WEBVTT 00:00.250 --> 00:02.609 Senate Armed Services Committee meets 00:02.609 --> 00:04.498 today to receive testimony on the 00:04.498 --> 00:07.159 posture of the United States Army . I 00:07.159 --> 00:09.381 want to thank our witnesses , Secretary 00:09.381 --> 00:11.492 of the Army Dan Driscoll , and acting 00:11.492 --> 00:13.437 Chief of Staff of the Army General 00:13.437 --> 00:15.715 Chris Lindy for being here . Thank you , 00:15.715 --> 00:17.826 gentlemen . Today , the Army is being 00:17.826 --> 00:17.559 asked to conduct more demanding 00:17.559 --> 00:21.250 missions in more locations against more 00:21.250 --> 00:23.760 capable adversaries than at any time in 00:23.760 --> 00:26.549 a generation . Russia's war of choice . 00:27.079 --> 00:29.301 In Ukraine has underscored the enduring 00:29.301 --> 00:32.040 importance of land power in high 00:32.040 --> 00:35.069 intensity conflict . In that theater , 00:35.319 --> 00:37.486 the US Army has played a critical role 00:37.486 --> 00:40.400 in helping Ukrainians plan for and 00:40.400 --> 00:43.240 resource their forces through the 00:43.240 --> 00:46.150 Security Assistance Group Ukraine . Our 00:46.150 --> 00:48.750 army has also harvested many lessons 00:48.750 --> 00:51.279 from that partnership to inform our 00:51.279 --> 00:53.240 modernization . At the same time , 00:53.279 --> 00:55.390 we're witnessing the army's essential 00:55.390 --> 00:58.080 contributions to ongoing operations in 00:58.080 --> 01:01.479 Centcom . US Army soldiers like those 01:01.479 --> 01:04.919 from the 1st Battalion , 43rd Air 01:04.919 --> 01:07.839 Defense Artillery are using Patriot 01:07.839 --> 01:10.040 systems to help defend our service 01:10.040 --> 01:12.262 members , partners , and allies against 01:12.262 --> 01:14.500 persistent missile and drone threats . 01:14.800 --> 01:16.689 Similarly , the Arkansas National 01:16.689 --> 01:19.620 Guard's 142nd Field Artillery Brigade 01:19.620 --> 01:21.919 is employing ground-based missiles to 01:21.919 --> 01:24.419 strike enemy targets deep inside Orion . 01:24.989 --> 01:27.470 These actions demonstrate both the 01:27.470 --> 01:30.250 reach of America's army only 5 years 01:30.510 --> 01:32.677 since President Trump rightly chose to 01:32.677 --> 01:35.209 build new weapons instead of tolerating 01:35.550 --> 01:38.389 Vladimir Putin's constant violations of 01:38.389 --> 01:41.029 the INF Treaty . Meanwhile , the pacing 01:41.029 --> 01:43.629 challenge posed by China . Demands that 01:43.629 --> 01:45.889 the army be prepared to support joint 01:45.889 --> 01:49.339 force operations across vast distances 01:49.610 --> 01:51.777 under persistent threat and a tempo at 01:51.777 --> 01:54.769 a tempo we have not seen in decades . 01:55.750 --> 01:57.806 Many think of the Western Pacific as 01:57.806 --> 02:01.309 solely naval and air theater , but our 02:01.309 --> 02:03.750 two witnesses certainly do not agree 02:03.750 --> 02:05.917 with that . Our ground forces continue 02:05.917 --> 02:07.690 to make absolutely crucial 02:08.029 --> 02:10.750 contributions to security in the first 02:10.750 --> 02:12.669 island chain , including through 02:12.669 --> 02:14.830 massive and growing partnerships with 02:14.830 --> 02:16.719 our South Korean , Japanese , and 02:16.719 --> 02:18.663 Filipino treaty allies . All these 02:18.663 --> 02:20.719 demands underscore the importance of 02:20.719 --> 02:22.910 fielding and sustaining the most 02:22.910 --> 02:25.479 advanced . And capable systems in the 02:25.479 --> 02:27.201 world from missile defense and 02:27.201 --> 02:30.360 long-range strike weapons to resilient 02:30.360 --> 02:32.360 command and control systems and new 02:32.360 --> 02:35.669 methods of breaching . Defensive lines , 02:36.059 --> 02:38.337 these capabilities are not theoretical . 02:38.337 --> 02:40.559 They're being employed today to protect 02:40.559 --> 02:42.940 American lives and uphold stability . 02:43.339 --> 02:45.660 The Army provides the backbone of our 02:45.660 --> 02:49.009 global logistics . This enables joint 02:49.009 --> 02:51.009 operations and it delivers the land 02:51.009 --> 02:53.009 combat power that it takes to deter 02:53.009 --> 02:55.979 aggression and if necessary to win 02:55.979 --> 02:58.220 decisively . The army must be ready , 02:58.339 --> 03:01.300 but our readiness today is frankly 03:01.300 --> 03:04.779 uneven . Modernization efforts have 03:05.139 --> 03:07.361 produced promising capabilities but not 03:07.361 --> 03:09.970 at the speed or scale required by the 03:09.970 --> 03:11.970 threat . I think our witnesses will 03:11.970 --> 03:14.026 agree with that . At the same time , 03:14.026 --> 03:16.248 the army continues to struggle with the 03:16.248 --> 03:18.192 operational readiness rates of its 03:18.192 --> 03:21.009 primary equipment , its maintenance 03:21.009 --> 03:24.449 backlogs , and its munitions stockpiles 03:24.449 --> 03:28.240 all are under extreme strain . Under 03:28.240 --> 03:30.407 Secretary Driscoll , the Army has made 03:30.407 --> 03:32.919 significant strides to prepare for 03:32.919 --> 03:35.440 changing combat conditions . So I 03:35.440 --> 03:37.440 commend the Secretary on that . The 03:37.440 --> 03:39.384 Army has acted with discipline and 03:39.384 --> 03:41.496 foresight to develop a new generation 03:41.496 --> 03:44.139 of weapons , the precision strike 03:44.399 --> 03:48.279 missile . Low-cost munitions , the new 03:48.279 --> 03:52.039 MV-75 helicopter , the M1E3 tank , 03:52.080 --> 03:53.858 and finally , after 20 years of 03:53.858 --> 03:56.389 struggles , a more coherent command and 03:56.389 --> 03:59.979 control system . Um , I also appreciate 03:59.979 --> 04:01.757 the Army's improved approach to 04:01.860 --> 04:05.179 modernization of our organic industrial 04:05.179 --> 04:07.012 base . Our main trouble that the 04:07.012 --> 04:10.460 Pentagon is not moving fast enough . Or 04:10.460 --> 04:12.729 has not been moving fast enough to 04:12.729 --> 04:15.460 improve the logistics capability and 04:15.460 --> 04:17.579 capacity of the joint force and the 04:17.579 --> 04:19.880 secretary will want to talk about that 04:20.339 --> 04:22.450 certainly today logistics sustainment 04:22.450 --> 04:25.619 and prepositioning will be decisive in 04:25.619 --> 04:27.920 any future conflict . The Army must 04:27.920 --> 04:30.540 demonstrate how it will enable the 04:30.540 --> 04:32.880 joint force to operate effectively 04:33.420 --> 04:36.079 across that theater . This will require . 04:37.100 --> 04:39.267 Additional resources to bring unmanned 04:39.267 --> 04:42.010 surface and air vehicles . Into the 04:42.010 --> 04:44.450 force at scale to purchase next 04:44.450 --> 04:46.910 generation capabilities to sustain US 04:46.910 --> 04:50.709 forces in dispersed locations . I want 04:50.709 --> 04:54.589 to also commend the Army led by US Army 04:54.589 --> 04:56.589 Europe in developing new methods of 04:56.589 --> 04:59.269 warfare in response to tactical and 04:59.269 --> 05:01.670 operational lessons learned in Ukraine . 05:02.239 --> 05:04.420 The eastern flank deterrence line 05:04.880 --> 05:07.739 concept consists of largely unmanned 05:08.239 --> 05:11.390 trip wire combined with layered missile 05:11.390 --> 05:13.600 defenses and distributed strike 05:13.600 --> 05:15.378 capabilities . It's exactly the 05:15.378 --> 05:17.433 direction we need to go , and I hope 05:17.433 --> 05:20.559 the Army will field those capabilities 05:20.559 --> 05:24.149 to European command rapidly . So I look 05:24.149 --> 05:26.038 forward to hearing from Secretary 05:26.038 --> 05:27.927 Driscoll and General about how to 05:27.927 --> 05:30.320 handle these challenges . We will need 05:30.320 --> 05:32.042 clear priorities , disciplined 05:32.042 --> 05:34.799 execution . And transparent 05:34.799 --> 05:36.959 communications to move forward to 05:36.959 --> 05:39.320 secure that the US Army remains ready , 05:39.399 --> 05:42.359 modern , and capable of meeting the 05:42.359 --> 05:44.649 moment . With that , I turn to my 05:44.869 --> 05:46.980 colleague and friend , Ranking Member 05:46.980 --> 05:48.869 Reed . Thank you very much , Mr . 05:48.869 --> 05:50.758 Chairman and Secretary Driscoll , 05:50.758 --> 05:53.000 General Lane , welcome . Uh , thank you 05:53.000 --> 05:55.056 for both of your outstanding service 05:55.440 --> 05:57.640 and please convey my appreciation to 05:57.640 --> 05:59.584 the soldiers and civilians serving 05:59.584 --> 06:01.839 under your command . I want to begin by 06:01.839 --> 06:04.061 expressing my deepest condolence to the 06:04.061 --> 06:06.172 families of those who have sacrificed 06:06.172 --> 06:08.283 and were lost in the Middle East over 06:08.283 --> 06:10.061 the past several months . Their 06:10.061 --> 06:12.283 sacrifice deserves our greatest respect 06:12.283 --> 06:14.006 and gratitude . I also want to 06:14.006 --> 06:15.950 acknowledge the absence of General 06:15.950 --> 06:18.149 Randy George . Last month , Secretary 06:18.149 --> 06:20.316 Hicks has removed him as Army Chief of 06:20.316 --> 06:22.559 Staff without explanation . General 06:22.559 --> 06:24.503 George is one of more than 2 dozen 06:24.503 --> 06:26.720 general and flag officers that were 06:26.720 --> 06:29.200 fired over the past year . Not for 06:29.200 --> 06:31.679 course , not for misconduct , but for 06:31.679 --> 06:33.735 reasons the Secretary of Defense has 06:33.735 --> 06:35.901 refused to share with this committee . 06:36.079 --> 06:38.920 What we do know is this nearly 60% of 06:38.920 --> 06:42.279 those fired are female or black in a 06:42.279 --> 06:44.119 field where women and minorities 06:44.119 --> 06:46.399 represent less than 20% of general 06:46.399 --> 06:48.899 officers . That is a disturbing pattern 06:48.899 --> 06:50.510 that directly undermines the 06:50.510 --> 06:52.232 merit-based promotion system . 06:52.440 --> 06:54.551 Secretary Driscoll , General O'Neve , 06:54.551 --> 06:56.773 these issues are of great importance to 06:56.773 --> 06:58.829 this committee , and I would ask for 06:58.829 --> 07:01.051 forthright answers today . The army has 07:01.051 --> 07:03.273 been extensively deployed over the past 07:03.273 --> 07:04.773 year . The army's tactical 07:04.773 --> 07:06.718 contributions to the operations in 07:06.718 --> 07:08.773 Venezuela , Iran , the Red Sea , and 07:08.773 --> 07:10.884 its continued support to Ukraine have 07:10.884 --> 07:12.950 been outstanding . The soldiers and 07:12.950 --> 07:14.950 commanders executing these missions 07:14.950 --> 07:16.728 have done their jobs with great 07:16.728 --> 07:19.059 professionalism and skill . I disagree 07:19.059 --> 07:21.260 with many of President Trump's foreign 07:21.260 --> 07:23.540 interventions , but my concerns are 07:23.540 --> 07:25.700 strategic , not with our military 07:25.700 --> 07:28.679 forces . Secretary Driscoll , last year 07:28.679 --> 07:30.846 you announced an ambitious plan called 07:30.846 --> 07:32.901 the Army Transformation Initiative . 07:32.901 --> 07:35.012 Among other changes , this initiative 07:35.012 --> 07:37.260 combines major commands , restructures 07:37.260 --> 07:39.739 brigade combat teams , reorganizes 07:39.739 --> 07:41.700 aviation , and moves toward 07:41.700 --> 07:44.540 capability-based portfolio acquisition . 07:45.109 --> 07:47.276 These are significant changes . I want 07:47.276 --> 07:49.498 to understand how the army is balancing 07:49.498 --> 07:51.276 this transformation while it is 07:51.276 --> 07:53.387 conducting combat operations overseas 07:53.470 --> 07:55.709 and maintaining a significant role on 07:55.709 --> 07:57.989 the southwest border . Secretary 07:57.989 --> 08:00.100 Driscoll , I would ask for updates on 08:00.100 --> 08:02.910 these efforts . The Army is also facing 08:02.910 --> 08:05.619 a nearly $2 billion readiness shortfall 08:05.619 --> 08:07.910 largely because DHS has failed to 08:07.910 --> 08:10.021 reimburse the Army for border support 08:10.021 --> 08:12.500 missions . The committee will want to 08:12.500 --> 08:14.333 understand , and we've made some 08:14.333 --> 08:16.519 progress in the closed session , what 08:16.579 --> 08:19.260 this means in concrete terms . I've 08:19.260 --> 08:21.371 received concerning reports about the 08:21.371 --> 08:23.739 potential for canceling training 08:23.739 --> 08:27.079 rotations , grounded flight hours , and 08:27.079 --> 08:29.100 reduced guard and reserve training 08:29.100 --> 08:31.880 resources . These are real costs for 08:31.880 --> 08:34.510 real units . I would note that rather 08:34.510 --> 08:36.566 than addressing this shortfall , the 08:36.566 --> 08:38.799 reconciliation bill under consideration 08:38.799 --> 08:41.440 in the Senate would send roughly $70 08:41.440 --> 08:44.679 billion more to DHS , the same 08:44.679 --> 08:46.846 department that has not paid its bills 08:46.846 --> 08:49.359 to the Army . At the same time , the 08:49.359 --> 08:51.640 Army has proposed increased funding for 08:51.640 --> 08:53.529 important programs like munitions 08:53.529 --> 08:55.418 procurement . That effort is well 08:55.418 --> 08:57.690 reasoned . However , even if production 08:57.690 --> 09:00.010 timeline shortened from 3 years to 2 , 09:00.390 --> 09:02.612 the munitions gap we have suffered from 09:02.612 --> 09:04.334 the war in Iran does not close 09:04.334 --> 09:06.501 overnight . I would like to know where 09:06.501 --> 09:08.612 Army munitions stocks stand today and 09:08.612 --> 09:10.446 what the realistic replenishment 09:10.446 --> 09:12.612 timeline looks like given expenditures 09:12.612 --> 09:14.779 in Iran . Further , while I understand 09:14.779 --> 09:16.779 the Army is realigning its civilian 09:16.779 --> 09:19.001 workforce , the department has been far 09:19.001 --> 09:22.530 too slow to start civilian hiring after 09:22.530 --> 09:24.619 last year's reckless dose cuts and 09:24.619 --> 09:27.109 hiring freezes . The Army has also 09:27.159 --> 09:29.409 curbed its Smart Scholars program , 09:29.690 --> 09:31.412 which fast tracks STEM trained 09:31.412 --> 09:33.579 civilians into future leadership roles 09:33.729 --> 09:35.896 and has disrupted partnerships between 09:35.896 --> 09:37.673 Army depots and local community 09:37.673 --> 09:39.880 colleges . Secretary Driscoll , the 09:39.880 --> 09:42.400 Army civilian workforce is a readiness 09:42.400 --> 09:44.890 asset , hollowing out has long-term 09:44.890 --> 09:47.289 consequences that may not show up in 09:47.289 --> 09:49.080 this year's budget , but will 09:49.080 --> 09:51.247 absolutely show up in this committee's 09:51.247 --> 09:53.247 hearings years from now . I want to 09:53.247 --> 09:55.358 hear how you are planning to speed up 09:55.358 --> 09:57.524 civilian hiring and ensure the Army is 09:57.524 --> 09:59.524 investing in its future workforce . 09:59.524 --> 10:01.524 Finally , I'm interested in hearing 10:01.524 --> 10:03.524 more about the Army's modernization 10:03.524 --> 10:05.302 priorities , the development of 10:05.302 --> 10:07.524 next-generation helicopters and tanks , 10:07.760 --> 10:10.440 infantry fighting vehicles , UAS and 10:10.440 --> 10:12.799 counter UAS systems , offensive and 10:12.799 --> 10:15.320 defensive fires , and the evolving 10:15.320 --> 10:17.940 prepositioning model are welcoming 10:18.479 --> 10:21.190 efforts , very much so . In a congested 10:21.190 --> 10:23.669 logistic environment where we stage our 10:23.669 --> 10:25.891 material will matter as much as what we 10:25.891 --> 10:28.070 have on hand . I would appreciate an 10:28.070 --> 10:30.070 update on how the army is balancing 10:30.070 --> 10:32.237 these efforts . I look forward to your 10:32.237 --> 10:34.570 testimony and thank you , Mr . Chairman . 10:34.570 --> 10:36.890 Thank you , sir . And , um , Secretary 10:36.890 --> 10:39.001 Driscoll , you are now recognized for 10:39.001 --> 10:40.890 your opening statement . Chairman 10:40.890 --> 10:42.612 Wicker , Ranking Member Reed , 10:42.612 --> 10:44.446 distinguished members , it is an 10:44.446 --> 10:46.779 absolute privilege to address you today . 10:46.779 --> 10:48.834 After a year in this position , I am 10:48.834 --> 10:50.779 prouder than ever to represent our 10:50.779 --> 10:53.001 soldiers and their families . As all of 10:53.001 --> 10:55.057 you know , our soldiers are the very 10:55.057 --> 10:57.400 best in the entire world . They're bold , 10:57.659 --> 10:59.979 decisive , and they can overcome 10:59.979 --> 11:02.201 anything when we properly enable them . 11:02.679 --> 11:05.320 That's why I spent over 130 days on the 11:05.320 --> 11:09.039 road across 19 countries and 25 states 11:09.359 --> 11:12.369 to hear directly from them . I ate with 11:12.369 --> 11:14.480 them , put hands on their equipment , 11:14.480 --> 11:16.258 and had candid discussions with 11:16.258 --> 11:18.580 soldiers of every single rank . What I 11:18.580 --> 11:20.700 heard was clear . Our soldiers are 11:20.700 --> 11:22.922 ready to innovate and win , but our own 11:22.922 --> 11:25.419 bureaucracy and regulations are still 11:25.419 --> 11:27.650 holding them back . Getting what 11:27.650 --> 11:29.650 soldiers need to win and making the 11:29.650 --> 11:31.761 army budget actually work for them is 11:31.761 --> 11:34.409 definitionally a bipartisan topic . And 11:34.409 --> 11:37.409 I know all of you agree with that . You 11:37.409 --> 11:39.969 supported our army for decades , and we 11:39.969 --> 11:42.080 wouldn't be here without all of you . 11:42.570 --> 11:44.514 But we know the system that should 11:44.514 --> 11:46.590 benefit soldiers remains broken . 11:47.130 --> 11:48.908 Quality of life and battlefield 11:48.908 --> 11:51.080 advantage aren't always the number one 11:51.080 --> 11:54.020 budget priority . It's a simple fact , 11:54.559 --> 11:57.000 and we need your help to continue to 11:57.000 --> 11:59.570 change it . We need right to repair 11:59.570 --> 12:01.969 legislation , relief from pre-World War 12:01.969 --> 12:05.039 II laws , and significantly more budget 12:05.039 --> 12:07.780 flexibility . Thank you so much for 12:07.780 --> 12:09.780 last year's progress , but if we're 12:09.780 --> 12:11.891 going to win the next fight , we must 12:11.891 --> 12:14.750 go even further . Technological change 12:14.750 --> 12:17.539 is accelerating , warfare is evolving , 12:17.750 --> 12:21.469 and speed is absolutely critical . Your 12:21.469 --> 12:23.302 help to either lower barriers to 12:23.302 --> 12:25.525 innovation or stick to the decades-long 12:25.525 --> 12:29.140 status quo makes all the difference . I 12:29.140 --> 12:31.029 invite all of you to come see our 12:31.029 --> 12:33.030 transformation firsthand . We are 12:33.030 --> 12:35.030 partnering with private industry to 12:35.030 --> 12:36.974 adopt the best tech , talent , and 12:36.974 --> 12:38.863 tradecraft . We're inviting those 12:38.863 --> 12:40.799 partners onto our bases to unlock 12:40.799 --> 12:43.280 dormant resources and offset federal 12:43.280 --> 12:46.270 budget delays . We are blazing a trail 12:46.270 --> 12:48.440 for our nation on nuclear energy , 12:48.640 --> 12:50.473 counter drone capabilities , and 12:50.473 --> 12:53.750 military AI . Despite red tape , we're 12:53.750 --> 12:55.861 delivering better dining , barracks , 12:55.861 --> 12:59.090 Wi Fi , and 3D printed barracks . Even 12:59.090 --> 13:01.090 though it can feel like the deck is 13:01.090 --> 13:03.034 sometimes stacked against us , the 13:03.034 --> 13:04.923 United States Army is a beacon of 13:04.923 --> 13:07.559 transformation . For instance , as we 13:07.559 --> 13:09.590 speak , we are hosting the largest 13:09.590 --> 13:11.880 hackathon in human history to 13:11.880 --> 13:14.479 retroactively jailbreak our siloed 13:14.479 --> 13:17.989 equipment . It's named Operation 13:17.989 --> 13:20.099 Jailbreak . Last month in Europe , 13:20.390 --> 13:22.390 soldiers showed me how our software 13:22.390 --> 13:24.168 systems are compartmentalized , 13:24.270 --> 13:26.669 isolated and ineffective against modern 13:26.669 --> 13:29.729 threats . Meanwhile , Ukraine's Delta 13:29.729 --> 13:32.109 Common operating System , their modular 13:32.109 --> 13:34.276 open system architecture , command and 13:34.276 --> 13:36.609 control system is absolutely incredible . 13:37.070 --> 13:39.348 It fully integrates every single drone , 13:39.419 --> 13:41.308 every sensor , and every shooting 13:41.308 --> 13:43.809 platform into just one single network . 13:44.229 --> 13:46.929 Ours does not . Unfortunately , for 13:46.929 --> 13:48.540 decades , our budget process 13:48.540 --> 13:50.762 incentivized companies to protect their 13:50.762 --> 13:52.818 intellectual property at all costs , 13:52.818 --> 13:54.770 creating walled gardens in our C2 13:54.770 --> 13:57.010 architecture . And this has been the 13:57.010 --> 14:00.099 status quo for far too long . It is no 14:00.099 --> 14:02.739 longer acceptable , and industry is 14:02.739 --> 14:05.450 helping us solve it . I contacted 9 of 14:05.450 --> 14:07.394 our defense primes and other large 14:07.394 --> 14:09.849 partners who immediately agreed to send 14:09.849 --> 14:11.929 thousands of pieces of equipment , 14:12.450 --> 14:14.394 engineers , and scientists to Fort 14:14.394 --> 14:17.489 Carson . Together we will force our way 14:17.489 --> 14:19.739 through the firewalls , link every 14:19.739 --> 14:22.010 system , and achieve true right to 14:22.010 --> 14:24.520 integrate . This is our first sprint , 14:24.650 --> 14:26.820 and we will do it again and again and 14:26.820 --> 14:29.042 again until we get it right . I want to 14:29.042 --> 14:31.264 be clear , this is a perfect example of 14:31.264 --> 14:33.609 the army's potential for speed and 14:33.609 --> 14:36.989 innovation . Absolutely no one else has 14:36.989 --> 14:38.822 the talent , the drive , and the 14:38.822 --> 14:40.933 obsessive work ethic to pull this off 14:40.933 --> 14:43.440 so quickly . Operation Jailbreak is the 14:43.440 --> 14:45.719 first of many sprints to bypass red 14:45.719 --> 14:48.479 tape and bureaucracy . What we're doing 14:48.479 --> 14:50.423 in Colorado should be the standard 14:50.423 --> 14:52.423 operating procedure going forward . 14:52.880 --> 14:54.960 It's the iterative process , process 14:54.960 --> 14:57.119 that makes America's tech sector the 14:57.119 --> 14:59.349 very best in the world . But you would 14:59.349 --> 15:01.799 be amazed at the regulatory walls that 15:01.799 --> 15:04.820 stood in our way . And we've expended a 15:04.820 --> 15:07.380 sinful amount of energy just to do the 15:07.380 --> 15:10.619 right thing . Imagine what we can do if 15:10.619 --> 15:12.859 you continue to help us slash those 15:12.859 --> 15:15.340 restrictions . We can do more if you 15:15.340 --> 15:17.507 help us balance oversight with speed . 15:17.830 --> 15:19.997 We can maximize our budget if you help 15:19.997 --> 15:22.330 us partner with America's entrepreneurs . 15:22.510 --> 15:24.677 We can move faster if you help us shed 15:24.677 --> 15:26.732 obsolete equipment and invest in the 15:26.732 --> 15:29.469 future . And with your help , we can 15:29.469 --> 15:31.830 assure our army remains the dominant 15:31.830 --> 15:34.260 land fighting force for the next 250 15:34.260 --> 15:36.780 years . Thank you so much for having us , 15:36.789 --> 15:38.845 and I look forward to answering your 15:38.845 --> 15:41.011 questions . Thank you very much , Mr . 15:41.011 --> 15:43.320 Secretary General Lane , you are 15:43.320 --> 15:45.570 recognized . Thank you , Sir . Chairman 15:45.570 --> 15:47.626 Wicker , Ranking Member Reed , thank 15:47.626 --> 15:49.514 you for the opportunity to appear 15:49.514 --> 15:51.403 before this committee today . The 15:51.403 --> 15:53.514 credibility of our army is defined by 15:53.514 --> 15:55.681 what it's prepared to do , not what it 15:55.681 --> 15:57.848 intends to do . Sir , every decision I 15:57.848 --> 15:59.903 make enables our soldiers to be more 15:59.903 --> 16:02.014 lethal and ready to fight and win and 16:02.014 --> 16:03.959 serve as the backbone of the joint 16:03.959 --> 16:05.959 force . In the Indo-Pacific , we're 16:05.959 --> 16:07.903 building a force postured to deter 16:07.903 --> 16:10.049 threats to US national interest and 16:10.049 --> 16:11.993 designed to extend the operational 16:11.993 --> 16:14.271 reach and endurance of the joint force . 16:14.570 --> 16:16.969 Right now , 87,000 soldiers are 16:16.969 --> 16:19.191 campaigning throughout the region . Our 16:19.191 --> 16:21.413 Typhoon missile systems are deployed to 16:21.413 --> 16:23.770 the Philippines and Japan . We position 16:23.770 --> 16:27.049 LTAMMs in Guam , and IFPIC unit in 16:27.049 --> 16:29.250 Korea , extending next generation air 16:29.250 --> 16:31.250 and missile defense against current 16:31.250 --> 16:33.361 threats in the region . The first and 16:33.361 --> 16:35.289 3rd multi-domain commands are now 16:35.289 --> 16:37.345 operational in the region , and this 16:37.345 --> 16:39.345 fall , the 4th Multi-domain Command 16:39.345 --> 16:41.289 headquarters will stand up at Fort 16:41.289 --> 16:43.830 Carson . Each multi-domain command 16:44.049 --> 16:45.993 brings together long-range fires , 16:45.993 --> 16:47.993 intelligence , electronic warfare , 16:47.993 --> 16:50.450 space , and cyber , all integrated into 16:50.450 --> 16:52.799 a single theater level capability 16:52.799 --> 16:54.799 designed to support the joint force 16:54.799 --> 16:57.250 commanders across vast distances of the 16:57.250 --> 16:59.250 Pacific . Every one of these 16:59.250 --> 17:01.250 capabilities exists because of the 17:01.250 --> 17:03.640 investments this committee supported . 17:04.088 --> 17:05.866 In the Middle East , our forces 17:05.866 --> 17:07.866 continue to defend US personnel and 17:07.866 --> 17:09.977 partners while sustaining layered air 17:09.977 --> 17:12.199 and missile defense , long-range strike 17:12.199 --> 17:14.366 capability , and operational logistics 17:14.366 --> 17:16.199 across CENTCOM . At home , we're 17:16.199 --> 17:18.421 preparing the force for future conflict 17:18.421 --> 17:20.532 at our combat training centers . It's 17:20.532 --> 17:20.529 where we're training our soldiers to 17:20.529 --> 17:22.751 fight against an adversary in the mud , 17:22.751 --> 17:24.973 to solve complex problems , and to test 17:24.973 --> 17:27.168 our latest systems . But we cannot 17:27.168 --> 17:29.390 field modern kit while sustaining agent 17:29.390 --> 17:31.612 systems that consume time , money , and 17:31.612 --> 17:34.640 manpower . Divesting legacy platforms 17:34.640 --> 17:36.640 reduces the maintenance demand that 17:36.640 --> 17:38.696 falls hardest on our junior soldiers 17:38.696 --> 17:41.079 and frees resources to advance next 17:41.079 --> 17:43.089 generation systems . That's why we 17:43.089 --> 17:45.256 restructured how we acquire , design , 17:45.256 --> 17:47.200 sustain , and field equipment with 17:47.200 --> 17:49.367 decisive focus on speed , the right to 17:49.367 --> 17:51.660 repair , and system modularity . That 17:51.660 --> 17:53.771 thinking is already reflected in some 17:53.771 --> 17:55.882 of our next generation platforms like 17:55.882 --> 17:57.938 the XM30 infantry fighting vehicle , 17:57.938 --> 18:00.819 the M13E Abrams , and the MV-75 18:00.819 --> 18:03.041 Cheyenne , which provides unprecedented 18:03.041 --> 18:05.579 speeds , range , and flexibility . Each 18:05.579 --> 18:07.635 of these systems are designed so the 18:07.635 --> 18:09.579 next operational upgrade requires 18:09.579 --> 18:11.819 integration , not a brand new start . 18:12.560 --> 18:14.616 But none of this matters if we can't 18:14.616 --> 18:16.560 produce and sustain at scale , and 18:16.560 --> 18:18.782 that's why we continue to modernize the 18:18.782 --> 18:20.838 OIB through advanced manufacturing , 18:20.838 --> 18:22.893 depot , modernization , and expanded 18:22.893 --> 18:25.060 partnerships with industry , including 18:25.060 --> 18:27.060 enhanced use leases that accelerate 18:27.060 --> 18:28.782 infrastructure development and 18:28.782 --> 18:30.893 production capability . And while the 18:30.893 --> 18:33.359 industrial capacity is important , the 18:33.359 --> 18:35.526 strength of our army is only as strong 18:35.526 --> 18:37.581 as our ability to retain experienced 18:37.581 --> 18:39.637 soldiers and whether the force we're 18:39.637 --> 18:41.581 building reflects the standards we 18:41.581 --> 18:43.359 claim to uphold . That standard 18:43.359 --> 18:45.470 includes $4 billion in infrastructure 18:45.470 --> 18:47.581 investments throughout 2026 , rolling 18:47.581 --> 18:49.859 out out campus-style dining facilities , 18:49.859 --> 18:52.081 scaling our holistic health and fitness 18:52.081 --> 18:54.489 across the entire force , and soldiers 18:54.489 --> 18:56.489 are seeing the difference and so do 18:56.489 --> 18:58.433 American citizens . Our recruiting 18:58.433 --> 19:00.656 numbers are soaring . We're on track to 19:00.656 --> 19:03.640 achieve this year's accession . Ahead 19:03.640 --> 19:06.760 of schedule because in the end soldiers 19:06.760 --> 19:08.982 are the reason your army can do what it 19:08.982 --> 19:10.760 does . Your army delivers the 19:10.760 --> 19:12.704 intelligence and fires that enable 19:12.704 --> 19:15.119 maneuver . We sustain operations , we 19:15.119 --> 19:17.319 protect the force . We provide the 19:17.319 --> 19:19.430 command and control architecture that 19:19.430 --> 19:21.375 allows a joint force and America's 19:21.375 --> 19:23.400 allies to operate together , every 19:23.400 --> 19:25.770 component of the fight . The joint 19:25.770 --> 19:27.937 fight depends on our army's ability to 19:27.937 --> 19:30.479 do all those things simultaneously and 19:30.479 --> 19:32.719 exceptionally well . We will not fail 19:32.719 --> 19:35.089 our country . This will defend . And 19:35.089 --> 19:37.311 thank you for your continued support as 19:37.311 --> 19:39.478 we sustain the best army the world has 19:39.478 --> 19:41.811 ever known . Well , thank you very much . 19:41.811 --> 19:43.478 And now we begin our round of 19:43.478 --> 19:45.700 questioning . Uh , uh , so let me ask , 19:45.700 --> 19:47.867 uh , let me start with you , Secretary 19:47.867 --> 19:51.689 Driscoll , um . Operation Jailbreak , 19:52.010 --> 19:54.699 um . Involves the right to integrate . 19:54.959 --> 19:58.699 How many . How many this is brand 19:58.699 --> 20:00.532 new this month , is that right , 20:00.532 --> 20:03.099 Secretary Driscoll , um , as of about a 20:03.099 --> 20:05.609 week ago . All right , OK . How many 20:05.609 --> 20:08.040 companies are involved at this point ? 20:09.500 --> 20:11.667 So , we , we started chairman with the 20:11.667 --> 20:15.099 5 primes , um , Andel Palantir L3 , 20:15.459 --> 20:17.681 um , we're the original . We had , they 20:17.681 --> 20:19.403 have since been inviting other 20:19.403 --> 20:21.292 companies to come out . If I were 20:21.292 --> 20:23.292 estimating , I would guess 30 to 50 20:23.292 --> 20:25.515 companies are currently involved by day 20:25.515 --> 20:27.737 10 and our , what we have told industry 20:27.737 --> 20:29.848 is we will take every single piece of 20:29.848 --> 20:32.015 equipment that our army uses . This is 20:32.015 --> 20:31.979 thousands of pieces of equipment and 20:31.979 --> 20:34.146 all of them will be jailbroken . Which 20:34.146 --> 20:36.368 just practically means all of them will 20:36.368 --> 20:38.590 be able to share information out of the 20:38.590 --> 20:40.812 system and receive information into the 20:40.812 --> 20:42.923 system . And what's so powerful about 20:42.923 --> 20:45.146 this is , once you can do that to these 20:45.146 --> 20:44.689 pieces of equipment , and this is what 20:44.689 --> 20:46.689 we've learned from the Ukrainians , 20:46.689 --> 20:48.911 this is where you can start to layer in 20:48.911 --> 20:50.911 things like generative AI models to 20:50.911 --> 20:53.449 help you with decision making . OK , um . 20:54.979 --> 20:58.670 How long have the Ukrainians been using 20:58.670 --> 21:02.510 this concept ? Um , 21:02.550 --> 21:05.069 I would say the entire war . Um 21:06.660 --> 21:09.880 OK , is it frustrating to you that 21:10.640 --> 21:13.640 That now in the 5th year . We're just 21:14.099 --> 21:17.180 embracing this concept this month , May 21:17.180 --> 21:20.689 of 2026 . Chairman , I would look at 21:20.689 --> 21:22.856 myself and only myself that we haven't 21:22.856 --> 21:24.911 moved faster on it . I do think that 21:25.099 --> 21:27.266 what we have that the Ukrainians don't 21:27.266 --> 21:29.377 have is we have deep infrastructure . 21:29.377 --> 21:31.660 We have deep expertise , and the 21:31.660 --> 21:34.420 downside of a bureaucracy can also 21:34.420 --> 21:36.949 empower . some upsides of a bureaucracy . 21:36.989 --> 21:39.030 And so what has been incredibly 21:39.030 --> 21:41.030 valuable for us , and I don't think 21:41.030 --> 21:43.197 respectfully the Ukrainians could have 21:43.197 --> 21:44.974 done it in 10 days , is we have 21:44.974 --> 21:47.197 basically the entire defense industrial 21:47.197 --> 21:49.308 base is now moving to this . They are 21:49.308 --> 21:51.530 actively shipping equipment and we have 21:51.530 --> 21:53.419 scientists and computer engineers 21:53.419 --> 21:55.641 currently in Colorado making everything 21:55.641 --> 21:57.752 flow . And so I think what we will be 21:57.752 --> 21:59.808 able to do in 6 weeks will be unlike 21:59.808 --> 22:01.863 anything that could be done anywhere 22:01.863 --> 22:04.030 else in the world . OK , so in 6 weeks 22:04.030 --> 22:06.197 you're you're going to have tangible . 22:06.197 --> 22:10.130 Results unequivocally . Um , most 22:10.130 --> 22:13.829 interesting , um . How fast is the army 22:13.829 --> 22:17.229 moving to embrace low-cost munitions 22:17.229 --> 22:19.569 across portfolios and um . 22:21.810 --> 22:24.150 Uh , uh , when are we gonna start 22:24.150 --> 22:25.079 moving faster ? 22:28.520 --> 22:30.631 Sure , uh , so both of you can answer 22:30.631 --> 22:32.964 that . So , we're tied in with the , uh , 22:32.964 --> 22:35.020 the Deputy Secretary of War's , uh , 22:35.020 --> 22:37.076 you know , munitions council . We're 22:37.076 --> 22:39.187 moving as fast as we possibly can . I 22:39.187 --> 22:41.242 think the goal is to have a magazine 22:41.242 --> 22:43.464 depth that supports both low , low-cost 22:43.464 --> 22:45.680 munitions and our exquisite munitions 22:45.680 --> 22:47.902 so we have the , the proper fit and the 22:47.902 --> 22:50.069 proper numbers , uh , that , that we , 22:50.119 --> 22:52.286 uh , we think we're going to need in a 22:52.286 --> 22:54.452 future conflict . And and Chairman , I 22:54.452 --> 22:56.675 would say , um , Under Secretary of War 22:56.675 --> 22:58.730 and the president , we , we've spent 22:58.730 --> 23:00.952 the 1st 9 months of at least my time in 23:00.952 --> 23:02.730 the seat . Redoing a lot of the 23:02.730 --> 23:04.786 bureaucratic structures that existed 23:04.786 --> 23:06.841 with how we buy things , how we test 23:06.841 --> 23:09.063 things , and how we scale things . Um , 23:09.063 --> 23:11.175 and there are some leading indicators 23:11.175 --> 23:13.397 to me that make me believe that we have 23:13.397 --> 23:15.563 made , uh , strong and lasting changes 23:15.563 --> 23:17.786 that will allow us to do this much more 23:17.786 --> 23:19.841 frequently . So , if you look at the 23:19.841 --> 23:22.063 day 5 of the war , um , where we wanted 23:22.063 --> 23:24.063 to go get more interceptors for the 23:24.063 --> 23:26.286 Shaheed drones , we were , we were able 23:26.286 --> 23:28.508 to contract for 13,000 . Ops and 10,000 23:28.508 --> 23:30.540 bumblebees within five days . Those 23:30.540 --> 23:33.819 were showing up in theater in packages 23:33.819 --> 23:36.219 of 1000 or more , and we were able to 23:36.219 --> 23:38.441 flow soldiers in as a train the trainer 23:38.441 --> 23:41.020 model . And that to me is a massive 23:41.020 --> 23:43.380 success that shows me or makes me 23:43.380 --> 23:45.436 believe that all of the changes that 23:45.436 --> 23:47.491 had occurred earlier in the year are 23:47.491 --> 23:49.269 actually working and allow us , 23:49.269 --> 23:51.213 allowing us to be able to start to 23:51.213 --> 23:50.939 scale these lower cost solutions . Mr . 23:51.099 --> 23:54.939 Secretary , in 60 seconds , can you Um , 23:55.280 --> 23:57.391 give us a quick overview of your role 23:57.391 --> 23:59.502 in the , in , in what might happen in 23:59.502 --> 24:02.920 the Indo-Pacific . With regard to the 24:02.920 --> 24:05.087 army . Absolutely . I think what we've 24:05.087 --> 24:07.198 seen in Centcom in the last couple of 24:07.198 --> 24:09.309 months is the army has a huge role to 24:09.309 --> 24:11.420 play . We are the logistical backbone 24:11.420 --> 24:13.531 of what is occurring in the theater . 24:13.531 --> 24:15.309 We are able with our long range 24:15.309 --> 24:17.476 precision fires to reach out and touch 24:17.476 --> 24:19.531 the enemy in ways that just the army 24:19.531 --> 24:21.753 historically had not been able to . And 24:21.753 --> 24:23.920 then one of our superpowers as an army 24:23.920 --> 24:23.739 is we can disperse quickly . And so 24:23.959 --> 24:26.181 whether it's on the air defense side or 24:26.181 --> 24:28.126 on the offensive side , the United 24:28.126 --> 24:30.181 States Army will play a huge role in 24:30.181 --> 24:32.348 whatever happens in the Indo-Pacific . 24:32.348 --> 24:34.403 All right , I'll , I'll yield back . 24:34.403 --> 24:36.737 Senator Reid . Thank you very much , Mr . 24:36.737 --> 24:38.737 Chairman , and let me commend you , 24:38.737 --> 24:40.792 Secretary Driscoll , because you not 24:40.792 --> 24:43.015 only sensed the change in warfare , but 24:43.015 --> 24:45.070 you seized an opportunity and you're 24:45.070 --> 24:47.015 pushing through . Well done . Uh , 24:47.400 --> 24:49.622 based on the experience in Ukraine , we 24:49.622 --> 24:51.567 understand fundamental changes are 24:51.567 --> 24:53.233 taking on , and I , I sort of 24:53.233 --> 24:55.344 characterized it when I served in the 24:55.344 --> 24:57.456 military a few years ago , the mantra 24:57.456 --> 24:59.719 was shoot , move , and communicate . 25:00.170 --> 25:02.750 Today it's communicate so you can shoot 25:02.750 --> 25:05.170 and move , and hackathon goes right to 25:05.170 --> 25:07.569 that principal issue . Well done . Let 25:07.569 --> 25:09.902 me ask another question though , that's , 25:09.902 --> 25:12.069 uh , uh , the military promotion board 25:12.069 --> 25:14.589 system is central to our military in 25:15.050 --> 25:17.650 every way , shape and form . The law 25:17.650 --> 25:19.483 that we promulgated requires the 25:19.483 --> 25:21.539 selection boards use a comprehensive 25:21.539 --> 25:23.317 evaluation process to review an 25:23.317 --> 25:25.261 officer's entire record and select 25:25.261 --> 25:28.050 officers who are the best qualified for 25:28.050 --> 25:30.430 promotion and future service . It's 25:30.430 --> 25:32.597 based on the collective assessment and 25:32.597 --> 25:35.189 judgment of their peers and throughout 25:35.189 --> 25:37.869 their OERs and also the senior officers 25:37.869 --> 25:40.270 on the board . Can you tell us why 25:40.270 --> 25:42.829 Secretary Heck has directed that 5 25:42.829 --> 25:44.996 names be withheld from the most recent 25:44.996 --> 25:47.162 Army one-star list concerning officers 25:47.162 --> 25:50.030 accused of no misconduct ? And did you 25:50.030 --> 25:52.630 support or recommend the actions by the 25:52.630 --> 25:56.060 secretary ? Uh , ranking member , um , 25:56.439 --> 25:58.661 the , the private conversations between 25:58.661 --> 26:00.717 me and Secretary of War , I'll never 26:00.717 --> 26:02.883 talk about those . I will say that the 26:02.883 --> 26:04.939 United States Army , um , has always 26:04.939 --> 26:06.883 followed the rules and regulations 26:06.883 --> 26:09.106 around promotion board . Well , I don't 26:09.106 --> 26:11.328 think there's a very clear role for the 26:11.328 --> 26:13.469 Secretary of Defense to take off 26:14.089 --> 26:16.760 individuals from the board . Uh , uh , 26:16.989 --> 26:19.100 what other promotion boards have been 26:19.100 --> 26:22.359 subject to this review ? Uh , I'm sorry , 26:22.479 --> 26:24.535 Senator , would you mind repeating ? 26:24.890 --> 26:26.969 Secretary of Defense removed several 26:26.969 --> 26:29.329 names from a promotion board , which I 26:29.329 --> 26:31.010 think is highly unusual to be 26:31.010 --> 26:34.709 diplomatic . Uh , what other boards has 26:34.709 --> 26:38.550 he reviewed and with the intent 26:38.550 --> 26:40.550 perhaps of removing people from the 26:40.550 --> 26:42.494 board , from the recommendations ? 26:42.494 --> 26:44.717 Senator , as far as I know , no other , 26:44.920 --> 26:47.359 um , um , names , names have been put 26:47.359 --> 26:50.599 on a different scroll . So what , uh , 26:50.839 --> 26:52.895 incentivize the Secretary to look at 26:52.895 --> 26:56.569 this particular board ? I do not know , 26:56.660 --> 26:58.604 Senator Well , that's a question I 26:58.604 --> 27:02.329 think would be important to ask . Now , 27:03.530 --> 27:05.930 If these officers were judged by their 27:05.930 --> 27:08.670 peers and their superiors to be of , as 27:08.670 --> 27:11.010 statutorily required , best qualified 27:11.010 --> 27:13.750 promotion of future service , Uh 27:16.089 --> 27:18.422 They've been denied immediate promotion . 27:18.422 --> 27:20.367 Would they still be eligible to go 27:20.367 --> 27:22.819 before another board ? As I understand 27:22.819 --> 27:25.041 it mechanistically , Senator , um , the 27:25.041 --> 27:27.420 scroll that was submitted to the Senate 27:27.420 --> 27:29.531 did not include these officers' names 27:29.531 --> 27:31.939 on it . Um , another scroll could be 27:31.939 --> 27:34.050 submitted either individually or with 27:34.050 --> 27:36.106 the collective for to the Senate for 27:36.106 --> 27:39.369 promotion as you actively reviewing the 27:39.369 --> 27:41.280 individual cases so that you can 27:41.739 --> 27:44.160 determine yourself that , uh , these 27:44.619 --> 27:46.786 individuals should be reconsidered for 27:46.786 --> 27:48.952 a board of promotion . I can commit to 27:48.952 --> 27:50.675 you , Senator , and the entire 27:50.675 --> 27:52.730 committee that General Le Neve and I 27:52.730 --> 27:54.786 are advocating for American soldiers 27:54.786 --> 27:57.119 every single day , um , and we are , um , 27:57.119 --> 27:59.849 um , constantly working to make sure 27:59.849 --> 28:01.960 that the Army is promoting the best . 28:01.960 --> 28:04.010 Uh , my fear is that this is not 28:04.010 --> 28:06.010 something that's obscure , but it's 28:06.010 --> 28:08.189 very relevant to every officer and 28:08.410 --> 28:10.410 every person in the army , and that 28:10.410 --> 28:13.170 they've seen literally a life's work 28:13.170 --> 28:15.290 suddenly terminated . Without 28:15.290 --> 28:17.623 explanation by the Secretary of Defense , 28:17.623 --> 28:19.679 that doesn't send a good message , I 28:19.679 --> 28:21.846 believe , to the forces . Let me raise 28:21.846 --> 28:23.846 a subject that is seldom considered 28:23.846 --> 28:26.140 here wajale . As you know , Mr . 28:26.189 --> 28:28.411 Secretary , the Army is responsible for 28:28.411 --> 28:30.245 Quine , and as you also know , I 28:30.245 --> 28:32.650 suspect , the status here is terrible . 28:32.739 --> 28:35.540 Uh , out of date radars , it's the 28:35.540 --> 28:37.596 major missile testing system for the 28:37.596 --> 28:39.540 Army , for the whole Department of 28:39.540 --> 28:42.469 Defense . Uh , can you confirm that the 28:42.469 --> 28:45.709 Army is still in charge and how are you 28:45.709 --> 28:47.765 going to remedy the poor situation ? 28:49.859 --> 28:51.780 Sure , we are , we still are the 28:51.780 --> 28:54.219 executive agent , um , and , uh , we're 28:54.219 --> 28:55.989 looking at ways to improve the 28:55.989 --> 28:58.045 infrastructure , uh , there . It's a 28:58.045 --> 28:59.933 critical , critical component for 28:59.933 --> 29:02.619 testing , as you , as you say , um , in 29:02.619 --> 29:04.619 the Pacific , and we're not walking 29:04.619 --> 29:07.400 away from it . Thank you . In 30 29:07.400 --> 29:11.239 seconds , General Lane , based on our 29:11.239 --> 29:13.461 experience in Ukraine , the observation 29:13.461 --> 29:15.680 we've conducted , how are you going to 29:15.680 --> 29:17.624 integrate that into the new combat 29:17.624 --> 29:21.160 vehicle systems ? My sense is combat 29:21.160 --> 29:23.216 vehicles are very much vulnerable to 29:23.216 --> 29:25.382 drones and other systems , but can you 29:25.382 --> 29:27.604 respond ? No , sir , and thanks for the 29:27.604 --> 29:29.790 question . That's , that's one of the 29:29.790 --> 29:32.599 key secret sauces in our new PAEs that 29:32.599 --> 29:35.369 the Secretary and team created . Uh , 29:35.449 --> 29:37.505 is to be able to use lessons learned 29:37.505 --> 29:39.338 and feed it into the acquisition 29:39.338 --> 29:41.560 process , get it out into the soldiers' 29:41.560 --> 29:43.616 hands , test it , and then get the , 29:43.616 --> 29:46.069 the , uh , the feedback back into the 29:46.069 --> 29:48.291 acquisition to be able to have a system 29:48.291 --> 29:51.520 that continually innovates . Uh , for , 29:51.530 --> 29:53.920 uh , the , the future threat , uh , so 29:54.140 --> 29:56.251 our lessons are being incorporated in 29:56.251 --> 29:58.362 all of our systems across the board . 29:58.362 --> 30:00.529 Thank you very much . Thank you . Uh , 30:00.529 --> 30:02.699 thank you , Senator Reed , Senator 30:02.699 --> 30:04.989 Shaheen , I mean Senator Ernst , I'm 30:04.989 --> 30:07.160 sorry , right here in front of me . 30:07.819 --> 30:09.986 Thanks , Mr . Chair , and , uh , thank 30:09.986 --> 30:12.060 you , Secretary Driscoll and General 30:12.060 --> 30:13.838 Lenny for being in front of our 30:13.838 --> 30:16.004 committee today and for your continued 30:16.004 --> 30:18.650 service to our nation . Um , I do want 30:18.650 --> 30:21.670 to start with the Army Transformation 30:21.670 --> 30:23.614 initiative , and I wanna thank the 30:23.614 --> 30:26.369 ranking member for , um , bringing up 30:26.369 --> 30:29.810 the dismissal of , uh , General Randy 30:29.810 --> 30:31.890 George because , uh , Secretary 30:31.890 --> 30:34.930 Driscoll , when you first , uh , came 30:34.930 --> 30:37.189 into your position , I remember meeting 30:37.189 --> 30:39.770 with you , met with General George 30:39.770 --> 30:41.437 about the Army Transformation 30:41.437 --> 30:43.709 initiative which was long , long 30:44.050 --> 30:46.689 overdue . Uh , this committee has been 30:46.689 --> 30:48.930 very clear that we support the goal of 30:48.930 --> 30:52.640 a leaner and more lethal army , and , 30:52.650 --> 30:54.810 uh , with , uh , dismissal , the 30:54.810 --> 30:57.089 dismissal of Randy George , we also saw 30:57.089 --> 30:59.329 the dismissal of General Hodney , who 30:59.329 --> 31:03.189 is or was the US Army Transformation 31:03.189 --> 31:05.780 and Training Command commander , um , 31:05.810 --> 31:09.449 so two very unfortunate dismissals at a 31:09.449 --> 31:12.250 time when we do need that leaner , more 31:12.250 --> 31:15.170 lethal army . Um , so as we look at 31:15.170 --> 31:18.180 this , uh , we need to , uh , achieve 31:18.180 --> 31:21.400 electronic dominance . Uh , we need to 31:21.400 --> 31:23.439 get unmanned systems into every 31:23.439 --> 31:26.160 division , and we need to enable 31:26.160 --> 31:28.959 AI-driven command and control , uh , at 31:28.959 --> 31:31.170 the theater cops and division levels . 31:31.520 --> 31:34.329 Uh , so Secretary Driscoll , can you 31:34.329 --> 31:36.910 provide an update on what tangible 31:36.910 --> 31:39.119 progress we are now making . Uh , in 31:39.119 --> 31:41.750 the Army transformation initiative , 31:42.119 --> 31:44.280 and can you talk about some of the 31:44.280 --> 31:47.319 areas where we did in the past several 31:47.319 --> 31:50.880 months , uh , achieve , uh , greater 31:50.880 --> 31:53.102 capabilities within the army because of 31:53.102 --> 31:56.119 the ATI . Uh , absolutely , Senator . 31:56.300 --> 31:59.500 Um , I'm incredibly optimistic that the 31:59.500 --> 32:01.778 groundwork that we've laid in the last , 32:01.778 --> 32:04.020 uh , 10 to 16 months has allowed us to 32:04.020 --> 32:06.076 move more quickly as an army . We've 32:06.076 --> 32:09.000 been able to do new starts on an M1E3 , 32:09.300 --> 32:11.522 uh , uh , a new version of a tank . The 32:11.522 --> 32:14.180 Flora long range helicopter has gotten 32:14.180 --> 32:16.180 a lot of investment and focus . Our 32:16.180 --> 32:18.347 next gen C2 has expanded the number of 32:18.347 --> 32:20.569 divisions , and we were able to do that 32:20.569 --> 32:22.291 much more quickly than we were 32:22.291 --> 32:24.513 originally able to originally able to . 32:24.513 --> 32:26.880 And part of that is because of the hard 32:26.880 --> 32:29.079 decisions that we made on where to cut 32:29.079 --> 32:31.160 spending . It is very hard once a 32:31.160 --> 32:33.327 system and a program get up to be able 32:33.327 --> 32:35.271 to stop the spending in the future 32:35.271 --> 32:37.438 because all sorts of different reasons 32:37.438 --> 32:39.549 make it where that momentum is pretty 32:39.549 --> 32:41.604 difficult , and I'm , I'm incredibly 32:41.604 --> 32:43.716 grateful to all of you for supporting 32:43.716 --> 32:45.660 us . We saved about $48 billion we 32:45.660 --> 32:47.827 think , over the five-year period that 32:47.827 --> 32:50.349 we've been able to . Reinvest into our 32:50.349 --> 32:52.516 transformation . And then the last bit 32:52.516 --> 32:54.349 I'll say is a lot of it has been 32:54.349 --> 32:56.571 systematic changes . So when we look at 32:56.571 --> 32:58.738 what we did , converting over our PEOs 32:58.738 --> 33:00.960 to PAEs , essentially what we did is we 33:00.960 --> 33:03.380 took 13 silos of decision making , and 33:03.380 --> 33:05.213 within that silo , you'd have 15 33:05.213 --> 33:07.380 different stops between when we wanted 33:07.380 --> 33:09.491 to buy something and when we actually 33:09.491 --> 33:11.547 could purchase it , and any of those 33:11.547 --> 33:11.380 stops could kick it back to the 33:11.380 --> 33:13.380 beginning . And so for acquisition 33:13.380 --> 33:15.547 decisions , some of the times it would 33:15.547 --> 33:17.436 take between 2 and 4 years to get 33:17.436 --> 33:19.380 something we knew we wanted in the 33:19.380 --> 33:21.324 hands of soldiers . By the time we 33:21.324 --> 33:23.491 actually got it there , it was already 33:23.491 --> 33:23.339 outdated . We've been able to collapse 33:23.339 --> 33:25.500 those systems down and do much more 33:25.500 --> 33:27.444 like what occurs in the commercial 33:27.444 --> 33:29.667 sector where we're doing the equivalent 33:29.667 --> 33:31.770 of putting our engineers with our 33:31.770 --> 33:33.881 manufacturers and our accountants and 33:33.881 --> 33:36.048 our lawyers all in one . Team . And so 33:36.048 --> 33:38.159 an example of when we've been able to 33:38.159 --> 33:40.270 move very quickly where I don't think 33:40.270 --> 33:42.326 we could have pre-ATI is getting the 33:42.326 --> 33:44.400 Mirros and the Bumblebee into the um 33:44.400 --> 33:47.260 Centcom . From day 5 , we decided we 33:47.260 --> 33:49.540 needed it . By day 10 , we had 33:49.540 --> 33:52.089 contracted for 23,000 , and by day 20 , 33:52.099 --> 33:54.432 they were starting to flow into theater . 33:54.432 --> 33:56.979 That's really good . Um , and I , I do 33:56.979 --> 33:59.146 hope the other . Service branches take 33:59.146 --> 34:01.257 a look at what the army has been able 34:01.257 --> 34:03.500 to achieve and find a way forward in 34:03.500 --> 34:05.500 their in their own service branches 34:05.500 --> 34:08.020 because this is pretty exemplary um and 34:08.020 --> 34:10.300 then as , as we're looking ahead , what 34:10.300 --> 34:12.580 are the next major phases in this 34:12.580 --> 34:16.179 initiative and where do you see that we 34:16.179 --> 34:19.379 are assuming the greatest risk as we're 34:19.379 --> 34:22.208 executing ? Ma'am , uh , you know , 34:22.358 --> 34:24.469 thanks for the question . You , you , 34:24.469 --> 34:26.636 you touched on it . So , you know , we 34:26.636 --> 34:28.525 spent a lot of time , uh , in the 34:28.525 --> 34:30.358 beginning of Army transformation 34:30.358 --> 34:32.414 looking at division and below , uh , 34:32.414 --> 34:34.302 you know , at the , really at the 34:34.302 --> 34:36.469 tactical level . You , you hit it spot 34:36.469 --> 34:38.414 on in your opening question . Uh , 34:38.414 --> 34:40.636 we're taking a hard look now at Corps , 34:40.636 --> 34:42.691 uh , Army service component commands 34:42.691 --> 34:44.914 and , and what we have to change inside 34:44.914 --> 34:47.191 of those organizations to take on , uh , 34:47.191 --> 34:49.414 more of a role . Uh , in , in how we're 34:49.414 --> 34:51.580 going to have to fight in the future , 34:51.580 --> 34:51.189 and that's , that's a lens that we're 34:51.189 --> 34:53.189 taking a look at right now . That's 34:53.189 --> 34:55.245 wonderful . Yes , uh , and Senator , 34:55.245 --> 34:57.411 I'd say , uh , the biggest risk is not 34:57.411 --> 34:59.467 going fast enough . Next Gen C2 , we 34:59.467 --> 35:01.578 think it will be in all the divisions 35:01.578 --> 35:03.689 or we're modeling it to be in all the 35:03.689 --> 35:05.911 divisions within 5 years . Um , I don't 35:05.911 --> 35:05.475 think that's sufficient . I think we 35:05.475 --> 35:07.594 need to do it in 2 or 3 . It is just 35:07.594 --> 35:09.705 simply a spending pacing item at this 35:09.705 --> 35:11.816 point because we know what we need to 35:11.816 --> 35:13.927 do . OK , thank you , gentlemen , for 35:13.927 --> 35:16.205 being here . Thank you , Senator Ernst . 35:16.205 --> 35:18.150 There's a vote going on now on the 35:18.150 --> 35:20.316 floor , actually a series of 2 votes . 35:20.316 --> 35:22.538 We will continue our hearing during the 35:22.538 --> 35:25.879 vote and um . I , I'll be leaving , and 35:25.879 --> 35:28.469 I think Senator Budd will take the 35:28.469 --> 35:31.350 gavel for about 5 minutes . At this 35:31.350 --> 35:33.294 point , I call on Senator Hirono . 35:33.510 --> 35:35.677 Thank you , Mr . Chairman . Welcome to 35:35.677 --> 35:37.899 both of you . As Secretary Driscoll , I 35:37.899 --> 35:40.066 want to ask you about your approach to 35:40.066 --> 35:42.066 the negotiations involving Hawaii's 35:42.066 --> 35:44.300 military training lands consisting of 35:44.300 --> 35:47.709 some 29,000 acres . I understand the 35:47.709 --> 35:50.110 importance of these training lands for 35:50.110 --> 35:51.888 army readiness and Indo-Pacific 35:51.888 --> 35:53.870 deterrence . I also understand the 35:53.870 --> 35:56.250 importance of this land and these 35:56.250 --> 35:58.489 negotiations to the people of Hawaii . 35:58.790 --> 36:00.901 And the native Hawaiian community and 36:00.901 --> 36:03.012 that is why I have been engaging with 36:03.012 --> 36:04.629 DOD leaders about how these 36:04.629 --> 36:07.409 negotiations will proceed , uh . 36:08.750 --> 36:11.110 Expressing the need for community input 36:11.110 --> 36:13.310 for a number of years now and at your 36:13.310 --> 36:15.477 confirmation hearing and again at last 36:15.477 --> 36:17.699 year's posture hearing you committed to 36:17.699 --> 36:19.989 negotiating in good faith with the 36:19.989 --> 36:23.709 state and the community , so it was uh 36:23.709 --> 36:25.931 concerning that instead of what I would 36:25.931 --> 36:27.709 consider open communication and 36:27.709 --> 36:29.598 transparency . the army last year 36:29.598 --> 36:31.709 pursued unilateral condemnation 36:31.709 --> 36:34.429 language as shown by your attempt to 36:34.429 --> 36:36.949 add last minute NDA language to support 36:36.949 --> 36:39.560 condemnation , and Congress responded 36:39.560 --> 36:42.229 by instead reinforcing the continuing 36:42.229 --> 36:45.219 need for good faith negotiations . A 36:45.219 --> 36:48.139 unilateral decision to condemn 36:49.070 --> 36:51.610 state lands would bypass the community , 36:52.270 --> 36:53.992 the state government , and the 36:53.992 --> 36:56.260 congressional delegation . The relevant 36:56.260 --> 36:58.330 condemnation statute , in fact , 36:58.340 --> 37:00.739 requires the army to pursue and exhaust 37:00.739 --> 37:04.419 all other available options before 37:04.419 --> 37:06.586 starting condemnation proceedings . So 37:06.586 --> 37:09.179 I don't see how the army can meet that 37:09.179 --> 37:10.957 requirement when it is not even 37:10.957 --> 37:14.820 resubmitted . Corrected EISS to 37:14.820 --> 37:16.931 address the deficiencies noted by the 37:16.931 --> 37:19.042 Board of Land and Natural Resources , 37:19.042 --> 37:21.379 which in May uh led to their 37:21.379 --> 37:24.659 disapproval of the Army submitted EISS . 37:24.899 --> 37:27.139 It's been a year . So given these 37:27.139 --> 37:29.139 actions appears that , you know , I 37:29.139 --> 37:31.139 hope this isn't the case , that the 37:31.139 --> 37:33.250 army is trying to run the clock . And 37:33.250 --> 37:35.306 leave unilateral condemnation as the 37:35.306 --> 37:37.361 only viable course of action . And I 37:37.361 --> 37:39.583 want to state again for the record that 37:39.870 --> 37:42.092 I oppose unilateral condemnation . What 37:42.092 --> 37:45.030 we need is a negotiated approach to 37:45.030 --> 37:48.959 these , these lands . Um , And 37:48.959 --> 37:51.126 I've taken that position for years and 37:51.126 --> 37:53.348 we're now at the point where the leases 37:53.348 --> 37:55.403 are almost up and final negotiations 37:55.403 --> 37:57.800 need to occur with meaningful community 37:57.800 --> 38:00.040 engagement and input , especially from 38:00.040 --> 38:01.984 the native Hawaiian community . So 38:01.984 --> 38:04.207 Secretary Driscoll , I have a number of 38:04.207 --> 38:06.040 questions about your plans going 38:06.040 --> 38:08.207 forward . You previously , first , you 38:08.207 --> 38:10.373 previously committed to negotiating in 38:10.373 --> 38:12.596 good faith . Do you still stand by that 38:12.596 --> 38:15.300 commitment ? Yes , unequivocally . The 38:15.300 --> 38:17.739 Army AISS were rejected by the Hawaii 38:17.739 --> 38:19.699 Land Board last summer because of 38:19.699 --> 38:21.866 several noted deficiencies , including 38:22.340 --> 38:25.179 uh their failure to adequately address , 38:25.189 --> 38:27.459 uh , assess the cultural and historical 38:27.459 --> 38:29.969 impacts of continued training . Mr . 38:29.979 --> 38:32.090 Secretary , can I get your commitment 38:32.090 --> 38:35.530 that the Army will resubmit their EISS 38:35.530 --> 38:39.300 to address these deficiencies ? Senator , 38:39.389 --> 38:41.722 um , just to the spirit of the question , 38:41.722 --> 38:43.833 uh , I try to always say this , and I 38:43.833 --> 38:46.000 mean it very sincerely . When you talk 38:46.000 --> 38:48.167 to our soldiers and their families who 38:48.167 --> 38:50.056 spend a lot of their lives on the 38:50.056 --> 38:49.820 Hawaiian Islands , and they're 38:49.820 --> 38:51.987 incredibly grateful to the community . 38:51.987 --> 38:53.987 The community has been fantastic to 38:53.987 --> 38:56.153 them over decades and so we want to be 38:56.153 --> 38:58.500 very respectful of the deep 38:58.500 --> 39:00.500 relationship that those people have 39:00.500 --> 39:02.667 with the land . And so , um , I commit 39:02.667 --> 39:04.833 to following up with your office . And 39:04.833 --> 39:06.778 I hope that means that you will be 39:06.778 --> 39:08.944 resubmitting your EISS because to me , 39:08.944 --> 39:12.340 resubmitting the EISS is part of , of , 39:12.429 --> 39:14.596 of what even the condemnation statutes 39:14.596 --> 39:16.429 requires you to do , which is to 39:16.429 --> 39:18.540 exhaust , um , all avenues that means 39:18.540 --> 39:20.939 negotiations . Next question , what is 39:20.939 --> 39:23.419 the status of your negotiations with 39:23.419 --> 39:25.899 the state of Hawaii ? Can you describe 39:25.899 --> 39:28.080 in detail what steps you plan to take 39:28.260 --> 39:30.149 in the next 60 days ? The time is 39:30.149 --> 39:32.260 running on these visas to advance and 39:32.260 --> 39:34.482 negotiate an agreement with the state . 39:35.429 --> 39:37.689 Senator , um , we , we've aspired over 39:37.689 --> 39:39.856 the years before I was in the seat . I 39:39.856 --> 39:41.911 think we've had a number of meetings 39:41.911 --> 39:44.022 and then since I've been here , I can 39:44.022 --> 39:46.189 speak more articulately to that . Um , 39:46.189 --> 39:48.467 we've engaged with the delegation , uh , 39:48.467 --> 39:50.467 both who represent here in DC , but 39:50.467 --> 39:52.578 then we've had a lot of conversations 39:52.578 --> 39:54.633 with state leadership and what we've 39:54.633 --> 39:56.800 tried to do is balance out fairness to 39:56.800 --> 39:59.189 the local population with this idea and 39:59.189 --> 40:01.467 this , um , commitment from me that we , 40:01.467 --> 40:03.578 the United States are . The Army must 40:03.578 --> 40:05.800 maintain this land . We need it for our 40:05.800 --> 40:07.911 training . We need it to be ready for 40:07.911 --> 40:10.078 the Indo-Pacific and with the timeline 40:10.078 --> 40:09.729 that you were referencing coming up 40:09.729 --> 40:12.040 very , very , very soon . Well , 40:12.090 --> 40:14.257 frankly , the , the , the negotiations 40:14.257 --> 40:16.257 must occur with the state of Hawaii 40:16.257 --> 40:18.368 because the lease is with the state . 40:18.368 --> 40:20.146 That means negotiating with the 40:20.146 --> 40:22.201 governor , basically . Uh , so those 40:22.201 --> 40:24.257 need to proceed in good faith , as I 40:24.257 --> 40:26.969 would call it . And um so I , I want to 40:27.330 --> 40:31.000 urge you again to resume if they have 40:31.270 --> 40:33.437 been a pause , resume these good faith 40:33.437 --> 40:35.548 negotiations because that's what it's 40:35.548 --> 40:37.270 gonna take for us to come to a 40:37.270 --> 40:39.437 resolution that is going to be fair to 40:39.437 --> 40:41.659 all parties and that certainly includes 40:41.659 --> 40:43.770 with the input of the native Hawaiian 40:43.770 --> 40:45.992 community . Thank you , Mr . Chairman . 40:45.992 --> 40:48.103 Yes , ma'am . Thank you , Senator . I 40:48.103 --> 40:50.326 recognize myself . Uh , good to see you 40:50.326 --> 40:52.492 both . Great to see a North Carolinian 40:52.492 --> 40:54.770 here . Thank you both for your service . 40:54.770 --> 40:56.937 Uh , General Neve , Neve , I was proud 40:56.937 --> 40:58.937 to see the Army's , uh , request of 40:58.937 --> 41:00.937 2400 infantry squad vehicles or the 41:00.937 --> 41:03.100 ISVs in this year's , uh , budget 41:03.100 --> 41:05.211 request . So I think that's the right 41:05.211 --> 41:07.320 step to modernize , um , the squad 41:07.320 --> 41:09.459 vehicles and increase survivability . 41:09.959 --> 41:12.330 Um , they're very impressive . Um , we 41:12.330 --> 41:14.663 even saw them in Western North Carolina , 41:14.663 --> 41:16.929 uh , as the 18th Airborne Corps was out 41:16.929 --> 41:18.969 there for Hurricane Helene , and I 41:18.969 --> 41:21.080 appreciate their work there . So what 41:21.080 --> 41:23.302 are some of your thoughts on multi-year 41:23.302 --> 41:25.358 procurement , uh , for that platform 41:25.580 --> 41:27.691 and also expanding procurement of the 41:27.691 --> 41:31.550 ISV heavy ? Yeah , sure . I , 41:31.659 --> 41:35.120 I , I , uh , support , uh , multi-year 41:35.179 --> 41:37.401 contracts . I mean , it , it helps us , 41:37.401 --> 41:40.090 um , you know , in the , in the , uh , 41:40.100 --> 41:42.433 bargaining process . It helps us in the , 41:42.433 --> 41:44.711 you know , full procurement of it . Um , 41:44.711 --> 41:46.659 the heavy , uh , version , uh , is 41:46.659 --> 41:48.603 going to be able to provide us the 41:48.603 --> 41:50.840 ability to also generate power , uh , 41:51.060 --> 41:53.171 on the battlefield that we're , we're 41:53.171 --> 41:55.227 going to need to have that's running 41:55.227 --> 41:57.227 our command and control centers and 41:57.227 --> 41:56.620 some of our advanced weapons systems . 41:56.699 --> 41:58.820 It's a critical , uh , platform that 41:58.820 --> 42:00.987 we're going to need as well . And look 42:00.987 --> 42:03.209 forward to having that , uh , compete , 42:03.209 --> 42:06.570 uh , you know , um , In the , in the 42:06.570 --> 42:08.903 next rounds . Well , thank you for that . 42:08.903 --> 42:11.669 I look at multi-year , as being a great 42:11.669 --> 42:13.447 way to take better advantage of 42:13.447 --> 42:15.280 taxpayer dollars and use it more 42:15.280 --> 42:17.336 efficiently . I mean if you're doing 42:17.336 --> 42:19.447 one year contracts , it seems kind of 42:19.447 --> 42:21.391 risky to the producer , and we can 42:21.391 --> 42:23.447 drive down the cost per unit if it's 42:23.447 --> 42:25.391 aircraft for the other branches or 42:25.391 --> 42:27.639 yourselves , um , or ISVs . uh , I 42:27.639 --> 42:29.806 think it's a smart way to go forward . 42:29.806 --> 42:31.639 Did you have a comment on that , 42:31.639 --> 42:33.806 Secretary ? Yes , Senator , and , um , 42:33.806 --> 42:35.972 the ISV is actually a success story in 42:35.972 --> 42:35.320 a lot of different ways , uh , 42:35.520 --> 42:37.687 particularly for North Carolina . With 42:37.687 --> 42:39.909 Hendrix Automotive , a racing company , 42:39.909 --> 42:42.020 and one of the things is we , we were 42:42.020 --> 42:44.187 converting over the ISV , which is 80% 42:44.187 --> 42:46.365 a Chevy Colorado , into what is now a 42:46.365 --> 42:48.775 very powerful , beloved military 42:48.775 --> 42:52.055 vehicle , is the rapid iteration of our 42:52.055 --> 42:53.833 soldiers being able to test the 42:53.833 --> 42:55.722 versions and then this automotive 42:55.722 --> 42:57.611 racing company being able to make 42:57.611 --> 42:59.833 changes . in near real time is what got 42:59.833 --> 43:02.055 that vehicle from off the drawing board 43:02.055 --> 43:04.222 into the hands of soldiers , and it is 43:04.222 --> 43:07.021 truly one of the beacons of 43:07.021 --> 43:09.352 transformation that we use for all the 43:09.352 --> 43:11.574 rest of the products that we're working 43:11.574 --> 43:13.574 on is we say we need you to be more 43:13.574 --> 43:15.685 like Hendrix Automotive . Well , it's 43:15.685 --> 43:17.796 certainly a great model . Thank you , 43:17.796 --> 43:19.908 Mr . Secretary . Another question , I 43:19.908 --> 43:21.796 know you've been laser focused on 43:21.796 --> 43:24.019 applying lessons learned from Ukraine . 43:24.019 --> 43:26.241 To the Army Transformation Initiative . 43:26.241 --> 43:28.074 Um , one lesson , uh , that I've 43:28.074 --> 43:29.963 learned is that small UAS , small 43:29.963 --> 43:31.796 drones , they need to be able to 43:31.796 --> 43:33.908 operate in a GPS denied environment , 43:33.908 --> 43:36.074 sometimes with its own counter droning 43:36.074 --> 43:37.963 technology on board . So what's , 43:37.963 --> 43:40.074 what's the Army doing on this front ? 43:40.074 --> 43:39.100 And I'll start with you , Mr . 43:39.110 --> 43:41.360 Secretary . Um , you're absolutely 43:41.360 --> 43:43.582 right , Senator . This is the future of 43:43.582 --> 43:45.416 not only warfare , but just more 43:45.416 --> 43:47.527 generally how humans inflict violence 43:47.527 --> 43:49.638 on each other . This is a risk at our 43:49.638 --> 43:51.860 stadiums , our arenas , our ports , our 43:51.860 --> 43:54.082 borders , um , and not just our , our , 43:54.082 --> 43:56.193 for our nation , but every nation all 43:56.193 --> 43:58.138 at once . As we have the World Cup 43:58.138 --> 44:00.360 coming up , the president and Secretary 44:00.360 --> 43:59.899 of War have been very focused on 43:59.899 --> 44:02.121 partnering with the rest of the federal 44:02.121 --> 44:04.010 government to counter these exact 44:04.010 --> 44:06.177 problems . And so what we , the United 44:06.177 --> 44:08.399 States Army are doing is we have formed 44:08.399 --> 44:10.732 JAA or we are the lead to JAA 401 , the , 44:10.732 --> 44:12.843 the nation's preeminent counter drone 44:13.075 --> 44:15.555 joint task force , and in that we are 44:15.555 --> 44:17.635 testing all sorts of drones and all 44:17.635 --> 44:19.579 sorts of environments , and we are 44:19.579 --> 44:21.635 working with our federal partners to 44:21.635 --> 44:23.746 create training lands where we can do 44:23.746 --> 44:25.913 all of the things you're talking about 44:25.913 --> 44:28.079 with electronic warfare because one of 44:28.079 --> 44:30.191 the problems we as The nation have is 44:30.191 --> 44:32.413 and it's kind of more of an upside than 44:32.413 --> 44:31.892 a downside , but we're not actually in 44:31.892 --> 44:33.892 a war environment and we just don't 44:33.892 --> 44:36.114 want to take the same level of risk for 44:36.114 --> 44:38.281 training and testing as you might do 44:38.281 --> 44:40.802 perhaps in Ukraine or in CENTCO right 44:40.802 --> 44:42.913 now . And so we are actively building 44:42.913 --> 44:44.802 out those ranges on behalf of the 44:44.802 --> 44:46.691 government . Understood . Another 44:46.691 --> 44:48.858 question , Mr . Secretary , you know , 44:48.858 --> 44:50.969 the 18th Airborne Corps has uncovered 44:50.969 --> 44:53.302 some valuable lessons in Scarlet Dragon . 44:53.302 --> 44:55.469 Uh , with the technology testing , one 44:55.469 --> 44:57.469 of which is the need for AI enabled 44:57.469 --> 44:59.635 predictive , uh , logistics software . 44:59.635 --> 45:01.469 Uh , so what's the army doing to 45:01.469 --> 45:03.300 prioritize contested logistics 45:03.300 --> 45:05.459 capabilities specifically for a fight 45:05.459 --> 45:07.681 over long distances like in the Western 45:07.681 --> 45:09.737 Pacific ? Um , we were talking about 45:09.737 --> 45:11.515 Operation Jailbreak where we're 45:11.515 --> 45:13.626 physically breaking down these pieces 45:13.626 --> 45:15.792 of equipment so information can flow . 45:15.792 --> 45:18.015 A parallel exercise that has been going 45:18.015 --> 45:20.237 on is in our business systems . I think 45:20.237 --> 45:22.459 it was about a year and a half ago , we 45:22.459 --> 45:24.459 had over 600 business systems , and 45:24.459 --> 45:23.979 many of them didn't exchange 45:23.979 --> 45:26.090 information . We have collapsed those 45:26.090 --> 45:28.257 down to 200 , which any business owner 45:28.257 --> 45:30.479 would still be horrified at the idea of 45:30.479 --> 45:32.535 200 business systems . We're pushing 45:32.535 --> 45:34.479 them down to hopefully land in the 45:34.479 --> 45:36.701 teens where all of them will be able to 45:36.701 --> 45:38.812 exchange information and that once we 45:38.812 --> 45:40.868 break down those data silos , that's 45:40.868 --> 45:43.035 where we can start to layer in agentic 45:43.035 --> 45:45.201 solutions to help us with planning for 45:45.201 --> 45:47.479 the contested Indo-Pacific environment . 45:47.479 --> 45:46.754 Well , I appreciate both of your work . 45:46.794 --> 45:48.850 You're headed in a great direction . 45:48.850 --> 45:50.850 Thank you . I now recognize Senator 45:50.850 --> 45:52.750 King . Thank you very much , Mr . 45:52.870 --> 45:54.759 Acting Chairman . I thought for a 45:54.759 --> 45:56.814 moment you and I could take over the 45:56.814 --> 45:58.981 committee . Uh , uh , I appreciate the 45:58.981 --> 46:01.037 recognition . Uh , Mr . Chairman , I 46:01.037 --> 46:03.148 want to reiterate a point that , that 46:03.148 --> 46:05.259 is , I think , very significant . For 46:05.259 --> 46:07.481 the first time in my experience on this 46:07.481 --> 46:09.592 committee , we are putting 25% of the 46:09.592 --> 46:11.989 defense budget out of the bipartisan 46:11.989 --> 46:13.711 process . Mr . Secretary , you 46:13.711 --> 46:15.933 mentioned the , uh , I tried to get the 46:15.933 --> 46:17.878 exact words , the Army budget is a 46:17.878 --> 46:21.469 bipartisan project and . 15% of this 46:21.469 --> 46:23.302 budget is in so-called mandatory 46:23.302 --> 46:25.191 spending , a term I've never seen 46:25.191 --> 46:27.080 before in this context , which is 46:27.080 --> 46:29.247 basically reconciliation , which is by 46:29.247 --> 46:32.429 definition a partisan project in terms 46:32.429 --> 46:34.373 of the entire defense budget , the 46:34.373 --> 46:36.830 Golden Dome project , for example , is 46:36.830 --> 46:40.389 in . Uh , this , uh , this new category 46:40.649 --> 46:43.179 that's outside of the bipartisan 46:43.179 --> 46:45.401 process both here in this committee and 46:45.401 --> 46:47.401 in the Appropriations Committee . I 46:47.401 --> 46:50.379 think that's a very dangerous precedent 46:50.379 --> 46:53.600 that's being set , uh , because 46:53.620 --> 46:56.100 basically it is deciding that a 46:56.100 --> 46:58.267 significant part of the defense budget 46:58.267 --> 47:00.979 shall be off limits to the minority 47:00.979 --> 47:02.812 party , whichever it may be at a 47:02.812 --> 47:05.899 particular time . Um , this is a a 47:05.899 --> 47:07.899 significant change in our budgetary 47:07.899 --> 47:10.121 process that Mr . Chairman , I think we 47:10.121 --> 47:12.288 should really have a serious look at . 47:12.288 --> 47:14.510 I don't view this as a partisan issue . 47:14.510 --> 47:16.677 I view this as a , as an institutional 47:16.677 --> 47:18.979 issue , and we are basically ceding , 47:19.260 --> 47:21.489 in this case , 25% of our budgetary 47:21.489 --> 47:25.459 authority that's outside , as I 47:25.459 --> 47:27.570 say , the authority of this committee 47:27.570 --> 47:29.792 and the Appropriations Committee . Uh , 47:29.792 --> 47:32.439 Mr . Secretary , I'm a little , uh , uh , 47:32.449 --> 47:35.260 unsure about the Operation Jailbreak . 47:35.639 --> 47:37.750 You've , you've , uh , by the way , I 47:37.750 --> 47:39.583 compliment you on , on the , the 47:39.583 --> 47:41.361 impulse for this . I think it's 47:41.361 --> 47:43.399 absolutely essential . But you keep 47:43.399 --> 47:45.343 talking about integration and data 47:45.343 --> 47:47.979 silos . That's not right to repair . 47:48.320 --> 47:51.330 Please . What are we , what are we 47:51.330 --> 47:53.386 actually talking about here ? Are we 47:53.386 --> 47:55.552 talking about getting the IP that will 47:55.552 --> 47:58.169 enable us to repair , because I 47:58.169 --> 48:00.225 believed for years that we should be 48:00.225 --> 48:02.290 buying that IP every time we buy a 48:02.290 --> 48:04.530 platform . But it sounds like Operation 48:04.530 --> 48:06.586 Jailbreak is more about data sharing 48:06.586 --> 48:08.969 than it is of the IP on the right to 48:08.969 --> 48:11.929 repair these weapons systems . Exactly 48:11.929 --> 48:14.151 right , Senator . So it is separate and 48:14.151 --> 48:16.373 distinct , uh , slightly related to why 48:16.373 --> 48:18.207 it's important to us , but we're 48:18.207 --> 48:20.373 calling it right to integrate . And so 48:20.373 --> 48:22.540 fundamentally what we are requiring is 48:22.540 --> 48:24.707 each and every system that we use that 48:24.707 --> 48:26.873 creates data needs to create an API or 48:26.873 --> 48:28.985 an SDK , a software development kit , 48:29.209 --> 48:31.431 so that it can push information outside 48:31.431 --> 48:33.719 that closed system , and we can send it 48:33.719 --> 48:35.941 over . We're a network to our and we're 48:35.941 --> 48:38.163 starting with AI's lattice platform for 48:38.163 --> 48:40.163 command and control , but basically 48:40.163 --> 48:41.886 what we are requiring , we are 48:41.886 --> 48:43.997 retroactively going back and creating 48:43.997 --> 48:45.830 these APIs and SDKs , and we are 48:45.830 --> 48:47.997 proactively requiring any new piece of 48:47.997 --> 48:49.997 equipment that we buy to be able to 48:49.997 --> 48:51.663 share information and receive 48:51.663 --> 48:53.830 information so we can get that , and I 48:53.830 --> 48:53.689 think that's salutary , and that's one 48:53.689 --> 48:55.911 of the lessons from Ukraine , I think , 48:55.911 --> 48:58.770 is in vastly increasing the speed of 48:59.010 --> 49:01.530 command and control , but uh , right to 49:01.530 --> 49:04.370 repair is a separate issue and Uh , in 49:04.370 --> 49:06.860 my view , every army depot , every navy 49:06.860 --> 49:10.340 ship , every Air Force hangar should 49:10.340 --> 49:12.739 have a 3D printer . We should not have , 49:13.000 --> 49:15.056 we have a readiness problem , as you 49:15.056 --> 49:17.278 well know , on all of these complicated 49:17.278 --> 49:19.500 machines , whether it's an airplane , a 49:19.500 --> 49:21.500 ship , or a weapons system . And we 49:21.500 --> 49:23.669 shouldn't be waiting for a valve from 49:23.669 --> 49:25.969 the manufacturer , and I hope that 49:26.260 --> 49:29.209 you'll push in the procurement process 49:29.510 --> 49:32.500 for buying the IP so that we can print 49:32.500 --> 49:35.399 our own parts or get our own parts in 49:35.409 --> 49:38.169 in the in the market and not be held up 49:39.030 --> 49:42.239 by the proprietary nature of the of the 49:42.239 --> 49:44.594 IP . On these complicated weapons 49:44.594 --> 49:46.927 systems , are you with me on that ? Yes , 49:46.927 --> 49:49.150 Senator , right to repair . Why it is , 49:49.405 --> 49:51.627 there are a couple of reasons that make 49:51.627 --> 49:53.738 it more important now than ever . One 49:53.738 --> 49:55.905 of the reasons is if our pacing threat 49:55.905 --> 49:57.738 is in the Indo-Pacific and we're 49:57.738 --> 49:59.849 worried about contested logistics for 49:59.849 --> 50:02.072 many and most of the parts , we need to 50:02.072 --> 50:04.238 be able to manufacture them on site or 50:04.238 --> 50:06.405 nearly on site . And with the increase 50:06.405 --> 50:08.516 in advanced manufacturing that's been 50:08.516 --> 50:10.572 going on , we're actually at a place 50:10.572 --> 50:10.409 that we can do that . And so what we , 50:10.459 --> 50:12.348 the army are doing is through our 50:12.348 --> 50:14.570 vantage platform , we are scanning in a 50:14.570 --> 50:16.681 lot of these parts that break often . 50:16.681 --> 50:18.739 We are putting in the digital design 50:18.739 --> 50:20.628 file , and what that is doing for 50:20.628 --> 50:22.961 soldiers is it's actually allowing them . 50:22.961 --> 50:24.517 To access a nearby advanced 50:24.517 --> 50:26.683 manufacturing platform or a 3D printer 50:26.683 --> 50:28.906 and print these parts . And so like the 50:28.906 --> 50:32.054 101st Airborne had 80% of its 777s down , 50:32.395 --> 50:34.506 and many of them were for a part that 50:34.506 --> 50:36.673 it ended up we could 3D print for $8 . 50:36.673 --> 50:38.895 And so we have since fixed that . Delta 50:38.895 --> 50:41.117 Airlines had that availability , they'd 50:41.117 --> 50:43.339 be out of business . So I , I hope that 50:43.339 --> 50:45.395 you'll also talk to your procurement 50:45.395 --> 50:47.562 folks to be sure this is a part of the 50:47.562 --> 50:49.673 acquisition process that we're buying 50:49.673 --> 50:51.839 not only the object , but we're buying 50:51.839 --> 50:53.784 the IP so that we can maintain the 50:53.784 --> 50:56.006 object ourselves . So I , I commend you 50:56.006 --> 50:57.728 for this , but don't stop with 50:57.728 --> 51:00.030 integrating uh software . Let's , let's 51:00.030 --> 51:02.389 keep going on the , on the repair 51:02.389 --> 51:04.445 itself . Yes sir . Thank you . Thank 51:04.445 --> 51:06.800 you , Mr . Chairman . Senator , I add 51:06.800 --> 51:09.120 my commendation . I , I would only say 51:09.120 --> 51:12.120 that right to repair is easier said 51:12.120 --> 51:13.800 than done , and it involves 51:13.800 --> 51:17.060 intellectual property , and I , I wish 51:17.679 --> 51:19.719 everyone the best who's trying to 51:19.719 --> 51:22.120 negotiate this because it's a sticky 51:22.120 --> 51:25.179 wicket . Senator Blumenthal . 51:26.780 --> 51:28.780 Thank you , uh , thank you both for 51:28.780 --> 51:30.947 your service . Thanks for being here . 51:30.947 --> 51:34.810 Um . To the extent that you can 51:34.810 --> 51:36.810 in this setting , could you give me 51:37.050 --> 51:39.161 your assessment of how the Ukrainians 51:39.161 --> 51:41.290 are doing against the Russians ? I 51:41.290 --> 51:43.401 think there is a false narrative that 51:43.401 --> 51:45.689 the Russians are winning . In fact , 51:45.879 --> 51:49.370 the contrary seems to be true , at 51:49.370 --> 51:51.689 least in certain parts of the 51:51.689 --> 51:54.550 battlefield . Certainly the Ukrainians , 51:54.830 --> 51:56.997 I think , are capable of prevailing if 51:56.997 --> 51:59.163 they have sufficient support from us . 51:59.163 --> 52:03.120 What's your assessment ? Um , 52:03.129 --> 52:05.260 Senator , I talked to the Ukrainians 52:05.260 --> 52:07.316 reasonably frequently and definitely 52:07.316 --> 52:09.371 through SAU . The United States Army 52:09.371 --> 52:11.620 has had a presence helping Ukraine 52:11.620 --> 52:13.780 since day one . A lot of our leaders 52:13.780 --> 52:15.447 have developed very long-term 52:15.447 --> 52:17.669 relationships , and it's been a two-way 52:17.669 --> 52:19.724 street . We have learned an enormous 52:19.724 --> 52:21.780 amount from them . When I talk about 52:21.780 --> 52:23.947 Operation Jailbreak , that was because 52:23.947 --> 52:26.058 2 weeks ago we were in Germany , um , 52:26.058 --> 52:27.891 running a joint exercise and the 52:27.891 --> 52:30.058 Ukrainians actually sent some of their 52:30.058 --> 52:32.169 most talented people to help us learn 52:32.169 --> 52:34.224 how they would do the fight , and it 52:34.224 --> 52:34.060 was in that instance that we learned 52:34.060 --> 52:37.196 that . But then on our side , we are 52:37.196 --> 52:39.140 able to see and help with a lot of 52:39.140 --> 52:41.196 their intelligence gathering , and I 52:41.196 --> 52:43.916 think what we are seeing is the 52:43.916 --> 52:47.835 Russians' loss of Starlink has 52:47.835 --> 52:49.835 set them back pretty meaningfully . 52:50.025 --> 52:52.247 They have probably since regathered the 52:52.247 --> 52:54.414 momentum . The Ukrainians have done an 52:54.414 --> 52:56.192 incredible job of starting . To 52:56.192 --> 52:58.358 innovate to larger Group 2 , Group 3 , 52:58.358 --> 53:00.303 and Group 4 drones , which is what 53:00.303 --> 53:02.247 we're seeing where they're able to 53:02.247 --> 53:04.192 reach further into Russia to cause 53:04.192 --> 53:06.414 damage . Um , I think the quick summary 53:06.414 --> 53:08.525 would be what we expect as the United 53:08.525 --> 53:10.303 States Army when we look at the 53:10.303 --> 53:12.581 conflict is continued kind of grinding , 53:12.581 --> 53:14.692 slow success in either direction with 53:14.692 --> 53:16.581 neither side likely able to break 53:16.581 --> 53:18.790 through in the next 18 months . Yeah , 53:19.290 --> 53:21.401 sir , I concur , uh , completely with 53:21.401 --> 53:23.623 the , with the secretary . As I said in 53:23.623 --> 53:25.679 the , in the earlier session , I ran 53:25.679 --> 53:27.846 the training program , uh , you know , 53:27.846 --> 53:30.729 for , for a year . Um , it , uh , you 53:30.729 --> 53:33.909 know , early on , uh , was , was , uh , 53:34.290 --> 53:36.512 eye-opening to see how long , uh , that 53:36.512 --> 53:38.568 they could , uh , they could hold on 53:38.568 --> 53:40.790 and , and what , what they've been able 53:40.790 --> 53:42.901 to do , uh , up to this point , but I 53:42.901 --> 53:44.790 concur with the , the secretary's 53:44.790 --> 53:47.139 assessment . And do we have munitions 53:47.139 --> 53:50.419 that We can provide to them that would 53:50.419 --> 53:53.969 be useful to them . They're buying them 53:54.030 --> 53:56.308 where no one will have to pay for them . 53:56.308 --> 53:58.419 Um , Senator , we , we , I think we'd 53:58.419 --> 54:00.308 prefer to answer that in a closed 54:00.308 --> 54:03.719 setting . Let me ask you , um , In 54:03.719 --> 54:07.330 terms of our defense industrial base , 54:07.840 --> 54:09.784 again , to the extent you can talk 54:09.784 --> 54:11.729 about it in this setting , I think 54:11.729 --> 54:14.169 there is a feeling . Long term over 54:14.169 --> 54:17.429 years that we've failed to 54:17.850 --> 54:21.649 make our Defense production is 54:21.649 --> 54:25.100 nimble and agile . The Ukrainians 54:25.100 --> 54:26.959 certainly have demonstrated both 54:27.479 --> 54:30.580 agility and nimbleness . I've seen them 54:30.580 --> 54:33.860 on my 9 trips to Ukraine visiting . 54:35.020 --> 54:38.320 The drone factories , how they 54:38.439 --> 54:41.540 actually make changes to their products 54:41.540 --> 54:44.060 on the assembly line in real time as 54:44.060 --> 54:46.393 they receive information from the front . 54:46.909 --> 54:50.020 We have nothing like that agility or 54:50.020 --> 54:53.340 nimbleness . Um , can you talk about 54:53.340 --> 54:57.229 what The Department of Defense should 54:57.229 --> 55:00.209 be doing to To make our defense 55:00.209 --> 55:02.639 contractors more responsive to the 55:02.639 --> 55:05.600 needs of our military . So , I can 55:05.600 --> 55:07.489 speak to the first part about our 55:07.489 --> 55:10.479 industrial base , or our army's 23 plus 55:10.479 --> 55:12.879 depots . Uh , we , we've taken a hard 55:12.879 --> 55:15.419 look at , uh , ways across the board , 55:16.000 --> 55:18.278 uh , to invest in this for a long term , 55:18.278 --> 55:20.389 whether it's advanced manufacturing , 55:20.389 --> 55:23.260 it's , it's , uh , uh , uh , land use , 55:23.479 --> 55:26.350 uh , agreements , uh , it's bringing in 55:26.350 --> 55:29.360 private , uh , uh , public partnerships 55:29.360 --> 55:31.520 in , uh , at each of the different 55:31.520 --> 55:33.909 sites . In order to get our industrial 55:33.909 --> 55:36.350 base up to a footing that we know that 55:36.350 --> 55:38.517 we're going to need them at to be able 55:38.517 --> 55:40.683 to produce that scale , whether that's 55:40.683 --> 55:43.139 parts for drones , or parts for our , 55:43.149 --> 55:46.310 uh , our equipment , uh , both in the 55:46.310 --> 55:48.366 fleet that we have now and the fleet 55:48.366 --> 55:50.532 that we're going to look to procure in 55:50.532 --> 55:52.643 the future , the Secretary has pushed 55:52.643 --> 55:55.129 us to ensure that we have the ability 55:56.030 --> 55:58.310 to be able to utilize our organic base 55:58.310 --> 56:00.532 in the equipment that we're going after 56:00.532 --> 56:02.699 in the future . Uh , what , what the , 56:02.699 --> 56:04.921 you know , the , I think the department 56:04.921 --> 56:07.088 writ large , uh , sees the same issues 56:07.088 --> 56:09.560 that , uh , you know , that we , we all 56:09.560 --> 56:12.899 acknowledge , uh , in a , in a , uh , 56:12.909 --> 56:15.310 workforce that , uh , in , uh , in 56:15.310 --> 56:17.477 sites that haven't been fully invested 56:17.477 --> 56:20.810 in over , over decades . And Senator , 56:20.860 --> 56:23.129 I would just echo um what General Le 56:23.129 --> 56:25.351 Neve is saying with , um , we believe a 56:25.351 --> 56:27.407 one time and you all have to balance 56:27.407 --> 56:29.739 the preferences of your constituents 56:29.739 --> 56:31.683 much more than we do . We are more 56:31.683 --> 56:33.850 narrowly focused on soldiers and their 56:33.850 --> 56:35.961 family and lethality , but we believe 56:35.961 --> 56:37.739 the 27 budget would give us the 56:37.739 --> 56:39.906 one-time spending to increase a lot of 56:39.906 --> 56:42.017 our abilities and capabilities on the 56:42.017 --> 56:44.072 OIB , which would make our country a 56:44.072 --> 56:46.350 lot safer . Thank you . Uh , thank you , 56:46.350 --> 56:48.689 Senator , Senator Scott . Thanks to 56:48.689 --> 56:50.856 both of you for being here . Um , so , 56:50.856 --> 56:53.290 Secretary , I have 3 things . Um , the 56:53.290 --> 56:55.770 first is , um , Orlando . Um , you've 56:55.770 --> 56:58.189 got the Army's Program Executive , uh , 56:58.449 --> 57:00.338 executive Office for simulation , 57:00.338 --> 57:02.449 training instrumentation . So located 57:02.449 --> 57:04.810 in Orlando . What's going on ? Are you 57:04.810 --> 57:07.090 gonna make it a lot bigger ? So just 57:07.090 --> 57:09.034 tell me what , what do you think's 57:09.034 --> 57:11.146 gonna be happening there ? We , I was 57:11.146 --> 57:13.368 governor and we put a lot of money into 57:13.368 --> 57:15.534 the simulation program . It's , it's a 57:15.534 --> 57:17.590 big , you know , a big opportunity , 57:17.590 --> 57:17.389 whichever one wants to answer it , but 57:17.649 --> 57:19.816 our goal is to do whatever we can , of 57:19.816 --> 57:21.760 course , to grow it . But we , you 57:21.760 --> 57:23.927 gotta , you have to do what's best for 57:23.927 --> 57:26.038 the army . So , our simulation , uh , 57:26.038 --> 57:27.816 you know , center there is , is 57:27.816 --> 57:29.982 incredible . It's gonna be continue to 57:29.982 --> 57:32.149 be , uh , very , very important . Uh , 57:32.149 --> 57:34.093 as we move forward with , uh , our 57:34.093 --> 57:36.427 modernization program , we are not , uh , 57:36.427 --> 57:38.482 you know , stepping away from , uh , 57:38.610 --> 57:40.777 the incredible capability that we have 57:40.777 --> 57:42.943 there , especially what it provides to 57:42.943 --> 57:44.888 our combat training centers , uh , 57:44.969 --> 57:47.610 provides inside of our , uh , our , our 57:47.610 --> 57:49.666 warfighting exercises that we , uh , 57:49.729 --> 57:52.370 execute at brigade , and all the way up 57:52.370 --> 57:54.314 to core level . There's a critical 57:54.314 --> 57:56.314 component in there that helps us to 57:56.314 --> 57:58.370 continue to modernize that program . 57:58.370 --> 58:00.648 And Senator , what I would say is , um , 58:00.648 --> 58:02.926 simulation is more important than ever . 58:02.926 --> 58:04.814 The ability to take data from the 58:04.814 --> 58:06.926 battlefield , whether it's in Centcom 58:06.926 --> 58:09.037 or what we can get out of Ukraine and 58:09.037 --> 58:11.148 to feed that into the system to learn 58:11.148 --> 58:13.259 and not just for the human learning , 58:13.259 --> 58:15.481 but to train our counter drone models . 58:15.481 --> 58:17.426 To train our drone models as these 58:17.426 --> 58:19.592 eugenic solutions start to flow , data 58:19.592 --> 58:21.648 and simulation will matter more than 58:21.648 --> 58:23.814 ever . And so , um , if I was guessing 58:23.814 --> 58:25.981 kind of as a directional guidance to a 58:25.981 --> 58:28.092 space , I would imagine that vertical 58:28.092 --> 58:30.969 grows over time . Sure . So , um , 58:31.139 --> 58:33.361 sector drones , and you've talked about 58:33.361 --> 58:35.472 a little bit . So we had a , we had a 58:35.472 --> 58:37.695 speaker at one of our lunches the other 58:37.695 --> 58:39.750 day that , um , said that Ukraine is 58:39.750 --> 58:43.179 building 5 million drones a year . And 58:43.179 --> 58:45.346 said , doesn't mean this is accurate , 58:45.346 --> 58:47.568 but said that , you know , our military 58:47.568 --> 58:49.568 will add 10,000 to 150,000 drones a 58:49.568 --> 58:53.540 year . So , So what's , what 58:53.699 --> 58:55.977 do we need ? How fast can we get there ? 58:55.977 --> 58:58.032 Because clearly it sure appears that 58:58.032 --> 59:00.143 then going forward , drones are going 59:00.143 --> 59:02.199 to become more significant , right ? 59:02.199 --> 59:04.310 And it , and it actually is way safer 59:04.310 --> 59:06.477 for our military , our men and women . 59:06.477 --> 59:08.643 So can you just talk about where , how 59:08.643 --> 59:10.866 far , where you want to get ? How , how 59:10.866 --> 59:12.699 are we doing ? Um , absolutely , 59:12.699 --> 59:14.755 Senator . Um , drones will be a core 59:14.755 --> 59:16.977 part of our future combat and no matter 59:16.977 --> 59:19.088 where you go , I think , um , What we 59:19.088 --> 59:21.810 as a nation need to do is create the 59:21.810 --> 59:23.977 mechanisms and the tools to be able to 59:23.977 --> 59:26.449 scale when we need to . We don't need 5 59:26.449 --> 59:28.570 million drones a year right now , nor 59:28.570 --> 59:30.689 would we want them because they will 59:30.689 --> 59:32.969 get outdated likely well before we need 59:32.969 --> 59:35.629 them , but we need to be ready to scale 59:35.629 --> 59:37.959 and have a plan and have the , the 59:37.959 --> 59:40.181 resilience in the supply chain and know 59:40.181 --> 59:42.348 where we're going in that moment . And 59:42.348 --> 59:44.292 so what we are doing is as an army 59:44.292 --> 59:46.348 starting to slowly flex the muscle , 59:46.348 --> 59:48.570 and so we should have some of the first 59:48.570 --> 59:48.560 brushless motors rolling off our 59:48.560 --> 59:50.727 manufacturing lines that we , the army 59:50.727 --> 59:52.893 are owning . We don't expect to supply 59:52.893 --> 59:55.060 the entire industry brushless motors , 59:55.060 --> 59:57.060 but we think it is so important for 59:57.060 --> 59:59.227 future warfare that we need to do that 59:59.227 --> 01:00:01.449 on our depots and . Our arsenals and so 01:00:01.449 --> 01:00:03.671 what we are working on now and owe back 01:00:03.671 --> 01:00:05.671 to this committee is a more fulsome 01:00:05.671 --> 01:00:07.560 plan of how we are looking at the 01:00:07.560 --> 01:00:09.782 entire drone , um , ecosystem and where 01:00:09.782 --> 01:00:12.004 we think we need to have redundancy and 01:00:12.004 --> 01:00:14.227 overinvestment . That makes sense . And 01:00:14.227 --> 01:00:14.034 then you think , and then with the 01:00:14.034 --> 01:00:15.905 ability to ramp up if we need 01:00:16.485 --> 01:00:18.652 unequivocally , yes , yeah . So what , 01:00:18.685 --> 01:00:20.629 so you've had the job for a little 01:00:20.629 --> 01:00:22.685 while . What are you most proud of ? 01:00:22.685 --> 01:00:22.205 What do you , what do you feel good 01:00:22.205 --> 01:00:24.530 about that you're getting done ? Um , 01:00:25.050 --> 01:00:28.169 this sounds like a , um , unnecessarily 01:00:28.169 --> 01:00:31.179 flattering remark , um , to all of you 01:00:31.179 --> 01:00:33.346 and to the American soldiers , but the 01:00:33.346 --> 01:00:35.568 vast majority of people I interact with 01:00:35.568 --> 01:00:37.457 every single day want to make our 01:00:37.457 --> 01:00:39.679 country safer . They want to innovate . 01:00:39.679 --> 01:00:41.846 The American soldier having spent time 01:00:41.846 --> 01:00:43.846 out of uniform at fancy schools and 01:00:43.846 --> 01:00:46.068 working at fancy firms , I would bet on 01:00:46.068 --> 01:00:47.901 them 100% of the time to solve a 01:00:47.901 --> 01:00:50.068 difficult problem . And so I guess now 01:00:50.068 --> 01:00:52.235 18 months in , I am significantly more 01:00:52.235 --> 01:00:54.709 optimistic that all of these massive 01:00:54.709 --> 01:00:57.010 challenges and this inflection point 01:00:57.179 --> 01:00:59.235 that is occurring all over the world 01:00:59.235 --> 01:01:01.457 all at once , that we're going to win , 01:01:01.457 --> 01:01:03.290 that we will do it with whatever 01:01:03.290 --> 01:01:05.235 resources you give us and that the 01:01:05.235 --> 01:01:07.179 American soldier will come out the 01:01:07.179 --> 01:01:09.179 other end even . More lethal , more 01:01:09.179 --> 01:01:11.290 ferocious , and hopefully less likely 01:01:11.290 --> 01:01:11.284 to be needed because every adversary 01:01:11.284 --> 01:01:13.340 will know that , um , they will lose 01:01:13.340 --> 01:01:15.506 that fight and , um , 18 months in , I 01:01:15.506 --> 01:01:17.617 can say I'm more positive than when I 01:01:17.617 --> 01:01:19.506 started . Great . Are both of you 01:01:19.506 --> 01:01:21.506 comfortable , you're confident that 01:01:21.506 --> 01:01:23.728 you're continuing to get the , the best 01:01:23.728 --> 01:01:23.165 leaders around you to be able to make 01:01:23.165 --> 01:01:25.498 sure we , we have the most lethal force ? 01:01:26.790 --> 01:01:30.659 I am 100% confident , sir . I would 01:01:30.659 --> 01:01:34.500 say , um , the army for my mere 3.5 01:01:34.500 --> 01:01:36.500 years in and then getting to see it 01:01:36.500 --> 01:01:38.611 from a different vantage point , uh , 01:01:38.611 --> 01:01:40.500 its superpower is that it creates 01:01:40.500 --> 01:01:42.500 incredible leaders at all levels of 01:01:42.500 --> 01:01:45.030 echelon , and I would have absolutely 01:01:45.030 --> 01:01:47.252 no doubt that if you took out 50 at any 01:01:47.252 --> 01:01:49.252 given point , we could replace them 01:01:49.252 --> 01:01:51.141 immediately and the army would go 01:01:51.141 --> 01:01:53.474 rolling along like it has for 250 years . 01:01:53.474 --> 01:01:55.586 Thanks . Thanks , both of you . Thank 01:01:55.586 --> 01:01:57.752 you , Senator Scott . Senator Warren . 01:01:58.010 --> 01:02:00.121 Thank you , Mr . Chairman . We need a 01:02:00.121 --> 01:02:03.770 military right to repair law . Got an 01:02:03.770 --> 01:02:05.937 example today , and that is Black Hawk 01:02:05.937 --> 01:02:08.719 helicopters . There's a tiny knob that 01:02:08.719 --> 01:02:11.449 pilots need to scroll through for 01:02:11.449 --> 01:02:14.010 information , and every month about 4 01:02:14.010 --> 01:02:16.699 of them break . The army could replace 01:02:16.699 --> 01:02:20.459 them for about $15 but because the Army 01:02:20.459 --> 01:02:22.699 does not have the right to repair the 01:02:22.699 --> 01:02:26.120 whole helicopter goes offline and the 01:02:26.120 --> 01:02:29.860 contractor charges $47,000 to 01:02:29.860 --> 01:02:32.219 replace the entire screen . Let that 01:02:32.219 --> 01:02:34.739 sink in $15 or 01:02:34.739 --> 01:02:38.040 $47,000 . Now 01:02:38.379 --> 01:02:40.323 Secretary Driscoll , you and other 01:02:40.323 --> 01:02:42.546 military leaders have repeatedly said . 01:02:42.909 --> 01:02:45.320 That Congress needs to repair , needs 01:02:45.320 --> 01:02:48.159 to pass the right to repair law . And 01:02:48.159 --> 01:02:50.879 last year , both the House and the 01:02:50.879 --> 01:02:54.520 Senate passed reforms , but the big 01:02:54.520 --> 01:02:57.479 defense contractors lobbyists killed it 01:02:57.479 --> 01:03:00.360 behind closed doors . So let's talk out 01:03:00.360 --> 01:03:03.760 in the open about what those lobbyists 01:03:03.760 --> 01:03:05.816 are claiming . Let's just get it out 01:03:05.816 --> 01:03:08.639 here . Number one . They say 01:03:08.639 --> 01:03:10.528 contractors can't hand over their 01:03:10.528 --> 01:03:12.800 intellectual property and data because 01:03:12.800 --> 01:03:15.679 the army would steal it . Secretary 01:03:15.679 --> 01:03:17.919 Driscoll , what do you say to big 01:03:17.919 --> 01:03:20.030 contractors that claim the Army can't 01:03:20.030 --> 01:03:21.863 be trusted with sensitive data ? 01:03:23.469 --> 01:03:25.629 Senator , I would say one of the more 01:03:25.629 --> 01:03:27.740 preposterous things I've heard in the 01:03:27.740 --> 01:03:30.018 last 18 months , but you have heard it . 01:03:30.018 --> 01:03:32.073 I have heard it often , is that we , 01:03:32.073 --> 01:03:34.073 the United States Army , would take 01:03:34.073 --> 01:03:36.296 this data and do something nefarious at 01:03:36.296 --> 01:03:38.407 worst or at perhaps best from a moral 01:03:38.407 --> 01:03:40.351 perspective , we would haphazardly 01:03:40.351 --> 01:03:42.518 handle it . The United States Army and 01:03:42.518 --> 01:03:44.240 the Pentagon in particular are 01:03:44.240 --> 01:03:45.962 exceptionally good at handling 01:03:45.962 --> 01:03:48.185 sensitive data , and we have incredible 01:03:48.185 --> 01:03:50.296 processes in place . I would say more 01:03:50.296 --> 01:03:52.518 so than any other organization . And so 01:03:52.518 --> 01:03:55.804 my My reply is and has always been we 01:03:55.804 --> 01:03:57.915 don't want to take any data , we just 01:03:57.915 --> 01:04:00.844 want to purchase it . OK , so let's do 01:04:00.844 --> 01:04:02.844 another one . Big contractors claim 01:04:02.844 --> 01:04:04.965 that DOD doesn't need right to repair 01:04:04.965 --> 01:04:07.604 reforms because you already have all of 01:04:07.604 --> 01:04:09.524 the authority you need to access 01:04:09.524 --> 01:04:12.485 technical data for repairs . Now it 01:04:12.485 --> 01:04:14.614 turns out when you look at that 01:04:14.614 --> 01:04:16.725 existing legal authority , it 01:04:16.725 --> 01:04:19.854 explicitly says that technical data 01:04:19.854 --> 01:04:22.284 does not include computer software . 01:04:22.879 --> 01:04:26.520 Secretary Driscoll , it's 2026 . Most 01:04:26.520 --> 01:04:30.080 weapons run on software . If the Army 01:04:30.080 --> 01:04:32.360 can't use software to repair its own 01:04:32.360 --> 01:04:34.439 equipment and weapons , is that a 01:04:34.439 --> 01:04:36.879 problem for readiness ? Unequivocally , 01:04:36.919 --> 01:04:39.679 yes , yes . So in fact , for example , 01:04:39.840 --> 01:04:42.879 the Army is already unable to repair 01:04:42.879 --> 01:04:44.919 the Avenger air defense system . 01:04:45.260 --> 01:04:47.600 Because it doesn't have the software it 01:04:47.600 --> 01:04:50.899 needs , so right to repair must include 01:04:51.120 --> 01:04:54.199 software . Let's do one more . Big 01:04:54.199 --> 01:04:56.830 contractors have floated the idea of 01:04:56.830 --> 01:04:59.550 data as a service , which is really 01:04:59.550 --> 01:05:03.040 just code for pay per view . It means 01:05:03.040 --> 01:05:06.199 that the department is metered and 01:05:06.199 --> 01:05:09.790 billed every single time they access 01:05:09.790 --> 01:05:12.239 materials , and it's pretty easy to see 01:05:12.239 --> 01:05:14.040 how costs would add up in those 01:05:14.040 --> 01:05:17.360 circumstances since one contractor is 01:05:17.360 --> 01:05:20.955 already charging the Air Force . $900 01:05:20.955 --> 01:05:24.415 a page for upgrades to its maintenance 01:05:24.415 --> 01:05:27.254 manuals . Secretary Driscoll , aside 01:05:27.254 --> 01:05:30.895 from the cost of pay per view , what 01:05:30.895 --> 01:05:34.114 happens if the Army is trying to repair 01:05:34.114 --> 01:05:36.534 a piece of broken equipment in a remote 01:05:36.534 --> 01:05:39.770 area ? And it has to keep messaging the 01:05:39.770 --> 01:05:42.739 contractor to get access to the manual , 01:05:43.639 --> 01:05:45.600 Senator , this is what happens 01:05:45.600 --> 01:05:47.767 frequently , whether the specifics are 01:05:47.767 --> 01:05:49.989 true today or it's directionally true . 01:05:49.989 --> 01:05:52.080 Directionally our soldiers struggle 01:05:52.080 --> 01:05:53.858 mightily . To keep a lot of our 01:05:53.858 --> 01:05:56.080 equipment online , and this is not in a 01:05:56.080 --> 01:05:58.247 moment of conflict . That could be the 01:05:58.247 --> 01:06:00.024 decisive point between us being 01:06:00.024 --> 01:06:02.247 successful somewhere 6000 miles away in 01:06:02.247 --> 01:06:04.469 the Indo-Pacific or failing our mission 01:06:04.469 --> 01:06:06.636 if we can't repair our own equipment . 01:06:06.636 --> 01:06:08.580 Yeah , you know , it is a reminder 01:06:08.580 --> 01:06:11.074 we've got to have this access , and I 01:06:11.074 --> 01:06:13.241 just want to say this business of data 01:06:13.241 --> 01:06:15.352 as a service is just one more attempt 01:06:15.352 --> 01:06:17.518 to try to gouge American taxpayers and 01:06:17.518 --> 01:06:20.625 put our service members at risk . Last 01:06:20.625 --> 01:06:22.850 question , Secretary Driscoll . Does 01:06:22.850 --> 01:06:25.290 the Army need Congress to pass right to 01:06:25.290 --> 01:06:27.729 repair reforms in this year's National 01:06:27.729 --> 01:06:30.129 Defense Authorization Act , or should 01:06:30.129 --> 01:06:32.530 we let the big contractors kill it once 01:06:32.530 --> 01:06:34.752 again behind closed doors ? What do you 01:06:34.752 --> 01:06:36.863 think here ? This one is known as low 01:06:36.863 --> 01:06:40.520 and slow over the plate . Yes , 01:06:41.489 --> 01:06:43.378 this is one of the most important 01:06:43.378 --> 01:06:45.378 things , and I don't say this to be 01:06:45.378 --> 01:06:47.409 over the top . I'm not intending to 01:06:47.409 --> 01:06:50.000 play into the set of questions . We , 01:06:50.010 --> 01:06:52.370 the United States Army and we , the 01:06:52.370 --> 01:06:54.426 broader military , must maintain the 01:06:54.426 --> 01:06:56.537 right to be able to take advantage of 01:06:56.537 --> 01:06:58.481 all of the new tools because if we 01:06:58.481 --> 01:07:00.592 don't , our adversaries will , and we 01:07:00.592 --> 01:07:02.592 will be put at a meaningfully worse 01:07:02.592 --> 01:07:04.995 position . Yeah , well , I'm very Much 01:07:04.995 --> 01:07:07.273 appreciate the job you're trying to do , 01:07:07.273 --> 01:07:09.495 General . I'm sorry I didn't get to ask 01:07:09.495 --> 01:07:11.495 you the same set of questions , but 01:07:11.495 --> 01:07:13.662 I've got a tough chairman who shuts me 01:07:13.662 --> 01:07:15.828 down when I go over . She's 15 seconds 01:07:15.828 --> 01:07:17.884 over , and I'm pretty hot about it . 01:07:17.884 --> 01:07:20.051 Exactly . I can tell , but I really do 01:07:20.051 --> 01:07:22.273 appreciate all you're trying to do . We 01:07:22.273 --> 01:07:24.495 need to help you out with getting right 01:07:24.495 --> 01:07:24.455 to repair through this year . There 01:07:24.455 --> 01:07:26.511 will be an opportunity , of course , 01:07:26.511 --> 01:07:29.239 for a second round , and And questions 01:07:29.239 --> 01:07:31.017 for the record . Also , Senator 01:07:31.017 --> 01:07:33.072 Sullivan , you're recognized . Thank 01:07:33.072 --> 01:07:35.072 you , Mr . Chairman , and I want to 01:07:35.072 --> 01:07:37.128 commend Senator Warren on her , uh , 01:07:37.128 --> 01:07:39.183 great work on right to repair . It's 01:07:39.183 --> 01:07:41.183 very bipartisan . Get that over the 01:07:41.183 --> 01:07:43.350 goal line . Thanks for your leadership 01:07:43.350 --> 01:07:45.572 on that . Um , Mr . Secretary-General , 01:07:45.572 --> 01:07:47.739 good to see you both . Thanks for your 01:07:47.739 --> 01:07:49.739 visit to Alaska and I heard it went 01:07:49.739 --> 01:07:51.850 well . I wanna talk about some Alaska 01:07:51.850 --> 01:07:53.795 issues . Appreciate that . Sorry I 01:07:53.795 --> 01:07:55.961 wasn't there to show you around . Uh , 01:07:55.961 --> 01:07:57.906 but I thank you for that . I don't 01:07:57.906 --> 01:07:59.961 thank you for stealing one of my top 01:07:59.961 --> 01:07:59.469 staffers though , who's sitting behind 01:07:59.469 --> 01:08:02.929 you , but , um , I will , uh , forgive 01:08:02.929 --> 01:08:05.449 you . It's it's for the betterment of 01:08:05.449 --> 01:08:07.616 America , I guess , that I had to lose 01:08:07.616 --> 01:08:09.838 Jimmy . Who's , uh , done a great job . 01:08:09.838 --> 01:08:12.171 I'm sure he's doing a great job for you . 01:08:12.171 --> 01:08:14.709 Um . A couple of things I want to talk 01:08:14.709 --> 01:08:18.089 about . Fort Greeley , uh , you know , 01:08:18.169 --> 01:08:21.609 the UAPAC , um , commander was just out 01:08:21.609 --> 01:08:24.250 there , uh , this past weekend . Uh , 01:08:24.330 --> 01:08:26.129 the forty-ninth Missile Defense 01:08:26.129 --> 01:08:28.296 Battalion does a great job with regard 01:08:28.296 --> 01:08:30.919 to missile defense for America . What 01:08:30.919 --> 01:08:32.919 was your assessment when you're out 01:08:32.919 --> 01:08:35.141 there ? One thing that frustrates me is 01:08:35.141 --> 01:08:37.479 that we have , um , You know , 20 empty 01:08:37.479 --> 01:08:41.000 silos out there still . Uh , we need 01:08:41.000 --> 01:08:44.029 more missiles in those silos . That's , 01:08:44.040 --> 01:08:46.439 uh , I'm sure you know the motto of the 01:08:46.439 --> 01:08:48.495 49th Missile Defense Battalion , the 01:08:48.520 --> 01:08:50.759 300 , protecting the 300 million . 01:08:50.839 --> 01:08:53.061 They're literally modern-day Spartans . 01:08:53.061 --> 01:08:55.228 Do you have any sense on that and when 01:08:55.228 --> 01:08:57.561 we can celebrate , uh , accelerate ? Uh , 01:08:57.720 --> 01:08:59.887 more missile defense at Fort Greeley , 01:08:59.887 --> 01:09:01.942 General , Mr . Secretary , either of 01:09:01.942 --> 01:09:03.998 you . Yes , sir , I , I , you know , 01:09:03.998 --> 01:09:05.998 we're tied in with , uh , the , the 01:09:05.998 --> 01:09:08.109 team that's looking at that . I can't 01:09:08.109 --> 01:09:08.079 give you a sense of , you know , how 01:09:08.079 --> 01:09:10.878 fast those are , uh , gonna be , you 01:09:10.878 --> 01:09:12.878 know , you know , more assets moved 01:09:12.878 --> 01:09:15.100 there . I can't tell you how critical , 01:09:15.208 --> 01:09:17.719 uh , that site is , uh , you know , for , 01:09:17.878 --> 01:09:20.249 for all of our defense . Yeah , maybe , 01:09:20.559 --> 01:09:22.726 uh , maybe a cue for , if you can give 01:09:22.726 --> 01:09:24.892 me more details on that . We need , we 01:09:24.892 --> 01:09:26.615 need , uh , to accelerate more 01:09:26.615 --> 01:09:28.948 ground-based missile interceptors there . 01:09:28.948 --> 01:09:31.281 I think it's just a no-brainer . Um , I , 01:09:31.281 --> 01:09:33.979 I spent the weekend , uh , in Fairbanks , 01:09:34.060 --> 01:09:37.520 Alaska at the US Chamber of Commerce , 01:09:37.729 --> 01:09:40.060 uh , in Fairbanks Military Appreciation 01:09:40.060 --> 01:09:42.160 Dinner . Uh , Major General , uh , 01:09:42.180 --> 01:09:44.402 Cogbill was there , the 11th Airborne , 01:09:44.779 --> 01:09:47.959 um , division commander . By the way , 01:09:48.020 --> 01:09:50.620 the morale there seems very high . They 01:09:50.620 --> 01:09:53.259 were whipping every other Army unit in 01:09:53.259 --> 01:09:55.315 these competitions . They went , the 01:09:55.410 --> 01:09:57.410 general and his sergeant Major went 01:09:57.410 --> 01:09:59.410 through all these things , the 11th 01:09:59.410 --> 01:10:01.410 Airborne's doing . No offense , the 01:10:01.410 --> 01:10:03.021 82nd , but there's some good 01:10:03.021 --> 01:10:05.132 competition going on right now . Um , 01:10:05.399 --> 01:10:07.779 And I'm very proud of that unit . Um , 01:10:08.160 --> 01:10:10.104 one of the first things I did as a 01:10:10.104 --> 01:10:12.216 brand new senator , I was here only a 01:10:12.216 --> 01:10:13.882 couple of weeks and the Obama 01:10:13.882 --> 01:10:15.882 administration was gonna cut 40,000 01:10:15.882 --> 01:10:18.104 additional active duty troops . This is 01:10:18.104 --> 01:10:20.104 in 2015 , which they did , and they 01:10:20.104 --> 01:10:22.271 were going to get rid of the 425 , the 01:10:22.271 --> 01:10:24.327 only airborne brigade combat team in 01:10:24.327 --> 01:10:26.549 the entire Indo-Pacific . I fought like 01:10:26.549 --> 01:10:28.771 crazy as a new senator to , Stop that , 01:10:28.771 --> 01:10:31.020 which I did . Put a hold on everybody 01:10:31.029 --> 01:10:34.419 in the army's , uh , system 01:10:35.000 --> 01:10:37.299 until we got them to , uh , to 01:10:37.399 --> 01:10:39.455 relinquish cutting the 425 . And now 01:10:39.455 --> 01:10:41.621 the 425 is , as you know , part of the 01:10:41.621 --> 01:10:44.479 11th Airborne . Um , the 17 additional 01:10:44.479 --> 01:10:46.590 Hlos , my understanding are coming to 01:10:46.590 --> 01:10:48.646 the 11th Airborne Division . Can you 01:10:48.646 --> 01:10:50.701 give me an update on that ? And then 01:10:50.701 --> 01:10:53.035 some of the good work that's being done . 01:10:53.035 --> 01:10:55.090 Uh , with regard to drones , you may 01:10:55.090 --> 01:10:57.035 have seen the University of Alaska 01:10:57.035 --> 01:10:59.146 Fairbanks just had a partnership with 01:10:59.146 --> 01:11:02.310 DIU on the drone capabilities that we 01:11:02.310 --> 01:11:05.430 have at the university . And , um , if 01:11:05.430 --> 01:11:07.541 you can give me an update both on the 01:11:07.541 --> 01:11:10.589 Hilos coming to Fort Wainwright as part 01:11:10.589 --> 01:11:12.700 of the 11th Airborne Division and the 01:11:12.700 --> 01:11:14.990 work that we want to scale up that the 01:11:14.990 --> 01:11:17.939 11th Airborne's doing on uh drone 01:11:17.939 --> 01:11:21.189 software and other capabilities . And 01:11:21.189 --> 01:11:23.022 then , uh , as you answer that , 01:11:23.022 --> 01:11:25.189 because I want to be respectful , uh , 01:11:25.189 --> 01:11:27.189 Mr . Secretary , one thing , uh , I 01:11:27.189 --> 01:11:29.133 want to make sure we do maybe in a 01:11:29.133 --> 01:11:31.300 phone call , I'm sorry , we didn't get 01:11:31.300 --> 01:11:33.467 to meet before this . There was a memo 01:11:33.467 --> 01:11:35.522 on the A-day contracting awards that 01:11:35.522 --> 01:11:37.578 came out from the , uh , some DAS in 01:11:37.578 --> 01:11:37.310 the army . It looks like it goes 01:11:37.310 --> 01:11:39.199 against previous commitments that 01:11:39.199 --> 01:11:41.990 senior army leadership made , uh , with 01:11:41.990 --> 01:11:44.750 regard to , to me . So I'd like to 01:11:44.750 --> 01:11:47.870 offline to Talk about that this this 01:11:47.870 --> 01:11:49.814 memo is causing a heck of a lot of 01:11:49.814 --> 01:11:51.981 confusion and I think it's misguided . 01:11:51.981 --> 01:11:55.810 45 seconds , but so with that . I'll 01:11:55.810 --> 01:11:57.921 follow up with you , Mr . Secretary . 01:11:57.921 --> 01:11:59.977 Can you talk about the 11th Airborne 01:11:59.977 --> 01:12:02.199 there , General , and the issues that I 01:12:02.199 --> 01:12:04.477 raised and the great job they're doing ? 01:12:04.477 --> 01:12:04.459 No , sir . Uh , first off , thanks for 01:12:04.459 --> 01:12:06.626 the support of getting the 11th across 01:12:06.626 --> 01:12:08.848 the goal line . My , my daughter served 01:12:08.848 --> 01:12:10.859 in 125 , so , uh , bringing both of 01:12:10.859 --> 01:12:12.970 those units together on , on her 1 01:12:12.970 --> 01:12:15.939 division command , uh , it , it brings 01:12:15.939 --> 01:12:17.828 about the esprit de corps and the 01:12:17.828 --> 01:12:20.259 morale . Uh , that you're seeing across 01:12:20.259 --> 01:12:22.481 that , that division right now . We got 01:12:22.481 --> 01:12:24.370 great leadership up there , sir . 01:12:24.370 --> 01:12:26.592 There's a , there's a lot of good going 01:12:26.592 --> 01:12:28.926 on , uh , inside the division right now , 01:12:28.926 --> 01:12:30.815 especially with , you know , what 01:12:30.815 --> 01:12:32.815 they're doing with the , with drone 01:12:32.815 --> 01:12:35.037 experimentations . We'll take all those 01:12:35.037 --> 01:12:34.640 lessons learned , especially what we're 01:12:34.640 --> 01:12:36.696 learning about just surviving in the 01:12:36.696 --> 01:12:39.399 winter , uh , up there and , yes , sir , 01:12:39.660 --> 01:12:41.771 and what we got to do across the goal 01:12:41.771 --> 01:12:43.716 line . I mean , you take a look at 01:12:43.716 --> 01:12:45.882 batteries alone . We're going to learn 01:12:45.882 --> 01:12:47.938 a lot , uh , from , uh , how quickly 01:12:47.938 --> 01:12:50.049 the cold takes it , takes the battery 01:12:50.049 --> 01:12:52.271 down . It's the same thing that's going 01:12:52.271 --> 01:12:52.009 to happen in the heat , you know , when 01:12:52.009 --> 01:12:53.787 we're in the jungle . So we are 01:12:53.787 --> 01:12:55.731 learning a lot across , across the 01:12:55.731 --> 01:12:57.398 board . And we are moving the 01:12:57.398 --> 01:12:59.565 helicopter . It's part of the aviation 01:12:59.565 --> 01:13:01.787 transformation . Uh , there's some that 01:13:01.787 --> 01:13:04.065 are coming out of , uh , you know , uh , 01:13:04.459 --> 01:13:06.681 further reaches in the Pacific and that 01:13:06.681 --> 01:13:08.848 will come back , uh , into Alaska to , 01:13:08.848 --> 01:13:11.640 to , uh , fully field . The aviation 01:13:11.640 --> 01:13:13.696 brigade up there , we haven't walked 01:13:13.696 --> 01:13:15.751 back from that , and that's , that's 01:13:15.751 --> 01:13:18.029 moving as fast as possible . Thank you , 01:13:18.029 --> 01:13:20.196 General , and you , you can supplement 01:13:20.196 --> 01:13:22.209 your Answer for the record . I 01:13:22.209 --> 01:13:24.098 appreciate your testimony in that 01:13:24.098 --> 01:13:26.209 regard , Senator Peters . Thank you , 01:13:26.209 --> 01:13:28.320 Mr . Chairman and gentlemen . Welcome 01:13:28.320 --> 01:13:30.431 to the hearing here today . Secretary 01:13:30.431 --> 01:13:32.153 Drisco , um , as , uh , as you 01:13:32.153 --> 01:13:34.265 experienced last summer when you were 01:13:34.265 --> 01:13:36.487 up in Michigan , sorry I wasn't able to 01:13:36.487 --> 01:13:35.669 join you . I was out of the country 01:13:35.669 --> 01:13:37.558 during that time , but I know you 01:13:37.750 --> 01:13:41.250 enjoyed seeing exercise northern strike 01:13:41.700 --> 01:13:43.589 in operation and the thousands of 01:13:43.589 --> 01:13:46.209 troops . Both US allies and partner 01:13:46.209 --> 01:13:49.310 service members from over 20 countries 01:13:49.310 --> 01:13:51.366 were at that national all-domain War 01:13:51.366 --> 01:13:53.643 Fighting Center . Um , and as you know , 01:13:53.959 --> 01:13:56.070 uh , the center is comprised of about 01:13:56.070 --> 01:13:59.640 148,000 acres of training space at Camp 01:13:59.640 --> 01:14:02.810 Grayling and 17,000 square miles of 01:14:02.810 --> 01:14:05.009 special use military airspace at the 01:14:05.009 --> 01:14:08.509 Alpena Combat Readiness Training Center . 01:14:08.609 --> 01:14:12.250 It's an incredible place to do a very 01:14:12.250 --> 01:14:14.361 advanced and sophisticated training . 01:14:14.580 --> 01:14:16.358 Uh , and in recognition of this 01:14:16.358 --> 01:14:18.580 unparalleled training environment , the 01:14:18.580 --> 01:14:20.691 department recently designated , uh , 01:14:20.691 --> 01:14:22.747 it has a national range for uncrewed 01:14:22.747 --> 01:14:24.858 aerial systems , uh , training , uh , 01:14:24.858 --> 01:14:27.020 as well . So , my question is , with 01:14:27.020 --> 01:14:29.520 this new designation , How is the Army 01:14:29.520 --> 01:14:32.319 leveraging exercises like Northern 01:14:32.319 --> 01:14:34.799 Strike for realistic drone and counter 01:14:34.799 --> 01:14:37.759 drone warfare , and are you exploring 01:14:37.759 --> 01:14:40.560 greater Army involvement at the 01:14:40.560 --> 01:14:42.671 National All Domain Warfare Center in 01:14:42.671 --> 01:14:44.560 Michigan to leverage these unique 01:14:44.560 --> 01:14:47.274 capabilities for new uncrewed ? Range 01:14:47.274 --> 01:14:50.595 designations . Senator , Camp Grayling 01:14:50.595 --> 01:14:52.995 is an incredible asset . Our nation , I 01:14:52.995 --> 01:14:55.162 think , has underutilized for the last 01:14:55.162 --> 01:14:57.051 couple of decades . The amount of 01:14:57.051 --> 01:14:59.273 airspace that we have there to test and 01:14:59.273 --> 01:15:02.194 to train is unmatched or nearly 01:15:02.194 --> 01:15:04.416 unmatched in all the places I've gone . 01:15:05.259 --> 01:15:07.481 What we must do as a nation is continue 01:15:07.481 --> 01:15:09.703 to get a lot of flight data and we have 01:15:09.703 --> 01:15:11.815 to get learnings that can be fed into 01:15:11.815 --> 01:15:14.100 systems and um Camp Grayling is at the 01:15:14.100 --> 01:15:16.267 top of our list to expand our presence 01:15:16.267 --> 01:15:18.489 there . And then if you think about the 01:15:18.489 --> 01:15:20.600 manufacturing capabilities of Detroit 01:15:20.600 --> 01:15:22.656 in particular , when we were there , 01:15:22.656 --> 01:15:24.711 what they were capable of doing with 01:15:24.711 --> 01:15:27.044 drones and having created a drone corps . 01:15:27.044 --> 01:15:29.267 Corridor for training and testing for a 01:15:29.267 --> 01:15:31.489 lot of commercial companies . It is the 01:15:31.489 --> 01:15:33.822 exact type of place where we , the army , 01:15:33.822 --> 01:15:33.306 want to grow our presence because what 01:15:33.306 --> 01:15:36.425 we have learned is we can nearly never 01:15:36.425 --> 01:15:38.226 be the cutting edge of these 01:15:38.226 --> 01:15:40.504 technologies . They just move too fast . 01:15:40.504 --> 01:15:42.670 And so we want our soldiers co-located 01:15:42.670 --> 01:15:44.616 with venture-backed startups and 01:15:44.616 --> 01:15:46.783 venture-backed founders . So that they 01:15:46.783 --> 01:15:48.838 can both get the excitement but also 01:15:48.838 --> 01:15:50.672 the , the forward edge of what's 01:15:50.672 --> 01:15:52.727 possible , um , and we found that at 01:15:52.727 --> 01:15:54.894 Camp Grayling in , um , in the rest of 01:15:54.894 --> 01:15:56.949 Michigan . Well , great . We'll look 01:15:56.949 --> 01:15:59.116 forward to continuing to work with you 01:15:59.116 --> 01:15:58.941 to expand that and appreciate your , 01:15:59.062 --> 01:16:01.118 your comments , Secretary Driscoll . 01:16:01.981 --> 01:16:03.759 This committee has consistently 01:16:03.759 --> 01:16:05.870 prioritized environmental stewardship 01:16:05.870 --> 01:16:08.092 through the bipartisan national defense 01:16:08.092 --> 01:16:11.091 bills by tackling PFASS contamination . 01:16:11.629 --> 01:16:13.907 And prioritizing environmental cleanup . 01:16:14.359 --> 01:16:16.581 So to bring back Camp Grayling into the 01:16:16.581 --> 01:16:18.526 discussion , I have concerns about 01:16:18.790 --> 01:16:21.120 conflicting and inconsistent comments 01:16:21.120 --> 01:16:23.120 by the administration regarding the 01:16:23.120 --> 01:16:25.453 importance of environmental stewardship , 01:16:25.453 --> 01:16:27.231 despite the strong support from 01:16:27.231 --> 01:16:29.044 Committee and others , and I'm 01:16:29.044 --> 01:16:31.155 particularly troubled about what this 01:16:31.155 --> 01:16:32.655 means for PFAST cleanup at 01:16:32.655 --> 01:16:34.725 installations like Camp Grayling , 01:16:34.845 --> 01:16:37.012 which you just mentioned , which is an 01:16:37.012 --> 01:16:39.234 amazing facility , but clearly has some 01:16:39.234 --> 01:16:41.178 issues that we need to deal with , 01:16:41.178 --> 01:16:42.845 particularly with those local 01:16:42.845 --> 01:16:45.178 communities . So with that in mind , uh , 01:16:45.178 --> 01:16:47.067 uh , do I have your commitment to 01:16:47.067 --> 01:16:49.123 prioritize environmental programs to 01:16:49.123 --> 01:16:51.123 include the PFAST , uh , cleanup at 01:16:51.123 --> 01:16:52.845 installations like , uh , Camp 01:16:52.845 --> 01:16:54.789 Grantling in Michigan , as well as 01:16:54.789 --> 01:16:56.956 across country . But if you could talk 01:16:56.956 --> 01:16:56.629 about Camp Grandling specifically , I 01:16:56.629 --> 01:16:58.685 certainly would appreciate it . Um , 01:16:58.685 --> 01:17:00.573 Senator , very broadly , um , you 01:17:00.573 --> 01:17:02.685 definitely have the Army's commitment 01:17:02.685 --> 01:17:04.851 to be good stewards in the communities 01:17:04.851 --> 01:17:06.962 where we live . Um , we are , we , we 01:17:06.962 --> 01:17:09.185 aspire to be very thoughtful , um , and 01:17:09.185 --> 01:17:11.185 almost like the Boy Scouts where we 01:17:11.185 --> 01:17:13.296 leave the areas , we , um , train and 01:17:13.296 --> 01:17:12.799 live better than when we found them . 01:17:13.060 --> 01:17:14.949 And so very broadly you have that 01:17:14.949 --> 01:17:17.282 commitment and then specifically , I'll , 01:17:17.282 --> 01:17:19.504 I'll follow back up with your office on 01:17:19.504 --> 01:17:21.449 PFASS at Camp Grayling . Great , I 01:17:21.449 --> 01:17:23.839 appreciate that . The , um , uh , this 01:17:23.839 --> 01:17:25.950 is really to both of you , uh , the , 01:17:25.950 --> 01:17:28.117 the army , as you both know , conducts 01:17:28.117 --> 01:17:30.172 critical work to design , test , and 01:17:30.172 --> 01:17:32.339 engineer the next generation of ground 01:17:32.339 --> 01:17:34.228 combat systems in Michigan at the 01:17:34.228 --> 01:17:36.117 Detroit Arsenal to include Ground 01:17:36.117 --> 01:17:38.339 Vehicle System Center , uh , uh , which 01:17:38.339 --> 01:17:40.117 is GVSC . But despite the , the 01:17:40.117 --> 01:17:41.839 critical work that they're I'm 01:17:41.839 --> 01:17:44.006 concerned about workforce changes that 01:17:44.006 --> 01:17:46.061 included reassignment of personnel , 01:17:46.274 --> 01:17:48.330 the removal of collective bargaining 01:17:48.330 --> 01:17:50.385 rights of employees at the arsenal , 01:17:50.385 --> 01:17:52.496 and I'm troubled that these employees 01:17:52.496 --> 01:17:54.663 at the arsenal will no longer have the 01:17:54.663 --> 01:17:56.774 right to bargain for fair wages , for 01:17:56.774 --> 01:17:58.718 job security , and for a dignified 01:17:58.718 --> 01:18:00.885 retirement , quite frankly . So I hope 01:18:00.885 --> 01:18:00.529 I have , uh , both of your commitment 01:18:00.529 --> 01:18:02.970 to look seriously into these issues and 01:18:02.970 --> 01:18:05.081 ensure that the changes are not going 01:18:05.081 --> 01:18:07.137 to harm the technical teams that are 01:18:07.137 --> 01:18:09.137 there and risk overburdening , uh , 01:18:09.137 --> 01:18:11.359 what are really highly specialized in a 01:18:11.359 --> 01:18:13.359 valuable workforce . If you want to 01:18:13.359 --> 01:18:15.470 comment , uh , generally about that , 01:18:15.470 --> 01:18:17.692 but certainly would have , I don't know 01:18:17.692 --> 01:18:16.970 how familiar you are with what's 01:18:16.970 --> 01:18:19.137 happening in the Detroit Arsenal , but 01:18:19.137 --> 01:18:18.979 if you could talk about that , I'd 01:18:18.979 --> 01:18:22.279 certainly appreciate it . Yeah , sir , 01:18:22.330 --> 01:18:24.799 you do have , uh , I speak for , so I , 01:18:24.890 --> 01:18:27.001 and I speak for the secretary as well 01:18:27.001 --> 01:18:29.112 that our commitment , uh , you know , 01:18:29.112 --> 01:18:31.223 as we look at our , our human capital 01:18:31.223 --> 01:18:33.390 and all of our , our , uh , you know , 01:18:33.390 --> 01:18:35.557 key infrastructure that we're doing it 01:18:35.557 --> 01:18:37.612 with dignity , uh , and , uh , and , 01:18:37.612 --> 01:18:40.049 and care as we try to balance where the 01:18:40.049 --> 01:18:42.839 workforce is across , uh , our , uh , 01:18:42.939 --> 01:18:46.689 our base . Secretary , thank you . 01:18:48.850 --> 01:18:51.072 We'll follow up on more . Thank you . I 01:18:51.072 --> 01:18:54.549 appreciate that . Good afternoon , 01:18:54.589 --> 01:18:56.700 gentlemen . Uh , Mr . Secretary , I'd 01:18:56.700 --> 01:18:58.867 like to talk a little bit about , uh , 01:18:58.867 --> 01:19:01.145 how critical it is for our warfighters , 01:19:01.145 --> 01:19:03.311 uh , to be able to repair and maintain 01:19:03.311 --> 01:19:05.311 their own equipment , especially in 01:19:05.311 --> 01:19:07.145 forward deployed areas , and how 01:19:07.145 --> 01:19:08.811 important it is for combatant 01:19:08.811 --> 01:19:10.867 commanders , uh , and commanders who 01:19:10.867 --> 01:19:10.750 are closest to the fight to have the 01:19:10.750 --> 01:19:13.069 flexibility , the authority and the 01:19:13.069 --> 01:19:15.029 funding to not just acquire the 01:19:15.029 --> 01:19:17.629 equipment that they need quickly , but 01:19:17.629 --> 01:19:19.740 then sustain , maintain , and in some 01:19:19.740 --> 01:19:21.851 cases modify that equipment . For the 01:19:21.851 --> 01:19:23.851 needs of the battlefield , um , the 01:19:23.851 --> 01:19:26.129 21st century battlefield moves quickly . 01:19:26.129 --> 01:19:28.073 The software and , uh , electronic 01:19:28.073 --> 01:19:30.470 warfare and spectrum , uh , landscape 01:19:30.470 --> 01:19:32.799 changes constantly , and sometimes the 01:19:32.799 --> 01:19:35.359 design of a device or the architecture 01:19:35.359 --> 01:19:37.990 of a software program may look great in 01:19:37.990 --> 01:19:40.157 a test range or in a lab , but when it 01:19:40.157 --> 01:19:42.046 hits the realities of combat , it 01:19:42.046 --> 01:19:44.212 requires modification and , and , uh , 01:19:44.212 --> 01:19:46.379 sometimes those modifications can take 01:19:46.379 --> 01:19:48.046 years , so . Uh , what is the 01:19:48.046 --> 01:19:50.101 department doing to resolve this and 01:19:50.101 --> 01:19:51.879 what can we do on the Hill in a 01:19:51.879 --> 01:19:53.934 bipartisan manner to make sure we're 01:19:53.934 --> 01:19:53.549 giving you and the warfighters the 01:19:53.549 --> 01:19:55.979 tools , uh , to get that done ? Um , 01:19:56.390 --> 01:19:58.740 Senator , uh , you're absolutely right . 01:19:59.100 --> 01:20:02.319 Warfare has changed , um . So 01:20:02.319 --> 01:20:05.450 dramatically that . One of the few 01:20:05.450 --> 01:20:07.850 things I can guarantee is when we go 01:20:07.850 --> 01:20:11.089 into a large scale conflict within days , 01:20:11.209 --> 01:20:13.330 minutes or hours , we will know where 01:20:13.330 --> 01:20:15.552 we need to change our equipment and our 01:20:15.552 --> 01:20:17.663 tools and our TTPs , and we will have 01:20:17.663 --> 01:20:19.774 to start to act quickly . And so we , 01:20:19.774 --> 01:20:21.810 the United States Army , are not 01:20:21.810 --> 01:20:24.290 Ukraine . We have more assets . We have 01:20:24.290 --> 01:20:26.401 a deeper defense industrial base . We 01:20:26.401 --> 01:20:28.457 have many tools and resources at our 01:20:28.457 --> 01:20:30.512 disposal that make it so that we can 01:20:30.512 --> 01:20:32.568 fight differently , but the thing we 01:20:32.568 --> 01:20:34.734 must do . Like the Ukrainians , and we 01:20:34.734 --> 01:20:36.901 must do like armies all over the world 01:20:36.901 --> 01:20:39.012 is we must be able to adapt quickly . 01:20:39.012 --> 01:20:40.901 And so what we've done is we have 01:20:40.901 --> 01:20:42.846 redone how we purchase things . So 01:20:42.846 --> 01:20:45.068 we've changed our acquisition structure 01:20:45.068 --> 01:20:47.179 to where we are using a model we call 01:20:47.179 --> 01:20:47.115 transformation and contact where our 01:20:47.115 --> 01:20:49.935 soldiers are are getting to test in the 01:20:49.935 --> 01:20:52.157 field our devices in advance , and they 01:20:52.157 --> 01:20:53.768 are helping us work with the 01:20:53.768 --> 01:20:55.491 manufacturers and the software 01:20:55.491 --> 01:20:57.491 developers before they even get the 01:20:57.491 --> 01:20:59.713 first real purchase to get it closer to 01:20:59.713 --> 01:21:01.824 where we know we will need it to be . 01:21:01.824 --> 01:21:03.935 And then the other things that we are 01:21:03.935 --> 01:21:03.339 doing is we are working with you and 01:21:03.339 --> 01:21:05.339 all of your colleagues to do things 01:21:05.339 --> 01:21:08.140 like get statutorily required that we 01:21:08.140 --> 01:21:10.307 always have our right to repair , that 01:21:10.307 --> 01:21:12.418 we always have a right to integrate , 01:21:12.418 --> 01:21:14.529 and what we mean by that is , We must 01:21:14.529 --> 01:21:16.751 have the design files for the parts and 01:21:16.751 --> 01:21:18.918 the pieces where when we're 6000 miles 01:21:18.918 --> 01:21:20.640 from home , we must be able to 01:21:20.640 --> 01:21:22.751 manufacture those changes , or excuse 01:21:22.751 --> 01:21:24.973 me , manufacture those pieces ourselves 01:21:24.973 --> 01:21:27.140 and then for right to integrate . What 01:21:27.140 --> 01:21:29.196 we're doing there is we're basically 01:21:29.196 --> 01:21:31.307 requiring every piece of equipment to 01:21:31.307 --> 01:21:33.473 be open through an API or an SDK so we 01:21:33.473 --> 01:21:35.529 can feed data out . And feed data in 01:21:35.529 --> 01:21:37.640 and what that does is it will stop us 01:21:37.640 --> 01:21:39.751 from having to swivel chair between 6 01:21:39.751 --> 01:21:41.807 to 8 systems , which is what happens 01:21:41.807 --> 01:21:43.918 right now when you go to SAGU and see 01:21:43.918 --> 01:21:45.973 how our army is interacting with the 01:21:45.973 --> 01:21:47.973 Ukrainians . We have 6 to 8 systems 01:21:47.973 --> 01:21:50.196 that we're using . When you engage with 01:21:50.196 --> 01:21:50.040 the Ukrainians , they basically have 1 01:21:50.040 --> 01:21:52.600 or 2 systems at most , and that is what 01:21:52.600 --> 01:21:54.711 we're doing as an army to get ready . 01:21:54.711 --> 01:21:57.540 Hey , sir , if I may 1 , we appreciate 01:21:57.540 --> 01:21:59.818 your , your support on right to repair . 01:21:59.818 --> 01:22:02.069 It's critical for us . One , our 01:22:02.069 --> 01:22:04.347 industrial base can't keep up with our , 01:22:04.347 --> 01:22:06.513 our enduring systems right now , so we 01:22:06.513 --> 01:22:08.736 got to have the ability to make our own 01:22:08.736 --> 01:22:10.902 parts and fix our equipment , and it's 01:22:10.902 --> 01:22:13.013 going to be demonstrably harder to do 01:22:13.013 --> 01:22:15.910 that in a Pacific theater , and we got 01:22:15.910 --> 01:22:18.132 to be able to do this at the edge . G , 01:22:18.189 --> 01:22:20.411 you give it to the soldiers , they will 01:22:20.411 --> 01:22:24.399 fix our stuff immediately fast . Well , 01:22:24.470 --> 01:22:26.637 I agree and we'll keep working on it . 01:22:26.637 --> 01:22:28.637 Uh , Second is air defense . So the 01:22:28.637 --> 01:22:30.914 wars you and I and all of us fought in , 01:22:30.914 --> 01:22:32.970 we didn't really have to worry about 01:22:32.970 --> 01:22:34.692 air to ground threats from our 01:22:34.692 --> 01:22:36.859 adversary . However , as we've learned 01:22:36.859 --> 01:22:38.859 here in the past few years , really 01:22:38.859 --> 01:22:38.750 since ISIS with the drone threat , of 01:22:38.750 --> 01:22:41.083 course now we're seeing it even more so , 01:22:41.339 --> 01:22:43.561 uh , with our fight against Iran is our 01:22:43.561 --> 01:22:45.520 ability to protect ourselves from 01:22:45.520 --> 01:22:47.187 airborne threats . We've done 01:22:47.187 --> 01:22:49.131 fantastically well at intercepting 01:22:49.131 --> 01:22:51.076 threats , whether it be missiles , 01:22:51.076 --> 01:22:53.076 drones , or otherwise . Um , but we 01:22:53.076 --> 01:22:55.131 also have a legacy air defense model 01:22:55.131 --> 01:22:57.076 built largely on active radars and 01:22:57.076 --> 01:22:59.298 active sensing , and that can present a 01:22:59.298 --> 01:23:01.298 serious vulnerability for us with a 01:23:01.298 --> 01:23:03.330 peer to peer fight with China or 01:23:03.330 --> 01:23:05.386 someone else . Uh , what is the army 01:23:05.386 --> 01:23:07.386 doing and what can we do further to 01:23:07.386 --> 01:23:09.441 develop passive sensing so we're not 01:23:09.441 --> 01:23:11.497 emitting locations for , for our air 01:23:11.497 --> 01:23:13.386 defense forces and , um , whether 01:23:13.386 --> 01:23:15.608 that's terrestrial base or space base , 01:23:15.608 --> 01:23:15.370 but , uh , what does that look like 01:23:15.370 --> 01:23:18.049 right now for the army ? Sure , yes , 01:23:18.290 --> 01:23:20.512 across the board . I mean , it's , it's 01:23:20.512 --> 01:23:23.169 a layered defense , uh , and we , we 01:23:23.169 --> 01:23:25.490 are going after , uh , everything to be 01:23:25.490 --> 01:23:27.850 able to protect our , our soldiers and 01:23:27.850 --> 01:23:29.961 really the joint force . It's what we 01:23:29.961 --> 01:23:32.128 do , uh , as part of the joint force . 01:23:32.128 --> 01:23:34.406 So , uh , whether it's , uh , you know , 01:23:34.406 --> 01:23:36.628 new , new systems that we're pushing as 01:23:36.628 --> 01:23:38.906 fast as we can in the CEO to learn how , 01:23:38.906 --> 01:23:40.906 how they're , uh , you know , being 01:23:40.906 --> 01:23:43.017 operated and the success that they're 01:23:43.017 --> 01:23:45.072 having there , or going after , uh , 01:23:45.072 --> 01:23:46.739 space-based , um , you know , 01:23:47.240 --> 01:23:50.009 technology to help us , uh , uh , uh , 01:23:50.020 --> 01:23:52.890 to defeat , uh , what was going to be , 01:23:52.899 --> 01:23:55.649 uh , you know , a , a much larger , uh , 01:23:55.660 --> 01:23:57.771 scale of these systems if we're going 01:23:57.771 --> 01:24:01.069 against a , a near peer . So , Yes , to 01:24:01.069 --> 01:24:03.291 everything that you just said , we have 01:24:03.291 --> 01:24:05.402 to go after for our layered defense . 01:24:05.402 --> 01:24:07.347 And Senator , we're kicking off on 01:24:07.347 --> 01:24:09.458 Thursday at DCI , Defense of Critical 01:24:09.458 --> 01:24:11.569 Infrastructure , meeting down at Fort 01:24:11.569 --> 01:24:13.736 Bragg , and we've invited in a host of 01:24:13.736 --> 01:24:13.629 participants , so power companies , 01:24:13.709 --> 01:24:16.709 utilities , water , and what we are 01:24:16.709 --> 01:24:18.931 doing there is we are hoping to build a 01:24:18.931 --> 01:24:21.042 blueprint for how to defend ourselves 01:24:21.042 --> 01:24:23.042 both in Konas and then export those 01:24:23.042 --> 01:24:25.042 lessons to Oconis . But things like 01:24:25.042 --> 01:24:27.209 acoustic passive sensors , if you look 01:24:27.209 --> 01:24:26.709 at what's happening in Ukraine , 01:24:27.129 --> 01:24:29.351 they're getting an incredible amount of 01:24:29.351 --> 01:24:31.351 value out of that , and we are just 01:24:31.351 --> 01:24:33.462 underinvested in it right now . Thank 01:24:33.462 --> 01:24:32.830 you . Great . Thanks , gentlemen . 01:24:32.919 --> 01:24:35.086 Ready to lead the way . Sure , Senator 01:24:35.086 --> 01:24:37.870 Sheehy , um , Senator King . Thank you , 01:24:37.879 --> 01:24:40.046 Mr . Chair and thanks to the witnesses 01:24:40.046 --> 01:24:42.379 for both the closed setting in this one , 01:24:42.379 --> 01:24:44.379 really good information . Secretary 01:24:44.379 --> 01:24:46.379 Driscoll , I have two topics that I 01:24:46.379 --> 01:24:48.379 would like to raise with you . Um , 01:24:48.379 --> 01:24:50.546 despite a Pentagon budget request that 01:24:50.546 --> 01:24:52.657 would increase the top line by 50% if 01:24:52.657 --> 01:24:54.660 you include both components , and 01:24:54.660 --> 01:24:56.700 despite the fact that that top line 01:24:56.700 --> 01:24:59.740 increase produces significant and I 01:24:59.740 --> 01:25:01.851 think well merited pay raises for our 01:25:01.851 --> 01:25:04.240 troops . There's no pay raise for the 01:25:04.240 --> 01:25:06.296 civilian workforce . There's a bonus 01:25:06.296 --> 01:25:08.351 pool , but there's no guaranteed pay 01:25:08.351 --> 01:25:10.296 raise for the civilian workforce . 01:25:10.296 --> 01:25:13.339 About 25% of the army . You know , 01:25:13.459 --> 01:25:16.419 component is civilian . Um , a huge 01:25:16.419 --> 01:25:18.859 portion of that civilian workforce in 01:25:18.859 --> 01:25:20.859 the army and the other branches are 01:25:20.859 --> 01:25:23.081 veterans , so they've already served in 01:25:23.081 --> 01:25:25.137 a , in , in an active capacity , and 01:25:25.137 --> 01:25:27.192 now they're civilians . And I'm very 01:25:27.192 --> 01:25:29.290 troubled by the absence of a pay 01:25:29.290 --> 01:25:31.346 increase proposal in the president's 01:25:31.346 --> 01:25:33.401 budget . I'm not going to ask you to 01:25:33.401 --> 01:25:35.290 justify it because I know the way 01:25:35.290 --> 01:25:37.179 budgets get done often we ask for 01:25:37.179 --> 01:25:39.123 things and somebody else makes the 01:25:39.123 --> 01:25:41.346 decision , but for those who are paying 01:25:41.346 --> 01:25:43.346 attention to this hearing , who are 01:25:43.346 --> 01:25:45.568 part of the civilian workforce or their 01:25:45.568 --> 01:25:47.679 families , talk to me about the value 01:25:47.679 --> 01:25:49.623 add . That that one quarter of the 01:25:49.623 --> 01:25:51.846 army's workforce that civilian provides 01:25:51.846 --> 01:25:54.589 to our nation's defense , Senator , one 01:25:54.589 --> 01:25:56.950 of my other major lessons in the last 01:25:56.950 --> 01:25:59.589 18 months in the role is how critical , 01:25:59.669 --> 01:26:01.836 crucial , and patriotic our civilian . 01:26:02.169 --> 01:26:04.339 Workers are , to your point , many of 01:26:04.339 --> 01:26:06.339 them are former service members who 01:26:06.339 --> 01:26:08.561 have gotten out , but even the ones who 01:26:08.561 --> 01:26:10.617 aren't , you don't take that job for 01:26:10.617 --> 01:26:12.783 the pay . You take that job because in 01:26:12.783 --> 01:26:14.839 the vast majority of instances , you 01:26:14.839 --> 01:26:16.950 care deeply about our country and you 01:26:16.950 --> 01:26:19.117 want to contribute as an expert . What 01:26:19.117 --> 01:26:21.450 we , the army , have owed our civilians , 01:26:21.450 --> 01:26:23.617 we've tried to do over the last 8 or 9 01:26:23.617 --> 01:26:25.783 months , we've kept a hiring freeze in 01:26:25.783 --> 01:26:28.006 place longer than most , and we did not 01:26:28.006 --> 01:26:30.117 do that because we want to overburden 01:26:30.117 --> 01:26:32.283 the civilian workforce . We did not do 01:26:32.283 --> 01:26:34.395 that just to be punitive to a process 01:26:34.395 --> 01:26:36.395 that had grown large and unwieldy . 01:26:36.959 --> 01:26:39.181 What we , we did that because we wanted 01:26:39.181 --> 01:26:41.348 to take the time to thoughtfully match 01:26:41.348 --> 01:26:43.570 our people to our jobs that we needed . 01:26:43.570 --> 01:26:45.792 We've done that over the last 6 weeks . 01:26:45.792 --> 01:26:47.792 We are . Undoing or pulling off the 01:26:47.792 --> 01:26:49.903 hiring freeze in the vast majority of 01:26:49.903 --> 01:26:52.070 instances , and what we are cautiously 01:26:52.070 --> 01:26:54.181 optimistic is that going forward what 01:26:54.181 --> 01:26:56.237 civilians should see in their day to 01:26:56.237 --> 01:26:57.903 day is a much more controlled 01:26:57.903 --> 01:27:00.126 management over their career . And what 01:27:00.126 --> 01:27:02.070 we hope that leads to is , even if 01:27:02.070 --> 01:27:04.237 we're not able to give them pay raises 01:27:04.237 --> 01:27:06.403 today , we should be able to give them 01:27:06.403 --> 01:27:06.346 pass to grow in their career and their 01:27:06.346 --> 01:27:08.513 profession to make more money . I hope 01:27:08.513 --> 01:27:10.457 the committee might tackle this as 01:27:10.457 --> 01:27:12.735 we're working on the NDAA . Oftentimes , 01:27:12.735 --> 01:27:14.679 you know , our civilian . are just 01:27:14.679 --> 01:27:16.790 serving side by side with soldiers or 01:27:16.790 --> 01:27:19.013 other troops . I'm on the board at West 01:27:19.013 --> 01:27:21.068 Point . You've got , you know , Army 01:27:21.068 --> 01:27:23.235 props and assistant props . You've got 01:27:23.235 --> 01:27:25.457 civilian props and assistant props when 01:27:25.457 --> 01:27:27.179 they're serving side by side , 01:27:27.179 --> 01:27:29.179 co-teaching classes and things like 01:27:29.179 --> 01:27:31.402 that or serving in any other capacity , 01:27:31.402 --> 01:27:33.624 and one side is getting a pay raise and 01:27:33.624 --> 01:27:35.568 the other group is not , that does 01:27:35.568 --> 01:27:37.568 create some internal challenges . I 01:27:37.568 --> 01:27:39.735 hope we might deal with it . The , the 01:27:39.735 --> 01:27:39.091 only other issue I wanted to ask you , 01:27:39.341 --> 01:27:42.910 Senator Driscoll , is this , um . Last 01:27:42.910 --> 01:27:44.854 year during the hearing , I really 01:27:44.854 --> 01:27:46.910 focused with you just because it was 01:27:46.910 --> 01:27:49.188 sort of time critical and , and tragic , 01:27:49.188 --> 01:27:51.243 frankly , uh , about staying engaged 01:27:51.243 --> 01:27:53.354 with the families who lost loved ones 01:27:53.354 --> 01:27:57.060 in the , the Flight 5342 crash that 01:27:57.100 --> 01:27:59.529 that claimed the lives of civilians , 01:27:59.950 --> 01:28:02.770 you know , patriotic soldiers , 01:28:03.029 --> 01:28:05.669 aviators . Um , I think it's really , 01:28:05.750 --> 01:28:08.270 really important that we continue to be 01:28:08.270 --> 01:28:10.240 transparent . But also learn the 01:28:10.240 --> 01:28:12.296 lessons and improve and you and I've 01:28:12.296 --> 01:28:14.680 had some conversations . The Army's 01:28:14.680 --> 01:28:16.680 already done a number of things to 01:28:16.680 --> 01:28:19.640 respond to NTSB preliminary reports and 01:28:19.640 --> 01:28:21.529 your , your own work , and that's 01:28:21.529 --> 01:28:23.196 positive . I think we have an 01:28:23.196 --> 01:28:25.362 opportunity to do more . But there are 01:28:25.362 --> 01:28:27.600 3 army investigations that are still 01:28:27.600 --> 01:28:30.759 pending about that crash , and I was 01:28:30.759 --> 01:28:32.926 told when the NTSB issued their report 01:28:32.926 --> 01:28:35.240 in January that the 3 were likely to 01:28:35.240 --> 01:28:37.462 come to a resolution sometime soon . My 01:28:37.462 --> 01:28:39.819 understanding is that's not the case . 01:28:40.439 --> 01:28:42.839 When will these investigations be done 01:28:42.839 --> 01:28:44.283 in your best estimation ? 01:28:47.080 --> 01:28:49.720 Sure , the , the 15-6 , I think is the , 01:28:49.839 --> 01:28:51.728 you know , one of the ones you're 01:28:51.728 --> 01:28:53.561 talking about that , uh , I just 01:28:53.561 --> 01:28:55.339 received the brief on it , uh , 01:28:55.339 --> 01:28:57.672 yesterday . You and I talked about this , 01:28:57.672 --> 01:28:59.672 uh , in , in the office call , uh , 01:28:59.672 --> 01:29:02.560 that moves forward , uh , uh , in the 01:29:02.560 --> 01:29:04.727 process , uh , to be able to get it in 01:29:04.727 --> 01:29:06.893 front of , of the army families , uh , 01:29:06.893 --> 01:29:09.060 and then , uh , to be able to be , you 01:29:09.060 --> 01:29:11.060 know , with the secretary's consent 01:29:11.060 --> 01:29:13.171 shared , um . And that process moving 01:29:13.171 --> 01:29:15.393 on , I think that the 18th of the month 01:29:15.393 --> 01:29:17.509 is the date that we're hoping to meet 01:29:17.509 --> 01:29:19.549 the gates . And Senator , just to 01:29:19.549 --> 01:29:21.771 publicly reaffirm the commitment that I 01:29:21.771 --> 01:29:23.882 made privately to the families , uh , 01:29:23.882 --> 01:29:26.105 we will be as transparent as law allows 01:29:26.105 --> 01:29:28.216 us , uh , because we do want to learn 01:29:28.216 --> 01:29:30.438 as much as we possibly can from this so 01:29:30.438 --> 01:29:32.549 it doesn't happen again . And I would 01:29:32.549 --> 01:29:34.660 just encourage as I close . Obviously 01:29:34.660 --> 01:29:36.716 transparent with the army families , 01:29:36.716 --> 01:29:36.490 but I think transparent with all those 01:29:36.490 --> 01:29:38.712 who lost their lives that day . Again , 01:29:38.712 --> 01:29:40.879 there may be some legal restrictions , 01:29:40.879 --> 01:29:43.101 but lawyers usually tell you that there 01:29:43.101 --> 01:29:45.268 are legal obstacles . There aren't . I 01:29:45.268 --> 01:29:47.490 say that as a lawyer , and I would just 01:29:47.490 --> 01:29:49.657 say we really owe it to these families 01:29:49.689 --> 01:29:51.856 to , to , to help them believe that we 01:29:51.856 --> 01:29:53.689 are doing everything possible to 01:29:53.689 --> 01:29:55.633 minimize the chance this will ever 01:29:55.633 --> 01:29:57.800 happen again . Um , and just on behalf 01:29:57.800 --> 01:30:00.022 of the army , we wholeheartedly agree , 01:30:00.022 --> 01:30:02.245 and when I say families , I mean all of 01:30:02.245 --> 01:30:04.411 them . Thank you . And , and thank you 01:30:04.411 --> 01:30:06.411 for that , gentlemen , um , Senator 01:30:06.411 --> 01:30:08.522 Cotton . Thank you gentlemen for your 01:30:08.522 --> 01:30:08.109 appearance here and your service to our 01:30:08.109 --> 01:30:10.331 nation . Arlington National Cemetery is 01:30:10.331 --> 01:30:12.665 hallowed ground , not just for our army , 01:30:12.665 --> 01:30:14.498 but for our entire nation . Um , 01:30:14.498 --> 01:30:16.553 General Lane , I first want to thank 01:30:16.553 --> 01:30:18.720 the Army , uh , and Secretary Driscoll 01:30:18.720 --> 01:30:20.498 for , uh , restoring the Casson 01:30:20.498 --> 01:30:22.331 detachment at Arlington National 01:30:22.331 --> 01:30:24.859 Cemetery following the unwise decision 01:30:24.859 --> 01:30:28.399 in 2023 to posit . Um , Casson's 01:30:28.399 --> 01:30:30.566 participation in military funerals has 01:30:30.566 --> 01:30:32.732 been a time-honored tradition honoring 01:30:32.732 --> 01:30:35.010 our nation's heroes and their families . 01:30:35.010 --> 01:30:36.899 I'm glad we're on track . To move 01:30:36.899 --> 01:30:39.121 beyond limited operations and back to 4 01:30:39.121 --> 01:30:41.232 squads performing funerals later this 01:30:41.232 --> 01:30:43.455 year , General Laneve , can we get your 01:30:43.455 --> 01:30:45.621 personal commitment that the Army will 01:30:45.621 --> 01:30:47.566 continue to prioritize the case on 01:30:47.566 --> 01:30:49.732 detachment for years ahead , including 01:30:49.732 --> 01:30:52.066 the sustained resourcing the unit needs ? 01:30:52.066 --> 01:30:54.288 Yes sir . And uh , can you also give us 01:30:54.288 --> 01:30:56.343 your personal commitment that you'll 01:30:56.343 --> 01:30:58.343 keep this committee informed of any 01:30:58.343 --> 01:31:00.288 delays or additional resources you 01:31:00.288 --> 01:31:00.250 might need to keep the case on 01:31:00.250 --> 01:31:01.972 detachment fully operational ? 01:31:02.089 --> 01:31:04.089 Absolutely , sir . Thank you . Uh , 01:31:04.500 --> 01:31:06.556 Secretary Driscoll , uh , Pine Bluff 01:31:06.556 --> 01:31:08.611 Arsenal , along with the rest of the 01:31:08.611 --> 01:31:10.500 Army's organic industrial base is 01:31:10.500 --> 01:31:12.444 essential to address our munitions 01:31:12.444 --> 01:31:14.556 crisis . I want to thank you and what 01:31:14.556 --> 01:31:16.556 the Army has done to make sure that 01:31:16.556 --> 01:31:16.350 we're fully using the organic 01:31:16.350 --> 01:31:18.517 industrial base . I'm pleased that the 01:31:18.517 --> 01:31:20.517 Army and the Arkansas congressional 01:31:20.517 --> 01:31:22.683 delegation's joint efforts , uh , have 01:31:22.683 --> 01:31:24.906 ensured that Pine Bluff will evolve and 01:31:24.906 --> 01:31:27.128 expand its mission to meet the needs of 01:31:27.128 --> 01:31:29.183 our military . The proposed enhanced 01:31:29.183 --> 01:31:31.294 use lease agreement with HANWA is one 01:31:31.294 --> 01:31:33.406 prime example of working with private 01:31:33.406 --> 01:31:35.183 industry to enhance our organic 01:31:35.183 --> 01:31:37.128 industrial base . Uh , of course , 01:31:37.128 --> 01:31:39.128 addressing the munitions needs that 01:31:39.128 --> 01:31:41.128 have been all on our minds today is 01:31:41.128 --> 01:31:43.183 going to require an all of the above 01:31:43.183 --> 01:31:45.350 strategy for both private industry and 01:31:45.350 --> 01:31:47.461 army programs of record . Given those 01:31:47.461 --> 01:31:49.517 demands and need to scale production 01:31:49.517 --> 01:31:51.628 across all 23 sites , can you tell us 01:31:51.628 --> 01:31:53.794 what's next in your thinking about how 01:31:53.794 --> 01:31:55.906 to ensure that installations like the 01:31:55.906 --> 01:31:57.850 Pine Bluff Arsenal and our other . 01:31:57.850 --> 01:31:59.794 Industrial base sites received the 01:31:59.794 --> 01:32:01.961 government and private investment they 01:32:01.961 --> 01:32:04.294 need to help solve our munitions crisis . 01:32:04.294 --> 01:32:06.239 Yes sir , Senator , um , the Hanwa 01:32:06.239 --> 01:32:08.350 investment , um , I , I was down with 01:32:08.350 --> 01:32:10.517 the governor talking to Hanwa a couple 01:32:10.517 --> 01:32:12.572 of weeks ago , and we are incredibly 01:32:12.572 --> 01:32:14.628 excited and proud of using that as a 01:32:14.628 --> 01:32:16.683 pathfinder for how we can scale this 01:32:16.683 --> 01:32:16.032 across the country . The other 01:32:16.032 --> 01:32:18.199 pathfinder that we're doing is we went 01:32:18.199 --> 01:32:20.312 out to private industry to see was it 01:32:20.312 --> 01:32:22.256 possible to do data centers and so 01:32:22.352 --> 01:32:24.630 we're excited to have two data centers , 01:32:24.630 --> 01:32:26.685 one in Texas , one in . In Utah that 01:32:26.685 --> 01:32:28.908 we're using to build out the model to , 01:32:28.908 --> 01:32:31.130 to , to flex our might as an army where 01:32:31.130 --> 01:32:33.352 we have millions of acres of land where 01:32:33.352 --> 01:32:35.519 we can partner with private industry . 01:32:35.519 --> 01:32:37.630 What our next step was , Senator , is 01:32:37.630 --> 01:32:39.741 we basically went out with an RFI and 01:32:39.741 --> 01:32:41.908 we said , our American industry , what 01:32:41.908 --> 01:32:43.685 would you do on our bases , our 01:32:43.685 --> 01:32:45.852 arsenals , and our depots ? We had 200 01:32:45.852 --> 01:32:47.685 submissions last month . We have 01:32:47.685 --> 01:32:49.908 narrowed them down to about 110 that we 01:32:49.908 --> 01:32:51.963 could do . I'd say of those 110 , 60 01:32:51.963 --> 01:32:54.074 are some of the most well-known names 01:32:54.074 --> 01:32:56.241 in . Our largest private companies and 01:32:56.241 --> 01:32:58.296 private investors . Last week we met 01:32:58.296 --> 01:33:00.296 with Treasury and we met with OMB . 01:33:00.296 --> 01:33:02.408 They're giving us full-time employees 01:33:02.408 --> 01:33:04.630 for 90 to 180 days for us to go through 01:33:04.630 --> 01:33:06.741 these 110 proposals , and what we are 01:33:06.741 --> 01:33:08.685 hoping to do is within a couple of 01:33:08.685 --> 01:33:10.796 weeks or months be able to announce a 01:33:10.796 --> 01:33:13.019 lot more partnerships like Hanwan , our 01:33:13.019 --> 01:33:15.185 different arsenals and depots . Good , 01:33:15.185 --> 01:33:15.155 thank you . I think that's a very 01:33:15.155 --> 01:33:17.322 welcome development . These sites have 01:33:17.322 --> 01:33:19.322 languished for some years , and I'm 01:33:19.322 --> 01:33:21.433 glad that we're taking full advantage 01:33:21.433 --> 01:33:23.569 of all the um . The opportunity they 01:33:23.569 --> 01:33:25.625 provide to help address our munition 01:33:25.625 --> 01:33:27.625 crisis . I , I want to talk briefly 01:33:27.625 --> 01:33:29.791 about physical fitness standards . I'm 01:33:29.791 --> 01:33:32.013 pleased to see the Army leading the way 01:33:32.013 --> 01:33:31.970 on restoring fitness standards for 01:33:31.970 --> 01:33:34.026 combat troops . The new combat field 01:33:34.026 --> 01:33:36.248 test establishes a single mission-based 01:33:36.560 --> 01:33:38.727 standard that's aligned to the demands 01:33:38.727 --> 01:33:40.671 of combat , ensuring readiness and 01:33:40.671 --> 01:33:42.727 lethality in soldiers serving in , I 01:33:42.727 --> 01:33:45.689 believe , 24 designated combat military 01:33:45.689 --> 01:33:47.522 occupation specialties . Can you 01:33:47.522 --> 01:33:49.850 explain , Mr . Secretary ? How high 01:33:49.850 --> 01:33:52.089 standards across all units of our 01:33:52.089 --> 01:33:53.811 military contribute to greater 01:33:53.811 --> 01:33:56.339 lethality . Um , Senator , I think in 01:33:56.339 --> 01:33:58.283 your experience , uh , in combat , 01:33:58.283 --> 01:34:00.283 certainly General Lane , when we've 01:34:00.283 --> 01:34:02.283 spoken about it . Um , when bullets 01:34:02.283 --> 01:34:04.117 start to fly , it doesn't matter 01:34:04.117 --> 01:34:06.283 whether you're a male or a female . It 01:34:06.283 --> 01:34:06.049 doesn't matter where you grew up , and 01:34:06.049 --> 01:34:07.890 none of that matters . It is the 01:34:07.890 --> 01:34:10.001 perfect egalitarian system of can you 01:34:10.001 --> 01:34:12.168 be there for your battle buddy on your 01:34:12.168 --> 01:34:14.390 right and left . And what we , the army 01:34:14.390 --> 01:34:16.612 have tried to do in my time in and then 01:34:16.612 --> 01:34:18.557 certainly in this seat has been to 01:34:18.557 --> 01:34:20.668 model out that behavior across all of 01:34:20.668 --> 01:34:22.834 our different MOSs , but certainly our 01:34:22.834 --> 01:34:24.834 combat arms , and we are excited to 01:34:24.834 --> 01:34:26.946 follow the President Trump's lead and 01:34:26.946 --> 01:34:29.112 Secretary of War headset . To continue 01:34:29.112 --> 01:34:31.334 to expand and invest in our soldiers to 01:34:31.334 --> 01:34:33.279 make them the most lethal fighting 01:34:33.279 --> 01:34:35.446 force in the world , and these uniform 01:34:35.446 --> 01:34:37.668 standards , irrespective of , um , will 01:34:37.668 --> 01:34:39.834 not just be uniform standards but high 01:34:39.834 --> 01:34:41.834 standards that's appropriate to the 01:34:41.834 --> 01:34:44.057 military occupation specialty . It , it 01:34:44.057 --> 01:34:46.112 is a hard test , Senator , sir , and 01:34:46.112 --> 01:34:45.825 high standards , sir . I have a 01:34:46.125 --> 01:34:48.236 daughter that's in the army and a son 01:34:48.236 --> 01:34:50.236 that's in the army , and , and they 01:34:50.236 --> 01:34:53.015 both , uh , want high standards , um , 01:34:53.285 --> 01:34:56.604 across the board , uh , you know , uh . 01:34:57.169 --> 01:34:59.569 For all of our occupational specialties , 01:34:59.669 --> 01:35:02.002 but especially the , the 24 you've done , 01:35:02.049 --> 01:35:03.938 you've done the research , you're 01:35:03.938 --> 01:35:06.049 confident these standards are uniform 01:35:06.049 --> 01:35:08.216 and high . There's what's needed to be 01:35:08.216 --> 01:35:10.327 ready to fight in this MOSs , and now 01:35:10.327 --> 01:35:12.382 you'll apply this test and the chips 01:35:12.382 --> 01:35:14.605 will fall where they may no matter what 01:35:14.605 --> 01:35:17.370 the results are along race , religion , 01:35:17.569 --> 01:35:19.729 political affiliation , or dietary 01:35:19.729 --> 01:35:21.951 preferences . That's the intent , sir . 01:35:21.951 --> 01:35:25.089 Thank you . Thank you , Senator Cotton . 01:35:25.250 --> 01:35:27.729 Um , Senator Shaheen , uh , thank you , 01:35:27.750 --> 01:35:29.917 Mr . Chairman , and thank you both for 01:35:29.917 --> 01:35:31.806 being here . It's been a marathon 01:35:31.806 --> 01:35:34.129 morning , I'm sure . Um , Secretary 01:35:34.129 --> 01:35:36.240 Driscoll , I wanna go back to some of 01:35:36.240 --> 01:35:38.370 the issues we raised , um , we 01:35:38.370 --> 01:35:40.537 discussed earlier , um , in the closed 01:35:40.537 --> 01:35:42.537 session about prepositioned stock . 01:35:42.537 --> 01:35:44.870 This is not classified information , um , 01:35:44.930 --> 01:35:48.890 as I understand , but My understanding 01:35:48.890 --> 01:35:51.279 about the army's interest in 01:35:51.290 --> 01:35:53.512 prepositioning stocks throughout Europe 01:35:53.512 --> 01:35:55.734 was because it reduces deployment times 01:35:55.734 --> 01:35:58.890 and it acts as a deterrence and helps 01:35:58.890 --> 01:36:01.399 um in providing combat power for any 01:36:01.399 --> 01:36:05.270 contingency operations now . As 01:36:05.270 --> 01:36:07.990 I understand , General Grikovich , um , 01:36:09.189 --> 01:36:13.029 He was interested in updating the 01:36:13.029 --> 01:36:16.270 APS before more troops are removed from 01:36:16.270 --> 01:36:19.660 his theater from Germany because he's 01:36:19.660 --> 01:36:21.660 interested in being able to rapidly 01:36:21.660 --> 01:36:24.169 assemble 4 armored brigade combat teams . 01:36:24.859 --> 01:36:28.540 So , you raised concerns about cost 01:36:28.540 --> 01:36:30.770 earlier . So can you talk about what's 01:36:30.770 --> 01:36:33.500 the cost difference between maintaining 01:36:33.500 --> 01:36:36.299 APS and the theater versus surging 01:36:36.299 --> 01:36:38.521 forces and equipment from the US in the 01:36:38.521 --> 01:36:42.410 event of a crisis ? Ma'am , uh , 01:36:42.490 --> 01:36:44.712 thank you for the question . As we , as 01:36:44.712 --> 01:36:47.046 we discussed earlier , you know , there , 01:36:47.046 --> 01:36:49.212 there's a , there's a balance in there 01:36:49.212 --> 01:36:51.379 too of , of being able to surge forces 01:36:51.379 --> 01:36:53.490 to fall in on equipment that is ready 01:36:53.490 --> 01:36:55.823 and compatible with the equipment there . 01:36:55.823 --> 01:36:59.450 So , uh , APS , while , uh , is a , is , 01:36:59.459 --> 01:37:02.399 uh , almost an insurance policy , that 01:37:02.399 --> 01:37:05.430 equipment , uh , stays at a level . Uh , 01:37:05.870 --> 01:37:07.939 that at times is not compatible with 01:37:07.939 --> 01:37:09.828 the equipment that we would bring 01:37:09.828 --> 01:37:11.883 forward . I mean , to have equipment 01:37:11.883 --> 01:37:15.379 forward always is good for , you know , 01:37:15.660 --> 01:37:18.060 speed , uh , to get personnel in place , 01:37:18.140 --> 01:37:20.580 but it is unsustainable at that cost 01:37:20.580 --> 01:37:23.359 right now . Um , so , you know , for 01:37:23.589 --> 01:37:27.399 what the cost of what transporting 01:37:27.979 --> 01:37:30.310 new equipment as , as the . 01:37:30.779 --> 01:37:33.689 Capabilities change or the cost of 01:37:33.819 --> 01:37:36.700 guarding the equipment . What , help us 01:37:36.700 --> 01:37:38.756 understand what the additional costs 01:37:38.756 --> 01:37:40.644 are that you're concerned about . 01:37:40.644 --> 01:37:42.811 Maintaining , uh , equipment sets that 01:37:42.811 --> 01:37:45.200 just sit in the cost associated with , 01:37:45.209 --> 01:37:47.431 uh , that , it's , you know , somewhere 01:37:47.431 --> 01:37:49.542 around 2 billion dollars+ dollars for 01:37:49.542 --> 01:37:51.859 that one BCT , um , and I know that 01:37:51.859 --> 01:37:53.637 General Grikovich is looking at 01:37:53.637 --> 01:37:55.859 different ways to mitigate this cost to 01:37:55.859 --> 01:37:58.180 help the army , uh , to be able to meet 01:37:58.180 --> 01:38:01.459 this requirement . As discussed earlier , 01:38:01.759 --> 01:38:03.759 we'd like to see those , you know , 01:38:03.759 --> 01:38:06.080 some of those equipment be training 01:38:06.080 --> 01:38:07.969 sets that we could fall in on and 01:38:07.969 --> 01:38:11.560 utilize in exercises across Europe when 01:38:11.560 --> 01:38:13.782 needed . So what would be the deterrent 01:38:13.782 --> 01:38:17.180 to doing that ? Well , it's just a 01:38:17.180 --> 01:38:19.236 different , uh , uh , way to look at 01:38:19.236 --> 01:38:21.402 the equipment , and that would have to 01:38:21.402 --> 01:38:24.299 be a discussion between , uh , uh , uh , 01:38:25.229 --> 01:38:27.340 Sakur , uh , and the team . And I , I 01:38:27.340 --> 01:38:29.451 know that , that the , uh , the Joint 01:38:29.451 --> 01:38:31.562 Chiefs is looking at this as well and 01:38:31.562 --> 01:38:33.785 how our posture is across the world and 01:38:33.785 --> 01:38:35.562 all of our , our forward , uh , 01:38:35.562 --> 01:38:38.669 position forces or fleet . So the issue 01:38:38.669 --> 01:38:41.399 is internal . You all could decide that 01:38:41.399 --> 01:38:43.450 you're gonna use the equipment for 01:38:43.450 --> 01:38:45.450 training if you decide to do that . 01:38:45.950 --> 01:38:47.783 Yeah , I , I think , uh , it's a 01:38:47.783 --> 01:38:49.919 different categorization of it , uh , 01:38:49.990 --> 01:38:52.046 and then there's a different funding 01:38:52.046 --> 01:38:54.189 line associated with it . But it's 01:38:54.189 --> 01:38:56.270 still an internal decision you're 01:38:56.270 --> 01:38:59.299 telling us . Thank you , um , Secretary 01:38:59.299 --> 01:39:01.390 Driscoll , I want to go back to last 01:39:01.390 --> 01:39:04.910 year when you were helping to negotiate 01:39:04.910 --> 01:39:07.109 with the administration between Russia 01:39:07.109 --> 01:39:09.890 and Ukraine when , um , Russia , 01:39:10.750 --> 01:39:13.350 or when the administration offered a 01:39:13.350 --> 01:39:15.239 plan that looked like it had been 01:39:15.239 --> 01:39:18.569 written by Russia to end the war , um , 01:39:19.029 --> 01:39:22.810 and at that time you suggested that . 01:39:23.299 --> 01:39:25.979 It was important to get a peace deal as 01:39:25.979 --> 01:39:28.290 quickly as possible because Ukraine was 01:39:28.290 --> 01:39:30.700 facing defeat on the battlefield . 01:39:32.149 --> 01:39:34.109 I've seen a number of unclassified 01:39:34.109 --> 01:39:36.430 assessments and open source reports 01:39:36.430 --> 01:39:38.790 that I'm sure you've seen in the last 01:39:38.790 --> 01:39:42.669 month or so that suggests that not 01:39:42.669 --> 01:39:44.899 only is Ukraine not in danger of losing 01:39:44.899 --> 01:39:46.899 the war at this point , but they're 01:39:46.899 --> 01:39:49.870 actually that Russia is the one who's 01:39:49.870 --> 01:39:52.092 in danger of losing the war , and if we 01:39:52.092 --> 01:39:54.203 would just put a little more pressure 01:39:54.203 --> 01:39:56.426 on Russia , that their economy would be 01:39:56.426 --> 01:39:58.950 in real trouble , so . Can you tell us , 01:39:59.109 --> 01:40:02.549 do you think that Ukraine is at this 01:40:02.549 --> 01:40:04.770 point seems like it's been defeated , 01:40:04.950 --> 01:40:07.589 and what more should we be thinking 01:40:07.589 --> 01:40:10.790 about to do in order to pressure Russia 01:40:11.109 --> 01:40:13.970 so that they actually do lose this war , 01:40:14.990 --> 01:40:17.250 Senator , I encourage anybody . 01:40:18.759 --> 01:40:20.919 Who has contacts in Ukraine both 01:40:20.919 --> 01:40:22.879 individually to ask about their 01:40:22.879 --> 01:40:25.660 experience with us and the broader 01:40:25.660 --> 01:40:27.604 administration and then the United 01:40:27.604 --> 01:40:29.827 States Army more broadly has been there 01:40:29.827 --> 01:40:31.938 from day one supporting the Ukrainian 01:40:31.938 --> 01:40:34.049 people . Well , I don't disagree with 01:40:34.049 --> 01:40:36.271 you on the army . That's not really the 01:40:36.271 --> 01:40:38.216 question that I'm asking you . I'm 01:40:38.216 --> 01:40:39.993 asking you , and given that the 01:40:39.993 --> 01:40:41.716 administration just lifted the 01:40:41.716 --> 01:40:44.399 sanctions on Russian oil so that 01:40:44.399 --> 01:40:47.779 they're Recouping about $4 billion a 01:40:47.779 --> 01:40:51.620 month because of that oil to help 01:40:51.620 --> 01:40:53.859 fund the war in Ukraine and by the way 01:40:53.859 --> 01:40:57.819 to help fund . To help the Iranians 01:40:57.819 --> 01:41:00.879 with their targeting of US military 01:41:00.879 --> 01:41:03.101 sites and service members in the Middle 01:41:03.101 --> 01:41:05.379 East , um , why should we not think 01:41:05.379 --> 01:41:08.020 that there's a mismatch between what 01:41:08.020 --> 01:41:10.700 the army is doing , as you say , and 01:41:10.700 --> 01:41:12.811 what the administration is doing with 01:41:12.811 --> 01:41:15.899 respect to helping the Russians to fund 01:41:15.899 --> 01:41:18.177 their war time has expired . Thank you . 01:41:18.339 --> 01:41:21.129 I yield myself 5 minutes . Uh , General , 01:41:21.419 --> 01:41:23.879 China's most recent defense white paper . 01:41:24.810 --> 01:41:28.339 Says that the PLA Navy is bolstering 01:41:28.339 --> 01:41:31.879 capabilities for maritime maneuver 01:41:31.879 --> 01:41:34.080 operations and maritime joint 01:41:34.080 --> 01:41:36.459 operations . In response , the US 01:41:36.459 --> 01:41:39.649 Army's multi-domain task forces are 01:41:39.649 --> 01:41:41.819 becoming key to the Army's role in the 01:41:41.819 --> 01:41:45.180 Indo-Pacific . How important are MDTFs 01:41:45.180 --> 01:41:46.902 in deterring aggression in the 01:41:46.902 --> 01:41:49.060 Indo-Pacific , and what can I and 01:41:49.060 --> 01:41:51.282 members of the committee do to help you 01:41:51.282 --> 01:41:53.560 accelerate their critical capabilities ? 01:41:53.560 --> 01:41:55.782 Yes , sir . First , uh , thanks for the 01:41:55.782 --> 01:41:58.116 question . Thanks for your support . Um , 01:41:58.116 --> 01:42:00.171 the multi-domain task force is , the 01:42:00.171 --> 01:42:03.160 multi-domain command , uh , or , or the 01:42:03.160 --> 01:42:05.020 command is critical as a theater 01:42:05.020 --> 01:42:07.399 enabling , uh , element that the task 01:42:07.399 --> 01:42:09.549 forces can , can be placed , uh , 01:42:09.790 --> 01:42:12.229 across the Pacific at scale , uh , and , 01:42:12.350 --> 01:42:14.461 and operate underneath it . They're , 01:42:14.461 --> 01:42:16.628 they're a critical component of , uh , 01:42:16.628 --> 01:42:18.739 deterrence and then , uh , you know , 01:42:18.739 --> 01:42:20.850 if needed . Uh , the ability to bring 01:42:20.850 --> 01:42:23.072 those effects , uh , on any adversary . 01:42:23.072 --> 01:42:25.072 So , uh , the , the ability to have 01:42:25.072 --> 01:42:27.229 them forward in theater , uh , and , 01:42:27.419 --> 01:42:30.470 and , you know , uh , uh , positions 01:42:30.470 --> 01:42:33.669 that have a direct , uh , deterrence is 01:42:33.669 --> 01:42:35.729 critical , uh , for us . And , and , 01:42:35.859 --> 01:42:37.910 you know , uh , we're seeking to 01:42:37.910 --> 01:42:39.966 support Admiral Paparo and , and his 01:42:39.966 --> 01:42:42.021 team and how they're looking at , at 01:42:42.021 --> 01:42:44.021 setting the theater , um , uh , for 01:42:44.021 --> 01:42:45.854 that . Good . Uh , we want to be 01:42:45.854 --> 01:42:48.021 supportive , so let us know how we can 01:42:48.021 --> 01:42:50.649 support the army , um , as you advance 01:42:50.649 --> 01:42:52.760 that cause . Secretary Driscoll , you 01:42:52.760 --> 01:42:54.871 and I have talked many times before , 01:42:54.871 --> 01:42:56.927 and I , I appreciate your efforts to 01:42:56.927 --> 01:42:58.705 prepare the army for the future 01:42:58.705 --> 01:43:00.705 battlefield . How are you balancing 01:43:00.705 --> 01:43:02.538 though the need to modernize and 01:43:02.538 --> 01:43:04.593 transform the active component while 01:43:04.593 --> 01:43:06.649 also ensuring that the guard and the 01:43:06.649 --> 01:43:08.649 reserve , um , component retain the 01:43:08.649 --> 01:43:10.705 equipment and capabilities that they 01:43:10.705 --> 01:43:12.939 need for their mission ? Um , Senator , 01:43:12.990 --> 01:43:15.750 I think what , um , I , A , I 01:43:15.750 --> 01:43:17.806 appreciate those conversations we've 01:43:17.806 --> 01:43:19.917 had , and B , the , the guard and the 01:43:19.917 --> 01:43:21.972 reserve components , when we look at 01:43:21.972 --> 01:43:24.139 CETCOM , when you look at the , at the 01:43:24.139 --> 01:43:24.069 border , when you look at a lot of the 01:43:24.069 --> 01:43:26.125 missions that the United States Army 01:43:26.125 --> 01:43:28.236 has undertaken since I've been in the 01:43:28.236 --> 01:43:30.402 role , the , the guard and the reserve 01:43:30.402 --> 01:43:32.740 play an incredible role in that . And 01:43:32.740 --> 01:43:35.779 um under both formerly General George 01:43:35.779 --> 01:43:38.112 and under General Laneve , when we talk , 01:43:38.112 --> 01:43:39.979 we talk very specifically about 01:43:39.979 --> 01:43:42.240 resourcing everyone at the same time . 01:43:42.770 --> 01:43:44.770 Obviously with budget constraints , 01:43:44.770 --> 01:43:46.881 that's not possible to technically do 01:43:46.881 --> 01:43:49.103 simultaneously , but what we don't want 01:43:49.103 --> 01:43:51.326 to do is we don't want to model out and 01:43:51.326 --> 01:43:53.381 how we roll out new equipment to the 01:43:53.381 --> 01:43:55.603 force , this idea that they're anything 01:43:55.603 --> 01:43:57.603 other than an equal participant and 01:43:57.603 --> 01:43:59.548 oftentimes carrying the exact same 01:43:59.548 --> 01:44:01.714 burden when we go to conflict . And so 01:44:01.714 --> 01:44:03.548 we very explicitly are hoping to 01:44:03.548 --> 01:44:05.714 upgrade them to things like NextGen C2 01:44:05.714 --> 01:44:07.881 and give them new equipment as we roll 01:44:07.881 --> 01:44:10.103 it out to the broader force . You and I 01:44:10.103 --> 01:44:12.159 have talked about this before , um . 01:44:12.159 --> 01:44:14.270 And as you know , Humvees are made in 01:44:14.270 --> 01:44:16.540 Indiana , a lot of really good jobs and 01:44:16.540 --> 01:44:20.140 workers . That make the Humvee , um , 01:44:20.410 --> 01:44:22.466 it's important to Indiana , but it's 01:44:22.466 --> 01:44:24.859 also important to , uh , uh , the Army , 01:44:25.100 --> 01:44:27.322 especially , uh , to the reserves . The 01:44:27.322 --> 01:44:29.044 Army Transformation Initiative 01:44:29.044 --> 01:44:31.259 transitions the Humvee away from the 01:44:31.259 --> 01:44:33.689 active component . At the same time , 01:44:33.810 --> 01:44:36.040 more than half of the adjutant generals 01:44:36.370 --> 01:44:38.330 have asked that Congress fund 01:44:38.330 --> 01:44:41.370 modernized Humvees . What , what role 01:44:41.370 --> 01:44:43.529 can the Humvee play for the Army 01:44:43.529 --> 01:44:45.640 Reserve and Guard across a wide range 01:44:45.640 --> 01:44:47.696 of missions like disaster relief and 01:44:47.696 --> 01:44:50.229 Homeland Security ? Um , I , I would 01:44:50.229 --> 01:44:52.285 say , Senator , the , the Humvee has 01:44:52.285 --> 01:44:54.285 been an incredible asset for the US 01:44:54.285 --> 01:44:56.629 Army for decades . Um , and what we are 01:44:56.629 --> 01:44:58.685 not trying to say is that it will no 01:44:58.685 --> 01:45:01.229 longer have a role . We are trying to 01:45:01.229 --> 01:45:03.285 balance that out with other assets , 01:45:03.285 --> 01:45:05.507 but there are all sorts of things . One 01:45:05.507 --> 01:45:07.562 of the vehicles that we were able to 01:45:07.562 --> 01:45:09.673 make autonomously driven was a Humvee 01:45:09.673 --> 01:45:11.840 because it's drive-by wire , just like 01:45:11.840 --> 01:45:14.007 the ISV , you can upgrade these things 01:45:14.007 --> 01:45:16.229 very quickly and use them for all sorts 01:45:16.229 --> 01:45:18.340 of purposes that if you were thinking 01:45:18.340 --> 01:45:20.451 about a non-autonomous vehicle , that 01:45:20.451 --> 01:45:22.673 constrains its use case in a way . That 01:45:22.673 --> 01:45:24.673 once you're able to do all of these 01:45:24.673 --> 01:45:26.896 things with open architecture systems , 01:45:26.896 --> 01:45:26.484 the Humvee is going to be able to help 01:45:26.484 --> 01:45:28.484 us on the border . It's going to be 01:45:28.484 --> 01:45:30.762 able to help us with natural disasters . 01:45:30.762 --> 01:45:32.873 It's going to be able to help us in a 01:45:32.873 --> 01:45:35.095 lot of theaters where it may still have 01:45:35.095 --> 01:45:37.206 a lot of relevance , even if it's not 01:45:37.206 --> 01:45:39.428 the one-stop solution anymore . Can you 01:45:39.428 --> 01:45:39.205 give us a quick update with the last 40 01:45:39.205 --> 01:45:41.205 seconds I have left on , on how the 01:45:41.205 --> 01:45:43.359 transition's going ? Um , which 01:45:43.359 --> 01:45:45.692 transition , sorry , just overall , I'm , 01:45:45.692 --> 01:45:47.689 um , the overall overall army 01:45:47.689 --> 01:45:49.850 transformation initiative , just give 01:45:49.850 --> 01:45:51.961 us a progress report . Yes sir . So , 01:45:51.961 --> 01:45:54.009 um , we , we are about one year in 01:45:54.009 --> 01:45:56.009 right now . It was May of last year 01:45:56.009 --> 01:45:58.231 when we did it . Um , I , I try to look 01:45:58.231 --> 01:46:00.065 for leading indicators that it's 01:46:00.065 --> 01:46:02.120 actually working . I think the first 01:46:02.120 --> 01:46:04.176 one is if you and I invite anyone on 01:46:04.176 --> 01:46:06.231 the committee to actually go talk to 01:46:06.231 --> 01:46:06.080 soldiers , I think that they would say 01:46:06.080 --> 01:46:08.136 right now feels very different . The 01:46:08.136 --> 01:46:10.358 army feels like it's moving quickly . I 01:46:10.358 --> 01:46:12.469 think if you look at what we're doing 01:46:12.469 --> 01:46:14.524 with our data on our business system 01:46:14.524 --> 01:46:16.580 side , or if you look at where we're 01:46:16.580 --> 01:46:16.200 doing this Operation Jailbreak , but 01:46:16.200 --> 01:46:18.367 it's been occurring before , those are 01:46:18.367 --> 01:46:20.644 all good . If you look at the new M1E3 , 01:46:20.644 --> 01:46:22.700 the Flora . Um , the , the different 01:46:22.700 --> 01:46:24.811 systems that we are procuring , there 01:46:24.811 --> 01:46:26.922 are all open architecture , and these 01:46:26.922 --> 01:46:29.033 are the types of platforms and assets 01:46:29.033 --> 01:46:31.200 that can change in the future in a way 01:46:31.200 --> 01:46:31.129 that we just historically have not 01:46:31.129 --> 01:46:33.407 thought about it . My time has expired . 01:46:33.407 --> 01:46:35.407 Thank you , Senator Banks , Senator 01:46:35.407 --> 01:46:37.518 Peters , I mean , Senator Kelly . I'm 01:46:37.518 --> 01:46:40.000 sorry . Thank you , Mr . Chairman . Um , 01:46:40.209 --> 01:46:42.265 gentlemen , thank you for being here 01:46:42.265 --> 01:46:44.240 today , Secretary Driscoll . The 01:46:44.240 --> 01:46:47.040 electronic Proving Ground , it's near 01:46:47.040 --> 01:46:49.939 Fort Huachuca provides a very unique 01:46:49.939 --> 01:46:52.660 electronic warfare testing capability , 01:46:53.319 --> 01:46:55.879 uh , largely because it has very 01:46:55.879 --> 01:46:58.160 favorable geography , protected 01:46:58.160 --> 01:47:01.060 airspace surrounded on all sides by 01:47:02.100 --> 01:47:05.810 terrain . And because of that 01:47:05.910 --> 01:47:08.021 we've got an ability there to conduct 01:47:08.021 --> 01:47:10.569 very aggressive electronic warfare and 01:47:10.569 --> 01:47:13.589 jamming tests with minimal interference 01:47:13.589 --> 01:47:16.910 that goes beyond the area . This is the 01:47:16.910 --> 01:47:19.069 kind of testing we need to understand 01:47:19.069 --> 01:47:21.350 how our systems would perform if we 01:47:21.350 --> 01:47:23.572 were up against near peer adversaries . 01:47:24.049 --> 01:47:25.939 And that's why I've been kind of 01:47:25.939 --> 01:47:28.419 frustrated by the army's lack of 01:47:28.419 --> 01:47:31.259 communication regarding changes that 01:47:31.259 --> 01:47:33.700 are already underway at EPG . We've 01:47:33.700 --> 01:47:35.867 tried to engage with the army multiple 01:47:35.867 --> 01:47:38.140 times . My office has learned about 01:47:38.140 --> 01:47:40.740 staffing reductions and mission impacts 01:47:41.020 --> 01:47:43.259 after they've happened , even though 01:47:43.259 --> 01:47:46.240 we're trying to communicate with 01:47:47.740 --> 01:47:50.700 the leadership . Um , so . 01:47:51.799 --> 01:47:53.855 We're trying to proactively engage , 01:47:54.120 --> 01:47:56.342 but we're not getting the response that 01:47:56.342 --> 01:47:58.564 we would normally expect , and it's one 01:47:58.564 --> 01:48:02.270 of the Army's premier facilities for EW 01:48:02.270 --> 01:48:04.381 and Spectrum operations . So when the 01:48:04.381 --> 01:48:06.381 Army reduces capacity there without 01:48:06.600 --> 01:48:08.489 clearly articulating some kind of 01:48:08.489 --> 01:48:10.322 long-range plan , it raises real 01:48:10.322 --> 01:48:12.322 questions about how these decisions 01:48:12.322 --> 01:48:15.720 align with the Army's stated priorities 01:48:15.720 --> 01:48:18.500 with regards to modernization . So , 01:48:18.959 --> 01:48:21.070 I'd just like a commitment from you . 01:48:21.070 --> 01:48:23.126 If , if , um , if we could work with 01:48:23.126 --> 01:48:25.100 your office to try to , you know , 01:48:25.220 --> 01:48:27.220 figure out what's going on and make 01:48:27.220 --> 01:48:29.331 sure that the decisions we are making 01:48:29.331 --> 01:48:31.498 are in the best interest of the army . 01:48:31.498 --> 01:48:33.664 Uh , Senator , absolutely , and , uh , 01:48:33.664 --> 01:48:35.720 just to go back a step , um , one of 01:48:35.720 --> 01:48:37.887 the things we've tried to model out in 01:48:37.887 --> 01:48:39.831 the last 18 months is , uh , ultra 01:48:39.831 --> 01:48:41.942 responsiveness , ultra transparency , 01:48:41.942 --> 01:48:43.831 ultra clarity both to the private 01:48:43.831 --> 01:48:46.164 sector , to our larger defense partners , 01:48:46.164 --> 01:48:48.220 to the primes and the smaller mids , 01:48:48.220 --> 01:48:50.387 and then also to all of you . And so , 01:48:50.387 --> 01:48:52.498 uh , I apologize that we haven't been 01:48:52.498 --> 01:48:54.498 faster and more clear , but we will 01:48:54.498 --> 01:48:54.399 remedy that . All right , all right , 01:48:54.560 --> 01:48:56.799 thank , thank you . And then on another 01:48:56.799 --> 01:48:59.040 subject . I'm a bit concerned about the 01:48:59.040 --> 01:49:01.450 army's direction here on aviation . You 01:49:01.450 --> 01:49:04.009 know , this year , you're spending $4 01:49:04.009 --> 01:49:06.370 billion . Next year you're requesting 01:49:06.370 --> 01:49:09.029 half of that . Your requests include 01:49:09.029 --> 01:49:12.359 0 AH-64 Apaches , 01:49:12.729 --> 01:49:16.290 zero Chinook Block 2s , and 1 01:49:16.290 --> 01:49:19.250 UH60 Black Hawk . And while I 01:49:19.250 --> 01:49:22.290 understand the intent of the Army 01:49:22.290 --> 01:49:24.799 transformation initiative , I'm also 01:49:24.799 --> 01:49:26.966 concerned that we're divesting in some 01:49:26.966 --> 01:49:29.399 capabilities that fill a critical 01:49:29.399 --> 01:49:31.479 requirement . We talked a little bit 01:49:31.479 --> 01:49:33.701 about this , you know , general , about 01:49:33.701 --> 01:49:35.868 learning the correct lesson from the , 01:49:35.868 --> 01:49:38.035 you know , former conflict , and we've 01:49:38.035 --> 01:49:40.090 got to be really careful here , um , 01:49:40.090 --> 01:49:41.757 and we don't have a validated 01:49:41.757 --> 01:49:43.646 replacement for these systems . A 01:49:43.646 --> 01:49:45.759 reasonable path forward . I think it 01:49:45.759 --> 01:49:47.815 would be to sustain Army aircraft we 01:49:47.815 --> 01:49:51.149 have and use their capacity until we 01:49:51.149 --> 01:49:53.330 integrate new technologies , but 01:49:53.330 --> 01:49:55.441 instead we're facing a budget request 01:49:55.441 --> 01:49:57.663 that leaves Congress no assurances that 01:49:57.663 --> 01:49:59.719 the Army and especially the National 01:49:59.719 --> 01:50:02.279 Guard will not suffer from a 01:50:02.279 --> 01:50:04.990 significant capability gap in its 01:50:04.990 --> 01:50:07.640 ability to move people and weapons , 01:50:07.839 --> 01:50:10.620 cargo , but also put , you know , fire , 01:50:11.120 --> 01:50:13.287 you know , downrange , especially with 01:50:13.287 --> 01:50:15.580 regards to the Apache . It's also 01:50:15.580 --> 01:50:17.802 concerned , I'm concerned that we might 01:50:17.802 --> 01:50:20.024 be repeating a mistake that we saw with 01:50:20.024 --> 01:50:22.839 the Air Force and the A-10 where the 01:50:22.839 --> 01:50:25.049 service spent years arguing it could 01:50:25.049 --> 01:50:27.839 retire the platform , only to realize 01:50:27.839 --> 01:50:29.895 that there's a critical mission need 01:50:29.895 --> 01:50:31.819 and nothing to fill it , and then 01:50:31.819 --> 01:50:34.700 suddenly with extra costs now extend 01:50:34.700 --> 01:50:37.100 the aircraft's life after the 01:50:37.100 --> 01:50:39.322 industrial capacity and its sustainment 01:50:39.322 --> 01:50:42.470 challenges have gotten worse . Once 01:50:42.470 --> 01:50:44.414 production lines and suppliers and 01:50:44.414 --> 01:50:46.470 workforce capacity disappear , 01:50:46.750 --> 01:50:49.350 rebuilding them can be rather costly 01:50:49.350 --> 01:50:51.859 and time consuming . And this budget , 01:50:51.899 --> 01:50:54.620 I think , threatens the health of the 01:50:54.620 --> 01:50:56.898 defense industrial base in that regard . 01:50:57.220 --> 01:50:59.109 Industry has been very clear that 01:50:59.109 --> 01:51:01.740 foreign sales on these systems are not 01:51:01.740 --> 01:51:04.069 enough to sustain the production lines 01:51:04.419 --> 01:51:07.979 past maybe the early 2030s . Um , 01:51:08.259 --> 01:51:10.481 we've also been hearing from some small 01:51:10.481 --> 01:51:12.537 businesses . I heard one that says , 01:51:12.537 --> 01:51:14.759 hey , the writing is on the wall here , 01:51:14.759 --> 01:51:16.981 and he wants to get out of the business 01:51:16.981 --> 01:51:18.981 of supporting Army helicopters , so 01:51:18.981 --> 01:51:21.203 that could be something you're going to 01:51:21.203 --> 01:51:23.426 have to deal with . Um . You , but Mr . 01:51:23.426 --> 01:51:25.481 Secretary , you continue to say that 01:51:25.481 --> 01:51:27.648 the Apache , Black Hawk , Chinook have 01:51:27.648 --> 01:51:29.815 a role and need to be modernized , but 01:51:29.815 --> 01:51:31.759 the budget doesn't actually get us 01:51:31.759 --> 01:51:33.815 there . So , can you explain , I , I 01:51:33.815 --> 01:51:36.520 know I'm over my time here , um , you 01:51:36.520 --> 01:51:38.779 know , how do we , how do we do this 01:51:39.000 --> 01:51:41.509 and sustain these systems under this 01:51:41.509 --> 01:51:42.953 existing budget request ? 01:51:47.029 --> 01:51:49.085 You cannot supplement your answer on 01:51:49.085 --> 01:51:51.220 the record , but go ahead and try to 01:51:51.220 --> 01:51:53.959 answer . So we've 01:51:56.529 --> 01:51:58.696 tried to say on the record a number of 01:51:58.696 --> 01:52:01.120 times . Excuse me . These systems will 01:52:01.120 --> 01:52:03.231 be in the army's life for a very long 01:52:03.231 --> 01:52:05.399 time . What we are trying to do is get 01:52:05.399 --> 01:52:07.560 out in advance of the number that we 01:52:07.560 --> 01:52:10.160 will have at total as we start to bring 01:52:10.160 --> 01:52:12.160 on things like flora . What is that 01:52:12.160 --> 01:52:14.839 ideal balance look like ? And so that's 01:52:14.839 --> 01:52:16.950 what you see reflected in the current 01:52:16.950 --> 01:52:19.640 budget . I think um we are optimistic 01:52:19.640 --> 01:52:21.584 that FMS will make up a lot of the 01:52:21.584 --> 01:52:23.759 cases to keep these lines on . Sorry . 01:52:24.560 --> 01:52:26.616 But still in the budget , you know , 01:52:26.616 --> 01:52:29.870 right now 1 Black Hawk , 0 01:52:30.169 --> 01:52:34.089 Apache , 0 Chinook , and the FMS 01:52:34.089 --> 01:52:37.959 thing from our , as , as my office has 01:52:37.959 --> 01:52:40.181 looked into this , it just doesn't seem 01:52:40.181 --> 01:52:43.270 like enough to sustain the helicopter 01:52:43.270 --> 01:52:45.326 industrial base . So thank you . I'm 01:52:45.326 --> 01:52:47.492 sorry I'm over my time . Thank you for 01:52:47.492 --> 01:52:49.381 that observation , Senator . Uh , 01:52:49.381 --> 01:52:51.492 Senator Slotkin , I'm sure you are as 01:52:51.492 --> 01:52:54.049 delighted as I am that Senator Rosen 01:52:54.049 --> 01:52:57.089 has appeared . Um , and Senator Rosen , 01:52:57.129 --> 01:52:59.609 you're recognized for 5 minutes . Thank 01:52:59.609 --> 01:53:01.442 you , Chairman Wicker , uh , for 01:53:01.442 --> 01:53:03.609 holding this hearing . Sorry , Senator 01:53:03.609 --> 01:53:06.720 Slotkin . Anyway , uh , thank you , 01:53:06.729 --> 01:53:09.089 Secretary Driscoll , uh , General Lane 01:53:09.089 --> 01:53:11.145 for testifying today , uh , uh , for 01:53:11.145 --> 01:53:13.422 the classified briefing which was , uh , 01:53:13.422 --> 01:53:15.311 uh , terrific . I appreciate your 01:53:15.311 --> 01:53:17.311 service . I wanna talk a little bit 01:53:17.311 --> 01:53:19.311 about duty status reform because as 01:53:19.311 --> 01:53:21.367 evidenced in recent operations , the 01:53:21.367 --> 01:53:23.311 National Guard is . Evolved from a 01:53:23.311 --> 01:53:25.709 strategic reserve into a consistently 01:53:25.709 --> 01:53:27.487 operational force , the reserve 01:53:27.487 --> 01:53:29.376 components are now relied upon at 01:53:29.376 --> 01:53:31.153 unprecedented rate , a pace for 01:53:31.153 --> 01:53:33.589 overseas deployment and state emergency 01:53:33.589 --> 01:53:35.950 activations , often with a disparity of 01:53:35.950 --> 01:53:38.006 entitlements depending on their duty 01:53:38.006 --> 01:53:40.660 status . Reserve component soldiers 01:53:40.660 --> 01:53:42.771 experienced a bureaucratic inequities 01:53:42.771 --> 01:53:46.700 of no fewer than 29 , 29 01:53:46.700 --> 01:53:48.867 different and cumbersome duty statuses 01:53:49.020 --> 01:53:51.131 which prevent them from receiving the 01:53:51.131 --> 01:53:53.242 same pay and benefits as their active 01:53:53.242 --> 01:53:55.353 duty counterparts performing the same 01:53:55.353 --> 01:53:57.576 duties . So Secretary , uh , Driscoll , 01:53:57.576 --> 01:53:59.742 there is a DOD legislative proposal to 01:53:59.742 --> 01:54:02.220 fix this issue that OMB has not yet 01:54:02.220 --> 01:54:04.600 cleared for Congress to consider . And 01:54:04.600 --> 01:54:07.060 this is really hurting our , our guard . 01:54:07.310 --> 01:54:09.477 And so in the meantime , what specific 01:54:09.477 --> 01:54:11.643 initiatives is the army considering to 01:54:11.643 --> 01:54:13.699 modernize and consolidate these duty 01:54:13.699 --> 01:54:15.754 statuses ? Number one , you're gonna 01:54:15.754 --> 01:54:17.977 reduce administrative burden and you're 01:54:17.977 --> 01:54:19.699 gonna improve pay and benefits 01:54:19.699 --> 01:54:21.921 continuity and better support our guard 01:54:21.921 --> 01:54:24.143 and reserve soldiers and uh how are you 01:54:24.143 --> 01:54:26.254 gonna support duty status reform ? It 01:54:26.254 --> 01:54:28.477 is critical for retention , uh , taking 01:54:28.477 --> 01:54:30.366 care of our guard and reserve and 01:54:30.366 --> 01:54:32.421 retention of our guard and reserve . 01:54:32.839 --> 01:54:35.350 Yeah ma'am , first off , thanks , 01:54:35.509 --> 01:54:37.620 thanks for recognizing the , uh , 01:54:37.700 --> 01:54:41.660 incredible , um , Uh , commitment and 01:54:41.660 --> 01:54:43.938 impact that that all of the components , 01:54:43.938 --> 01:54:46.104 but especially our reserve and , and , 01:54:46.470 --> 01:54:49.430 and guard are , are playing right now , 01:54:49.439 --> 01:54:51.779 uh , across the globe . Uh , we are 01:54:51.779 --> 01:54:53.890 taking a look at this . We're , we're 01:54:53.890 --> 01:54:56.001 tied in , uh , with the department as 01:54:56.001 --> 01:54:58.168 they're , as they're looking at this , 01:54:58.168 --> 01:55:00.040 uh , broadly as a , as an entire 01:55:00.040 --> 01:55:02.020 department , uh , not just an army 01:55:02.020 --> 01:55:04.609 alone . Thank you . It , it is really 01:55:04.609 --> 01:55:06.720 critical , Secretary Driscoll . I , I 01:55:06.720 --> 01:55:08.776 think we have to do it across , uh , 01:55:08.776 --> 01:55:10.887 agency , across , uh , services , but 01:55:10.887 --> 01:55:13.053 it's really important and it's hurting 01:55:13.053 --> 01:55:14.942 our guard in Nevada and of course 01:55:14.942 --> 01:55:17.165 across the country . And Senator , they 01:55:17.165 --> 01:55:19.220 just handed me a note saying it just 01:55:19.220 --> 01:55:19.120 cleared OMB . It just cleared . Well , 01:55:19.359 --> 01:55:21.680 there you go , and that's how fast I 01:55:21.680 --> 01:55:23.847 asked the question , got it done , and 01:55:23.847 --> 01:55:25.958 that's how , and there , and there we 01:55:25.958 --> 01:55:28.013 go . Well , thank you for that . You 01:55:28.013 --> 01:55:27.839 made my day , of course , and I would 01:55:27.839 --> 01:55:29.839 just follow up really quickly , and 01:55:29.839 --> 01:55:31.895 this is a very boring thing we don't 01:55:31.895 --> 01:55:33.839 reference often , but our business 01:55:33.839 --> 01:55:36.006 systems like the . Duty status matters 01:55:36.006 --> 01:55:37.950 a lot , but it's also our business 01:55:37.950 --> 01:55:40.117 systems are failing our soldiers . And 01:55:40.117 --> 01:55:42.339 so this is the back end of how they get 01:55:42.339 --> 01:55:41.544 paid and how they get their benefits 01:55:41.544 --> 01:55:43.544 and how we treat it carefully why I 01:55:43.544 --> 01:55:45.877 brought it up as my number one question . 01:55:45.877 --> 01:55:47.988 Thank you . We are trying to optimize 01:55:47.988 --> 01:55:50.155 it all . I want to quickly in the time 01:55:50.155 --> 01:55:49.705 I have left , talk about the cyber 01:55:49.705 --> 01:55:53.305 workforce , the FY 24 NDAA included my 01:55:53.305 --> 01:55:55.472 bipartisan legislation authorizing the 01:55:55.472 --> 01:55:57.745 Army to create a civilian cybersecurity 01:55:57.745 --> 01:55:59.578 reserve to provide cybercom with 01:55:59.578 --> 01:56:01.745 qualified civilian personnel for surge 01:56:01.745 --> 01:56:03.856 capacity . Ensuring the US government 01:56:03.856 --> 01:56:06.023 has the cyber talent needed to respond 01:56:06.023 --> 01:56:08.419 to malicious activity and secure DOD's , 01:56:08.609 --> 01:56:10.776 uh , information and systems . I'm the 01:56:10.776 --> 01:56:12.609 ranking member on cyber Security 01:56:12.609 --> 01:56:14.887 Committee here . And so to both of you , 01:56:14.887 --> 01:56:17.053 can you provide a status update on the 01:56:17.053 --> 01:56:19.165 Army's implementation of the civilian 01:56:19.165 --> 01:56:22.740 cybersecurity reserve and , um . To the 01:56:22.740 --> 01:56:24.796 secretary , can you also add , given 01:56:24.796 --> 01:56:26.962 that cyber personnel are often able to 01:56:26.962 --> 01:56:29.540 earn significantly higher compensation 01:56:29.540 --> 01:56:31.596 outside of government service , what 01:56:31.596 --> 01:56:33.596 authorities or compensation reforms 01:56:33.596 --> 01:56:35.596 does the Army need from Congress to 01:56:35.596 --> 01:56:37.762 better compete with the private sector 01:56:37.762 --> 01:56:39.873 for elite cyber talent ? Um , how are 01:56:39.873 --> 01:56:41.984 you measuring that and what can we do 01:56:41.984 --> 01:56:45.080 to , uh , to help ? Um , Senator , this 01:56:45.080 --> 01:56:47.247 is a topic near and dear to my heart , 01:56:47.247 --> 01:56:49.358 um , that we will follow up with your 01:56:49.358 --> 01:56:51.700 office on a more , um , timely 01:56:51.879 --> 01:56:54.046 cybersecurity reserve update and so we 01:56:54.046 --> 01:56:56.157 can provide you an update on where it 01:56:56.157 --> 01:56:58.046 is . More broadly speaking , what 01:56:58.046 --> 01:57:00.319 authorities would we need ? Um , I 01:57:00.319 --> 01:57:02.319 think when you actually look at the 01:57:02.319 --> 01:57:04.680 threat from a peer or near peer , take 01:57:04.680 --> 01:57:07.013 China as an example , and their ability . 01:57:07.013 --> 01:57:09.350 To tie in their cyber talent into their 01:57:09.350 --> 01:57:11.572 research universities and their private 01:57:11.572 --> 01:57:13.739 companies , we as a nation do not have 01:57:13.739 --> 01:57:15.961 something like that , um , and all that 01:57:15.961 --> 01:57:18.128 guarantees is that we will not be able 01:57:18.128 --> 01:57:20.294 to keep up . What we do have is if you 01:57:20.294 --> 01:57:22.406 look at our models , um , from OpenAI 01:57:22.406 --> 01:57:24.709 and Google , all of those are first 01:57:24.709 --> 01:57:27.299 class . Best in , uh , class , but we 01:57:27.299 --> 01:57:29.299 need the human beings to be able to 01:57:29.299 --> 01:57:31.410 operate . So I want you , we're gonna 01:57:31.410 --> 01:57:33.410 do the mark in a few weeks , and as 01:57:33.410 --> 01:57:35.243 ranking member on cyber , I know 01:57:35.243 --> 01:57:37.355 Senator Rounds and I might prefer but 01:57:37.355 --> 01:57:37.350 really like to have that update from 01:57:37.350 --> 01:57:39.350 you if you could talk about that in 01:57:39.350 --> 01:57:41.406 general . There's just a few seconds 01:57:41.406 --> 01:57:43.683 left if you wanna talk about it at all . 01:57:43.683 --> 01:57:45.628 Otherwise I'm going to , uh , uh , 01:57:45.628 --> 01:57:47.628 yield to Senator Slotkin . Yeah , I 01:57:47.628 --> 01:57:49.794 concur with with Secretary Baham , and 01:57:49.794 --> 01:57:51.906 uh we'll follow back up with you on , 01:57:51.906 --> 01:57:51.899 on where we're at . The sooner the 01:57:51.899 --> 01:57:53.899 better . That way we have some good 01:57:53.899 --> 01:57:56.010 input for the mark in less than a few 01:57:56.010 --> 01:57:58.288 weeks now . Thank you . Thank you , Mr . 01:57:58.288 --> 01:58:00.455 Chairman . Thank you , Senator Rosen . 01:58:00.455 --> 01:58:02.621 Senator Slotin . Great . You're almost 01:58:02.621 --> 01:58:02.020 done . If you're , if you're to me , 01:58:02.100 --> 01:58:04.156 you're at the end , the bitter end . 01:58:04.156 --> 01:58:06.489 There is a vote on , but I think we can , 01:58:06.489 --> 01:58:08.711 we can both make it . Thank you . Thank 01:58:08.711 --> 01:58:10.878 you . I know I'm paying my dues here . 01:58:10.878 --> 01:58:13.044 Um , so two very different questions . 01:58:13.044 --> 01:58:15.459 Um , you know , thank you . I , I know 01:58:15.459 --> 01:58:17.681 Senator Peter said this too , but thank 01:58:17.681 --> 01:58:19.848 you for coming to Michigan last year , 01:58:19.848 --> 01:58:21.903 coming to see Northern Strike , um , 01:58:21.903 --> 01:58:24.015 biggest multi-domain exercise east of 01:58:24.015 --> 01:58:26.070 the Mississippi , um , and thank you 01:58:26.070 --> 01:58:28.310 for coming to Detroit as well to see 01:58:28.310 --> 01:58:30.310 some of the tech innovation we have 01:58:30.310 --> 01:58:32.643 going on . Given our manufacturing base , 01:58:32.643 --> 01:58:35.060 we really feel we can increase the 01:58:35.060 --> 01:58:36.939 number of military missions and 01:58:36.939 --> 01:58:39.050 contracts that we have coming through 01:58:39.050 --> 01:58:41.759 Michigan . Um , and , um , we talked , 01:58:41.839 --> 01:58:43.839 you know , you came and talked to a 01:58:43.839 --> 01:58:46.006 bunch of our , our defense contractors 01:58:46.006 --> 01:58:47.783 in Macomb County about the Army 01:58:47.783 --> 01:58:49.895 Transformation initiative , and while 01:58:49.895 --> 01:58:52.640 we want deeply to modernize , um , you 01:58:52.640 --> 01:58:54.751 know , there are certain things since 01:58:54.751 --> 01:58:56.973 we do land vehicles where we're kind of 01:58:56.973 --> 01:58:59.319 on the losing end of that experience , 01:58:59.439 --> 01:59:01.550 so we're trying to find other areas . 01:59:01.819 --> 01:59:04.209 Um , and I think where we're poised to 01:59:04.209 --> 01:59:05.987 really break out and become the 01:59:05.987 --> 01:59:08.729 nation's leader is on drone , R&D , and 01:59:08.729 --> 01:59:11.299 manufacturing . Um , and , you know , 01:59:11.339 --> 01:59:13.506 drones are becoming ubiquitous . I was 01:59:13.506 --> 01:59:15.395 just looking at where we had some 01:59:15.395 --> 01:59:17.561 deadly tornadoes . They did search and 01:59:17.561 --> 01:59:19.506 rescue via drone . Um , people are 01:59:19.506 --> 01:59:21.339 looking for their lost pets as a 01:59:21.339 --> 01:59:23.283 service now . You can hire a drone 01:59:23.283 --> 01:59:26.220 service . Um , uh , you know , we want 01:59:26.220 --> 01:59:28.387 to . Um , be poised , but what are the 01:59:28.387 --> 01:59:30.553 other things , you know , and , and we 01:59:30.553 --> 01:59:32.664 were very happy , I should say , just 01:59:32.664 --> 01:59:34.776 early this year , the Army designated 01:59:34.776 --> 01:59:36.887 one of our facilities up north as the 01:59:36.887 --> 01:59:39.220 first drone testing site in the country . 01:59:39.220 --> 01:59:41.331 So we feel like we're ready to really 01:59:41.331 --> 01:59:43.553 like take this to the next level . Um , 01:59:43.850 --> 01:59:45.850 how should we be thinking back home 01:59:45.850 --> 01:59:48.479 briefly about , um , advanced 01:59:48.479 --> 01:59:50.535 manufacturing using the capabilities 01:59:50.535 --> 01:59:52.770 that Michigan in particularly , in 01:59:52.770 --> 01:59:55.029 particular has to serving the next 01:59:55.029 --> 01:59:56.918 generation of , of Army soldier , 01:59:57.529 --> 01:59:59.959 Senator , the , the , I think . 02:00:01.279 --> 02:00:03.557 Your state in particular with its deep , 02:00:03.557 --> 02:00:06.200 rich manufacturing history , um , can 02:00:06.200 --> 02:00:09.560 help us solve a problem that Globally , 02:00:09.759 --> 02:00:12.600 we are still gapped as a human species , 02:00:12.680 --> 02:00:14.902 but then specifically the United States 02:00:14.902 --> 02:00:17.069 Army for conflict . These larger Group 02:00:17.069 --> 02:00:19.859 3 , Group 4 , Group 5 drones , um , 02:00:20.240 --> 02:00:22.080 when we , when we complement the 02:00:22.080 --> 02:00:23.802 Russians and we complement the 02:00:23.802 --> 02:00:25.802 Ukrainians , what we really mean is 02:00:25.802 --> 02:00:28.024 they're , they're very good at building 02:00:28.024 --> 02:00:30.080 the smaller ones . The larger ones , 02:00:30.080 --> 02:00:32.191 the types of drones that will one day 02:00:32.191 --> 02:00:34.413 be able to supplement or someday far in 02:00:34.413 --> 02:00:36.358 the future replace things like the 02:00:36.358 --> 02:00:38.413 Apache . are much larger , much more 02:00:38.413 --> 02:00:40.524 difficult to build , require a lot of 02:00:40.524 --> 02:00:42.247 deep expertise and a lot of um 02:00:42.330 --> 02:00:44.441 investment . And so that is a place I 02:00:44.441 --> 02:00:46.497 think when , when we look out at the 02:00:46.497 --> 02:00:48.608 assets we as a nation have , we think 02:00:48.608 --> 02:00:50.990 Michigan and Camp Grayling can help us 02:00:50.990 --> 02:00:53.450 um . Refine what we're working on and 02:00:53.450 --> 02:00:55.783 help expand it and scale it . Yeah , we , 02:00:55.783 --> 02:00:57.894 we want to be good partners in that , 02:00:57.894 --> 02:01:00.006 and , you know , we're the arsenal of 02:01:00.006 --> 02:01:01.783 democracy and , and have a rich 02:01:01.783 --> 02:01:03.839 tradition of , of , you know , being 02:01:03.839 --> 02:01:05.894 there when our country needs us . So 02:01:05.894 --> 02:01:05.500 would love to talk to you more about 02:01:05.500 --> 02:01:07.700 that . Um , break , break , separate 02:01:07.700 --> 02:01:10.500 topic . You were up in , um , at Camp 02:01:10.500 --> 02:01:12.819 Grayling , um , which is Grayling , 02:01:12.899 --> 02:01:15.580 Michigan , which has , like other 02:01:15.580 --> 02:01:17.636 military communities , had a problem 02:01:17.636 --> 02:01:21.370 with PFOS contamination . Um , and , um , 02:01:21.459 --> 02:01:24.580 I met via Zoom with a bunch of local 02:01:24.580 --> 02:01:26.691 community advocates . These are folks 02:01:26.691 --> 02:01:28.524 who are deeply supportive of the 02:01:28.524 --> 02:01:30.691 military presence . This is not . Um , 02:01:30.691 --> 02:01:32.691 just like we have in , in other Air 02:01:32.691 --> 02:01:34.913 Force and former Air Force locations in 02:01:34.913 --> 02:01:36.913 Michigan , up in Oscoda , these are 02:01:36.913 --> 02:01:39.136 people who believe in the mission , but 02:01:39.136 --> 02:01:41.358 they can't drink their well water . The 02:01:41.358 --> 02:01:43.413 lake that Camp Grayling is on , Lake 02:01:43.413 --> 02:01:45.469 Marguerite , like people can't , you 02:01:45.469 --> 02:01:47.524 know , they can't drink the water in 02:01:47.524 --> 02:01:49.413 that area . There's concerns when 02:01:49.413 --> 02:01:51.413 there's foam . They can't let their 02:01:51.413 --> 02:01:53.636 kids or their dogs touch that foam . So 02:01:53.636 --> 02:01:55.747 it's a real , it's a real thing , and 02:01:55.747 --> 02:01:57.580 the , the , the army does have a 02:01:57.580 --> 02:01:59.413 responsibility . There was a $20 02:01:59.413 --> 02:02:01.580 million set aside by the army to clean 02:02:01.580 --> 02:02:03.802 that up , and early this year , um , we 02:02:03.802 --> 02:02:05.969 got the word that they want to do more 02:02:05.969 --> 02:02:07.899 testing before they engage in any 02:02:07.899 --> 02:02:10.259 cleanup . Um , and I just , we've had , 02:02:10.319 --> 02:02:12.652 I've seen this movie with the Air Force , 02:02:12.819 --> 02:02:14.839 um , and I just am asking your 02:02:14.910 --> 02:02:17.709 commitment . Um , uh , we understand 02:02:17.709 --> 02:02:19.876 that testing may need to go on for the 02:02:19.876 --> 02:02:21.990 rest of this calendar year , but that 02:02:21.990 --> 02:02:24.589 has often been used as a way to push 02:02:24.589 --> 02:02:26.899 off and never take responsibility when 02:02:26.899 --> 02:02:28.843 people are literally having to buy 02:02:28.843 --> 02:02:30.955 their own water or get it provided to 02:02:30.955 --> 02:02:33.066 them . So , can I get your commitment 02:02:33.066 --> 02:02:35.288 that you'll look at this particularly . 02:02:35.310 --> 02:02:38.870 And that we will not go beyond 2026 for 02:02:38.870 --> 02:02:40.814 that additional testing . So these 02:02:40.814 --> 02:02:42.814 people have some remediation , some 02:02:42.814 --> 02:02:45.092 cleanup of their wells . Uh , I commit , 02:02:45.092 --> 02:02:47.314 Senator , following up with your office 02:02:47.314 --> 02:02:49.537 with a very clear answer . I don't know 02:02:49.537 --> 02:02:49.270 the specifics of the timing of the 02:02:49.270 --> 02:02:51.870 testing , um , but , but my , my 02:02:51.870 --> 02:02:53.592 experience has been we don't . 02:02:53.592 --> 02:02:55.870 Intentionally do those things to delay . 02:02:55.870 --> 02:02:57.981 So , um , I will check in and we will 02:02:57.981 --> 02:03:00.203 follow up . Yeah , I think there's been 02:03:00.203 --> 02:03:02.314 generations of folks on , again , not 02:03:02.314 --> 02:03:04.426 just Army , other services , but this 02:03:04.426 --> 02:03:04.109 is not the beginning of this movie , 02:03:04.220 --> 02:03:06.220 right ? It may be new to you guys . 02:03:06.220 --> 02:03:08.331 It's not new to these communities and 02:03:08.331 --> 02:03:10.276 we just ask for your commitment to 02:03:10.276 --> 02:03:12.276 follow up . Any of us , if we had a 02:03:12.276 --> 02:03:14.442 home on a lake , would want to be able 02:03:14.442 --> 02:03:16.609 to have our kids swim there safely and 02:03:16.609 --> 02:03:18.831 drink the water . So we just appreciate 02:03:18.831 --> 02:03:20.887 you looking into it . Thank you . So 02:03:20.887 --> 02:03:23.620 Slain , how long has this been a known 02:03:23.620 --> 02:03:27.540 problem ? So both in Army communities 02:03:27.540 --> 02:03:29.484 and in former Air Force base up in 02:03:29.484 --> 02:03:32.620 Ocoda , um , years and years , and at 02:03:32.620 --> 02:03:34.953 this point it's got to be over a decade . 02:03:35.339 --> 02:03:37.339 We have some Michigan residents who 02:03:37.339 --> 02:03:39.770 have more PFOS in their blood than any 02:03:39.770 --> 02:03:42.890 other human beings on Earth . So , and 02:03:42.890 --> 02:03:45.001 again these are dedicated communities 02:03:45.001 --> 02:03:48.035 who love the military . But can't like 02:03:48.035 --> 02:03:50.257 send their kids to certain summer camps 02:03:50.257 --> 02:03:52.368 because there's so much contamination 02:03:52.368 --> 02:03:54.555 in their local lakes . So this was an 02:03:54.555 --> 02:03:56.555 issue I'm big on in the House and I 02:03:56.875 --> 02:03:58.819 continue to be hammering it in the 02:03:58.819 --> 02:04:00.875 Senate . Would love your help , Mr . 02:04:00.875 --> 02:04:02.597 Chairman . Thank you , Senator 02:04:02.597 --> 02:04:04.597 Duckworth . Thank you Mr . Chairman 02:04:04.597 --> 02:04:06.819 Secretary Driscoll I appreciated , um , 02:04:06.819 --> 02:04:09.097 our meeting yesterday . Thank you , uh , 02:04:09.097 --> 02:04:10.931 especially when you committed to 02:04:10.931 --> 02:04:13.153 providing the families of the DCA crash 02:04:13.153 --> 02:04:15.270 victims the findings from any Army 02:04:15.379 --> 02:04:17.490 investigations without any additional 02:04:17.490 --> 02:04:19.657 administrative hurdles from my seat on 02:04:19.657 --> 02:04:21.601 both this committee and commerce , 02:04:21.601 --> 02:04:23.601 Science and Transportation , I look 02:04:23.601 --> 02:04:23.229 forward to working with you to 02:04:23.229 --> 02:04:25.340 implement . Necessary reforms to make 02:04:25.340 --> 02:04:27.562 sure that our airspace is safe both for 02:04:27.562 --> 02:04:29.507 the flying public but also for our 02:04:29.507 --> 02:04:31.935 warfighters as well . Um , I , I do 02:04:31.935 --> 02:04:34.102 want now to turn to the Army's organic 02:04:34.102 --> 02:04:36.055 industrial base in my state , Rock 02:04:36.055 --> 02:04:37.999 Island Arsenal is home to critical 02:04:37.999 --> 02:04:39.722 manufacturing of munitions and 02:04:39.722 --> 02:04:42.055 equipment . The Joint Munitions Command , 02:04:42.055 --> 02:04:43.833 which delivers munitions to the 02:04:43.833 --> 02:04:45.999 battlefield , and the Army Sustainment 02:04:45.999 --> 02:04:45.950 Command , which drives the Army's 02:04:45.950 --> 02:04:48.509 logistics enterprise to name only a few 02:04:48.509 --> 02:04:50.899 of the arsenal's critical functions . 02:04:51.410 --> 02:04:53.521 So as I mentioned to you , I was very 02:04:53.521 --> 02:04:55.521 concerned to hear in March that the 02:04:55.521 --> 02:04:57.743 Army was suddenly reassigning employees 02:04:57.743 --> 02:04:59.354 who manage our munitions and 02:04:59.354 --> 02:05:01.410 sustainment in the middle of a war . 02:05:01.410 --> 02:05:03.410 Over the past two months I've heard 02:05:03.410 --> 02:05:05.243 from constituents who instead of 02:05:05.243 --> 02:05:07.410 focusing on their missions were thrust 02:05:07.410 --> 02:05:09.299 into personal turmoil by the army 02:05:09.299 --> 02:05:11.589 through a hasty personnel campaign . In 02:05:11.589 --> 02:05:13.830 March , as many as 155 civilian workers 02:05:13.830 --> 02:05:15.719 at Rock Island , many of whom are 02:05:15.719 --> 02:05:17.941 veterans themselves , were told , and I 02:05:17.941 --> 02:05:20.589 quote , that they were surplus 02:05:20.589 --> 02:05:22.859 employees , end quote , and they were 02:05:22.859 --> 02:05:24.915 left in limbo for weeks worried that 02:05:24.915 --> 02:05:27.081 they would lose their jobs , with many 02:05:27.081 --> 02:05:29.137 only being able , being told later , 02:05:29.137 --> 02:05:31.359 much later , weeks later , never mind . 02:05:31.359 --> 02:05:33.137 Some of these so-called surplus 02:05:33.137 --> 02:05:35.248 employees were given only 2 to 5 days 02:05:35.248 --> 02:05:37.729 to accept a job out of state and uproot 02:05:37.729 --> 02:05:40.009 their families or face termination from 02:05:40.009 --> 02:05:43.560 civil service . 2 to 5 days , that's it . 02:05:44.709 --> 02:05:46.709 2 to 5 days to make a life altering 02:05:46.709 --> 02:05:48.931 career decision . I don't think this is 02:05:48.931 --> 02:05:51.153 how we should be treating our patriotic 02:05:51.153 --> 02:05:53.320 career civilians , and my constituents 02:05:53.320 --> 02:05:55.431 are worried about the still uncertain 02:05:55.431 --> 02:05:55.189 merger of two critical commands , the 02:05:55.189 --> 02:05:57.245 Joint Munitions Command and the Army 02:05:57.245 --> 02:05:59.467 Sustainment Command , and what it means 02:05:59.467 --> 02:06:01.467 for their jobs and their missions . 02:06:01.467 --> 02:06:03.578 Secretary Driscoll , do you commit to 02:06:03.578 --> 02:06:05.745 notifying me and this committee before 02:06:05.745 --> 02:06:07.745 any additional workforce changes at 02:06:07.745 --> 02:06:09.800 Rock Island Arsenal , including from 02:06:09.800 --> 02:06:12.149 the merger at JMC and ASC ? Um , 02:06:12.509 --> 02:06:14.676 Senator , to all of your remarks , and 02:06:14.676 --> 02:06:16.453 it was helpful meeting with you 02:06:16.453 --> 02:06:18.676 yesterday . Um , Those populations , we 02:06:18.676 --> 02:06:20.898 aspire to do what was right . We aspire 02:06:20.898 --> 02:06:23.009 to be thoughtful . Um , giving 2 to 5 02:06:23.009 --> 02:06:25.176 days is , uh , probably not sufficient 02:06:25.176 --> 02:06:27.509 for that decision in hindsight . And so , 02:06:27.509 --> 02:06:29.453 uh , my commitment to you is after 02:06:29.453 --> 02:06:31.676 meeting with you , I went back , talked 02:06:31.676 --> 02:06:31.509 to the team , and we will try if we 02:06:31.509 --> 02:06:34.200 have to do similar , um , have similar 02:06:34.259 --> 02:06:36.939 conversations to , uh , give more time 02:06:36.939 --> 02:06:39.161 and more grace for people to make these 02:06:39.161 --> 02:06:41.383 big decisions . Uh , to your question , 02:06:41.383 --> 02:06:43.495 Senator , we will do our very best to 02:06:43.495 --> 02:06:45.661 include you in your office in any sort 02:06:45.661 --> 02:06:47.772 of hiring that we have to do for Rock 02:06:47.772 --> 02:06:49.883 Island . Any , will you contact us um 02:06:49.883 --> 02:06:51.790 before any , uh , uh , before it 02:06:51.790 --> 02:06:54.870 actually takes place ? Um 02:06:55.589 --> 02:06:57.645 Especially if you're terminating big 02:06:57.645 --> 02:06:59.867 people , Senator , I'm not intending to 02:06:59.867 --> 02:07:01.990 pause , uh , necessarily . I , um , I 02:07:01.990 --> 02:07:04.157 am trying to think through the process 02:07:04.157 --> 02:07:05.879 of if we had to get rid of one 02:07:05.879 --> 02:07:05.700 individual because of some sort of , no , 02:07:05.910 --> 02:07:07.632 I mean , I mean like an effort 02:07:07.632 --> 02:07:09.854 generally the spirit of your question , 02:07:09.854 --> 02:07:11.910 yes , OK , thank you . Uh , shifting 02:07:11.910 --> 02:07:14.021 gears to another issue , the domestic 02:07:14.021 --> 02:07:15.966 misuse of the military in American 02:07:15.966 --> 02:07:18.021 cities and the taxpayers' waste that 02:07:18.021 --> 02:07:17.850 has gone with it . Months ago , 02:07:17.970 --> 02:07:19.748 President Trump claimed that he 02:07:19.748 --> 02:07:21.748 mobilized 500 National Guard men to 02:07:21.748 --> 02:07:23.859 reduce crime in Chicago , his words , 02:07:23.859 --> 02:07:25.914 but they never set foot in Chicago . 02:07:25.914 --> 02:07:27.748 They stayed confined to bases in 02:07:27.748 --> 02:07:29.970 Illinois because federal courts and and 02:07:29.970 --> 02:07:31.637 our Supreme Court found their 02:07:31.637 --> 02:07:33.748 deployment illegal and cost taxpayers 02:07:33.748 --> 02:07:36.549 $21 million in the process . But 02:07:36.549 --> 02:07:38.382 President Trump's obsession with 02:07:38.382 --> 02:07:40.271 misusing the military in American 02:07:40.271 --> 02:07:42.327 streets is not over , and he in fact 02:07:42.327 --> 02:07:44.549 often threatens to deploy the guard for 02:07:44.549 --> 02:07:46.549 political purposes , from saying he 02:07:46.549 --> 02:07:45.870 might send them to airports to 02:07:45.870 --> 02:07:48.092 lamenting he should have had them , and 02:07:48.092 --> 02:07:50.314 these are his words , seize the ballots 02:07:50.314 --> 02:07:52.537 in 2020 . So this is not hypothetical , 02:07:52.537 --> 02:07:54.314 he said that . And don't forget 02:07:54.314 --> 02:07:56.314 thousands of guardsmen are still in 02:07:56.314 --> 02:07:58.370 Washington DC under no valid mission 02:07:58.370 --> 02:08:00.537 and are and also are doing so at great 02:08:00.537 --> 02:08:02.759 taxpayer expense . In fact , for fiscal 02:08:02.759 --> 02:08:04.981 year 2027 , the president is requesting 02:08:04.981 --> 02:08:08.209 $605 million for DC deployment of the 02:08:08.209 --> 02:08:10.970 National Guard . Just outside the walls 02:08:10.970 --> 02:08:13.192 of this building , guardsmen are forced 02:08:13.192 --> 02:08:15.526 to be away from their families and jobs , 02:08:15.526 --> 02:08:17.859 to rove around the city in packs of six , 02:08:17.859 --> 02:08:20.192 bored , picking up trash , or gardening . 02:08:20.192 --> 02:08:22.414 All while the National Guard has actual 02:08:22.414 --> 02:08:24.526 missions to train for like responding 02:08:24.526 --> 02:08:26.637 to natural disasters or preparing for 02:08:26.637 --> 02:08:28.748 combat , and I'd like to discuss some 02:08:28.748 --> 02:08:28.129 of the ways the Army could better use 02:08:28.129 --> 02:08:30.410 the 605 million that the president 02:08:30.410 --> 02:08:32.188 wants to waste on unnecessarily 02:08:32.188 --> 02:08:34.354 deploying the military to the nation's 02:08:34.354 --> 02:08:36.466 capital . Secretary Driscoll , yes or 02:08:36.466 --> 02:08:38.632 no , do you agree with the call on the 02:08:38.632 --> 02:08:40.521 Army transformation initiative to 02:08:40.521 --> 02:08:42.521 expand pre-positioned stocks in the 02:08:42.521 --> 02:08:45.890 Indo-Pacific ? Yes , 02:08:46.520 --> 02:08:49.240 well , for $605 million the army could 02:08:49.240 --> 02:08:51.310 fund 11 times the preposition stocks 02:08:51.310 --> 02:08:53.477 for repair parts and supplies in Japan 02:08:53.477 --> 02:08:55.366 and Korea than it had last year . 02:08:55.399 --> 02:08:57.759 That's what $605 million could pay for . 02:08:58.000 --> 02:09:00.167 I'll give you another example . Yes or 02:09:00.167 --> 02:09:02.167 no ? Do you agree that soldiers and 02:09:02.167 --> 02:09:04.000 their families deserve access to 02:09:04.000 --> 02:09:06.279 affordable healthcare ? Yes , for 605 02:09:06.279 --> 02:09:08.720 million for that DC deployment , the 02:09:08.720 --> 02:09:11.839 army could provide 15,125 military 02:09:11.839 --> 02:09:14.350 families IVF treatments . Instead of 02:09:14.350 --> 02:09:16.461 misusing the guard to stoke his ego , 02:09:16.461 --> 02:09:18.683 President Trump could keep his campaign 02:09:18.683 --> 02:09:20.794 promise , and I quote , these are his 02:09:20.794 --> 02:09:22.906 words , he wants to pay for all costs 02:09:22.906 --> 02:09:25.072 associated with IVF treatments for our 02:09:25.072 --> 02:09:27.017 heroes . I urge Congress to invest 02:09:27.017 --> 02:09:26.859 these funds where it really matters . 02:09:27.069 --> 02:09:29.830 Thank you . Thank you , Senator 02:09:30.250 --> 02:09:32.139 Duckworth . I'd like to thank our 02:09:32.139 --> 02:09:34.279 witnesses for their testimony . 20 02:09:34.649 --> 02:09:38.229 members have been able to ask 02:09:38.229 --> 02:09:41.169 questions during this open hearing for 02:09:41.169 --> 02:09:43.336 the information of members . Questions 02:09:43.336 --> 02:09:45.250 for the record will be due to the 02:09:45.250 --> 02:09:47.472 committee within 2 business days of the 02:09:47.472 --> 02:09:49.609 conclusion of this hearing , which is 02:09:49.609 --> 02:09:51.089 right now . We are adjourned .