WEBVTT

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And now we meet today to receive

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testimony in open session . On the

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posture of United States Special

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Operations Command . United States

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Cyber Command . We're joined by Admiral

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Mitch Bradley , commander of the United

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States Special Operations Command ,

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General Joshua Rudd . Commander of

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the United States Cyber Command and

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director of the National Security

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Agency , Mr . Derek Anderson ,

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Assistant Secretary of Defense for

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Special Operations and low intensity

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conflict , and Ms . Katie Sutton ,

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Assistant Secretary of Defense for

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cyber Policy , and um , all members are .

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reminded to silence . Their devices ,

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including the chair . Um , recent

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operations , including Absolute Resolve ,

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Midnight Hammer , and Epic Fury ,

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represent a watershed moment for

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American military power . Each

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operation wove cyber effects into the

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fabric of joint force operations at the

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beginning of planning . Consequently ,

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our cyber operators were able to

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illustrate the potential of these

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capabilities as a force multiplier

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unlike any other . We must ensure that

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the lessons learned from recent

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operations are fully digested and

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integrated into our doctrine and

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planning . However , we cannot allow

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these successes to lull us into

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complacency . Cyber threats are

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immediate . Persistent , and they are

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escalating . Every day our adversaries

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target America's critical

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infrastructure and government networks .

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They're advancing their capabilities to

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outpace and outcompete our forces in

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cyberspace , and we must not allow that .

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To keep up with these threats , we must

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redouble our efforts to modernize and

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strengthen . American cyber forces .

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Doing so requires us to make

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fundamental updates to the way military

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services generate , organize , and

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sustain cyber forces . This effort is

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as ambitious as it is necessary . The

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Pentagon has launched a department-wide

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initiative , Cybercom 2.0 .

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To increase skill and readiness of our

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cyber forces , this initiative is

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simple . Just like any other military

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service , we will need well-trained , a

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well-trained pipeline of cyber

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operators supported by a whole range of

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acquisition professionals , and we do

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not have that today . Perhaps have

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testimony about how far along we are .

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Our , our cyber operators are working

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overtime . And we're not ready to

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generate new forces to replace them .

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I'm troubled that this effort is not

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moving fast enough . Current operations

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will always be priority number one ,

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but we must ensure this pace is

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sustainable . Our cyber operators are

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not the only highly specialized forces

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in demand . America's special

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operations forces are more important

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now than ever before . No longer

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confined to their traditional role as a

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force of last resort , special

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operations forces often serve as a

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first choice across the full spectrum

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of military action .

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Special operations forces conduct

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direct action against high value

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targets as we witnessed during the raid

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to apprehend Nicolas Maduro from his

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heavily fortified compound outside

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Caracas . They train and advise partner

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forces , building capacity and

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strengthening alliances across Latin

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America , Europe , and the first island

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changes they . Gather intelligence

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against our adversaries and hostile

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environments . They respond to crises

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worldwide at a moment's notice , and

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they operate in the gray zone between

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peace and war , um , the context in

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which much of today's strategic

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competition unfolds , however , the

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funding provided to Special Operations

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Command has not kept pace with the

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seemingly insatiable demand for its

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capabilities . The command faces a

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troubling gap between its mission

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requirements and available resources ,

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and I do think there's consensus on

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both sides of the dais and both sides

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of the aisle to correct that as soon as

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we can . Last year , General Brian

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Fenton , then commander of Special

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Operations Command , stated before this

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committee , and I'm going to quote ,

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General Fenton , we continue to grapple

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with years of flat budgets . A

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14% decrease in buying power ,

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significant personnel reductions , and

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the requirement to evolve our

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technology and authorities . All this

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forces trade-offs , tough choices that

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challenge current missions and put

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modernization at risk . End of quote

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from General Fenton . Uh , ladies and

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gentlemen , unfortunately , the $1.6

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billion increase in last year's

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reconciliation funding was not fully

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applied to the purpose for which

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Congress intended it . Perhaps we could

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discuss that today . This morning , I

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looked to Admiral Bradley and Secretary

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Anderson to tell us . To tell this

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committee what they need , I hope they

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will tell us how to equip their force

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to combat the advanced militaries of

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China and Russia , to remain fully

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engaged in the fight against violent

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Islamic terrorism , and to respond at a

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moment's notice as our nation's premier .

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Crisis response force and with that I

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recognize my friend and colleague , the

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Ranking Member Reed , for his opening

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remarks . Thank you very much , Mr .

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Chairman , and welcome , uh , Admiral

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Bradley and General Rudd , Mr .

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Anderson and Ms . Sutton . Thank you

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very much and please convey our .

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Thanks , our deep thanks to the men and

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women under your commands . Tomorrow

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marks 2 months since President Trump

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launched the war with Iran . Both

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Special Operations Command and Cyber

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Command are deeply engaged in this

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conflict . Our special operatives and

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cyber forces have played a major role

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in enabling combat operations ,

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conducting information warfare . And

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providing intelligence support ,

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including the remarkable mission to

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rescue the crew of the F-15 aircraft

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shot down in Iran earlier this month .

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This hearing is a reminder that modern

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warfare requires a full integration of

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every element of American military

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power . Today I would like our

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witnesses to provide updates on how

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their personnel are engaged in the war

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with Iran and what lessons should be

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drawn for future conflicts . Admiral

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Bradley , our special operations forces

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are unparalleled , but they are not

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without limits . I am concerned the

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administration has been deploying your

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forces at an unsustainable pace and for

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uh missions that . Could be questioned

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over the past year , SOCOM has led and

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executed the attack on Venezuela to

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capture Nicolas Maduro , the boat

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strike campaign in the Caribbean and

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Pacific , and various operations

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throughout the Middle East and Africa .

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I have serious concerns about Operation

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Southern Sphere in particular . Our

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service members have been ordered to

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strike and kill hundreds of suspected

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criminals in the open ocean over the

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past 8 months , placing them in legally

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and ethically perilous circumstances .

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I would ask for an update on SOCOM's

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role in Southern Spear and its missions

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in the region moving forward .

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Additionally , Admiral Bradley , in

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your prepared statement , you rightly

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discuss how warfare is increasingly

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defined by , in your words ,

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competition below the threshold of

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armed conflict . In essence , a gray

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zone environment that is precisely

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where our special operations forces

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should be most affected , and I would

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ask for your plans . To prepare our

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special forces for such environments

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and what impact today's high operations

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tempo could have on future readiness .

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Similarly , Mr . Anderson , I would

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appreciate an update on the role of our

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special operations in advising US

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partners in Europe and the Indo-Pacific .

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And what steps you are taking to help

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equip and modernize our forces . I

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would also ask for an update on your

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efforts to strengthen the abilities of

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your office to fill its service

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secretary-like responsibilities for the

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oversight of the organization and

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readiness of our special operations

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forces . General Rudd , Ms . Sutton , I

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understand you are conducting a cyber

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2.0 force structure review . I welcome

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such a review . The current cyber

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mission force design is more than a

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decade old , and chronic readiness

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problems persist . Our most skilled

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cyber operators are highly sought after

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in the private sector , and the

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military cannot easily match , uh , the

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financial incentives that they're

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presented with . As such , a

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professional attrition in cybercom

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remains high . I would appreciate an

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update on the force design changes you

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are considering and how such changes

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could affect the joint cyber warfare

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warfare fighting architecture .

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Additionally . This committee has been

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briefed in closed session about the

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cyber activities used during recent

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operations like Midnight Hammer and

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Absolute Resolve . I would like to

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understand in open session how you are

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integrating cyber effects into combat

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missions and operational planning and

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where shortfalls remain that can be

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addressed through legislation . Finally ,

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Ms . Sutton , your office is new and

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its mandate is very consequential .

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Providing civilian oversight and

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advocacy for Cybercom , I would like to

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hear how you . Our structuring your

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office , whether you are adequately

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resourced and how you are working

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across the department to improve

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acquisition functions and civilian

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hiring authorities for the command .

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Thank you again , uh , all of you that

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the missions of SOCOM and CyberCom are

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indispensable to our national security ,

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and I look forward to your testimony .

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Thank you , Mr . Chairman . All right ,

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Secretary Anderson , I think we'll

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start with you on opening statements ,

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um , if you don't mind , and I know you ,

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you , um . You , you gave

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Full statement in the classified

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section , but , but feel free to go

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ahead and , and , uh . Tell us what you

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have in mind . Thank you , uh , Senator ,

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and I appreciate that , uh , Chairman

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Wicker , Ranking Member Reed , and

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other distinguished members of the

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committee , thank you for the

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opportunity to testify in the global

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posture of our nation's special

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operations forces . I'm honored to

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testify alongside Assistant Secretary

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Catherine Sutton , Admiral Mitch

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Bradley , and uh , General Joshua Rudd .

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The SOLAT team together with their US

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SOCOM counterparts bring invaluable

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expertise , leadership , and insight as

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we advocate on behalf of the SOF

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Enterprise , our service members and

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their families . People are the

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foundation of SOF and of the joint

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force . They are our competitive

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advantage against our adversaries . We

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are thankful for those who have

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volunteered to serve , those currently

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in harm's way , and those who have made

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the ultimate sacrifice , including the

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13 US service members we've lost during

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ongoing operations . We honor their

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lives and legacy and we'll never forget

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the sacrifices in defense of our

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country . Today's security environment

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is defined by simultaneity ,

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convergence , and speed . State

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adversaries , terrorist organizations ,

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and transnational criminal networks are

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increasingly aligned , technologically

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enabled , and active across domains and

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regions . To answer these challenges ,

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the national defense strategy marks a

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fundamental shift , directing the

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Department of War to implement a

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flexible , realistic approach to

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protect America's interests .

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Purpose-built for this era , SOft

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provides capability and optionality .

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Comprising only 3% of the joint force

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and less than 2% of the department's

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budget , roughly equivalent to the

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procurement cost of a single aircraft

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carrier , SOft delivers outsized

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strategic value . SOft provides senior

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leaders with scalable , tailorable ,

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and asymmetric options across the full

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spectrum of competition and conflict ,

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leveraging persistent global presence ,

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generational relationships , and unique

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authorities . The quiet professionals

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within SOft shape the operating

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environment , strengthen partners , and

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impose costs on our adversaries . While

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you may not read about it in the

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headlines , every major operation has a

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soft component to it . Operations like

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Southern Spear , Rough Rider , Midnight

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Hammer , Absolute Resolve , and Epic

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Fury have demonstrated our nation's

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prowess and commitment to confront our

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adversaries wherever they may be . From

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the Western Hemisphere across the

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Indo-Pacific to the Middle East ,

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Africa , Europe , and beyond , SOF has

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been decisive in defending the homeland ,

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deterring China , and enabling our

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partners and allies . Should deterrence

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fail , SOFT's posture with the joint

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force to prevail in high-end conflict ,

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in accordance with the law and

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congressional guidance of which we are

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immensely grateful . The department has

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taken decisive and concrete steps to

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institutionalize SOLIC's oversight and

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advocacy role and strengthen the

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governance of the SOft enterprise .

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Over the last year and a half , we've

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transformed the Secretariat for Special

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Operations to provide direct civilian

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oversight across organized , train ,

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and equip responsibilities , not to

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duplicate or disrupt the operational

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execution role of US SOCOM , but to

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support , sustain , and strengthen it .

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This transformation moves us beyond the

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old advisory construct to a true

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exercise of authority , direction and

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control through an analytical ,

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disciplined , data-driven , and

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strategically sound approach . While

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the maturation of these initiatives is

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ongoing , these foundational changes

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fulfill congressional intent and

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provide the oversight mechanisms needed

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to shape for structure , guide

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budgetary and planning processes , and

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forge the future of SORF . The

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optionality that SOF delivers requires

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resourcing and investments to maintain

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our competitive edge , SOFT needs

14:05.428 --> 14:07.428
sustained partnership , predictable

14:07.428 --> 14:08.928
resourcing , and continued

14:08.928 --> 14:11.039
modernization . We greatly appreciate

14:11.039 --> 14:13.261
the support from this committee , and I

14:13.261 --> 14:15.428
commit to continued collaboration with

14:15.428 --> 14:15.369
Congress and to make full use of my

14:15.369 --> 14:17.091
position in the department and

14:17.091 --> 14:19.147
alongside the services to ensure SOF

14:19.147 --> 14:21.313
remains resourced , ready , relevant ,

14:21.313 --> 14:23.369
and accountable , and to ensure that

14:23.369 --> 14:25.425
they can meet today's missions while

14:25.425 --> 14:27.702
transforming for tomorrow's challenges .

14:27.702 --> 14:29.813
I'm honored to lead the lead the soft

14:29.813 --> 14:31.980
enterprise . I invite you to visit our

14:31.980 --> 14:31.289
special operators and their families

14:31.289 --> 14:33.345
across the globe to see firsthand in

14:33.345 --> 14:35.067
the great work they do and the

14:35.067 --> 14:37.011
challenges they face . Our service

14:37.011 --> 14:39.067
members and their families represent

14:39.067 --> 14:41.122
the finest that America has to offer

14:41.122 --> 14:43.345
and are something we as a nation should

14:43.345 --> 14:45.122
be proud of . Thank you for the

14:45.122 --> 14:45.049
opportunity to testify . I look forward

14:45.049 --> 14:47.049
to your questions . OK , let's go ,

14:47.049 --> 14:49.130
Admiral Bradley , and then we'll do

14:49.130 --> 14:51.570
Secretary Sutton and General Rudd .

14:51.969 --> 14:54.247
Admiral , you're recognized . Chairman ,

14:54.247 --> 14:56.358
thank you , Chairman Wicker , Ranking

14:56.358 --> 14:58.580
Member Reed , and distinguished members

14:58.580 --> 15:00.691
of this of this committee . Thank you

15:00.691 --> 15:00.169
for the opportunity to represent the

15:00.169 --> 15:02.113
men and women of the United States

15:02.113 --> 15:04.002
Special Operations Command . I am

15:04.002 --> 15:06.169
honored to testify alongside Honorable

15:06.169 --> 15:08.650
Derek Anderson , RASW SOLIC . In SOCOM ,

15:08.729 --> 15:11.710
we rely upon the empowered SOCOM SOLIC

15:11.710 --> 15:13.770
team for oversight , support , and

15:13.770 --> 15:15.890
advocacy to succeed in all of our

15:15.890 --> 15:17.668
global missions . Furthermore ,

15:17.668 --> 15:19.668
privileged to testify alongside our

15:19.668 --> 15:21.969
partners from CyberCom . General Josh

15:21.969 --> 15:24.119
Rudd and ASW Honorable Katie Sutton ,

15:24.289 --> 15:26.122
the deep integration between our

15:26.122 --> 15:28.530
commands ensures , as you've said ,

15:28.809 --> 15:30.865
Chairman , that we can project power

15:30.865 --> 15:32.865
and protect the homeland across all

15:32.865 --> 15:35.087
domains . Distinguished members of this

15:35.087 --> 15:37.253
committee , the Honorable Anderson has

15:37.253 --> 15:39.420
laid out the strategic challenge , and

15:39.420 --> 15:41.420
I , I'd like to emphasize what this

15:41.420 --> 15:43.642
means for , for your warfighters inside

15:43.642 --> 15:45.698
SOCOM . The bottom line is we do not

15:45.698 --> 15:47.809
have the luxury of focusing on only a

15:47.809 --> 15:49.789
single goal or mission . While we

15:49.789 --> 15:52.122
defend the homeland as our top priority ,

15:52.122 --> 15:54.178
we must also orient our force on the

15:54.178 --> 15:56.456
long-term pacing challenge of of China .

15:56.750 --> 15:58.669
We simultaneously deter the acute

15:58.669 --> 16:00.836
threat of conventional aggression from

16:00.836 --> 16:03.479
Russia and Iran . And remain postured

16:03.479 --> 16:05.423
to dismantle the networks of their

16:05.423 --> 16:07.368
proxies while we guard against the

16:07.368 --> 16:09.590
reckless provocations of isolated rogue

16:09.590 --> 16:11.479
states . And through it all , the

16:11.479 --> 16:13.423
persistent threat of ideologically

16:13.423 --> 16:16.270
driven and narco-terrorism continues to

16:16.270 --> 16:18.270
demand our and our integrated inter

16:18.270 --> 16:21.080
agencies constant vigilance . This is

16:21.080 --> 16:23.729
the reality of simultaneity . To meet

16:23.729 --> 16:25.840
this reality , we carry on the legacy

16:25.840 --> 16:28.007
of the Chendits , the Marine Raiders ,

16:28.007 --> 16:30.118
the underwater demolition teams , and

16:30.118 --> 16:32.173
the jetbergs of World War II . Small

16:32.173 --> 16:34.229
teams who flew and parachuted behind

16:34.229 --> 16:36.450
enemy lines or swam through murky

16:36.450 --> 16:38.570
waters , not to win the war by

16:38.570 --> 16:40.369
themselves , but to empower our

16:40.369 --> 16:42.591
partners to win it as part of a greater

16:42.591 --> 16:44.702
alliance . That is the essence of how

16:44.702 --> 16:47.340
we as just 3% of the joint force and

16:47.340 --> 16:49.750
less 2% of the department's budget ,

16:50.099 --> 16:52.179
provide an indispensable asymmetric

16:52.179 --> 16:54.340
advantage . We are a force ready to

16:54.340 --> 16:56.396
multiply the effects of our allies ,

16:56.396 --> 16:58.118
partners , and our joint force

16:58.118 --> 17:00.229
teammates . Our joint force teammates

17:00.229 --> 17:02.284
recognize this . They recognize that

17:02.284 --> 17:04.396
our SAF are more in demand today than

17:04.396 --> 17:06.396
we ever have been . Your $2 billion

17:06.396 --> 17:08.451
near $2 billion uplift to our budget

17:08.451 --> 17:10.618
last year in 206 was an important down

17:10.618 --> 17:13.339
payment . But after 5 years of flat

17:13.339 --> 17:15.310
budgets , only with increased

17:15.310 --> 17:17.477
investment can we continue to meet the

17:17.477 --> 17:19.588
demands of the competition crisis and

17:19.588 --> 17:22.150
modernization for future conflict . You

17:22.150 --> 17:24.829
see , our purpose is our mission . This

17:24.829 --> 17:26.773
means that we are laser focused on

17:26.773 --> 17:28.885
maintaining the readiness required to

17:28.885 --> 17:30.607
defend the homeland , to deter

17:30.607 --> 17:32.773
aggression from our facing challenge ,

17:32.773 --> 17:34.829
and to enable true burden sharing by

17:34.829 --> 17:36.996
empowering the growing capacity of our

17:36.996 --> 17:39.162
allies and partners . But that mission

17:39.162 --> 17:41.496
is not accomplished by technology alone ,

17:41.496 --> 17:43.607
it is executed . By the most decisive

17:43.607 --> 17:45.440
advantage we have , our people ,

17:45.440 --> 17:47.551
empowered by a culture of meritocracy

17:47.551 --> 17:49.773
and supported by critical programs that

17:49.773 --> 17:51.940
you have helped to manifest , like the

17:51.940 --> 17:54.107
preservation of the force and family .

17:54.107 --> 17:56.162
The health of your soft formation is

17:56.162 --> 17:58.385
not just strong , it's getting stronger

17:58.385 --> 18:00.162
every day . And to ensure these

18:00.162 --> 18:02.273
exceptional men and women can succeed

18:02.273 --> 18:04.607
in the complex environments of tomorrow ,

18:04.607 --> 18:06.718
increasingly encroaching upon today .

18:06.718 --> 18:08.551
We are making transformation our

18:08.551 --> 18:10.718
imperative . We must adapt faster than

18:10.718 --> 18:12.829
our adversaries . We must sustain and

18:12.829 --> 18:14.885
improve our ability to project force

18:14.885 --> 18:17.218
through the most contested environments .

18:17.218 --> 18:18.940
We must evolve to leverage the

18:18.940 --> 18:20.996
ubiquitous information environment ,

18:20.996 --> 18:23.051
and we must make advantageous use of

18:23.051 --> 18:25.420
abundant , attritable autonomy as we

18:25.420 --> 18:27.253
support the joint force . We are

18:27.253 --> 18:28.809
evolving our force design ,

18:28.809 --> 18:30.920
accelerating capability development ,

18:30.930 --> 18:33.152
and strengthening our partnerships with

18:33.152 --> 18:35.263
the services and allies to stay ahead

18:35.263 --> 18:37.374
of emerging threats . Our partnership

18:37.374 --> 18:39.486
with SOCO with Cybercom is a hallmark

18:39.486 --> 18:41.374
of this evolution , synchronizing

18:41.374 --> 18:43.430
virtual and physical domain maneuver

18:43.430 --> 18:45.763
across the spectrum for mission success .

18:45.763 --> 18:47.374
As the department's lead for

18:47.374 --> 18:49.430
experimentation in autonomy , we are

18:49.430 --> 18:51.374
not just adapting , we are driving

18:51.374 --> 18:53.208
change . We are working with the

18:53.208 --> 18:55.430
services to incorporate next generation

18:55.430 --> 18:57.763
capabilities , systems that are precise ,

18:57.763 --> 18:59.819
autonomous , affordable , and always

18:59.819 --> 19:01.874
consistent with the law of war . Our

19:01.874 --> 19:03.930
goal to deliver these tools with the

19:03.930 --> 19:05.819
element of surprise from unwarned

19:05.819 --> 19:07.597
access and placement at scale ,

19:07.597 --> 19:09.459
ensuring our forces maintain the

19:09.459 --> 19:11.181
decisive advantage against any

19:11.181 --> 19:13.290
adversary . However , our ability to

19:13.290 --> 19:15.930
accomplish this is not guaranteed . It

19:15.930 --> 19:18.041
requires accelerated modernization in

19:18.041 --> 19:19.652
your continued partnership .

19:19.652 --> 19:21.374
Predictable resourcing for our

19:21.374 --> 19:23.541
program's modernization is a strategic

19:23.541 --> 19:25.597
necessity . S Soft was purpose built

19:25.597 --> 19:27.763
for this era of competition , and with

19:27.763 --> 19:29.874
your continued support , we will meet

19:29.874 --> 19:32.041
today's missions while transforming to

19:32.041 --> 19:34.208
ensure we are ready for the challenges

19:34.208 --> 19:36.430
tomorrow . Thank you and I look forward

19:36.430 --> 19:39.270
to your questions . Thank you , Admiral

19:39.270 --> 19:41.492
Secretary Sutton , you are recognized .

19:41.670 --> 19:43.892
Chairman Wicker , Ranking Member Reed ,

19:43.910 --> 19:45.743
and distinguished members of the

19:45.743 --> 19:47.410
committee . Thank you for the

19:47.410 --> 19:49.632
opportunity to testify here today . I'm

19:49.632 --> 19:51.799
honored to be here with General Rudd ,

19:51.799 --> 19:53.910
whose immense experience , especially

19:53.910 --> 19:56.132
in the Indo-Pacific region , will prove

19:56.132 --> 19:58.243
invaluable as we posture to implement

19:58.243 --> 20:00.410
the priorities of the National Defense

20:00.410 --> 20:02.466
strategy . I congratulate Lieutenant

20:02.466 --> 20:04.688
General Hartmann and his wife Catherine

20:04.688 --> 20:06.910
on his retirement and thank him for his

20:06.910 --> 20:09.021
service and visionary leadership that

20:09.021 --> 20:11.243
has built the cyber enterprise over the

20:11.243 --> 20:13.132
years , setting the stage for our

20:13.132 --> 20:15.243
future success . It is a privilege to

20:15.243 --> 20:17.530
also testify alongside our special

20:17.530 --> 20:19.308
operations partners , Assistant

20:19.308 --> 20:21.530
Secretary of War , Derek Anderson and

20:21.530 --> 20:24.410
Admiral Rich Bradley . This joint

20:24.410 --> 20:26.299
appearance underscores a critical

20:26.299 --> 20:28.449
reality . The synergy between our

20:28.449 --> 20:30.479
communities creates an asymmetric

20:30.479 --> 20:33.430
advantage , presenting our adversaries

20:33.430 --> 20:35.449
with compounding dilemmas in both

20:35.449 --> 20:38.510
physical and virtual worlds . In my

20:38.510 --> 20:40.621
role , I'm responsible for overseeing

20:40.621 --> 20:42.949
the department's cyber operations

20:42.949 --> 20:46.369
policies , integrating cyber activities ,

20:46.510 --> 20:48.569
and exercising authority , direction

20:48.569 --> 20:52.160
and control over US Cyber Command . I'd

20:52.160 --> 20:54.160
like to start by describing two key

20:54.160 --> 20:56.000
dynamics of the strategic cyber

20:56.000 --> 20:57.739
environment . The character of

20:57.739 --> 20:59.890
cyberwarfare is changing rapidly ,

21:00.219 --> 21:02.330
shaped by the growing threat posed by

21:02.330 --> 21:04.579
our adversaries and accelerated by the

21:04.579 --> 21:07.619
ever growing power of technology . The

21:07.619 --> 21:09.660
first major change we are seeing is

21:09.660 --> 21:11.979
that our adversaries have moved beyond

21:11.979 --> 21:14.780
conducting espionage and theft and are

21:14.780 --> 21:16.699
preparing for conflict by

21:16.699 --> 21:19.579
prepositioning disruptive capabilities

21:19.579 --> 21:21.190
inside our nation's critical

21:21.190 --> 21:23.520
infrastructure . This strategic shift

21:23.520 --> 21:26.439
from exploitation to effects aims to

21:26.439 --> 21:28.760
disrupt military deployments and sow

21:28.760 --> 21:32.160
chaos in crisis or conflict . Cyber

21:32.160 --> 21:34.327
threats like Volt typhoon are not just

21:34.327 --> 21:36.119
a nuisance , they represent a

21:36.119 --> 21:38.175
significant and persistent threat to

21:38.175 --> 21:40.008
our national security . Second ,

21:40.008 --> 21:42.119
artificial intelligence is a powerful

21:42.119 --> 21:44.452
force multiplier , increasing the speed ,

21:44.452 --> 21:46.452
scale , and sophistication of these

21:46.452 --> 21:49.160
threats . AI accelerates the entire

21:49.160 --> 21:51.104
attack life cycle , creating a new

21:51.104 --> 21:53.199
dynamic where the pace of attacks

21:53.479 --> 21:56.359
challenges our ability to react and the

21:56.359 --> 21:58.939
scale overwhelms our ability to defend .

22:00.069 --> 22:02.150
Rapid innovation has lowered the

22:02.150 --> 22:04.270
barrier for entry for advanced cyber

22:04.270 --> 22:06.430
actors , blurring the line between

22:06.430 --> 22:08.319
nation states and other malicious

22:08.319 --> 22:10.369
actors . Our adversaries are

22:10.369 --> 22:12.536
operationalizing AI to outcompete us ,

22:12.660 --> 22:14.827
and we must move urgently to put these

22:14.827 --> 22:16.549
same tools in the hands of our

22:16.549 --> 22:19.670
warfighters . Given these realities , a

22:19.670 --> 22:21.781
purely defensive posture is no longer

22:21.781 --> 22:24.709
sufficient . To implement the 2026

22:24.709 --> 22:26.820
National Defense strategies vision of

22:26.820 --> 22:28.931
achieving peace through strength , we

22:28.931 --> 22:30.987
must act decisively to transform the

22:30.987 --> 22:33.319
cyber enterprise guided by three core

22:33.319 --> 22:36.150
priorities . First , we must integrate

22:36.150 --> 22:38.920
cyber across all domains . Cyber is the

22:38.920 --> 22:41.069
connective tissue of modern warfare ,

22:41.349 --> 22:43.660
playing a critical role in joint

22:43.660 --> 22:45.829
operations alongside our special

22:45.829 --> 22:48.089
operations partners . We will continue

22:48.089 --> 22:50.349
to integrate cyber capabilities across

22:50.349 --> 22:52.969
every warfighting domain . To develop a

22:52.969 --> 22:55.469
full range of options to deter conflict

22:55.650 --> 22:57.706
and ensure the joint force has every

22:57.706 --> 23:01.219
advantage . Second , we must gain

23:01.219 --> 23:03.420
strategic advantage below the level of

23:03.420 --> 23:06.719
armed conflict . A resilient defense

23:06.719 --> 23:09.180
must be paired with proactive ,

23:09.339 --> 23:12.300
relentless disruption . By empowering

23:12.300 --> 23:15.380
our world-class cyber operators to

23:15.380 --> 23:18.060
execute full spectrum cyber operations ,

23:18.260 --> 23:20.160
we will systematically erode our

23:20.160 --> 23:22.239
adversaries' cyber capabilities ,

23:22.699 --> 23:24.780
dismantle their infrastructure , and

23:24.780 --> 23:28.219
impose consequences . Third , our 4th ,

23:28.400 --> 23:30.849
our force must organize to dominate .

23:31.380 --> 23:33.602
Our strategies are only as effective as

23:33.602 --> 23:35.910
the force that executes them . Through

23:35.910 --> 23:38.410
the Cyber Command 2.0 initiative , we

23:38.410 --> 23:41.489
are undertaking the most comprehensive

23:41.739 --> 23:44.030
transformation of our cyber force since

23:44.030 --> 23:46.790
its inception to elevate our

23:46.790 --> 23:48.457
operational readiness , scale

23:48.457 --> 23:50.699
technological advantage , and propel

23:50.699 --> 23:52.921
our force to meet the modern demands of

23:52.921 --> 23:55.650
conflict . To achieve these priorities ,

23:55.819 --> 23:58.420
we are leveraging the engine of

23:58.420 --> 24:00.619
American industry , harnessing the

24:00.619 --> 24:02.619
speed and innovation of the private

24:02.619 --> 24:05.339
sector to protect the cyber domain that

24:05.339 --> 24:07.283
powers our national security , our

24:07.283 --> 24:09.450
economic prosperity , and the American

24:09.450 --> 24:11.617
way of life . My office is leading the

24:11.617 --> 24:13.561
development of a Department of War

24:13.561 --> 24:15.839
cyber strategy to implement this pivot ,

24:15.839 --> 24:17.895
which I look forward to sharing with

24:17.895 --> 24:20.117
the committee when complete . Let there

24:20.117 --> 24:22.228
be no doubt , the Department of War's

24:22.228 --> 24:24.117
commitment to the defense of this

24:24.117 --> 24:26.228
nation is absolute . We have a solemn

24:26.228 --> 24:28.117
duty to ensure our joint force is

24:28.117 --> 24:30.283
equipped to dominate within the highly

24:30.283 --> 24:32.506
contested cyber domain . The support of

24:32.506 --> 24:34.617
this committee is fundamental to this

24:34.617 --> 24:36.783
mission's success . Thank you for your

24:36.783 --> 24:36.150
support , and I look forward to your

24:36.150 --> 24:39.229
questions . Thank you very much ,

24:39.589 --> 24:42.180
General Rudd . Chairman Wicker ,

24:42.530 --> 24:44.752
Ranking Member Reed , and distinguished

24:44.752 --> 24:46.808
members of the committee , thank you

24:46.808 --> 24:48.919
for the opportunity to testify before

24:48.919 --> 24:50.974
you today alongside my distinguished

24:50.974 --> 24:53.086
colleagues from the department and US

24:53.086 --> 24:55.141
Special Operations Command . With me

24:55.141 --> 24:57.308
today is Command Chief Master Sergeant

24:57.308 --> 24:59.363
Kenneth Bruce , the US Cyber Command

24:59.363 --> 25:01.474
and National Security Agency senior ,

25:01.474 --> 25:03.900
senior enlisted leader . We are honored

25:03.900 --> 25:06.011
to represent the soldiers , sailors ,

25:06.011 --> 25:08.260
airmen , marines , guardians , and

25:08.260 --> 25:10.093
coast guardsmen , as well as the

25:10.093 --> 25:12.619
civilians who defend our networks and

25:12.619 --> 25:15.099
deliver effects that matter every day .

25:16.209 --> 25:18.431
I want to thank this committee for your

25:18.431 --> 25:20.376
continued support for our critical

25:20.376 --> 25:22.431
mission at US Cyber Command . I also

25:22.431 --> 25:24.598
want to recognize and thank Lieutenant

25:24.598 --> 25:26.820
Lieutenant General Joe Hartmann and his

25:26.820 --> 25:28.987
wife Catherine for their many years of

25:28.987 --> 25:30.820
service to this nation and their

25:30.820 --> 25:32.653
incredible contribution to Cyber

25:32.653 --> 25:32.449
Command and the National Security

25:32.449 --> 25:35.599
Agency . The people of US Cyber Command

25:35.599 --> 25:38.329
are paramount to our success . Their

25:38.329 --> 25:40.609
professionalism and dedication enable

25:40.609 --> 25:43.060
everything we accomplish . Our

25:43.060 --> 25:45.227
workforce represents the finest talent

25:45.227 --> 25:47.579
in cyber operations , a broad team of

25:47.579 --> 25:49.690
military service members and civilian

25:49.690 --> 25:51.801
professionals delivering unparalleled

25:51.801 --> 25:53.912
expertise to one of the nation's most

25:53.912 --> 25:56.079
critical missions . Cybercom's mission

25:56.079 --> 25:58.359
is threefold defend the homeland ,

25:58.859 --> 26:00.581
defend the Department of War's

26:00.581 --> 26:02.748
information networks , and support the

26:02.748 --> 26:04.581
joint force . In executing these

26:04.581 --> 26:06.581
missions , we maintain a formidable

26:06.581 --> 26:08.748
partnership with the National Security

26:08.748 --> 26:10.970
Agency . NSA's roles , responsibilities

26:10.970 --> 26:13.369
and capabilities complement Cybercoms ,

26:13.689 --> 26:15.467
creating a unity of effort that

26:15.467 --> 26:17.300
strengthens our common defense .

26:19.189 --> 26:21.849
Since taking command , I've emphasized

26:22.150 --> 26:25.540
four operating principles speed , scale ,

26:25.829 --> 26:28.869
innovation , and integration . I'm

26:28.869 --> 26:31.036
proud to report that Cybercom has been

26:31.036 --> 26:33.202
executing under these principles since

26:33.202 --> 26:35.369
before my arrival . Which has made for

26:35.369 --> 26:37.480
a smooth transition and allowed me to

26:37.480 --> 26:39.480
hit the ground running . Throughout

26:39.480 --> 26:41.425
2025 and into 2026 , we've quickly

26:41.425 --> 26:43.369
adapted to the dynamic and complex

26:43.369 --> 26:45.536
cyber domain , demonstrating our value

26:45.536 --> 26:48.959
at scale . In 2025 we executed more

26:48.959 --> 26:51.500
than 8000 cyber missions , an increase

26:51.500 --> 26:53.900
of 25% compared to 2024 .

26:56.170 --> 26:58.520
This year we expect even more activity ,

26:58.729 --> 27:00.951
and with your support , I'm certain our

27:00.951 --> 27:02.896
talented force is up to the task .

27:03.150 --> 27:05.317
Cybercom gains experience and insights

27:05.317 --> 27:07.483
from real-world operations every day ,

27:07.483 --> 27:09.206
and that experience guides our

27:09.206 --> 27:11.428
operational support to the warfighter .

27:11.428 --> 27:13.594
Our innovative activity contributes to

27:13.594 --> 27:15.650
mission outcomes , to force building

27:15.650 --> 27:17.817
initiatives like Cybercom 2.0 , and to

27:17.817 --> 27:20.150
the employment of emerging technologies .

27:20.609 --> 27:22.260
Cyber domain cuts across all

27:22.260 --> 27:24.371
warfighting domains , and integrating

27:24.371 --> 27:26.482
cyber into the joint force operations

27:26.482 --> 27:28.060
enhances combat and command

27:28.060 --> 27:31.550
effectiveness across the board . When

27:31.550 --> 27:33.869
called upon , Cybercom employs full

27:33.869 --> 27:36.229
spectrum cyber operations with and on

27:36.229 --> 27:38.396
behalf of the other combatant commands

27:38.396 --> 27:40.510
to deter and , if necessary , defeat

27:40.510 --> 27:43.400
our adversaries . Our participation in

27:43.400 --> 27:45.520
Operation Absolute Resolve and

27:45.520 --> 27:47.900
Operation Epic Fry are prime examples

27:48.040 --> 27:51.000
of this integration in action , cyber

27:51.000 --> 27:52.800
and kinetic operations working

27:52.800 --> 27:55.750
seamlessly to achieve joint objectives .

27:56.689 --> 27:58.800
We're also executing the service-like

27:58.800 --> 28:01.022
authorities granted to us by Congress .

28:01.022 --> 28:03.500
Cybercom 2.0 is moving at pace and

28:03.500 --> 28:05.611
achieving new milestones each month .

28:06.560 --> 28:09.040
Through Cybercom 2.0 , we will deliver

28:09.040 --> 28:11.479
the capability and capacity to identify

28:11.479 --> 28:13.701
and hire a talented workforce , provide

28:13.701 --> 28:15.535
them with optimal training , and

28:15.535 --> 28:17.312
incentivize them to stay in the

28:17.312 --> 28:19.479
cyberforce . Additionally , it will

28:19.479 --> 28:21.319
enhance our ability to work more

28:21.319 --> 28:23.640
closely with industry and academia to

28:23.640 --> 28:26.099
develop , acquire , and operationalize

28:26.280 --> 28:28.800
cutting edge capabilities . Cyber

28:28.800 --> 28:30.967
Command will continue to work with the

28:30.967 --> 28:33.239
cyber policy team and the services to

28:33.239 --> 28:35.959
ensure CyberCom 2.0 is implemented

28:35.959 --> 28:37.939
effectively . Thank you for the

28:37.939 --> 28:40.272
privilege of appearing before you today .

28:40.272 --> 28:42.439
I look forward to working with you and

28:42.439 --> 28:44.383
I look forward to your questions .

28:44.800 --> 28:46.856
Thank you very much . Uh , Secretary

28:46.856 --> 28:49.390
Sutton and General Rudd , let me begin

28:49.969 --> 28:52.530
with the two of you . Um , I've read ,

28:52.540 --> 28:54.130
um , a pretty , um ,

28:56.369 --> 29:00.239
Disturbing quote from General

29:00.239 --> 29:03.400
Brian Fenton , um . Last year

29:04.939 --> 29:08.819
about Years of flat budgets ,

29:08.900 --> 29:12.630
14% decrease in buying power and ,

29:12.739 --> 29:15.520
and significant personnel reductions ,

29:16.020 --> 29:19.229
um . How is

29:19.890 --> 29:23.469
Cybercom 2.0 going to address these ?

29:24.209 --> 29:28.170
Um , And is the work , uh ,

29:28.260 --> 29:31.239
is our pace at this point happening

29:31.699 --> 29:34.260
fast enough , Secretary Sutton .

29:35.459 --> 29:37.681
Senator , thanks for the opportunity to

29:37.681 --> 29:39.459
talk about this really critical

29:39.459 --> 29:41.619
initiative . Uh , one of the concepts

29:41.619 --> 29:44.020
of Cyber Command 20 is really looking

29:44.020 --> 29:46.187
at how we build mastery into our force

29:46.420 --> 29:48.420
before we continue to just grow the

29:48.420 --> 29:51.859
force . We have our built out our cyber

29:51.859 --> 29:53.979
mission force and have largely been

29:53.979 --> 29:56.201
able to get them to a basic trained and

29:56.201 --> 29:58.545
qualified level . What we really need

29:58.545 --> 30:00.601
to look at and what the aim of Cyber

30:00.601 --> 30:02.625
Command 2.0 is how do we take that

30:02.625 --> 30:05.265
basic and trained force and build in

30:05.265 --> 30:08.125
domain mastery and specialized skills

30:08.305 --> 30:10.416
to be able to get after some of these

30:10.416 --> 30:12.583
problems that we face and to have them

30:12.583 --> 30:14.694
be a more effective and more lethal ,

30:14.694 --> 30:17.150
lethal force . To do that , the Cyber

30:17.150 --> 30:19.689
Command 2.0 implementation plan looks

30:19.689 --> 30:21.689
across the entire talent management

30:21.689 --> 30:23.856
pipeline to really address this not as

30:23.856 --> 30:26.569
an incremental one by one step , but to

30:26.569 --> 30:28.959
relook at the entire way that we talent

30:28.959 --> 30:31.050
manage this force , to really build

30:31.050 --> 30:33.890
that unique technical skill set in the

30:33.890 --> 30:36.112
way that we've done other models in the

30:36.112 --> 30:38.334
department like the medical community ,

30:38.334 --> 30:40.168
the soft community , the nuclear

30:40.168 --> 30:43.000
community . And so we are undertaking

30:43.000 --> 30:45.380
that implementation plan very rapidly ,

30:45.560 --> 30:47.959
looking at how we can do quick wins and

30:47.959 --> 30:51.079
pilots off the bat and then take

30:51.079 --> 30:52.801
lessons learned from those and

30:52.801 --> 30:54.579
implement more of the long term

30:54.579 --> 30:56.635
policies . We can always move faster

30:56.635 --> 30:58.857
and we continue to move faster and look

30:58.857 --> 31:00.968
forward to continuing to brief you on

31:00.968 --> 31:03.239
our progress as we move forward . Uh ,

31:03.359 --> 31:05.303
well , General Rudd , I'll let you

31:05.303 --> 31:07.359
follow up there , but it , could you

31:07.359 --> 31:10.640
identify . Your most , uh , in , in ,

31:10.650 --> 31:14.170
uh , in connection with Cybercom 2.0 ,

31:14.530 --> 31:17.609
your most important milestone to

31:17.619 --> 31:21.300
achieve , um , At the earliest

31:22.349 --> 31:25.260
possible moment . Yeah , thanks ,

31:25.380 --> 31:27.602
Chairman . I appreciate the opportunity

31:27.602 --> 31:31.140
to follow up on this . The Cybercom 2.0

31:31.140 --> 31:34.180
approach is built on seven attributes .

31:34.390 --> 31:36.660
First and foremost , it's the people .

31:36.819 --> 31:39.640
We've got to identify , recruit , and

31:39.780 --> 31:41.836
assess and bring in the right people

31:42.219 --> 31:44.920
and get them at that baseline level of

31:45.079 --> 31:47.190
certification that enables them to do

31:47.190 --> 31:49.357
the mission as soon as they get to the

31:49.357 --> 31:51.468
force . The next , the next attribute

31:51.468 --> 31:53.801
that's really guiding and driving us is .

31:53.890 --> 31:57.140
Incentivization . So both , uh , um ,

31:57.369 --> 32:00.089
monetarily for the skill set , great

32:00.089 --> 32:02.369
competition with the private sector as

32:02.369 --> 32:04.313
you would imagine for this type of

32:04.313 --> 32:06.313
skill set , and making sure that we

32:06.313 --> 32:08.480
harness every authority and every cent

32:08.480 --> 32:10.258
that we have to incentivize the

32:10.258 --> 32:13.329
workforce . Next critical piece of this

32:13.329 --> 32:15.329
is training . We've got to have the

32:15.329 --> 32:18.050
right training pipeline and the right

32:18.050 --> 32:20.161
resources centered around training to

32:20.161 --> 32:22.599
go again from what the services provide ,

32:22.800 --> 32:25.170
which is that baseline operational

32:25.170 --> 32:27.250
capability , and then bringing it to

32:27.250 --> 32:29.560
what we desire for every member is the

32:29.560 --> 32:32.060
mastery . We've then got to make sure

32:32.060 --> 32:34.282
that we can retain this force . This is

32:34.282 --> 32:36.338
where we look at models like Special

32:36.338 --> 32:38.449
Operations Command , where across the

32:38.449 --> 32:40.449
service components there's a career

32:40.449 --> 32:42.609
path where we can retain the best and

32:42.609 --> 32:45.369
the highly trained ones that have again

32:45.369 --> 32:47.258
ideally gained mastery or working

32:47.258 --> 32:49.258
towards mastery . We can repeatedly

32:49.258 --> 32:51.849
keep them in a rotation and an

32:51.849 --> 32:54.560
assignment here at Cyber Command . And

32:54.560 --> 32:56.689
also much like special operations ,

32:56.770 --> 32:58.510
we're developing and executing

32:58.510 --> 33:00.699
specialized mission sets that require

33:00.699 --> 33:02.643
specialized training and again the

33:02.643 --> 33:04.810
ability to incentivize and retain that

33:04.810 --> 33:07.869
talent . And then finally we're looking

33:07.869 --> 33:10.219
at , it's not just the cyber operator ,

33:10.339 --> 33:12.450
but it's also the enablers . It's the

33:12.450 --> 33:14.506
headquarters element and the support

33:14.506 --> 33:16.506
pieces that come with that . That's

33:16.506 --> 33:18.561
part of the force presentation model

33:18.561 --> 33:18.510
from the services and that's what we're

33:18.510 --> 33:20.677
getting after , Chairman . The , the ,

33:20.677 --> 33:22.788
the most , I think one of the biggest

33:22.788 --> 33:24.954
challenges is really just figuring out

33:24.954 --> 33:27.121
how do we attract the right people and

33:27.121 --> 33:29.288
incentivize them to want to have a , a

33:29.288 --> 33:31.454
career in , in cyberforce . And , um ,

33:31.670 --> 33:33.781
just brief , you can't do this on the

33:33.781 --> 33:35.948
cheap , can you , General ? Chairman ,

33:35.959 --> 33:38.089
we certainly can't . Uh , thank you

33:38.089 --> 33:41.359
very much , Senator Reid . Thank you

33:41.359 --> 33:44.599
very much , Mr . Chairman . Admiral

33:44.599 --> 33:47.910
Bradley and Mr . Anderson , um . You

33:47.910 --> 33:50.510
have some of the same issues and you've

33:50.510 --> 33:53.630
been working on it before as uh

33:53.630 --> 33:55.686
Secretary Sutton and General Rudd of

33:56.109 --> 33:57.998
creating a service secretary-like

33:57.998 --> 34:01.569
position and um since you've been

34:01.569 --> 34:04.349
uh both confirmed , what have you done

34:04.349 --> 34:06.910
to sort of accomplish that mission ,

34:07.030 --> 34:08.641
getting you into the service

34:08.641 --> 34:10.870
secretary-like mode and maybe what

34:10.870 --> 34:13.590
advice you have for us , our cybercom

34:13.590 --> 34:16.429
friends ? Senator , but first and

34:16.429 --> 34:18.485
foremost , uh , you know , Honorable

34:18.485 --> 34:20.790
Sutton and I , uh , speak regularly

34:20.790 --> 34:22.846
about this topic . Uh , I can assure

34:22.846 --> 34:24.957
you of that , but I want to thank the

34:24.957 --> 34:26.846
committee specifically on the 907

34:26.846 --> 34:28.846
authorities that you gave us in the

34:28.846 --> 34:28.709
NDAA that allowed us to be a

34:28.709 --> 34:30.949
service-like entity . Uh , since taking

34:30.949 --> 34:33.227
the seat , we've had a few initiatives ,

34:33.227 --> 34:35.171
uh , but just to highlight a few ,

34:35.171 --> 34:37.227
Senator , uh , you know , we've been

34:37.227 --> 34:39.116
investing more in our personnel ,

34:39.116 --> 34:41.227
having that advocacy for the budget ,

34:41.227 --> 34:43.227
um , specifically being in the room

34:43.227 --> 34:45.393
with our service secretaries , uh , to

34:45.393 --> 34:44.659
make sure we're doing things in an

34:44.659 --> 34:46.603
efficient manner and it's the best

34:46.603 --> 34:48.770
dollar going , uh , for the taxpayer .

34:48.870 --> 34:51.459
Um , administratively , um , Admiral

34:51.459 --> 34:53.626
Bradley and I have done a , a sprint ,

34:53.626 --> 34:55.681
as you might call it . Uh , where we

34:55.681 --> 34:57.848
have taken our staffs to look at where

34:57.848 --> 34:59.959
there might be efficiencies made , so

34:59.959 --> 35:02.015
we don't have duplicate efforts both

35:02.015 --> 35:04.015
from the SOLC Enterprise as well as

35:04.015 --> 35:06.126
from the SOCOM enterprise . Ideally ,

35:06.126 --> 35:08.237
uh , we come out with a General Order

35:08.237 --> 35:10.459
One similar to what the Army , uh , and

35:10.459 --> 35:12.681
other services do where it lays out the

35:12.681 --> 35:15.015
roles and the responsibilities for , uh ,

35:15.015 --> 35:17.181
us as a service like in SOLIC and then

35:17.181 --> 35:16.949
obviously , uh , SOCOM and Admiral

35:16.949 --> 35:19.227
Bradley . So it's been a great , great .

35:19.227 --> 35:21.171
initiative that we've been pushing

35:21.171 --> 35:23.060
forward and it's , and it's quite

35:23.060 --> 35:25.227
honestly , uh , made our staffs talk ,

35:25.227 --> 35:27.005
uh , and be and be more open in

35:27.005 --> 35:29.116
dialogue and how we do things . So uh

35:29.116 --> 35:31.338
I'd be remiss not to mention I have , I

35:31.338 --> 35:33.560
think one of , uh , how we've organized

35:33.560 --> 35:32.600
ourselves specifically in SoliC to

35:32.600 --> 35:34.830
mirror something like what the services

35:34.830 --> 35:37.052
have where we have the capabilities and

35:37.052 --> 35:39.108
development , we have an MNRA , uh ,

35:39.108 --> 35:40.941
and we have a special operations

35:40.941 --> 35:43.163
analytical arm as well . So , um , it's

35:43.163 --> 35:44.997
a lot of work , but we're moving

35:44.997 --> 35:46.997
headstrong , uh , forward with it .

35:46.997 --> 35:49.108
Admiral , yes , ranked member , first

35:49.108 --> 35:51.163
I'd start foundationally . We inside

35:51.163 --> 35:53.280
the uniform , uh , aspects of SOCOM

35:53.280 --> 35:55.879
recognize the constitutional foundation

35:56.080 --> 35:58.136
of civilian control of the uniformed

35:58.136 --> 36:00.399
service . It's a critical facet of our

36:00.399 --> 36:02.580
constitutional democracy , and , uh ,

36:02.600 --> 36:04.767
we are fully supportive of manifesting

36:04.767 --> 36:07.250
it inside our formations as well . Very

36:07.250 --> 36:11.016
pragmatic . As well as SOCOM recognizes

36:11.016 --> 36:13.835
that the next challenges we face will

36:13.835 --> 36:16.057
be solved through a tighter integration

36:16.057 --> 36:18.279
with our service teammates , we have to

36:18.279 --> 36:20.395
also have that service connection at

36:20.395 --> 36:22.506
the secretariat level . And so inside

36:22.506 --> 36:24.673
the Pentagon , it's very important for

36:24.673 --> 36:27.335
a robust , empowered SLIC to be able to

36:27.335 --> 36:29.557
be in the same meetings and to have the

36:29.557 --> 36:31.724
same interactions . to complement what

36:31.724 --> 36:33.779
we are doing on the uniform side and

36:33.779 --> 36:35.835
the sprint and the interactions that

36:35.835 --> 36:37.724
our staff are having to both find

36:37.724 --> 36:39.902
places where horizontal integration is

36:39.902 --> 36:42.124
appropriate , that is teaming to divide

36:42.124 --> 36:43.846
labor and be better , but also

36:43.846 --> 36:45.569
appropriately where vertically

36:45.569 --> 36:47.569
oversight functions need to exist .

36:47.711 --> 36:49.933
Both of those are critical aspects that

36:49.933 --> 36:51.989
are coming out of the sprint . Thank

36:51.989 --> 36:54.199
you very much . General Rudd , uh ,

36:54.360 --> 36:56.582
we've talked a lot about Cybercom . Can

36:56.582 --> 36:58.919
you , uh , tell us what you believe

36:58.919 --> 37:01.679
your three top challenges are at NSA ?

37:04.459 --> 37:07.189
And sorry , ranking member at NSA . Yes ,

37:07.540 --> 37:09.484
I'm sorry . That's my Rhode Island

37:09.484 --> 37:11.651
accent . Forgive me . All right , no ,

37:11.651 --> 37:13.707
thanks , ranking member . The , uh ,

37:13.979 --> 37:16.146
you know , it kind of goes back to the

37:16.146 --> 37:18.201
operating principles against which I

37:18.340 --> 37:20.409
conveyed both to the committee in my

37:20.409 --> 37:22.409
opening statement , but also to the

37:22.409 --> 37:25.179
forces . We have to move at the pace of

37:25.179 --> 37:27.939
the strategic environment in which

37:28.399 --> 37:31.379
driven really in large part by the pace

37:31.379 --> 37:33.435
of technology . So the ability to be

37:33.435 --> 37:35.601
able to harness technology ahead of an

37:35.601 --> 37:38.219
adversary , to be at the foremost front

37:38.219 --> 37:40.760
and retain and maintain that advantage

37:41.419 --> 37:43.659
is , is really what's critical . The

37:43.659 --> 37:45.992
next piece is the ability to scale . Um ,

37:45.992 --> 37:49.580
we've got to take our , our , our

37:49.580 --> 37:52.570
efforts again . To move fast , figure

37:52.570 --> 37:54.514
out where does it apply , not only

37:54.514 --> 37:56.610
across other parts of NSA but across

37:56.610 --> 37:58.499
Cybercom , but then , of course ,

37:58.689 --> 38:00.967
across the entirety of the Joint Force .

38:00.967 --> 38:03.370
Um , and then driven by innovation .

38:04.209 --> 38:06.376
Moving creatively to solve the hardest

38:06.376 --> 38:08.487
problems . We may not always have the

38:08.487 --> 38:10.709
scale and mass that we would , we would

38:10.709 --> 38:12.542
desire , but we know that we can

38:12.542 --> 38:14.709
creatively outthink anybody . And then

38:14.709 --> 38:16.931
finally , it's integration . We want to

38:16.931 --> 38:19.265
make sure that we are nested with again ,

38:19.265 --> 38:21.431
not only across the two commands to be

38:21.431 --> 38:23.376
complementary , that delivers that

38:23.376 --> 38:23.129
speed , but then in support of the

38:23.129 --> 38:25.280
joint force , but also in support of

38:25.280 --> 38:27.336
interagency where , where required .

38:28.010 --> 38:30.129
Well , I have 14 seconds left , so I

38:30.129 --> 38:32.489
can just salute Secretary Sutton . I

38:32.489 --> 38:34.767
think you're gonna do an excellent job .

38:34.767 --> 38:36.600
Uh , and one of the issues , the

38:36.600 --> 38:38.969
question I was gonna ask , we'll send

38:38.969 --> 38:41.025
you a written question . Time's up .

38:41.025 --> 38:43.191
The center of , thank you , the Center

38:43.191 --> 38:46.500
of gravity for your AI , uh , efforts

38:46.570 --> 38:49.719
in the , uh , cybercom . Uh , realm and

38:49.719 --> 38:52.040
also I think in , uh , special ops I

38:52.040 --> 38:54.262
think that's the question we'll send in

38:54.262 --> 38:56.318
writing , but it's important . Thank

38:56.318 --> 38:58.429
you very much , Mr . Chairman . Thank

38:58.429 --> 39:00.707
you , sir . Senator Fisher . Thank you ,

39:00.707 --> 39:02.873
Mr . Chairman . Uh , Admiral Bradley ,

39:02.873 --> 39:05.340
how are you working , um , and

39:05.340 --> 39:09.110
assessing SOCOMs , um , if it's

39:09.110 --> 39:11.879
appropriately postured for the

39:11.879 --> 39:15.879
Indo-Pacific . Senator , thank

39:15.879 --> 39:18.110
you . Uh , first , uh , we , we look at

39:18.110 --> 39:20.166
it across the spectrum of conflict ,

39:20.166 --> 39:22.439
competition , crisis , and , uh ,

39:22.449 --> 39:24.338
should , uh , crisis cascade into

39:24.338 --> 39:26.505
conflict , how are we positioned to be

39:26.505 --> 39:28.560
able to , uh , support the combatant

39:28.560 --> 39:30.782
commander , uh , my good friend Admiral

39:30.782 --> 39:33.229
Sam Pomparo . Um , how are we prepared

39:33.229 --> 39:35.396
to integrate with the services and the

39:35.396 --> 39:37.451
service components there in the Indo

39:37.451 --> 39:40.050
Paycom AOR and at a competition level ,

39:40.219 --> 39:43.250
how are we able to provide value to our

39:43.250 --> 39:45.489
allies and partners to strengthen the

39:45.489 --> 39:47.620
resilience of our , of our alliances

39:47.620 --> 39:49.850
there and we believe that that is

39:49.850 --> 39:52.580
foremost and most important in any

39:52.580 --> 39:54.979
strategy of deterrence is to have that

39:54.979 --> 39:57.146
stronger alliance . So do you , do you

39:57.146 --> 39:59.959
have direct input when you're talking .

40:00.209 --> 40:03.449
About being able to uh integrate with

40:03.449 --> 40:05.449
services , do you have input on the

40:05.449 --> 40:08.530
training and um equipping them for the

40:08.530 --> 40:11.050
Indo-Pacific ? Certainly on our SOF

40:11.050 --> 40:13.106
forces I do . I have , I have direct

40:13.106 --> 40:14.606
responsibility , statutory

40:14.606 --> 40:16.828
responsibility to ensure that our , our

40:16.828 --> 40:19.050
SOF members are trained and adequate to

40:19.050 --> 40:21.217
the missions that they'll be presented

40:21.217 --> 40:23.494
with , to integrate with services , uh ,

40:23.494 --> 40:25.606
well , to do our missions and part of

40:25.606 --> 40:27.661
our mission is to integrate with the

40:27.661 --> 40:29.939
service . So yes , OK , thank you . Um ,

40:30.110 --> 40:33.449
we've seen our adversaries increasingly ,

40:33.510 --> 40:36.489
uh , coordinate , especially on malign

40:36.489 --> 40:40.189
activity . So how is , how is SOCOM

40:40.189 --> 40:42.469
working to strengthen relationships

40:42.469 --> 40:44.636
with our allies and our partners which

40:44.636 --> 40:47.110
you talked about earlier , but both in

40:47.110 --> 40:49.590
terms of building up , uh , first of

40:49.590 --> 40:51.757
all , our capabilities with them , but

40:51.757 --> 40:54.590
also their own capabilities and when

40:54.590 --> 40:57.100
you work on those combined , uh ,

40:57.110 --> 41:00.050
training exercises . Senator , the , uh ,

41:00.169 --> 41:02.280
of course , the first level in , in a

41:02.280 --> 41:04.558
relationship is trust . The first , uh ,

41:04.558 --> 41:06.780
the most basic essence , and that trust

41:06.780 --> 41:08.669
comes from credibility . Um , our

41:08.669 --> 41:10.836
relationships over generations help us

41:10.836 --> 41:12.947
to give that credibility , bring that

41:12.947 --> 41:15.129
credibility and that trust . Um , I

41:15.129 --> 41:17.462
might pick just one as an example , the ,

41:17.462 --> 41:19.740
the country of the Philippines , where ,

41:19.740 --> 41:22.073
um , for 100 years , over 100 years now ,

41:22.073 --> 41:24.296
we've had an institutional relationship

41:24.296 --> 41:26.296
as a , as a nation . But just since

41:26.296 --> 41:28.909
2016 and our partnership on island to

41:28.909 --> 41:31.750
help the Philippine Armed Forces clear

41:31.750 --> 41:33.806
Marawi , uh , one of their principal

41:33.806 --> 41:36.389
cities , of the threat from ISIS has

41:36.389 --> 41:38.870
given us great ability to stretch

41:38.870 --> 41:40.592
across turbulent political and

41:40.592 --> 41:43.310
diplomatic times to today where we are

41:43.310 --> 41:45.469
able to use that credibility , help

41:45.469 --> 41:47.469
them see and share information with

41:47.469 --> 41:50.050
them through some new relationship

41:50.050 --> 41:52.695
dynamics . To understand the threats to

41:52.695 --> 41:54.806
their sovereign territory and so that

41:54.806 --> 41:56.639
that sharing of information is a

41:56.639 --> 41:58.751
critical aspect to allow them to take

41:58.751 --> 42:01.495
action uh for their own problems in the

42:01.495 --> 42:03.662
information in the competition space .

42:03.662 --> 42:05.975
I'm , I'm sure you've um had a number

42:05.975 --> 42:07.745
of opportunities there in the

42:07.745 --> 42:10.614
Indo-Pacific to work on having that

42:10.614 --> 42:12.935
greater , uh , collaboration with our

42:12.935 --> 42:15.665
partner forces . I was , um ,

42:16.135 --> 42:19.260
interested . In your view on the

42:19.260 --> 42:22.580
exercises that took place uh with cold

42:22.580 --> 42:25.860
response 26 , you know , looking at

42:25.860 --> 42:28.260
Norway and Finland , an entirely

42:28.260 --> 42:31.020
different environment , I'd say . Yes ,

42:31.139 --> 42:33.139
ma'am . I , I'll , I'll , uh , I'll

42:33.139 --> 42:35.361
speak uh more generally and I , I don't

42:35.361 --> 42:37.528
want to get ahead of , uh , of my good

42:37.528 --> 42:39.583
friend General Grikovich there who ,

42:39.583 --> 42:41.750
who of course oversees those , but But

42:41.750 --> 42:43.417
from a soft perspective , our

42:43.417 --> 42:45.528
partnership with our Scandinavian and

42:45.528 --> 42:47.472
European and NATO allies has , has

42:47.472 --> 42:49.695
always been critical . Um , of course ,

42:49.695 --> 42:51.861
for the last 25 years , a lot of focus

42:51.861 --> 42:54.083
for us in the Middle East , not as many

42:54.083 --> 42:56.195
snow-capped mountains to , to work in

42:56.195 --> 42:58.361
as in the , as in the high north . And

42:58.361 --> 43:00.370
so as we re-enter into that area ,

43:00.419 --> 43:02.260
working . With our Scandinavian

43:02.260 --> 43:04.482
partners has brought an awful lot of uh

43:04.482 --> 43:07.580
uh reprisal of old skills back and so

43:07.580 --> 43:09.580
we're , we're deepening those and I

43:09.580 --> 43:11.780
think that partnership not just in the

43:11.780 --> 43:13.820
uh on the land but in the maritime

43:13.820 --> 43:16.370
domain is a critical component to what

43:16.370 --> 43:18.899
uh we will offer to NATO for future

43:18.899 --> 43:21.010
deterrence . Good to hear , um , Ms .

43:21.060 --> 43:24.679
Sutton , how will Cybercom 2.0

43:24.679 --> 43:27.459
enable the department to better adapt

43:27.459 --> 43:30.189
to the evolving . Uh , technological

43:30.189 --> 43:33.010
landscape , uh , when we look at AI ,

43:33.409 --> 43:35.570
that's kind of what the question is

43:35.570 --> 43:37.626
that , uh , Senator Reid , I think ,

43:37.626 --> 43:40.330
was going to send you . So as

43:40.330 --> 43:42.219
technology continues to move at a

43:42.219 --> 43:44.163
tremendous speed , one of the gaps

43:44.163 --> 43:45.997
we're seeing in the force is the

43:45.997 --> 43:48.163
ability to get our force after they've

43:48.163 --> 43:50.052
made it through the service basic

43:50.052 --> 43:52.163
training to have . Training available

43:52.163 --> 43:54.386
at the speed of need to address some of

43:54.386 --> 43:56.659
these technologies . So , for example ,

43:56.879 --> 43:59.101
um , someone might have made it through

43:59.101 --> 44:00.935
their basic training . How do we

44:00.935 --> 44:03.268
provide training for them on cloud , AI ,

44:03.280 --> 44:05.919
on scata systems , other specialized

44:05.919 --> 44:08.100
things we're gonna need . One of the

44:08.149 --> 44:10.320
enablers of Cyber Command 2.0 is

44:10.320 --> 44:12.487
creation of an advanced cyber training

44:12.487 --> 44:14.598
and education . Center , which is not

44:14.598 --> 44:16.320
going to be a brick and mortar

44:16.320 --> 44:18.542
institution that builds courses sort of

44:18.542 --> 44:20.709
the traditional way , but it's looking

44:20.709 --> 44:22.487
at how we leverage industry and

44:22.487 --> 44:24.709
academia to have training available for

44:24.709 --> 44:26.820
our active force to be able to get at

44:26.820 --> 44:29.010
closing those skill gaps as technology

44:29.330 --> 44:31.219
continues to move quickly . Let's

44:31.219 --> 44:33.386
leverage the training that's available

44:33.386 --> 44:35.608
in industry that's moving at that speed

44:35.608 --> 44:37.774
as well . Uh , thank you . I will have

44:37.774 --> 44:39.719
a question for General Red for the

44:39.719 --> 44:42.469
record , uh , when we look at CyberCon .

44:42.879 --> 44:45.389
Uh , 2.0 and specifically for the

44:45.389 --> 44:48.219
Indo-Pacific . Thank you . Thank you ,

44:48.550 --> 44:50.661
Senator Fisher , Senator Blumenthal .

44:53.500 --> 44:55.722
Thank you , Senator Wicker . Uh , thank

44:55.722 --> 44:57.944
you all for being here and again , as I

44:57.944 --> 45:00.111
expressed this morning , thank you all

45:00.111 --> 45:02.389
for your service in our closed session ,

45:02.419 --> 45:04.750
we discussed A number of the questions

45:04.750 --> 45:08.479
I'd like to raise now . First , um , I

45:08.479 --> 45:10.620
think our cooperation with Ukraine is

45:10.620 --> 45:12.787
tremendously important . I'm regretful

45:12.787 --> 45:14.919
that We are

45:16.669 --> 45:19.949
In my view , failing to provide all of

45:19.949 --> 45:22.171
the support that we should militarily .

45:22.830 --> 45:26.479
Um , I am working hard on a Russian

45:26.639 --> 45:29.739
sanctions bill that I hope will help

45:29.739 --> 45:33.439
economically stop the flow of

45:33.439 --> 45:35.800
revenue to Putin's war machine from

45:35.800 --> 45:39.429
purchasers of Russian oil and gas . And

45:39.429 --> 45:42.149
intelligence sharing has been

45:42.149 --> 45:45.159
tremendously important to Ukraine in

45:46.270 --> 45:48.290
Pushing back , and I think .

45:49.659 --> 45:53.060
Impressively on Russia's assault , the

45:53.060 --> 45:55.338
false narrative that Russia is winning ,

45:55.338 --> 45:58.439
I've tried to counter based on my

46:00.439 --> 46:02.959
Trips to Ukraine , 10 in all , uh ,

46:03.040 --> 46:05.939
most recently in February , where I saw

46:06.159 --> 46:08.159
really the progress that Ukraine is

46:08.159 --> 46:10.260
making contrary to some of the

46:11.080 --> 46:13.080
propaganda that Russia is spreading

46:13.080 --> 46:16.469
about how they are winning . But I'd

46:16.469 --> 46:19.550
like to ask this panel , maybe

46:19.550 --> 46:22.340
beginning with General Rudd . Um ,

46:23.030 --> 46:25.629
Whether our intelligence sharing is

46:25.629 --> 46:28.610
continuing in a robust way as it has

46:28.610 --> 46:32.219
been in the past , which I I think it

46:32.219 --> 46:34.386
has been tremendously important to the

46:34.386 --> 46:36.663
extent you can comment in this setting .

46:37.580 --> 46:40.360
Uh , thanks , Senator Blumenthal . Um ,

46:40.489 --> 46:43.010
as we discussed previously , the , uh ,

46:43.219 --> 46:47.189
the focus and attention , um , On a

46:47.189 --> 46:50.070
variety of priorities and , and efforts

46:50.070 --> 46:53.889
is remains steady . We move

46:54.229 --> 46:57.370
in an agile manner to Various

46:57.790 --> 47:00.790
crisis and or efforts , but we maintain

47:00.790 --> 47:03.469
focus and pressure on that . And so our

47:03.469 --> 47:05.739
support through European command from

47:05.739 --> 47:07.906
an intelligence perspective in support

47:07.906 --> 47:10.790
of that effort remains intact . We're

47:10.790 --> 47:12.846
looking consistently and making sure

47:12.846 --> 47:14.901
that we have the right resources and

47:14.901 --> 47:16.957
folks focused on that , working very

47:16.957 --> 47:19.234
closely with General Grikovich on that .

47:19.234 --> 47:22.590
I hope that . Our military command .

47:23.800 --> 47:26.159
will let us know if there's any change

47:26.159 --> 47:29.489
in . That approach and policy because I

47:29.489 --> 47:31.656
think that the American people deserve

47:31.656 --> 47:34.330
to know if there is a reduction or

47:34.330 --> 47:36.689
diminution in our intelligence

47:36.689 --> 47:40.419
commitment . Um General

47:40.419 --> 47:42.363
Bradley , uh , I'm sorry , Admiral

47:42.363 --> 47:45.120
Bradley , uh , if you could tell us .

47:46.560 --> 47:48.616
A bit about the lessons learned from

47:48.616 --> 47:52.060
Ukraine . Senator , absolutely . Uh ,

47:52.229 --> 47:54.229
first , uh , to answer the original

47:54.229 --> 47:56.507
question and maybe bridge to that , um ,

47:56.507 --> 47:58.396
one of the things that I think we

47:58.396 --> 48:00.396
provide through those relationships

48:00.396 --> 48:02.618
longstanding is the venue for others to

48:02.618 --> 48:04.540
partner and to bring capacity and

48:04.540 --> 48:06.620
capability . And so one of our SOF

48:06.620 --> 48:09.209
headquarters there , AIA sort of , uh ,

48:09.219 --> 48:11.441
offers the opportunity for 19 different

48:11.441 --> 48:13.552
nations to partner to come to support

48:13.552 --> 48:15.775
the , uh , the effort across the area .

48:15.775 --> 48:17.775
And I , and I think that's critical

48:17.775 --> 48:19.830
because it is not just about what we

48:19.830 --> 48:21.941
bring , but it's about enabling those

48:21.941 --> 48:23.997
partners to really share more of the

48:23.997 --> 48:23.585
burden , to be able to provide

48:23.585 --> 48:25.752
assistance to the Ukrainians as well .

48:25.785 --> 48:27.785
Ultimately though , I think to your

48:27.785 --> 48:30.007
point about lessons learned , if I look

48:30.007 --> 48:31.729
back over the last 25 years of

48:31.729 --> 48:33.785
counterterrorism targeting where our

48:33.785 --> 48:36.063
integrated interagency law enforcement ,

48:36.063 --> 48:38.063
intel community , and military were

48:38.063 --> 48:40.229
able to bring great precision . To our

48:40.229 --> 48:42.452
understanding of both the adversary but

48:42.452 --> 48:44.674
also the context around the adversary ,

48:44.674 --> 48:47.007
the civilians that were not adversaries ,

48:47.007 --> 48:49.063
that has been very important . Those

48:49.063 --> 48:50.912
lessons have translated very

48:50.912 --> 48:53.392
importantly into the high-end conflict

48:53.392 --> 48:55.670
of the Ukraine battlefield . And so we ,

48:55.670 --> 48:57.725
we continue to apply those lessons ,

48:57.725 --> 49:00.003
refine them with new information , and ,

49:00.003 --> 49:02.170
and frankly we learn from them as well

49:02.170 --> 49:04.503
as we do in part to our teammates there .

49:04.669 --> 49:07.750
When I've visited Ukraine , uh , often

49:07.750 --> 49:09.949
I've gone to the drone manufacturing .

49:11.020 --> 49:12.742
Facilities which have grown in

49:12.742 --> 49:15.159
sophistication and number . They're

49:15.489 --> 49:17.711
producing , I think , 1000 drones a day

49:17.711 --> 49:20.050
now . And what has so impressed me is

49:20.050 --> 49:22.889
they change . They work on . The

49:22.889 --> 49:24.722
evolution of their drones on the

49:24.722 --> 49:26.929
assembly line . They'll get real-time

49:26.929 --> 49:28.985
information from the battlefield and

49:28.985 --> 49:31.207
they'll make adjustments , literally as

49:31.207 --> 49:34.129
they are manufacturing and uh I don't

49:34.129 --> 49:37.709
know anything . In our industrial base

49:37.709 --> 49:40.370
that is as nimble and agile and quick .

49:41.090 --> 49:44.840
Um I I hope

49:44.840 --> 49:47.340
this panel agrees that we need to move

49:47.340 --> 49:49.284
more in that direction . Would you

49:49.284 --> 49:51.118
agree , Admiral Senator , I do .

49:51.118 --> 49:53.173
Although I will say that many of our

49:53.173 --> 49:55.396
business , our defense industrial based

49:55.396 --> 49:57.451
partners are watching this as well .

49:57.451 --> 49:59.673
And of course the Ukrainians are driven

49:59.673 --> 50:01.840
by the existential need for that cycle

50:01.840 --> 50:03.896
of adaptation . As we watch that , I

50:03.896 --> 50:05.618
have great confidence that our

50:05.618 --> 50:07.784
industrial base here can do the same .

50:07.784 --> 50:09.840
Thank you . Thanks , Mr . Chairman .

50:09.840 --> 50:11.507
Thank you very much , Senator

50:11.507 --> 50:13.729
Blumenthal . Senator Budd . Thank you ,

50:13.729 --> 50:15.784
Chairman . Good to see each of you .

50:15.784 --> 50:17.784
Thank you all for being here . Uh ,

50:17.784 --> 50:17.520
Admiral Bradley , I want to talk about

50:17.520 --> 50:19.800
SOCOM's operation maintenance budget ,

50:19.840 --> 50:22.229
if you will . So I noticed that O&M has

50:22.229 --> 50:26.120
only increased from 9.4 billion to

50:26.120 --> 50:29.600
10.9 billion between 2019 and 20207 .

50:30.189 --> 50:32.620
Um , so it , it's failing to keep pace

50:32.620 --> 50:34.731
with inflation and more importantly ,

50:34.731 --> 50:36.953
the increase in the operational tempo .

50:37.040 --> 50:39.040
So can you talk about what you'd be

50:39.040 --> 50:41.639
able to do with a higher top line and

50:41.639 --> 50:43.583
some of the trade-offs that you're

50:43.583 --> 50:46.540
currently making between O&M as it is

50:46.800 --> 50:49.439
and modernization and also Milon .

50:50.709 --> 50:52.370
Senator , I , I will , um ,

50:52.550 --> 50:55.590
specifically to ONM in , in , uh , in

50:55.590 --> 50:58.320
unique ways , uh , Special Operations

50:58.320 --> 51:00.820
Command uses our ops and maintenance

51:00.820 --> 51:03.229
budget for our key modernization

51:03.229 --> 51:05.590
efforts , uh , in most cases to be able

51:05.590 --> 51:08.090
to we modernize just not just through

51:08.389 --> 51:10.611
the development of new means , articles

51:10.611 --> 51:13.260
and , and uh . And devices , but also

51:13.260 --> 51:16.000
the ways in which those means are used

51:16.179 --> 51:19.209
that requires more exquisite ranges

51:19.209 --> 51:21.431
that have the ability for us to be able

51:21.431 --> 51:23.542
to practice , train , and rehearse in

51:23.542 --> 51:25.739
increasingly contested electromagnetic

51:25.739 --> 51:27.628
spectrum environments . Those are

51:27.628 --> 51:29.795
difficult to be able to produce inside

51:29.795 --> 51:32.017
the United States but not undoable . It

51:32.017 --> 51:34.072
just takes more money . We also need

51:34.072 --> 51:36.072
threat representative systems to be

51:36.072 --> 51:38.183
able to operate against , again , and

51:38.183 --> 51:40.540
operators to mimic our adversaries as

51:40.540 --> 51:42.989
they operate them . All of that takes

51:42.989 --> 51:45.379
new ranges and money and for the

51:45.379 --> 51:47.379
employment of autonomy , as Senator

51:47.379 --> 51:49.790
Blumenthal was . Discussing , we have

51:49.790 --> 51:51.623
to be able to bring together our

51:51.623 --> 51:54.270
standard exquisite weapons systems now

51:54.270 --> 51:56.548
with teamed and collaborative autonomy ,

51:56.548 --> 51:58.603
and there are very few places inside

51:58.603 --> 52:00.826
the United States where that is an easy

52:00.826 --> 52:02.937
thing to do . In many places where it

52:02.937 --> 52:05.048
needs to be done , and we are working

52:05.048 --> 52:07.214
to do that . Thank you for that . Um ,

52:07.214 --> 52:09.214
a question , uh , for you , Admiral

52:09.214 --> 52:11.437
Bradley , and also Secretary Anderson .

52:11.437 --> 52:13.548
Um , I'd like your thoughts on how we

52:13.548 --> 52:13.449
retain mid-career operators , if you

52:13.449 --> 52:15.505
will . You know , I know , um , each

52:15.505 --> 52:17.838
service drives their own bonus programs ,

52:17.838 --> 52:20.060
and I acknowledge that money is not the

52:20.060 --> 52:22.282
only reason why folks stay or go . Um ,

52:22.282 --> 52:24.282
but so tell us what you're doing to

52:24.282 --> 52:26.616
help retain our most seasoned operators ,

52:26.616 --> 52:28.671
whether it's through non-monetary or

52:28.671 --> 52:30.782
monetary . Secretary Anderson , we'll

52:30.782 --> 52:30.550
start with you and then , uh , Admiral

52:30.550 --> 52:32.979
Bradley , please . Yes , Senator , um ,

52:33.280 --> 52:35.502
one of the things I noticed , uh , when

52:35.502 --> 52:37.724
I was over in the Army was , you know ,

52:37.724 --> 52:37.709
you just can't throw money at the

52:37.709 --> 52:39.876
problem all the time , right ? Whether

52:39.876 --> 52:41.598
it be retention bonuses , that

52:41.598 --> 52:41.370
certainly is helpful , but we've seen

52:41.370 --> 52:43.481
things in the Army where , you know ,

52:43.481 --> 52:45.537
change of duty location , uh , those

52:45.537 --> 52:47.259
small things are what keep our

52:47.259 --> 52:49.481
individuals in . But what I would argue

52:49.481 --> 52:51.592
within the SOCOM community that we do

52:51.592 --> 52:53.759
incredibly well is our preservation of

52:53.759 --> 52:56.037
the force and family . Uh , which , um ,

52:56.037 --> 52:57.814
uh , Congress has , has been so

52:57.814 --> 52:59.981
gracious to give us that $11 million .

52:59.981 --> 53:01.981
Now granted , we're going to see an

53:01.981 --> 53:01.909
increase , uh , in the workforce on

53:01.909 --> 53:04.020
that . Um , but what I would tell you

53:04.020 --> 53:06.076
is when we look at the , the service

53:06.076 --> 53:08.131
member and when they're making those

53:08.131 --> 53:10.131
decisions to stay in the military ,

53:10.131 --> 53:12.131
it's typically not done in the team

53:12.131 --> 53:14.353
room , it's not done at the pool , it's

53:14.353 --> 53:13.469
not done wherever , it's usually done

53:13.469 --> 53:15.136
at the kitchen table . So the

53:15.136 --> 53:17.191
preservation of the force and family

53:17.191 --> 53:19.358
has been an absolutely amazing program

53:19.358 --> 53:21.580
where we're not only taking care of our

53:21.580 --> 53:23.747
operators from a physical standpoint ,

53:23.747 --> 53:25.747
but from a mental standpoint . Uh ,

53:25.747 --> 53:27.913
you'll hear Admiral Bradley talk about

53:27.913 --> 53:30.025
the mind gym . That we , that we have

53:30.025 --> 53:32.191
our service members where if you see a

53:32.191 --> 53:34.302
professional athlete when they go out

53:34.302 --> 53:36.469
to the , to the top tiers , uh , yes ,

53:36.469 --> 53:38.525
their physical body is absolutely in

53:39.105 --> 53:41.327
great shape , but their minds also have

53:41.327 --> 53:43.327
to be pristine and so whether it be

53:43.327 --> 53:45.825
family , uh , family outings where we

53:45.825 --> 53:47.769
can take individuals and have them

53:47.769 --> 53:49.881
speak with folks to help their family

53:49.881 --> 53:51.906
out , but that , but that um PTIF

53:51.906 --> 53:54.073
program , the president . Preservation

53:54.073 --> 53:56.184
of the force and family is absolutely

53:56.184 --> 53:55.461
critical when we look at retention ,

53:55.541 --> 53:57.662
Senator . Thanks . Senator , the only

53:57.662 --> 54:00.021
thing I would add is that , um , as you

54:00.021 --> 54:02.243
highlighted , pay incentives are a part

54:02.243 --> 54:04.465
of it , but those are controlled by the

54:04.465 --> 54:06.410
services and another place where a

54:06.410 --> 54:08.521
robust and empowered SOIC helps us to

54:08.521 --> 54:10.521
be able to stitch those together to

54:10.521 --> 54:12.743
ensure we have a common approach across

54:12.743 --> 54:14.521
all the services for all of our

54:14.521 --> 54:16.743
operators and enablers . Very helpful .

54:16.743 --> 54:18.854
Thank you both . Secretary Anderson ,

54:18.854 --> 54:20.521
I'm a strong supporter of the

54:20.521 --> 54:23.360
U.S.Israel counter UXS program . Um , I

54:23.360 --> 54:25.416
think that's in your office . So can

54:25.416 --> 54:27.527
you talk about what your team's doing

54:27.527 --> 54:29.693
to assist Israel in countering Iranian

54:29.693 --> 54:31.916
unmanned systems and how these programs

54:31.916 --> 54:33.804
actually help our own military in

54:33.804 --> 54:36.919
return ? Uh yes , Senator , uh , so we

54:36.919 --> 54:38.919
have a unique ability to be able to

54:38.919 --> 54:40.919
work with countries like Israel and

54:40.919 --> 54:43.141
there's a few other countries out there

54:43.141 --> 54:42.810
where we do essentially a fifty-fifty

54:42.810 --> 54:45.439
burden sharing , uh , investment . Um ,

54:45.550 --> 54:47.989
what we have found incredibly helpful

54:47.989 --> 54:50.310
is to see some of the , the counter UXS

54:50.310 --> 54:53.010
that us and Israel have developed

54:53.879 --> 54:56.790
together that have 100% been applicable

54:56.790 --> 55:00.149
to operations like Epic Fury . Um , now

55:00.149 --> 55:02.429
granted , we , we don't always have the

55:02.429 --> 55:04.540
capability that has the same function

55:04.540 --> 55:06.373
if that makes sense . So there's

55:06.373 --> 55:08.429
certainly things that we want to use

55:08.429 --> 55:10.485
the capability for that the Israelis

55:10.485 --> 55:12.540
want to use the capability for , but

55:12.540 --> 55:15.020
it's been 100% an absolute . Uh , great

55:15.020 --> 55:17.020
partnership with the Israelis to be

55:17.020 --> 55:18.742
able to , uh , not only on the

55:18.742 --> 55:20.576
counterUXS front but a few other

55:20.576 --> 55:22.798
different areas that we've been able to

55:22.798 --> 55:25.020
work with the Israelis . Very helpful .

55:25.020 --> 55:27.131
Thank you all . Thank you very much ,

55:27.131 --> 55:29.242
Senator Budd . Senator Hirono , thank

55:29.242 --> 55:31.298
you , Mr . Chairman . General Rudd ,

55:31.298 --> 55:33.610
you know , in previous elections as

55:33.610 --> 55:37.159
part of the election . Security Group

55:37.159 --> 55:40.139
ESG , uh , both CyberCom

55:40.860 --> 55:42.820
and NSA played a vital role in

55:42.820 --> 55:45.110
protecting our democratic processes

55:45.110 --> 55:47.332
from foreign interference , and I , and

55:47.332 --> 55:50.050
I , I assume you share my concern that ,

55:50.060 --> 55:52.171
uh , there is a potential for foreign

55:52.171 --> 55:54.449
interference in our upcoming elections .

55:54.820 --> 55:58.219
And so . I'd like to ask if uh you ,

55:58.300 --> 56:00.633
you have already set up or you're gonna ,

56:00.633 --> 56:04.179
you're planning to set up uh the ESG to

56:04.179 --> 56:05.957
ensure that there is no foreign

56:05.957 --> 56:08.235
interference in our upcoming elections .

56:10.550 --> 56:12.717
Senator , we , we certainly share your

56:12.717 --> 56:14.939
concern , and we're always looking , as

56:14.939 --> 56:17.179
you would expect us to , for any type

56:17.179 --> 56:18.901
of foreign activity that would

56:18.901 --> 56:21.790
undermine our democratic process . And

56:21.790 --> 56:23.699
as we discussed , we are , we are

56:23.699 --> 56:26.179
postured and ready to support as

56:26.179 --> 56:28.370
required or tasked in making sure that

56:28.370 --> 56:30.537
we safeguard our elections . Well , do

56:30.537 --> 56:33.489
you have an ESG set up ? For this

56:33.489 --> 56:36.770
purpose . Yeah , Senator , I don't , I

56:36.770 --> 56:38.548
don't know that an ESG has been

56:38.548 --> 56:40.929
established yet , but we are prepared

56:40.929 --> 56:43.850
to as , as required . Well , we used to

56:43.850 --> 56:46.610
have , uh , ESG , and I , I think you

56:46.610 --> 56:48.570
can understand why I'm concerned

56:48.570 --> 56:50.403
because there's no reason not to

56:50.403 --> 56:52.959
anticipate foreign interference in our

56:52.959 --> 56:54.959
elections , i.e. , Russia , China ,

56:54.959 --> 56:57.237
possibly Iran , although they're being ,

56:57.237 --> 56:59.126
uh , maybe they have other , uh ,

56:59.126 --> 57:02.110
things to deal with . But , um , do you ,

57:02.459 --> 57:05.000
do you anticipate ? Foreign

57:05.000 --> 57:06.989
interference with our upcoming

57:06.989 --> 57:10.929
elections . Senator , I

57:10.929 --> 57:13.129
think it's , it's reasonable to expect

57:13.129 --> 57:15.296
based on what we've seen in the past ,

57:15.296 --> 57:17.351
uh , and so I , I think it is really

57:17.351 --> 57:19.518
important to , uh , to set up an ESG ,

57:19.518 --> 57:21.351
and I will follow up with you on

57:21.351 --> 57:23.407
whether that is happening . And will

57:23.407 --> 57:25.407
you commit to jealousy guarding our

57:25.407 --> 57:27.570
elections this year and , uh , report

57:27.570 --> 57:30.770
to Congress any attempts by , um .

57:31.889 --> 57:34.989
By this uh administration to polarize

57:35.330 --> 57:39.300
the process . Senator , we ,

57:39.510 --> 57:43.250
we will certainly execute . Uh ,

57:43.429 --> 57:45.750
what we're tasked to in , in regards to

57:45.750 --> 57:48.270
that , yeah , I realize that , that uh

57:48.270 --> 57:50.270
you have a responsibility regarding

57:50.270 --> 57:52.603
foreign interference with our elections ,

57:52.603 --> 57:54.810
but there is , uh , definitely . Uh ,

57:54.830 --> 57:57.340
efforts , uh , to , um , uh ,

57:57.389 --> 57:59.469
domestically interfere with our

57:59.469 --> 58:01.358
elections by , for example , uh ,

58:01.358 --> 58:03.525
having the former attorney general sue

58:03.525 --> 58:05.636
29 states for voter rolls . These are

58:05.636 --> 58:07.858
millions of people's information . What

58:07.858 --> 58:09.969
does , uh , the Department of Justice

58:09.969 --> 58:11.850
need with these , uh , with this

58:11.850 --> 58:14.072
information ? What do they intend to do

58:14.072 --> 58:16.406
and not to mention . The desire to , to ,

58:16.406 --> 58:18.419
uh , push for the passage of the

58:18.419 --> 58:20.719
so-called SAV Act , which will result

58:20.719 --> 58:22.941
in millions of people who are currently

58:22.941 --> 58:25.163
registered to vote , unable to register

58:25.163 --> 58:27.330
to vote because they don't have either

58:27.330 --> 58:30.060
a birth certificate or , um , a

58:30.060 --> 58:32.219
passport . So there are things

58:32.219 --> 58:34.330
happening on the domestic front , and

58:34.330 --> 58:36.330
that's why , uh , uh , you know , I

58:36.330 --> 58:38.441
have some serious concerns . Uh , for

58:38.441 --> 58:40.679
Admiral Bradley . Uh , one or so

58:40.679 --> 58:42.957
SOCOM's enduring competitive advantage ,

58:42.957 --> 58:44.679
and you mentioned that the how

58:44.679 --> 58:46.623
important our allies are , uh , in

58:46.623 --> 58:48.790
great power competition is its network

58:48.790 --> 58:50.709
of allies and partners in the

58:50.709 --> 58:53.350
Indo-Pacific built over decades through

58:53.350 --> 58:55.979
sustained engagement , training , and

58:55.979 --> 58:58.959
interoperability . Um , given the

58:58.959 --> 59:01.419
increased demands for homeland defense

59:01.419 --> 59:03.760
and allied burden sharing in the new

59:03.760 --> 59:07.479
NDS , how are you increasing SAF's

59:07.479 --> 59:10.520
posture and presence in the 1st and 2nd

59:10.520 --> 59:12.860
island chains to deter Chinese

59:12.860 --> 59:15.439
aggression and support Admiral Paparo's ?

59:17.229 --> 59:20.840
Um , denial defense . Senator , thank

59:20.840 --> 59:22.951
you . Um , as you know , uh , General

59:22.951 --> 59:25.159
Fenton , um , um , was very strong on

59:25.159 --> 59:27.326
leading to adjust our posture over the

59:27.326 --> 59:29.603
last 4 years to be able to , uh , have ,

59:29.603 --> 59:31.548
uh , to empower those generational

59:31.548 --> 59:33.492
relationships . And thanks to both

59:33.492 --> 59:35.548
chambers , frankly , but , uh , your

59:35.548 --> 59:37.548
strong work , we are well resourced

59:37.548 --> 59:39.603
with , uh , with people in the right

59:39.603 --> 59:41.770
structure to be able to sustain that ,

59:41.770 --> 59:44.048
uh , that presence and that commitment ,

59:44.048 --> 59:45.881
uh , while we manage the ongoing

59:45.881 --> 59:48.103
threats to the homeland and the other ,

59:48.103 --> 59:51.320
uh , commitments that we have . Um , OK ,

59:51.399 --> 59:53.566
I'm , I'm glad that , uh , some of you

59:53.566 --> 59:55.621
already , uh , uh , talked about the

59:55.621 --> 59:57.621
importance of having the , uh , the

59:57.621 --> 59:59.677
kind of workforce that is trained to

59:59.677 --> 01:00:01.788
deal with the , the needs of the , of

01:00:01.788 --> 01:00:04.070
the , the , uh , cyber domain , and ,

01:00:04.080 --> 01:00:07.689
um , um . General Rudd , you mentioned

01:00:07.689 --> 01:00:09.745
that it is really critical to get to

01:00:09.745 --> 01:00:11.856
get the right kind of people . What ,

01:00:11.856 --> 01:00:14.022
what are the right kind of people that

01:00:14.022 --> 01:00:16.133
you're hoping to recruit , uh , to be

01:00:16.133 --> 01:00:19.129
trained in the cyber domain ? Yeah ,

01:00:19.270 --> 01:00:21.548
thanks , Senator . As you would expect ,

01:00:22.010 --> 01:00:24.232
someone who's highly technical minded .

01:00:25.620 --> 01:00:28.840
Smart . Innovative , motivated ,

01:00:29.229 --> 01:00:32.120
and is committed to doing something

01:00:32.120 --> 01:00:34.342
extraordinary . Do you have a number of

01:00:34.342 --> 01:00:37.719
goals ? I mean how many thousands of

01:00:37.719 --> 01:00:39.830
people are we gonna need to have this

01:00:39.830 --> 01:00:41.941
kind of training to counter the Milan

01:00:41.941 --> 01:00:43.663
activities of of our near peer

01:00:43.663 --> 01:00:46.919
competitors ? Yes , Senator , I , I

01:00:46.919 --> 01:00:48.939
think we have objectives that are

01:00:49.080 --> 01:00:51.679
outlined within Cybercom 2.0 , but I

01:00:51.679 --> 01:00:53.846
think what , what I owe this committee

01:00:53.846 --> 01:00:56.012
and frankly the nation is a continuous

01:00:56.012 --> 01:00:58.068
assessment to make sure that we have

01:00:58.068 --> 01:01:00.360
the right numbers and to your opening

01:01:00.360 --> 01:01:03.399
point that they're the best , most

01:01:03.399 --> 01:01:05.621
highly qualified talent and that we can

01:01:05.621 --> 01:01:07.510
make sure that we can upgame them

01:01:07.510 --> 01:01:09.677
through training and through the , the

01:01:09.677 --> 01:01:11.843
mechanisms that'll , that'll make this

01:01:11.843 --> 01:01:13.732
enduring . General , if you could

01:01:13.732 --> 01:01:15.899
quantify that on the , on the record ,

01:01:15.899 --> 01:01:17.899
um . By supplementing your answer ,

01:01:17.899 --> 01:01:19.621
Chairman , I'll , I'll , I , I

01:01:19.621 --> 01:01:21.899
certainly will . Thank you . Thank you ,

01:01:21.899 --> 01:01:24.066
Senator Hirono . Senator Scott , thank

01:01:24.066 --> 01:01:23.830
you , Chairman . I want to thank each

01:01:23.830 --> 01:01:25.941
of you for joining us here today . It

01:01:25.941 --> 01:01:28.163
is critical that the US is always ready

01:01:28.163 --> 01:01:30.750
to deter any threats . One big way is

01:01:30.750 --> 01:01:32.917
by working with our allies and partner

01:01:32.917 --> 01:01:34.917
nations to solidify our coordinated

01:01:34.917 --> 01:01:37.028
efforts to ensure security around the

01:01:37.028 --> 01:01:39.139
world . Even in places where we don't

01:01:39.139 --> 01:01:41.361
have our own troops readily stationed .

01:01:41.361 --> 01:01:43.194
Admiral Bradley , how do foreign

01:01:43.194 --> 01:01:45.139
military sales programs enhance US

01:01:45.139 --> 01:01:47.250
military to military relationships in

01:01:47.250 --> 01:01:50.409
the Indo-Pacific and globally ? Senator ,

01:01:50.889 --> 01:01:53.080
foreign military sales , direct

01:01:53.080 --> 01:01:55.191
commercial sales , and , and the like

01:01:55.191 --> 01:01:57.979
are all critical to us being able to

01:01:57.979 --> 01:02:01.149
have expectation of interoperability

01:02:01.149 --> 01:02:03.610
and expectation of what our allies and

01:02:03.610 --> 01:02:06.169
partners will be able to perform when

01:02:06.169 --> 01:02:08.649
they act on their own behalf . That in

01:02:08.649 --> 01:02:11.040
turn gives us a much better ability to

01:02:11.040 --> 01:02:12.984
understand . What their weaknesses

01:02:12.984 --> 01:02:15.096
might be or what gaps that might need

01:02:15.096 --> 01:02:17.262
to be filled by US contributions . And

01:02:17.262 --> 01:02:19.318
so as you highlight , even in places

01:02:19.318 --> 01:02:21.429
where we are not present in all times

01:02:21.429 --> 01:02:24.419
or always , knowing what they are using ,

01:02:24.580 --> 01:02:26.524
how they're using it gives us that

01:02:26.524 --> 01:02:28.524
extra advantage . So you know their

01:02:28.524 --> 01:02:30.524
capability and you also , if you're

01:02:30.524 --> 01:02:32.747
ever going to work with them , you know

01:02:32.747 --> 01:02:34.858
how you operate with them . Yes sir .

01:02:34.858 --> 01:02:37.310
What risk do we face to access and to

01:02:37.310 --> 01:02:39.532
access and influence if we fail to work

01:02:39.532 --> 01:02:41.421
well with our allies and remain a

01:02:41.421 --> 01:02:43.421
reliable and timely defense partner

01:02:43.421 --> 01:02:45.588
compared to competitors like communist

01:02:45.588 --> 01:02:47.810
China ? Well , Senator , in all cases ,

01:02:47.810 --> 01:02:49.977
uh , placement and access is , uh , is

01:02:49.977 --> 01:02:52.729
a corollary to understanding . And so

01:02:52.729 --> 01:02:54.840
being on the ground with those out on

01:02:54.840 --> 01:02:57.370
the edge of the , of the territory to

01:02:57.370 --> 01:02:59.426
be able to appreciate the context of

01:02:59.426 --> 01:03:01.592
what's happening , helps to inform our

01:03:01.592 --> 01:03:03.370
decision making in the rear and

01:03:03.370 --> 01:03:05.537
throughout the chain of command . So ,

01:03:05.537 --> 01:03:07.648
uh , I believe that it is fundamental

01:03:07.648 --> 01:03:09.870
to our ability to know not only when we

01:03:09.870 --> 01:03:11.926
should act , but how we should act ,

01:03:11.926 --> 01:03:14.148
and that , that is a partnership that .

01:03:14.148 --> 01:03:16.314
We see play out across the world , not

01:03:16.314 --> 01:03:18.648
just in the Indo-Pacific . For instance ,

01:03:18.648 --> 01:03:20.915
in Ecuador recently , some really good

01:03:20.915 --> 01:03:23.034
operational results informed by our

01:03:23.034 --> 01:03:25.145
Ecuadorian partners to help us choose

01:03:25.395 --> 01:03:27.875
which and how to target adversaries

01:03:27.875 --> 01:03:30.042
there . But that , of course , is just

01:03:30.042 --> 01:03:32.097
an instance that has been played out

01:03:32.097 --> 01:03:33.986
over the last 25 years across the

01:03:33.986 --> 01:03:36.208
Middle East , Africa , across Europe as

01:03:36.208 --> 01:03:39.064
well , and , and I , and I believe the

01:03:39.064 --> 01:03:42.659
same analog applies globally . Emmiral

01:03:42.659 --> 01:03:44.937
Bradley , Assistant Secretary Anderson ,

01:03:44.937 --> 01:03:46.937
how does the forward presence of US

01:03:46.937 --> 01:03:49.159
Special Operations Forces contribute to

01:03:49.159 --> 01:03:51.326
countering communist China's influence

01:03:51.326 --> 01:03:51.300
campaigns , particularly in the

01:03:51.300 --> 01:03:53.356
Indo-Pacific and other key regions ,

01:03:53.409 --> 01:03:55.131
and what advantages do Special

01:03:55.131 --> 01:03:57.131
operations forces bring in building

01:03:57.131 --> 01:03:58.798
partner capacity , strengthen

01:03:58.798 --> 01:04:00.409
resilience , and shaping the

01:04:00.409 --> 01:04:02.631
competitive environment below the level

01:04:02.631 --> 01:04:04.742
of armed conflict ? Senator , I might

01:04:04.742 --> 01:04:06.798
start , but just quickly , that same

01:04:06.798 --> 01:04:08.465
placement and access and that

01:04:08.465 --> 01:04:10.631
understanding allows us to use what is

01:04:10.631 --> 01:04:12.520
the uh the equivalent of the high

01:04:12.520 --> 01:04:14.409
ground in the influence sphere of

01:04:14.409 --> 01:04:16.409
competition , the truth . In almost

01:04:16.409 --> 01:04:18.298
every case , all we have to do is

01:04:18.298 --> 01:04:19.853
illuminate the truth of our

01:04:19.853 --> 01:04:21.798
adversaries' nefarious activity to

01:04:21.798 --> 01:04:23.909
allow our partners to then counter it

01:04:23.909 --> 01:04:25.965
uh and to be able to use it to their

01:04:25.965 --> 01:04:28.187
advantage . Senator , I might , I might

01:04:28.187 --> 01:04:29.965
add just , uh , back to Admiral

01:04:29.965 --> 01:04:32.187
Bradley's point of placement and access

01:04:32.187 --> 01:04:34.353
without going into some detail , but ,

01:04:34.353 --> 01:04:36.409
uh , just being president in some of

01:04:36.409 --> 01:04:36.260
these areas with our partners is an

01:04:36.260 --> 01:04:38.620
absolute deterrent . Uh , not only that ,

01:04:38.739 --> 01:04:40.795
but we , uh , some of our forces and

01:04:40.795 --> 01:04:42.406
what they've been able , the

01:04:42.406 --> 01:04:44.295
capabilities they've been able to

01:04:44.295 --> 01:04:46.461
create , if you might call it , within

01:04:46.461 --> 01:04:48.128
some of these , uh , areas of

01:04:48.128 --> 01:04:50.295
responsibility . One example is , uh ,

01:04:50.295 --> 01:04:52.017
you know , some of our special

01:04:52.017 --> 01:04:54.128
operations forces had a critical need

01:04:54.128 --> 01:04:56.128
for medical , uh , and so . Medical

01:04:56.128 --> 01:04:58.128
role to facility and what they were

01:04:58.128 --> 01:04:57.899
able to do is work with the local

01:04:57.899 --> 01:04:59.899
hospital to embed themselves within

01:04:59.899 --> 01:05:02.139
that hospital , not only providing care

01:05:02.139 --> 01:05:04.419
for that local area but also providing

01:05:04.419 --> 01:05:06.308
training for themselves . That in

01:05:06.308 --> 01:05:07.919
itself is one a capabilities

01:05:07.919 --> 01:05:09.752
development , a readiness , uh ,

01:05:09.752 --> 01:05:11.919
development , but also , you know , we

01:05:11.919 --> 01:05:13.919
talk about by with and through your

01:05:13.919 --> 01:05:13.800
partners . There's no better way than

01:05:13.810 --> 01:05:15.810
than through the local population .

01:05:15.899 --> 01:05:17.899
Thank you . MR Bradley . How are US

01:05:17.899 --> 01:05:20.010
Special operations forces integrating

01:05:20.010 --> 01:05:22.066
unmanned and autonomous technologies

01:05:22.066 --> 01:05:24.879
into their operations ? Senator , at

01:05:24.879 --> 01:05:27.330
every level , um , as we say , from the

01:05:27.330 --> 01:05:29.163
battlefield to the back office ,

01:05:29.163 --> 01:05:31.010
finding ways to be able to bring

01:05:31.010 --> 01:05:33.729
autonomy , treatable mass autonomy to

01:05:33.729 --> 01:05:36.649
bear , is a very important part of how

01:05:36.649 --> 01:05:39.149
we on the edge can leverage our

01:05:39.149 --> 01:05:41.316
placement and access to not only serve

01:05:41.316 --> 01:05:43.427
our own interests , but to be able to

01:05:43.427 --> 01:05:45.538
help our partners who generally don't

01:05:45.538 --> 01:05:47.705
have the same budgets we do to be . To

01:05:47.705 --> 01:05:49.871
buy that kind of capacity to give them

01:05:49.871 --> 01:05:53.870
asymmetric advantages . So autonomous

01:05:53.870 --> 01:05:55.669
capability is critical to our

01:05:55.669 --> 01:05:57.280
understanding from a sensing

01:05:57.280 --> 01:05:59.629
perspective , as well as it is from a ,

01:05:59.709 --> 01:06:01.598
from a surveillance to be able to

01:06:01.598 --> 01:06:03.949
sustain containment of an objective

01:06:03.949 --> 01:06:06.171
that you would want to watch . And then

01:06:06.171 --> 01:06:08.282
finally , clearly for for the ability

01:06:08.282 --> 01:06:10.227
to project violence should that be

01:06:10.227 --> 01:06:12.282
required . So looking at the success

01:06:12.282 --> 01:06:14.282
the Ukrainian armed forces have had

01:06:14.282 --> 01:06:17.050
with um drones and other autonomous uh

01:06:17.260 --> 01:06:19.204
opportunities , do you think we're

01:06:19.204 --> 01:06:21.459
moving fast enough ? Senator , I , I

01:06:21.459 --> 01:06:24.250
would never suggest that the pace at

01:06:24.250 --> 01:06:26.139
which we are moving today is fast

01:06:26.139 --> 01:06:27.917
enough . We need to continue to

01:06:27.917 --> 01:06:30.083
accelerate it . Clearly the Ukrainians

01:06:30.083 --> 01:06:32.250
are driven by an existential need that

01:06:32.250 --> 01:06:34.472
we do not feel , and so we need to make

01:06:34.472 --> 01:06:36.361
up that difference in existential

01:06:36.361 --> 01:06:39.580
motivation with a real appreciation of

01:06:39.580 --> 01:06:41.691
the advantage that it will provide us

01:06:41.780 --> 01:06:44.139
and importantly to deal with the

01:06:44.139 --> 01:06:46.361
challenges of simultaneity , to be able

01:06:46.361 --> 01:06:48.472
to help our partners to do the same .

01:06:48.472 --> 01:06:50.472
Um , our role inside the department

01:06:50.472 --> 01:06:52.028
there is to , uh , identify

01:06:52.028 --> 01:06:54.459
opportunities to test , to validate ,

01:06:54.540 --> 01:06:56.750
and to illuminate those , uh , down

01:06:56.750 --> 01:06:58.972
selected and , uh , and frankly to work

01:06:58.972 --> 01:07:01.194
with our industry partners to help them

01:07:01.194 --> 01:07:03.417
improve their capabilities so that they

01:07:03.417 --> 01:07:05.528
might be more readily integrated into

01:07:05.528 --> 01:07:07.639
our services warfighting constructs ,

01:07:07.639 --> 01:07:09.694
as well as our allies and partners .

01:07:09.694 --> 01:07:11.639
Thank you . Thank you , Chairman .

01:07:11.639 --> 01:07:13.639
Thank you , Senator Scott , Senator

01:07:13.639 --> 01:07:15.583
Kaine . Thank you , Mr . Chair and

01:07:15.583 --> 01:07:17.417
thanks to the witnesses . I have

01:07:17.417 --> 01:07:19.306
questions for Admiral Bradley and

01:07:19.306 --> 01:07:21.306
Secretary Anderson really about two

01:07:21.306 --> 01:07:23.417
topics , Operation Southern Spear and

01:07:23.417 --> 01:07:25.528
then the um preservation of force and

01:07:25.528 --> 01:07:27.750
family initiative that you've discussed

01:07:27.750 --> 01:07:29.830
on , on Southern Spear . Um , I'm

01:07:29.830 --> 01:07:31.886
correct , am I not , that the , that

01:07:31.886 --> 01:07:34.108
the lead on Southern Sear operations is

01:07:34.520 --> 01:07:36.742
SouthHCOM , but special operators often

01:07:36.742 --> 01:07:39.100
play a role in particular , um ,

01:07:39.810 --> 01:07:42.032
operations within that . Am I correct ?

01:07:42.032 --> 01:07:43.866
Yes , Senator . Um , there is an

01:07:43.866 --> 01:07:46.229
article that was published on April 21

01:07:46.229 --> 01:07:48.062
in The Guardian that I'd like to

01:07:48.062 --> 01:07:50.285
introduce for the record . The title of

01:07:50.285 --> 01:07:52.285
it is , We Were Terrified They Were

01:07:52.285 --> 01:07:54.396
Going to Kill Us Fishers who survived

01:07:54.396 --> 01:07:56.618
US boat strike . Speak out , if I might

01:07:56.618 --> 01:07:58.729
introduce that into the record , Mr .

01:07:58.729 --> 01:08:00.840
Chair . You guys will be surprised to

01:08:00.840 --> 01:08:02.562
know that I don't just believe

01:08:02.562 --> 01:08:04.896
everything I read in , in news accounts ,

01:08:04.896 --> 01:08:07.007
but this is one that is public that I

01:08:07.007 --> 01:08:09.229
want to ask about . It's , it's a story

01:08:09.229 --> 01:08:11.229
about a US strike purportedly on an

01:08:11.229 --> 01:08:13.173
Ecuadorian fishing vessel near the

01:08:13.173 --> 01:08:15.489
Galapagos that took place on March

01:08:15.489 --> 01:08:17.970
twenty-sixth , and the indication in

01:08:17.970 --> 01:08:20.189
the story , as I say it's a week old ,

01:08:20.339 --> 01:08:23.450
is that this was a fishing vessel that

01:08:23.450 --> 01:08:26.049
after the boat was struck , a US patrol

01:08:26.049 --> 01:08:29.988
boat . Rescued those on the vessel , um ,

01:08:30.249 --> 01:08:32.729
handcuffed them , transported them to a

01:08:32.729 --> 01:08:34.969
Salvadoran patrol boat . They were

01:08:34.969 --> 01:08:37.500
eventually taken to Salvador . Where

01:08:37.500 --> 01:08:40.299
they were released to a UN shelter and

01:08:40.299 --> 01:08:42.243
then eventually taken back home to

01:08:42.243 --> 01:08:44.077
Ecuador where they were released

01:08:44.259 --> 01:08:46.700
without charge . Are you aware of the

01:08:46.700 --> 01:08:49.339
allegation of this US strike on this

01:08:49.339 --> 01:08:51.506
Ecuadorian fishing vessel , Admiral or

01:08:51.506 --> 01:08:53.728
Secretary ? Senator , I am aware of the

01:08:53.728 --> 01:08:56.379
article . I'm also aware that later in

01:08:56.379 --> 01:08:59.700
the article it quotes the department's

01:08:59.700 --> 01:09:02.620
response to it as there not having been

01:09:02.620 --> 01:09:05.659
any US military involvement . Uh , I'm

01:09:05.659 --> 01:09:07.826
also aware that there are , there were

01:09:07.826 --> 01:09:10.958
no recorded or no , no US strikes

01:09:11.258 --> 01:09:14.418
within 3 weeks around that incident as

01:09:14.418 --> 01:09:16.278
well . I believe the Ecuadorian

01:09:16.278 --> 01:09:18.445
government has , has rendered judgment

01:09:18.445 --> 01:09:20.500
that there were no US involvement in

01:09:20.500 --> 01:09:22.499
that . So I , I can't speak to any

01:09:22.499 --> 01:09:25.139
greater detail . Obviously SOHCOM and

01:09:25.139 --> 01:09:27.139
the department would own that , but

01:09:27.139 --> 01:09:29.250
those are , those are from , um , you

01:09:29.250 --> 01:09:31.528
know , superficial observations . Yeah ,

01:09:31.528 --> 01:09:33.695
let , let me read the portion from the

01:09:33.695 --> 01:09:33.458
article that I think you're referring

01:09:33.458 --> 01:09:35.569
to . The Pentagon and the White House

01:09:35.569 --> 01:09:37.902
did not respond to requests for comment .

01:09:38.120 --> 01:09:41.549
US Southern Command said it had no

01:09:41.549 --> 01:09:44.399
information to provide regarding any US

01:09:44.399 --> 01:09:46.220
government personnel personnel

01:09:46.220 --> 01:09:49.120
involvement in any of the incidents

01:09:49.120 --> 01:09:51.709
laid out . Um , are you aware of any

01:09:53.129 --> 01:09:55.240
investigation into this ? I mean this

01:09:55.240 --> 01:09:57.407
is a pretty , you know , tough claim ,

01:09:57.410 --> 01:09:59.577
the tough claim that the US would have

01:09:59.577 --> 01:10:01.410
attacked a fishing boat that had

01:10:01.410 --> 01:10:04.810
nothing to do with any group on the

01:10:04.810 --> 01:10:06.977
classified DTO list . Are you aware of

01:10:06.977 --> 01:10:09.270
any investigation that's being done

01:10:09.270 --> 01:10:11.370
into this public reporting to see if

01:10:11.370 --> 01:10:13.649
it's accurate or not , Senator ? I'm

01:10:13.649 --> 01:10:16.729
not . I believe though the , the , the ,

01:10:16.759 --> 01:10:18.870
uh , The methodology we go through is

01:10:18.870 --> 01:10:20.910
first to assess a claim like this ,

01:10:21.189 --> 01:10:23.910
whether or not it is credible , and I

01:10:23.910 --> 01:10:25.966
believe from what you've cited there

01:10:25.966 --> 01:10:27.966
and what I understand from from the

01:10:27.966 --> 01:10:30.229
rendering that it was deemed not to be

01:10:30.229 --> 01:10:31.951
credible . Therefore , further

01:10:31.951 --> 01:10:33.785
investigation not required . And

01:10:33.785 --> 01:10:35.673
Secretary Anderson , is that your

01:10:35.673 --> 01:10:35.069
understanding as well ? Yes , Senator

01:10:35.069 --> 01:10:37.379
Kaine , exactly what Admiral Bradley

01:10:37.379 --> 01:10:39.546
say , unaware as well from what I've ,

01:10:39.589 --> 01:10:42.020
what I've been told . So your testimony ,

01:10:42.029 --> 01:10:44.310
based on your understanding . And this

01:10:44.310 --> 01:10:46.479
is SOUTHCOM Equities obviously , but

01:10:46.479 --> 01:10:50.149
Special operations participates is that

01:10:50.149 --> 01:10:53.069
this public reporting , at least

01:10:53.069 --> 01:10:55.236
SOUTHCOM has gone back and they cannot

01:10:55.509 --> 01:10:57.850
find evidence that the US carried out

01:10:58.629 --> 01:11:01.750
strike operations of that kind on that

01:11:01.750 --> 01:11:03.972
day . That's your understanding , yes ,

01:11:03.972 --> 01:11:06.083
Senator , it is . Well , I think it's

01:11:06.083 --> 01:11:08.083
important to put that on the record

01:11:08.083 --> 01:11:09.750
because obviously if there is

01:11:09.750 --> 01:11:12.028
information about the veracity of this ,

01:11:12.028 --> 01:11:14.194
it should . Come out , um , one of the

01:11:14.194 --> 01:11:16.194
things that I think can be a little

01:11:16.194 --> 01:11:16.160
confusing in this instance that could

01:11:16.160 --> 01:11:18.382
have led to confusion in this , in this

01:11:18.382 --> 01:11:20.830
circumstance is , as far as I know ,

01:11:21.379 --> 01:11:23.959
Southern Spear is a military operation

01:11:23.959 --> 01:11:26.759
carried out against targets connected

01:11:26.759 --> 01:11:29.600
to organizations , the list of whom are

01:11:29.600 --> 01:11:31.656
still classified , is that correct ?

01:11:33.910 --> 01:11:37.600
I believe so , Senator . I think

01:11:37.600 --> 01:11:40.520
that the operations authorized by the

01:11:40.520 --> 01:11:42.979
president can be carried out against

01:11:43.879 --> 01:11:45.768
organizations on a list of DTOs ,

01:11:45.799 --> 01:11:47.855
designated terrorist organizations ,

01:11:47.855 --> 01:11:49.855
that is classified . It's only been

01:11:49.855 --> 01:11:51.910
shared with Congress in a classified

01:11:51.910 --> 01:11:54.021
setting . It's not been made public ,

01:11:54.021 --> 01:11:56.021
and that also means The , the enemy

01:11:56.021 --> 01:11:58.132
hasn't been told you're an enemy . If

01:11:58.132 --> 01:12:00.355
you , if you declare war against Iraq ,

01:12:00.355 --> 01:12:02.577
for example , or al-Qaeda , that public

01:12:02.577 --> 01:12:04.632
declaration alerts the enemy to know

01:12:04.632 --> 01:12:06.688
that , hey , you're the enemy if you

01:12:06.688 --> 01:12:08.910
associate with the group subject to the

01:12:09.319 --> 01:12:11.759
designation . If the DTO list in

01:12:11.759 --> 01:12:14.069
Southern Spear is purely classified ,

01:12:14.399 --> 01:12:16.979
that means we haven't alerted . Uh ,

01:12:17.160 --> 01:12:19.160
those who the US has determined are

01:12:19.160 --> 01:12:21.520
combatants that we are in fact engaging

01:12:21.520 --> 01:12:23.742
in war against them , and that can lead

01:12:23.742 --> 01:12:25.964
to confusion . My , my time is up , but

01:12:25.964 --> 01:12:27.964
I just want to just say this , I do

01:12:27.964 --> 01:12:30.240
commend what you guys have done . Um ,

01:12:30.310 --> 01:12:33.080
on this , um , preservation of force

01:12:33.080 --> 01:12:35.080
and family initiative , and I think

01:12:35.080 --> 01:12:37.247
it's particularly needed among special

01:12:37.247 --> 01:12:39.413
operators , but I also think it offers

01:12:39.413 --> 01:12:41.524
a template more generally for the way

01:12:41.524 --> 01:12:43.747
we ought to approach the issue of the ,

01:12:43.747 --> 01:12:45.913
you know , long-term well-being of our

01:12:45.913 --> 01:12:47.913
service members . So keep it up and

01:12:47.913 --> 01:12:50.024
spread the . Best practices from what

01:12:50.024 --> 01:12:51.969
you're doing . Thank you , Senator

01:12:51.969 --> 01:12:54.136
Sullivan . Thank you , Mr . Chairman ,

01:12:54.136 --> 01:12:56.358
and thank you to the witnesses . I just

01:12:56.358 --> 01:12:58.524
want to add Senator Kaine's point . We

01:12:58.524 --> 01:13:00.636
had a classified briefing a couple of

01:13:00.636 --> 01:13:02.870
months ago on the ways in which both

01:13:02.870 --> 01:13:06.629
SOCOM , Southern Command , NSA . Go

01:13:06.629 --> 01:13:09.229
through the target , targeting in , in

01:13:09.229 --> 01:13:11.285
this regard , and Admiral , isn't it

01:13:11.285 --> 01:13:13.396
true it's , uh , the JAG officers are

01:13:13.396 --> 01:13:15.451
there in every step of the way . The

01:13:15.451 --> 01:13:17.507
NSA is , I mean , it is an exquisite

01:13:17.507 --> 01:13:21.009
detailed and very uh robust targeting

01:13:21.009 --> 01:13:23.339
op before anyone is given the authority

01:13:23.339 --> 01:13:26.189
to go strike , correct , Senator , that

01:13:26.189 --> 01:13:28.189
is correct . It is based off of the

01:13:28.189 --> 01:13:30.580
lessons learned and the processes , uh ,

01:13:30.620 --> 01:13:32.731
perfected over the last 25 years of ,

01:13:32.731 --> 01:13:34.990
uh , persona targeting . Yeah , no , I

01:13:34.990 --> 01:13:37.990
think the . Uh , that briefing from my

01:13:37.990 --> 01:13:39.879
perspective was very impressive .

01:13:39.879 --> 01:13:41.879
General Rudd , I want to go back to

01:13:41.879 --> 01:13:44.101
where you and I had a good conversation

01:13:44.101 --> 01:13:46.268
during your confirmation process . And

01:13:46.268 --> 01:13:48.323
it's about how our adversaries often

01:13:48.323 --> 01:13:50.379
all over the place take aggressive ,

01:13:50.379 --> 01:13:52.910
offensive , state-sponsored kind of

01:13:52.910 --> 01:13:55.689
cyber-related actions against us across

01:13:56.109 --> 01:13:58.229
so many spheres , elections ,

01:13:58.709 --> 01:14:02.390
infrastructure , uh , NSA and our other

01:14:02.390 --> 01:14:04.990
uh services do a great job on defending

01:14:04.990 --> 01:14:07.430
that . But , um , I think , you know ,

01:14:07.509 --> 01:14:09.842
the best defense is also a good offense ,

01:14:09.842 --> 01:14:11.953
right ? And I know you probably can't

01:14:11.953 --> 01:14:14.120
answer the questions here . But , um ,

01:14:14.229 --> 01:14:16.919
Are we also looking at offensive

01:14:16.919 --> 01:14:19.086
operations from a cyber perspective to

01:14:19.086 --> 01:14:21.470
keep our adversaries at bay ? The one I

01:14:21.470 --> 01:14:23.581
always think would be good is letting

01:14:23.581 --> 01:14:25.581
the people of China and Russia know

01:14:25.581 --> 01:14:27.637
just how corrupt their leaders are ,

01:14:27.637 --> 01:14:29.748
how rich they are . Putin , I think ,

01:14:29.748 --> 01:14:32.081
is one of the richest guys in the world .

01:14:32.081 --> 01:14:34.414
Xi Xi Jinping's sister is a billionaire .

01:14:34.414 --> 01:14:36.414
I wonder how that happened . Um , I

01:14:36.414 --> 01:14:38.359
mean , Isn't it also good to go on

01:14:38.359 --> 01:14:40.248
offense , right ? We get , we get

01:14:40.248 --> 01:14:42.470
attacked a lot , but to let people know

01:14:42.660 --> 01:14:44.771
that , uh , we can go on offense with

01:14:44.771 --> 01:14:46.771
the exquisite capabilities that you

01:14:46.771 --> 01:14:50.370
have . Senator , I ,

01:14:51.109 --> 01:14:53.689
we absolutely have to be capable of

01:14:53.689 --> 01:14:55.509
providing offensive options and

01:14:55.509 --> 01:14:57.398
certainly working in concert with

01:14:57.750 --> 01:14:59.917
Honorable Sutton as she crafts out the

01:14:59.917 --> 01:15:02.083
strategy for the department in support

01:15:02.083 --> 01:15:04.560
of the NDS . You could expect that

01:15:04.939 --> 01:15:07.161
we'll be in a position and we have to ,

01:15:07.161 --> 01:15:09.383
I mean , when these dictators are using

01:15:09.383 --> 01:15:11.217
cyber ops to come after the most

01:15:11.217 --> 01:15:13.272
important thing to all of us , which

01:15:13.272 --> 01:15:15.495
are the You know , American elections ,

01:15:15.495 --> 01:15:17.661
when none of them would ever stand for

01:15:17.661 --> 01:15:19.717
election because they fear their own

01:15:19.717 --> 01:15:21.606
people . I think we should flex a

01:15:21.606 --> 01:15:23.772
little offensive cyber capability . Do

01:15:23.772 --> 01:15:25.995
you agree with that , Madam Secretary ?

01:15:26.040 --> 01:15:28.759
Absolutely . As was articulated in the

01:15:28.759 --> 01:15:31.037
president's cyber strategy for America ,

01:15:31.279 --> 01:15:33.520
we need to be very clear that malicious

01:15:33.520 --> 01:15:35.879
cyber actors in this space have and

01:15:35.879 --> 01:15:38.029
will feel the consequences of their

01:15:38.029 --> 01:15:40.020
action . We need to look at how we

01:15:40.020 --> 01:15:42.187
leverage all tools of national power ,

01:15:42.859 --> 01:15:45.180
uh , whether it be military offensive

01:15:45.180 --> 01:15:47.100
capabilities or other interagency

01:15:47.100 --> 01:15:49.267
efforts , and that is something we are

01:15:49.267 --> 01:15:51.211
going to be posturing with the new

01:15:51.211 --> 01:15:53.211
Department of War cyber strategy to

01:15:53.211 --> 01:15:55.378
make sure we have those capabilities .

01:15:55.378 --> 01:15:54.589
Good . I think it's really important .

01:15:54.689 --> 01:15:56.799
We don't have to say it , but I mean

01:15:57.339 --> 01:15:59.117
they want to come play with our

01:15:59.117 --> 01:16:01.061
elections . We can make sure their

01:16:01.061 --> 01:16:03.006
people know how corrupt they are .

01:16:03.006 --> 01:16:05.228
They're leaders , because a lot of them

01:16:05.228 --> 01:16:07.228
are corrupt , and um . Their people

01:16:07.228 --> 01:16:09.395
should know that . General Rudd , uh ,

01:16:09.395 --> 01:16:11.450
we're really excited in Alaska , NSA

01:16:11.450 --> 01:16:13.672
Alaska's expansion is almost complete .

01:16:13.672 --> 01:16:15.839
Um , you know , it's , uh , it's great

01:16:15.839 --> 01:16:17.950
to see that . My understanding is the

01:16:17.950 --> 01:16:20.172
new edition is gonna be able to house ,

01:16:20.172 --> 01:16:23.310
um , uh , 50 additional billets there .

01:16:23.410 --> 01:16:25.810
Um , you know that the group in Alaska ,

01:16:25.919 --> 01:16:28.169
they do fantastic work . It's not on

01:16:28.169 --> 01:16:30.502
the front pages , it doesn't need to be ,

01:16:30.502 --> 01:16:32.447
but , um , would you be willing to

01:16:32.447 --> 01:16:35.140
visit NSA Alaska with me soon and Meet

01:16:35.140 --> 01:16:37.049
these uh great Americans who are

01:16:37.049 --> 01:16:39.105
conducting these missions under your

01:16:39.105 --> 01:16:41.819
command from my state and work with me

01:16:41.819 --> 01:16:44.041
on ensuring any additional requirements

01:16:44.041 --> 01:16:46.620
we need to fully man that expansion in

01:16:46.620 --> 01:16:49.410
NSA Alaska , 50 additional billets , uh ,

01:16:49.419 --> 01:16:51.540
we can make sure we get done . Hey ,

01:16:51.620 --> 01:16:53.676
Senator , I , I look forward to that

01:16:53.676 --> 01:16:55.676
opportunity . I think we may have a

01:16:55.676 --> 01:16:57.787
chance here . In the near future to ,

01:16:57.787 --> 01:17:00.049
uh , see that site , uh , that it's

01:17:00.049 --> 01:17:02.359
ribbon cutting , but I also have a

01:17:02.359 --> 01:17:04.526
confession to make . I think I pledged

01:17:04.526 --> 01:17:06.470
in the confirmation hearing that I

01:17:06.470 --> 01:17:09.290
would go there first if confirmed . Um ,

01:17:09.669 --> 01:17:11.810
I , I hope you'll appreciate it and

01:17:11.810 --> 01:17:13.699
understand . Everybody commits to

01:17:13.699 --> 01:17:15.866
coming to Alaska . Well , I , it'll be

01:17:15.866 --> 01:17:17.979
my second location , um , in the role

01:17:17.979 --> 01:17:20.649
only because Hawaii , as you , I think

01:17:20.649 --> 01:17:22.593
you know , experienced some pretty

01:17:22.593 --> 01:17:25.209
horrific , uh . Storms and it caused

01:17:25.209 --> 01:17:27.153
some physical damage and wanted to

01:17:27.153 --> 01:17:29.209
check on our folks there . General ,

01:17:29.209 --> 01:17:31.320
your , your excuse is General . All ,

01:17:31.320 --> 01:17:33.487
all of our witnesses are absolved from

01:17:33.609 --> 01:17:36.350
that promise . It's made by everyone

01:17:36.350 --> 01:17:38.680
under duress , and we understand it's ,

01:17:38.770 --> 01:17:40.992
it's not duress . They're just going to

01:17:40.992 --> 01:17:42.714
see , Mr . Chairman , the most

01:17:42.714 --> 01:17:45.048
strategic place in the world , and , uh ,

01:17:45.048 --> 01:17:47.214
Admiral , I , I wanna , and maybe I'll

01:17:47.214 --> 01:17:49.437
submit this for the record , but , um .

01:17:49.437 --> 01:17:51.729
Uh , the University of Alaska Fairbanks

01:17:51.729 --> 01:17:54.649
is doing fantastic work on the UAS

01:17:55.250 --> 01:17:59.240
counter UAS strategy testing . Uh , DIU

01:17:59.240 --> 01:18:02.009
is gonna make an announcement here on a ,

01:18:02.089 --> 01:18:04.279
uh , commitment to work with the

01:18:04.279 --> 01:18:06.830
University of Alaska Fairbanks on , uh ,

01:18:06.839 --> 01:18:09.006
all the counter UAS stuff that they're

01:18:09.006 --> 01:18:11.061
doing , which is really needed , and

01:18:11.061 --> 01:18:13.339
we're at the cutting edge up in Alaska .

01:18:13.339 --> 01:18:15.672
So , I'd like to get Secretary Anderson ,

01:18:15.672 --> 01:18:17.895
you and the Admiral maybe , uh , in a ,

01:18:17.895 --> 01:18:19.839
uh , Answer for a question for the

01:18:19.839 --> 01:18:22.006
record because I'm over my time here ,

01:18:22.006 --> 01:18:24.061
to work with me and the committee on

01:18:24.061 --> 01:18:26.117
those really good opportunities on a

01:18:26.117 --> 01:18:28.450
critical area for our national security ,

01:18:28.450 --> 01:18:30.617
and that's the counter drone mission .

01:18:30.939 --> 01:18:33.161
Thank you . Thank you , Mr . Chairman .

01:18:33.161 --> 01:18:35.106
Thank you , Senator Sullivan , and

01:18:35.106 --> 01:18:37.217
thank you for your question about the

01:18:37.217 --> 01:18:39.450
leaders of our adversaries .

01:18:40.669 --> 01:18:44.310
Vladimir Putin is not . Our friend

01:18:45.390 --> 01:18:48.209
Uh , not only is he One of the most

01:18:48.209 --> 01:18:50.870
notorious war criminals of our time ,

01:18:51.689 --> 01:18:54.569
but one of , one of the greediest

01:18:54.569 --> 01:18:57.870
thieves breathing on the earth . Well ,

01:18:57.930 --> 01:18:59.986
Mr . Chairman , Senator Warren and I

01:18:59.986 --> 01:19:02.319
have worked on this very issue together .

01:19:02.319 --> 01:19:04.374
It's a bipartisan issue that , hey ,

01:19:04.374 --> 01:19:06.152
these guys are coming after our

01:19:06.152 --> 01:19:08.263
elections . We need to make them feel

01:19:08.263 --> 01:19:10.374
the pain . Why don't we recognize her

01:19:10.374 --> 01:19:12.652
at this moment ? Thank you . Thank you .

01:19:17.040 --> 01:19:19.096
I want to talk about what's going on

01:19:19.096 --> 01:19:21.262
with our troops when they're injured .

01:19:21.262 --> 01:19:23.370
We have 400 troops at least so far

01:19:23.370 --> 01:19:25.649
who've been injured in President

01:19:25.649 --> 01:19:28.089
Trump's war with Iran , and now

01:19:28.089 --> 01:19:30.830
traumatic brain injuries have become

01:19:30.830 --> 01:19:34.759
the signature injury of the

01:19:34.759 --> 01:19:37.209
war against Iran . Research has shown

01:19:37.209 --> 01:19:40.529
that special operators are at a higher

01:19:40.529 --> 01:19:43.890
risk of blast exposure and TBI , which ,

01:19:43.959 --> 01:19:45.959
as you know , increases the risk of

01:19:45.959 --> 01:19:48.279
suicide , of seizures , and of memory

01:19:48.279 --> 01:19:51.259
loss . Several 100 special operators

01:19:51.259 --> 01:19:53.370
are now deployed in the Middle East ,

01:19:53.410 --> 01:19:56.330
and I'm very concerned about whether or

01:19:56.330 --> 01:19:59.609
not our troops are getting the care

01:19:59.609 --> 01:20:02.649
that they need for these injuries . For

01:20:02.649 --> 01:20:04.816
instance , we know about a soldier who

01:20:04.816 --> 01:20:07.038
was injured in the Iranian drone strike

01:20:07.038 --> 01:20:10.089
in Kuwait , and he was promised TBI

01:20:10.089 --> 01:20:12.200
care once they made it out of the war

01:20:12.200 --> 01:20:14.367
zone . But even after being shipped to

01:20:14.367 --> 01:20:17.279
Germany and then to Texas , the soldier

01:20:17.279 --> 01:20:20.399
didn't receive care for weeks . So

01:20:20.399 --> 01:20:22.439
Admiral Bradley , uh , do you think

01:20:22.439 --> 01:20:24.495
that wounded soldiers should have to

01:20:24.495 --> 01:20:26.879
wait nearly a month to see a doctor ?

01:20:28.319 --> 01:20:31.439
Uh , Senator , I know , in the , in the

01:20:31.439 --> 01:20:33.550
hypothetical , I , I absolutely don't

01:20:33.550 --> 01:20:35.550
believe that . I , I don't know the

01:20:35.550 --> 01:20:37.828
details of the situation though . Yeah ,

01:20:37.879 --> 01:20:39.935
but , but that's the real point . We

01:20:39.935 --> 01:20:42.101
can agree they need help and they need

01:20:42.101 --> 01:20:44.839
to be evaluated right away , and this

01:20:44.839 --> 01:20:46.895
committee has worked on a bipartisan

01:20:46.895 --> 01:20:49.930
basis to help service members with

01:20:49.930 --> 01:20:53.720
brain injuries , but without records of

01:20:53.720 --> 01:20:56.080
these injuries , it becomes harder and

01:20:56.080 --> 01:20:58.669
harder to get care . That's

01:20:58.669 --> 01:21:01.189
particularly critical for high speed

01:21:01.189 --> 01:21:04.580
boat teams and special operators given

01:21:04.580 --> 01:21:07.189
the exposure to these pounding waves

01:21:07.189 --> 01:21:10.229
and high caliber weapons . Boat team

01:21:10.229 --> 01:21:13.444
leaders have described how quote . The

01:21:13.444 --> 01:21:16.765
damage piles up almost unnoticed for

01:21:16.765 --> 01:21:20.365
years and then cascades , but

01:21:21.515 --> 01:21:24.694
DOD requires cognitive assessments only

01:21:24.694 --> 01:21:28.305
every 5 years and SOCOM every 3 .

01:21:28.645 --> 01:21:30.812
I have a bipartisan bill with Senators

01:21:30.812 --> 01:21:32.845
Ernst and King and others on this

01:21:32.845 --> 01:21:34.794
committee to make sure that these

01:21:34.794 --> 01:21:37.084
injuries don't fall through the cracks ,

01:21:37.444 --> 01:21:40.890
including . By requiring more regular

01:21:40.890 --> 01:21:43.609
screening and logs to be able to track

01:21:43.810 --> 01:21:46.569
exposure , Admiral Bradley , the

01:21:46.569 --> 01:21:49.169
effects of TBIs can compound over time ,

01:21:49.290 --> 01:21:51.810
as we know . Do you agree that it is

01:21:51.810 --> 01:21:54.169
better if we catch these brain injuries

01:21:54.169 --> 01:21:56.839
earlier rather than later ? Senator , I

01:21:56.839 --> 01:21:58.959
absolutely do . Good . And do you

01:21:58.959 --> 01:22:01.126
support keeping better records so that

01:22:01.126 --> 01:22:03.348
we're able to do that and more frequent

01:22:03.348 --> 01:22:06.040
evaluations , Senator ? I do . It is

01:22:06.040 --> 01:22:08.520
critical to be able to understand the

01:22:08.520 --> 01:22:11.080
mechanisms of harm that come from these

01:22:11.080 --> 01:22:13.279
various sources that we don't

01:22:13.279 --> 01:22:15.446
understand very well , and that data ,

01:22:15.446 --> 01:22:17.446
those logs . That data will help to

01:22:17.446 --> 01:22:19.720
inform not only treatment but also

01:22:19.720 --> 01:22:21.831
means to be able to prevent it in its

01:22:21.831 --> 01:22:24.053
outset . Good . I appreciate that . You

01:22:24.053 --> 01:22:26.220
know , the fact that troops have faced

01:22:26.220 --> 01:22:29.319
long wait lists to get specialty care

01:22:29.319 --> 01:22:32.839
for brain health within DOD's

01:22:32.839 --> 01:22:34.879
military system and one of the ways

01:22:34.879 --> 01:22:37.879
that DOD . has tried to address these

01:22:37.879 --> 01:22:41.200
waitlists is by partnering with outside

01:22:41.200 --> 01:22:43.990
experts like Homebase , uh , back in

01:22:43.990 --> 01:22:46.560
Massachusetts . Homebase's

01:22:46.560 --> 01:22:48.919
comprehensive brain health and trauma

01:22:48.919 --> 01:22:52.830
program . Has helped get 95% of

01:22:52.830 --> 01:22:55.689
special operators that it's treated

01:22:55.990 --> 01:22:58.569
back into the field . Admiral Bradley ,

01:22:58.709 --> 01:23:00.598
in your experience , have special

01:23:00.598 --> 01:23:03.189
operators benefited from programs like

01:23:03.189 --> 01:23:05.919
Homebase ? Senator , absolutely ,

01:23:06.020 --> 01:23:09.669
combat , that comprehensive program for

01:23:09.669 --> 01:23:11.910
brain health is a critical part . We

01:23:11.910 --> 01:23:14.839
also have partnerships with UNC ,

01:23:14.850 --> 01:23:16.628
University of North Carolina in

01:23:16.628 --> 01:23:18.794
Southern Florida and several others to

01:23:18.794 --> 01:23:21.017
be able to do the same . Thing they are

01:23:21.017 --> 01:23:23.592
all very capable in progressing

01:23:23.592 --> 01:23:25.814
programs . I think , as you highlight ,

01:23:26.413 --> 01:23:28.413
institutionalizing those beyond the

01:23:28.413 --> 01:23:30.635
pilot that they are into something that

01:23:30.635 --> 01:23:32.857
is a part of our mainstream system that

01:23:32.857 --> 01:23:34.913
can then be treated with Tricare and

01:23:34.913 --> 01:23:37.080
with our VA systems is a critical next

01:23:37.080 --> 01:23:39.246
step . And I very much appreciate your

01:23:39.246 --> 01:23:41.413
point about institutionalizing it . We

01:23:41.413 --> 01:23:43.635
can't just treat this as a one-off . We

01:23:43.635 --> 01:23:45.812
know the problem exists . We've got to

01:23:45.812 --> 01:23:48.053
record . We've got to document , and

01:23:48.053 --> 01:23:49.997
we've got to . Have people who can

01:23:49.997 --> 01:23:52.053
treat it . We need to have dedicated

01:23:52.053 --> 01:23:54.315
resources to support our troops who are

01:23:54.315 --> 01:23:56.715
suffering from brain injuries . The

01:23:56.715 --> 01:23:58.715
Trump administration has plunged us

01:23:58.715 --> 01:24:01.835
into a war and is asking Congress for a

01:24:01.835 --> 01:24:05.715
record $1.5 trillion for

01:24:05.715 --> 01:24:08.636
the Pentagon . It is outrageous that we

01:24:08.636 --> 01:24:10.956
would be cutting corners on treating

01:24:10.956 --> 01:24:13.234
wounded warriors . Thank you , Admiral .

01:24:13.234 --> 01:24:15.345
I look forward to working with you on

01:24:15.345 --> 01:24:17.289
this . Thank you , Mr . Chairman .

01:24:17.289 --> 01:24:19.234
Thank you , Senator Rosen . Well ,

01:24:19.234 --> 01:24:21.345
thank you , Chairman Wicker , Ranking

01:24:21.345 --> 01:24:23.456
Member Reed , and , uh , uh thank you

01:24:23.456 --> 01:24:25.512
for , uh , well , I saw you a little

01:24:25.512 --> 01:24:27.678
bit earlier today , so thank you again

01:24:27.678 --> 01:24:29.734
for your service and , and for being

01:24:29.734 --> 01:24:31.845
here . Um , I wanna talk a little bit

01:24:31.845 --> 01:24:33.956
about operational tempo and readiness

01:24:33.956 --> 01:24:35.845
reporting because cyber operation

01:24:35.845 --> 01:24:37.845
forces will of course have , well ,

01:24:37.845 --> 01:24:37.319
they're always in high demand , but

01:24:37.319 --> 01:24:39.541
they've been in extra high demand since

01:24:39.541 --> 01:24:41.597
CyberCom was established , which has

01:24:41.597 --> 01:24:43.708
been exacerbated by the challenges of

01:24:43.708 --> 01:24:45.819
getting the unit readiness numbers up

01:24:45.819 --> 01:24:47.708
at the same time . Now that we're

01:24:47.708 --> 01:24:49.875
fighting wars in multiple theaters , I

01:24:49.875 --> 01:24:51.930
have to imagine that the operational

01:24:51.930 --> 01:24:53.597
tempo of those forces is also

01:24:53.597 --> 01:24:55.763
increasing dramatically . So , General

01:24:55.763 --> 01:24:57.875
Rudd , uh , could you give us a sense

01:24:57.875 --> 01:24:59.986
of what the trend is for the up tempo

01:24:59.986 --> 01:25:02.560
or cybern Mission Force , please ?

01:25:03.770 --> 01:25:05.660
Thanks , Senator Rosen . I , I

01:25:05.660 --> 01:25:07.771
appreciate uh the attention on this ,

01:25:07.771 --> 01:25:10.819
this topic . As you described and as we

01:25:10.819 --> 01:25:13.660
would expect , very high demand and a

01:25:13.660 --> 01:25:15.799
very high operational tempo for our ,

01:25:16.020 --> 01:25:19.120
our cyber warriors . In support in real

01:25:19.120 --> 01:25:22.399
time 24/7 of the joint force across a

01:25:22.399 --> 01:25:25.560
number of problem sets and so this

01:25:25.560 --> 01:25:27.616
really speaks to the heart of one of

01:25:27.616 --> 01:25:29.959
the attributes of Cybercom 2.00 that we

01:25:29.959 --> 01:25:32.520
refer to as optimized unit phasing . So

01:25:32.520 --> 01:25:34.799
think of a cycle upon which you rotate

01:25:34.799 --> 01:25:38.089
again . This is where we have a lot to

01:25:38.089 --> 01:25:40.629
gain from understanding SOCOM's model

01:25:41.140 --> 01:25:44.310
for years , both Admiral Bradley and I

01:25:44.310 --> 01:25:46.143
were part of a system that had a

01:25:46.143 --> 01:25:48.366
rotational force effort . Now granted ,

01:25:48.366 --> 01:25:50.560
there's surges , um , and we account

01:25:50.560 --> 01:25:52.504
for those , but part of the way we

01:25:52.504 --> 01:25:54.727
accounted for that is size of the force

01:25:54.727 --> 01:25:56.838
and bringing in . sufficient capacity

01:25:57.049 --> 01:25:59.529
to be able to operationally employ the

01:25:59.529 --> 01:26:02.560
force continuously across a number of

01:26:02.560 --> 01:26:04.449
problem sets . Well , that's good

01:26:04.449 --> 01:26:06.504
because you didn't know what my next

01:26:06.504 --> 01:26:08.282
question would be , but it's to

01:26:08.282 --> 01:26:10.116
Secretary Sutton . The status of

01:26:10.116 --> 01:26:12.116
implementing the 97 recommendations

01:26:12.116 --> 01:26:14.282
from Cybercom 2.0 . What is that ? And

01:26:14.282 --> 01:26:16.330
the resources , speaking of to your

01:26:16.330 --> 01:26:18.497
point , General , the resources needed

01:26:18.497 --> 01:26:20.497
to implement them , especially when

01:26:20.497 --> 01:26:22.830
setting up three enabling organizations .

01:26:24.049 --> 01:26:26.160
Senator , thank you for that question

01:26:26.160 --> 01:26:28.327
and for your continued focus on this ,

01:26:28.327 --> 01:26:30.327
on the cyber topic over the years .

01:26:30.327 --> 01:26:32.549
From an implementation perspective , as

01:26:32.549 --> 01:26:34.827
you mentioned , there's a lot of tasks ,

01:26:34.827 --> 01:26:36.882
so the approach that we're taking is

01:26:36.882 --> 01:26:39.105
that within my office I've built a core

01:26:39.105 --> 01:26:40.938
team that is dedicated to to the

01:26:40.938 --> 01:26:43.049
implementation process and one of the

01:26:43.049 --> 01:26:45.049
things that's really exciting to me

01:26:45.049 --> 01:26:47.009
about that is it , uh , features

01:26:47.009 --> 01:26:49.231
contributions from all of our service .

01:26:49.231 --> 01:26:51.231
Cyber components and we've actually

01:26:51.231 --> 01:26:53.398
brought in people who have been in our

01:26:53.398 --> 01:26:55.620
force for a long time that are now have

01:26:55.620 --> 01:26:57.731
the opportunity to build the system ,

01:26:57.731 --> 01:26:59.898
the talent management system that they

01:26:59.898 --> 01:27:01.953
wish they would have had . So , it's

01:27:01.953 --> 01:27:04.176
the unicorns that we're trying to build

01:27:04.176 --> 01:27:06.231
at scope and scale are now coming in

01:27:06.231 --> 01:27:06.049
and helping to write the details ,

01:27:06.419 --> 01:27:08.740
build out the assessments we need , and

01:27:08.740 --> 01:27:10.907
come up with the models of how we keep

01:27:10.907 --> 01:27:13.879
careers going , um , to build mastery .

01:27:14.520 --> 01:27:16.870
From a resource perspective , uh , we

01:27:16.870 --> 01:27:19.390
have included funding for the Cyber

01:27:19.390 --> 01:27:21.112
Command 2.0 initiatives in the

01:27:21.112 --> 01:27:23.509
president's 27 budget , including

01:27:23.509 --> 01:27:25.731
funding to start incentive pay to get ,

01:27:25.731 --> 01:27:28.279
uh , mastery incentives implemented ,

01:27:28.470 --> 01:27:30.569
as well as for some of the enabling

01:27:30.569 --> 01:27:32.569
organizations and some of the other

01:27:32.569 --> 01:27:34.736
service requirements to be able to get

01:27:34.736 --> 01:27:36.958
this to speed and look forward to being

01:27:36.958 --> 01:27:39.013
able to execute that upon passage of

01:27:39.013 --> 01:27:41.180
the budget for FY 27 . Thank you . I ,

01:27:41.180 --> 01:27:43.402
I'm gonna stick on cyber operations for

01:27:43.402 --> 01:27:45.402
a minute because I wanna talk about

01:27:45.402 --> 01:27:47.569
intelligence capabilities . So General

01:27:47.569 --> 01:27:49.625
Rodd , um , your responses to , uh ,

01:27:49.625 --> 01:27:51.680
our advanced policy questions during

01:27:51.680 --> 01:27:53.902
your nomination process , you mentioned

01:27:53.902 --> 01:27:55.950
the criticality of foundational

01:27:55.950 --> 01:27:58.200
intelligence to support cyberspace

01:27:58.200 --> 01:28:00.033
operations and the need for that

01:28:00.033 --> 01:28:01.644
capability to keep pace with

01:28:01.644 --> 01:28:03.867
operational needs . So as we all know ,

01:28:03.867 --> 01:28:06.629
the FY 25 NDAA has set a requirement

01:28:06.629 --> 01:28:08.319
for DOD to establish a cyber

01:28:08.319 --> 01:28:10.759
intelligence capability to provide just

01:28:10.759 --> 01:28:13.000
that sort of foundational intelligence

01:28:13.000 --> 01:28:15.167
support . So General Rudd , have you ,

01:28:15.167 --> 01:28:17.389
uh , you have the ability to shape this

01:28:17.389 --> 01:28:19.444
foundational intelligence capability

01:28:19.444 --> 01:28:21.222
from the start . So , could you

01:28:21.222 --> 01:28:23.278
elaborate a little bit more based on

01:28:23.278 --> 01:28:25.222
your experiences at IndoPaycom and

01:28:25.222 --> 01:28:27.167
SOCOM , what you would like to see

01:28:27.167 --> 01:28:28.944
incorporated in this foundation

01:28:28.944 --> 01:28:32.069
intelligence capability , please ? Well ,

01:28:32.189 --> 01:28:34.870
Senator , the , the reference to my

01:28:34.870 --> 01:28:36.926
past experience , I would tell you .

01:28:38.100 --> 01:28:40.290
Intelligence drives ops and ops drives

01:28:40.290 --> 01:28:42.401
intelligence and so it's a continuous

01:28:42.401 --> 01:28:44.568
cycle and what we learned over decades

01:28:44.979 --> 01:28:47.500
of fighting alongside each other in a

01:28:47.500 --> 01:28:50.560
variety of places is the intelligence

01:28:50.810 --> 01:28:52.921
apparatus has to be closely linked to

01:28:52.921 --> 01:28:55.088
and understand the operational side of

01:28:55.088 --> 01:28:57.143
this and I haven't had the chance to

01:28:57.143 --> 01:28:59.339
specifically dive into this yet . It's

01:28:59.339 --> 01:29:01.061
going to be part of my initial

01:29:01.061 --> 01:29:03.117
assessment and happy to come back to

01:29:03.117 --> 01:29:05.117
you for the record , uh . As I look

01:29:05.117 --> 01:29:07.172
more closely at that , thank you . I

01:29:07.172 --> 01:29:09.395
look forward to that . We have a lot of

01:29:09.395 --> 01:29:11.672
work to do . Thank you . Mr . Chairman ,

01:29:11.672 --> 01:29:13.339
Senator Slotkin , we're doing

01:29:13.339 --> 01:29:15.672
everything we can to keep you from , um ,

01:29:15.672 --> 01:29:17.839
asking your question . Senator Banks ,

01:29:17.839 --> 01:29:19.895
you're recognized . Thank you , Mr .

01:29:19.895 --> 01:29:22.061
Chairman . General Rudd , can you talk

01:29:22.061 --> 01:29:24.172
about how the PLA is using artificial

01:29:24.172 --> 01:29:26.228
intelligence to enhance its military

01:29:26.228 --> 01:29:30.060
operations ? Senator , I , as you

01:29:30.060 --> 01:29:31.859
would hope and expect , that's

01:29:31.859 --> 01:29:34.419
certainly something that we are paying

01:29:34.419 --> 01:29:36.540
particular attention to , the , the

01:29:36.540 --> 01:29:38.540
details of which I'd , I'd probably

01:29:38.540 --> 01:29:40.651
rather go into in a close . You , you

01:29:40.651 --> 01:29:42.818
can vaguely , but I vaguely , I mean ,

01:29:42.818 --> 01:29:44.651
you could vaguely talk about how

01:29:44.651 --> 01:29:46.596
artificial intelligence is used in

01:29:46.596 --> 01:29:48.929
warfare . And gains that they're making ,

01:29:48.929 --> 01:29:48.279
I mean , I , I don't think there's

01:29:48.279 --> 01:29:50.501
anything classified about that . Yeah ,

01:29:50.501 --> 01:29:52.390
Senator , I appreciate that using

01:29:52.390 --> 01:29:54.501
artificial intelligence . I'm sorry ,

01:29:54.501 --> 01:29:56.557
you can agree , you would agree that

01:29:56.557 --> 01:29:58.835
they are using artificial intelligence ,

01:29:58.835 --> 01:29:58.419
Senator . I think that's , that's quite

01:29:58.419 --> 01:30:00.641
clear that they are . Yes , sir . Thank

01:30:00.641 --> 01:30:03.379
you . Um , so , um , that being the

01:30:03.379 --> 01:30:05.689
case , would you agree that AI is a

01:30:06.220 --> 01:30:08.720
quote dual use technology .

01:30:10.959 --> 01:30:13.120
Senator , dual use in , in , in what

01:30:13.120 --> 01:30:15.759
sense both for non-military and

01:30:15.759 --> 01:30:18.319
military , I , I , Senator , I think

01:30:18.319 --> 01:30:19.986
that's , that's a fair way to

01:30:19.986 --> 01:30:22.041
characterize it . Um , and how , how

01:30:22.041 --> 01:30:24.263
important is it for the US to have More

01:30:24.263 --> 01:30:27.020
and better high-end chips than what

01:30:27.020 --> 01:30:30.979
China does . Senator , I would take

01:30:30.979 --> 01:30:34.100
that category more broadly and say I

01:30:34.100 --> 01:30:36.779
think it's critical that the US has the

01:30:36.779 --> 01:30:39.560
technological advantage in every aspect

01:30:39.560 --> 01:30:43.060
of war fighting and certainly as we

01:30:43.060 --> 01:30:46.700
see the increase in the advent of the

01:30:46.700 --> 01:30:48.978
application of artificial intelligence .

01:30:49.500 --> 01:30:51.611
We're gonna have to make sure that uh

01:30:51.611 --> 01:30:53.833
we retain and maintain our advantage in

01:30:53.833 --> 01:30:56.056
that and move as fast as we can . You ,

01:30:56.056 --> 01:30:58.222
you agree . I mean , I , I , I believe

01:30:58.222 --> 01:31:00.056
we , we have today , we have the

01:31:00.056 --> 01:31:02.056
advantage . I think you would , you

01:31:02.056 --> 01:31:03.778
just said that to maintain our

01:31:03.778 --> 01:31:03.740
advantage . So you agree that we have

01:31:03.740 --> 01:31:05.962
the advantage . What would happen if we

01:31:05.962 --> 01:31:08.129
lost that advantage ? Well , Senator ,

01:31:08.129 --> 01:31:10.240
I think this team right here is gonna

01:31:10.240 --> 01:31:12.407
do everything we can to make sure that

01:31:12.407 --> 01:31:14.629
we don't do that . Um , certainly we're

01:31:14.629 --> 01:31:16.573
working furiously to do that , and

01:31:16.573 --> 01:31:18.518
we're not gonna be complacent . We

01:31:18.518 --> 01:31:20.629
won't be satisfied and , uh , In my ,

01:31:20.629 --> 01:31:22.740
in my opening statement , I emphasize

01:31:22.740 --> 01:31:25.073
four operating principles speed , scale ,

01:31:25.073 --> 01:31:27.240
innovation , and integration . I think

01:31:27.240 --> 01:31:29.407
if we press as hard as we can to apply

01:31:29.407 --> 01:31:31.407
those principles to everything that

01:31:31.407 --> 01:31:33.462
we're doing , but in particular , an

01:31:33.462 --> 01:31:35.796
effort to maintain our advantage in the ,

01:31:35.796 --> 01:31:38.169
the highest tech areas . We'll be OK .

01:31:38.319 --> 01:31:40.097
And yet we'll never it would be

01:31:40.097 --> 01:31:42.319
completely unacceptable , wouldn't it ,

01:31:42.319 --> 01:31:44.041
General Rudd , if we lost that

01:31:44.041 --> 01:31:46.097
advantage , Chair Chairman , it , it

01:31:46.097 --> 01:31:48.263
would be unacceptable , and we'll make

01:31:48.263 --> 01:31:50.319
sure that , uh , we do everything to

01:31:50.319 --> 01:31:50.089
retain that . Yeah , I , I , I think

01:31:50.089 --> 01:31:52.256
that's , um , I understand there are a

01:31:52.256 --> 01:31:54.256
lot of things that you can't say in

01:31:54.256 --> 01:31:56.033
this setting . But I think it's

01:31:56.033 --> 01:31:58.089
important for the American people to

01:31:58.089 --> 01:32:00.256
know that . The the critical nature of

01:32:00.256 --> 01:32:02.422
us keeping that advantage and the role

01:32:02.422 --> 01:32:04.589
that . Uh , high-end chips play in all

01:32:04.589 --> 01:32:06.589
of it . I mean , you , you , you've

01:32:06.589 --> 01:32:08.390
already agreed that . Um , it's

01:32:08.390 --> 01:32:10.279
important that we maintain high ,

01:32:11.149 --> 01:32:13.589
high-end chips for America and for

01:32:13.589 --> 01:32:16.149
American , Ame our , our own use and

01:32:16.149 --> 01:32:18.390
develop our own technologies and how

01:32:18.390 --> 01:32:20.668
dangerous it would be if our adversary .

01:32:21.109 --> 01:32:23.390
Um , gained an advantage on us on that

01:32:23.390 --> 01:32:25.501
front or even that we would give away

01:32:25.501 --> 01:32:27.723
our high-end chips to our adversaries .

01:32:27.723 --> 01:32:30.709
Does that make sense ? Senator , I

01:32:31.430 --> 01:32:34.350
It does make sense . And again , that ,

01:32:34.390 --> 01:32:36.790
that's a critical piece of uh how we're

01:32:36.790 --> 01:32:38.901
going to maintain our advantage , and

01:32:38.901 --> 01:32:41.012
we also have to understand and expect

01:32:41.012 --> 01:32:44.109
that capability will be distributed and

01:32:44.109 --> 01:32:46.350
available to others , which is why this

01:32:46.350 --> 01:32:48.589
continuous cycle of maintaining our

01:32:48.589 --> 01:32:51.470
edge is , is really important . Um ,

01:32:51.890 --> 01:32:54.001
yeah , I'll , I , I'll move on . Last

01:32:54.001 --> 01:32:55.946
week , President Trump said that ,

01:32:55.946 --> 01:32:58.459
quote , America's aging and constrained

01:32:58.799 --> 01:33:01.109
electric grid infrastructure poses an

01:33:01.109 --> 01:33:04.209
increasing threat to national defenses ,

01:33:04.680 --> 01:33:06.458
end quote . What , what risk do

01:33:06.458 --> 01:33:08.347
cyberattacks pose to our critical

01:33:08.347 --> 01:33:09.347
infrastructure ?

01:33:12.390 --> 01:33:16.180
Well , Senator , the It's

01:33:16.180 --> 01:33:18.402
certainly a vulnerability , and I think

01:33:18.402 --> 01:33:20.569
that's the awareness and understanding

01:33:20.569 --> 01:33:22.624
of that is the first line of defense

01:33:22.624 --> 01:33:24.458
and then making sure that , uh ,

01:33:24.620 --> 01:33:27.660
experts in this field know how to get

01:33:27.660 --> 01:33:29.859
ahead of it , know how to apply the

01:33:29.859 --> 01:33:31.740
best cyber defenses , and , uh ,

01:33:32.660 --> 01:33:34.827
Certainly to the extent we're able and

01:33:34.827 --> 01:33:36.993
we have the capacity , we want to make

01:33:36.993 --> 01:33:39.160
sure that we're working with the right

01:33:39.160 --> 01:33:40.827
folks to protect our critical

01:33:40.827 --> 01:33:42.771
infrastructure , and I assume what

01:33:42.771 --> 01:33:45.450
President Trump is saying . About the

01:33:45.589 --> 01:33:47.645
infrastructure that would extend the

01:33:47.645 --> 01:33:50.470
transportation nodes like seaports ,

01:33:50.580 --> 01:33:52.636
airports , and railroads . Would you

01:33:52.636 --> 01:33:55.379
agree with that ? Senator , I , I won't

01:33:55.379 --> 01:33:58.720
speculate on , on . What the president

01:33:58.720 --> 01:34:00.942
meant specifically , I haven't had that

01:34:00.942 --> 01:34:02.887
conversation with him , um , but I

01:34:02.887 --> 01:34:04.942
think it's fair , actually , I think

01:34:04.942 --> 01:34:06.998
it's , it's important that we figure

01:34:06.998 --> 01:34:08.998
out what the definition of critical

01:34:08.998 --> 01:34:10.998
infrastructure is , um , prioritize

01:34:10.998 --> 01:34:13.053
where we need to put our efforts and

01:34:13.053 --> 01:34:15.276
resources to safeguard it . Thank you .

01:34:15.276 --> 01:34:17.331
My time has expired . Thank you very

01:34:17.331 --> 01:34:20.060
much , Senator Slotkin . Thank you . Um ,

01:34:20.149 --> 01:34:23.029
I wanna , um , support everything that

01:34:23.029 --> 01:34:25.490
Senator Banks just said and just return

01:34:25.490 --> 01:34:27.870
to the topic on the classified AI race .

01:34:27.910 --> 01:34:29.966
I know we can't talk about it here ,

01:34:29.966 --> 01:34:32.077
but . Um , I don't think the American

01:34:32.077 --> 01:34:34.243
public understands how important it is

01:34:34.243 --> 01:34:36.077
to win that race , that it's the

01:34:36.077 --> 01:34:38.354
equivalent of winning the nuclear race ,

01:34:38.354 --> 01:34:40.410
like whoever gets there first . Um ,

01:34:40.430 --> 01:34:43.029
and I think , um , you know , if we

01:34:43.029 --> 01:34:45.700
were healthy as a country , then

01:34:45.700 --> 01:34:47.756
elected officials from both sides of

01:34:47.756 --> 01:34:49.756
the aisle would be focusing on this

01:34:49.756 --> 01:34:51.756
constantly to make sure we win this

01:34:51.756 --> 01:34:54.189
race . Um . In that spirit , um ,

01:34:54.450 --> 01:34:56.561
General Rudd , you know , I think the

01:34:56.561 --> 01:34:58.672
thing that has been , congratulations

01:34:58.672 --> 01:35:00.617
on being in the seat . I think the

01:35:00.617 --> 01:35:02.783
thing that , um , has caught , I think

01:35:02.783 --> 01:35:04.783
the attention of a lot of us is the

01:35:04.783 --> 01:35:06.894
announcement in the last 3 or 4 weeks

01:35:06.894 --> 01:35:10.169
by anthropic and then OpenAI of new

01:35:10.169 --> 01:35:12.450
products , Mythos being the anthropic

01:35:12.450 --> 01:35:14.672
product and the OpenAI product having a

01:35:14.672 --> 01:35:18.410
longer name . Um , and they are testing

01:35:18.410 --> 01:35:20.970
this new product very differently than

01:35:20.970 --> 01:35:23.689
a commercial product . They are testing

01:35:23.689 --> 01:35:26.040
it like a weapon . They have provided ,

01:35:26.100 --> 01:35:28.267
at least in Anthropic's case , they've

01:35:28.267 --> 01:35:29.989
provided Mythos to like 50 big

01:35:29.989 --> 01:35:32.560
companies for them to test and , and

01:35:32.560 --> 01:35:34.282
stress test and figure out the

01:35:34.282 --> 01:35:36.393
vulnerabilities . Microsoft is one of

01:35:36.393 --> 01:35:38.282
those companies . They're turning

01:35:38.282 --> 01:35:40.227
around and announcing like 270 new

01:35:40.227 --> 01:35:42.270
patches just last week , which we

01:35:42.270 --> 01:35:46.120
assume Mythos picked up , and I was so

01:35:46.120 --> 01:35:48.231
concerned about this . new step we're

01:35:48.231 --> 01:35:50.629
taking in the how it supercharges cyber

01:35:50.629 --> 01:35:52.930
attacks that I did a big Zoom yesterday

01:35:52.930 --> 01:35:56.029
with 350 Michiganders IT professionals

01:35:56.029 --> 01:35:58.229
for our hospitals , our schools on how

01:35:58.229 --> 01:36:01.350
to prepare for this threat . Um , is

01:36:01.350 --> 01:36:04.910
the NSA or CyberCom testing Mythos

01:36:04.910 --> 01:36:08.029
right now and using this moment to test

01:36:08.029 --> 01:36:09.696
out our own vulnerabilities ?

01:36:12.279 --> 01:36:14.209
Senator , this is a critically

01:36:14.209 --> 01:36:16.376
important topic . Uh , I think the way

01:36:16.376 --> 01:36:18.970
you described it was , uh .

01:36:20.279 --> 01:36:24.240
Appropriate and uh you know . I ,

01:36:24.370 --> 01:36:26.592
I , what I don't want to do is speak to

01:36:26.592 --> 01:36:28.648
one specific model . I think what we

01:36:28.648 --> 01:36:32.109
need to think about is the application

01:36:32.109 --> 01:36:35.240
and the access to early all future

01:36:35.240 --> 01:36:37.569
models that we see in terms of the

01:36:37.569 --> 01:36:41.299
capability that , uh , The

01:36:41.299 --> 01:36:43.580
the most current models and the new

01:36:43.580 --> 01:36:46.990
models . Potentially imply for both

01:36:47.240 --> 01:36:49.770
defensive . I understand , but our

01:36:49.770 --> 01:36:52.720
nation , our , our , our , our networks ,

01:36:52.810 --> 01:36:54.810
we have two companies , right , who

01:36:54.810 --> 01:36:56.532
have , I mean , this is public

01:36:56.532 --> 01:36:58.699
information , right ? They've come out

01:36:58.699 --> 01:37:00.921
with these products in the past month .

01:37:00.921 --> 01:37:03.088
It sent the cybersecurity world in the

01:37:03.088 --> 01:37:05.310
commercial sector kind of spinning that

01:37:05.310 --> 01:37:08.459
we now have this super . Charged AI

01:37:08.459 --> 01:37:10.015
technology that finds these

01:37:10.015 --> 01:37:12.070
vulnerabilities . I'm just asking if

01:37:12.070 --> 01:37:14.015
the Pentagon or NSA is testing out

01:37:14.015 --> 01:37:16.237
either of these two companies' models ,

01:37:16.237 --> 01:37:18.459
Senator . Again , we're , we're looking

01:37:18.459 --> 01:37:20.680
at all models that we think have the

01:37:20.680 --> 01:37:23.240
power that , uh , so associated you're ,

01:37:23.390 --> 01:37:25.446
I want you to be using them . I want

01:37:25.446 --> 01:37:27.779
you to be experimenting with . Them and ,

01:37:27.779 --> 01:37:29.834
uh , but the Pentagon has had a very

01:37:29.834 --> 01:37:31.946
public fight with anthropic . Again ,

01:37:31.946 --> 01:37:33.946
this is public information , so I'm

01:37:33.946 --> 01:37:35.890
just making sure that the newest ,

01:37:35.890 --> 01:37:37.890
hottest AI empowered cybersecurity

01:37:38.029 --> 01:37:40.251
models are being used by the Pentagon ,

01:37:40.669 --> 01:37:43.549
um , on cybersecurity . So I , I , I ,

01:37:43.669 --> 01:37:45.780
I'm taking your answer as yes , and ,

01:37:45.780 --> 01:37:47.947
and correct me if I'm wrong . Um , let

01:37:47.947 --> 01:37:50.280
me turn to another topic and , you know ,

01:37:50.280 --> 01:37:52.447
we're heading towards a summit between

01:37:52.447 --> 01:37:54.447
the president and Xi Jinping . Um ,

01:37:54.560 --> 01:37:57.040
Chinese president on May 14th , huge

01:37:57.040 --> 01:37:59.207
deal , right , in the , in the world ,

01:37:59.207 --> 01:38:02.680
um , of negotiation and security . Um ,

01:38:02.790 --> 01:38:06.160
and I am just concerned that there's a ,

01:38:06.319 --> 01:38:08.879
uh , a topic on the table of allowing

01:38:08.879 --> 01:38:11.212
Chinese vehicles into the United States .

01:38:11.212 --> 01:38:13.157
And I think the Chinese have shown

01:38:13.157 --> 01:38:15.640
themselves to be bad actors when it

01:38:15.640 --> 01:38:18.279
comes to collecting data on American

01:38:18.279 --> 01:38:20.919
citizens . They hacked the president

01:38:20.919 --> 01:38:23.141
and vice presidents . Phones during the

01:38:23.141 --> 01:38:26.143
campaign , salt typhoon , Volt typhoon

01:38:26.143 --> 01:38:28.312
getting into our infrastructure . Um ,

01:38:28.433 --> 01:38:30.433
they stole a bunch of our records ,

01:38:30.433 --> 01:38:32.433
probably yours , definitely mine in

01:38:32.433 --> 01:38:35.073
2016 from , um , OPM . I mean , they

01:38:35.073 --> 01:38:37.752
are not positive actors , and this body

01:38:37.752 --> 01:38:41.263
banned Huawei and TikTok , um , because

01:38:41.263 --> 01:38:43.073
of the data they were taking on

01:38:43.073 --> 01:38:45.735
Americans . So can you just say aloud ,

01:38:45.815 --> 01:38:48.096
I asked others in uniform this last

01:38:48.096 --> 01:38:50.416
week , um , do you believe that

01:38:50.416 --> 01:38:53.136
allowing in Chinese cars with LDAR and

01:38:53.136 --> 01:38:55.905
full motion video , geolocation , the

01:38:55.905 --> 01:38:58.335
ability to be hacked via Bluetooth , do

01:38:58.335 --> 01:39:00.416
you believe that that is a threat to

01:39:00.416 --> 01:39:02.305
our military bases , our critical

01:39:02.305 --> 01:39:04.194
infrastructure , and generally to

01:39:04.194 --> 01:39:06.083
collecting on American citizens ?

01:39:09.520 --> 01:39:12.359
Yeah , Senator , I think uh we need to

01:39:12.640 --> 01:39:14.418
take into account any potential

01:39:14.418 --> 01:39:17.120
technological application that poses a

01:39:17.120 --> 01:39:20.089
threat against our , our bases , our

01:39:20.450 --> 01:39:22.672
Our service members and make sure we do

01:39:22.672 --> 01:39:24.506
everything to , I would love the

01:39:24.506 --> 01:39:26.561
chairman's help . I've tried for two

01:39:26.561 --> 01:39:28.728
years in a row to ban Chinese vehicles

01:39:28.728 --> 01:39:30.450
from our military bases . As I

01:39:30.450 --> 01:39:32.561
understand it , abroad , our military

01:39:32.561 --> 01:39:34.728
bases with all these Chinese cars they

01:39:34.728 --> 01:39:36.839
can already get on . Um , they've got

01:39:36.839 --> 01:39:39.061
15% market share in Mexico . So I would

01:39:39.061 --> 01:39:41.283
hope that this committee could at least

01:39:41.283 --> 01:39:43.339
do the banning of them collecting on

01:39:43.339 --> 01:39:45.561
our military bases , and I yield back .

01:39:45.799 --> 01:39:47.910
Thank you very much , Senator Slack ,

01:39:47.910 --> 01:39:50.729
and , um , and this concludes today's

01:39:50.729 --> 01:39:52.507
hearing . I'd like to thank our

01:39:52.507 --> 01:39:54.729
witnesses for their testimony , for the

01:39:54.729 --> 01:39:56.896
information of members . Questions for

01:39:56.896 --> 01:39:59.118
the record will be due to the committee

01:39:59.118 --> 01:40:00.785
within 2 business days of the

01:40:00.785 --> 01:40:02.951
conclusion of this hearing . Thank you

01:40:02.951 --> 01:40:05.062
very , very much for your information

01:40:05.062 --> 01:40:07.173
and your testimony today , and we are

01:40:07.173 --> 01:40:07.569
adjourned .