12:01.091 --> 12:03.349
on a bipartisan basis to the Ukraine

12:03.349 --> 12:05.571
Security Assistance Initiative . Uh , a

12:05.571 --> 12:07.793
week ago , I asked Secretary Hegseth in

12:07.793 --> 12:09.960
this subcommittee for an update on the

12:09.960 --> 12:11.905
spend plan , was promised we would

12:11.905 --> 12:13.960
receive it within that week , and it

12:13.960 --> 12:16.580
hasn't happened . So any update you can

12:16.580 --> 12:18.760
provide on this directed appropriation

12:19.000 --> 12:21.111
that on a bipartisan basis members of

12:21.111 --> 12:23.111
this committee have raised over and

12:23.111 --> 12:25.820
over would be welcome . It is overdue .

12:26.280 --> 12:28.502
In the context of this administration's

12:28.502 --> 12:30.391
attacks on NATO and with Russia's

12:30.391 --> 12:32.502
heightened threats to our interests ,

12:32.502 --> 12:34.613
these decisions make no sense to me .

12:34.840 --> 12:37.007
Funding requests for drone and counter

12:37.007 --> 12:39.229
drone technology have increased , which

12:39.229 --> 12:41.007
I welcome . The Army's recently

12:41.007 --> 12:43.118
launched a creative drone marketplace

12:43.118 --> 12:45.229
and units are beginning to experiment

12:45.229 --> 12:47.284
with this vital new way of warfare .

12:47.479 --> 12:49.312
But most of the funding , as the

12:49.312 --> 12:51.423
chairman noted , is in reconciliation

12:51.809 --> 12:53.770
outside of base budget , and I'm

12:53.770 --> 12:55.381
unclear how much of this new

12:55.381 --> 12:57.690
procurement is occurring . I look

12:57.690 --> 12:59.690
forward to learning how the army is

12:59.690 --> 13:01.690
going to use these funds to build a

13:01.690 --> 13:03.746
broader drone industry ecosystem and

13:03.746 --> 13:05.929
how it plans on quickly driving new

13:05.929 --> 13:08.575
counter drone . protections across its

13:08.575 --> 13:10.575
forces . I think this is one of our

13:10.575 --> 13:12.734
most urgent missions . Last , on

13:12.734 --> 13:14.901
munitions , rethinking our approach to

13:14.901 --> 13:16.956
munitions has been a feature of this

13:16.956 --> 13:19.012
subcommittee since the early days of

13:19.012 --> 13:20.956
Russia's war of aggression against

13:20.956 --> 13:23.123
Ukraine . All of us support multi-year

13:23.123 --> 13:25.012
procurements , especially for the

13:25.012 --> 13:27.414
Patriot Pact 3 interceptor , but the

13:27.414 --> 13:29.375
request for these munitions in

13:29.375 --> 13:31.914
reconciliation is baffling to me . Why

13:31.914 --> 13:33.775
risk something so foundationally

13:33.775 --> 13:35.989
important ? In a partisan political

13:35.989 --> 13:38.045
process , the outcome of which is so

13:38.045 --> 13:40.100
uncertain . And in light of the high

13:40.100 --> 13:41.933
expenditure rates in our current

13:41.933 --> 13:44.045
conflict in the Middle East , how are

13:44.045 --> 13:46.100
we ramping production to accommodate

13:46.100 --> 13:48.267
our needs alongside those of our vital

13:48.267 --> 13:50.322
and trusted partners and allies ? We

13:50.322 --> 13:52.156
also have to discuss the looming

13:52.156 --> 13:54.322
multi-billion dollar shortfall in army

13:54.322 --> 13:56.433
military personnel and O&M accounts ,

13:56.433 --> 13:58.600
excuse me , operations and maintenance

13:58.600 --> 14:00.822
accounts . There's multiple reasons for

14:00.822 --> 14:00.750
this , um , and I look forward to

14:00.750 --> 14:02.900
talking through this . But last , the

14:02.900 --> 14:04.844
army's also been ordered to divert

14:04.844 --> 14:06.956
personnel for DH missions , uh , here

14:06.956 --> 14:09.178
at home . Um , all of us who spend time

14:09.178 --> 14:11.650
here in Washington see , guardsmen , uh ,

14:11.719 --> 14:13.719
they're performing as ordered , but

14:13.719 --> 14:15.941
they're often doing nothing more urgent

14:15.941 --> 14:18.163
than picking up trash . I'd rather have

14:18.163 --> 14:20.219
them in Europe , making Putin second

14:20.219 --> 14:22.386
guess his strategy . The army's budget

14:22.386 --> 14:24.163
and its near future are full of

14:24.163 --> 14:26.386
contradictions . I find some puzzling ,

14:26.386 --> 14:28.497
some troubling . Alongside flashes of

14:28.497 --> 14:30.608
brilliance and decisions that give me

14:30.608 --> 14:32.775
confidence and optimism , ultimately ,

14:32.775 --> 14:35.250
the fiscal year 27 request is just that ,

14:35.330 --> 14:37.650
a request , and I hope this dialogue

14:37.650 --> 14:39.817
and the work of this subcommittee will

14:39.817 --> 14:41.928
help shape it in a way that meets our

14:41.928 --> 14:43.983
Article One responsibilities for the

14:43.983 --> 14:46.261
year ahead . Thank you , Mr . Chairman ,

14:46.261 --> 14:48.428
and thank you , Mr . Secretary . Now ,

14:48.428 --> 14:50.539
let's have a brief opening statements

14:50.539 --> 14:52.817
from both of you going first , uh , Mr .

14:52.840 --> 14:55.210
Secretary . Chairman McConnell ,

14:55.359 --> 14:57.415
Ranking Member Coons , distinguished

14:57.415 --> 14:59.526
members , it's a privilege to address

14:59.526 --> 15:01.359
you today . After a year in this

15:01.359 --> 15:03.415
position , I am prouder than ever to

15:03.415 --> 15:05.248
represent our soldiers and their

15:05.248 --> 15:07.303
families . As , as all of you know ,

15:07.303 --> 15:09.415
our soldiers are the very best in the

15:09.415 --> 15:11.526
world . They're bold , decisive , and

15:11.526 --> 15:13.470
they can overcome anything when we

15:13.470 --> 15:15.470
properly enable them . That's why I

15:15.470 --> 15:17.359
spent over 130 days on the road ,

15:17.359 --> 15:20.010
across 19 countries and 25 states to

15:20.010 --> 15:22.619
hear directly from them . I ate with

15:22.619 --> 15:24.730
them , put hands on their equipment ,

15:24.730 --> 15:26.619
and had candid conversations with

15:26.619 --> 15:28.786
soldiers of every single rank . What I

15:28.786 --> 15:30.730
heard was clear . Our soldiers are

15:30.730 --> 15:32.952
ready to innovate and win , but our own

15:32.952 --> 15:35.063
bureaucracy and regulations are still

15:35.063 --> 15:36.897
holding them back . Getting what

15:36.897 --> 15:38.897
soldiers need to win and making the

15:38.897 --> 15:41.008
army budget actually work for them is

15:41.008 --> 15:43.230
definitionally a bipartisan topic , and

15:43.230 --> 15:45.452
I know all of you agree with that . You

15:45.452 --> 15:47.675
have supported our army for decades and

15:47.675 --> 15:49.786
we wouldn't be here without you . But

15:49.786 --> 15:51.952
we know the system that should benefit

15:51.952 --> 15:54.008
soldiers remains broken . Quality of

15:54.008 --> 15:56.119
life and battlefield advantage aren't

15:56.119 --> 15:58.341
always the number one budget priority .

15:58.341 --> 16:00.452
It's a simple fact , and we need your

16:00.452 --> 16:02.675
help to continue to change it . We need

16:02.675 --> 16:04.563
the right to repair legislation ,

16:04.563 --> 16:06.979
relief from pre-World War II laws , and

16:06.979 --> 16:09.201
significantly more budget flexibility .

16:09.659 --> 16:11.700
Thank you so much for last year's

16:11.700 --> 16:13.811
progress , but if we're gonna win the

16:13.811 --> 16:15.978
next fight , we must go even further .

16:16.289 --> 16:18.456
Technological change is accelerating ,

16:18.456 --> 16:20.609
warfare is evolving , and speed is

16:20.609 --> 16:23.570
absolutely critical . Your help to

16:23.570 --> 16:25.403
either help us lower barriers to

16:25.403 --> 16:27.626
innovation or stick to the decades-long

16:27.626 --> 16:30.969
status quo makes all the difference . I

16:30.969 --> 16:32.858
invite all of you to come see our

16:32.858 --> 16:35.159
transformation firsthand . We're

16:35.159 --> 16:37.159
partnering with private industry to

16:37.159 --> 16:39.103
adopt the best tech , talent , and

16:39.103 --> 16:40.992
tradecraft . We're inviting those

16:40.992 --> 16:42.881
partners onto our bases to unlock

16:42.881 --> 16:45.159
dormant resources and offset federal

16:45.159 --> 16:47.960
budget delays . We're blazing a trail

16:47.960 --> 16:49.904
for our nation on nuclear energy ,

16:49.904 --> 16:51.682
counter-term capabilities , and

16:51.682 --> 16:54.580
military AI . Despite red tape , we're

16:54.580 --> 16:56.691
delivering better dining , barracks ,

16:56.691 --> 17:00.090
Wi Fi , and 3D printed barracks . Even

17:00.090 --> 17:02.090
though it can feel like the deck is

17:02.090 --> 17:04.257
stacked against us , the United States

17:04.257 --> 17:05.923
Army is an absolute beacon of

17:05.923 --> 17:08.034
transformation . For instance , as we

17:08.034 --> 17:09.979
speak at this exact moment , we're

17:09.979 --> 17:12.146
hosting the largest hackathon in human

17:12.146 --> 17:14.449
history to retroactively jailbreak our

17:14.449 --> 17:18.420
siloed equipment . It's named Operation

17:18.420 --> 17:20.540
Jailbreak . Last month in Europe ,

17:20.810 --> 17:22.810
soldiers showed me how our software

17:22.810 --> 17:24.588
systems are compartmentalized ,

17:24.588 --> 17:26.532
isolated , and ineffective against

17:26.532 --> 17:29.250
modern threats . Meanwhile , Ukraine's

17:29.250 --> 17:31.361
Delta Common operating System , their

17:31.361 --> 17:33.306
modular open system architecture ,

17:33.306 --> 17:35.209
command and control system , is

17:35.209 --> 17:37.930
absolutely incredible . It fully

17:37.930 --> 17:40.449
integrates every drone , every sensor ,

17:40.530 --> 17:43.209
and every single shooting platform into

17:43.209 --> 17:46.949
just one single network . Ours does not .

17:47.530 --> 17:49.419
Unfortunately , for decades , our

17:49.419 --> 17:51.530
budget process incentivized companies

17:51.569 --> 17:53.402
to to protect their intellectual

17:53.402 --> 17:55.625
property at all costs , creating walled

17:55.625 --> 17:57.569
gardens in our command and control

17:57.569 --> 17:59.513
infrastructure . This has been the

17:59.513 --> 18:02.140
status quo for far too long . It is no

18:02.140 --> 18:04.420
longer acceptable , and industry is

18:04.420 --> 18:06.531
actually helping us to solve it right

18:06.531 --> 18:08.880
now . I contacted 9 of our defense

18:08.880 --> 18:10.880
primes and other large partners who

18:10.880 --> 18:13.410
immediately agreed to send thousands of

18:13.410 --> 18:15.729
pieces of equipment , hundreds of

18:15.729 --> 18:18.062
engineers and scientists to Fort Carson .

18:18.530 --> 18:20.697
Together we will force our way through

18:20.697 --> 18:22.586
the firewalls , link every single

18:22.586 --> 18:25.010
system , and achieve true right to

18:25.010 --> 18:27.319
integrate . And this is just our first

18:27.319 --> 18:29.619
sprint . We will do it again and again

18:29.800 --> 18:32.133
and again until we get it exactly right .

18:32.520 --> 18:34.464
And I wanna be clear , this is the

18:34.464 --> 18:36.687
perfect example of our army's potential

18:36.687 --> 18:39.420
for speed and innovation . No one else

18:39.420 --> 18:41.476
has the talent , the drive , and the

18:41.476 --> 18:43.642
obsessive work ethic , like ethic like

18:43.642 --> 18:45.459
our soldiers to pull this off .

18:46.369 --> 18:48.530
Operation Jailbreak is the first of

18:48.530 --> 18:50.569
many sprints to bypass red tape and

18:50.569 --> 18:52.689
bureaucracy . What we're doing in

18:52.689 --> 18:54.578
Colorado should be the standing ,

18:54.578 --> 18:56.800
standard operating procedure across the

18:56.800 --> 18:58.856
entire federal government . It's the

18:58.856 --> 19:01.022
iterative process that makes America's

19:01.022 --> 19:03.300
tech sector the very best in the world .

19:03.369 --> 19:05.091
But you would be amazed at the

19:05.091 --> 19:07.369
regulatory walls that stood in our way .

19:07.780 --> 19:10.260
And we've expanded an absolutely sinful

19:10.260 --> 19:12.371
amount of energy just to do the right

19:12.371 --> 19:15.550
thing . Imagine what we can do if you

19:15.550 --> 19:17.328
continue to help us slash those

19:17.328 --> 19:19.670
restrictions . We can do more if you

19:19.670 --> 19:21.837
help us balance oversight with speed .

19:21.837 --> 19:24.003
We can maximize our budget if you help

19:24.003 --> 19:26.337
us partner with America's entrepreneurs .

19:26.337 --> 19:28.503
We can move faster if you help us shed

19:28.503 --> 19:30.559
obsolete equipment and invest in the

19:30.559 --> 19:32.810
future . And with your help , we can

19:32.810 --> 19:34.866
ensure our army remains the dominant

19:34.866 --> 19:36.921
land fighting force for the next 250

19:36.921 --> 19:39.349
years . Thank you so much for having us ,

19:39.359 --> 19:41.415
and I look forward to answering your

19:41.415 --> 19:43.829
questions . General , go ahead .

19:44.949 --> 19:46.949
Chairman McConnell , Ranking Member

19:46.949 --> 19:49.060
Koons , thank you for the opportunity

19:49.060 --> 19:51.282
to appear before this committee today .

19:51.282 --> 19:53.449
The credibility of our army is defined

19:53.449 --> 19:55.616
by what it's prepared to do , not what

19:55.616 --> 19:57.838
it intends to do . Sir , every decision

19:57.838 --> 20:00.005
I make enables our soldiers to be more

20:00.005 --> 20:00.000
lethal and ready to fight and win and

20:00.000 --> 20:01.944
serve as the backbone of the joint

20:01.944 --> 20:03.944
force . In the Indo-Pacific . We're

20:03.944 --> 20:05.833
building a force posture to deter

20:05.833 --> 20:08.056
threats to the US national interest and

20:08.056 --> 20:10.000
designed to extend the operational

20:10.000 --> 20:12.278
reach and endurance of the joint force .

20:12.278 --> 20:14.056
Right now , 87,000 soldiers are

20:14.056 --> 20:16.278
campaigning throughout the region . Our

20:16.278 --> 20:18.500
Typhoon missile systems are deployed to

20:18.500 --> 20:20.444
the Philippines and Japan . And we

20:20.444 --> 20:22.556
position LTAMMS in Guam and the IFPIC

20:22.556 --> 20:24.369
unit in Korea , extending next

20:24.369 --> 20:26.313
generation air and missile defense

20:26.313 --> 20:28.536
against current threats in the region .

20:28.536 --> 20:30.489
The 1st and 3rd multi-domain task

20:30.489 --> 20:32.378
forces are now operational in the

20:32.378 --> 20:34.211
region , and this fall , the 4th

20:34.211 --> 20:36.267
multi-domain task force headquarters

20:36.267 --> 20:38.433
will stand up at Fort Carson . Each of

20:38.433 --> 20:40.600
these MDTFs brings together long range

20:40.600 --> 20:42.489
fires , intelligence , electronic

20:42.489 --> 20:44.390
warfare , space and cyber , all

20:44.390 --> 20:46.750
integrated into a single theater level

20:46.750 --> 20:48.694
capability designed to support the

20:48.694 --> 20:50.639
joint force commanders across vast

20:50.639 --> 20:53.119
distances in the Pacific . Every one of

20:53.119 --> 20:55.175
these capabilities exists because of

20:55.175 --> 20:56.959
the investments this committee

20:56.959 --> 20:58.989
supported in the Middle East . Army

20:58.989 --> 21:01.156
forces continue to defend US personnel

21:01.156 --> 21:03.267
and partners while sustaining layered

21:03.267 --> 21:05.322
air and missile defense , long range

21:05.322 --> 21:07.322
strike capability , and operational

21:07.322 --> 21:09.433
logistics across CENCOM . And at home

21:09.433 --> 21:11.489
we're preparing the force for future

21:11.489 --> 21:13.711
conflict at our combat training centers

21:13.711 --> 21:15.767
where we train our soldiers to fight

21:15.767 --> 21:17.822
against an adversary in the mud , to

21:17.822 --> 21:19.878
solve complex problems , and to test

21:19.878 --> 21:21.822
our latest systems . But we cannot

21:21.822 --> 21:24.045
field modern kit while sustaining aging

21:24.045 --> 21:26.267
systems that consume time , money , and

21:26.267 --> 21:28.378
manpower . Divesting legacy platforms

21:28.378 --> 21:30.378
reduces the maintenance demand that

21:30.378 --> 21:32.433
falls hardest on our junior soldiers

21:32.433 --> 21:34.433
and frees resources to advance next

21:34.433 --> 21:36.600
generation systems . That's why we are

21:36.600 --> 21:38.822
restructuring how we acquire , design ,

21:38.822 --> 21:40.878
sustain , and field equipment with a

21:40.878 --> 21:43.045
decisive focus on speed , the right to

21:43.045 --> 21:45.369
repair , and systems modularity . That

21:45.369 --> 21:47.480
thinking is already reflected in some

21:47.480 --> 21:49.591
of our next generation platforms like

21:49.591 --> 21:51.647
the XM30 infantry fighting vehicle ,

21:51.647 --> 21:54.160
the M1E3 Abrahams , and the MV-75

21:54.160 --> 21:56.382
Cheyenne , which provides unprecedented

21:56.382 --> 21:59.310
speeds , range , and flexibility . And

21:59.310 --> 22:01.254
because of our secretary , each of

22:01.254 --> 22:03.421
these systems are designed so the next

22:03.421 --> 22:05.032
operational upgrade requires

22:05.032 --> 22:06.977
integration , not a completely new

22:06.977 --> 22:09.143
start . But none of this matters if we

22:09.143 --> 22:11.199
can't produce and sustain at scale .

22:11.310 --> 22:13.032
And this is why we continue to

22:13.032 --> 22:14.977
modernize our OIB through advanced

22:14.977 --> 22:17.088
manufacturing , depot modernization ,

22:17.088 --> 22:19.199
expanded partnerships with industry ,

22:19.670 --> 22:21.614
including , including enhanced use

22:21.614 --> 22:23.726
leases that accelerate infrastructure

22:23.726 --> 22:25.837
development and production capacity .

22:25.890 --> 22:27.723
And while industrial capacity is

22:27.723 --> 22:29.946
important , the strength of our army is

22:29.946 --> 22:32.168
only as strong as our ability to retain

22:32.168 --> 22:34.334
experienced soldiers , and whether the

22:34.334 --> 22:36.223
force we're building reflects the

22:36.223 --> 22:38.223
standards we claim to uphold . That

22:38.223 --> 22:40.001
standard includes $4 billion in

22:40.001 --> 22:42.334
infrastructure investments through 2026 .

22:42.334 --> 22:44.446
We're rolling out campus-style dining

22:44.446 --> 22:46.390
facilities as the secretary talked

22:46.390 --> 22:48.334
about . We're scaling our holistic

22:48.334 --> 22:50.446
health and fitness across the force ,

22:50.446 --> 22:50.349
and soldiers are seeing the difference ,

22:50.359 --> 22:52.479
and so do American citizens . Our

22:52.479 --> 22:54.535
recruiting numbers are soaring , and

22:54.535 --> 22:56.646
we're on track to achieve this year's

22:56.646 --> 22:58.479
success and target well ahead of

22:58.479 --> 23:00.257
schedule . Because in the end ,

23:00.257 --> 23:02.368
soldiers are the reason your army can

23:02.368 --> 23:04.423
do what it does . Your army delivers

23:04.423 --> 23:06.590
the intelligence and fires that enable

23:06.590 --> 23:08.868
us to maneuver . We sustain operations ,

23:08.868 --> 23:10.979
we protect the force , and we provide

23:10.979 --> 23:13.035
the command and control architecture

23:13.035 --> 23:12.869
that allows a joint force and America's

23:12.869 --> 23:15.410
allies to operate together . Every

23:15.410 --> 23:17.632
component of the joint fight depends on

23:17.632 --> 23:19.577
our army's ability to do all those

23:19.577 --> 23:21.799
things simultaneously and exceptionally

23:21.799 --> 23:24.650
well , and we will not fail our country .

23:25.219 --> 23:27.441
This will defend and thank you for your

23:27.441 --> 23:29.441
continued support as we sustain the

23:29.441 --> 23:31.441
best army the world has ever , ever

23:31.441 --> 23:35.069
seen . Thank you , General . Obviously

23:35.069 --> 23:37.660
history indicates the strongest form of

23:37.660 --> 23:41.630
deterrence . is to

23:42.229 --> 23:45.109
say things like Reagan did on peace to

23:45.109 --> 23:47.750
strength , but not just say it , but

23:48.119 --> 23:50.550
back it up with your policies .

23:51.449 --> 23:53.560
The administration's focus on pushing

23:53.560 --> 23:56.469
allies and partners . To increase their

23:56.469 --> 24:00.310
own military capacity . would

24:01.219 --> 24:03.459
ostensibly enhance that sort of

24:03.459 --> 24:05.979
deterrence , and that's all good news .

24:08.680 --> 24:12.140
General You helped assist

24:12.300 --> 24:15.079
the Ukrainian military before

24:16.020 --> 24:18.619
Russia's escalation in 2022 .

24:20.589 --> 24:23.430
Would earlier and more rapid US

24:23.430 --> 24:25.630
assistance to Ukraine have enhanced

24:25.630 --> 24:29.469
deterrence and defense against Russia's

24:29.469 --> 24:32.579
full-scale invasion ? And for both of

24:32.579 --> 24:36.229
you . If the PRC acts on its ambition

24:36.229 --> 24:39.280
to control Taiwan , It would threaten

24:39.280 --> 24:41.447
key American interests and disrupt the

24:41.447 --> 24:44.119
global economy . This is why there's

24:44.119 --> 24:47.640
been a strong bipartisan . Support

24:48.510 --> 24:50.680
To improve Taiwan's defensive

24:50.680 --> 24:54.369
capabilities . And while I'm Kind of

24:54.369 --> 24:57.410
worried after the trip recently to

24:57.410 --> 25:00.949
China . That arms sales to Taiwan are

25:00.949 --> 25:04.890
being Delayed . So , do

25:04.890 --> 25:08.689
you agree that helping Taiwan or the

25:08.689 --> 25:10.467
Philippines better defend their

25:10.467 --> 25:12.745
territory actually enhances deterrence ?

25:13.739 --> 25:15.406
Are there lessons learned and

25:15.406 --> 25:17.572
capabilities demonstrated in Ukraine ?

25:18.349 --> 25:21.400
that are applicable to Go on .

25:22.280 --> 25:25.160
Or the Philippines , sir , first ,

25:25.239 --> 25:27.517
thanks for the question and , and , uh ,

25:27.517 --> 25:29.572
I know we talked before about , uh ,

25:29.572 --> 25:32.079
you know , my , my participation , um ,

25:32.560 --> 25:34.560
you know , early on , uh , with the

25:34.560 --> 25:36.560
Ukrainians . I , I think , uh , you

25:36.560 --> 25:38.338
know , talking about deterrence

25:38.719 --> 25:40.920
anywhere that we have the ability to

25:40.920 --> 25:43.400
sustain campaigning across the Pacific

25:43.400 --> 25:45.640
where we have our forces that can do

25:45.640 --> 25:47.473
access and presence where we can

25:47.473 --> 25:49.584
maneuver . Uh , our forces in and out

25:49.584 --> 25:51.807
of the theater to show different , um ,

25:51.807 --> 25:54.530
capabilities , uh , to not only our

25:54.530 --> 25:57.449
allies but to , to , uh , display our

25:57.449 --> 25:59.616
capabilities and how fast we can be in

25:59.616 --> 26:01.393
the theater is always a form of

26:01.393 --> 26:03.560
deterrence , uh , for the enemy . Um ,

26:03.890 --> 26:06.250
we are taking , sir , and I , and I , I

26:06.250 --> 26:08.290
want to make sure that , uh , this

26:08.290 --> 26:10.290
entire committee , you know , fully

26:10.290 --> 26:12.457
understands we are taking every single

26:12.457 --> 26:14.790
lesson learned as fast as possible from .

26:14.790 --> 26:16.957
The Ukrainian battlefield and from the

26:16.957 --> 26:19.123
battlefield that's going on in OEF and

26:19.123 --> 26:21.420
cycling that into our formations ,

26:22.719 --> 26:24.880
we're we're using the lessons learned

26:24.880 --> 26:26.936
on our combat training centers . The

26:26.936 --> 26:29.158
secretary is pushing us hard on getting

26:29.158 --> 26:31.269
the capabilities down to our soldiers

26:31.269 --> 26:33.269
as fast as possible in order to get

26:33.269 --> 26:36.880
hands on so they can be as prepared to

26:36.880 --> 26:39.109
protect themselves and to be able to

26:39.920 --> 26:41.949
engage the enemy with this new

26:41.949 --> 26:44.689
technology at scale . And Chairman , um ,

26:44.859 --> 26:47.060
what I would echo from General Leneve

26:47.060 --> 26:49.116
is that the lessons we're taking are

26:49.116 --> 26:51.171
speed and maneuver matters more than

26:51.171 --> 26:53.171
ever . Um , the dispersion , if you

26:53.171 --> 26:55.171
look at Ukraine , the , the , the ,

26:55.171 --> 26:57.393
their ability to disperse their command

26:57.393 --> 26:59.504
and control , to disperse their fires

26:59.504 --> 27:01.727
matters . Long range precision fires is

27:01.727 --> 27:03.838
something we as a nation are uniquely

27:03.838 --> 27:05.782
good . At , um , and continuing to

27:05.782 --> 27:07.893
invest in that and then the very last

27:07.893 --> 27:09.671
one is if you look at contested

27:09.671 --> 27:11.782
logistics when we are 6000 miles from

27:11.782 --> 27:14.060
our home , data matters more than ever .

27:14.060 --> 27:13.890
And so when I was referencing Project

27:13.890 --> 27:15.834
Jailbreak or Operation Jailbreak ,

27:15.849 --> 27:18.010
those are the types of exercises that

27:18.010 --> 27:20.121
should set us up for success anywhere

27:20.121 --> 27:21.954
in the world , but including the

27:21.954 --> 27:23.788
Indo-Pacific . We're shifting to

27:23.788 --> 27:25.621
another part of the world , uh ,

27:25.729 --> 27:28.569
European allies are all

27:29.400 --> 27:31.670
Dramatically increasing their defense

27:31.670 --> 27:35.050
spending . And traditionally we've

27:35.989 --> 27:37.711
Directed their spending toward

27:37.711 --> 27:41.160
American-made capabilities . Germany is

27:41.160 --> 27:43.949
on track to spend 5% of their GDP by

27:43.949 --> 27:47.810
2035 . Poland spends more

27:47.810 --> 27:50.550
as a share of GDP than anybody else in

27:50.550 --> 27:51.209
NATO .

28:05.020 --> 28:07.209
To what extent was the army consulted

28:08.069 --> 28:10.390
on the coil of rotational deployment ?

28:11.390 --> 28:14.069
To Poland , it was announced last week .

28:15.569 --> 28:17.770
Out of surprising allies with abrupt

28:17.770 --> 28:21.300
changes to US force posture . Is that

28:21.300 --> 28:24.270
deepen or improve cooperation ?

28:25.380 --> 28:27.369
And what is the status of sales of

28:27.369 --> 28:30.530
long-range strike capabilities ? Which

28:30.530 --> 28:33.089
could serve to offset the capabilities

28:33.089 --> 28:36.599
of US . Rotational courses to Germany .

28:38.630 --> 28:42.609
Or to Poland . Chairman ,

28:42.729 --> 28:44.785
um , we're working with our allies ,

28:44.785 --> 28:46.729
particularly in Europe , um , very

28:46.729 --> 28:48.650
tightly on as they increase their

28:48.650 --> 28:50.594
defense spending over the upcoming

28:50.594 --> 28:52.650
years , uh , particularly because of

28:52.650 --> 28:54.428
President Trump's push , we are

28:54.428 --> 28:56.483
standing up marketplaces for counter

28:56.483 --> 28:58.594
drone through our giant F-401 that is

28:58.594 --> 29:00.761
actually in concert with them , and so

29:00.761 --> 29:02.928
we've come up with the , the rules and

29:02.928 --> 29:05.039
the protocols for information sharing

29:05.039 --> 29:06.983
with the Brits . We're inviting 23

29:06.983 --> 29:09.206
other nations to this marketplace , and

29:09.206 --> 29:08.739
then our hope is that we're going to be

29:08.739 --> 29:11.380
able to expand it to include providers

29:11.380 --> 29:13.547
of um supplies from all over the world

29:13.547 --> 29:15.769
and so they're going to be able to list

29:15.769 --> 29:17.880
their own companies . We , the United

29:17.880 --> 29:20.102
States Army will function like Consumer

29:20.102 --> 29:22.213
Reports , and this should be good for

29:22.213 --> 29:24.158
the entire industry globally , but

29:24.158 --> 29:26.324
particularly small and medium American

29:26.324 --> 29:30.180
businesses . In , in short , there's

29:30.920 --> 29:32.739
nothing wrong with uh

29:34.020 --> 29:36.939
Improving our situation with regard to

29:36.939 --> 29:40.459
Ukraine . I mean , we had difficulty .

29:42.689 --> 29:45.729
Confirming that the 400 million that we

29:46.050 --> 29:49.079
spent in this year's appropriation . is

29:49.079 --> 29:52.930
actually going . I hope so . Sarah

29:52.930 --> 29:56.589
Coons . Thank you , Mr . Chairman . Let

29:56.589 --> 29:59.510
me just , uh . Extend the question you

29:59.510 --> 30:02.030
were just asked last year , the

30:02.030 --> 30:05.510
Pentagon requested 0 for Ukraine and

30:05.510 --> 30:07.989
0 for our Baltic allies , and on a

30:07.989 --> 30:10.150
bipartisan basis , this subcommittee

30:10.150 --> 30:12.428
put in hundreds of millions of dollars .

30:12.428 --> 30:14.650
The secretary was in front of us a week

30:14.650 --> 30:16.539
ago . He promised us a spend plan

30:16.539 --> 30:18.650
within the week . We haven't received

30:18.650 --> 30:20.817
one . Do you have any update for us on

30:20.817 --> 30:23.039
progress towards spend plans , uh , for

30:23.060 --> 30:25.282
our Baltic assurance initiative and our

30:25.282 --> 30:27.338
Ukraine assurance initiative , which

30:27.338 --> 30:29.449
was as asked of the secretary in this

30:29.449 --> 30:31.171
chamber a week ago , the clear

30:31.171 --> 30:33.004
intention of this subcommittee .

30:33.004 --> 30:35.282
Senator , I'll take the first swing if ,

30:35.282 --> 30:37.449
uh , General Laneve has any additional

30:37.449 --> 30:39.671
information . Um , I think we know what

30:39.671 --> 30:39.319
is publicly available . We're obviously

30:39.319 --> 30:42.069
working with OSW , um , frequently to

30:42.069 --> 30:44.069
come up with plans , including this

30:44.069 --> 30:46.199
spend plan . Um , I can provide more

30:46.199 --> 30:48.143
specifics to your office after the

30:48.143 --> 30:50.366
hearing . In , in other words , no , we

30:50.366 --> 30:52.310
don't have a spend plan that we're

30:52.310 --> 30:54.680
gonna get this week either . Sorry , I ,

30:54.849 --> 30:57.930
I can't answer for the , uh , uh , OSW ,

30:58.170 --> 31:00.689
um , but we'll , as the secretary says ,

31:00.770 --> 31:02.714
I mean , I'll just be blunt , like

31:02.849 --> 31:05.969
we're here to talk about $236 billion .

31:06.369 --> 31:08.536
You share our perspective that Ukraine

31:08.536 --> 31:10.869
is the Silicon Valley of modern warfare .

31:10.869 --> 31:13.170
You're taking great steps to partner

31:13.170 --> 31:15.281
with them and to ingest their lessons

31:15.281 --> 31:17.569
and to deploy it . I don't know why

31:17.569 --> 31:19.736
this is something we've had to ask and

31:19.736 --> 31:21.680
ask and ask , and we can't get the

31:21.680 --> 31:23.847
spend plan , so . Please convey to the

31:23.847 --> 31:25.902
secretary , uh , our shared sense of

31:25.902 --> 31:27.736
urgency about this . Let me just

31:27.736 --> 31:29.847
briefly ask about this forced posture

31:29.847 --> 31:31.736
change in Europe and why . To the

31:31.736 --> 31:34.380
extent you can answer it , my sense is

31:34.380 --> 31:36.491
that there was an abrupt announcement

31:36.491 --> 31:38.713
of the withdrawal of 5000 of our troops

31:38.713 --> 31:40.380
from Germany and then shortly

31:40.380 --> 31:43.660
thereafter , um , uh . Underway

31:43.660 --> 31:46.140
deployment of 4000 to Poland was

31:46.140 --> 31:48.260
changed in some way and then a change

31:48.260 --> 31:50.410
in terms of prepositioning stocks .

31:50.739 --> 31:52.961
What's happening with our force posture

31:52.961 --> 31:56.719
in Europe and why ? So we're

31:56.719 --> 31:58.552
continually looking at the force

31:58.552 --> 32:00.775
posture across Europe . When you , when

32:00.775 --> 32:02.775
you look at our army prepositioning

32:02.775 --> 32:04.997
stocks , we've been looking at that for

32:04.997 --> 32:07.260
years , um , across not only just

32:07.260 --> 32:09.427
Europe , across the globe and where we

32:09.427 --> 32:11.593
have prepositioned stocks . We've been

32:11.593 --> 32:13.593
looking at the force posture across

32:13.593 --> 32:15.750
Europe , based off of the surge of

32:15.750 --> 32:17.806
rotational units , uh , you know , a

32:17.806 --> 32:19.972
couple of years ago , based off of the

32:19.972 --> 32:23.880
invasion in in consultation with . Uh ,

32:23.959 --> 32:25.903
the UCO commander , we , we talked

32:25.903 --> 32:28.079
about what forces , uh , that he was ,

32:28.239 --> 32:30.630
you know , were aware that this

32:30.630 --> 32:33.119
decision was being made as a Title 10 ,

32:33.560 --> 32:35.782
I'm talking the force structure that we

32:35.782 --> 32:37.949
were pulling it out . I am not part of

32:37.949 --> 32:40.060
the discussions with our , our , uh ,

32:40.060 --> 32:42.004
our allies , and that , that's a ,

32:42.004 --> 32:44.116
that's above a Title 10 requirement .

32:44.116 --> 32:46.338
OK , so , um , I think what I'm hearing

32:46.338 --> 32:48.504
is nothing more than I've been able to

32:48.504 --> 32:50.671
get from press accounts . Congress was

32:50.671 --> 32:52.910
not consulted . By press accounts , our

32:52.910 --> 32:55.869
allies were not consulted , and I'm

32:55.869 --> 32:57.925
concerned that the lesson our allies

32:57.925 --> 33:00.036
are learning is that Chancellor Mertz

33:00.036 --> 33:03.430
criticized um our operations in Iran

33:03.430 --> 33:05.430
and the president in a fit of pique

33:05.430 --> 33:07.430
announced withdrawal of 5000 troops

33:07.430 --> 33:09.597
that had not previously been planned .

33:09.597 --> 33:11.708
Please disabuse me of this notion and

33:11.708 --> 33:13.930
help reassure me that this is part of a

33:13.930 --> 33:16.097
long planned change in rotation . Um ,

33:16.099 --> 33:18.321
as I think you know , my brother served

33:18.321 --> 33:20.488
in the 2nd Armored . It is really hard

33:20.488 --> 33:22.710
to get prepositioned stocks to places ,

33:22.710 --> 33:24.710
whether it's the Western Pacific or

33:24.710 --> 33:26.710
Eastern Europe in advance . I don't

33:26.710 --> 33:28.543
understand why there's been some

33:28.619 --> 33:31.020
alleged change in long-range fires or

33:31.020 --> 33:34.099
in prepositioned stocks in Europe in a

33:34.099 --> 33:35.932
way that really puts at risk our

33:35.932 --> 33:38.739
deterrence of Russia . Senator , um ,

33:38.819 --> 33:41.020
one of the things under , uh , and I

33:41.020 --> 33:42.853
mean this very sincerely and not

33:42.853 --> 33:45.076
sycophantically , under President Trump

33:45.076 --> 33:47.409
and Secretary of Warhecket's leadership ,

33:47.409 --> 33:47.180
we have been re-looking at

33:47.180 --> 33:49.291
prepositioned stocks globally and how

33:49.291 --> 33:51.347
we think about when we send our sons

33:51.347 --> 33:53.513
and daughters to fight on our behalf ,

33:53.513 --> 33:55.569
what tools and weapons can be in the

33:55.569 --> 33:57.624
theater for them . And so one of the

33:57.624 --> 33:59.680
reasons we were so excited about the

33:59.680 --> 34:01.847
giant of marketplace is once you , and

34:01.847 --> 34:04.013
this sounds esoteric , but once you're

34:04.013 --> 34:03.599
able to have compatible equipment ,

34:03.859 --> 34:05.859
when . Soldiers deployed , they can

34:05.859 --> 34:08.026
fall in on equipment from our allies ,

34:08.026 --> 34:10.081
and the allies can either send their

34:10.081 --> 34:12.192
people and their things or just their

34:12.192 --> 34:11.425
things . And so we are going after

34:11.425 --> 34:13.481
prepositioned stock . Let me ask you

34:13.481 --> 34:15.758
about that . As we've discussed before ,

34:15.758 --> 34:17.703
I was at the dignified transfer at

34:17.703 --> 34:19.481
Dover Air Force Base for 3 Army

34:19.481 --> 34:21.703
reservists who were killed in the Tower

34:21.703 --> 34:23.758
22 attack in 2024 . I promised their

34:23.758 --> 34:25.592
families I'd take very seriously

34:25.592 --> 34:27.814
counter UAS capabilities , particularly

34:27.814 --> 34:31.060
for 4 deployed American soldiers . Um ,

34:31.100 --> 34:33.322
and we work together to give you budget

34:33.322 --> 34:35.433
flexibility . Um , you're doing a lot

34:35.433 --> 34:37.656
in , uh , counter UAS work , the , um ,

34:37.760 --> 34:39.780
JITAF 401 that you referenced , the

34:39.780 --> 34:41.836
open market . I'm very encouraged by

34:41.836 --> 34:43.947
this , but your , your budget request

34:43.947 --> 34:46.169
for this effort is only 136 million out

34:46.169 --> 34:48.939
of 250 billion . And as I understand it ,

34:49.340 --> 34:51.507
the army's only buying one counter UAS

34:51.507 --> 34:53.540
system when there's a wide range of

34:53.540 --> 34:55.850
possibilities . Help me understand why

34:55.850 --> 34:58.979
your FY 27 request is focused on a

34:58.979 --> 35:02.090
single system . And of all the

35:02.090 --> 35:04.257
militaries in the world , the one most

35:04.257 --> 35:06.368
capable of intercepting Shahed drones

35:06.530 --> 35:08.474
seems to me to be the Ukrainians .

35:08.850 --> 35:12.370
We're in an ongoing war in Iran where

35:12.370 --> 35:14.530
all of the civilian and military

35:14.530 --> 35:16.474
infrastructure of our partners and

35:16.474 --> 35:18.530
allies is at risk of Shahed drones .

35:18.530 --> 35:20.641
Why not partner more closely with the

35:20.641 --> 35:22.641
Ukrainians on ? Head interceptors ,

35:22.641 --> 35:24.808
Senator , uh , to , to the last bit of

35:24.808 --> 35:26.752
your remark , we , we've purchased

35:26.752 --> 35:28.808
13,000 Mirros since the start of the

35:28.808 --> 35:30.863
conflict . Our understanding , and I

35:30.863 --> 35:32.530
talked to the Ukrainians very

35:32.530 --> 35:34.752
frequently , is qualitatively that is ,

35:34.752 --> 35:36.752
if not their favorite interceptor ,

35:36.752 --> 35:38.863
then one of the top two or three . we

35:38.863 --> 35:41.086
have flown 13,000 into theater over the

35:41.086 --> 35:43.030
last couple of weeks . We've had .

35:43.030 --> 35:45.086
Ranger Regiment 802nd training doing

35:45.086 --> 35:47.086
train the trainers um if and when a

35:47.086 --> 35:49.252
conflict kicks back off , we will have

35:49.252 --> 35:51.320
a number of new solutions in theater

35:51.320 --> 35:54.550
that all started from GA 401's kickoff

35:54.550 --> 35:56.494
nine months ago . Thank you . Last

35:56.494 --> 35:58.494
question , um , your budget request

35:58.494 --> 36:00.661
reduces aircraft procurement by nearly

36:00.661 --> 36:02.780
half . It doesn't request . Any new

36:02.780 --> 36:04.836
Apaches , any new Chinooks , I think

36:04.836 --> 36:07.058
only one Black Hawk , um , and the Army

36:07.058 --> 36:09.270
request invests in modifications and

36:09.270 --> 36:11.989
assumes FMS sales . I understand part

36:11.989 --> 36:13.878
of what you're trying to do is to

36:13.878 --> 36:16.669
rebalance legacy systems , um , but the

36:16.669 --> 36:19.580
Chinook is the only heavy vertical lift

36:19.580 --> 36:21.802
platform in the joint force , and , and

36:21.802 --> 36:24.024
the MV-75 is , is not a replacement for

36:24.024 --> 36:26.080
this capability . Am I correct ? The

36:26.080 --> 36:28.300
army has very few block 2s in the

36:28.300 --> 36:30.330
Chinook fleet mix . What are the

36:30.330 --> 36:32.500
advantages of those block twos and why

36:32.500 --> 36:35.659
stop buying block 2s when we don't have

36:35.659 --> 36:37.603
a transition plan to an autonomous

36:37.603 --> 36:39.715
platform for this critical heavy lift

36:39.715 --> 36:42.048
function ? So , you're , you're correct ,

36:42.048 --> 36:45.929
very few inside the inventory . And I

36:45.929 --> 36:47.818
know that , that , uh , Secretary

36:47.818 --> 36:49.929
Hickste , you know , mentioned this ,

36:49.929 --> 36:52.151
uh , uh , last week that he's taken a ,

36:52.151 --> 36:54.373
an overall look again at the , uh , our

36:54.373 --> 36:56.889
aviation strategy . We are as well , uh ,

36:57.010 --> 36:59.177
taking a look at , at , you know , the

36:59.177 --> 37:01.177
decisions that were all made on the

37:01.177 --> 37:03.288
side of angels . Do they still hold ,

37:03.288 --> 37:05.399
you know , as , as we go forward . We

37:05.399 --> 37:07.399
know we need the Cheyenne . We know

37:07.399 --> 37:09.566
that the 47 , the Black Hawk , and the

37:09.566 --> 37:11.454
Apache are not legacy equipment .

37:11.454 --> 37:13.621
They're enduring . They're gonna be in

37:13.621 --> 37:15.566
our , in our , uh , fleet for many

37:15.566 --> 37:15.379
years . So we're taking a hard look at

37:15.379 --> 37:17.639
this to make sure that we've done the ,

37:17.780 --> 37:20.439
the right , uh , you know , decisions ,

37:20.489 --> 37:23.169
uh , on , on how we're looking at that .

37:23.449 --> 37:25.727
And , and we'll come back to you , sir ,

37:25.727 --> 37:27.838
and , and , and what we come back out

37:27.838 --> 37:29.393
with because I think future

37:29.393 --> 37:31.505
acquisitions of Chinooks are key . In

37:31.505 --> 37:33.505
order to sustains to see that we're

37:33.505 --> 37:36.610
doing this . All right , thank you very

37:36.610 --> 37:37.610
much .

37:43.760 --> 37:47.219
Collins . Thank you very much , Mr .

37:47.229 --> 37:50.989
Chairman . Um , Mr . Secretary General ,

37:51.110 --> 37:54.030
welcome . I just want to associate

37:54.030 --> 37:56.252
myself with the remarks of the chairman

37:56.252 --> 37:59.510
and ranking member about Ukraine and

37:59.510 --> 38:02.409
the need for the spend plan , but also

38:02.750 --> 38:06.229
to learn the lessons from Ukraine's

38:06.469 --> 38:10.129
incredible success with counter UAS and

38:10.449 --> 38:13.550
electronic warfare . I think that's

38:14.070 --> 38:17.949
extremely important . I want to refer

38:17.949 --> 38:20.469
to another lesson , Mr . Secretary ,

38:20.500 --> 38:23.969
from Ukraine , and that is that the

38:23.969 --> 38:27.790
need for distributed autonomous systems

38:28.120 --> 38:31.610
operating alongside soldiers has become

38:31.610 --> 38:35.030
clear . At the same time , outside

38:35.030 --> 38:38.209
analysts and defense industry reporting

38:38.209 --> 38:41.689
now suggests that the army remains

38:41.689 --> 38:45.409
years away . From fielding autonomous

38:45.409 --> 38:49.229
ground systems at an operational scale ,

38:49.570 --> 38:53.169
the army has continued to publicly

38:53.169 --> 38:56.989
emphasize the autonomy , robotics ,

38:57.449 --> 39:00.290
unmanned systems , human machine

39:00.290 --> 39:03.300
teaming , all of those are central to

39:03.300 --> 39:06.810
the future battlefield . And yet last

39:06.810 --> 39:09.830
year , as you know from our

39:09.830 --> 39:12.360
conversation . Uh , the army made what

39:12.360 --> 39:15.120
I deemed to be a very short-sighted and

39:15.120 --> 39:18.840
unfortunate decision to cancel the

39:18.840 --> 39:21.620
robotic combat vehicle program ,

39:22.159 --> 39:25.239
including the ripsa platform developed

39:25.239 --> 39:29.219
in the state of Maine . What ,

39:29.639 --> 39:33.600
where does the army's autonomous ground

39:33.600 --> 39:36.379
vehicle strategy stand today ?

39:37.659 --> 39:40.699
Um , Senator , I agree with nearly all

39:40.699 --> 39:42.532
of your remarks on the future of

39:42.532 --> 39:44.780
warfare , and one of the things the

39:44.780 --> 39:47.002
United States Army has gotten wrong for

39:47.002 --> 39:49.002
a very long time is , and this goes

39:49.002 --> 39:51.169
back to these closed systems , systems

39:51.169 --> 39:53.224
that just can operate , cannot share

39:53.224 --> 39:55.280
data outside of the system , and the

39:55.280 --> 39:57.280
reason that is so important is once

39:57.280 --> 39:57.179
something is in , in this instance

39:57.179 --> 39:59.679
drive by wire , um , we can take it and

39:59.679 --> 40:01.790
make it auto . very quickly and so we

40:01.790 --> 40:04.080
met a new company last year , about 14

40:04.080 --> 40:06.191
months ago called Applied Intuition ,

40:06.191 --> 40:08.413
and they had never a single time worked

40:08.413 --> 40:10.580
with an Army vehicle and we asked them

40:10.580 --> 40:12.469
how long would it take to make it

40:12.469 --> 40:14.747
autonomous , and they did it in 8 days .

40:14.747 --> 40:16.636
And so it's , it's actually not a

40:16.636 --> 40:18.691
systematic problem within any of our

40:18.691 --> 40:20.747
future vehicles because they're open

40:20.747 --> 40:22.524
architecture . You can layer in

40:22.524 --> 40:24.580
software to control the vehicle very

40:24.580 --> 40:26.802
quickly . It is a legacy problem of how

40:26.802 --> 40:29.136
we used to design systems and overspend .

40:29.136 --> 40:31.080
And so specifically to what you're

40:31.080 --> 40:30.610
referencing , Senator , what we

40:30.610 --> 40:32.721
canceled , the other big lesson we're

40:32.721 --> 40:34.777
learning directly from Ukraine is we

40:34.777 --> 40:36.943
and everything we purchase have got to

40:36.943 --> 40:39.166
be on the right end of the cost curve ,

40:39.166 --> 40:41.332
because if an $800 drone can destroy a

40:41.332 --> 40:43.554
thing very quickly and easily , even as

40:43.554 --> 40:45.777
the wealthiest nation in the history of

40:45.777 --> 40:45.179
the world , we just can't sustain it .

40:45.419 --> 40:47.419
And so one of the things we're very

40:47.419 --> 40:49.475
focused on is everything we purchase

40:49.475 --> 40:51.252
going forward being closer to a

40:51.252 --> 40:53.379
tradable where we can afford it as a

40:53.379 --> 40:55.659
nation to lose it to drones . Well , I

40:55.659 --> 40:57.659
would say that it was the height of

40:57.659 --> 41:01.425
irony that when the army was having

41:01.425 --> 41:04.725
its parade last year of the future .

41:05.044 --> 41:07.354
What did they have in it but the rips

41:07.354 --> 41:09.687
off when you made that remark , Senator ,

41:09.687 --> 41:11.965
last year , I agree it was very ironic .

41:11.965 --> 41:14.245
So it seems to me that suggests there's

41:14.245 --> 41:17.284
a lot of value there . Uh , let me

41:17.284 --> 41:19.764
switch to a different issue , General .

41:19.844 --> 41:22.520
I'm going to address this to you . Uh ,

41:22.610 --> 41:26.320
the Berry Amendment was enacted

41:26.320 --> 41:29.919
to ensure that American troops are

41:29.919 --> 41:33.840
wearing American manufactured uniforms

41:33.840 --> 41:37.239
made in the USA . That was originally

41:37.239 --> 41:40.860
passed in 19 . 1941 , it was

41:40.860 --> 41:43.409
permanently enacted in

41:43.409 --> 41:47.179
1994 and we expanded it

41:47.179 --> 41:50.560
to cover athletic footwear um

41:50.780 --> 41:54.439
during my time in office so .

41:55.290 --> 41:59.290
There still is a continued exception

41:59.290 --> 42:03.030
to the Barry Amendment for combat boots

42:03.250 --> 42:06.370
that are purchased by a service , a

42:06.370 --> 42:09.889
service member . Every other

42:09.889 --> 42:13.370
major component of the uniform must

42:13.370 --> 42:17.030
be American made , and yet we continue

42:17.250 --> 42:20.209
to allow an exception for options .

42:20.659 --> 42:24.000
combat boots in practice this has

42:24.000 --> 42:26.320
allowed a growing share of the market

42:26.929 --> 42:30.270
to shift to foreign manufacturers and

42:30.270 --> 42:33.810
foreign supply chains that

42:33.810 --> 42:36.939
completely undermines the whole

42:36.939 --> 42:39.659
intent of the Berry amendment .

42:41.340 --> 42:45.179
Why are we continuing to allow for that

42:45.179 --> 42:48.379
exception and can we work together to

42:48.379 --> 42:51.540
close this loophole and ensure that the

42:51.540 --> 42:55.399
combat boots worn with the US military

42:55.780 --> 42:59.469
uniform are made in America ? Ma'am ,

42:59.550 --> 43:01.717
the simple answer is yes . I commit to

43:01.717 --> 43:03.939
working with you and the team , uh , on

43:03.939 --> 43:06.106
how do we close this gap . Thank you .

43:06.389 --> 43:07.945
Thank you , Mr . Chairman .

43:10.270 --> 43:13.020
Said Irwin . Thank you , Mr . Chairman ,

43:13.080 --> 43:15.939
uh , and welcome , Secretary General

43:15.939 --> 43:18.161
for being with us today . For more than

43:18.161 --> 43:20.510
4 years now , the Ukrainian people have

43:20.510 --> 43:22.510
bravely fought on the front line of

43:22.510 --> 43:24.677
democracy against Russian aggression .

43:25.110 --> 43:27.310
Today , Putin continues to bomb and

43:27.310 --> 43:29.590
kill innocent civilians while ignoring

43:29.590 --> 43:32.139
President Trump's call for peace . I

43:32.139 --> 43:34.195
want to thank you , Mr . Secretary ,

43:34.195 --> 43:36.250
for standing alongside Ukraine , for

43:36.250 --> 43:38.472
visiting the country , for highlighting

43:38.472 --> 43:40.583
its achievements on the battlefield ,

43:40.583 --> 43:42.583
and for being a voice in support of

43:42.583 --> 43:44.979
security assistance . Ukraine has truly

43:44.979 --> 43:46.923
offered an incredible glimpse into

43:46.923 --> 43:49.620
modern warfare with notable ingenuity

43:49.620 --> 43:52.340
and agility developed with low-cost

43:52.340 --> 43:54.770
technology . Secretary Driscoll , can

43:54.770 --> 43:56.979
you elaborate on the value of

43:56.979 --> 43:59.500
US-Ukraine cooperation and advancement

43:59.780 --> 44:02.219
in emerging technologies to prepare our

44:02.219 --> 44:04.275
own soldiers for battlefields in the

44:04.275 --> 44:06.330
future ? Um , absolutely , Senator ,

44:06.330 --> 44:08.441
and the chairman referenced it in his

44:08.441 --> 44:10.330
opening remarks . We consider the

44:10.330 --> 44:12.330
Ukrainian battlefield , the Silicon

44:12.330 --> 44:14.497
Valley of war . The United States Army

44:14.497 --> 44:16.719
has had through SAGU and other groups a

44:16.719 --> 44:18.886
relationship with the Ukrainians since

44:18.886 --> 44:21.219
the very beginning . General Leneve was .

44:21.219 --> 44:24.125
Working with the Ukrainians well , well

44:24.125 --> 44:26.125
before things even kicked off . And

44:26.125 --> 44:28.445
what I can say is , nearly every single

44:28.445 --> 44:30.501
thing we do as an army , we pressure

44:30.501 --> 44:32.556
test against the idea of , will this

44:32.556 --> 44:34.556
work in the Middle East ? Could the

44:34.556 --> 44:36.723
Ukrainians use this in their theater ?

44:36.723 --> 44:38.834
And if not , why are we pursuing it ?

44:38.834 --> 44:41.167
There are different things about how we ,

44:41.167 --> 44:43.389
the army , have to prepare for a future

44:43.389 --> 44:43.139
conflict at a future spot where we

44:43.139 --> 44:45.361
don't know about . And so if that is in

44:45.361 --> 44:47.472
SCO , if that's in the Indo-Pacific ,

44:47.472 --> 44:49.472
if that's moving quickly through an

44:49.472 --> 44:51.528
urban area , there are tools we will

44:51.528 --> 44:53.780
need like tanks that are valuable in

44:53.780 --> 44:55.780
different settings than the kind of

44:55.780 --> 44:58.002
plot of Ukraine . And so we balance out

44:58.002 --> 45:00.002
that that is not what all conflicts

45:00.002 --> 45:02.002
will look like , but the Ukrainians

45:02.002 --> 45:03.724
have done an incredible job of

45:03.724 --> 45:05.836
innovating at speed . They've done an

45:05.836 --> 45:08.058
incredible job of getting their private

45:08.058 --> 45:10.169
industry and some of their smartest ,

45:10.169 --> 45:12.391
most talented people to come help their

45:12.391 --> 45:12.344
armed forces and their army , and we

45:12.344 --> 45:14.584
are trying to mimic and model out how

45:14.584 --> 45:16.959
to do that with our industry too . Mr .

45:17.120 --> 45:19.000
Secretary , the US currently is

45:19.000 --> 45:21.056
stationed and rotates forces through

45:21.056 --> 45:22.778
the Baltic states and Poland ,

45:22.778 --> 45:25.000
countries on the front lines of Russian

45:25.000 --> 45:27.111
sabotage and belligerence , countries

45:27.111 --> 45:28.833
that are also far exceed their

45:28.833 --> 45:31.080
obligations under NATO . They've been

45:31.080 --> 45:33.247
true partners to the United States and

45:33.247 --> 45:35.469
in fact , I'll never forget last year ,

45:35.679 --> 45:37.735
Mr . Secretary , accompanying you to

45:37.735 --> 45:39.800
the dignified transfer at Dover Air

45:39.800 --> 45:42.360
Force Base of 4 American soldiers who

45:42.360 --> 45:44.520
died in a tragic training exercise in

45:44.520 --> 45:47.219
Lithuania . In Vilnius the day before ,

45:47.600 --> 45:50.080
the Lithuanian people came out and

45:50.080 --> 45:52.760
publicly mourned with us as these

45:52.760 --> 45:55.159
soldiers were returned home . This

45:55.159 --> 45:57.215
issue hit close to home , as some of

45:57.215 --> 45:59.381
these soldiers were from my home state

45:59.381 --> 46:01.492
of Illinois . In fact , Poland is our

46:01.492 --> 46:03.770
partner in the Illinois National Guard ,

46:03.770 --> 46:05.992
a relationship highly regarded . The US

46:05.992 --> 46:08.159
troop presence in these countries is a

46:08.159 --> 46:10.159
strategic decision , one rooted in

46:10.159 --> 46:12.639
shared values between our nations . I'm

46:12.639 --> 46:14.989
deeply concerned as I learned about the

46:14.989 --> 46:17.211
administration's plans to reduce forces

46:17.211 --> 46:19.322
in this theater , and I wonder if you

46:19.322 --> 46:21.820
could tell me , if we walk away from

46:21.870 --> 46:24.280
our allies in that region , what is the

46:24.280 --> 46:26.820
plan for US force posture in the world ?

46:27.199 --> 46:29.310
I can start and then hand it to uh my

46:29.310 --> 46:31.310
colleague . Um , I , I just want to

46:31.310 --> 46:33.366
echo your remarks , Senator , on the

46:33.366 --> 46:35.421
Lithuanians . Um , we still pray for

46:35.421 --> 46:37.699
those families of the fallen . Um , it ,

46:37.699 --> 46:39.866
it was devastating being at Dover with

46:39.866 --> 46:41.810
him and their family or with their

46:41.810 --> 46:41.639
families and their friends , but the

46:41.639 --> 46:43.583
Lithuanians were incredible . Um ,

46:43.790 --> 46:45.790
everyone I have seen that I know of

46:45.790 --> 46:47.734
since , I have thanked them . They

46:47.734 --> 46:49.901
wrapped their arms around our soldiers

46:49.901 --> 46:52.012
and their leadership and took us into

46:52.012 --> 46:54.068
their community . Um , and so we are

46:54.068 --> 46:56.290
very grateful for that , General Lane .

46:56.290 --> 46:58.290
Yes , sir , we have great relations

46:58.290 --> 47:00.457
with , uh , with our , uh , partners ,

47:00.457 --> 47:02.679
militaries , you know , across , across

47:02.679 --> 47:04.901
Europe . Sir , I , I still think you'll

47:04.901 --> 47:07.219
see , um , you know , based off of the

47:07.320 --> 47:09.639
commander of UCO's movement of forces ,

47:09.679 --> 47:11.735
you'll still see , you know , forces

47:11.735 --> 47:14.300
that are actively , uh , participating ,

47:14.419 --> 47:17.239
uh , inside of , of Poland . Uh , with

47:17.239 --> 47:19.320
our allies , it , it won't be the

47:19.320 --> 47:21.487
armored brigade , but you still have ,

47:21.487 --> 47:23.542
you know , the 2nd , 2CR that's over

47:23.542 --> 47:25.709
there , uh , right now . We still have

47:25.709 --> 47:27.653
another ABCT . We still have a , a

47:27.653 --> 47:29.709
division headquarters that's forward

47:29.709 --> 47:31.709
deployed . That's part of the , the

47:31.709 --> 47:33.931
surge that went forward . We still have

47:33.931 --> 47:36.042
5th Corps , uh , that's , that's in ,

47:36.042 --> 47:38.098
uh , in Europe . So , uh , while one

47:38.098 --> 47:40.264
brigade is coming back , we still have

47:40.264 --> 47:42.320
a pretty big force presence from the

47:42.320 --> 47:44.431
United States Army , uh , in Europe .

47:44.431 --> 47:46.209
Thank you , General . uh , Mr .

47:46.209 --> 47:45.919
Secretary , I wanna thank you for

47:45.919 --> 47:48.030
visiting the Rock Island Arsenal last

47:48.030 --> 47:50.252
year . I asked you to do it and you did

47:50.252 --> 47:52.363
it quickly , so quickly I couldn't go

47:52.363 --> 47:54.363
with you , but thank you anyway for

47:54.363 --> 47:56.475
visiting and for working with me over

47:56.475 --> 47:58.530
the past year to protect , uh , that

47:58.530 --> 48:00.850
arsenal team from job cuts that may

48:00.850 --> 48:04.010
hurt our organic industrial base . Can

48:04.010 --> 48:06.870
you commit to reprotecting our OIB

48:06.870 --> 48:09.250
sites like Rock Island Arsenal from

48:09.250 --> 48:11.729
further job cuts ? Um , Senator , I can

48:11.729 --> 48:14.330
commit to , we are , um , actively

48:14.330 --> 48:15.997
focused on President Trump to

48:16.250 --> 48:18.306
strengthen our industrial base , and

48:18.306 --> 48:20.472
Secretary Warheck had mandated that we

48:20.472 --> 48:22.694
do that . Does that include Rock Island

48:22.694 --> 48:24.917
Arsenal ? Rock Island Arsenal is , uh ,

48:24.917 --> 48:26.583
the forefront of our advanced

48:26.583 --> 48:28.750
manufacturing push , which will be the

48:28.750 --> 48:28.489
future of how we do fights and

48:28.489 --> 48:30.600
logistics all over the world . And so

48:30.600 --> 48:32.656
absolutely . I'm glad I came to this

48:32.656 --> 48:34.933
hearing . Thank you for your statement .

48:37.080 --> 48:39.320
Murkowski , then Shutts , and then

48:39.320 --> 48:41.431
Kennedy , thank you , Mr . Chairman .

48:41.431 --> 48:43.487
Gentlemen , thank you for being here

48:43.487 --> 48:45.764
and for your leadership . Uh , General ,

48:45.764 --> 48:47.931
uh , Lenev , I wanna , uh , address my

48:47.931 --> 48:49.987
first question to you . Uh , Senator

48:49.987 --> 48:52.042
Collins and I were talking about the

48:52.042 --> 48:53.987
boot issue , and I was telling her

48:53.987 --> 48:56.320
we're making or we're certainly testing ,

48:56.320 --> 48:58.376
uh , bunny boots in , in Alaska that

48:58.376 --> 49:00.431
are made in Alaska . So just putting

49:00.431 --> 49:02.709
that out . And when it comes to Arctic ,

49:02.709 --> 49:04.931
you will have big bunny boots to fill .

49:04.931 --> 49:07.054
Um , I , uh , I remain a big fan of ,

49:07.215 --> 49:09.745
of General Randy George . Um , he was a

49:09.745 --> 49:11.967
guy who understood the Arctic . I think

49:11.967 --> 49:14.189
it says a lot that he chose to take his

49:14.189 --> 49:18.064
oath of office , uh , uh , as the 41st

49:18.064 --> 49:20.231
Chief of Staff , not at the Pentagon ,

49:20.231 --> 49:22.895
but out there , um , at JBAR surrounded

49:22.895 --> 49:25.006
by the 11th Airborne . I thought that

49:25.006 --> 49:28.340
that was pretty cool . Um . But he , uh ,

49:28.479 --> 49:30.535
he really demonstrated to me we were

49:30.535 --> 49:32.590
out in the field at an Arctic , um ,

49:32.590 --> 49:35.459
training exercise in , in February . Uh ,

49:35.689 --> 49:38.090
the commitment and an understanding as

49:38.090 --> 49:40.719
to what it took to be engaged in , in

49:40.719 --> 49:44.250
Arctic warfare , and he has said that

49:44.250 --> 49:46.239
the army had really , his words ,

49:46.530 --> 49:48.474
really allowed our capabilities to

49:48.474 --> 49:50.641
atrophy in the Arctic , and now it was

49:50.641 --> 49:53.169
a catch-up game , and , and he was all

49:53.169 --> 49:55.336
in on what are we going to do with the

49:55.336 --> 49:57.502
level of innovation , how are we going

49:57.502 --> 49:59.502
to move this at , at , at literally

49:59.502 --> 50:02.020
warp speed here . So the question to

50:02.020 --> 50:05.939
you , um , uh , General Lane is , is

50:06.040 --> 50:08.262
we're , we're looking at what Russia is

50:08.262 --> 50:10.709
doing , um , we see how China is

50:10.709 --> 50:13.239
accelerating . Experts , outside

50:13.239 --> 50:15.406
experts say that we are doing catch up

50:15.406 --> 50:17.840
in the Arctic . Does this budget , in

50:17.840 --> 50:21.419
your view , um , continue the Arctic

50:21.939 --> 50:24.161
investment strategy that I think , uh ,

50:24.161 --> 50:26.272
General George put in motion , or are

50:26.272 --> 50:29.429
we , are we holding back here ? Ma'am ,

50:29.510 --> 50:31.843
we're definitely not taking a step back .

50:31.843 --> 50:34.121
And , in fact , if , if I tried at all ,

50:34.510 --> 50:36.909
there's a , a , a personal person that

50:36.909 --> 50:38.909
would kill me . My daughter's first

50:38.909 --> 50:40.979
assignment was in 125 , uh , up in

50:40.979 --> 50:44.169
Alaska . And thank you for , uh , your ,

50:44.310 --> 50:47.110
uh , commitment and efforts to help us

50:47.110 --> 50:49.790
turn , uh , those two brigades that ,

50:49.909 --> 50:52.131
you know , always seemed like they were

50:52.131 --> 50:53.687
separate and not part of an

50:53.687 --> 50:56.070
organization . Truly into a division

50:56.070 --> 50:58.830
that has a , a shared focus , a shared

50:58.830 --> 51:00.997
commitment , and you can see the spree

51:00.997 --> 51:03.163
there . And what we're learning , um ,

51:03.163 --> 51:05.274
from , uh , the , the training that's

51:05.274 --> 51:07.274
going on , whether it's an airborne

51:07.274 --> 51:09.386
operation or , you know , just trying

51:09.386 --> 51:11.969
to , uh , to maneuver , uh , during ,

51:12.149 --> 51:14.500
uh , the winter . Uh , it's going to

51:14.500 --> 51:17.020
help us throughout the army , not , not

51:17.020 --> 51:20.219
just in winter , uh , or , uh , you

51:20.219 --> 51:22.580
know , uh , the Arctic conditions , but

51:22.580 --> 51:24.747
if you look at batteries and how , how

51:24.747 --> 51:26.691
fast batteries get depleted in the

51:26.691 --> 51:28.691
Arctic , that's the same thing that

51:28.691 --> 51:30.913
happens in , in the jungle . So there's

51:30.913 --> 51:33.024
a lot of , uh , corollaries too , but

51:33.024 --> 51:35.191
really to answer your question , we're

51:35.191 --> 51:34.540
not stepping away from it because we

51:34.540 --> 51:36.373
know it's going to be a critical

51:36.373 --> 51:38.373
battleground in the future . Well ,

51:38.373 --> 51:40.596
they say that if you can figure out how

51:40.596 --> 51:42.762
to fight there , you can figure it out

51:42.762 --> 51:45.320
just about , about anywhere and I , I ,

51:45.399 --> 51:47.510
I would certainly agree with that . I

51:47.510 --> 51:49.732
wanna follow on the chairman's comments

51:49.732 --> 51:51.919
as , as well as that of the , of the

51:51.919 --> 51:55.139
ranking member when it comes to , um ,

51:55.719 --> 51:58.120
uh , this budget request and the fact

51:58.120 --> 52:00.149
that a quarter of the budget , uh ,

52:00.159 --> 52:03.239
37.7 billion depends on a

52:03.239 --> 52:07.090
reconciliation package , um . That

52:07.090 --> 52:10.050
is yet to be divined , to be decided .

52:10.159 --> 52:13.610
Uh , it's already queued , um , in line

52:13.610 --> 52:16.189
behind other legislative priorities .

52:16.570 --> 52:19.689
Um , and there's important stuff in it

52:19.689 --> 52:22.959
like . In that 37.7

52:22.959 --> 52:25.550
billion,830 of the Army's

52:25.719 --> 52:29.479
857 requested THAAD interceptors , um ,

52:29.530 --> 52:31.810
we've got the PAC-3 MSE Patriot

52:31.810 --> 52:34.969
interceptors , um , uh , jumping nearly

52:34.969 --> 52:38.850
nine times from 357 rounds to over 3200 ,

52:39.290 --> 52:41.250
um , so it , I mean , it's , it's

52:41.250 --> 52:43.409
important what is in that proposed

52:43.409 --> 52:46.189
reconciliation . But we're also waiting

52:46.189 --> 52:48.550
on the forthcoming Iran war

52:48.550 --> 52:51.350
supplemental , which we anticipate will

52:51.350 --> 52:53.461
have significant funding requests for

52:53.461 --> 52:56.870
munitions restock . So , kind of walk

52:56.870 --> 52:59.229
me through kind of the governing

52:59.229 --> 53:01.469
principle here , if you will . What ,

53:01.550 --> 53:03.590
what goes in the base budget , what

53:03.590 --> 53:06.270
goes in reconciliation , what goes in

53:06.270 --> 53:08.709
the supplemental , and , and , and is

53:08.709 --> 53:11.070
that distinction being driven by

53:11.070 --> 53:13.489
actually . By actual military

53:13.489 --> 53:16.530
requirements or by what you think might

53:16.530 --> 53:20.370
be able to pass this legislative body .

53:21.699 --> 53:23.866
Senator , um , I think as you and your

53:23.866 --> 53:25.977
colleagues know much better than us ,

53:25.977 --> 53:28.139
um , we , we work across the services

53:28.139 --> 53:30.250
hand in hand with OSW to come up with

53:30.250 --> 53:32.020
this plan . We agree

53:32.020 --> 53:34.131
wholeheartedheartedly with all of you

53:34.260 --> 53:36.371
that the reconciliation portion , the

53:36.371 --> 53:38.371
supplemental portion , all of it is

53:38.371 --> 53:40.427
critical . For our national security

53:40.427 --> 53:42.649
and our personal commitments is to work

53:42.649 --> 53:44.649
with any office so that it is not a

53:44.649 --> 53:46.816
partisan exercise , but instead all of

53:46.816 --> 53:48.816
you can see the bipartisanship with

53:48.816 --> 53:51.149
which I think we put together this plan .

53:51.149 --> 53:54.435
Do we have a Plan B in in in the in the

53:54.435 --> 53:56.594
chance that there is not a third

53:56.594 --> 53:59.790
reconciliation ? Um , Senator , we can

53:59.790 --> 54:01.679
follow up with your office on the

54:01.679 --> 54:03.734
specifics , OK , because as I , as I

54:03.734 --> 54:05.901
look to what's included , it's kind of

54:05.901 --> 54:07.989
important stuff and so helping us

54:07.989 --> 54:10.156
understand our role here , uh , on the

54:10.156 --> 54:12.267
Appropriations Committee and how this

54:12.267 --> 54:14.378
maps forward , I think is important .

54:14.378 --> 54:16.711
Thank you , Mr . Chairman . Schatz , um ,

54:17.409 --> 54:20.110
Kennedy and Murphy . Thank you ,

54:20.189 --> 54:23.699
Chairman . Um , secretary , good to see

54:23.699 --> 54:26.870
you . I wanted to follow up our

54:26.870 --> 54:28.926
ongoing conversation about the lease

54:28.926 --> 54:30.703
negotiations . I know you're in

54:30.703 --> 54:32.926
constructive dialogue with the governor

54:32.926 --> 54:36.169
and his administration . Uh I wanna

54:36.169 --> 54:38.729
just sort of set the tone here and make

54:38.729 --> 54:40.785
sure we're on the same page at least

54:40.785 --> 54:43.530
conceptually obviously deals have to be

54:43.530 --> 54:45.474
negotiated , but I think the first

54:45.474 --> 54:49.090
thing is do you want a deal with the

54:49.090 --> 54:51.209
state government done in a

54:51.209 --> 54:53.760
collaborative fashion ? Unequivocally ,

54:53.800 --> 54:57.370
Senator , OK , and . Um ,

54:57.879 --> 54:59.990
there are a couple of things that are

54:59.990 --> 55:02.157
happening right now . First of all , I

55:02.157 --> 55:04.323
think a deal is possible . I wanna say

55:04.323 --> 55:08.080
that , um , but the state of Hawaii up

55:08.080 --> 55:11.590
until now has . Provided state

55:11.590 --> 55:15.120
lands for army training . Uh , for free

55:16.149 --> 55:18.770
And that's just not a reasonable deal

55:18.899 --> 55:22.709
and so it's true that the Department of

55:22.709 --> 55:26.229
War , the Department of the Army has a

55:26.229 --> 55:28.850
legal right . To

55:29.510 --> 55:32.989
Adversely condemn property that they

55:32.989 --> 55:35.310
deem in the national security interests

55:35.310 --> 55:38.590
of the United States . That is the kind

55:38.590 --> 55:40.989
of thing that sounds easy in Washington .

55:41.629 --> 55:44.350
And would create lots of difficulty

55:44.350 --> 55:47.860
back home because . What we

55:47.860 --> 55:51.580
have underlying this relationship is a

55:51.580 --> 55:54.260
cooperative attitude between state

55:54.260 --> 55:56.316
government , county government , and

55:56.316 --> 55:58.538
the federal government in this instance

55:58.538 --> 56:00.760
and there are very few instances of the

56:00.760 --> 56:02.427
army or the department of war

56:02.427 --> 56:04.649
condemning state property . It happened

56:04.649 --> 56:06.649
in New York . It happened in Puerto

56:06.649 --> 56:09.500
Rico in both instances those were , I

56:09.500 --> 56:11.611
mean those are moments in history and

56:11.611 --> 56:13.611
they're not good ones , right ? And

56:13.611 --> 56:15.833
they weren't good for the Department of

56:15.833 --> 56:17.889
War and so I would just like to hear

56:17.889 --> 56:19.889
from you . That you'd like to avoid

56:19.889 --> 56:22.056
that outcome of adverse condemnation ,

56:22.056 --> 56:24.222
not that you take it off the table . I

56:24.222 --> 56:26.444
know that you , um , uh , don't want to

56:26.444 --> 56:28.611
take anything off the table when we're

56:28.611 --> 56:30.722
still in a negotiation , but I'd like

56:30.722 --> 56:30.689
to hear that that's not where you're

56:30.689 --> 56:34.409
sort of barreling towards . Um , happy

56:34.409 --> 56:36.840
to , Senator . Uh , I first always try

56:36.840 --> 56:38.673
to say this , and I mean it very

56:38.673 --> 56:40.951
sincerely . If you talk to any soldier ,

56:40.951 --> 56:43.118
and I'm sure General Laneve could echo

56:43.118 --> 56:45.340
this , who has been stationed in Hawaii

56:45.340 --> 56:47.562
with their families , they get embraced

56:47.562 --> 56:49.451
by that community , unlike almost

56:49.451 --> 56:49.050
anywhere else our soldiers go . It's

56:49.050 --> 56:51.217
one of the most requested places , not

56:51.217 --> 56:53.106
just because it's beautiful , but

56:53.106 --> 56:55.106
because the community is so good to

56:55.106 --> 56:57.217
them . And that can be that trust and

56:57.217 --> 56:59.439
relationships takes decades to build up

56:59.449 --> 57:01.909
and so we are incredibly grateful . Um ,

57:01.929 --> 57:03.818
the second one is I don't want to

57:03.818 --> 57:05.873
underestimate the importance of that

57:05.873 --> 57:08.096
training land for our national security

57:08.096 --> 57:09.873
and how important it is for the

57:09.873 --> 57:11.985
Indo-Pacific when we reference Alaska

57:11.985 --> 57:13.762
and how important it is for our

57:13.762 --> 57:15.818
soldiers to get to train there . The

57:15.818 --> 57:17.929
triple canopy that 25th ID gets to do

57:17.929 --> 57:20.151
impacts how we create our TTPs and will

57:20.151 --> 57:22.262
make us stronger in the future , uh ,

57:22.262 --> 57:24.151
but to your specific . Question ,

57:24.151 --> 57:26.207
Senator , um , the governor's team ,

57:26.207 --> 57:28.373
your federal delegation have advocated

57:28.373 --> 57:30.596
incredibly tirelessly for the people of

57:30.596 --> 57:32.651
Hawaii . We want to come to the most

57:32.651 --> 57:34.818
fair resolution as quickly as possible

57:34.818 --> 57:37.040
so that we can continue to maintain the

57:37.040 --> 57:39.040
relationship with the community and

57:39.040 --> 57:41.318
have this national security asset . OK ,

57:41.318 --> 57:43.485
in , in the interest of continuing the

57:43.485 --> 57:45.707
negotiation , but as , as , as we say ,

57:45.707 --> 57:45.215
hard on the issues , easy on each other ,

57:45.294 --> 57:47.572
I want to just flag a couple of issues .

57:47.572 --> 57:49.738
First , um , there's sort of chatter .

57:50.379 --> 57:53.620
Uh , about a provision in the house

57:53.620 --> 57:56.320
mark of the defense authorization bill ,

57:56.860 --> 58:00.030
and I think that that . Is

58:00.729 --> 58:02.770
very likely unwise because we're

58:02.770 --> 58:06.449
talking about . One chamber , one party ,

58:07.139 --> 58:09.361
and if we're gonna do anything with the

58:09.361 --> 58:11.583
Hawaii congressional delegation , we've

58:11.583 --> 58:13.472
got 2 defense appropriators and 2

58:13.472 --> 58:15.639
defense authorizers , we should all be

58:15.639 --> 58:15.100
in the room and know what the heck is

58:15.100 --> 58:17.100
being contemplated as ledge text is

58:17.100 --> 58:19.399
being sort of uh transmitted back and

58:19.399 --> 58:21.566
forth and if it's not , then we should

58:21.566 --> 58:23.788
know that that's not what's happening .

58:23.788 --> 58:25.788
That's number 1 . Number 2 is as we

58:25.788 --> 58:27.788
think about the remuneration to the

58:27.788 --> 58:30.121
state government , right ? It's a lease .

58:30.121 --> 58:32.343
You got a lessee and a lessor , and the

58:32.343 --> 58:34.343
lessor should get something for the

58:34.343 --> 58:36.399
lease . You agree with that . Now we

58:36.399 --> 58:38.510
have to talk about the details . Um ,

58:38.510 --> 58:41.040
it's just important to not move

58:41.040 --> 58:44.070
anything to the left on the MLCon list ,

58:44.120 --> 58:46.320
on the unfunded priorities list . So

58:46.320 --> 58:49.159
think of this as a proper community

58:49.159 --> 58:52.620
benefits package , as you know . I've

58:52.620 --> 58:54.969
been on this committee for a while now

58:55.199 --> 58:57.600
and I'm happy to advocate for increased

58:57.600 --> 58:59.489
defense spending , generally army

58:59.489 --> 59:01.879
spending in particular , um , in the

59:01.879 --> 59:04.101
state of Hawaii . However , when you're

59:04.101 --> 59:06.479
talking about a lease negotiation like

59:06.479 --> 59:09.840
us doing Milon and moving it to the

59:09.840 --> 59:12.239
left or , you know , buying down the

59:12.239 --> 59:14.461
Uer list is not gonna be something that

59:14.461 --> 59:18.000
we can . Honestly convey is a community

59:18.000 --> 59:19.722
benefits package . So as we're

59:19.722 --> 59:22.239
contemplating how to make the community

59:22.239 --> 59:24.199
whole and maintain that level of

59:24.199 --> 59:26.310
cooperation , there's some people who

59:26.310 --> 59:28.477
believe the Department of Defense just

59:28.477 --> 59:30.699
doesn't belong in the state of Hawaii .

59:30.699 --> 59:30.669
Those people will never be satisfied .

59:30.919 --> 59:33.086
There are some people who think that ,

59:33.086 --> 59:35.308
uh , the Department of . Defense should

59:35.308 --> 59:37.197
not give anything to the state of

59:37.197 --> 59:39.197
Hawaii . Those people will never be

59:39.197 --> 59:41.419
satisfied , but the middle wants a fair

59:41.419 --> 59:43.419
deal , and that fair deal would not

59:43.419 --> 59:45.641
include just increased army spending on

59:45.641 --> 59:47.752
army stuff , but rather , uh , a kind

59:47.752 --> 59:50.370
of compensation for the ability to use

59:50.370 --> 59:53.969
the lands at , um , at PTA , um ,

59:54.139 --> 59:57.969
and PMRF and elsewhere . Thank you .

01:00:02.959 --> 01:00:03.959
Kennedy .

01:00:07.739 --> 01:00:09.479
Gentlemen , welcome . um .

01:00:11.780 --> 01:00:13.947
My , my , my biggest surprise from the

01:00:13.947 --> 01:00:17.439
summit between Presidents Trump and Xi .

01:00:18.770 --> 01:00:21.350
Was how open and notorious .

01:00:22.860 --> 01:00:25.879
President Xi was with respect to his

01:00:26.659 --> 01:00:29.939
insecurity about Taiwan . I mean ,

01:00:29.949 --> 01:00:33.919
before , during , after the summit . Um

01:00:36.209 --> 01:00:39.540
He , he basically said , America ,

01:00:39.699 --> 01:00:41.755
President Trump need to leave Taiwan

01:00:41.755 --> 01:00:45.360
alone . Taiwan is ours . And President

01:00:45.360 --> 01:00:48.719
Xi has this reputation built up by many

01:00:48.719 --> 01:00:50.663
members of our media as being this

01:00:50.663 --> 01:00:53.290
master negotiator . I found that

01:00:53.290 --> 01:00:56.290
surprising . It's understandable

01:00:57.729 --> 01:01:00.810
America has learned how to fight a game .

01:01:01.639 --> 01:01:03.861
And I'm sure President Xi is looking at

01:01:03.861 --> 01:01:06.889
what President Trump did and In

01:01:06.889 --> 01:01:10.050
Venezuela and Cuba and Iran and the

01:01:10.050 --> 01:01:13.800
Sahel and Yemen . Um ,

01:01:15.520 --> 01:01:18.479
Be that as it may , Mr . Xi has

01:01:18.479 --> 01:01:21.239
demonstrated . And telegraphed his

01:01:21.239 --> 01:01:23.959
insecurities . That gives us leverage .

01:01:24.949 --> 01:01:28.629
Doesn't that argue for us to go forward

01:01:28.629 --> 01:01:31.540
with an arms sale to Taiwan and others

01:01:31.540 --> 01:01:34.800
after it ? General , let me ask you

01:01:34.800 --> 01:01:37.719
first , our secretary , whoever wants

01:01:37.719 --> 01:01:41.050
to answer . Um , Senator , uh , the ,

01:01:41.129 --> 01:01:43.296
the , the portion of it that I would ,

01:01:43.296 --> 01:01:44.962
uh , strongly and , uh , very

01:01:44.962 --> 01:01:48.290
vehemently disagree with is , um , that

01:01:48.290 --> 01:01:50.401
in any instance where President Trump

01:01:50.401 --> 01:01:52.330
is , he would concede anything

01:01:52.330 --> 01:01:54.552
unnecessarily . And so I , I didn't , I

01:01:54.552 --> 01:01:57.050
didn't ask that . I , I , if you can't

01:01:57.050 --> 01:01:59.217
answer , tell me because I , I , I , I

01:01:59.217 --> 01:02:01.272
don't want anybody to get fired . It

01:02:01.272 --> 01:02:03.383
just seems to me I was surprised that

01:02:03.383 --> 01:02:06.169
President Xi was so . So , uh , obvious

01:02:06.169 --> 01:02:08.336
in his insecurity . He's worried about

01:02:08.336 --> 01:02:10.336
Taiwan . He's worried about America

01:02:10.336 --> 01:02:12.502
supporting Taiwan . If we want , if we

01:02:12.502 --> 01:02:15.350
want stability . We're not going to get

01:02:15.350 --> 01:02:19.229
it By being nice to Xi , we're going to

01:02:19.229 --> 01:02:21.620
get it by making him respect our

01:02:21.620 --> 01:02:24.020
strength . Don't you think that argues

01:02:24.020 --> 01:02:26.242
for us to go forward with arms sales to

01:02:26.242 --> 01:02:28.409
Taiwan ? Uh , Senator , I can say that

01:02:28.409 --> 01:02:31.189
under this budget , um , this $1.5

01:02:31.189 --> 01:02:33.411
trillion budget , we , we will be in an

01:02:33.411 --> 01:02:35.620
even stronger position to defend our

01:02:35.620 --> 01:02:38.320
allies , Mr . Secretary . I , I , I ,

01:02:38.439 --> 01:02:40.661
it's a policy question that is above my

01:02:40.661 --> 01:02:42.606
Title 10 authority , Senator . All

01:02:42.606 --> 01:02:44.772
right , well , let me ask you , let me

01:02:44.772 --> 01:02:47.199
shift direction . I look , I , I , I

01:02:47.199 --> 01:02:49.255
don't , I don't think you have to be

01:02:49.255 --> 01:02:51.679
Einstein's cousin to figure out what we

01:02:51.679 --> 01:02:53.290
ought to do next in terms of

01:02:53.290 --> 01:02:56.439
establishing deterrence , but maybe

01:02:56.439 --> 01:02:58.879
that's just me . Um ,

01:03:00.199 --> 01:03:01.729
Is Russia our friend ?

01:03:03.889 --> 01:03:07.669
No Between Ukraine

01:03:07.669 --> 01:03:10.189
and Russia and the war they're fighting .

01:03:11.060 --> 01:03:14.350
Who do we want to win ? Ukraine .

01:03:15.149 --> 01:03:18.820
OK . Um , isn't it a fact ?

01:03:19.399 --> 01:03:21.899
Well , strike that . What's the most

01:03:21.899 --> 01:03:23.550
powerful army in Europe ?

01:03:29.639 --> 01:03:31.639
Sir , I , I'd say anywhere that the

01:03:31.639 --> 01:03:33.861
United States soldier is , I understand

01:03:33.861 --> 01:03:35.861
other than the United States Army ,

01:03:35.861 --> 01:03:38.139
what's the most powerful European army ?

01:03:38.320 --> 01:03:40.300
Yeah , it's , it's probably , uh ,

01:03:40.649 --> 01:03:43.879
between , uh , Russia and , uh , you

01:03:43.879 --> 01:03:45.879
know , some of our allies have some

01:03:45.879 --> 01:03:47.935
incredible army service . Ukraine is

01:03:47.935 --> 01:03:50.212
incredible capabilities . It's Ukraine ,

01:03:50.212 --> 01:03:52.379
isn't it , Terry ? Ukraine has a , has

01:03:52.379 --> 01:03:54.268
been , has done an incredible job

01:03:54.268 --> 01:03:56.435
against a , uh , aggressor . Don't you

01:03:56.435 --> 01:03:58.546
find it breathtaking , General , what

01:03:58.546 --> 01:04:00.379
they've done ? They started with

01:04:00.379 --> 01:04:02.490
nothing . I do find it breathtaking ,

01:04:02.490 --> 01:04:04.657
and , and I just , they're producing .

01:04:04.657 --> 01:04:07.250
2 , now 200 drones a day in addition to

01:04:07.250 --> 01:04:10.370
cruise missiles to reach into Russia .

01:04:10.729 --> 01:04:13.850
They've taken out 40% of

01:04:13.850 --> 01:04:17.350
Russia's ability to export its oil .

01:04:18.350 --> 01:04:20.350
I just find , and they started with

01:04:20.350 --> 01:04:22.820
nothing . I remember when all the

01:04:22.820 --> 01:04:25.229
experts who are almost always wrong ,

01:04:25.389 --> 01:04:28.129
so Russia's gonna move in on Ukraine .

01:04:28.340 --> 01:04:30.562
They're gonna roll in like like thunder

01:04:30.562 --> 01:04:32.729
on a summer night . It'll be over in 2

01:04:32.729 --> 01:04:35.659
days . And now Ukraine has turned the

01:04:35.659 --> 01:04:39.290
tide . Why don't we support .

01:04:40.820 --> 01:04:43.780
Taking those $200 billion of Russian

01:04:43.780 --> 01:04:46.760
assets in Europe that we have seized .

01:04:47.949 --> 01:04:50.060
And getting that money to Ukraine and

01:04:50.060 --> 01:04:53.040
let's win this thing . Or at least get

01:04:53.040 --> 01:04:54.929
Putin into a position where he'll

01:04:54.929 --> 01:04:58.629
negotiate a settlement . Would you

01:04:58.629 --> 01:05:01.489
support that ? Again , Senator , my

01:05:01.489 --> 01:05:03.545
Title 10 authorities , that that's a

01:05:03.545 --> 01:05:05.909
policy question outside of our lane . I

01:05:05.909 --> 01:05:07.798
mean , it just seems so , I'm not

01:05:07.798 --> 01:05:10.879
talking about federal money . There's

01:05:10.879 --> 01:05:13.790
$200 billion sitting there . Heck ,

01:05:13.879 --> 01:05:17.169
there's , there's there , there's $31

01:05:17.169 --> 01:05:19.113
billion in the UK alone . France ,

01:05:19.120 --> 01:05:21.580
Macron , President Macron , swell guy .

01:05:21.840 --> 01:05:24.679
He's always giving us advice and , and

01:05:24.679 --> 01:05:27.419
fussing at us . France is sitting on

01:05:27.419 --> 01:05:29.590
$22 billion . Why don't they give that

01:05:29.590 --> 01:05:33.219
to Ukraine ? They'll use the money to

01:05:33.219 --> 01:05:35.108
buy some of our , our , our , our

01:05:35.108 --> 01:05:37.929
weapons . It's just sitting there . If

01:05:37.929 --> 01:05:40.649
we want to win , why don't we support

01:05:40.649 --> 01:05:44.010
taking the 200+ billion dollars and

01:05:44.010 --> 01:05:46.199
saying , here , Ukraine , here's the

01:05:46.199 --> 01:05:47.532
money , go whip their .

01:05:50.199 --> 01:05:52.143
You're not gonna , you don't wanna

01:05:52.143 --> 01:05:53.810
answer that , do you guys ? I

01:05:53.810 --> 01:05:55.866
understand . I get it . I'm , I went

01:05:55.866 --> 01:05:57.810
over . I'm sorry , Mr . Chairman .

01:06:05.389 --> 01:06:09.070
Shahane , uh , Capito , Baldwin , and

01:06:09.070 --> 01:06:11.709
Bosson . Um , thank you , Mr . Chairman ,

01:06:11.760 --> 01:06:15.199
and let me begin by thanking both of

01:06:15.199 --> 01:06:17.260
you for being here and associating

01:06:17.260 --> 01:06:19.204
myself with the remarks of Senator

01:06:19.204 --> 01:06:21.629
Kennedy with respect to Ukraine , um ,

01:06:21.800 --> 01:06:23.639
and point out that if the

01:06:23.639 --> 01:06:25.528
administration would just put the

01:06:25.528 --> 01:06:27.379
sanctions back on the oil .

01:06:29.649 --> 01:06:32.850
It would stop Russia from gaining $4

01:06:32.850 --> 01:06:35.209
billion a month that they're using to

01:06:35.209 --> 01:06:37.265
put into Ukraine , and , and I would

01:06:37.265 --> 01:06:39.487
just say , Secretary Driscoll , that in

01:06:39.487 --> 01:06:41.709
fact as the Secretary of the Army , you

01:06:41.709 --> 01:06:44.370
are a policy person . And while you may

01:06:44.370 --> 01:06:46.537
not want to answer that question , and

01:06:46.537 --> 01:06:48.648
I understand that if you want to bump

01:06:48.648 --> 01:06:50.870
that to the president , but to say that

01:06:50.870 --> 01:06:52.981
you're not responsible for policy , I

01:06:52.981 --> 01:06:55.148
think is not an accurate description ,

01:06:55.669 --> 01:06:57.836
um , but I want to ask you because the

01:06:57.836 --> 01:07:00.739
last time you were both um . We had an

01:07:00.739 --> 01:07:02.683
exchange . It was before the Armed

01:07:02.683 --> 01:07:04.739
Services Committee , and I asked you

01:07:04.739 --> 01:07:07.739
about the drawdown of the troops from

01:07:07.739 --> 01:07:10.659
Germany . And then walked out of that

01:07:10.659 --> 01:07:12.959
hearing and heard that the

01:07:13.739 --> 01:07:15.683
administration had just decided to

01:07:15.683 --> 01:07:18.260
cancel a deployment of 4000 troops to

01:07:18.260 --> 01:07:21.320
Poland , and I just wondered if

01:07:21.939 --> 01:07:24.540
you or anyone in the administration

01:07:24.540 --> 01:07:26.707
contacted our Polish allies about that

01:07:26.707 --> 01:07:28.762
troop withdrawal , if they knew that

01:07:28.762 --> 01:07:31.250
was coming , and if you , um , either

01:07:31.250 --> 01:07:33.250
of you were asked about your advice

01:07:33.250 --> 01:07:35.159
with respect to whether that

01:07:35.929 --> 01:07:39.239
cancellation should be done . Ma'am ,

01:07:39.320 --> 01:07:41.487
thank you , uh , for the question . As

01:07:41.487 --> 01:07:43.909
I , I stated earlier , I , I was in ,

01:07:43.959 --> 01:07:46.250
uh , consultation with the , the UCO

01:07:46.250 --> 01:07:48.361
commander on , on what force it would

01:07:48.361 --> 01:07:50.361
be as the Title 10 , and , and what

01:07:50.361 --> 01:07:52.600
would come out , uh , in , in my

01:07:52.600 --> 01:07:54.767
recommendation to him , uh , as well .

01:07:55.040 --> 01:07:57.262
Uh , but , uh , you know , notification

01:07:57.262 --> 01:07:59.262
to our , our partners , um , on the

01:07:59.262 --> 01:08:01.318
Title 10 . Uh , that's not something

01:08:01.318 --> 01:08:03.373
that's in my purview of , if General

01:08:03.373 --> 01:08:05.707
Grikovich did that as the UCO commander ,

01:08:05.707 --> 01:08:07.762
if that was done , uh , inside the ,

01:08:07.762 --> 01:08:10.639
the OSW policy . And Senator , I would

01:08:10.639 --> 01:08:13.260
say , uh , the , the services are , uh ,

01:08:13.320 --> 01:08:15.376
this is not intended to be an answer

01:08:15.376 --> 01:08:17.431
that's hiding the ball , but instead

01:08:17.431 --> 01:08:19.653
very accurately , we are constantly and

01:08:19.653 --> 01:08:21.598
frequently talking about our force

01:08:21.598 --> 01:08:23.709
posture all over the world throughout

01:08:23.709 --> 01:08:25.709
the year , um , with policy and OSW

01:08:25.709 --> 01:08:27.931
leadership in the administration , um ,

01:08:27.931 --> 01:08:29.931
and so we are regularly involved in

01:08:29.931 --> 01:08:32.153
conversations . Um , but it just struck

01:08:32.153 --> 01:08:35.119
me that we had just had an exchange

01:08:35.119 --> 01:08:37.929
about the fact that it would be OK to

01:08:37.929 --> 01:08:39.929
draw down those troops from Germany

01:08:39.929 --> 01:08:42.096
because we were going to be rotating ,

01:08:42.096 --> 01:08:45.930
um , troops in and then . There

01:08:45.930 --> 01:08:49.930
was no effort to Um ,

01:08:50.479 --> 01:08:52.646
address what was happening in Poland .

01:08:52.646 --> 01:08:54.868
It just , it seemed like a , a decision

01:08:54.868 --> 01:08:58.049
that was not thought through , um , so

01:08:58.049 --> 01:09:00.216
that's why I wondered if , if you were

01:09:00.216 --> 01:09:02.327
asked , and , and I think it's , it's

01:09:02.327 --> 01:09:05.029
the reason that in the NDAA last year ,

01:09:05.330 --> 01:09:08.149
um , the Congress mandated

01:09:08.490 --> 01:09:10.849
consultation . Before the

01:09:10.849 --> 01:09:13.016
administration can remove US forces in

01:09:13.016 --> 01:09:15.688
Europe below 76,000 for longer than 45

01:09:15.688 --> 01:09:17.829
days because there is real concern

01:09:18.249 --> 01:09:21.910
about what Not with respect to what the

01:09:21.910 --> 01:09:24.077
two of you are saying , but about what

01:09:24.077 --> 01:09:26.021
this administration is planning in

01:09:26.021 --> 01:09:28.243
terms of the drawdown from Europe and ,

01:09:28.390 --> 01:09:31.870
and . Isn't it true that

01:09:32.259 --> 01:09:34.970
one of , one of the important reasons

01:09:34.970 --> 01:09:37.660
to have prepositioned equipment , we

01:09:37.660 --> 01:09:40.640
had this exchange at SASC as well , um ,

01:09:40.709 --> 01:09:43.799
is because it allows us to have , um ,

01:09:44.259 --> 01:09:48.120
more rapidly assemble , um , troops

01:09:48.140 --> 01:09:50.899
if we need to go into the Middle East

01:09:50.899 --> 01:09:53.529
or go someplace else if we have , um ,

01:09:53.540 --> 01:09:55.707
the ability to have that prepositioned

01:09:55.707 --> 01:09:58.240
equipment . So , ma'am , uh , you know ,

01:09:58.319 --> 01:10:00.160
the , we've been looking at our

01:10:00.160 --> 01:10:02.770
preposition , uh , force structure for

01:10:02.770 --> 01:10:06.479
a while , um , and , and really , uh ,

01:10:06.640 --> 01:10:09.319
the , the analysis to take a look at it ,

01:10:09.759 --> 01:10:11.981
do you keep it as a preposition force ,

01:10:12.200 --> 01:10:14.311
uh , that , you know , you , you only

01:10:14.311 --> 01:10:16.644
break , uh , you know , when , when you ,

01:10:16.644 --> 01:10:18.978
you break glass when you need to use it ,

01:10:18.978 --> 01:10:21.144
or do you , you , you change the , The

01:10:21.144 --> 01:10:23.256
way we look at that force is training

01:10:23.256 --> 01:10:25.422
sets that could be spread out that you

01:10:25.422 --> 01:10:27.533
could fall in which , which breaks it

01:10:27.533 --> 01:10:29.644
up . It's a less of a target . You'll

01:10:29.644 --> 01:10:31.867
still be able to utilize them , but the

01:10:31.867 --> 01:10:33.589
most important part is you can

01:10:33.589 --> 01:10:35.644
continually upgrade those systems so

01:10:35.644 --> 01:10:37.756
they can talk to each other and , and

01:10:37.756 --> 01:10:39.978
as we said at that SASC hearing , I , I

01:10:39.978 --> 01:10:42.144
think that makes sense , but we're not

01:10:42.144 --> 01:10:44.256
doing that either , as I understand .

01:10:44.256 --> 01:10:46.311
No , ma'am , we are taking a look at

01:10:46.311 --> 01:10:48.422
that . Um , that , that was part of ,

01:10:48.422 --> 01:10:50.256
uh , the overall look . So we're

01:10:50.256 --> 01:10:52.478
studying it is what you're telling me .

01:10:52.478 --> 01:10:54.422
Yes ma'am , we are , we're , we're

01:10:54.422 --> 01:10:54.350
looking at how we can make these sets ,

01:10:54.700 --> 01:10:56.867
uh , the ability , as you and I talked

01:10:56.867 --> 01:10:59.200
before , to be able to , to get on them ,

01:10:59.200 --> 01:11:01.422
to be able to use them . To , to reduce

01:11:01.422 --> 01:11:03.478
the amount of money it costs to move

01:11:03.478 --> 01:11:05.700
equipment back . Well , I look , I look

01:11:05.700 --> 01:11:07.867
forward to hearing the outcome of that

01:11:07.867 --> 01:11:07.750
study . I , I wanna ask one more

01:11:07.750 --> 01:11:09.861
question before my time is over , and

01:11:09.861 --> 01:11:11.861
that is , um , this came up at that

01:11:11.861 --> 01:11:13.917
SASS hearing as well , but Secretary

01:11:13.917 --> 01:11:15.917
Driscoll , US Army in Europe took a

01:11:15.917 --> 01:11:19.020
decrement of 155 million . In FY 26

01:11:19.020 --> 01:11:21.180
funding because of non-reimbursable

01:11:21.180 --> 01:11:23.291
support to the Department of Homeland

01:11:23.291 --> 01:11:25.402
Security at last week's hearing , you

01:11:25.402 --> 01:11:27.459
testified that you had not been

01:11:27.459 --> 01:11:29.403
reimbursed for that . I assume you

01:11:29.403 --> 01:11:31.626
still have not been reimbursed for that

01:11:31.626 --> 01:11:33.792
amount . Um , Senator , um , I , I was

01:11:33.792 --> 01:11:36.000
able to talk to . Uh , uh , Secretary

01:11:36.000 --> 01:11:38.167
Mullen yesterday at the White House in

01:11:38.167 --> 01:11:40.080
person . He is with the Pentagon

01:11:40.080 --> 01:11:42.302
leadership today . This morning they're

01:11:42.302 --> 01:11:44.469
meeting on it . Um , as of yesterday ,

01:11:44.469 --> 01:11:46.580
it , I believe , and I will commit to

01:11:46.580 --> 01:11:48.691
following up with your office if this

01:11:48.691 --> 01:11:50.913
is not correct , it is all on track for

01:11:50.913 --> 01:11:53.080
reimbursement soon . Um , can you get

01:11:53.080 --> 01:11:56.560
back to this committee relative to the

01:11:56.560 --> 01:11:58.671
timetable for when that reimbursement

01:11:58.671 --> 01:12:00.727
is going to get done ? Yes , ma'am .

01:12:00.727 --> 01:12:03.419
Thank you . Capito ,

01:12:04.330 --> 01:12:07.140
Baldwin , and Bosun . Uh , thank you ,

01:12:07.149 --> 01:12:09.260
Mr . Chairman . Thank you , Secretary

01:12:09.260 --> 01:12:11.482
Driscoll for being here . You stated in

01:12:11.482 --> 01:12:13.538
your , uh , opening statement , uh ,

01:12:13.538 --> 01:12:15.705
that , uh , the Army's combat training

01:12:15.705 --> 01:12:17.816
centers need to provide training that

01:12:17.816 --> 01:12:19.982
is tough , realistic , and relevant to

01:12:19.982 --> 01:12:22.149
modern threats . As you know , much of

01:12:22.149 --> 01:12:24.316
our current training infrastructure is

01:12:24.316 --> 01:12:25.871
dated , overscheduled , and

01:12:25.871 --> 01:12:27.982
concentrated in Western , uh , desert

01:12:27.982 --> 01:12:30.093
environments . That's why I supported

01:12:30.093 --> 01:12:32.260
the funding for the East Coast Warfare

01:12:32.260 --> 01:12:34.080
Center . It , it is in a former

01:12:34.080 --> 01:12:35.969
industrial sites in southern West

01:12:35.969 --> 01:12:38.120
Virginia to create a more agile , low

01:12:38.120 --> 01:12:40.040
overhead costs , government and

01:12:40.040 --> 01:12:41.818
industry accessible test bed in

01:12:41.818 --> 01:12:43.818
challenging terrain in our , in our

01:12:43.818 --> 01:12:45.984
southern part of our state . Secretary

01:12:45.984 --> 01:12:48.040
Driscoll , will you commit to having

01:12:48.040 --> 01:12:49.984
the Army review how the East Coast

01:12:49.984 --> 01:12:52.040
Warfare Center could complement your

01:12:52.040 --> 01:12:54.207
combat training reform , uh , training

01:12:54.207 --> 01:12:53.799
center reform and how it could fill

01:12:53.799 --> 01:12:56.189
gaps in threat representative training ,

01:12:56.390 --> 01:12:58.600
mission rehearsal , counter UAS , and

01:12:58.600 --> 01:13:00.720
electronic warfare ? Yes , Senator ,

01:13:00.879 --> 01:13:04.000
thank you . Can you describe where you

01:13:04.000 --> 01:13:06.278
think this would fill the gaps for you ,

01:13:06.278 --> 01:13:08.389
this East East Coast warfare center ?

01:13:09.049 --> 01:13:11.271
Um current training environments , um ,

01:13:11.520 --> 01:13:13.520
like you said , Senator , are , are

01:13:13.520 --> 01:13:15.798
inadequate for the risk and the threat .

01:13:15.798 --> 01:13:17.853
And if , if you look back to Ukraine

01:13:17.853 --> 01:13:20.020
and you look at how difficult it is to

01:13:20.020 --> 01:13:22.131
move and Um , to avoid being seen and

01:13:22.131 --> 01:13:24.600
to be dispersed enough to survive the

01:13:24.600 --> 01:13:26.767
number and variety of training centers

01:13:26.767 --> 01:13:28.878
that we can create where we can layer

01:13:28.878 --> 01:13:30.989
in things like electronic warfare and

01:13:30.989 --> 01:13:33.439
contested electromagnetic environments

01:13:33.439 --> 01:13:35.550
is crucial for our country . And so .

01:13:35.550 --> 01:13:37.717
Um , what you're describing as part of

01:13:37.717 --> 01:13:39.883
a constellation of new solutions would

01:13:39.883 --> 01:13:42.050
be , I think , from my understanding ,

01:13:42.050 --> 01:13:41.805
pretty impactful . Yes , General ,

01:13:41.924 --> 01:13:43.924
would you like to comment on that ,

01:13:43.924 --> 01:13:46.146
please , ma'am ? Any , anytime we can ,

01:13:46.146 --> 01:13:47.924
uh , provide a , a spot for our

01:13:47.924 --> 01:13:50.091
soldiers to , to see something new for

01:13:50.091 --> 01:13:52.424
the first time , to innovate there , uh ,

01:13:52.424 --> 01:13:54.480
to learn how , how they would , uh ,

01:13:54.480 --> 01:13:56.646
react in , in different environments ,

01:13:56.646 --> 01:13:58.702
different settings is good for us in

01:13:58.702 --> 01:14:00.899
our readiness building . I commit as

01:14:00.899 --> 01:14:03.339
well as the secretary , uh , to , to

01:14:03.339 --> 01:14:05.506
reviewing that . Let me ask you this ,

01:14:05.506 --> 01:14:07.672
uh , because everything's changing and

01:14:07.672 --> 01:14:09.839
has changed so quickly in terms of the

01:14:09.839 --> 01:14:12.061
type of warfare , type of weapons being

01:14:12.061 --> 01:14:14.490
used , the technologies that are , uh ,

01:14:14.500 --> 01:14:16.667
required is that , does that mean that

01:14:16.667 --> 01:14:18.833
the training for these types of , uh ,

01:14:18.833 --> 01:14:20.778
either on a defensive or offensive

01:14:20.778 --> 01:14:22.979
posture is , uh , is moving just as

01:14:22.979 --> 01:14:25.799
fast , or does it take . Do you see

01:14:25.799 --> 01:14:28.021
what I'm saying ? How long does it take

01:14:28.021 --> 01:14:30.399
to , to , to reposition the troops in

01:14:30.399 --> 01:14:33.160
terms of skills , ma'am ? Uh , I think

01:14:33.160 --> 01:14:35.700
you would be , uh , very , very happy

01:14:35.700 --> 01:14:38.000
with your army . Um , we're taking the

01:14:38.000 --> 01:14:40.222
lessons learned not only from Ukraine ,

01:14:40.222 --> 01:14:42.444
we're taking the lessons learned on the

01:14:42.444 --> 01:14:44.222
current battlefield , and we're

01:14:44.222 --> 01:14:46.500
incorporating as fast as we can in our ,

01:14:46.500 --> 01:14:46.479
in our training scenarios at our combat

01:14:46.479 --> 01:14:48.812
training centers . That's the first one .

01:14:48.812 --> 01:14:50.923
The second one . Is we're continually

01:14:50.923 --> 01:14:53.146
look at our force structure and we just

01:14:53.146 --> 01:14:55.201
had a session yesterday of inside of

01:14:55.201 --> 01:14:57.350
our brigade combat teams where do we

01:14:57.350 --> 01:14:59.500
wanna have the emphasis and and the

01:14:59.500 --> 01:15:01.339
capabilities you're gonna have

01:15:01.339 --> 01:15:04.100
protection at the lowest level um and .

01:15:04.154 --> 01:15:06.321
And that's something that we owe our ,

01:15:06.321 --> 01:15:08.543
our soldiers , but we're looking across

01:15:08.543 --> 01:15:10.765
the border , where do we have the , the

01:15:10.765 --> 01:15:12.487
ability to put assets into the

01:15:12.487 --> 01:15:14.821
formations that they can use for lethal ,

01:15:14.834 --> 01:15:16.945
and we're , and we're looking at that

01:15:16.945 --> 01:15:19.112
based off of all the lessons learned .

01:15:19.112 --> 01:15:19.035
I think you'd be really proud of your

01:15:19.035 --> 01:15:21.035
army , Mr . Secretary , uh , and

01:15:21.035 --> 01:15:24.549
Senator , I would say , um . Our

01:15:24.549 --> 01:15:26.660
soldiers , our talent is incredible .

01:15:26.870 --> 01:15:28.592
We we , and I mean this as the

01:15:28.592 --> 01:15:30.814
civilians , are getting in their ways ,

01:15:30.950 --> 01:15:33.061
not letting them procure commercially

01:15:33.061 --> 01:15:35.172
available solutions fast enough . And

01:15:35.172 --> 01:15:37.339
so , um , I have frequently said , and

01:15:37.339 --> 01:15:39.506
if you say it to a group of soldiers ,

01:15:39.506 --> 01:15:39.470
they all nod immediately , that we

01:15:39.470 --> 01:15:41.470
should not ask them to step back in

01:15:41.470 --> 01:15:43.526
time 20 or 30 years when they put on

01:15:43.526 --> 01:15:45.526
their uniform . The iPhone in their

01:15:45.526 --> 01:15:47.748
pocket should not be more powerful than

01:15:47.748 --> 01:15:49.637
the tools we're giving them . The

01:15:49.637 --> 01:15:51.748
drones that they're able to go buy at

01:15:51.748 --> 01:15:51.439
Hobby Lobby or whatever the place where

01:15:51.439 --> 01:15:53.569
they shop is , should not be more

01:15:53.569 --> 01:15:55.625
effective and efficient than what we

01:15:55.625 --> 01:15:57.902
give them for military grade solutions .

01:15:57.902 --> 01:16:00.290
And the , the systematic failures of

01:16:00.290 --> 01:16:02.850
our bureaucracy over the last 2030

01:16:02.850 --> 01:16:05.017
years still need to be broken down and

01:16:05.017 --> 01:16:07.379
I Very sincerely mean uh to thank this

01:16:07.379 --> 01:16:09.268
committee and your colleagues for

01:16:09.268 --> 01:16:11.323
helping us in the past year , but we

01:16:11.323 --> 01:16:13.435
can go a lot faster . Yeah , so we're

01:16:13.435 --> 01:16:15.601
talking about technology . I think one

01:16:15.601 --> 01:16:17.657
of the things , and you and I talked

01:16:17.657 --> 01:16:17.410
about this , Mr . Secretary , is the ,

01:16:17.419 --> 01:16:19.660
uh , Catalyst Pathfinder program where

01:16:19.660 --> 01:16:23.069
the , uh . From the bottom up , so to

01:16:23.069 --> 01:16:25.399
speak , uh , any innovative solutions ,

01:16:25.720 --> 01:16:28.330
uh , can be created by the users of the

01:16:28.330 --> 01:16:30.608
technology or the users of the warfare ,

01:16:30.608 --> 01:16:32.719
and , uh , you know , soldiers always

01:16:32.719 --> 01:16:34.719
have really good ideas because just

01:16:34.719 --> 01:16:36.886
like in , in , in private industry and

01:16:36.886 --> 01:16:38.608
manufacturing , uh , there are

01:16:38.608 --> 01:16:40.663
improvements made at the lower level

01:16:40.663 --> 01:16:42.719
for , you know , stress fractures or

01:16:42.719 --> 01:16:44.886
whatever during , during manufacturing

01:16:44.886 --> 01:16:46.719
of certain . Uh , certain , uh ,

01:16:46.719 --> 01:16:48.941
materials , so I , I would like to talk

01:16:48.941 --> 01:16:51.108
about that . Last year's NDAA included

01:16:51.108 --> 01:16:52.886
language requiring the Catalyst

01:16:52.886 --> 01:16:54.941
Pathfinder program to be included in

01:16:54.941 --> 01:16:56.552
the Army divisions and to be

01:16:56.552 --> 01:16:56.290
incorporated . I mean , you know ,

01:16:56.419 --> 01:16:58.540
things with 3D printing and maker

01:16:58.540 --> 01:17:00.818
spaces . Do you have a comment on that ,

01:17:00.818 --> 01:17:03.649
um , Mr . Secretary ? Um , Senator , I

01:17:03.649 --> 01:17:05.930
think this is the future of , uh , how

01:17:05.930 --> 01:17:08.041
we're going to learn the most is from

01:17:08.041 --> 01:17:09.874
our soldiers , and I say this as

01:17:09.874 --> 01:17:11.986
somebody that got out of the military

01:17:11.986 --> 01:17:14.152
after 3.5 years , did the fancy , um ,

01:17:14.152 --> 01:17:16.374
school thing , worked in finance , have

01:17:16.374 --> 01:17:18.374
been around talented people , but I

01:17:18.374 --> 01:17:20.597
would bet on the American soldier every

01:17:20.597 --> 01:17:20.399
single time innovating us to the most

01:17:20.399 --> 01:17:22.399
successful outcome . And so , these

01:17:22.399 --> 01:17:24.566
maker spaces you're talking about , we

01:17:24.566 --> 01:17:26.879
have done them , um . Not haphazardly ,

01:17:26.919 --> 01:17:29.141
but with less of a strategic enterprise

01:17:29.141 --> 01:17:31.363
level plan than we should have . We are

01:17:31.363 --> 01:17:33.419
actively , uh , investing more time

01:17:33.709 --> 01:17:35.765
into creating a plan to scale across

01:17:35.765 --> 01:17:37.820
all of our divisions because I am in

01:17:37.820 --> 01:17:39.876
wholehearted agreement . Thank you .

01:17:39.876 --> 01:17:42.042
Thank you very much . Thank you both .

01:17:43.160 --> 01:17:45.729
Baldwin Thank you Mr . Chairman .

01:17:46.149 --> 01:17:49.270
Secretary Driscoll and General Laneve ,

01:17:49.350 --> 01:17:51.461
thank you both for being here today .

01:17:52.560 --> 01:17:55.700
On March 1st , an Iranian

01:17:55.700 --> 01:17:59.240
drone strike in Kuwait killed 6

01:17:59.240 --> 01:18:01.919
soldiers of the 103rd Sustainment

01:18:01.919 --> 01:18:04.086
Command and injured dozens of others ,

01:18:04.169 --> 01:18:06.200
including several from Wisconsin .

01:18:07.189 --> 01:18:09.839
Earlier this morning , CBS News

01:18:09.839 --> 01:18:12.479
reported that in the days prior to the

01:18:12.479 --> 01:18:15.270
March 1st , uh , drone strike , uh ,

01:18:15.359 --> 01:18:18.040
members of that unit requested

01:18:18.040 --> 01:18:21.060
additional medical supplies . Uh ,

01:18:22.290 --> 01:18:25.770
soldiers from the 103rd sustainment

01:18:25.770 --> 01:18:27.930
unit said that request was denied by

01:18:27.930 --> 01:18:31.149
the army . These same soldiers then

01:18:31.149 --> 01:18:32.939
said that some of those medical

01:18:32.939 --> 01:18:35.740
supplies could have potentially saved

01:18:35.740 --> 01:18:37.851
the lives of some of the soldiers who

01:18:37.851 --> 01:18:40.589
had to be treated at civilian hospitals

01:18:40.609 --> 01:18:42.620
in Kuwait because there was not

01:18:42.620 --> 01:18:44.790
adequate military medical care

01:18:44.790 --> 01:18:48.720
available to them . In February , uh ,

01:18:48.850 --> 01:18:50.970
Secretary Driscoll , why did the Army

01:18:50.970 --> 01:18:52.859
deny providing additional medical

01:18:52.859 --> 01:18:56.049
supplies to the soldiers of the 103rd

01:18:56.049 --> 01:18:58.919
Sustainment Command in Kuwait ? Um ,

01:18:59.040 --> 01:19:01.262
Senator , I don't know the specifics of

01:19:01.262 --> 01:19:03.373
the CBS story you're referencing from

01:19:03.373 --> 01:19:03.319
this morning , uh , but commit to

01:19:03.319 --> 01:19:05.541
following up with your office . OK . So

01:19:05.541 --> 01:19:07.763
will you commit to looking into whether

01:19:07.919 --> 01:19:09.975
such a request was denied , and will

01:19:09.975 --> 01:19:12.759
you follow up , uh , both with me and

01:19:12.759 --> 01:19:14.979
my office and this subcommittee once

01:19:14.979 --> 01:19:18.040
you've done so ? Yes , OK . The article

01:19:18.040 --> 01:19:20.240
also quotes soldiers from the unit who

01:19:20.240 --> 01:19:22.919
say that they did not receive adequate

01:19:22.919 --> 01:19:26.040
training on how to respond to a mass

01:19:26.040 --> 01:19:29.350
casualty attack before March 1st . Did

01:19:29.350 --> 01:19:32.509
all Army units receive such medical

01:19:32.509 --> 01:19:34.453
training prior to the beginning of

01:19:34.453 --> 01:19:36.350
Operation Epic Fury ?

01:19:39.950 --> 01:19:42.899
Ma'am , I , I , I , so we , we prepare

01:19:42.899 --> 01:19:45.270
our soldiers , uh , before we deploy

01:19:45.270 --> 01:19:47.492
them , and then there's rehearsals that

01:19:47.492 --> 01:19:49.750
are done , uh , in theater . I , I'd

01:19:49.750 --> 01:19:51.861
have to come back to you , uh , and I

01:19:51.861 --> 01:19:53.861
commit to doing that , but that's a

01:19:53.861 --> 01:19:55.972
question for Admiral Cooper , CENTCOM

01:19:55.972 --> 01:19:58.194
and its subordinate commander there for

01:19:58.194 --> 01:20:00.950
the Army Central , uh , to , to go over

01:20:00.950 --> 01:20:02.950
what , uh , drills , uh , that they

01:20:02.950 --> 01:20:05.350
conducted , um , throughout the , uh ,

01:20:05.509 --> 01:20:07.731
the theater , uh , but I'll follow back

01:20:07.731 --> 01:20:10.009
up with you and the committee . Please ,

01:20:10.009 --> 01:20:13.609
please do . Um , I want to turn to how

01:20:13.609 --> 01:20:16.029
the army has changed efforts to protect

01:20:16.029 --> 01:20:19.490
soldiers from drone attacks like that

01:20:19.490 --> 01:20:22.209
in Kuwait as a result of the war with

01:20:22.209 --> 01:20:26.129
Iran and the Russia-Ukraine war . With

01:20:26.129 --> 01:20:28.770
US assistance , the Ukrainians have

01:20:28.770 --> 01:20:30.992
become some of the best fighting forces

01:20:30.992 --> 01:20:33.229
in the world at shooting down drones .

01:20:34.160 --> 01:20:36.799
Yet when Operation Epic Fury began in

01:20:36.799 --> 01:20:39.589
February , our soldiers did not have

01:20:39.589 --> 01:20:42.450
the necessary equipment or training to

01:20:42.450 --> 01:20:45.470
stop the threat of Iranian drones . The

01:20:45.470 --> 01:20:47.830
army initially relied on advanced

01:20:47.830 --> 01:20:50.379
missile and air defense systems , but

01:20:50.680 --> 01:20:52.959
these systems are limited in number and

01:20:52.959 --> 01:20:56.350
cannot protect soldiers everywhere . So

01:20:56.350 --> 01:20:59.069
why were our soldiers unprepared for

01:20:59.069 --> 01:21:01.790
the threat of Iranian drones despite

01:21:01.790 --> 01:21:04.430
our collaboration with Ukraine , and

01:21:04.430 --> 01:21:06.541
what lessons have you learned for the

01:21:06.541 --> 01:21:09.859
future ? Um , Senator , uh , very

01:21:09.859 --> 01:21:12.740
sincerely , I appreciate your line of

01:21:12.740 --> 01:21:14.740
questioning because this is exactly

01:21:14.740 --> 01:21:16.907
what we should all be caring about and

01:21:16.907 --> 01:21:18.907
what me in this role , um , do care

01:21:18.907 --> 01:21:21.770
about . And , um , I'm through JAA 401 ,

01:21:21.819 --> 01:21:23.986
the Joint Interagency Task Force , the

01:21:23.986 --> 01:21:26.208
United States Army was put in charge of

01:21:26.208 --> 01:21:28.319
the counter or the drone threat . And

01:21:28.319 --> 01:21:30.430
counter drone solutions on the behalf

01:21:30.430 --> 01:21:32.597
of the Pentagon and then because I was

01:21:32.597 --> 01:21:34.763
acting director of ATF um for a little

01:21:34.763 --> 01:21:36.986
over a year , we , we were able to sync

01:21:36.986 --> 01:21:39.041
very closely with DOJ . And over the

01:21:39.041 --> 01:21:42.040
last 8 months we have done incredible

01:21:42.040 --> 01:21:44.689
work to get our nation to be able to

01:21:44.689 --> 01:21:46.689
capture the best practices from all

01:21:46.689 --> 01:21:48.411
over the world , including the

01:21:48.411 --> 01:21:50.578
Ukrainians . And so since the conflict

01:21:50.578 --> 01:21:52.356
kicked off , we've been able to

01:21:52.356 --> 01:21:54.133
purchase at what I would say is

01:21:54.133 --> 01:21:56.022
lightning speed , 13,000 Murros ,

01:21:56.069 --> 01:21:58.479
10,000 bumblebees . These are best in

01:21:58.479 --> 01:22:00.799
class systems and flow them into

01:22:00.799 --> 01:22:02.910
theater with Ranger Regiment training

01:22:02.910 --> 01:22:05.132
and 802cond helping to train . Um , and

01:22:05.132 --> 01:22:07.330
so I am incredibly optimistic that our

01:22:07.330 --> 01:22:09.330
soldiers are getting what they need

01:22:09.330 --> 01:22:11.608
going forward to to mitigate risk . If ,

01:22:11.608 --> 01:22:13.830
if I could add , the secretary's pushed

01:22:13.830 --> 01:22:16.052
us really hard and , and , and with , I

01:22:16.052 --> 01:22:18.879
hope the support , uh , of you all , we

01:22:18.879 --> 01:22:20.649
can really take a look at our

01:22:20.649 --> 01:22:23.149
industrial base across the , the board

01:22:23.450 --> 01:22:25.450
at all of our depots and how we can

01:22:25.450 --> 01:22:27.617
ramp this up as fast as possible based

01:22:27.617 --> 01:22:29.950
off of lessons learned from Ukraine and ,

01:22:29.950 --> 01:22:33.450
and , uh , OEF . I , I just wanna note ,

01:22:33.520 --> 01:22:36.850
um , it , it . It's so important that

01:22:36.850 --> 01:22:39.209
we have the capabilities necessary to

01:22:39.209 --> 01:22:41.649
protect the smaller and less fortified

01:22:41.649 --> 01:22:45.169
installations like the facility that I

01:22:45.169 --> 01:22:47.113
mentioned in Kuwait at the port of

01:22:47.113 --> 01:22:50.729
Shuba from drone attacks . Do you

01:22:50.729 --> 01:22:52.673
believe that we currently have the

01:22:52.673 --> 01:22:54.810
capabilities necessary to . Protect

01:22:54.810 --> 01:22:58.620
those Senator , um , we as a human

01:22:59.359 --> 01:23:01.581
civilization are at an inflection point

01:23:01.879 --> 01:23:04.046
for how humans can inflict violence to

01:23:04.046 --> 01:23:06.046
each other . Um , they can use cell

01:23:06.046 --> 01:23:08.046
networks . If you look at Operation

01:23:08.046 --> 01:23:10.212
Spider's Web , what happened deep into

01:23:10.212 --> 01:23:12.268
Russia , the Ukrainians were able to

01:23:12.268 --> 01:23:14.435
use about $80,000 worth of drones to ,

01:23:14.435 --> 01:23:16.601
um , against an adversary in the fight

01:23:16.601 --> 01:23:18.657
of our lifetime , inflict $8 billion

01:23:18.657 --> 01:23:21.359
worth of damage , um , and because you .

01:23:21.470 --> 01:23:23.470
We can do these things through cell

01:23:23.470 --> 01:23:25.692
networks and be thousands of miles away

01:23:25.692 --> 01:23:27.526
and the cost of these drones and

01:23:27.526 --> 01:23:29.359
explosives is so low . This is a

01:23:29.359 --> 01:23:31.359
problem that all of humanity has to

01:23:31.359 --> 01:23:33.526
solve . I think that the United States

01:23:33.526 --> 01:23:35.748
is absolutely under President Trump and

01:23:35.748 --> 01:23:37.914
Secretary of War has leadership at the

01:23:37.914 --> 01:23:40.026
forefront of doing this , but this is

01:23:40.026 --> 01:23:42.248
not a problem that can be solved . This

01:23:42.248 --> 01:23:44.192
is a mitigation of risk that we as

01:23:44.192 --> 01:23:46.359
humans have to continue to invest in ,

01:23:46.359 --> 01:23:48.470
um , and we are moving as fast as any

01:23:48.470 --> 01:23:48.390
people in the world , I believe . Thank

01:23:48.390 --> 01:23:49.390
you .

01:23:53.479 --> 01:23:54.640
Bozeman and Moran .

01:23:57.620 --> 01:23:59.787
Uh , thank you Mr . Chairman and thank

01:23:59.787 --> 01:24:01.770
you all for being here and , uh ,

01:24:02.229 --> 01:24:04.396
Secretary Driscoll , I wanna thank you

01:24:04.396 --> 01:24:06.729
for your effort and as you said earlier ,

01:24:06.729 --> 01:24:09.049
uh , getting our , uh , men and women

01:24:09.049 --> 01:24:11.382
that are out there , uh , doing the job ,

01:24:11.382 --> 01:24:13.830
doing a tremendous job keeping us safe ,

01:24:13.950 --> 01:24:16.006
trying to keep themselves safe , but

01:24:16.006 --> 01:24:18.228
again , giving them the technology that

01:24:18.228 --> 01:24:20.500
they need , uh , to get us into this

01:24:20.500 --> 01:24:22.890
century and , uh , this is something

01:24:22.890 --> 01:24:24.946
that you've just from the very first

01:24:24.946 --> 01:24:27.089
day I met you . Has been on your mind

01:24:27.089 --> 01:24:29.089
and every time I've been around you

01:24:29.089 --> 01:24:31.009
either personally or hearing you

01:24:31.009 --> 01:24:33.209
testify , it is the theme and I think

01:24:33.209 --> 01:24:35.649
it'll be a great legacy . So again

01:24:35.649 --> 01:24:38.109
thank you for doing that also using all

01:24:38.109 --> 01:24:40.276
of the tools in your toolbox , uh , as

01:24:40.276 --> 01:24:42.970
the army looks to modernize , uh , the

01:24:42.970 --> 01:24:46.069
industrial base , uh , again using ,

01:24:46.149 --> 01:24:49.799
using our , uh , capabilities , um .

01:24:51.029 --> 01:24:53.759
With our Various

01:24:54.609 --> 01:24:58.040
Entities , what can Congress do to ease

01:24:58.040 --> 01:25:00.207
the process and speed up the agreement

01:25:00.207 --> 01:25:02.299
cycle for the Army with the

01:25:02.560 --> 01:25:05.120
public-private partnerships , uh ,

01:25:05.200 --> 01:25:07.240
enhanced use leasing , all of those

01:25:07.240 --> 01:25:09.462
kind of things that are , they're new ,

01:25:09.462 --> 01:25:11.740
you know , they're kind of old but new ,

01:25:11.759 --> 01:25:13.815
and they're out there , they haven't

01:25:13.815 --> 01:25:16.560
been used very often and they face all

01:25:16.560 --> 01:25:19.500
kinds of hurdles . Senator , um , this

01:25:19.500 --> 01:25:21.722
is one of the things we're most excited

01:25:21.722 --> 01:25:25.399
about . That means it was a

01:25:25.399 --> 01:25:27.510
good question . Oh , it was good . It

01:25:27.510 --> 01:25:29.580
was , it got me nervous . Um , the

01:25:30.120 --> 01:25:32.120
enhanced use leases is something we

01:25:32.120 --> 01:25:34.342
think we can do . The American taxpayer

01:25:34.342 --> 01:25:36.120
and all of you have , um , have

01:25:36.120 --> 01:25:38.176
allocated to us millions of acres of

01:25:38.176 --> 01:25:40.287
land for our army bases , and we have

01:25:40.287 --> 01:25:42.398
historically underutilized them , and

01:25:42.398 --> 01:25:44.176
we have been far too reliant on

01:25:44.176 --> 01:25:46.919
congressionally , um , legislated

01:25:46.919 --> 01:25:49.141
dollars for us to care for our army and

01:25:49.141 --> 01:25:51.308
the communities we're in . And so what

01:25:51.308 --> 01:25:53.419
we want . to do is go out to the best

01:25:53.419 --> 01:25:55.586
of private sector and say , what would

01:25:55.586 --> 01:25:55.455
you do on these lands ? How can you

01:25:55.455 --> 01:25:57.622
benefit the communities , the soldiers

01:25:57.622 --> 01:25:59.844
and their families ? And our first test

01:25:59.844 --> 01:26:01.955
case was a data center in Texas and a

01:26:01.955 --> 01:26:04.066
data center in Utah , and we know how

01:26:04.066 --> 01:26:06.288
important compute is going to be and is

01:26:06.288 --> 01:26:08.399
for the modern fight . And so we , we

01:26:08.399 --> 01:26:10.622
should be finalizing those agreements ,

01:26:10.622 --> 01:26:12.733
I think any week , but it may be this

01:26:12.733 --> 01:26:14.899
week . But then what we did is we went

01:26:14.899 --> 01:26:17.122
out with an RFI and we basically said ,

01:26:17.122 --> 01:26:16.689
if you're an American company , if

01:26:16.689 --> 01:26:19.169
you're an American fund , what could

01:26:19.169 --> 01:26:21.058
you do to partner with us ? We've

01:26:21.058 --> 01:26:23.169
received over 200 submissions , about

01:26:23.169 --> 01:26:25.391
120 of them are viable . I would say 50

01:26:25.391 --> 01:26:27.169
of them are brand name American

01:26:27.169 --> 01:26:29.336
companies and we have . Partnered with

01:26:29.336 --> 01:26:31.558
Secretary Besson at Treasury , um , and

01:26:31.558 --> 01:26:33.725
Russ Vogt and OMB , and they have lent

01:26:33.725 --> 01:26:35.947
us full-time people to go through these

01:26:35.947 --> 01:26:38.113
proposals and so what we're hopeful is

01:26:38.113 --> 01:26:40.113
in about 8 to 10 weeks we will come

01:26:40.113 --> 01:26:42.424
back to all of you with 20-ish

01:26:42.754 --> 01:26:44.921
proposals that we think we can execute

01:26:44.921 --> 01:26:47.143
on across the country , um , and a plan

01:26:47.143 --> 01:26:49.310
to work together to expand it . Good .

01:26:49.310 --> 01:26:51.310
That's excellent , very good , uh .

01:26:52.410 --> 01:26:54.870
General , the Army's next generation

01:26:54.870 --> 01:26:56.810
squad weapon will give soldiers a

01:26:56.810 --> 01:26:59.609
lethal advantage in fiscal year 26 .

01:26:59.890 --> 01:27:03.850
Congress allocated $23.7 million to

01:27:03.850 --> 01:27:05.961
improve the Army's ability to produce

01:27:05.961 --> 01:27:09.589
primer for the new 6.8 mL ammunition ,

01:27:09.799 --> 01:27:13.180
millimeter ammunition . Can we just ,

01:27:13.359 --> 01:27:16.009
can you discuss the advantages the next

01:27:16.009 --> 01:27:18.065
generation squad weapon will provide

01:27:18.065 --> 01:27:20.120
our soldiers ? Yes , sir , and thank

01:27:20.120 --> 01:27:21.842
you for the question , sir . I

01:27:21.842 --> 01:27:24.009
appreciate meeting you the other day .

01:27:24.009 --> 01:27:26.100
Um , you know , accuracy , uh , you

01:27:26.100 --> 01:27:29.129
know , distance , lethality , uh , will

01:27:29.129 --> 01:27:31.350
all , uh , you know , benefit , um ,

01:27:32.060 --> 01:27:34.116
our , our soldiers . We want to give

01:27:34.116 --> 01:27:36.227
them the best piece of equipment that

01:27:36.227 --> 01:27:38.560
overmatches anything that the enemy has .

01:27:38.560 --> 01:27:40.560
Our soldiers should never go into a

01:27:40.560 --> 01:27:42.838
fight . And have to fight a fair fight .

01:27:42.838 --> 01:27:42.669
We should always have the equipment .

01:27:43.160 --> 01:27:45.799
Uh , that outpaces the threat and the

01:27:45.799 --> 01:27:48.021
capabilities that that the threat has ,

01:27:48.021 --> 01:27:50.243
and we appreciate the support . We're ,

01:27:50.319 --> 01:27:52.541
we're , uh , we're pretty excited about

01:27:52.541 --> 01:27:54.597
the weapons system . We are making ,

01:27:54.597 --> 01:27:56.708
you know , some refinements . We're ,

01:27:56.708 --> 01:27:56.270
we're getting it in the soldiers' hands ,

01:27:56.279 --> 01:27:58.390
and we're getting as much feedback we

01:27:58.390 --> 01:28:00.168
can from soldiers to be able to

01:28:00.168 --> 01:28:02.168
continue to tweak it like we always

01:28:02.168 --> 01:28:04.335
have with our weapons systems as we're

01:28:04.335 --> 01:28:06.390
we're procuring them so they get the

01:28:06.390 --> 01:28:08.612
very best , uh , weapons system that we

01:28:08.612 --> 01:28:10.890
can get with American taxpayer dollars ,

01:28:10.890 --> 01:28:10.839
and we appreciate your support , sir .

01:28:11.600 --> 01:28:13.322
Well , thank you all and we do

01:28:13.322 --> 01:28:15.378
appreciate , uh , your service in so

01:28:15.378 --> 01:28:17.544
many different ways . Thank you , Mr .

01:28:17.544 --> 01:28:19.711
Chairman . Chairman , thank you . with

01:28:19.711 --> 01:28:21.711
Chairman Bozeman in the room , uh ,

01:28:21.711 --> 01:28:23.767
I'll ask my last question first . My

01:28:23.767 --> 01:28:25.878
colleagues and I have been working on

01:28:25.878 --> 01:28:27.989
legislation that would expand the use

01:28:27.989 --> 01:28:30.156
of inter agency support agreements for

01:28:30.156 --> 01:28:32.439
military construction . Giving the army

01:28:32.439 --> 01:28:34.606
more flexibility to use options beyond

01:28:34.606 --> 01:28:36.661
the Army Corps of Engineers with the

01:28:36.661 --> 01:28:38.661
intent to reduce costs , accelerate

01:28:38.661 --> 01:28:40.606
delivery timelines , and invest in

01:28:40.606 --> 01:28:42.161
communities surrounding our

01:28:42.161 --> 01:28:44.328
installations . We've utilized this at

01:28:44.328 --> 01:28:46.439
Fort Riley in a very successful way ,

01:28:46.439 --> 01:28:48.606
and I , if we're successful in getting

01:28:48.606 --> 01:28:50.661
our legislation passed , I would ask

01:28:50.661 --> 01:28:52.939
each of you if you find that appealing ,

01:28:52.939 --> 01:28:52.189
and it would be something that would be

01:28:52.189 --> 01:28:54.720
utilized by the army . Um , Senator , I

01:28:54.720 --> 01:28:56.942
think this is one of the most impactful

01:28:56.942 --> 01:28:59.053
things this committee could do for us

01:28:59.053 --> 01:29:00.942
this year . Um , we were in North

01:29:00.942 --> 01:29:02.998
Carolina late last week talking with

01:29:02.998 --> 01:29:05.164
North Carolina leadership , um , and ,

01:29:05.164 --> 01:29:07.276
and we think that there are all sorts

01:29:07.276 --> 01:29:09.442
of models where we could piggyback off

01:29:09.442 --> 01:29:11.442
the innovations of your state . And

01:29:11.442 --> 01:29:13.442
meaningfully speed through projects

01:29:13.442 --> 01:29:15.331
much more cheaply to care for our

01:29:15.331 --> 01:29:17.498
soldiers and their families . And so I

01:29:17.498 --> 01:29:16.950
would rank this as the top 3 most

01:29:16.950 --> 01:29:19.228
important thing for the army this year .

01:29:19.228 --> 01:29:21.172
That's a nice answer . Thank you .

01:29:21.172 --> 01:29:23.061
Thank you . We appreciate and our

01:29:23.061 --> 01:29:25.283
soldiers appreciate this . We need it .

01:29:25.283 --> 01:29:27.228
Thank you . Um , let me talk about

01:29:27.228 --> 01:29:29.283
Flora for a minute . Uh , you , Mr .

01:29:29.283 --> 01:29:30.783
Secretary , and I have had

01:29:30.783 --> 01:29:32.894
conversations about this topic , uh ,

01:29:32.894 --> 01:29:34.950
this program , and represents one of

01:29:34.950 --> 01:29:37.117
the Army's most critical modernization

01:29:37.117 --> 01:29:39.172
investments . Um , how does the army

01:29:39.172 --> 01:29:41.283
plan to integrate the Cheyenne 2 into

01:29:41.283 --> 01:29:43.561
future combat , uh , aviation brigades ,

01:29:43.561 --> 01:29:47.109
and , um , and how are we doing on the

01:29:47.109 --> 01:29:49.053
necessary funding to get the , the

01:29:49.390 --> 01:29:52.029
Cheyenne 2 into that position ? Um ,

01:29:52.069 --> 01:29:54.291
I'll start first and then I can hand it

01:29:54.291 --> 01:29:56.569
to , um , General Le Neve . Um , I , I ,

01:29:56.790 --> 01:29:59.068
my impression on the Cheyenne and , um ,

01:29:59.068 --> 01:30:01.012
somebody that the committee should

01:30:01.012 --> 01:30:03.123
pressure test this is we are actually

01:30:03.123 --> 01:30:05.457
doing this new project in the right way .

01:30:05.457 --> 01:30:07.512
We are spending quickly , but , um ,

01:30:07.549 --> 01:30:09.493
very thoughtfully on behalf of the

01:30:09.493 --> 01:30:11.493
American taxpayer and our soldier .

01:30:11.493 --> 01:30:13.493
This project is . Moving forward at

01:30:13.493 --> 01:30:15.716
lightning speed for a big lift , and it

01:30:15.716 --> 01:30:17.827
is incredibly important because it is

01:30:17.827 --> 01:30:19.827
open architecture . It can be flown

01:30:19.827 --> 01:30:21.993
autonomously . It it can integrate new

01:30:21.993 --> 01:30:24.049
technologies that we don't even know

01:30:24.049 --> 01:30:25.993
about yet . And so if you think of

01:30:25.993 --> 01:30:27.882
manned aviation into the future ,

01:30:27.882 --> 01:30:29.549
almost certainly it will need

01:30:29.549 --> 01:30:31.605
autonomous unmanned solutions in and

01:30:31.605 --> 01:30:33.879
around it . And uh Flora and the

01:30:33.879 --> 01:30:35.879
Cheyenne are going to be able to do

01:30:35.879 --> 01:30:38.160
that and I talked to the CEOs um

01:30:38.160 --> 01:30:40.216
regularly . I'd say at least every 6

01:30:40.216 --> 01:30:42.327
weeks we're having a check-in call to

01:30:42.327 --> 01:30:44.327
make sure we're pacing . So , I , I

01:30:44.327 --> 01:30:48.250
think one of the , uh , the newest , uh ,

01:30:48.410 --> 01:30:50.577
piece to the , the Cheyenne . So we're

01:30:50.577 --> 01:30:52.743
gonna get it in our formation , uh , a

01:30:52.743 --> 01:30:54.966
lot faster , the first one , you know ,

01:30:55.109 --> 01:30:57.442
relatively , relatively fast , and then ,

01:30:57.442 --> 01:30:59.879
you know , the , the 4 , following that .

01:31:00.250 --> 01:31:02.361
But right now , we have aviators that

01:31:02.361 --> 01:31:04.472
are trained in the simulation . So as

01:31:04.472 --> 01:31:06.639
soon as we receive the aircraft , they

01:31:06.639 --> 01:31:06.529
can start flying in it right away . So

01:31:06.529 --> 01:31:08.640
we're not waiting , uh , to receive ,

01:31:08.640 --> 01:31:10.807
you know , the actual aircraft . We're

01:31:10.807 --> 01:31:12.696
already . Uh , learning in here .

01:31:12.696 --> 01:31:14.696
That's the first piece . The second

01:31:14.696 --> 01:31:16.640
piece , and the secretary normally

01:31:16.640 --> 01:31:18.862
talks about this , and I think it's the

01:31:18.862 --> 01:31:20.918
most important part about the entire

01:31:20.918 --> 01:31:20.850
system . I talked about it in my

01:31:20.850 --> 01:31:23.009
opening , you know , uh , we're going

01:31:23.009 --> 01:31:24.898
to be able to upgrade this , uh ,

01:31:24.898 --> 01:31:27.410
aircraft in stride , uh , just by , you

01:31:27.410 --> 01:31:29.810
know , simple using a USB port , uh ,

01:31:30.169 --> 01:31:32.169
inside of this completely different

01:31:32.169 --> 01:31:34.113
than what we've done before . When

01:31:34.113 --> 01:31:36.169
you've , you know , that you get the

01:31:36.169 --> 01:31:38.169
lifespan of the aircraft and you're

01:31:38.169 --> 01:31:37.859
like , OK , I gotta , I gotta find

01:31:37.859 --> 01:31:40.081
something different . It's a completely

01:31:40.081 --> 01:31:42.359
new restart . We're really hoping that ,

01:31:42.359 --> 01:31:44.303
uh , you know , we can continue to

01:31:44.303 --> 01:31:46.526
upgrade this in stride . I think it's a

01:31:46.526 --> 01:31:48.415
complete change in how we look at

01:31:48.415 --> 01:31:48.189
things . Generally , your answer , uh ,

01:31:48.259 --> 01:31:50.379
lends itself to my , my follow-up

01:31:50.379 --> 01:31:52.379
question , uh , or at least my next

01:31:52.379 --> 01:31:54.490
question . Cheyenne 2 represents this

01:31:54.490 --> 01:31:56.823
generational leap in vertical lift , uh ,

01:31:56.823 --> 01:31:59.060
capability , but the program , uh , I'm

01:31:59.060 --> 01:32:01.729
also supportive of is , uh , the Black

01:32:01.729 --> 01:32:04.089
Hawks . There's a fleet of more than

01:32:04.089 --> 01:32:07.370
2100 Black Hawks and projected flora

01:32:07.970 --> 01:32:10.160
production rates of full replacement a

01:32:10.160 --> 01:32:11.959
decade away . Uh , that's not a

01:32:11.959 --> 01:32:14.126
criticism , but it's the scale of what

01:32:14.126 --> 01:32:16.720
you're facing . And , um , the army has

01:32:16.720 --> 01:32:19.140
the opportunity and is balancing this

01:32:19.140 --> 01:32:21.759
circumstance , uh , with the need to

01:32:21.759 --> 01:32:24.040
modern , modernize and sustain the

01:32:24.040 --> 01:32:27.410
Black Hawk , uh , fleet . Um , what

01:32:27.410 --> 01:32:29.609
kind of transition do you see , and ,

01:32:29.689 --> 01:32:31.856
um , I wanna have you confirm that you

01:32:31.856 --> 01:32:34.022
know that , uh , that what I'm talking

01:32:34.022 --> 01:32:36.022
about on sustaining the , the Black

01:32:36.022 --> 01:32:38.245
Hawk . Sure , thanks for the question ,

01:32:38.370 --> 01:32:40.540
and , uh , we had talked a little bit

01:32:40.540 --> 01:32:42.596
about this earlier . So , you know ,

01:32:42.596 --> 01:32:44.484
where we look in the whole , uh ,

01:32:44.484 --> 01:32:46.970
aviation transformation initiative , um ,

01:32:47.370 --> 01:32:49.481
all the decisions that got us at this

01:32:49.481 --> 01:32:51.648
point were all on the side of angels ,

01:32:51.648 --> 01:32:53.814
but , you know , the , the landscape's

01:32:53.814 --> 01:32:55.981
changed a little bit . I look at the .

01:32:55.981 --> 01:32:57.926
The Black Hawk , the 47 , uh , the

01:32:57.926 --> 01:32:59.981
Apaches , enduring aircraft that are

01:32:59.981 --> 01:33:02.092
gonna be in our formations for a long

01:33:02.092 --> 01:33:04.259
time , and we , we have to continue to

01:33:04.259 --> 01:33:06.314
make sure that we , we put our , our

01:33:06.314 --> 01:33:08.426
soldiers and our pilots in the best ,

01:33:08.426 --> 01:33:08.330
uh , aircraft that available and then

01:33:08.330 --> 01:33:10.330
we also have to have the ability to

01:33:10.330 --> 01:33:12.497
make a leap . So what are we looking ?

01:33:12.497 --> 01:33:14.890
of what those numbers actually are and

01:33:15.089 --> 01:33:17.200
really the Secretary of War has asked

01:33:17.200 --> 01:33:19.200
us to take a look at this as well .

01:33:19.200 --> 01:33:21.311
Well , one of the things I take pride

01:33:21.311 --> 01:33:23.478
in is that the efforts at the National

01:33:23.478 --> 01:33:25.367
Institute of Aviation Research at

01:33:25.367 --> 01:33:27.367
Wichita State University has been a

01:33:27.367 --> 01:33:29.422
significant component in the Defense

01:33:29.422 --> 01:33:31.589
Department , the military's capability

01:33:31.589 --> 01:33:33.756
of sustaining through digital twinning

01:33:33.756 --> 01:33:35.533
and then replication , repair ,

01:33:35.533 --> 01:33:38.120
modification . Uh , the fleet and , uh ,

01:33:38.129 --> 01:33:40.185
Secretary Driscoll , you visited . I

01:33:40.185 --> 01:33:42.296
would ask you to encourage , uh , the

01:33:42.296 --> 01:33:44.629
general , to join me sometime in Kansas .

01:33:44.629 --> 01:33:46.796
He tells me he's been there before and

01:33:46.796 --> 01:33:46.290
I'd like to have him come back , and

01:33:46.290 --> 01:33:48.457
they've been incredible partners . And

01:33:48.457 --> 01:33:50.401
if you just think about , um , the

01:33:50.401 --> 01:33:52.457
concept of digitally twinning , um ,

01:33:52.457 --> 01:33:54.623
that will fundamentally alter how we ,

01:33:54.623 --> 01:33:56.790
the Army , make our budget decisions .

01:33:56.790 --> 01:33:58.901
It will fundamentally alter how we do

01:33:58.901 --> 01:34:01.068
the organic industrial base and how we

01:34:01.068 --> 01:34:03.401
move things to our distribution centers ,

01:34:03.401 --> 01:34:05.401
and it will alter how we fight wars

01:34:05.401 --> 01:34:04.984
going forward . This has been

01:34:05.265 --> 01:34:07.321
commonplace in the commercial sector

01:34:07.321 --> 01:34:09.524
for about 10 to 30 years . Um , we're

01:34:09.524 --> 01:34:11.468
just catching up , but what you're

01:34:11.468 --> 01:34:13.580
referencing is an incredibly valuable

01:34:13.580 --> 01:34:16.870
partner for us as we do that . My

01:34:16.870 --> 01:34:19.092
question , which was , would you insist

01:34:19.092 --> 01:34:21.450
the general come join me ? Sir , yes ,

01:34:21.580 --> 01:34:25.580
thank you . Thank you very much ,

01:34:25.669 --> 01:34:27.780
both of you for coming up today . The

01:34:27.780 --> 01:34:30.002
members of the subcommittee will have a

01:34:30.002 --> 01:34:32.225
week to submit additional questions for

01:34:32.225 --> 01:34:34.520
the record . Senators may submit

01:34:34.520 --> 01:34:36.631
additional written questions , and we

01:34:36.631 --> 01:34:38.964
ask that you respond to those questions .

01:34:39.310 --> 01:34:41.830
Within 30 days of receiving them , a

01:34:41.830 --> 01:34:44.009
subcommittee now stands in recess ,

01:34:44.330 --> 01:34:45.950
shall be to call the chair .