1 00:00:00,289 --> 00:00:02,122 And now we meet today to receive 2 00:00:02,122 --> 00:00:05,849 testimony in open session . On the 3 00:00:05,849 --> 00:00:07,682 posture of United States Special 4 00:00:07,682 --> 00:00:10,340 Operations Command . United States 5 00:00:10,340 --> 00:00:13,380 Cyber Command . We're joined by Admiral 6 00:00:13,380 --> 00:00:15,602 Mitch Bradley , commander of the United 7 00:00:15,602 --> 00:00:18,340 States Special Operations Command , 8 00:00:18,899 --> 00:00:22,709 General Joshua Rudd . Commander of 9 00:00:22,709 --> 00:00:24,709 the United States Cyber Command and 10 00:00:24,709 --> 00:00:26,598 director of the National Security 11 00:00:26,598 --> 00:00:28,320 Agency , Mr . Derek Anderson , 12 00:00:28,510 --> 00:00:30,454 Assistant Secretary of Defense for 13 00:00:30,454 --> 00:00:34,029 Special Operations and low intensity 14 00:00:34,029 --> 00:00:37,369 conflict , and Ms . Katie Sutton , 15 00:00:37,990 --> 00:00:40,209 Assistant Secretary of Defense for 16 00:00:40,409 --> 00:00:43,970 cyber Policy , and um , all members are . 17 00:00:45,990 --> 00:00:49,500 reminded to silence . Their devices , 18 00:00:50,060 --> 00:00:54,060 including the chair . Um , recent 19 00:00:54,060 --> 00:00:56,990 operations , including Absolute Resolve , 20 00:00:57,080 --> 00:00:58,969 Midnight Hammer , and Epic Fury , 21 00:00:59,069 --> 00:01:00,902 represent a watershed moment for 22 00:01:00,902 --> 00:01:03,220 American military power . Each 23 00:01:03,220 --> 00:01:06,160 operation wove cyber effects into the 24 00:01:06,160 --> 00:01:08,879 fabric of joint force operations at the 25 00:01:08,879 --> 00:01:11,290 beginning of planning . Consequently , 26 00:01:11,370 --> 00:01:13,709 our cyber operators were able to 27 00:01:13,709 --> 00:01:15,598 illustrate the potential of these 28 00:01:15,598 --> 00:01:19,389 capabilities as a force multiplier 29 00:01:19,809 --> 00:01:22,489 unlike any other . We must ensure that 30 00:01:22,489 --> 00:01:24,300 the lessons learned from recent 31 00:01:24,300 --> 00:01:26,330 operations are fully digested and 32 00:01:26,330 --> 00:01:28,163 integrated into our doctrine and 33 00:01:28,163 --> 00:01:30,250 planning . However , we cannot allow 34 00:01:30,250 --> 00:01:32,209 these successes to lull us into 35 00:01:32,209 --> 00:01:35,510 complacency . Cyber threats are 36 00:01:35,510 --> 00:01:38,389 immediate . Persistent , and they are 37 00:01:38,389 --> 00:01:41,370 escalating . Every day our adversaries 38 00:01:41,370 --> 00:01:42,814 target America's critical 39 00:01:42,814 --> 00:01:45,092 infrastructure and government networks . 40 00:01:45,092 --> 00:01:47,314 They're advancing their capabilities to 41 00:01:47,314 --> 00:01:49,970 outpace and outcompete our forces in 42 00:01:49,970 --> 00:01:52,410 cyberspace , and we must not allow that . 43 00:01:53,129 --> 00:01:55,351 To keep up with these threats , we must 44 00:01:55,351 --> 00:01:58,180 redouble our efforts to modernize and 45 00:01:58,180 --> 00:02:01,819 strengthen . American cyber forces . 46 00:02:02,309 --> 00:02:03,949 Doing so requires us to make 47 00:02:03,949 --> 00:02:06,540 fundamental updates to the way military 48 00:02:06,540 --> 00:02:08,484 services generate , organize , and 49 00:02:08,484 --> 00:02:12,378 sustain cyber forces . This effort is 50 00:02:12,378 --> 00:02:15,018 as ambitious as it is necessary . The 51 00:02:15,018 --> 00:02:17,240 Pentagon has launched a department-wide 52 00:02:17,240 --> 00:02:20,919 initiative , Cybercom 2.0 . 53 00:02:21,690 --> 00:02:24,009 To increase skill and readiness of our 54 00:02:24,009 --> 00:02:25,898 cyber forces , this initiative is 55 00:02:25,898 --> 00:02:28,350 simple . Just like any other military 56 00:02:28,690 --> 00:02:32,089 service , we will need well-trained , a 57 00:02:32,089 --> 00:02:34,350 well-trained pipeline of cyber 58 00:02:34,649 --> 00:02:36,871 operators supported by a whole range of 59 00:02:36,871 --> 00:02:39,169 acquisition professionals , and we do 60 00:02:39,169 --> 00:02:41,289 not have that today . Perhaps have 61 00:02:41,289 --> 00:02:43,610 testimony about how far along we are . 62 00:02:43,690 --> 00:02:46,250 Our , our cyber operators are working 63 00:02:46,250 --> 00:02:48,369 overtime . And we're not ready to 64 00:02:48,369 --> 00:02:50,480 generate new forces to replace them . 65 00:02:50,729 --> 00:02:52,785 I'm troubled that this effort is not 66 00:02:52,785 --> 00:02:55,007 moving fast enough . Current operations 67 00:02:55,007 --> 00:02:57,610 will always be priority number one , 68 00:02:57,759 --> 00:03:00,130 but we must ensure this pace is 69 00:03:00,130 --> 00:03:04,020 sustainable . Our cyber operators are 70 00:03:04,020 --> 00:03:06,187 not the only highly specialized forces 71 00:03:06,187 --> 00:03:08,089 in demand . America's special 72 00:03:08,089 --> 00:03:10,419 operations forces are more important 73 00:03:10,419 --> 00:03:12,880 now than ever before . No longer 74 00:03:12,880 --> 00:03:15,440 confined to their traditional role as a 75 00:03:15,660 --> 00:03:18,779 force of last resort , special 76 00:03:18,779 --> 00:03:21,179 operations forces often serve as a 77 00:03:21,179 --> 00:03:24,639 first choice across the full spectrum 78 00:03:24,639 --> 00:03:27,089 of military action . 79 00:03:29,729 --> 00:03:31,970 Special operations forces conduct 80 00:03:31,970 --> 00:03:33,809 direct action against high value 81 00:03:33,809 --> 00:03:36,169 targets as we witnessed during the raid 82 00:03:36,169 --> 00:03:39,289 to apprehend Nicolas Maduro from his 83 00:03:39,289 --> 00:03:41,330 heavily fortified compound outside 84 00:03:41,330 --> 00:03:45,289 Caracas . They train and advise partner 85 00:03:45,289 --> 00:03:47,490 forces , building capacity and 86 00:03:47,490 --> 00:03:49,850 strengthening alliances across Latin 87 00:03:49,850 --> 00:03:52,660 America , Europe , and the first island 88 00:03:52,660 --> 00:03:54,960 changes they . Gather intelligence 89 00:03:55,320 --> 00:03:57,320 against our adversaries and hostile 90 00:03:57,320 --> 00:03:59,479 environments . They respond to crises 91 00:03:59,800 --> 00:04:02,399 worldwide at a moment's notice , and 92 00:04:02,399 --> 00:04:04,839 they operate in the gray zone between 93 00:04:04,839 --> 00:04:08,000 peace and war , um , the context in 94 00:04:08,000 --> 00:04:09,778 which much of today's strategic 95 00:04:09,778 --> 00:04:11,778 competition unfolds , however , the 96 00:04:11,778 --> 00:04:13,944 funding provided to Special Operations 97 00:04:13,944 --> 00:04:16,119 Command has not kept pace with the 98 00:04:16,119 --> 00:04:19,359 seemingly insatiable demand for its 99 00:04:19,359 --> 00:04:21,980 capabilities . The command faces a 100 00:04:21,980 --> 00:04:24,260 troubling gap between its mission 101 00:04:24,260 --> 00:04:26,427 requirements and available resources , 102 00:04:26,429 --> 00:04:28,899 and I do think there's consensus on 103 00:04:28,899 --> 00:04:31,010 both sides of the dais and both sides 104 00:04:31,010 --> 00:04:33,232 of the aisle to correct that as soon as 105 00:04:33,232 --> 00:04:35,220 we can . Last year , General Brian 106 00:04:35,529 --> 00:04:37,739 Fenton , then commander of Special 107 00:04:37,739 --> 00:04:40,019 Operations Command , stated before this 108 00:04:40,019 --> 00:04:42,075 committee , and I'm going to quote , 109 00:04:42,260 --> 00:04:44,820 General Fenton , we continue to grapple 110 00:04:44,820 --> 00:04:48,540 with years of flat budgets . A 111 00:04:48,540 --> 00:04:52,019 14% decrease in buying power , 112 00:04:52,739 --> 00:04:55,579 significant personnel reductions , and 113 00:04:55,579 --> 00:04:58,679 the requirement to evolve our 114 00:04:58,679 --> 00:05:00,790 technology and authorities . All this 115 00:05:00,790 --> 00:05:03,339 forces trade-offs , tough choices that 116 00:05:03,339 --> 00:05:05,500 challenge current missions and put 117 00:05:05,500 --> 00:05:09,230 modernization at risk . End of quote 118 00:05:09,230 --> 00:05:11,880 from General Fenton . Uh , ladies and 119 00:05:11,880 --> 00:05:14,690 gentlemen , unfortunately , the $1.6 120 00:05:14,690 --> 00:05:16,468 billion increase in last year's 121 00:05:16,468 --> 00:05:18,523 reconciliation funding was not fully 122 00:05:18,523 --> 00:05:21,179 applied to the purpose for which 123 00:05:21,760 --> 00:05:25,350 Congress intended it . Perhaps we could 124 00:05:25,350 --> 00:05:27,461 discuss that today . This morning , I 125 00:05:27,461 --> 00:05:29,683 looked to Admiral Bradley and Secretary 126 00:05:29,683 --> 00:05:31,989 Anderson to tell us . To tell this 127 00:05:31,989 --> 00:05:34,156 committee what they need , I hope they 128 00:05:34,156 --> 00:05:36,329 will tell us how to equip their force 129 00:05:36,910 --> 00:05:39,390 to combat the advanced militaries of 130 00:05:39,390 --> 00:05:41,899 China and Russia , to remain fully 131 00:05:41,899 --> 00:05:43,955 engaged in the fight against violent 132 00:05:43,955 --> 00:05:47,350 Islamic terrorism , and to respond at a 133 00:05:47,350 --> 00:05:49,910 moment's notice as our nation's premier . 134 00:05:50,470 --> 00:05:53,660 Crisis response force and with that I 135 00:05:53,660 --> 00:05:55,882 recognize my friend and colleague , the 136 00:05:55,882 --> 00:05:57,993 Ranking Member Reed , for his opening 137 00:05:57,993 --> 00:06:00,049 remarks . Thank you very much , Mr . 138 00:06:00,049 --> 00:06:02,160 Chairman , and welcome , uh , Admiral 139 00:06:02,160 --> 00:06:04,519 Bradley and General Rudd , Mr . 140 00:06:04,529 --> 00:06:06,585 Anderson and Ms . Sutton . Thank you 141 00:06:06,585 --> 00:06:08,473 very much and please convey our . 142 00:06:09,500 --> 00:06:11,722 Thanks , our deep thanks to the men and 143 00:06:11,722 --> 00:06:13,778 women under your commands . Tomorrow 144 00:06:13,778 --> 00:06:15,833 marks 2 months since President Trump 145 00:06:15,833 --> 00:06:18,339 launched the war with Iran . Both 146 00:06:18,339 --> 00:06:20,540 Special Operations Command and Cyber 147 00:06:20,540 --> 00:06:22,484 Command are deeply engaged in this 148 00:06:22,484 --> 00:06:25,100 conflict . Our special operatives and 149 00:06:25,100 --> 00:06:27,380 cyber forces have played a major role 150 00:06:27,380 --> 00:06:29,209 in enabling combat operations , 151 00:06:29,459 --> 00:06:31,829 conducting information warfare . And 152 00:06:31,829 --> 00:06:33,662 providing intelligence support , 153 00:06:34,350 --> 00:06:36,350 including the remarkable mission to 154 00:06:36,350 --> 00:06:38,549 rescue the crew of the F-15 aircraft 155 00:06:38,549 --> 00:06:40,910 shot down in Iran earlier this month . 156 00:06:41,470 --> 00:06:43,637 This hearing is a reminder that modern 157 00:06:43,637 --> 00:06:46,070 warfare requires a full integration of 158 00:06:46,070 --> 00:06:48,309 every element of American military 159 00:06:48,309 --> 00:06:50,910 power . Today I would like our 160 00:06:50,910 --> 00:06:53,269 witnesses to provide updates on how 161 00:06:53,269 --> 00:06:55,589 their personnel are engaged in the war 162 00:06:55,589 --> 00:06:57,709 with Iran and what lessons should be 163 00:06:57,709 --> 00:07:00,179 drawn for future conflicts . Admiral 164 00:07:00,179 --> 00:07:02,401 Bradley , our special operations forces 165 00:07:02,401 --> 00:07:05,029 are unparalleled , but they are not 166 00:07:05,029 --> 00:07:07,940 without limits . I am concerned the 167 00:07:07,940 --> 00:07:10,107 administration has been deploying your 168 00:07:10,107 --> 00:07:13,089 forces at an unsustainable pace and for 169 00:07:13,589 --> 00:07:17,079 uh missions that . Could be questioned 170 00:07:17,390 --> 00:07:19,959 over the past year , SOCOM has led and 171 00:07:19,959 --> 00:07:22,079 executed the attack on Venezuela to 172 00:07:22,079 --> 00:07:24,079 capture Nicolas Maduro , the boat 173 00:07:24,079 --> 00:07:26,135 strike campaign in the Caribbean and 174 00:07:26,135 --> 00:07:28,100 Pacific , and various operations 175 00:07:28,100 --> 00:07:30,322 throughout the Middle East and Africa . 176 00:07:30,359 --> 00:07:32,920 I have serious concerns about Operation 177 00:07:32,920 --> 00:07:35,269 Southern Sphere in particular . Our 178 00:07:35,269 --> 00:07:37,325 service members have been ordered to 179 00:07:37,325 --> 00:07:39,436 strike and kill hundreds of suspected 180 00:07:39,436 --> 00:07:41,589 criminals in the open ocean over the 181 00:07:41,589 --> 00:07:44,649 past 8 months , placing them in legally 182 00:07:44,660 --> 00:07:47,089 and ethically perilous circumstances . 183 00:07:47,429 --> 00:07:49,485 I would ask for an update on SOCOM's 184 00:07:49,485 --> 00:07:51,709 role in Southern Spear and its missions 185 00:07:51,709 --> 00:07:53,850 in the region moving forward . 186 00:07:54,190 --> 00:07:56,190 Additionally , Admiral Bradley , in 187 00:07:56,190 --> 00:07:58,301 your prepared statement , you rightly 188 00:07:58,301 --> 00:08:00,301 discuss how warfare is increasingly 189 00:08:00,301 --> 00:08:01,912 defined by , in your words , 190 00:08:01,940 --> 00:08:03,884 competition below the threshold of 191 00:08:03,884 --> 00:08:06,410 armed conflict . In essence , a gray 192 00:08:06,410 --> 00:08:08,649 zone environment that is precisely 193 00:08:08,649 --> 00:08:10,649 where our special operations forces 194 00:08:10,649 --> 00:08:12,760 should be most affected , and I would 195 00:08:12,760 --> 00:08:15,500 ask for your plans . To prepare our 196 00:08:15,500 --> 00:08:17,556 special forces for such environments 197 00:08:17,556 --> 00:08:19,778 and what impact today's high operations 198 00:08:19,778 --> 00:08:22,179 tempo could have on future readiness . 199 00:08:22,619 --> 00:08:24,739 Similarly , Mr . Anderson , I would 200 00:08:24,739 --> 00:08:26,961 appreciate an update on the role of our 201 00:08:26,961 --> 00:08:28,850 special operations in advising US 202 00:08:28,850 --> 00:08:31,183 partners in Europe and the Indo-Pacific . 203 00:08:31,183 --> 00:08:33,789 And what steps you are taking to help 204 00:08:33,789 --> 00:08:36,270 equip and modernize our forces . I 205 00:08:36,270 --> 00:08:38,326 would also ask for an update on your 206 00:08:38,326 --> 00:08:40,492 efforts to strengthen the abilities of 207 00:08:40,492 --> 00:08:43,030 your office to fill its service 208 00:08:43,030 --> 00:08:45,750 secretary-like responsibilities for the 209 00:08:45,750 --> 00:08:47,639 oversight of the organization and 210 00:08:47,639 --> 00:08:49,639 readiness of our special operations 211 00:08:49,639 --> 00:08:52,320 forces . General Rudd , Ms . Sutton , I 212 00:08:52,320 --> 00:08:54,431 understand you are conducting a cyber 213 00:08:54,431 --> 00:08:57,650 2.0 force structure review . I welcome 214 00:08:57,650 --> 00:08:59,690 such a review . The current cyber 215 00:08:59,690 --> 00:09:01,690 mission force design is more than a 216 00:09:01,690 --> 00:09:04,030 decade old , and chronic readiness 217 00:09:04,030 --> 00:09:07,979 problems persist . Our most skilled 218 00:09:07,979 --> 00:09:10,201 cyber operators are highly sought after 219 00:09:10,201 --> 00:09:11,979 in the private sector , and the 220 00:09:11,979 --> 00:09:15,049 military cannot easily match , uh , the 221 00:09:15,049 --> 00:09:16,989 financial incentives that they're 222 00:09:17,099 --> 00:09:19,260 presented with . As such , a 223 00:09:19,260 --> 00:09:22,330 professional attrition in cybercom 224 00:09:22,820 --> 00:09:25,419 remains high . I would appreciate an 225 00:09:25,419 --> 00:09:27,586 update on the force design changes you 226 00:09:27,586 --> 00:09:29,641 are considering and how such changes 227 00:09:29,641 --> 00:09:31,697 could affect the joint cyber warfare 228 00:09:31,809 --> 00:09:34,099 warfare fighting architecture . 229 00:09:34,419 --> 00:09:36,586 Additionally . This committee has been 230 00:09:36,586 --> 00:09:38,586 briefed in closed session about the 231 00:09:38,586 --> 00:09:40,960 cyber activities used during recent 232 00:09:40,960 --> 00:09:42,960 operations like Midnight Hammer and 233 00:09:42,960 --> 00:09:45,109 Absolute Resolve . I would like to 234 00:09:45,109 --> 00:09:47,276 understand in open session how you are 235 00:09:47,276 --> 00:09:49,387 integrating cyber effects into combat 236 00:09:49,387 --> 00:09:51,989 missions and operational planning and 237 00:09:51,989 --> 00:09:53,989 where shortfalls remain that can be 238 00:09:53,989 --> 00:09:56,322 addressed through legislation . Finally , 239 00:09:56,590 --> 00:09:59,070 Ms . Sutton , your office is new and 240 00:09:59,070 --> 00:10:01,950 its mandate is very consequential . 241 00:10:02,510 --> 00:10:04,390 Providing civilian oversight and 242 00:10:04,390 --> 00:10:06,789 advocacy for Cybercom , I would like to 243 00:10:06,789 --> 00:10:10,080 hear how you . Our structuring your 244 00:10:10,080 --> 00:10:12,119 office , whether you are adequately 245 00:10:12,119 --> 00:10:14,008 resourced and how you are working 246 00:10:14,008 --> 00:10:15,841 across the department to improve 247 00:10:15,841 --> 00:10:17,786 acquisition functions and civilian 248 00:10:17,786 --> 00:10:19,841 hiring authorities for the command . 249 00:10:19,841 --> 00:10:22,008 Thank you again , uh , all of you that 250 00:10:22,008 --> 00:10:24,175 the missions of SOCOM and CyberCom are 251 00:10:24,175 --> 00:10:26,452 indispensable to our national security , 252 00:10:26,479 --> 00:10:28,646 and I look forward to your testimony . 253 00:10:28,646 --> 00:10:30,868 Thank you , Mr . Chairman . All right , 254 00:10:30,868 --> 00:10:30,679 Secretary Anderson , I think we'll 255 00:10:30,679 --> 00:10:32,846 start with you on opening statements , 256 00:10:32,846 --> 00:10:35,179 um , if you don't mind , and I know you , 257 00:10:35,200 --> 00:10:37,989 you , um . You , you gave 258 00:10:39,489 --> 00:10:42,580 Full statement in the classified 259 00:10:43,000 --> 00:10:46,119 section , but , but feel free to go 260 00:10:46,119 --> 00:10:48,750 ahead and , and , uh . Tell us what you 261 00:10:48,750 --> 00:10:51,640 have in mind . Thank you , uh , Senator , 262 00:10:51,679 --> 00:10:53,790 and I appreciate that , uh , Chairman 263 00:10:53,790 --> 00:10:55,735 Wicker , Ranking Member Reed , and 264 00:10:55,735 --> 00:10:57,679 other distinguished members of the 265 00:10:57,679 --> 00:10:57,479 committee , thank you for the 266 00:10:57,479 --> 00:10:59,535 opportunity to testify in the global 267 00:10:59,535 --> 00:11:01,312 posture of our nation's special 268 00:11:01,312 --> 00:11:03,257 operations forces . I'm honored to 269 00:11:03,257 --> 00:11:05,368 testify alongside Assistant Secretary 270 00:11:05,368 --> 00:11:05,039 Catherine Sutton , Admiral Mitch 271 00:11:05,039 --> 00:11:07,440 Bradley , and uh , General Joshua Rudd . 272 00:11:07,789 --> 00:11:09,900 The SOLAT team together with their US 273 00:11:09,900 --> 00:11:11,900 SOCOM counterparts bring invaluable 274 00:11:11,900 --> 00:11:14,150 expertise , leadership , and insight as 275 00:11:14,150 --> 00:11:15,983 we advocate on behalf of the SOF 276 00:11:15,983 --> 00:11:18,039 Enterprise , our service members and 277 00:11:18,039 --> 00:11:19,817 their families . People are the 278 00:11:19,817 --> 00:11:21,761 foundation of SOF and of the joint 279 00:11:21,761 --> 00:11:23,594 force . They are our competitive 280 00:11:23,594 --> 00:11:25,761 advantage against our adversaries . We 281 00:11:25,761 --> 00:11:27,539 are thankful for those who have 282 00:11:27,539 --> 00:11:29,706 volunteered to serve , those currently 283 00:11:29,706 --> 00:11:31,928 in harm's way , and those who have made 284 00:11:31,928 --> 00:11:31,590 the ultimate sacrifice , including the 285 00:11:31,590 --> 00:11:33,820 13 US service members we've lost during 286 00:11:33,820 --> 00:11:36,289 ongoing operations . We honor their 287 00:11:36,289 --> 00:11:38,511 lives and legacy and we'll never forget 288 00:11:38,511 --> 00:11:40,345 the sacrifices in defense of our 289 00:11:40,345 --> 00:11:42,511 country . Today's security environment 290 00:11:42,511 --> 00:11:44,122 is defined by simultaneity , 291 00:11:44,122 --> 00:11:45,900 convergence , and speed . State 292 00:11:45,900 --> 00:11:48,122 adversaries , terrorist organizations , 293 00:11:48,122 --> 00:11:50,345 and transnational criminal networks are 294 00:11:50,345 --> 00:11:52,511 increasingly aligned , technologically 295 00:11:52,511 --> 00:11:54,733 enabled , and active across domains and 296 00:11:54,733 --> 00:11:54,729 regions . To answer these challenges , 297 00:11:54,809 --> 00:11:56,920 the national defense strategy marks a 298 00:11:56,920 --> 00:11:58,809 fundamental shift , directing the 299 00:11:58,809 --> 00:12:00,642 Department of War to implement a 300 00:12:00,642 --> 00:12:02,476 flexible , realistic approach to 301 00:12:02,476 --> 00:12:02,330 protect America's interests . 302 00:12:02,900 --> 00:12:04,820 Purpose-built for this era , SOft 303 00:12:04,820 --> 00:12:06,931 provides capability and optionality . 304 00:12:07,219 --> 00:12:09,460 Comprising only 3% of the joint force 305 00:12:09,659 --> 00:12:11,715 and less than 2% of the department's 306 00:12:11,715 --> 00:12:13,659 budget , roughly equivalent to the 307 00:12:13,659 --> 00:12:15,770 procurement cost of a single aircraft 308 00:12:15,770 --> 00:12:17,603 carrier , SOft delivers outsized 309 00:12:17,603 --> 00:12:19,770 strategic value . SOft provides senior 310 00:12:19,770 --> 00:12:21,826 leaders with scalable , tailorable , 311 00:12:21,826 --> 00:12:23,992 and asymmetric options across the full 312 00:12:23,992 --> 00:12:26,159 spectrum of competition and conflict , 313 00:12:26,159 --> 00:12:28,381 leveraging persistent global presence , 314 00:12:28,381 --> 00:12:30,603 generational relationships , and unique 315 00:12:30,603 --> 00:12:32,715 authorities . The quiet professionals 316 00:12:32,715 --> 00:12:32,330 within SOft shape the operating 317 00:12:32,330 --> 00:12:34,552 environment , strengthen partners , and 318 00:12:34,552 --> 00:12:36,774 impose costs on our adversaries . While 319 00:12:36,774 --> 00:12:38,608 you may not read about it in the 320 00:12:38,608 --> 00:12:40,830 headlines , every major operation has a 321 00:12:40,830 --> 00:12:42,997 soft component to it . Operations like 322 00:12:42,997 --> 00:12:45,219 Southern Spear , Rough Rider , Midnight 323 00:12:45,219 --> 00:12:47,274 Hammer , Absolute Resolve , and Epic 324 00:12:47,274 --> 00:12:49,274 Fury have demonstrated our nation's 325 00:12:49,274 --> 00:12:51,441 prowess and commitment to confront our 326 00:12:51,441 --> 00:12:53,663 adversaries wherever they may be . From 327 00:12:53,663 --> 00:12:53,530 the Western Hemisphere across the 328 00:12:53,530 --> 00:12:55,419 Indo-Pacific to the Middle East , 329 00:12:55,419 --> 00:12:57,586 Africa , Europe , and beyond , SOF has 330 00:12:57,586 --> 00:12:59,919 been decisive in defending the homeland , 331 00:12:59,919 --> 00:13:01,863 deterring China , and enabling our 332 00:13:01,863 --> 00:13:04,086 partners and allies . Should deterrence 333 00:13:04,086 --> 00:13:06,141 fail , SOFT's posture with the joint 334 00:13:06,141 --> 00:13:08,363 force to prevail in high-end conflict , 335 00:13:08,363 --> 00:13:08,010 in accordance with the law and 336 00:13:08,010 --> 00:13:10,177 congressional guidance of which we are 337 00:13:10,177 --> 00:13:12,399 immensely grateful . The department has 338 00:13:12,399 --> 00:13:14,454 taken decisive and concrete steps to 339 00:13:14,454 --> 00:13:16,621 institutionalize SOLIC's oversight and 340 00:13:16,621 --> 00:13:18,454 advocacy role and strengthen the 341 00:13:18,454 --> 00:13:18,330 governance of the SOft enterprise . 342 00:13:18,950 --> 00:13:21,061 Over the last year and a half , we've 343 00:13:21,061 --> 00:13:23,283 transformed the Secretariat for Special 344 00:13:23,283 --> 00:13:25,394 Operations to provide direct civilian 345 00:13:25,394 --> 00:13:27,450 oversight across organized , train , 346 00:13:27,450 --> 00:13:29,450 and equip responsibilities , not to 347 00:13:29,450 --> 00:13:31,506 duplicate or disrupt the operational 348 00:13:31,506 --> 00:13:33,506 execution role of US SOCOM , but to 349 00:13:33,506 --> 00:13:35,728 support , sustain , and strengthen it . 350 00:13:35,728 --> 00:13:37,950 This transformation moves us beyond the 351 00:13:37,950 --> 00:13:39,783 old advisory construct to a true 352 00:13:39,783 --> 00:13:41,894 exercise of authority , direction and 353 00:13:41,894 --> 00:13:43,672 control through an analytical , 354 00:13:43,672 --> 00:13:45,450 disciplined , data-driven , and 355 00:13:45,450 --> 00:13:47,580 strategically sound approach . While 356 00:13:47,580 --> 00:13:49,747 the maturation of these initiatives is 357 00:13:49,747 --> 00:13:51,802 ongoing , these foundational changes 358 00:13:51,802 --> 00:13:53,636 fulfill congressional intent and 359 00:13:53,636 --> 00:13:55,858 provide the oversight mechanisms needed 360 00:13:55,858 --> 00:13:57,580 to shape for structure , guide 361 00:13:57,580 --> 00:13:59,747 budgetary and planning processes , and 362 00:13:59,747 --> 00:14:01,469 forge the future of SORF . The 363 00:14:01,469 --> 00:14:03,636 optionality that SOF delivers requires 364 00:14:03,636 --> 00:14:03,539 resourcing and investments to maintain 365 00:14:03,539 --> 00:14:05,428 our competitive edge , SOFT needs 366 00:14:05,428 --> 00:14:07,428 sustained partnership , predictable 367 00:14:07,428 --> 00:14:08,928 resourcing , and continued 368 00:14:08,928 --> 00:14:11,039 modernization . We greatly appreciate 369 00:14:11,039 --> 00:14:13,261 the support from this committee , and I 370 00:14:13,261 --> 00:14:15,428 commit to continued collaboration with 371 00:14:15,428 --> 00:14:15,369 Congress and to make full use of my 372 00:14:15,369 --> 00:14:17,091 position in the department and 373 00:14:17,091 --> 00:14:19,147 alongside the services to ensure SOF 374 00:14:19,147 --> 00:14:21,313 remains resourced , ready , relevant , 375 00:14:21,313 --> 00:14:23,369 and accountable , and to ensure that 376 00:14:23,369 --> 00:14:25,425 they can meet today's missions while 377 00:14:25,425 --> 00:14:27,702 transforming for tomorrow's challenges . 378 00:14:27,702 --> 00:14:29,813 I'm honored to lead the lead the soft 379 00:14:29,813 --> 00:14:31,980 enterprise . I invite you to visit our 380 00:14:31,980 --> 00:14:31,289 special operators and their families 381 00:14:31,289 --> 00:14:33,345 across the globe to see firsthand in 382 00:14:33,345 --> 00:14:35,067 the great work they do and the 383 00:14:35,067 --> 00:14:37,011 challenges they face . Our service 384 00:14:37,011 --> 00:14:39,067 members and their families represent 385 00:14:39,067 --> 00:14:41,122 the finest that America has to offer 386 00:14:41,122 --> 00:14:43,345 and are something we as a nation should 387 00:14:43,345 --> 00:14:45,122 be proud of . Thank you for the 388 00:14:45,122 --> 00:14:45,049 opportunity to testify . I look forward 389 00:14:45,049 --> 00:14:47,049 to your questions . OK , let's go , 390 00:14:47,049 --> 00:14:49,130 Admiral Bradley , and then we'll do 391 00:14:49,130 --> 00:14:51,570 Secretary Sutton and General Rudd . 392 00:14:51,969 --> 00:14:54,247 Admiral , you're recognized . Chairman , 393 00:14:54,247 --> 00:14:56,358 thank you , Chairman Wicker , Ranking 394 00:14:56,358 --> 00:14:58,580 Member Reed , and distinguished members 395 00:14:58,580 --> 00:15:00,691 of this of this committee . Thank you 396 00:15:00,691 --> 00:15:00,169 for the opportunity to represent the 397 00:15:00,169 --> 00:15:02,113 men and women of the United States 398 00:15:02,113 --> 00:15:04,002 Special Operations Command . I am 399 00:15:04,002 --> 00:15:06,169 honored to testify alongside Honorable 400 00:15:06,169 --> 00:15:08,650 Derek Anderson , RASW SOLIC . In SOCOM , 401 00:15:08,729 --> 00:15:11,710 we rely upon the empowered SOCOM SOLIC 402 00:15:11,710 --> 00:15:13,770 team for oversight , support , and 403 00:15:13,770 --> 00:15:15,890 advocacy to succeed in all of our 404 00:15:15,890 --> 00:15:17,668 global missions . Furthermore , 405 00:15:17,668 --> 00:15:19,668 privileged to testify alongside our 406 00:15:19,668 --> 00:15:21,969 partners from CyberCom . General Josh 407 00:15:21,969 --> 00:15:24,119 Rudd and ASW Honorable Katie Sutton , 408 00:15:24,289 --> 00:15:26,122 the deep integration between our 409 00:15:26,122 --> 00:15:28,530 commands ensures , as you've said , 410 00:15:28,809 --> 00:15:30,865 Chairman , that we can project power 411 00:15:30,865 --> 00:15:32,865 and protect the homeland across all 412 00:15:32,865 --> 00:15:35,087 domains . Distinguished members of this 413 00:15:35,087 --> 00:15:37,253 committee , the Honorable Anderson has 414 00:15:37,253 --> 00:15:39,420 laid out the strategic challenge , and 415 00:15:39,420 --> 00:15:41,420 I , I'd like to emphasize what this 416 00:15:41,420 --> 00:15:43,642 means for , for your warfighters inside 417 00:15:43,642 --> 00:15:45,698 SOCOM . The bottom line is we do not 418 00:15:45,698 --> 00:15:47,809 have the luxury of focusing on only a 419 00:15:47,809 --> 00:15:49,789 single goal or mission . While we 420 00:15:49,789 --> 00:15:52,122 defend the homeland as our top priority , 421 00:15:52,122 --> 00:15:54,178 we must also orient our force on the 422 00:15:54,178 --> 00:15:56,456 long-term pacing challenge of of China . 423 00:15:56,750 --> 00:15:58,669 We simultaneously deter the acute 424 00:15:58,669 --> 00:16:00,836 threat of conventional aggression from 425 00:16:00,836 --> 00:16:03,479 Russia and Iran . And remain postured 426 00:16:03,479 --> 00:16:05,423 to dismantle the networks of their 427 00:16:05,423 --> 00:16:07,368 proxies while we guard against the 428 00:16:07,368 --> 00:16:09,590 reckless provocations of isolated rogue 429 00:16:09,590 --> 00:16:11,479 states . And through it all , the 430 00:16:11,479 --> 00:16:13,423 persistent threat of ideologically 431 00:16:13,423 --> 00:16:16,270 driven and narco-terrorism continues to 432 00:16:16,270 --> 00:16:18,270 demand our and our integrated inter 433 00:16:18,270 --> 00:16:21,080 agencies constant vigilance . This is 434 00:16:21,080 --> 00:16:23,729 the reality of simultaneity . To meet 435 00:16:23,729 --> 00:16:25,840 this reality , we carry on the legacy 436 00:16:25,840 --> 00:16:28,007 of the Chendits , the Marine Raiders , 437 00:16:28,007 --> 00:16:30,118 the underwater demolition teams , and 438 00:16:30,118 --> 00:16:32,173 the jetbergs of World War II . Small 439 00:16:32,173 --> 00:16:34,229 teams who flew and parachuted behind 440 00:16:34,229 --> 00:16:36,450 enemy lines or swam through murky 441 00:16:36,450 --> 00:16:38,570 waters , not to win the war by 442 00:16:38,570 --> 00:16:40,369 themselves , but to empower our 443 00:16:40,369 --> 00:16:42,591 partners to win it as part of a greater 444 00:16:42,591 --> 00:16:44,702 alliance . That is the essence of how 445 00:16:44,702 --> 00:16:47,340 we as just 3% of the joint force and 446 00:16:47,340 --> 00:16:49,750 less 2% of the department's budget , 447 00:16:50,099 --> 00:16:52,179 provide an indispensable asymmetric 448 00:16:52,179 --> 00:16:54,340 advantage . We are a force ready to 449 00:16:54,340 --> 00:16:56,396 multiply the effects of our allies , 450 00:16:56,396 --> 00:16:58,118 partners , and our joint force 451 00:16:58,118 --> 00:17:00,229 teammates . Our joint force teammates 452 00:17:00,229 --> 00:17:02,284 recognize this . They recognize that 453 00:17:02,284 --> 00:17:04,396 our SAF are more in demand today than 454 00:17:04,396 --> 00:17:06,396 we ever have been . Your $2 billion 455 00:17:06,396 --> 00:17:08,451 near $2 billion uplift to our budget 456 00:17:08,451 --> 00:17:10,618 last year in 206 was an important down 457 00:17:10,618 --> 00:17:13,339 payment . But after 5 years of flat 458 00:17:13,339 --> 00:17:15,310 budgets , only with increased 459 00:17:15,310 --> 00:17:17,477 investment can we continue to meet the 460 00:17:17,477 --> 00:17:19,588 demands of the competition crisis and 461 00:17:19,588 --> 00:17:22,150 modernization for future conflict . You 462 00:17:22,150 --> 00:17:24,829 see , our purpose is our mission . This 463 00:17:24,829 --> 00:17:26,773 means that we are laser focused on 464 00:17:26,773 --> 00:17:28,885 maintaining the readiness required to 465 00:17:28,885 --> 00:17:30,607 defend the homeland , to deter 466 00:17:30,607 --> 00:17:32,773 aggression from our facing challenge , 467 00:17:32,773 --> 00:17:34,829 and to enable true burden sharing by 468 00:17:34,829 --> 00:17:36,996 empowering the growing capacity of our 469 00:17:36,996 --> 00:17:39,162 allies and partners . But that mission 470 00:17:39,162 --> 00:17:41,496 is not accomplished by technology alone , 471 00:17:41,496 --> 00:17:43,607 it is executed . By the most decisive 472 00:17:43,607 --> 00:17:45,440 advantage we have , our people , 473 00:17:45,440 --> 00:17:47,551 empowered by a culture of meritocracy 474 00:17:47,551 --> 00:17:49,773 and supported by critical programs that 475 00:17:49,773 --> 00:17:51,940 you have helped to manifest , like the 476 00:17:51,940 --> 00:17:54,107 preservation of the force and family . 477 00:17:54,107 --> 00:17:56,162 The health of your soft formation is 478 00:17:56,162 --> 00:17:58,385 not just strong , it's getting stronger 479 00:17:58,385 --> 00:18:00,162 every day . And to ensure these 480 00:18:00,162 --> 00:18:02,273 exceptional men and women can succeed 481 00:18:02,273 --> 00:18:04,607 in the complex environments of tomorrow , 482 00:18:04,607 --> 00:18:06,718 increasingly encroaching upon today . 483 00:18:06,718 --> 00:18:08,551 We are making transformation our 484 00:18:08,551 --> 00:18:10,718 imperative . We must adapt faster than 485 00:18:10,718 --> 00:18:12,829 our adversaries . We must sustain and 486 00:18:12,829 --> 00:18:14,885 improve our ability to project force 487 00:18:14,885 --> 00:18:17,218 through the most contested environments . 488 00:18:17,218 --> 00:18:18,940 We must evolve to leverage the 489 00:18:18,940 --> 00:18:20,996 ubiquitous information environment , 490 00:18:20,996 --> 00:18:23,051 and we must make advantageous use of 491 00:18:23,051 --> 00:18:25,420 abundant , attritable autonomy as we 492 00:18:25,420 --> 00:18:27,253 support the joint force . We are 493 00:18:27,253 --> 00:18:28,809 evolving our force design , 494 00:18:28,809 --> 00:18:30,920 accelerating capability development , 495 00:18:30,930 --> 00:18:33,152 and strengthening our partnerships with 496 00:18:33,152 --> 00:18:35,263 the services and allies to stay ahead 497 00:18:35,263 --> 00:18:37,374 of emerging threats . Our partnership 498 00:18:37,374 --> 00:18:39,486 with SOCO with Cybercom is a hallmark 499 00:18:39,486 --> 00:18:41,374 of this evolution , synchronizing 500 00:18:41,374 --> 00:18:43,430 virtual and physical domain maneuver 501 00:18:43,430 --> 00:18:45,763 across the spectrum for mission success . 502 00:18:45,763 --> 00:18:47,374 As the department's lead for 503 00:18:47,374 --> 00:18:49,430 experimentation in autonomy , we are 504 00:18:49,430 --> 00:18:51,374 not just adapting , we are driving 505 00:18:51,374 --> 00:18:53,208 change . We are working with the 506 00:18:53,208 --> 00:18:55,430 services to incorporate next generation 507 00:18:55,430 --> 00:18:57,763 capabilities , systems that are precise , 508 00:18:57,763 --> 00:18:59,819 autonomous , affordable , and always 509 00:18:59,819 --> 00:19:01,874 consistent with the law of war . Our 510 00:19:01,874 --> 00:19:03,930 goal to deliver these tools with the 511 00:19:03,930 --> 00:19:05,819 element of surprise from unwarned 512 00:19:05,819 --> 00:19:07,597 access and placement at scale , 513 00:19:07,597 --> 00:19:09,459 ensuring our forces maintain the 514 00:19:09,459 --> 00:19:11,181 decisive advantage against any 515 00:19:11,181 --> 00:19:13,290 adversary . However , our ability to 516 00:19:13,290 --> 00:19:15,930 accomplish this is not guaranteed . It 517 00:19:15,930 --> 00:19:18,041 requires accelerated modernization in 518 00:19:18,041 --> 00:19:19,652 your continued partnership . 519 00:19:19,652 --> 00:19:21,374 Predictable resourcing for our 520 00:19:21,374 --> 00:19:23,541 program's modernization is a strategic 521 00:19:23,541 --> 00:19:25,597 necessity . S Soft was purpose built 522 00:19:25,597 --> 00:19:27,763 for this era of competition , and with 523 00:19:27,763 --> 00:19:29,874 your continued support , we will meet 524 00:19:29,874 --> 00:19:32,041 today's missions while transforming to 525 00:19:32,041 --> 00:19:34,208 ensure we are ready for the challenges 526 00:19:34,208 --> 00:19:36,430 tomorrow . Thank you and I look forward 527 00:19:36,430 --> 00:19:39,270 to your questions . Thank you , Admiral 528 00:19:39,270 --> 00:19:41,492 Secretary Sutton , you are recognized . 529 00:19:41,670 --> 00:19:43,892 Chairman Wicker , Ranking Member Reed , 530 00:19:43,910 --> 00:19:45,743 and distinguished members of the 531 00:19:45,743 --> 00:19:47,410 committee . Thank you for the 532 00:19:47,410 --> 00:19:49,632 opportunity to testify here today . I'm 533 00:19:49,632 --> 00:19:51,799 honored to be here with General Rudd , 534 00:19:51,799 --> 00:19:53,910 whose immense experience , especially 535 00:19:53,910 --> 00:19:56,132 in the Indo-Pacific region , will prove 536 00:19:56,132 --> 00:19:58,243 invaluable as we posture to implement 537 00:19:58,243 --> 00:20:00,410 the priorities of the National Defense 538 00:20:00,410 --> 00:20:02,466 strategy . I congratulate Lieutenant 539 00:20:02,466 --> 00:20:04,688 General Hartmann and his wife Catherine 540 00:20:04,688 --> 00:20:06,910 on his retirement and thank him for his 541 00:20:06,910 --> 00:20:09,021 service and visionary leadership that 542 00:20:09,021 --> 00:20:11,243 has built the cyber enterprise over the 543 00:20:11,243 --> 00:20:13,132 years , setting the stage for our 544 00:20:13,132 --> 00:20:15,243 future success . It is a privilege to 545 00:20:15,243 --> 00:20:17,530 also testify alongside our special 546 00:20:17,530 --> 00:20:19,308 operations partners , Assistant 547 00:20:19,308 --> 00:20:21,530 Secretary of War , Derek Anderson and 548 00:20:21,530 --> 00:20:24,410 Admiral Rich Bradley . This joint 549 00:20:24,410 --> 00:20:26,299 appearance underscores a critical 550 00:20:26,299 --> 00:20:28,449 reality . The synergy between our 551 00:20:28,449 --> 00:20:30,479 communities creates an asymmetric 552 00:20:30,479 --> 00:20:33,430 advantage , presenting our adversaries 553 00:20:33,430 --> 00:20:35,449 with compounding dilemmas in both 554 00:20:35,449 --> 00:20:38,510 physical and virtual worlds . In my 555 00:20:38,510 --> 00:20:40,621 role , I'm responsible for overseeing 556 00:20:40,621 --> 00:20:42,949 the department's cyber operations 557 00:20:42,949 --> 00:20:46,369 policies , integrating cyber activities , 558 00:20:46,510 --> 00:20:48,569 and exercising authority , direction 559 00:20:48,569 --> 00:20:52,160 and control over US Cyber Command . I'd 560 00:20:52,160 --> 00:20:54,160 like to start by describing two key 561 00:20:54,160 --> 00:20:56,000 dynamics of the strategic cyber 562 00:20:56,000 --> 00:20:57,739 environment . The character of 563 00:20:57,739 --> 00:20:59,890 cyberwarfare is changing rapidly , 564 00:21:00,219 --> 00:21:02,330 shaped by the growing threat posed by 565 00:21:02,330 --> 00:21:04,579 our adversaries and accelerated by the 566 00:21:04,579 --> 00:21:07,619 ever growing power of technology . The 567 00:21:07,619 --> 00:21:09,660 first major change we are seeing is 568 00:21:09,660 --> 00:21:11,979 that our adversaries have moved beyond 569 00:21:11,979 --> 00:21:14,780 conducting espionage and theft and are 570 00:21:14,780 --> 00:21:16,699 preparing for conflict by 571 00:21:16,699 --> 00:21:19,579 prepositioning disruptive capabilities 572 00:21:19,579 --> 00:21:21,190 inside our nation's critical 573 00:21:21,190 --> 00:21:23,520 infrastructure . This strategic shift 574 00:21:23,520 --> 00:21:26,439 from exploitation to effects aims to 575 00:21:26,439 --> 00:21:28,760 disrupt military deployments and sow 576 00:21:28,760 --> 00:21:32,160 chaos in crisis or conflict . Cyber 577 00:21:32,160 --> 00:21:34,327 threats like Volt typhoon are not just 578 00:21:34,327 --> 00:21:36,119 a nuisance , they represent a 579 00:21:36,119 --> 00:21:38,175 significant and persistent threat to 580 00:21:38,175 --> 00:21:40,008 our national security . Second , 581 00:21:40,008 --> 00:21:42,119 artificial intelligence is a powerful 582 00:21:42,119 --> 00:21:44,452 force multiplier , increasing the speed , 583 00:21:44,452 --> 00:21:46,452 scale , and sophistication of these 584 00:21:46,452 --> 00:21:49,160 threats . AI accelerates the entire 585 00:21:49,160 --> 00:21:51,104 attack life cycle , creating a new 586 00:21:51,104 --> 00:21:53,199 dynamic where the pace of attacks 587 00:21:53,479 --> 00:21:56,359 challenges our ability to react and the 588 00:21:56,359 --> 00:21:58,939 scale overwhelms our ability to defend . 589 00:22:00,069 --> 00:22:02,150 Rapid innovation has lowered the 590 00:22:02,150 --> 00:22:04,270 barrier for entry for advanced cyber 591 00:22:04,270 --> 00:22:06,430 actors , blurring the line between 592 00:22:06,430 --> 00:22:08,319 nation states and other malicious 593 00:22:08,319 --> 00:22:10,369 actors . Our adversaries are 594 00:22:10,369 --> 00:22:12,536 operationalizing AI to outcompete us , 595 00:22:12,660 --> 00:22:14,827 and we must move urgently to put these 596 00:22:14,827 --> 00:22:16,549 same tools in the hands of our 597 00:22:16,549 --> 00:22:19,670 warfighters . Given these realities , a 598 00:22:19,670 --> 00:22:21,781 purely defensive posture is no longer 599 00:22:21,781 --> 00:22:24,709 sufficient . To implement the 2026 600 00:22:24,709 --> 00:22:26,820 National Defense strategies vision of 601 00:22:26,820 --> 00:22:28,931 achieving peace through strength , we 602 00:22:28,931 --> 00:22:30,987 must act decisively to transform the 603 00:22:30,987 --> 00:22:33,319 cyber enterprise guided by three core 604 00:22:33,319 --> 00:22:36,150 priorities . First , we must integrate 605 00:22:36,150 --> 00:22:38,920 cyber across all domains . Cyber is the 606 00:22:38,920 --> 00:22:41,069 connective tissue of modern warfare , 607 00:22:41,349 --> 00:22:43,660 playing a critical role in joint 608 00:22:43,660 --> 00:22:45,829 operations alongside our special 609 00:22:45,829 --> 00:22:48,089 operations partners . We will continue 610 00:22:48,089 --> 00:22:50,349 to integrate cyber capabilities across 611 00:22:50,349 --> 00:22:52,969 every warfighting domain . To develop a 612 00:22:52,969 --> 00:22:55,469 full range of options to deter conflict 613 00:22:55,650 --> 00:22:57,706 and ensure the joint force has every 614 00:22:57,706 --> 00:23:01,219 advantage . Second , we must gain 615 00:23:01,219 --> 00:23:03,420 strategic advantage below the level of 616 00:23:03,420 --> 00:23:06,719 armed conflict . A resilient defense 617 00:23:06,719 --> 00:23:09,180 must be paired with proactive , 618 00:23:09,339 --> 00:23:12,300 relentless disruption . By empowering 619 00:23:12,300 --> 00:23:15,380 our world-class cyber operators to 620 00:23:15,380 --> 00:23:18,060 execute full spectrum cyber operations , 621 00:23:18,260 --> 00:23:20,160 we will systematically erode our 622 00:23:20,160 --> 00:23:22,239 adversaries' cyber capabilities , 623 00:23:22,699 --> 00:23:24,780 dismantle their infrastructure , and 624 00:23:24,780 --> 00:23:28,219 impose consequences . Third , our 4th , 625 00:23:28,400 --> 00:23:30,849 our force must organize to dominate . 626 00:23:31,380 --> 00:23:33,602 Our strategies are only as effective as 627 00:23:33,602 --> 00:23:35,910 the force that executes them . Through 628 00:23:35,910 --> 00:23:38,410 the Cyber Command 2.0 initiative , we 629 00:23:38,410 --> 00:23:41,489 are undertaking the most comprehensive 630 00:23:41,739 --> 00:23:44,030 transformation of our cyber force since 631 00:23:44,030 --> 00:23:46,790 its inception to elevate our 632 00:23:46,790 --> 00:23:48,457 operational readiness , scale 633 00:23:48,457 --> 00:23:50,699 technological advantage , and propel 634 00:23:50,699 --> 00:23:52,921 our force to meet the modern demands of 635 00:23:52,921 --> 00:23:55,650 conflict . To achieve these priorities , 636 00:23:55,819 --> 00:23:58,420 we are leveraging the engine of 637 00:23:58,420 --> 00:24:00,619 American industry , harnessing the 638 00:24:00,619 --> 00:24:02,619 speed and innovation of the private 639 00:24:02,619 --> 00:24:05,339 sector to protect the cyber domain that 640 00:24:05,339 --> 00:24:07,283 powers our national security , our 641 00:24:07,283 --> 00:24:09,450 economic prosperity , and the American 642 00:24:09,450 --> 00:24:11,617 way of life . My office is leading the 643 00:24:11,617 --> 00:24:13,561 development of a Department of War 644 00:24:13,561 --> 00:24:15,839 cyber strategy to implement this pivot , 645 00:24:15,839 --> 00:24:17,895 which I look forward to sharing with 646 00:24:17,895 --> 00:24:20,117 the committee when complete . Let there 647 00:24:20,117 --> 00:24:22,228 be no doubt , the Department of War's 648 00:24:22,228 --> 00:24:24,117 commitment to the defense of this 649 00:24:24,117 --> 00:24:26,228 nation is absolute . We have a solemn 650 00:24:26,228 --> 00:24:28,117 duty to ensure our joint force is 651 00:24:28,117 --> 00:24:30,283 equipped to dominate within the highly 652 00:24:30,283 --> 00:24:32,506 contested cyber domain . The support of 653 00:24:32,506 --> 00:24:34,617 this committee is fundamental to this 654 00:24:34,617 --> 00:24:36,783 mission's success . Thank you for your 655 00:24:36,783 --> 00:24:36,150 support , and I look forward to your 656 00:24:36,150 --> 00:24:39,229 questions . Thank you very much , 657 00:24:39,589 --> 00:24:42,180 General Rudd . Chairman Wicker , 658 00:24:42,530 --> 00:24:44,752 Ranking Member Reed , and distinguished 659 00:24:44,752 --> 00:24:46,808 members of the committee , thank you 660 00:24:46,808 --> 00:24:48,919 for the opportunity to testify before 661 00:24:48,919 --> 00:24:50,974 you today alongside my distinguished 662 00:24:50,974 --> 00:24:53,086 colleagues from the department and US 663 00:24:53,086 --> 00:24:55,141 Special Operations Command . With me 664 00:24:55,141 --> 00:24:57,308 today is Command Chief Master Sergeant 665 00:24:57,308 --> 00:24:59,363 Kenneth Bruce , the US Cyber Command 666 00:24:59,363 --> 00:25:01,474 and National Security Agency senior , 667 00:25:01,474 --> 00:25:03,900 senior enlisted leader . We are honored 668 00:25:03,900 --> 00:25:06,011 to represent the soldiers , sailors , 669 00:25:06,011 --> 00:25:08,260 airmen , marines , guardians , and 670 00:25:08,260 --> 00:25:10,093 coast guardsmen , as well as the 671 00:25:10,093 --> 00:25:12,619 civilians who defend our networks and 672 00:25:12,619 --> 00:25:15,099 deliver effects that matter every day . 673 00:25:16,209 --> 00:25:18,431 I want to thank this committee for your 674 00:25:18,431 --> 00:25:20,376 continued support for our critical 675 00:25:20,376 --> 00:25:22,431 mission at US Cyber Command . I also 676 00:25:22,431 --> 00:25:24,598 want to recognize and thank Lieutenant 677 00:25:24,598 --> 00:25:26,820 Lieutenant General Joe Hartmann and his 678 00:25:26,820 --> 00:25:28,987 wife Catherine for their many years of 679 00:25:28,987 --> 00:25:30,820 service to this nation and their 680 00:25:30,820 --> 00:25:32,653 incredible contribution to Cyber 681 00:25:32,653 --> 00:25:32,449 Command and the National Security 682 00:25:32,449 --> 00:25:35,599 Agency . The people of US Cyber Command 683 00:25:35,599 --> 00:25:38,329 are paramount to our success . Their 684 00:25:38,329 --> 00:25:40,609 professionalism and dedication enable 685 00:25:40,609 --> 00:25:43,060 everything we accomplish . Our 686 00:25:43,060 --> 00:25:45,227 workforce represents the finest talent 687 00:25:45,227 --> 00:25:47,579 in cyber operations , a broad team of 688 00:25:47,579 --> 00:25:49,690 military service members and civilian 689 00:25:49,690 --> 00:25:51,801 professionals delivering unparalleled 690 00:25:51,801 --> 00:25:53,912 expertise to one of the nation's most 691 00:25:53,912 --> 00:25:56,079 critical missions . Cybercom's mission 692 00:25:56,079 --> 00:25:58,359 is threefold defend the homeland , 693 00:25:58,859 --> 00:26:00,581 defend the Department of War's 694 00:26:00,581 --> 00:26:02,748 information networks , and support the 695 00:26:02,748 --> 00:26:04,581 joint force . In executing these 696 00:26:04,581 --> 00:26:06,581 missions , we maintain a formidable 697 00:26:06,581 --> 00:26:08,748 partnership with the National Security 698 00:26:08,748 --> 00:26:10,970 Agency . NSA's roles , responsibilities 699 00:26:10,970 --> 00:26:13,369 and capabilities complement Cybercoms , 700 00:26:13,689 --> 00:26:15,467 creating a unity of effort that 701 00:26:15,467 --> 00:26:17,300 strengthens our common defense . 702 00:26:19,189 --> 00:26:21,849 Since taking command , I've emphasized 703 00:26:22,150 --> 00:26:25,540 four operating principles speed , scale , 704 00:26:25,829 --> 00:26:28,869 innovation , and integration . I'm 705 00:26:28,869 --> 00:26:31,036 proud to report that Cybercom has been 706 00:26:31,036 --> 00:26:33,202 executing under these principles since 707 00:26:33,202 --> 00:26:35,369 before my arrival . Which has made for 708 00:26:35,369 --> 00:26:37,480 a smooth transition and allowed me to 709 00:26:37,480 --> 00:26:39,480 hit the ground running . Throughout 710 00:26:39,480 --> 00:26:41,425 2025 and into 2026 , we've quickly 711 00:26:41,425 --> 00:26:43,369 adapted to the dynamic and complex 712 00:26:43,369 --> 00:26:45,536 cyber domain , demonstrating our value 713 00:26:45,536 --> 00:26:48,959 at scale . In 2025 we executed more 714 00:26:48,959 --> 00:26:51,500 than 8000 cyber missions , an increase 715 00:26:51,500 --> 00:26:53,900 of 25% compared to 2024 . 716 00:26:56,170 --> 00:26:58,520 This year we expect even more activity , 717 00:26:58,729 --> 00:27:00,951 and with your support , I'm certain our 718 00:27:00,951 --> 00:27:02,896 talented force is up to the task . 719 00:27:03,150 --> 00:27:05,317 Cybercom gains experience and insights 720 00:27:05,317 --> 00:27:07,483 from real-world operations every day , 721 00:27:07,483 --> 00:27:09,206 and that experience guides our 722 00:27:09,206 --> 00:27:11,428 operational support to the warfighter . 723 00:27:11,428 --> 00:27:13,594 Our innovative activity contributes to 724 00:27:13,594 --> 00:27:15,650 mission outcomes , to force building 725 00:27:15,650 --> 00:27:17,817 initiatives like Cybercom 2.0 , and to 726 00:27:17,817 --> 00:27:20,150 the employment of emerging technologies . 727 00:27:20,609 --> 00:27:22,260 Cyber domain cuts across all 728 00:27:22,260 --> 00:27:24,371 warfighting domains , and integrating 729 00:27:24,371 --> 00:27:26,482 cyber into the joint force operations 730 00:27:26,482 --> 00:27:28,060 enhances combat and command 731 00:27:28,060 --> 00:27:31,550 effectiveness across the board . When 732 00:27:31,550 --> 00:27:33,869 called upon , Cybercom employs full 733 00:27:33,869 --> 00:27:36,229 spectrum cyber operations with and on 734 00:27:36,229 --> 00:27:38,396 behalf of the other combatant commands 735 00:27:38,396 --> 00:27:40,510 to deter and , if necessary , defeat 736 00:27:40,510 --> 00:27:43,400 our adversaries . Our participation in 737 00:27:43,400 --> 00:27:45,520 Operation Absolute Resolve and 738 00:27:45,520 --> 00:27:47,900 Operation Epic Fry are prime examples 739 00:27:48,040 --> 00:27:51,000 of this integration in action , cyber 740 00:27:51,000 --> 00:27:52,800 and kinetic operations working 741 00:27:52,800 --> 00:27:55,750 seamlessly to achieve joint objectives . 742 00:27:56,689 --> 00:27:58,800 We're also executing the service-like 743 00:27:58,800 --> 00:28:01,022 authorities granted to us by Congress . 744 00:28:01,022 --> 00:28:03,500 Cybercom 2.0 is moving at pace and 745 00:28:03,500 --> 00:28:05,611 achieving new milestones each month . 746 00:28:06,560 --> 00:28:09,040 Through Cybercom 2.0 , we will deliver 747 00:28:09,040 --> 00:28:11,479 the capability and capacity to identify 748 00:28:11,479 --> 00:28:13,701 and hire a talented workforce , provide 749 00:28:13,701 --> 00:28:15,535 them with optimal training , and 750 00:28:15,535 --> 00:28:17,312 incentivize them to stay in the 751 00:28:17,312 --> 00:28:19,479 cyberforce . Additionally , it will 752 00:28:19,479 --> 00:28:21,319 enhance our ability to work more 753 00:28:21,319 --> 00:28:23,640 closely with industry and academia to 754 00:28:23,640 --> 00:28:26,099 develop , acquire , and operationalize 755 00:28:26,280 --> 00:28:28,800 cutting edge capabilities . Cyber 756 00:28:28,800 --> 00:28:30,967 Command will continue to work with the 757 00:28:30,967 --> 00:28:33,239 cyber policy team and the services to 758 00:28:33,239 --> 00:28:35,959 ensure CyberCom 2.0 is implemented 759 00:28:35,959 --> 00:28:37,939 effectively . Thank you for the 760 00:28:37,939 --> 00:28:40,272 privilege of appearing before you today . 761 00:28:40,272 --> 00:28:42,439 I look forward to working with you and 762 00:28:42,439 --> 00:28:44,383 I look forward to your questions . 763 00:28:44,800 --> 00:28:46,856 Thank you very much . Uh , Secretary 764 00:28:46,856 --> 00:28:49,390 Sutton and General Rudd , let me begin 765 00:28:49,969 --> 00:28:52,530 with the two of you . Um , I've read , 766 00:28:52,540 --> 00:28:54,130 um , a pretty , um , 767 00:28:56,369 --> 00:29:00,239 Disturbing quote from General 768 00:29:00,239 --> 00:29:03,400 Brian Fenton , um . Last year 769 00:29:04,939 --> 00:29:08,819 about Years of flat budgets , 770 00:29:08,900 --> 00:29:12,630 14% decrease in buying power and , 771 00:29:12,739 --> 00:29:15,520 and significant personnel reductions , 772 00:29:16,020 --> 00:29:19,229 um . How is 773 00:29:19,890 --> 00:29:23,469 Cybercom 2.0 going to address these ? 774 00:29:24,209 --> 00:29:28,170 Um , And is the work , uh , 775 00:29:28,260 --> 00:29:31,239 is our pace at this point happening 776 00:29:31,699 --> 00:29:34,260 fast enough , Secretary Sutton . 777 00:29:35,459 --> 00:29:37,681 Senator , thanks for the opportunity to 778 00:29:37,681 --> 00:29:39,459 talk about this really critical 779 00:29:39,459 --> 00:29:41,619 initiative . Uh , one of the concepts 780 00:29:41,619 --> 00:29:44,020 of Cyber Command 20 is really looking 781 00:29:44,020 --> 00:29:46,187 at how we build mastery into our force 782 00:29:46,420 --> 00:29:48,420 before we continue to just grow the 783 00:29:48,420 --> 00:29:51,859 force . We have our built out our cyber 784 00:29:51,859 --> 00:29:53,979 mission force and have largely been 785 00:29:53,979 --> 00:29:56,201 able to get them to a basic trained and 786 00:29:56,201 --> 00:29:58,545 qualified level . What we really need 787 00:29:58,545 --> 00:30:00,601 to look at and what the aim of Cyber 788 00:30:00,601 --> 00:30:02,625 Command 2.0 is how do we take that 789 00:30:02,625 --> 00:30:05,265 basic and trained force and build in 790 00:30:05,265 --> 00:30:08,125 domain mastery and specialized skills 791 00:30:08,305 --> 00:30:10,416 to be able to get after some of these 792 00:30:10,416 --> 00:30:12,583 problems that we face and to have them 793 00:30:12,583 --> 00:30:14,694 be a more effective and more lethal , 794 00:30:14,694 --> 00:30:17,150 lethal force . To do that , the Cyber 795 00:30:17,150 --> 00:30:19,689 Command 2.0 implementation plan looks 796 00:30:19,689 --> 00:30:21,689 across the entire talent management 797 00:30:21,689 --> 00:30:23,856 pipeline to really address this not as 798 00:30:23,856 --> 00:30:26,569 an incremental one by one step , but to 799 00:30:26,569 --> 00:30:28,959 relook at the entire way that we talent 800 00:30:28,959 --> 00:30:31,050 manage this force , to really build 801 00:30:31,050 --> 00:30:33,890 that unique technical skill set in the 802 00:30:33,890 --> 00:30:36,112 way that we've done other models in the 803 00:30:36,112 --> 00:30:38,334 department like the medical community , 804 00:30:38,334 --> 00:30:40,168 the soft community , the nuclear 805 00:30:40,168 --> 00:30:43,000 community . And so we are undertaking 806 00:30:43,000 --> 00:30:45,380 that implementation plan very rapidly , 807 00:30:45,560 --> 00:30:47,959 looking at how we can do quick wins and 808 00:30:47,959 --> 00:30:51,079 pilots off the bat and then take 809 00:30:51,079 --> 00:30:52,801 lessons learned from those and 810 00:30:52,801 --> 00:30:54,579 implement more of the long term 811 00:30:54,579 --> 00:30:56,635 policies . We can always move faster 812 00:30:56,635 --> 00:30:58,857 and we continue to move faster and look 813 00:30:58,857 --> 00:31:00,968 forward to continuing to brief you on 814 00:31:00,968 --> 00:31:03,239 our progress as we move forward . Uh , 815 00:31:03,359 --> 00:31:05,303 well , General Rudd , I'll let you 816 00:31:05,303 --> 00:31:07,359 follow up there , but it , could you 817 00:31:07,359 --> 00:31:10,640 identify . Your most , uh , in , in , 818 00:31:10,650 --> 00:31:14,170 uh , in connection with Cybercom 2.0 , 819 00:31:14,530 --> 00:31:17,609 your most important milestone to 820 00:31:17,619 --> 00:31:21,300 achieve , um , At the earliest 821 00:31:22,349 --> 00:31:25,260 possible moment . Yeah , thanks , 822 00:31:25,380 --> 00:31:27,602 Chairman . I appreciate the opportunity 823 00:31:27,602 --> 00:31:31,140 to follow up on this . The Cybercom 2.0 824 00:31:31,140 --> 00:31:34,180 approach is built on seven attributes . 825 00:31:34,390 --> 00:31:36,660 First and foremost , it's the people . 826 00:31:36,819 --> 00:31:39,640 We've got to identify , recruit , and 827 00:31:39,780 --> 00:31:41,836 assess and bring in the right people 828 00:31:42,219 --> 00:31:44,920 and get them at that baseline level of 829 00:31:45,079 --> 00:31:47,190 certification that enables them to do 830 00:31:47,190 --> 00:31:49,357 the mission as soon as they get to the 831 00:31:49,357 --> 00:31:51,468 force . The next , the next attribute 832 00:31:51,468 --> 00:31:53,801 that's really guiding and driving us is . 833 00:31:53,890 --> 00:31:57,140 Incentivization . So both , uh , um , 834 00:31:57,369 --> 00:32:00,089 monetarily for the skill set , great 835 00:32:00,089 --> 00:32:02,369 competition with the private sector as 836 00:32:02,369 --> 00:32:04,313 you would imagine for this type of 837 00:32:04,313 --> 00:32:06,313 skill set , and making sure that we 838 00:32:06,313 --> 00:32:08,480 harness every authority and every cent 839 00:32:08,480 --> 00:32:10,258 that we have to incentivize the 840 00:32:10,258 --> 00:32:13,329 workforce . Next critical piece of this 841 00:32:13,329 --> 00:32:15,329 is training . We've got to have the 842 00:32:15,329 --> 00:32:18,050 right training pipeline and the right 843 00:32:18,050 --> 00:32:20,161 resources centered around training to 844 00:32:20,161 --> 00:32:22,599 go again from what the services provide , 845 00:32:22,800 --> 00:32:25,170 which is that baseline operational 846 00:32:25,170 --> 00:32:27,250 capability , and then bringing it to 847 00:32:27,250 --> 00:32:29,560 what we desire for every member is the 848 00:32:29,560 --> 00:32:32,060 mastery . We've then got to make sure 849 00:32:32,060 --> 00:32:34,282 that we can retain this force . This is 850 00:32:34,282 --> 00:32:36,338 where we look at models like Special 851 00:32:36,338 --> 00:32:38,449 Operations Command , where across the 852 00:32:38,449 --> 00:32:40,449 service components there's a career 853 00:32:40,449 --> 00:32:42,609 path where we can retain the best and 854 00:32:42,609 --> 00:32:45,369 the highly trained ones that have again 855 00:32:45,369 --> 00:32:47,258 ideally gained mastery or working 856 00:32:47,258 --> 00:32:49,258 towards mastery . We can repeatedly 857 00:32:49,258 --> 00:32:51,849 keep them in a rotation and an 858 00:32:51,849 --> 00:32:54,560 assignment here at Cyber Command . And 859 00:32:54,560 --> 00:32:56,689 also much like special operations , 860 00:32:56,770 --> 00:32:58,510 we're developing and executing 861 00:32:58,510 --> 00:33:00,699 specialized mission sets that require 862 00:33:00,699 --> 00:33:02,643 specialized training and again the 863 00:33:02,643 --> 00:33:04,810 ability to incentivize and retain that 864 00:33:04,810 --> 00:33:07,869 talent . And then finally we're looking 865 00:33:07,869 --> 00:33:10,219 at , it's not just the cyber operator , 866 00:33:10,339 --> 00:33:12,450 but it's also the enablers . It's the 867 00:33:12,450 --> 00:33:14,506 headquarters element and the support 868 00:33:14,506 --> 00:33:16,506 pieces that come with that . That's 869 00:33:16,506 --> 00:33:18,561 part of the force presentation model 870 00:33:18,561 --> 00:33:18,510 from the services and that's what we're 871 00:33:18,510 --> 00:33:20,677 getting after , Chairman . The , the , 872 00:33:20,677 --> 00:33:22,788 the most , I think one of the biggest 873 00:33:22,788 --> 00:33:24,954 challenges is really just figuring out 874 00:33:24,954 --> 00:33:27,121 how do we attract the right people and 875 00:33:27,121 --> 00:33:29,288 incentivize them to want to have a , a 876 00:33:29,288 --> 00:33:31,454 career in , in cyberforce . And , um , 877 00:33:31,670 --> 00:33:33,781 just brief , you can't do this on the 878 00:33:33,781 --> 00:33:35,948 cheap , can you , General ? Chairman , 879 00:33:35,959 --> 00:33:38,089 we certainly can't . Uh , thank you 880 00:33:38,089 --> 00:33:41,359 very much , Senator Reid . Thank you 881 00:33:41,359 --> 00:33:44,599 very much , Mr . Chairman . Admiral 882 00:33:44,599 --> 00:33:47,910 Bradley and Mr . Anderson , um . You 883 00:33:47,910 --> 00:33:50,510 have some of the same issues and you've 884 00:33:50,510 --> 00:33:53,630 been working on it before as uh 885 00:33:53,630 --> 00:33:55,686 Secretary Sutton and General Rudd of 886 00:33:56,109 --> 00:33:57,998 creating a service secretary-like 887 00:33:57,998 --> 00:34:01,569 position and um since you've been 888 00:34:01,569 --> 00:34:04,349 uh both confirmed , what have you done 889 00:34:04,349 --> 00:34:06,910 to sort of accomplish that mission , 890 00:34:07,030 --> 00:34:08,641 getting you into the service 891 00:34:08,641 --> 00:34:10,870 secretary-like mode and maybe what 892 00:34:10,870 --> 00:34:13,590 advice you have for us , our cybercom 893 00:34:13,590 --> 00:34:16,429 friends ? Senator , but first and 894 00:34:16,429 --> 00:34:18,485 foremost , uh , you know , Honorable 895 00:34:18,485 --> 00:34:20,790 Sutton and I , uh , speak regularly 896 00:34:20,790 --> 00:34:22,846 about this topic . Uh , I can assure 897 00:34:22,846 --> 00:34:24,957 you of that , but I want to thank the 898 00:34:24,957 --> 00:34:26,846 committee specifically on the 907 899 00:34:26,846 --> 00:34:28,846 authorities that you gave us in the 900 00:34:28,846 --> 00:34:28,709 NDAA that allowed us to be a 901 00:34:28,709 --> 00:34:30,949 service-like entity . Uh , since taking 902 00:34:30,949 --> 00:34:33,227 the seat , we've had a few initiatives , 903 00:34:33,227 --> 00:34:35,171 uh , but just to highlight a few , 904 00:34:35,171 --> 00:34:37,227 Senator , uh , you know , we've been 905 00:34:37,227 --> 00:34:39,116 investing more in our personnel , 906 00:34:39,116 --> 00:34:41,227 having that advocacy for the budget , 907 00:34:41,227 --> 00:34:43,227 um , specifically being in the room 908 00:34:43,227 --> 00:34:45,393 with our service secretaries , uh , to 909 00:34:45,393 --> 00:34:44,659 make sure we're doing things in an 910 00:34:44,659 --> 00:34:46,603 efficient manner and it's the best 911 00:34:46,603 --> 00:34:48,770 dollar going , uh , for the taxpayer . 912 00:34:48,870 --> 00:34:51,459 Um , administratively , um , Admiral 913 00:34:51,459 --> 00:34:53,626 Bradley and I have done a , a sprint , 914 00:34:53,626 --> 00:34:55,681 as you might call it . Uh , where we 915 00:34:55,681 --> 00:34:57,848 have taken our staffs to look at where 916 00:34:57,848 --> 00:34:59,959 there might be efficiencies made , so 917 00:34:59,959 --> 00:35:02,015 we don't have duplicate efforts both 918 00:35:02,015 --> 00:35:04,015 from the SOLC Enterprise as well as 919 00:35:04,015 --> 00:35:06,126 from the SOCOM enterprise . Ideally , 920 00:35:06,126 --> 00:35:08,237 uh , we come out with a General Order 921 00:35:08,237 --> 00:35:10,459 One similar to what the Army , uh , and 922 00:35:10,459 --> 00:35:12,681 other services do where it lays out the 923 00:35:12,681 --> 00:35:15,015 roles and the responsibilities for , uh , 924 00:35:15,015 --> 00:35:17,181 us as a service like in SOLIC and then 925 00:35:17,181 --> 00:35:16,949 obviously , uh , SOCOM and Admiral 926 00:35:16,949 --> 00:35:19,227 Bradley . So it's been a great , great . 927 00:35:19,227 --> 00:35:21,171 initiative that we've been pushing 928 00:35:21,171 --> 00:35:23,060 forward and it's , and it's quite 929 00:35:23,060 --> 00:35:25,227 honestly , uh , made our staffs talk , 930 00:35:25,227 --> 00:35:27,005 uh , and be and be more open in 931 00:35:27,005 --> 00:35:29,116 dialogue and how we do things . So uh 932 00:35:29,116 --> 00:35:31,338 I'd be remiss not to mention I have , I 933 00:35:31,338 --> 00:35:33,560 think one of , uh , how we've organized 934 00:35:33,560 --> 00:35:32,600 ourselves specifically in SoliC to 935 00:35:32,600 --> 00:35:34,830 mirror something like what the services 936 00:35:34,830 --> 00:35:37,052 have where we have the capabilities and 937 00:35:37,052 --> 00:35:39,108 development , we have an MNRA , uh , 938 00:35:39,108 --> 00:35:40,941 and we have a special operations 939 00:35:40,941 --> 00:35:43,163 analytical arm as well . So , um , it's 940 00:35:43,163 --> 00:35:44,997 a lot of work , but we're moving 941 00:35:44,997 --> 00:35:46,997 headstrong , uh , forward with it . 942 00:35:46,997 --> 00:35:49,108 Admiral , yes , ranked member , first 943 00:35:49,108 --> 00:35:51,163 I'd start foundationally . We inside 944 00:35:51,163 --> 00:35:53,280 the uniform , uh , aspects of SOCOM 945 00:35:53,280 --> 00:35:55,879 recognize the constitutional foundation 946 00:35:56,080 --> 00:35:58,136 of civilian control of the uniformed 947 00:35:58,136 --> 00:36:00,399 service . It's a critical facet of our 948 00:36:00,399 --> 00:36:02,580 constitutional democracy , and , uh , 949 00:36:02,600 --> 00:36:04,767 we are fully supportive of manifesting 950 00:36:04,767 --> 00:36:07,250 it inside our formations as well . Very 951 00:36:07,250 --> 00:36:11,016 pragmatic . As well as SOCOM recognizes 952 00:36:11,016 --> 00:36:13,835 that the next challenges we face will 953 00:36:13,835 --> 00:36:16,057 be solved through a tighter integration 954 00:36:16,057 --> 00:36:18,279 with our service teammates , we have to 955 00:36:18,279 --> 00:36:20,395 also have that service connection at 956 00:36:20,395 --> 00:36:22,506 the secretariat level . And so inside 957 00:36:22,506 --> 00:36:24,673 the Pentagon , it's very important for 958 00:36:24,673 --> 00:36:27,335 a robust , empowered SLIC to be able to 959 00:36:27,335 --> 00:36:29,557 be in the same meetings and to have the 960 00:36:29,557 --> 00:36:31,724 same interactions . to complement what 961 00:36:31,724 --> 00:36:33,779 we are doing on the uniform side and 962 00:36:33,779 --> 00:36:35,835 the sprint and the interactions that 963 00:36:35,835 --> 00:36:37,724 our staff are having to both find 964 00:36:37,724 --> 00:36:39,902 places where horizontal integration is 965 00:36:39,902 --> 00:36:42,124 appropriate , that is teaming to divide 966 00:36:42,124 --> 00:36:43,846 labor and be better , but also 967 00:36:43,846 --> 00:36:45,569 appropriately where vertically 968 00:36:45,569 --> 00:36:47,569 oversight functions need to exist . 969 00:36:47,711 --> 00:36:49,933 Both of those are critical aspects that 970 00:36:49,933 --> 00:36:51,989 are coming out of the sprint . Thank 971 00:36:51,989 --> 00:36:54,199 you very much . General Rudd , uh , 972 00:36:54,360 --> 00:36:56,582 we've talked a lot about Cybercom . Can 973 00:36:56,582 --> 00:36:58,919 you , uh , tell us what you believe 974 00:36:58,919 --> 00:37:01,679 your three top challenges are at NSA ? 975 00:37:04,459 --> 00:37:07,189 And sorry , ranking member at NSA . Yes , 976 00:37:07,540 --> 00:37:09,484 I'm sorry . That's my Rhode Island 977 00:37:09,484 --> 00:37:11,651 accent . Forgive me . All right , no , 978 00:37:11,651 --> 00:37:13,707 thanks , ranking member . The , uh , 979 00:37:13,979 --> 00:37:16,146 you know , it kind of goes back to the 980 00:37:16,146 --> 00:37:18,201 operating principles against which I 981 00:37:18,340 --> 00:37:20,409 conveyed both to the committee in my 982 00:37:20,409 --> 00:37:22,409 opening statement , but also to the 983 00:37:22,409 --> 00:37:25,179 forces . We have to move at the pace of 984 00:37:25,179 --> 00:37:27,939 the strategic environment in which 985 00:37:28,399 --> 00:37:31,379 driven really in large part by the pace 986 00:37:31,379 --> 00:37:33,435 of technology . So the ability to be 987 00:37:33,435 --> 00:37:35,601 able to harness technology ahead of an 988 00:37:35,601 --> 00:37:38,219 adversary , to be at the foremost front 989 00:37:38,219 --> 00:37:40,760 and retain and maintain that advantage 990 00:37:41,419 --> 00:37:43,659 is , is really what's critical . The 991 00:37:43,659 --> 00:37:45,992 next piece is the ability to scale . Um , 992 00:37:45,992 --> 00:37:49,580 we've got to take our , our , our 993 00:37:49,580 --> 00:37:52,570 efforts again . To move fast , figure 994 00:37:52,570 --> 00:37:54,514 out where does it apply , not only 995 00:37:54,514 --> 00:37:56,610 across other parts of NSA but across 996 00:37:56,610 --> 00:37:58,499 Cybercom , but then , of course , 997 00:37:58,689 --> 00:38:00,967 across the entirety of the Joint Force . 998 00:38:00,967 --> 00:38:03,370 Um , and then driven by innovation . 999 00:38:04,209 --> 00:38:06,376 Moving creatively to solve the hardest 1000 00:38:06,376 --> 00:38:08,487 problems . We may not always have the 1001 00:38:08,487 --> 00:38:10,709 scale and mass that we would , we would 1002 00:38:10,709 --> 00:38:12,542 desire , but we know that we can 1003 00:38:12,542 --> 00:38:14,709 creatively outthink anybody . And then 1004 00:38:14,709 --> 00:38:16,931 finally , it's integration . We want to 1005 00:38:16,931 --> 00:38:19,265 make sure that we are nested with again , 1006 00:38:19,265 --> 00:38:21,431 not only across the two commands to be 1007 00:38:21,431 --> 00:38:23,376 complementary , that delivers that 1008 00:38:23,376 --> 00:38:23,129 speed , but then in support of the 1009 00:38:23,129 --> 00:38:25,280 joint force , but also in support of 1010 00:38:25,280 --> 00:38:27,336 interagency where , where required . 1011 00:38:28,010 --> 00:38:30,129 Well , I have 14 seconds left , so I 1012 00:38:30,129 --> 00:38:32,489 can just salute Secretary Sutton . I 1013 00:38:32,489 --> 00:38:34,767 think you're gonna do an excellent job . 1014 00:38:34,767 --> 00:38:36,600 Uh , and one of the issues , the 1015 00:38:36,600 --> 00:38:38,969 question I was gonna ask , we'll send 1016 00:38:38,969 --> 00:38:41,025 you a written question . Time's up . 1017 00:38:41,025 --> 00:38:43,191 The center of , thank you , the Center 1018 00:38:43,191 --> 00:38:46,500 of gravity for your AI , uh , efforts 1019 00:38:46,570 --> 00:38:49,719 in the , uh , cybercom . Uh , realm and 1020 00:38:49,719 --> 00:38:52,040 also I think in , uh , special ops I 1021 00:38:52,040 --> 00:38:54,262 think that's the question we'll send in 1022 00:38:54,262 --> 00:38:56,318 writing , but it's important . Thank 1023 00:38:56,318 --> 00:38:58,429 you very much , Mr . Chairman . Thank 1024 00:38:58,429 --> 00:39:00,707 you , sir . Senator Fisher . Thank you , 1025 00:39:00,707 --> 00:39:02,873 Mr . Chairman . Uh , Admiral Bradley , 1026 00:39:02,873 --> 00:39:05,340 how are you working , um , and 1027 00:39:05,340 --> 00:39:09,110 assessing SOCOMs , um , if it's 1028 00:39:09,110 --> 00:39:11,879 appropriately postured for the 1029 00:39:11,879 --> 00:39:15,879 Indo-Pacific . Senator , thank 1030 00:39:15,879 --> 00:39:18,110 you . Uh , first , uh , we , we look at 1031 00:39:18,110 --> 00:39:20,166 it across the spectrum of conflict , 1032 00:39:20,166 --> 00:39:22,439 competition , crisis , and , uh , 1033 00:39:22,449 --> 00:39:24,338 should , uh , crisis cascade into 1034 00:39:24,338 --> 00:39:26,505 conflict , how are we positioned to be 1035 00:39:26,505 --> 00:39:28,560 able to , uh , support the combatant 1036 00:39:28,560 --> 00:39:30,782 commander , uh , my good friend Admiral 1037 00:39:30,782 --> 00:39:33,229 Sam Pomparo . Um , how are we prepared 1038 00:39:33,229 --> 00:39:35,396 to integrate with the services and the 1039 00:39:35,396 --> 00:39:37,451 service components there in the Indo 1040 00:39:37,451 --> 00:39:40,050 Paycom AOR and at a competition level , 1041 00:39:40,219 --> 00:39:43,250 how are we able to provide value to our 1042 00:39:43,250 --> 00:39:45,489 allies and partners to strengthen the 1043 00:39:45,489 --> 00:39:47,620 resilience of our , of our alliances 1044 00:39:47,620 --> 00:39:49,850 there and we believe that that is 1045 00:39:49,850 --> 00:39:52,580 foremost and most important in any 1046 00:39:52,580 --> 00:39:54,979 strategy of deterrence is to have that 1047 00:39:54,979 --> 00:39:57,146 stronger alliance . So do you , do you 1048 00:39:57,146 --> 00:39:59,959 have direct input when you're talking . 1049 00:40:00,209 --> 00:40:03,449 About being able to uh integrate with 1050 00:40:03,449 --> 00:40:05,449 services , do you have input on the 1051 00:40:05,449 --> 00:40:08,530 training and um equipping them for the 1052 00:40:08,530 --> 00:40:11,050 Indo-Pacific ? Certainly on our SOF 1053 00:40:11,050 --> 00:40:13,106 forces I do . I have , I have direct 1054 00:40:13,106 --> 00:40:14,606 responsibility , statutory 1055 00:40:14,606 --> 00:40:16,828 responsibility to ensure that our , our 1056 00:40:16,828 --> 00:40:19,050 SOF members are trained and adequate to 1057 00:40:19,050 --> 00:40:21,217 the missions that they'll be presented 1058 00:40:21,217 --> 00:40:23,494 with , to integrate with services , uh , 1059 00:40:23,494 --> 00:40:25,606 well , to do our missions and part of 1060 00:40:25,606 --> 00:40:27,661 our mission is to integrate with the 1061 00:40:27,661 --> 00:40:29,939 service . So yes , OK , thank you . Um , 1062 00:40:30,110 --> 00:40:33,449 we've seen our adversaries increasingly , 1063 00:40:33,510 --> 00:40:36,489 uh , coordinate , especially on malign 1064 00:40:36,489 --> 00:40:40,189 activity . So how is , how is SOCOM 1065 00:40:40,189 --> 00:40:42,469 working to strengthen relationships 1066 00:40:42,469 --> 00:40:44,636 with our allies and our partners which 1067 00:40:44,636 --> 00:40:47,110 you talked about earlier , but both in 1068 00:40:47,110 --> 00:40:49,590 terms of building up , uh , first of 1069 00:40:49,590 --> 00:40:51,757 all , our capabilities with them , but 1070 00:40:51,757 --> 00:40:54,590 also their own capabilities and when 1071 00:40:54,590 --> 00:40:57,100 you work on those combined , uh , 1072 00:40:57,110 --> 00:41:00,050 training exercises . Senator , the , uh , 1073 00:41:00,169 --> 00:41:02,280 of course , the first level in , in a 1074 00:41:02,280 --> 00:41:04,558 relationship is trust . The first , uh , 1075 00:41:04,558 --> 00:41:06,780 the most basic essence , and that trust 1076 00:41:06,780 --> 00:41:08,669 comes from credibility . Um , our 1077 00:41:08,669 --> 00:41:10,836 relationships over generations help us 1078 00:41:10,836 --> 00:41:12,947 to give that credibility , bring that 1079 00:41:12,947 --> 00:41:15,129 credibility and that trust . Um , I 1080 00:41:15,129 --> 00:41:17,462 might pick just one as an example , the , 1081 00:41:17,462 --> 00:41:19,740 the country of the Philippines , where , 1082 00:41:19,740 --> 00:41:22,073 um , for 100 years , over 100 years now , 1083 00:41:22,073 --> 00:41:24,296 we've had an institutional relationship 1084 00:41:24,296 --> 00:41:26,296 as a , as a nation . But just since 1085 00:41:26,296 --> 00:41:28,909 2016 and our partnership on island to 1086 00:41:28,909 --> 00:41:31,750 help the Philippine Armed Forces clear 1087 00:41:31,750 --> 00:41:33,806 Marawi , uh , one of their principal 1088 00:41:33,806 --> 00:41:36,389 cities , of the threat from ISIS has 1089 00:41:36,389 --> 00:41:38,870 given us great ability to stretch 1090 00:41:38,870 --> 00:41:40,592 across turbulent political and 1091 00:41:40,592 --> 00:41:43,310 diplomatic times to today where we are 1092 00:41:43,310 --> 00:41:45,469 able to use that credibility , help 1093 00:41:45,469 --> 00:41:47,469 them see and share information with 1094 00:41:47,469 --> 00:41:50,050 them through some new relationship 1095 00:41:50,050 --> 00:41:52,695 dynamics . To understand the threats to 1096 00:41:52,695 --> 00:41:54,806 their sovereign territory and so that 1097 00:41:54,806 --> 00:41:56,639 that sharing of information is a 1098 00:41:56,639 --> 00:41:58,751 critical aspect to allow them to take 1099 00:41:58,751 --> 00:42:01,495 action uh for their own problems in the 1100 00:42:01,495 --> 00:42:03,662 information in the competition space . 1101 00:42:03,662 --> 00:42:05,975 I'm , I'm sure you've um had a number 1102 00:42:05,975 --> 00:42:07,745 of opportunities there in the 1103 00:42:07,745 --> 00:42:10,614 Indo-Pacific to work on having that 1104 00:42:10,614 --> 00:42:12,935 greater , uh , collaboration with our 1105 00:42:12,935 --> 00:42:15,665 partner forces . I was , um , 1106 00:42:16,135 --> 00:42:19,260 interested . In your view on the 1107 00:42:19,260 --> 00:42:22,580 exercises that took place uh with cold 1108 00:42:22,580 --> 00:42:25,860 response 26 , you know , looking at 1109 00:42:25,860 --> 00:42:28,260 Norway and Finland , an entirely 1110 00:42:28,260 --> 00:42:31,020 different environment , I'd say . Yes , 1111 00:42:31,139 --> 00:42:33,139 ma'am . I , I'll , I'll , uh , I'll 1112 00:42:33,139 --> 00:42:35,361 speak uh more generally and I , I don't 1113 00:42:35,361 --> 00:42:37,528 want to get ahead of , uh , of my good 1114 00:42:37,528 --> 00:42:39,583 friend General Grikovich there who , 1115 00:42:39,583 --> 00:42:41,750 who of course oversees those , but But 1116 00:42:41,750 --> 00:42:43,417 from a soft perspective , our 1117 00:42:43,417 --> 00:42:45,528 partnership with our Scandinavian and 1118 00:42:45,528 --> 00:42:47,472 European and NATO allies has , has 1119 00:42:47,472 --> 00:42:49,695 always been critical . Um , of course , 1120 00:42:49,695 --> 00:42:51,861 for the last 25 years , a lot of focus 1121 00:42:51,861 --> 00:42:54,083 for us in the Middle East , not as many 1122 00:42:54,083 --> 00:42:56,195 snow-capped mountains to , to work in 1123 00:42:56,195 --> 00:42:58,361 as in the , as in the high north . And 1124 00:42:58,361 --> 00:43:00,370 so as we re-enter into that area , 1125 00:43:00,419 --> 00:43:02,260 working . With our Scandinavian 1126 00:43:02,260 --> 00:43:04,482 partners has brought an awful lot of uh 1127 00:43:04,482 --> 00:43:07,580 uh reprisal of old skills back and so 1128 00:43:07,580 --> 00:43:09,580 we're , we're deepening those and I 1129 00:43:09,580 --> 00:43:11,780 think that partnership not just in the 1130 00:43:11,780 --> 00:43:13,820 uh on the land but in the maritime 1131 00:43:13,820 --> 00:43:16,370 domain is a critical component to what 1132 00:43:16,370 --> 00:43:18,899 uh we will offer to NATO for future 1133 00:43:18,899 --> 00:43:21,010 deterrence . Good to hear , um , Ms . 1134 00:43:21,060 --> 00:43:24,679 Sutton , how will Cybercom 2.0 1135 00:43:24,679 --> 00:43:27,459 enable the department to better adapt 1136 00:43:27,459 --> 00:43:30,189 to the evolving . Uh , technological 1137 00:43:30,189 --> 00:43:33,010 landscape , uh , when we look at AI , 1138 00:43:33,409 --> 00:43:35,570 that's kind of what the question is 1139 00:43:35,570 --> 00:43:37,626 that , uh , Senator Reid , I think , 1140 00:43:37,626 --> 00:43:40,330 was going to send you . So as 1141 00:43:40,330 --> 00:43:42,219 technology continues to move at a 1142 00:43:42,219 --> 00:43:44,163 tremendous speed , one of the gaps 1143 00:43:44,163 --> 00:43:45,997 we're seeing in the force is the 1144 00:43:45,997 --> 00:43:48,163 ability to get our force after they've 1145 00:43:48,163 --> 00:43:50,052 made it through the service basic 1146 00:43:50,052 --> 00:43:52,163 training to have . Training available 1147 00:43:52,163 --> 00:43:54,386 at the speed of need to address some of 1148 00:43:54,386 --> 00:43:56,659 these technologies . So , for example , 1149 00:43:56,879 --> 00:43:59,101 um , someone might have made it through 1150 00:43:59,101 --> 00:44:00,935 their basic training . How do we 1151 00:44:00,935 --> 00:44:03,268 provide training for them on cloud , AI , 1152 00:44:03,280 --> 00:44:05,919 on scata systems , other specialized 1153 00:44:05,919 --> 00:44:08,100 things we're gonna need . One of the 1154 00:44:08,149 --> 00:44:10,320 enablers of Cyber Command 2.0 is 1155 00:44:10,320 --> 00:44:12,487 creation of an advanced cyber training 1156 00:44:12,487 --> 00:44:14,598 and education . Center , which is not 1157 00:44:14,598 --> 00:44:16,320 going to be a brick and mortar 1158 00:44:16,320 --> 00:44:18,542 institution that builds courses sort of 1159 00:44:18,542 --> 00:44:20,709 the traditional way , but it's looking 1160 00:44:20,709 --> 00:44:22,487 at how we leverage industry and 1161 00:44:22,487 --> 00:44:24,709 academia to have training available for 1162 00:44:24,709 --> 00:44:26,820 our active force to be able to get at 1163 00:44:26,820 --> 00:44:29,010 closing those skill gaps as technology 1164 00:44:29,330 --> 00:44:31,219 continues to move quickly . Let's 1165 00:44:31,219 --> 00:44:33,386 leverage the training that's available 1166 00:44:33,386 --> 00:44:35,608 in industry that's moving at that speed 1167 00:44:35,608 --> 00:44:37,774 as well . Uh , thank you . I will have 1168 00:44:37,774 --> 00:44:39,719 a question for General Red for the 1169 00:44:39,719 --> 00:44:42,469 record , uh , when we look at CyberCon . 1170 00:44:42,879 --> 00:44:45,389 Uh , 2.0 and specifically for the 1171 00:44:45,389 --> 00:44:48,219 Indo-Pacific . Thank you . Thank you , 1172 00:44:48,550 --> 00:44:50,661 Senator Fisher , Senator Blumenthal . 1173 00:44:53,500 --> 00:44:55,722 Thank you , Senator Wicker . Uh , thank 1174 00:44:55,722 --> 00:44:57,944 you all for being here and again , as I 1175 00:44:57,944 --> 00:45:00,111 expressed this morning , thank you all 1176 00:45:00,111 --> 00:45:02,389 for your service in our closed session , 1177 00:45:02,419 --> 00:45:04,750 we discussed A number of the questions 1178 00:45:04,750 --> 00:45:08,479 I'd like to raise now . First , um , I 1179 00:45:08,479 --> 00:45:10,620 think our cooperation with Ukraine is 1180 00:45:10,620 --> 00:45:12,787 tremendously important . I'm regretful 1181 00:45:12,787 --> 00:45:14,919 that We are 1182 00:45:16,669 --> 00:45:19,949 In my view , failing to provide all of 1183 00:45:19,949 --> 00:45:22,171 the support that we should militarily . 1184 00:45:22,830 --> 00:45:26,479 Um , I am working hard on a Russian 1185 00:45:26,639 --> 00:45:29,739 sanctions bill that I hope will help 1186 00:45:29,739 --> 00:45:33,439 economically stop the flow of 1187 00:45:33,439 --> 00:45:35,800 revenue to Putin's war machine from 1188 00:45:35,800 --> 00:45:39,429 purchasers of Russian oil and gas . And 1189 00:45:39,429 --> 00:45:42,149 intelligence sharing has been 1190 00:45:42,149 --> 00:45:45,159 tremendously important to Ukraine in 1191 00:45:46,270 --> 00:45:48,290 Pushing back , and I think . 1192 00:45:49,659 --> 00:45:53,060 Impressively on Russia's assault , the 1193 00:45:53,060 --> 00:45:55,338 false narrative that Russia is winning , 1194 00:45:55,338 --> 00:45:58,439 I've tried to counter based on my 1195 00:46:00,439 --> 00:46:02,959 Trips to Ukraine , 10 in all , uh , 1196 00:46:03,040 --> 00:46:05,939 most recently in February , where I saw 1197 00:46:06,159 --> 00:46:08,159 really the progress that Ukraine is 1198 00:46:08,159 --> 00:46:10,260 making contrary to some of the 1199 00:46:11,080 --> 00:46:13,080 propaganda that Russia is spreading 1200 00:46:13,080 --> 00:46:16,469 about how they are winning . But I'd 1201 00:46:16,469 --> 00:46:19,550 like to ask this panel , maybe 1202 00:46:19,550 --> 00:46:22,340 beginning with General Rudd . Um , 1203 00:46:23,030 --> 00:46:25,629 Whether our intelligence sharing is 1204 00:46:25,629 --> 00:46:28,610 continuing in a robust way as it has 1205 00:46:28,610 --> 00:46:32,219 been in the past , which I I think it 1206 00:46:32,219 --> 00:46:34,386 has been tremendously important to the 1207 00:46:34,386 --> 00:46:36,663 extent you can comment in this setting . 1208 00:46:37,580 --> 00:46:40,360 Uh , thanks , Senator Blumenthal . Um , 1209 00:46:40,489 --> 00:46:43,010 as we discussed previously , the , uh , 1210 00:46:43,219 --> 00:46:47,189 the focus and attention , um , On a 1211 00:46:47,189 --> 00:46:50,070 variety of priorities and , and efforts 1212 00:46:50,070 --> 00:46:53,889 is remains steady . We move 1213 00:46:54,229 --> 00:46:57,370 in an agile manner to Various 1214 00:46:57,790 --> 00:47:00,790 crisis and or efforts , but we maintain 1215 00:47:00,790 --> 00:47:03,469 focus and pressure on that . And so our 1216 00:47:03,469 --> 00:47:05,739 support through European command from 1217 00:47:05,739 --> 00:47:07,906 an intelligence perspective in support 1218 00:47:07,906 --> 00:47:10,790 of that effort remains intact . We're 1219 00:47:10,790 --> 00:47:12,846 looking consistently and making sure 1220 00:47:12,846 --> 00:47:14,901 that we have the right resources and 1221 00:47:14,901 --> 00:47:16,957 folks focused on that , working very 1222 00:47:16,957 --> 00:47:19,234 closely with General Grikovich on that . 1223 00:47:19,234 --> 00:47:22,590 I hope that . Our military command . 1224 00:47:23,800 --> 00:47:26,159 will let us know if there's any change 1225 00:47:26,159 --> 00:47:29,489 in . That approach and policy because I 1226 00:47:29,489 --> 00:47:31,656 think that the American people deserve 1227 00:47:31,656 --> 00:47:34,330 to know if there is a reduction or 1228 00:47:34,330 --> 00:47:36,689 diminution in our intelligence 1229 00:47:36,689 --> 00:47:40,419 commitment . Um General 1230 00:47:40,419 --> 00:47:42,363 Bradley , uh , I'm sorry , Admiral 1231 00:47:42,363 --> 00:47:45,120 Bradley , uh , if you could tell us . 1232 00:47:46,560 --> 00:47:48,616 A bit about the lessons learned from 1233 00:47:48,616 --> 00:47:52,060 Ukraine . Senator , absolutely . Uh , 1234 00:47:52,229 --> 00:47:54,229 first , uh , to answer the original 1235 00:47:54,229 --> 00:47:56,507 question and maybe bridge to that , um , 1236 00:47:56,507 --> 00:47:58,396 one of the things that I think we 1237 00:47:58,396 --> 00:48:00,396 provide through those relationships 1238 00:48:00,396 --> 00:48:02,618 longstanding is the venue for others to 1239 00:48:02,618 --> 00:48:04,540 partner and to bring capacity and 1240 00:48:04,540 --> 00:48:06,620 capability . And so one of our SOF 1241 00:48:06,620 --> 00:48:09,209 headquarters there , AIA sort of , uh , 1242 00:48:09,219 --> 00:48:11,441 offers the opportunity for 19 different 1243 00:48:11,441 --> 00:48:13,552 nations to partner to come to support 1244 00:48:13,552 --> 00:48:15,775 the , uh , the effort across the area . 1245 00:48:15,775 --> 00:48:17,775 And I , and I think that's critical 1246 00:48:17,775 --> 00:48:19,830 because it is not just about what we 1247 00:48:19,830 --> 00:48:21,941 bring , but it's about enabling those 1248 00:48:21,941 --> 00:48:23,997 partners to really share more of the 1249 00:48:23,997 --> 00:48:23,585 burden , to be able to provide 1250 00:48:23,585 --> 00:48:25,752 assistance to the Ukrainians as well . 1251 00:48:25,785 --> 00:48:27,785 Ultimately though , I think to your 1252 00:48:27,785 --> 00:48:30,007 point about lessons learned , if I look 1253 00:48:30,007 --> 00:48:31,729 back over the last 25 years of 1254 00:48:31,729 --> 00:48:33,785 counterterrorism targeting where our 1255 00:48:33,785 --> 00:48:36,063 integrated interagency law enforcement , 1256 00:48:36,063 --> 00:48:38,063 intel community , and military were 1257 00:48:38,063 --> 00:48:40,229 able to bring great precision . To our 1258 00:48:40,229 --> 00:48:42,452 understanding of both the adversary but 1259 00:48:42,452 --> 00:48:44,674 also the context around the adversary , 1260 00:48:44,674 --> 00:48:47,007 the civilians that were not adversaries , 1261 00:48:47,007 --> 00:48:49,063 that has been very important . Those 1262 00:48:49,063 --> 00:48:50,912 lessons have translated very 1263 00:48:50,912 --> 00:48:53,392 importantly into the high-end conflict 1264 00:48:53,392 --> 00:48:55,670 of the Ukraine battlefield . And so we , 1265 00:48:55,670 --> 00:48:57,725 we continue to apply those lessons , 1266 00:48:57,725 --> 00:49:00,003 refine them with new information , and , 1267 00:49:00,003 --> 00:49:02,170 and frankly we learn from them as well 1268 00:49:02,170 --> 00:49:04,503 as we do in part to our teammates there . 1269 00:49:04,669 --> 00:49:07,750 When I've visited Ukraine , uh , often 1270 00:49:07,750 --> 00:49:09,949 I've gone to the drone manufacturing . 1271 00:49:11,020 --> 00:49:12,742 Facilities which have grown in 1272 00:49:12,742 --> 00:49:15,159 sophistication and number . They're 1273 00:49:15,489 --> 00:49:17,711 producing , I think , 1000 drones a day 1274 00:49:17,711 --> 00:49:20,050 now . And what has so impressed me is 1275 00:49:20,050 --> 00:49:22,889 they change . They work on . The 1276 00:49:22,889 --> 00:49:24,722 evolution of their drones on the 1277 00:49:24,722 --> 00:49:26,929 assembly line . They'll get real-time 1278 00:49:26,929 --> 00:49:28,985 information from the battlefield and 1279 00:49:28,985 --> 00:49:31,207 they'll make adjustments , literally as 1280 00:49:31,207 --> 00:49:34,129 they are manufacturing and uh I don't 1281 00:49:34,129 --> 00:49:37,709 know anything . In our industrial base 1282 00:49:37,709 --> 00:49:40,370 that is as nimble and agile and quick . 1283 00:49:41,090 --> 00:49:44,840 Um I I hope 1284 00:49:44,840 --> 00:49:47,340 this panel agrees that we need to move 1285 00:49:47,340 --> 00:49:49,284 more in that direction . Would you 1286 00:49:49,284 --> 00:49:51,118 agree , Admiral Senator , I do . 1287 00:49:51,118 --> 00:49:53,173 Although I will say that many of our 1288 00:49:53,173 --> 00:49:55,396 business , our defense industrial based 1289 00:49:55,396 --> 00:49:57,451 partners are watching this as well . 1290 00:49:57,451 --> 00:49:59,673 And of course the Ukrainians are driven 1291 00:49:59,673 --> 00:50:01,840 by the existential need for that cycle 1292 00:50:01,840 --> 00:50:03,896 of adaptation . As we watch that , I 1293 00:50:03,896 --> 00:50:05,618 have great confidence that our 1294 00:50:05,618 --> 00:50:07,784 industrial base here can do the same . 1295 00:50:07,784 --> 00:50:09,840 Thank you . Thanks , Mr . Chairman . 1296 00:50:09,840 --> 00:50:11,507 Thank you very much , Senator 1297 00:50:11,507 --> 00:50:13,729 Blumenthal . Senator Budd . Thank you , 1298 00:50:13,729 --> 00:50:15,784 Chairman . Good to see each of you . 1299 00:50:15,784 --> 00:50:17,784 Thank you all for being here . Uh , 1300 00:50:17,784 --> 00:50:17,520 Admiral Bradley , I want to talk about 1301 00:50:17,520 --> 00:50:19,800 SOCOM's operation maintenance budget , 1302 00:50:19,840 --> 00:50:22,229 if you will . So I noticed that O&M has 1303 00:50:22,229 --> 00:50:26,120 only increased from 9.4 billion to 1304 00:50:26,120 --> 00:50:29,600 10.9 billion between 2019 and 20207 . 1305 00:50:30,189 --> 00:50:32,620 Um , so it , it's failing to keep pace 1306 00:50:32,620 --> 00:50:34,731 with inflation and more importantly , 1307 00:50:34,731 --> 00:50:36,953 the increase in the operational tempo . 1308 00:50:37,040 --> 00:50:39,040 So can you talk about what you'd be 1309 00:50:39,040 --> 00:50:41,639 able to do with a higher top line and 1310 00:50:41,639 --> 00:50:43,583 some of the trade-offs that you're 1311 00:50:43,583 --> 00:50:46,540 currently making between O&M as it is 1312 00:50:46,800 --> 00:50:49,439 and modernization and also Milon . 1313 00:50:50,709 --> 00:50:52,370 Senator , I , I will , um , 1314 00:50:52,550 --> 00:50:55,590 specifically to ONM in , in , uh , in 1315 00:50:55,590 --> 00:50:58,320 unique ways , uh , Special Operations 1316 00:50:58,320 --> 00:51:00,820 Command uses our ops and maintenance 1317 00:51:00,820 --> 00:51:03,229 budget for our key modernization 1318 00:51:03,229 --> 00:51:05,590 efforts , uh , in most cases to be able 1319 00:51:05,590 --> 00:51:08,090 to we modernize just not just through 1320 00:51:08,389 --> 00:51:10,611 the development of new means , articles 1321 00:51:10,611 --> 00:51:13,260 and , and uh . And devices , but also 1322 00:51:13,260 --> 00:51:16,000 the ways in which those means are used 1323 00:51:16,179 --> 00:51:19,209 that requires more exquisite ranges 1324 00:51:19,209 --> 00:51:21,431 that have the ability for us to be able 1325 00:51:21,431 --> 00:51:23,542 to practice , train , and rehearse in 1326 00:51:23,542 --> 00:51:25,739 increasingly contested electromagnetic 1327 00:51:25,739 --> 00:51:27,628 spectrum environments . Those are 1328 00:51:27,628 --> 00:51:29,795 difficult to be able to produce inside 1329 00:51:29,795 --> 00:51:32,017 the United States but not undoable . It 1330 00:51:32,017 --> 00:51:34,072 just takes more money . We also need 1331 00:51:34,072 --> 00:51:36,072 threat representative systems to be 1332 00:51:36,072 --> 00:51:38,183 able to operate against , again , and 1333 00:51:38,183 --> 00:51:40,540 operators to mimic our adversaries as 1334 00:51:40,540 --> 00:51:42,989 they operate them . All of that takes 1335 00:51:42,989 --> 00:51:45,379 new ranges and money and for the 1336 00:51:45,379 --> 00:51:47,379 employment of autonomy , as Senator 1337 00:51:47,379 --> 00:51:49,790 Blumenthal was . Discussing , we have 1338 00:51:49,790 --> 00:51:51,623 to be able to bring together our 1339 00:51:51,623 --> 00:51:54,270 standard exquisite weapons systems now 1340 00:51:54,270 --> 00:51:56,548 with teamed and collaborative autonomy , 1341 00:51:56,548 --> 00:51:58,603 and there are very few places inside 1342 00:51:58,603 --> 00:52:00,826 the United States where that is an easy 1343 00:52:00,826 --> 00:52:02,937 thing to do . In many places where it 1344 00:52:02,937 --> 00:52:05,048 needs to be done , and we are working 1345 00:52:05,048 --> 00:52:07,214 to do that . Thank you for that . Um , 1346 00:52:07,214 --> 00:52:09,214 a question , uh , for you , Admiral 1347 00:52:09,214 --> 00:52:11,437 Bradley , and also Secretary Anderson . 1348 00:52:11,437 --> 00:52:13,548 Um , I'd like your thoughts on how we 1349 00:52:13,548 --> 00:52:13,449 retain mid-career operators , if you 1350 00:52:13,449 --> 00:52:15,505 will . You know , I know , um , each 1351 00:52:15,505 --> 00:52:17,838 service drives their own bonus programs , 1352 00:52:17,838 --> 00:52:20,060 and I acknowledge that money is not the 1353 00:52:20,060 --> 00:52:22,282 only reason why folks stay or go . Um , 1354 00:52:22,282 --> 00:52:24,282 but so tell us what you're doing to 1355 00:52:24,282 --> 00:52:26,616 help retain our most seasoned operators , 1356 00:52:26,616 --> 00:52:28,671 whether it's through non-monetary or 1357 00:52:28,671 --> 00:52:30,782 monetary . Secretary Anderson , we'll 1358 00:52:30,782 --> 00:52:30,550 start with you and then , uh , Admiral 1359 00:52:30,550 --> 00:52:32,979 Bradley , please . Yes , Senator , um , 1360 00:52:33,280 --> 00:52:35,502 one of the things I noticed , uh , when 1361 00:52:35,502 --> 00:52:37,724 I was over in the Army was , you know , 1362 00:52:37,724 --> 00:52:37,709 you just can't throw money at the 1363 00:52:37,709 --> 00:52:39,876 problem all the time , right ? Whether 1364 00:52:39,876 --> 00:52:41,598 it be retention bonuses , that 1365 00:52:41,598 --> 00:52:41,370 certainly is helpful , but we've seen 1366 00:52:41,370 --> 00:52:43,481 things in the Army where , you know , 1367 00:52:43,481 --> 00:52:45,537 change of duty location , uh , those 1368 00:52:45,537 --> 00:52:47,259 small things are what keep our 1369 00:52:47,259 --> 00:52:49,481 individuals in . But what I would argue 1370 00:52:49,481 --> 00:52:51,592 within the SOCOM community that we do 1371 00:52:51,592 --> 00:52:53,759 incredibly well is our preservation of 1372 00:52:53,759 --> 00:52:56,037 the force and family . Uh , which , um , 1373 00:52:56,037 --> 00:52:57,814 uh , Congress has , has been so 1374 00:52:57,814 --> 00:52:59,981 gracious to give us that $11 million . 1375 00:52:59,981 --> 00:53:01,981 Now granted , we're going to see an 1376 00:53:01,981 --> 00:53:01,909 increase , uh , in the workforce on 1377 00:53:01,909 --> 00:53:04,020 that . Um , but what I would tell you 1378 00:53:04,020 --> 00:53:06,076 is when we look at the , the service 1379 00:53:06,076 --> 00:53:08,131 member and when they're making those 1380 00:53:08,131 --> 00:53:10,131 decisions to stay in the military , 1381 00:53:10,131 --> 00:53:12,131 it's typically not done in the team 1382 00:53:12,131 --> 00:53:14,353 room , it's not done at the pool , it's 1383 00:53:14,353 --> 00:53:13,469 not done wherever , it's usually done 1384 00:53:13,469 --> 00:53:15,136 at the kitchen table . So the 1385 00:53:15,136 --> 00:53:17,191 preservation of the force and family 1386 00:53:17,191 --> 00:53:19,358 has been an absolutely amazing program 1387 00:53:19,358 --> 00:53:21,580 where we're not only taking care of our 1388 00:53:21,580 --> 00:53:23,747 operators from a physical standpoint , 1389 00:53:23,747 --> 00:53:25,747 but from a mental standpoint . Uh , 1390 00:53:25,747 --> 00:53:27,913 you'll hear Admiral Bradley talk about 1391 00:53:27,913 --> 00:53:30,025 the mind gym . That we , that we have 1392 00:53:30,025 --> 00:53:32,191 our service members where if you see a 1393 00:53:32,191 --> 00:53:34,302 professional athlete when they go out 1394 00:53:34,302 --> 00:53:36,469 to the , to the top tiers , uh , yes , 1395 00:53:36,469 --> 00:53:38,525 their physical body is absolutely in 1396 00:53:39,105 --> 00:53:41,327 great shape , but their minds also have 1397 00:53:41,327 --> 00:53:43,327 to be pristine and so whether it be 1398 00:53:43,327 --> 00:53:45,825 family , uh , family outings where we 1399 00:53:45,825 --> 00:53:47,769 can take individuals and have them 1400 00:53:47,769 --> 00:53:49,881 speak with folks to help their family 1401 00:53:49,881 --> 00:53:51,906 out , but that , but that um PTIF 1402 00:53:51,906 --> 00:53:54,073 program , the president . Preservation 1403 00:53:54,073 --> 00:53:56,184 of the force and family is absolutely 1404 00:53:56,184 --> 00:53:55,461 critical when we look at retention , 1405 00:53:55,541 --> 00:53:57,662 Senator . Thanks . Senator , the only 1406 00:53:57,662 --> 00:54:00,021 thing I would add is that , um , as you 1407 00:54:00,021 --> 00:54:02,243 highlighted , pay incentives are a part 1408 00:54:02,243 --> 00:54:04,465 of it , but those are controlled by the 1409 00:54:04,465 --> 00:54:06,410 services and another place where a 1410 00:54:06,410 --> 00:54:08,521 robust and empowered SOIC helps us to 1411 00:54:08,521 --> 00:54:10,521 be able to stitch those together to 1412 00:54:10,521 --> 00:54:12,743 ensure we have a common approach across 1413 00:54:12,743 --> 00:54:14,521 all the services for all of our 1414 00:54:14,521 --> 00:54:16,743 operators and enablers . Very helpful . 1415 00:54:16,743 --> 00:54:18,854 Thank you both . Secretary Anderson , 1416 00:54:18,854 --> 00:54:20,521 I'm a strong supporter of the 1417 00:54:20,521 --> 00:54:23,360 U.S.Israel counter UXS program . Um , I 1418 00:54:23,360 --> 00:54:25,416 think that's in your office . So can 1419 00:54:25,416 --> 00:54:27,527 you talk about what your team's doing 1420 00:54:27,527 --> 00:54:29,693 to assist Israel in countering Iranian 1421 00:54:29,693 --> 00:54:31,916 unmanned systems and how these programs 1422 00:54:31,916 --> 00:54:33,804 actually help our own military in 1423 00:54:33,804 --> 00:54:36,919 return ? Uh yes , Senator , uh , so we 1424 00:54:36,919 --> 00:54:38,919 have a unique ability to be able to 1425 00:54:38,919 --> 00:54:40,919 work with countries like Israel and 1426 00:54:40,919 --> 00:54:43,141 there's a few other countries out there 1427 00:54:43,141 --> 00:54:42,810 where we do essentially a fifty-fifty 1428 00:54:42,810 --> 00:54:45,439 burden sharing , uh , investment . Um , 1429 00:54:45,550 --> 00:54:47,989 what we have found incredibly helpful 1430 00:54:47,989 --> 00:54:50,310 is to see some of the , the counter UXS 1431 00:54:50,310 --> 00:54:53,010 that us and Israel have developed 1432 00:54:53,879 --> 00:54:56,790 together that have 100% been applicable 1433 00:54:56,790 --> 00:55:00,149 to operations like Epic Fury . Um , now 1434 00:55:00,149 --> 00:55:02,429 granted , we , we don't always have the 1435 00:55:02,429 --> 00:55:04,540 capability that has the same function 1436 00:55:04,540 --> 00:55:06,373 if that makes sense . So there's 1437 00:55:06,373 --> 00:55:08,429 certainly things that we want to use 1438 00:55:08,429 --> 00:55:10,485 the capability for that the Israelis 1439 00:55:10,485 --> 00:55:12,540 want to use the capability for , but 1440 00:55:12,540 --> 00:55:15,020 it's been 100% an absolute . Uh , great 1441 00:55:15,020 --> 00:55:17,020 partnership with the Israelis to be 1442 00:55:17,020 --> 00:55:18,742 able to , uh , not only on the 1443 00:55:18,742 --> 00:55:20,576 counterUXS front but a few other 1444 00:55:20,576 --> 00:55:22,798 different areas that we've been able to 1445 00:55:22,798 --> 00:55:25,020 work with the Israelis . Very helpful . 1446 00:55:25,020 --> 00:55:27,131 Thank you all . Thank you very much , 1447 00:55:27,131 --> 00:55:29,242 Senator Budd . Senator Hirono , thank 1448 00:55:29,242 --> 00:55:31,298 you , Mr . Chairman . General Rudd , 1449 00:55:31,298 --> 00:55:33,610 you know , in previous elections as 1450 00:55:33,610 --> 00:55:37,159 part of the election . Security Group 1451 00:55:37,159 --> 00:55:40,139 ESG , uh , both CyberCom 1452 00:55:40,860 --> 00:55:42,820 and NSA played a vital role in 1453 00:55:42,820 --> 00:55:45,110 protecting our democratic processes 1454 00:55:45,110 --> 00:55:47,332 from foreign interference , and I , and 1455 00:55:47,332 --> 00:55:50,050 I , I assume you share my concern that , 1456 00:55:50,060 --> 00:55:52,171 uh , there is a potential for foreign 1457 00:55:52,171 --> 00:55:54,449 interference in our upcoming elections . 1458 00:55:54,820 --> 00:55:58,219 And so . I'd like to ask if uh you , 1459 00:55:58,300 --> 00:56:00,633 you have already set up or you're gonna , 1460 00:56:00,633 --> 00:56:04,179 you're planning to set up uh the ESG to 1461 00:56:04,179 --> 00:56:05,957 ensure that there is no foreign 1462 00:56:05,957 --> 00:56:08,235 interference in our upcoming elections . 1463 00:56:10,550 --> 00:56:12,717 Senator , we , we certainly share your 1464 00:56:12,717 --> 00:56:14,939 concern , and we're always looking , as 1465 00:56:14,939 --> 00:56:17,179 you would expect us to , for any type 1466 00:56:17,179 --> 00:56:18,901 of foreign activity that would 1467 00:56:18,901 --> 00:56:21,790 undermine our democratic process . And 1468 00:56:21,790 --> 00:56:23,699 as we discussed , we are , we are 1469 00:56:23,699 --> 00:56:26,179 postured and ready to support as 1470 00:56:26,179 --> 00:56:28,370 required or tasked in making sure that 1471 00:56:28,370 --> 00:56:30,537 we safeguard our elections . Well , do 1472 00:56:30,537 --> 00:56:33,489 you have an ESG set up ? For this 1473 00:56:33,489 --> 00:56:36,770 purpose . Yeah , Senator , I don't , I 1474 00:56:36,770 --> 00:56:38,548 don't know that an ESG has been 1475 00:56:38,548 --> 00:56:40,929 established yet , but we are prepared 1476 00:56:40,929 --> 00:56:43,850 to as , as required . Well , we used to 1477 00:56:43,850 --> 00:56:46,610 have , uh , ESG , and I , I think you 1478 00:56:46,610 --> 00:56:48,570 can understand why I'm concerned 1479 00:56:48,570 --> 00:56:50,403 because there's no reason not to 1480 00:56:50,403 --> 00:56:52,959 anticipate foreign interference in our 1481 00:56:52,959 --> 00:56:54,959 elections , i.e. , Russia , China , 1482 00:56:54,959 --> 00:56:57,237 possibly Iran , although they're being , 1483 00:56:57,237 --> 00:56:59,126 uh , maybe they have other , uh , 1484 00:56:59,126 --> 00:57:02,110 things to deal with . But , um , do you , 1485 00:57:02,459 --> 00:57:05,000 do you anticipate ? Foreign 1486 00:57:05,000 --> 00:57:06,989 interference with our upcoming 1487 00:57:06,989 --> 00:57:10,929 elections . Senator , I 1488 00:57:10,929 --> 00:57:13,129 think it's , it's reasonable to expect 1489 00:57:13,129 --> 00:57:15,296 based on what we've seen in the past , 1490 00:57:15,296 --> 00:57:17,351 uh , and so I , I think it is really 1491 00:57:17,351 --> 00:57:19,518 important to , uh , to set up an ESG , 1492 00:57:19,518 --> 00:57:21,351 and I will follow up with you on 1493 00:57:21,351 --> 00:57:23,407 whether that is happening . And will 1494 00:57:23,407 --> 00:57:25,407 you commit to jealousy guarding our 1495 00:57:25,407 --> 00:57:27,570 elections this year and , uh , report 1496 00:57:27,570 --> 00:57:30,770 to Congress any attempts by , um . 1497 00:57:31,889 --> 00:57:34,989 By this uh administration to polarize 1498 00:57:35,330 --> 00:57:39,300 the process . Senator , we , 1499 00:57:39,510 --> 00:57:43,250 we will certainly execute . Uh , 1500 00:57:43,429 --> 00:57:45,750 what we're tasked to in , in regards to 1501 00:57:45,750 --> 00:57:48,270 that , yeah , I realize that , that uh 1502 00:57:48,270 --> 00:57:50,270 you have a responsibility regarding 1503 00:57:50,270 --> 00:57:52,603 foreign interference with our elections , 1504 00:57:52,603 --> 00:57:54,810 but there is , uh , definitely . Uh , 1505 00:57:54,830 --> 00:57:57,340 efforts , uh , to , um , uh , 1506 00:57:57,389 --> 00:57:59,469 domestically interfere with our 1507 00:57:59,469 --> 00:58:01,358 elections by , for example , uh , 1508 00:58:01,358 --> 00:58:03,525 having the former attorney general sue 1509 00:58:03,525 --> 00:58:05,636 29 states for voter rolls . These are 1510 00:58:05,636 --> 00:58:07,858 millions of people's information . What 1511 00:58:07,858 --> 00:58:09,969 does , uh , the Department of Justice 1512 00:58:09,969 --> 00:58:11,850 need with these , uh , with this 1513 00:58:11,850 --> 00:58:14,072 information ? What do they intend to do 1514 00:58:14,072 --> 00:58:16,406 and not to mention . The desire to , to , 1515 00:58:16,406 --> 00:58:18,419 uh , push for the passage of the 1516 00:58:18,419 --> 00:58:20,719 so-called SAV Act , which will result 1517 00:58:20,719 --> 00:58:22,941 in millions of people who are currently 1518 00:58:22,941 --> 00:58:25,163 registered to vote , unable to register 1519 00:58:25,163 --> 00:58:27,330 to vote because they don't have either 1520 00:58:27,330 --> 00:58:30,060 a birth certificate or , um , a 1521 00:58:30,060 --> 00:58:32,219 passport . So there are things 1522 00:58:32,219 --> 00:58:34,330 happening on the domestic front , and 1523 00:58:34,330 --> 00:58:36,330 that's why , uh , uh , you know , I 1524 00:58:36,330 --> 00:58:38,441 have some serious concerns . Uh , for 1525 00:58:38,441 --> 00:58:40,679 Admiral Bradley . Uh , one or so 1526 00:58:40,679 --> 00:58:42,957 SOCOM's enduring competitive advantage , 1527 00:58:42,957 --> 00:58:44,679 and you mentioned that the how 1528 00:58:44,679 --> 00:58:46,623 important our allies are , uh , in 1529 00:58:46,623 --> 00:58:48,790 great power competition is its network 1530 00:58:48,790 --> 00:58:50,709 of allies and partners in the 1531 00:58:50,709 --> 00:58:53,350 Indo-Pacific built over decades through 1532 00:58:53,350 --> 00:58:55,979 sustained engagement , training , and 1533 00:58:55,979 --> 00:58:58,959 interoperability . Um , given the 1534 00:58:58,959 --> 00:59:01,419 increased demands for homeland defense 1535 00:59:01,419 --> 00:59:03,760 and allied burden sharing in the new 1536 00:59:03,760 --> 00:59:07,479 NDS , how are you increasing SAF's 1537 00:59:07,479 --> 00:59:10,520 posture and presence in the 1st and 2nd 1538 00:59:10,520 --> 00:59:12,860 island chains to deter Chinese 1539 00:59:12,860 --> 00:59:15,439 aggression and support Admiral Paparo's ? 1540 00:59:17,229 --> 00:59:20,840 Um , denial defense . Senator , thank 1541 00:59:20,840 --> 00:59:22,951 you . Um , as you know , uh , General 1542 00:59:22,951 --> 00:59:25,159 Fenton , um , um , was very strong on 1543 00:59:25,159 --> 00:59:27,326 leading to adjust our posture over the 1544 00:59:27,326 --> 00:59:29,603 last 4 years to be able to , uh , have , 1545 00:59:29,603 --> 00:59:31,548 uh , to empower those generational 1546 00:59:31,548 --> 00:59:33,492 relationships . And thanks to both 1547 00:59:33,492 --> 00:59:35,548 chambers , frankly , but , uh , your 1548 00:59:35,548 --> 00:59:37,548 strong work , we are well resourced 1549 00:59:37,548 --> 00:59:39,603 with , uh , with people in the right 1550 00:59:39,603 --> 00:59:41,770 structure to be able to sustain that , 1551 00:59:41,770 --> 00:59:44,048 uh , that presence and that commitment , 1552 00:59:44,048 --> 00:59:45,881 uh , while we manage the ongoing 1553 00:59:45,881 --> 00:59:48,103 threats to the homeland and the other , 1554 00:59:48,103 --> 00:59:51,320 uh , commitments that we have . Um , OK , 1555 00:59:51,399 --> 00:59:53,566 I'm , I'm glad that , uh , some of you 1556 00:59:53,566 --> 00:59:55,621 already , uh , uh , talked about the 1557 00:59:55,621 --> 00:59:57,621 importance of having the , uh , the 1558 00:59:57,621 --> 00:59:59,677 kind of workforce that is trained to 1559 00:59:59,677 --> 01:00:01,788 deal with the , the needs of the , of 1560 01:00:01,788 --> 01:00:04,070 the , the , uh , cyber domain , and , 1561 01:00:04,080 --> 01:00:07,689 um , um . General Rudd , you mentioned 1562 01:00:07,689 --> 01:00:09,745 that it is really critical to get to 1563 01:00:09,745 --> 01:00:11,856 get the right kind of people . What , 1564 01:00:11,856 --> 01:00:14,022 what are the right kind of people that 1565 01:00:14,022 --> 01:00:16,133 you're hoping to recruit , uh , to be 1566 01:00:16,133 --> 01:00:19,129 trained in the cyber domain ? Yeah , 1567 01:00:19,270 --> 01:00:21,548 thanks , Senator . As you would expect , 1568 01:00:22,010 --> 01:00:24,232 someone who's highly technical minded . 1569 01:00:25,620 --> 01:00:28,840 Smart . Innovative , motivated , 1570 01:00:29,229 --> 01:00:32,120 and is committed to doing something 1571 01:00:32,120 --> 01:00:34,342 extraordinary . Do you have a number of 1572 01:00:34,342 --> 01:00:37,719 goals ? I mean how many thousands of 1573 01:00:37,719 --> 01:00:39,830 people are we gonna need to have this 1574 01:00:39,830 --> 01:00:41,941 kind of training to counter the Milan 1575 01:00:41,941 --> 01:00:43,663 activities of of our near peer 1576 01:00:43,663 --> 01:00:46,919 competitors ? Yes , Senator , I , I 1577 01:00:46,919 --> 01:00:48,939 think we have objectives that are 1578 01:00:49,080 --> 01:00:51,679 outlined within Cybercom 2.0 , but I 1579 01:00:51,679 --> 01:00:53,846 think what , what I owe this committee 1580 01:00:53,846 --> 01:00:56,012 and frankly the nation is a continuous 1581 01:00:56,012 --> 01:00:58,068 assessment to make sure that we have 1582 01:00:58,068 --> 01:01:00,360 the right numbers and to your opening 1583 01:01:00,360 --> 01:01:03,399 point that they're the best , most 1584 01:01:03,399 --> 01:01:05,621 highly qualified talent and that we can 1585 01:01:05,621 --> 01:01:07,510 make sure that we can upgame them 1586 01:01:07,510 --> 01:01:09,677 through training and through the , the 1587 01:01:09,677 --> 01:01:11,843 mechanisms that'll , that'll make this 1588 01:01:11,843 --> 01:01:13,732 enduring . General , if you could 1589 01:01:13,732 --> 01:01:15,899 quantify that on the , on the record , 1590 01:01:15,899 --> 01:01:17,899 um . By supplementing your answer , 1591 01:01:17,899 --> 01:01:19,621 Chairman , I'll , I'll , I , I 1592 01:01:19,621 --> 01:01:21,899 certainly will . Thank you . Thank you , 1593 01:01:21,899 --> 01:01:24,066 Senator Hirono . Senator Scott , thank 1594 01:01:24,066 --> 01:01:23,830 you , Chairman . I want to thank each 1595 01:01:23,830 --> 01:01:25,941 of you for joining us here today . It 1596 01:01:25,941 --> 01:01:28,163 is critical that the US is always ready 1597 01:01:28,163 --> 01:01:30,750 to deter any threats . One big way is 1598 01:01:30,750 --> 01:01:32,917 by working with our allies and partner 1599 01:01:32,917 --> 01:01:34,917 nations to solidify our coordinated 1600 01:01:34,917 --> 01:01:37,028 efforts to ensure security around the 1601 01:01:37,028 --> 01:01:39,139 world . Even in places where we don't 1602 01:01:39,139 --> 01:01:41,361 have our own troops readily stationed . 1603 01:01:41,361 --> 01:01:43,194 Admiral Bradley , how do foreign 1604 01:01:43,194 --> 01:01:45,139 military sales programs enhance US 1605 01:01:45,139 --> 01:01:47,250 military to military relationships in 1606 01:01:47,250 --> 01:01:50,409 the Indo-Pacific and globally ? Senator , 1607 01:01:50,889 --> 01:01:53,080 foreign military sales , direct 1608 01:01:53,080 --> 01:01:55,191 commercial sales , and , and the like 1609 01:01:55,191 --> 01:01:57,979 are all critical to us being able to 1610 01:01:57,979 --> 01:02:01,149 have expectation of interoperability 1611 01:02:01,149 --> 01:02:03,610 and expectation of what our allies and 1612 01:02:03,610 --> 01:02:06,169 partners will be able to perform when 1613 01:02:06,169 --> 01:02:08,649 they act on their own behalf . That in 1614 01:02:08,649 --> 01:02:11,040 turn gives us a much better ability to 1615 01:02:11,040 --> 01:02:12,984 understand . What their weaknesses 1616 01:02:12,984 --> 01:02:15,096 might be or what gaps that might need 1617 01:02:15,096 --> 01:02:17,262 to be filled by US contributions . And 1618 01:02:17,262 --> 01:02:19,318 so as you highlight , even in places 1619 01:02:19,318 --> 01:02:21,429 where we are not present in all times 1620 01:02:21,429 --> 01:02:24,419 or always , knowing what they are using , 1621 01:02:24,580 --> 01:02:26,524 how they're using it gives us that 1622 01:02:26,524 --> 01:02:28,524 extra advantage . So you know their 1623 01:02:28,524 --> 01:02:30,524 capability and you also , if you're 1624 01:02:30,524 --> 01:02:32,747 ever going to work with them , you know 1625 01:02:32,747 --> 01:02:34,858 how you operate with them . Yes sir . 1626 01:02:34,858 --> 01:02:37,310 What risk do we face to access and to 1627 01:02:37,310 --> 01:02:39,532 access and influence if we fail to work 1628 01:02:39,532 --> 01:02:41,421 well with our allies and remain a 1629 01:02:41,421 --> 01:02:43,421 reliable and timely defense partner 1630 01:02:43,421 --> 01:02:45,588 compared to competitors like communist 1631 01:02:45,588 --> 01:02:47,810 China ? Well , Senator , in all cases , 1632 01:02:47,810 --> 01:02:49,977 uh , placement and access is , uh , is 1633 01:02:49,977 --> 01:02:52,729 a corollary to understanding . And so 1634 01:02:52,729 --> 01:02:54,840 being on the ground with those out on 1635 01:02:54,840 --> 01:02:57,370 the edge of the , of the territory to 1636 01:02:57,370 --> 01:02:59,426 be able to appreciate the context of 1637 01:02:59,426 --> 01:03:01,592 what's happening , helps to inform our 1638 01:03:01,592 --> 01:03:03,370 decision making in the rear and 1639 01:03:03,370 --> 01:03:05,537 throughout the chain of command . So , 1640 01:03:05,537 --> 01:03:07,648 uh , I believe that it is fundamental 1641 01:03:07,648 --> 01:03:09,870 to our ability to know not only when we 1642 01:03:09,870 --> 01:03:11,926 should act , but how we should act , 1643 01:03:11,926 --> 01:03:14,148 and that , that is a partnership that . 1644 01:03:14,148 --> 01:03:16,314 We see play out across the world , not 1645 01:03:16,314 --> 01:03:18,648 just in the Indo-Pacific . For instance , 1646 01:03:18,648 --> 01:03:20,915 in Ecuador recently , some really good 1647 01:03:20,915 --> 01:03:23,034 operational results informed by our 1648 01:03:23,034 --> 01:03:25,145 Ecuadorian partners to help us choose 1649 01:03:25,395 --> 01:03:27,875 which and how to target adversaries 1650 01:03:27,875 --> 01:03:30,042 there . But that , of course , is just 1651 01:03:30,042 --> 01:03:32,097 an instance that has been played out 1652 01:03:32,097 --> 01:03:33,986 over the last 25 years across the 1653 01:03:33,986 --> 01:03:36,208 Middle East , Africa , across Europe as 1654 01:03:36,208 --> 01:03:39,064 well , and , and I , and I believe the 1655 01:03:39,064 --> 01:03:42,659 same analog applies globally . Emmiral 1656 01:03:42,659 --> 01:03:44,937 Bradley , Assistant Secretary Anderson , 1657 01:03:44,937 --> 01:03:46,937 how does the forward presence of US 1658 01:03:46,937 --> 01:03:49,159 Special Operations Forces contribute to 1659 01:03:49,159 --> 01:03:51,326 countering communist China's influence 1660 01:03:51,326 --> 01:03:51,300 campaigns , particularly in the 1661 01:03:51,300 --> 01:03:53,356 Indo-Pacific and other key regions , 1662 01:03:53,409 --> 01:03:55,131 and what advantages do Special 1663 01:03:55,131 --> 01:03:57,131 operations forces bring in building 1664 01:03:57,131 --> 01:03:58,798 partner capacity , strengthen 1665 01:03:58,798 --> 01:04:00,409 resilience , and shaping the 1666 01:04:00,409 --> 01:04:02,631 competitive environment below the level 1667 01:04:02,631 --> 01:04:04,742 of armed conflict ? Senator , I might 1668 01:04:04,742 --> 01:04:06,798 start , but just quickly , that same 1669 01:04:06,798 --> 01:04:08,465 placement and access and that 1670 01:04:08,465 --> 01:04:10,631 understanding allows us to use what is 1671 01:04:10,631 --> 01:04:12,520 the uh the equivalent of the high 1672 01:04:12,520 --> 01:04:14,409 ground in the influence sphere of 1673 01:04:14,409 --> 01:04:16,409 competition , the truth . In almost 1674 01:04:16,409 --> 01:04:18,298 every case , all we have to do is 1675 01:04:18,298 --> 01:04:19,853 illuminate the truth of our 1676 01:04:19,853 --> 01:04:21,798 adversaries' nefarious activity to 1677 01:04:21,798 --> 01:04:23,909 allow our partners to then counter it 1678 01:04:23,909 --> 01:04:25,965 uh and to be able to use it to their 1679 01:04:25,965 --> 01:04:28,187 advantage . Senator , I might , I might 1680 01:04:28,187 --> 01:04:29,965 add just , uh , back to Admiral 1681 01:04:29,965 --> 01:04:32,187 Bradley's point of placement and access 1682 01:04:32,187 --> 01:04:34,353 without going into some detail , but , 1683 01:04:34,353 --> 01:04:36,409 uh , just being president in some of 1684 01:04:36,409 --> 01:04:36,260 these areas with our partners is an 1685 01:04:36,260 --> 01:04:38,620 absolute deterrent . Uh , not only that , 1686 01:04:38,739 --> 01:04:40,795 but we , uh , some of our forces and 1687 01:04:40,795 --> 01:04:42,406 what they've been able , the 1688 01:04:42,406 --> 01:04:44,295 capabilities they've been able to 1689 01:04:44,295 --> 01:04:46,461 create , if you might call it , within 1690 01:04:46,461 --> 01:04:48,128 some of these , uh , areas of 1691 01:04:48,128 --> 01:04:50,295 responsibility . One example is , uh , 1692 01:04:50,295 --> 01:04:52,017 you know , some of our special 1693 01:04:52,017 --> 01:04:54,128 operations forces had a critical need 1694 01:04:54,128 --> 01:04:56,128 for medical , uh , and so . Medical 1695 01:04:56,128 --> 01:04:58,128 role to facility and what they were 1696 01:04:58,128 --> 01:04:57,899 able to do is work with the local 1697 01:04:57,899 --> 01:04:59,899 hospital to embed themselves within 1698 01:04:59,899 --> 01:05:02,139 that hospital , not only providing care 1699 01:05:02,139 --> 01:05:04,419 for that local area but also providing 1700 01:05:04,419 --> 01:05:06,308 training for themselves . That in 1701 01:05:06,308 --> 01:05:07,919 itself is one a capabilities 1702 01:05:07,919 --> 01:05:09,752 development , a readiness , uh , 1703 01:05:09,752 --> 01:05:11,919 development , but also , you know , we 1704 01:05:11,919 --> 01:05:13,919 talk about by with and through your 1705 01:05:13,919 --> 01:05:13,800 partners . There's no better way than 1706 01:05:13,810 --> 01:05:15,810 than through the local population . 1707 01:05:15,899 --> 01:05:17,899 Thank you . MR Bradley . How are US 1708 01:05:17,899 --> 01:05:20,010 Special operations forces integrating 1709 01:05:20,010 --> 01:05:22,066 unmanned and autonomous technologies 1710 01:05:22,066 --> 01:05:24,879 into their operations ? Senator , at 1711 01:05:24,879 --> 01:05:27,330 every level , um , as we say , from the 1712 01:05:27,330 --> 01:05:29,163 battlefield to the back office , 1713 01:05:29,163 --> 01:05:31,010 finding ways to be able to bring 1714 01:05:31,010 --> 01:05:33,729 autonomy , treatable mass autonomy to 1715 01:05:33,729 --> 01:05:36,649 bear , is a very important part of how 1716 01:05:36,649 --> 01:05:39,149 we on the edge can leverage our 1717 01:05:39,149 --> 01:05:41,316 placement and access to not only serve 1718 01:05:41,316 --> 01:05:43,427 our own interests , but to be able to 1719 01:05:43,427 --> 01:05:45,538 help our partners who generally don't 1720 01:05:45,538 --> 01:05:47,705 have the same budgets we do to be . To 1721 01:05:47,705 --> 01:05:49,871 buy that kind of capacity to give them 1722 01:05:49,871 --> 01:05:53,870 asymmetric advantages . So autonomous 1723 01:05:53,870 --> 01:05:55,669 capability is critical to our 1724 01:05:55,669 --> 01:05:57,280 understanding from a sensing 1725 01:05:57,280 --> 01:05:59,629 perspective , as well as it is from a , 1726 01:05:59,709 --> 01:06:01,598 from a surveillance to be able to 1727 01:06:01,598 --> 01:06:03,949 sustain containment of an objective 1728 01:06:03,949 --> 01:06:06,171 that you would want to watch . And then 1729 01:06:06,171 --> 01:06:08,282 finally , clearly for for the ability 1730 01:06:08,282 --> 01:06:10,227 to project violence should that be 1731 01:06:10,227 --> 01:06:12,282 required . So looking at the success 1732 01:06:12,282 --> 01:06:14,282 the Ukrainian armed forces have had 1733 01:06:14,282 --> 01:06:17,050 with um drones and other autonomous uh 1734 01:06:17,260 --> 01:06:19,204 opportunities , do you think we're 1735 01:06:19,204 --> 01:06:21,459 moving fast enough ? Senator , I , I 1736 01:06:21,459 --> 01:06:24,250 would never suggest that the pace at 1737 01:06:24,250 --> 01:06:26,139 which we are moving today is fast 1738 01:06:26,139 --> 01:06:27,917 enough . We need to continue to 1739 01:06:27,917 --> 01:06:30,083 accelerate it . Clearly the Ukrainians 1740 01:06:30,083 --> 01:06:32,250 are driven by an existential need that 1741 01:06:32,250 --> 01:06:34,472 we do not feel , and so we need to make 1742 01:06:34,472 --> 01:06:36,361 up that difference in existential 1743 01:06:36,361 --> 01:06:39,580 motivation with a real appreciation of 1744 01:06:39,580 --> 01:06:41,691 the advantage that it will provide us 1745 01:06:41,780 --> 01:06:44,139 and importantly to deal with the 1746 01:06:44,139 --> 01:06:46,361 challenges of simultaneity , to be able 1747 01:06:46,361 --> 01:06:48,472 to help our partners to do the same . 1748 01:06:48,472 --> 01:06:50,472 Um , our role inside the department 1749 01:06:50,472 --> 01:06:52,028 there is to , uh , identify 1750 01:06:52,028 --> 01:06:54,459 opportunities to test , to validate , 1751 01:06:54,540 --> 01:06:56,750 and to illuminate those , uh , down 1752 01:06:56,750 --> 01:06:58,972 selected and , uh , and frankly to work 1753 01:06:58,972 --> 01:07:01,194 with our industry partners to help them 1754 01:07:01,194 --> 01:07:03,417 improve their capabilities so that they 1755 01:07:03,417 --> 01:07:05,528 might be more readily integrated into 1756 01:07:05,528 --> 01:07:07,639 our services warfighting constructs , 1757 01:07:07,639 --> 01:07:09,694 as well as our allies and partners . 1758 01:07:09,694 --> 01:07:11,639 Thank you . Thank you , Chairman . 1759 01:07:11,639 --> 01:07:13,639 Thank you , Senator Scott , Senator 1760 01:07:13,639 --> 01:07:15,583 Kaine . Thank you , Mr . Chair and 1761 01:07:15,583 --> 01:07:17,417 thanks to the witnesses . I have 1762 01:07:17,417 --> 01:07:19,306 questions for Admiral Bradley and 1763 01:07:19,306 --> 01:07:21,306 Secretary Anderson really about two 1764 01:07:21,306 --> 01:07:23,417 topics , Operation Southern Spear and 1765 01:07:23,417 --> 01:07:25,528 then the um preservation of force and 1766 01:07:25,528 --> 01:07:27,750 family initiative that you've discussed 1767 01:07:27,750 --> 01:07:29,830 on , on Southern Spear . Um , I'm 1768 01:07:29,830 --> 01:07:31,886 correct , am I not , that the , that 1769 01:07:31,886 --> 01:07:34,108 the lead on Southern Sear operations is 1770 01:07:34,520 --> 01:07:36,742 SouthHCOM , but special operators often 1771 01:07:36,742 --> 01:07:39,100 play a role in particular , um , 1772 01:07:39,810 --> 01:07:42,032 operations within that . Am I correct ? 1773 01:07:42,032 --> 01:07:43,866 Yes , Senator . Um , there is an 1774 01:07:43,866 --> 01:07:46,229 article that was published on April 21 1775 01:07:46,229 --> 01:07:48,062 in The Guardian that I'd like to 1776 01:07:48,062 --> 01:07:50,285 introduce for the record . The title of 1777 01:07:50,285 --> 01:07:52,285 it is , We Were Terrified They Were 1778 01:07:52,285 --> 01:07:54,396 Going to Kill Us Fishers who survived 1779 01:07:54,396 --> 01:07:56,618 US boat strike . Speak out , if I might 1780 01:07:56,618 --> 01:07:58,729 introduce that into the record , Mr . 1781 01:07:58,729 --> 01:08:00,840 Chair . You guys will be surprised to 1782 01:08:00,840 --> 01:08:02,562 know that I don't just believe 1783 01:08:02,562 --> 01:08:04,896 everything I read in , in news accounts , 1784 01:08:04,896 --> 01:08:07,007 but this is one that is public that I 1785 01:08:07,007 --> 01:08:09,229 want to ask about . It's , it's a story 1786 01:08:09,229 --> 01:08:11,229 about a US strike purportedly on an 1787 01:08:11,229 --> 01:08:13,173 Ecuadorian fishing vessel near the 1788 01:08:13,173 --> 01:08:15,489 Galapagos that took place on March 1789 01:08:15,489 --> 01:08:17,970 twenty-sixth , and the indication in 1790 01:08:17,970 --> 01:08:20,189 the story , as I say it's a week old , 1791 01:08:20,339 --> 01:08:23,450 is that this was a fishing vessel that 1792 01:08:23,450 --> 01:08:26,049 after the boat was struck , a US patrol 1793 01:08:26,049 --> 01:08:29,988 boat . Rescued those on the vessel , um , 1794 01:08:30,249 --> 01:08:32,729 handcuffed them , transported them to a 1795 01:08:32,729 --> 01:08:34,969 Salvadoran patrol boat . They were 1796 01:08:34,969 --> 01:08:37,500 eventually taken to Salvador . Where 1797 01:08:37,500 --> 01:08:40,299 they were released to a UN shelter and 1798 01:08:40,299 --> 01:08:42,243 then eventually taken back home to 1799 01:08:42,243 --> 01:08:44,077 Ecuador where they were released 1800 01:08:44,259 --> 01:08:46,700 without charge . Are you aware of the 1801 01:08:46,700 --> 01:08:49,339 allegation of this US strike on this 1802 01:08:49,339 --> 01:08:51,506 Ecuadorian fishing vessel , Admiral or 1803 01:08:51,506 --> 01:08:53,728 Secretary ? Senator , I am aware of the 1804 01:08:53,728 --> 01:08:56,379 article . I'm also aware that later in 1805 01:08:56,379 --> 01:08:59,700 the article it quotes the department's 1806 01:08:59,700 --> 01:09:02,620 response to it as there not having been 1807 01:09:02,620 --> 01:09:05,659 any US military involvement . Uh , I'm 1808 01:09:05,659 --> 01:09:07,826 also aware that there are , there were 1809 01:09:07,826 --> 01:09:10,958 no recorded or no , no US strikes 1810 01:09:11,258 --> 01:09:14,418 within 3 weeks around that incident as 1811 01:09:14,418 --> 01:09:16,278 well . I believe the Ecuadorian 1812 01:09:16,278 --> 01:09:18,445 government has , has rendered judgment 1813 01:09:18,445 --> 01:09:20,500 that there were no US involvement in 1814 01:09:20,500 --> 01:09:22,499 that . So I , I can't speak to any 1815 01:09:22,499 --> 01:09:25,139 greater detail . Obviously SOHCOM and 1816 01:09:25,139 --> 01:09:27,139 the department would own that , but 1817 01:09:27,139 --> 01:09:29,250 those are , those are from , um , you 1818 01:09:29,250 --> 01:09:31,528 know , superficial observations . Yeah , 1819 01:09:31,528 --> 01:09:33,695 let , let me read the portion from the 1820 01:09:33,695 --> 01:09:33,458 article that I think you're referring 1821 01:09:33,458 --> 01:09:35,569 to . The Pentagon and the White House 1822 01:09:35,569 --> 01:09:37,902 did not respond to requests for comment . 1823 01:09:38,120 --> 01:09:41,549 US Southern Command said it had no 1824 01:09:41,549 --> 01:09:44,399 information to provide regarding any US 1825 01:09:44,399 --> 01:09:46,220 government personnel personnel 1826 01:09:46,220 --> 01:09:49,120 involvement in any of the incidents 1827 01:09:49,120 --> 01:09:51,709 laid out . Um , are you aware of any 1828 01:09:53,129 --> 01:09:55,240 investigation into this ? I mean this 1829 01:09:55,240 --> 01:09:57,407 is a pretty , you know , tough claim , 1830 01:09:57,410 --> 01:09:59,577 the tough claim that the US would have 1831 01:09:59,577 --> 01:10:01,410 attacked a fishing boat that had 1832 01:10:01,410 --> 01:10:04,810 nothing to do with any group on the 1833 01:10:04,810 --> 01:10:06,977 classified DTO list . Are you aware of 1834 01:10:06,977 --> 01:10:09,270 any investigation that's being done 1835 01:10:09,270 --> 01:10:11,370 into this public reporting to see if 1836 01:10:11,370 --> 01:10:13,649 it's accurate or not , Senator ? I'm 1837 01:10:13,649 --> 01:10:16,729 not . I believe though the , the , the , 1838 01:10:16,759 --> 01:10:18,870 uh , The methodology we go through is 1839 01:10:18,870 --> 01:10:20,910 first to assess a claim like this , 1840 01:10:21,189 --> 01:10:23,910 whether or not it is credible , and I 1841 01:10:23,910 --> 01:10:25,966 believe from what you've cited there 1842 01:10:25,966 --> 01:10:27,966 and what I understand from from the 1843 01:10:27,966 --> 01:10:30,229 rendering that it was deemed not to be 1844 01:10:30,229 --> 01:10:31,951 credible . Therefore , further 1845 01:10:31,951 --> 01:10:33,785 investigation not required . And 1846 01:10:33,785 --> 01:10:35,673 Secretary Anderson , is that your 1847 01:10:35,673 --> 01:10:35,069 understanding as well ? Yes , Senator 1848 01:10:35,069 --> 01:10:37,379 Kaine , exactly what Admiral Bradley 1849 01:10:37,379 --> 01:10:39,546 say , unaware as well from what I've , 1850 01:10:39,589 --> 01:10:42,020 what I've been told . So your testimony , 1851 01:10:42,029 --> 01:10:44,310 based on your understanding . And this 1852 01:10:44,310 --> 01:10:46,479 is SOUTHCOM Equities obviously , but 1853 01:10:46,479 --> 01:10:50,149 Special operations participates is that 1854 01:10:50,149 --> 01:10:53,069 this public reporting , at least 1855 01:10:53,069 --> 01:10:55,236 SOUTHCOM has gone back and they cannot 1856 01:10:55,509 --> 01:10:57,850 find evidence that the US carried out 1857 01:10:58,629 --> 01:11:01,750 strike operations of that kind on that 1858 01:11:01,750 --> 01:11:03,972 day . That's your understanding , yes , 1859 01:11:03,972 --> 01:11:06,083 Senator , it is . Well , I think it's 1860 01:11:06,083 --> 01:11:08,083 important to put that on the record 1861 01:11:08,083 --> 01:11:09,750 because obviously if there is 1862 01:11:09,750 --> 01:11:12,028 information about the veracity of this , 1863 01:11:12,028 --> 01:11:14,194 it should . Come out , um , one of the 1864 01:11:14,194 --> 01:11:16,194 things that I think can be a little 1865 01:11:16,194 --> 01:11:16,160 confusing in this instance that could 1866 01:11:16,160 --> 01:11:18,382 have led to confusion in this , in this 1867 01:11:18,382 --> 01:11:20,830 circumstance is , as far as I know , 1868 01:11:21,379 --> 01:11:23,959 Southern Spear is a military operation 1869 01:11:23,959 --> 01:11:26,759 carried out against targets connected 1870 01:11:26,759 --> 01:11:29,600 to organizations , the list of whom are 1871 01:11:29,600 --> 01:11:31,656 still classified , is that correct ? 1872 01:11:33,910 --> 01:11:37,600 I believe so , Senator . I think 1873 01:11:37,600 --> 01:11:40,520 that the operations authorized by the 1874 01:11:40,520 --> 01:11:42,979 president can be carried out against 1875 01:11:43,879 --> 01:11:45,768 organizations on a list of DTOs , 1876 01:11:45,799 --> 01:11:47,855 designated terrorist organizations , 1877 01:11:47,855 --> 01:11:49,855 that is classified . It's only been 1878 01:11:49,855 --> 01:11:51,910 shared with Congress in a classified 1879 01:11:51,910 --> 01:11:54,021 setting . It's not been made public , 1880 01:11:54,021 --> 01:11:56,021 and that also means The , the enemy 1881 01:11:56,021 --> 01:11:58,132 hasn't been told you're an enemy . If 1882 01:11:58,132 --> 01:12:00,355 you , if you declare war against Iraq , 1883 01:12:00,355 --> 01:12:02,577 for example , or al-Qaeda , that public 1884 01:12:02,577 --> 01:12:04,632 declaration alerts the enemy to know 1885 01:12:04,632 --> 01:12:06,688 that , hey , you're the enemy if you 1886 01:12:06,688 --> 01:12:08,910 associate with the group subject to the 1887 01:12:09,319 --> 01:12:11,759 designation . If the DTO list in 1888 01:12:11,759 --> 01:12:14,069 Southern Spear is purely classified , 1889 01:12:14,399 --> 01:12:16,979 that means we haven't alerted . Uh , 1890 01:12:17,160 --> 01:12:19,160 those who the US has determined are 1891 01:12:19,160 --> 01:12:21,520 combatants that we are in fact engaging 1892 01:12:21,520 --> 01:12:23,742 in war against them , and that can lead 1893 01:12:23,742 --> 01:12:25,964 to confusion . My , my time is up , but 1894 01:12:25,964 --> 01:12:27,964 I just want to just say this , I do 1895 01:12:27,964 --> 01:12:30,240 commend what you guys have done . Um , 1896 01:12:30,310 --> 01:12:33,080 on this , um , preservation of force 1897 01:12:33,080 --> 01:12:35,080 and family initiative , and I think 1898 01:12:35,080 --> 01:12:37,247 it's particularly needed among special 1899 01:12:37,247 --> 01:12:39,413 operators , but I also think it offers 1900 01:12:39,413 --> 01:12:41,524 a template more generally for the way 1901 01:12:41,524 --> 01:12:43,747 we ought to approach the issue of the , 1902 01:12:43,747 --> 01:12:45,913 you know , long-term well-being of our 1903 01:12:45,913 --> 01:12:47,913 service members . So keep it up and 1904 01:12:47,913 --> 01:12:50,024 spread the . Best practices from what 1905 01:12:50,024 --> 01:12:51,969 you're doing . Thank you , Senator 1906 01:12:51,969 --> 01:12:54,136 Sullivan . Thank you , Mr . Chairman , 1907 01:12:54,136 --> 01:12:56,358 and thank you to the witnesses . I just 1908 01:12:56,358 --> 01:12:58,524 want to add Senator Kaine's point . We 1909 01:12:58,524 --> 01:13:00,636 had a classified briefing a couple of 1910 01:13:00,636 --> 01:13:02,870 months ago on the ways in which both 1911 01:13:02,870 --> 01:13:06,629 SOCOM , Southern Command , NSA . Go 1912 01:13:06,629 --> 01:13:09,229 through the target , targeting in , in 1913 01:13:09,229 --> 01:13:11,285 this regard , and Admiral , isn't it 1914 01:13:11,285 --> 01:13:13,396 true it's , uh , the JAG officers are 1915 01:13:13,396 --> 01:13:15,451 there in every step of the way . The 1916 01:13:15,451 --> 01:13:17,507 NSA is , I mean , it is an exquisite 1917 01:13:17,507 --> 01:13:21,009 detailed and very uh robust targeting 1918 01:13:21,009 --> 01:13:23,339 op before anyone is given the authority 1919 01:13:23,339 --> 01:13:26,189 to go strike , correct , Senator , that 1920 01:13:26,189 --> 01:13:28,189 is correct . It is based off of the 1921 01:13:28,189 --> 01:13:30,580 lessons learned and the processes , uh , 1922 01:13:30,620 --> 01:13:32,731 perfected over the last 25 years of , 1923 01:13:32,731 --> 01:13:34,990 uh , persona targeting . Yeah , no , I 1924 01:13:34,990 --> 01:13:37,990 think the . Uh , that briefing from my 1925 01:13:37,990 --> 01:13:39,879 perspective was very impressive . 1926 01:13:39,879 --> 01:13:41,879 General Rudd , I want to go back to 1927 01:13:41,879 --> 01:13:44,101 where you and I had a good conversation 1928 01:13:44,101 --> 01:13:46,268 during your confirmation process . And 1929 01:13:46,268 --> 01:13:48,323 it's about how our adversaries often 1930 01:13:48,323 --> 01:13:50,379 all over the place take aggressive , 1931 01:13:50,379 --> 01:13:52,910 offensive , state-sponsored kind of 1932 01:13:52,910 --> 01:13:55,689 cyber-related actions against us across 1933 01:13:56,109 --> 01:13:58,229 so many spheres , elections , 1934 01:13:58,709 --> 01:14:02,390 infrastructure , uh , NSA and our other 1935 01:14:02,390 --> 01:14:04,990 uh services do a great job on defending 1936 01:14:04,990 --> 01:14:07,430 that . But , um , I think , you know , 1937 01:14:07,509 --> 01:14:09,842 the best defense is also a good offense , 1938 01:14:09,842 --> 01:14:11,953 right ? And I know you probably can't 1939 01:14:11,953 --> 01:14:14,120 answer the questions here . But , um , 1940 01:14:14,229 --> 01:14:16,919 Are we also looking at offensive 1941 01:14:16,919 --> 01:14:19,086 operations from a cyber perspective to 1942 01:14:19,086 --> 01:14:21,470 keep our adversaries at bay ? The one I 1943 01:14:21,470 --> 01:14:23,581 always think would be good is letting 1944 01:14:23,581 --> 01:14:25,581 the people of China and Russia know 1945 01:14:25,581 --> 01:14:27,637 just how corrupt their leaders are , 1946 01:14:27,637 --> 01:14:29,748 how rich they are . Putin , I think , 1947 01:14:29,748 --> 01:14:32,081 is one of the richest guys in the world . 1948 01:14:32,081 --> 01:14:34,414 Xi Xi Jinping's sister is a billionaire . 1949 01:14:34,414 --> 01:14:36,414 I wonder how that happened . Um , I 1950 01:14:36,414 --> 01:14:38,359 mean , Isn't it also good to go on 1951 01:14:38,359 --> 01:14:40,248 offense , right ? We get , we get 1952 01:14:40,248 --> 01:14:42,470 attacked a lot , but to let people know 1953 01:14:42,660 --> 01:14:44,771 that , uh , we can go on offense with 1954 01:14:44,771 --> 01:14:46,771 the exquisite capabilities that you 1955 01:14:46,771 --> 01:14:50,370 have . Senator , I , 1956 01:14:51,109 --> 01:14:53,689 we absolutely have to be capable of 1957 01:14:53,689 --> 01:14:55,509 providing offensive options and 1958 01:14:55,509 --> 01:14:57,398 certainly working in concert with 1959 01:14:57,750 --> 01:14:59,917 Honorable Sutton as she crafts out the 1960 01:14:59,917 --> 01:15:02,083 strategy for the department in support 1961 01:15:02,083 --> 01:15:04,560 of the NDS . You could expect that 1962 01:15:04,939 --> 01:15:07,161 we'll be in a position and we have to , 1963 01:15:07,161 --> 01:15:09,383 I mean , when these dictators are using 1964 01:15:09,383 --> 01:15:11,217 cyber ops to come after the most 1965 01:15:11,217 --> 01:15:13,272 important thing to all of us , which 1966 01:15:13,272 --> 01:15:15,495 are the You know , American elections , 1967 01:15:15,495 --> 01:15:17,661 when none of them would ever stand for 1968 01:15:17,661 --> 01:15:19,717 election because they fear their own 1969 01:15:19,717 --> 01:15:21,606 people . I think we should flex a 1970 01:15:21,606 --> 01:15:23,772 little offensive cyber capability . Do 1971 01:15:23,772 --> 01:15:25,995 you agree with that , Madam Secretary ? 1972 01:15:26,040 --> 01:15:28,759 Absolutely . As was articulated in the 1973 01:15:28,759 --> 01:15:31,037 president's cyber strategy for America , 1974 01:15:31,279 --> 01:15:33,520 we need to be very clear that malicious 1975 01:15:33,520 --> 01:15:35,879 cyber actors in this space have and 1976 01:15:35,879 --> 01:15:38,029 will feel the consequences of their 1977 01:15:38,029 --> 01:15:40,020 action . We need to look at how we 1978 01:15:40,020 --> 01:15:42,187 leverage all tools of national power , 1979 01:15:42,859 --> 01:15:45,180 uh , whether it be military offensive 1980 01:15:45,180 --> 01:15:47,100 capabilities or other interagency 1981 01:15:47,100 --> 01:15:49,267 efforts , and that is something we are 1982 01:15:49,267 --> 01:15:51,211 going to be posturing with the new 1983 01:15:51,211 --> 01:15:53,211 Department of War cyber strategy to 1984 01:15:53,211 --> 01:15:55,378 make sure we have those capabilities . 1985 01:15:55,378 --> 01:15:54,589 Good . I think it's really important . 1986 01:15:54,689 --> 01:15:56,799 We don't have to say it , but I mean 1987 01:15:57,339 --> 01:15:59,117 they want to come play with our 1988 01:15:59,117 --> 01:16:01,061 elections . We can make sure their 1989 01:16:01,061 --> 01:16:03,006 people know how corrupt they are . 1990 01:16:03,006 --> 01:16:05,228 They're leaders , because a lot of them 1991 01:16:05,228 --> 01:16:07,228 are corrupt , and um . Their people 1992 01:16:07,228 --> 01:16:09,395 should know that . General Rudd , uh , 1993 01:16:09,395 --> 01:16:11,450 we're really excited in Alaska , NSA 1994 01:16:11,450 --> 01:16:13,672 Alaska's expansion is almost complete . 1995 01:16:13,672 --> 01:16:15,839 Um , you know , it's , uh , it's great 1996 01:16:15,839 --> 01:16:17,950 to see that . My understanding is the 1997 01:16:17,950 --> 01:16:20,172 new edition is gonna be able to house , 1998 01:16:20,172 --> 01:16:23,310 um , uh , 50 additional billets there . 1999 01:16:23,410 --> 01:16:25,810 Um , you know that the group in Alaska , 2000 01:16:25,919 --> 01:16:28,169 they do fantastic work . It's not on 2001 01:16:28,169 --> 01:16:30,502 the front pages , it doesn't need to be , 2002 01:16:30,502 --> 01:16:32,447 but , um , would you be willing to 2003 01:16:32,447 --> 01:16:35,140 visit NSA Alaska with me soon and Meet 2004 01:16:35,140 --> 01:16:37,049 these uh great Americans who are 2005 01:16:37,049 --> 01:16:39,105 conducting these missions under your 2006 01:16:39,105 --> 01:16:41,819 command from my state and work with me 2007 01:16:41,819 --> 01:16:44,041 on ensuring any additional requirements 2008 01:16:44,041 --> 01:16:46,620 we need to fully man that expansion in 2009 01:16:46,620 --> 01:16:49,410 NSA Alaska , 50 additional billets , uh , 2010 01:16:49,419 --> 01:16:51,540 we can make sure we get done . Hey , 2011 01:16:51,620 --> 01:16:53,676 Senator , I , I look forward to that 2012 01:16:53,676 --> 01:16:55,676 opportunity . I think we may have a 2013 01:16:55,676 --> 01:16:57,787 chance here . In the near future to , 2014 01:16:57,787 --> 01:17:00,049 uh , see that site , uh , that it's 2015 01:17:00,049 --> 01:17:02,359 ribbon cutting , but I also have a 2016 01:17:02,359 --> 01:17:04,526 confession to make . I think I pledged 2017 01:17:04,526 --> 01:17:06,470 in the confirmation hearing that I 2018 01:17:06,470 --> 01:17:09,290 would go there first if confirmed . Um , 2019 01:17:09,669 --> 01:17:11,810 I , I hope you'll appreciate it and 2020 01:17:11,810 --> 01:17:13,699 understand . Everybody commits to 2021 01:17:13,699 --> 01:17:15,866 coming to Alaska . Well , I , it'll be 2022 01:17:15,866 --> 01:17:17,979 my second location , um , in the role 2023 01:17:17,979 --> 01:17:20,649 only because Hawaii , as you , I think 2024 01:17:20,649 --> 01:17:22,593 you know , experienced some pretty 2025 01:17:22,593 --> 01:17:25,209 horrific , uh . Storms and it caused 2026 01:17:25,209 --> 01:17:27,153 some physical damage and wanted to 2027 01:17:27,153 --> 01:17:29,209 check on our folks there . General , 2028 01:17:29,209 --> 01:17:31,320 your , your excuse is General . All , 2029 01:17:31,320 --> 01:17:33,487 all of our witnesses are absolved from 2030 01:17:33,609 --> 01:17:36,350 that promise . It's made by everyone 2031 01:17:36,350 --> 01:17:38,680 under duress , and we understand it's , 2032 01:17:38,770 --> 01:17:40,992 it's not duress . They're just going to 2033 01:17:40,992 --> 01:17:42,714 see , Mr . Chairman , the most 2034 01:17:42,714 --> 01:17:45,048 strategic place in the world , and , uh , 2035 01:17:45,048 --> 01:17:47,214 Admiral , I , I wanna , and maybe I'll 2036 01:17:47,214 --> 01:17:49,437 submit this for the record , but , um . 2037 01:17:49,437 --> 01:17:51,729 Uh , the University of Alaska Fairbanks 2038 01:17:51,729 --> 01:17:54,649 is doing fantastic work on the UAS 2039 01:17:55,250 --> 01:17:59,240 counter UAS strategy testing . Uh , DIU 2040 01:17:59,240 --> 01:18:02,009 is gonna make an announcement here on a , 2041 01:18:02,089 --> 01:18:04,279 uh , commitment to work with the 2042 01:18:04,279 --> 01:18:06,830 University of Alaska Fairbanks on , uh , 2043 01:18:06,839 --> 01:18:09,006 all the counter UAS stuff that they're 2044 01:18:09,006 --> 01:18:11,061 doing , which is really needed , and 2045 01:18:11,061 --> 01:18:13,339 we're at the cutting edge up in Alaska . 2046 01:18:13,339 --> 01:18:15,672 So , I'd like to get Secretary Anderson , 2047 01:18:15,672 --> 01:18:17,895 you and the Admiral maybe , uh , in a , 2048 01:18:17,895 --> 01:18:19,839 uh , Answer for a question for the 2049 01:18:19,839 --> 01:18:22,006 record because I'm over my time here , 2050 01:18:22,006 --> 01:18:24,061 to work with me and the committee on 2051 01:18:24,061 --> 01:18:26,117 those really good opportunities on a 2052 01:18:26,117 --> 01:18:28,450 critical area for our national security , 2053 01:18:28,450 --> 01:18:30,617 and that's the counter drone mission . 2054 01:18:30,939 --> 01:18:33,161 Thank you . Thank you , Mr . Chairman . 2055 01:18:33,161 --> 01:18:35,106 Thank you , Senator Sullivan , and 2056 01:18:35,106 --> 01:18:37,217 thank you for your question about the 2057 01:18:37,217 --> 01:18:39,450 leaders of our adversaries . 2058 01:18:40,669 --> 01:18:44,310 Vladimir Putin is not . Our friend 2059 01:18:45,390 --> 01:18:48,209 Uh , not only is he One of the most 2060 01:18:48,209 --> 01:18:50,870 notorious war criminals of our time , 2061 01:18:51,689 --> 01:18:54,569 but one of , one of the greediest 2062 01:18:54,569 --> 01:18:57,870 thieves breathing on the earth . Well , 2063 01:18:57,930 --> 01:18:59,986 Mr . Chairman , Senator Warren and I 2064 01:18:59,986 --> 01:19:02,319 have worked on this very issue together . 2065 01:19:02,319 --> 01:19:04,374 It's a bipartisan issue that , hey , 2066 01:19:04,374 --> 01:19:06,152 these guys are coming after our 2067 01:19:06,152 --> 01:19:08,263 elections . We need to make them feel 2068 01:19:08,263 --> 01:19:10,374 the pain . Why don't we recognize her 2069 01:19:10,374 --> 01:19:12,652 at this moment ? Thank you . Thank you . 2070 01:19:17,040 --> 01:19:19,096 I want to talk about what's going on 2071 01:19:19,096 --> 01:19:21,262 with our troops when they're injured . 2072 01:19:21,262 --> 01:19:23,370 We have 400 troops at least so far 2073 01:19:23,370 --> 01:19:25,649 who've been injured in President 2074 01:19:25,649 --> 01:19:28,089 Trump's war with Iran , and now 2075 01:19:28,089 --> 01:19:30,830 traumatic brain injuries have become 2076 01:19:30,830 --> 01:19:34,759 the signature injury of the 2077 01:19:34,759 --> 01:19:37,209 war against Iran . Research has shown 2078 01:19:37,209 --> 01:19:40,529 that special operators are at a higher 2079 01:19:40,529 --> 01:19:43,890 risk of blast exposure and TBI , which , 2080 01:19:43,959 --> 01:19:45,959 as you know , increases the risk of 2081 01:19:45,959 --> 01:19:48,279 suicide , of seizures , and of memory 2082 01:19:48,279 --> 01:19:51,259 loss . Several 100 special operators 2083 01:19:51,259 --> 01:19:53,370 are now deployed in the Middle East , 2084 01:19:53,410 --> 01:19:56,330 and I'm very concerned about whether or 2085 01:19:56,330 --> 01:19:59,609 not our troops are getting the care 2086 01:19:59,609 --> 01:20:02,649 that they need for these injuries . For 2087 01:20:02,649 --> 01:20:04,816 instance , we know about a soldier who 2088 01:20:04,816 --> 01:20:07,038 was injured in the Iranian drone strike 2089 01:20:07,038 --> 01:20:10,089 in Kuwait , and he was promised TBI 2090 01:20:10,089 --> 01:20:12,200 care once they made it out of the war 2091 01:20:12,200 --> 01:20:14,367 zone . But even after being shipped to 2092 01:20:14,367 --> 01:20:17,279 Germany and then to Texas , the soldier 2093 01:20:17,279 --> 01:20:20,399 didn't receive care for weeks . So 2094 01:20:20,399 --> 01:20:22,439 Admiral Bradley , uh , do you think 2095 01:20:22,439 --> 01:20:24,495 that wounded soldiers should have to 2096 01:20:24,495 --> 01:20:26,879 wait nearly a month to see a doctor ? 2097 01:20:28,319 --> 01:20:31,439 Uh , Senator , I know , in the , in the 2098 01:20:31,439 --> 01:20:33,550 hypothetical , I , I absolutely don't 2099 01:20:33,550 --> 01:20:35,550 believe that . I , I don't know the 2100 01:20:35,550 --> 01:20:37,828 details of the situation though . Yeah , 2101 01:20:37,879 --> 01:20:39,935 but , but that's the real point . We 2102 01:20:39,935 --> 01:20:42,101 can agree they need help and they need 2103 01:20:42,101 --> 01:20:44,839 to be evaluated right away , and this 2104 01:20:44,839 --> 01:20:46,895 committee has worked on a bipartisan 2105 01:20:46,895 --> 01:20:49,930 basis to help service members with 2106 01:20:49,930 --> 01:20:53,720 brain injuries , but without records of 2107 01:20:53,720 --> 01:20:56,080 these injuries , it becomes harder and 2108 01:20:56,080 --> 01:20:58,669 harder to get care . That's 2109 01:20:58,669 --> 01:21:01,189 particularly critical for high speed 2110 01:21:01,189 --> 01:21:04,580 boat teams and special operators given 2111 01:21:04,580 --> 01:21:07,189 the exposure to these pounding waves 2112 01:21:07,189 --> 01:21:10,229 and high caliber weapons . Boat team 2113 01:21:10,229 --> 01:21:13,444 leaders have described how quote . The 2114 01:21:13,444 --> 01:21:16,765 damage piles up almost unnoticed for 2115 01:21:16,765 --> 01:21:20,365 years and then cascades , but 2116 01:21:21,515 --> 01:21:24,694 DOD requires cognitive assessments only 2117 01:21:24,694 --> 01:21:28,305 every 5 years and SOCOM every 3 . 2118 01:21:28,645 --> 01:21:30,812 I have a bipartisan bill with Senators 2119 01:21:30,812 --> 01:21:32,845 Ernst and King and others on this 2120 01:21:32,845 --> 01:21:34,794 committee to make sure that these 2121 01:21:34,794 --> 01:21:37,084 injuries don't fall through the cracks , 2122 01:21:37,444 --> 01:21:40,890 including . By requiring more regular 2123 01:21:40,890 --> 01:21:43,609 screening and logs to be able to track 2124 01:21:43,810 --> 01:21:46,569 exposure , Admiral Bradley , the 2125 01:21:46,569 --> 01:21:49,169 effects of TBIs can compound over time , 2126 01:21:49,290 --> 01:21:51,810 as we know . Do you agree that it is 2127 01:21:51,810 --> 01:21:54,169 better if we catch these brain injuries 2128 01:21:54,169 --> 01:21:56,839 earlier rather than later ? Senator , I 2129 01:21:56,839 --> 01:21:58,959 absolutely do . Good . And do you 2130 01:21:58,959 --> 01:22:01,126 support keeping better records so that 2131 01:22:01,126 --> 01:22:03,348 we're able to do that and more frequent 2132 01:22:03,348 --> 01:22:06,040 evaluations , Senator ? I do . It is 2133 01:22:06,040 --> 01:22:08,520 critical to be able to understand the 2134 01:22:08,520 --> 01:22:11,080 mechanisms of harm that come from these 2135 01:22:11,080 --> 01:22:13,279 various sources that we don't 2136 01:22:13,279 --> 01:22:15,446 understand very well , and that data , 2137 01:22:15,446 --> 01:22:17,446 those logs . That data will help to 2138 01:22:17,446 --> 01:22:19,720 inform not only treatment but also 2139 01:22:19,720 --> 01:22:21,831 means to be able to prevent it in its 2140 01:22:21,831 --> 01:22:24,053 outset . Good . I appreciate that . You 2141 01:22:24,053 --> 01:22:26,220 know , the fact that troops have faced 2142 01:22:26,220 --> 01:22:29,319 long wait lists to get specialty care 2143 01:22:29,319 --> 01:22:32,839 for brain health within DOD's 2144 01:22:32,839 --> 01:22:34,879 military system and one of the ways 2145 01:22:34,879 --> 01:22:37,879 that DOD . has tried to address these 2146 01:22:37,879 --> 01:22:41,200 waitlists is by partnering with outside 2147 01:22:41,200 --> 01:22:43,990 experts like Homebase , uh , back in 2148 01:22:43,990 --> 01:22:46,560 Massachusetts . Homebase's 2149 01:22:46,560 --> 01:22:48,919 comprehensive brain health and trauma 2150 01:22:48,919 --> 01:22:52,830 program . Has helped get 95% of 2151 01:22:52,830 --> 01:22:55,689 special operators that it's treated 2152 01:22:55,990 --> 01:22:58,569 back into the field . Admiral Bradley , 2153 01:22:58,709 --> 01:23:00,598 in your experience , have special 2154 01:23:00,598 --> 01:23:03,189 operators benefited from programs like 2155 01:23:03,189 --> 01:23:05,919 Homebase ? Senator , absolutely , 2156 01:23:06,020 --> 01:23:09,669 combat , that comprehensive program for 2157 01:23:09,669 --> 01:23:11,910 brain health is a critical part . We 2158 01:23:11,910 --> 01:23:14,839 also have partnerships with UNC , 2159 01:23:14,850 --> 01:23:16,628 University of North Carolina in 2160 01:23:16,628 --> 01:23:18,794 Southern Florida and several others to 2161 01:23:18,794 --> 01:23:21,017 be able to do the same . Thing they are 2162 01:23:21,017 --> 01:23:23,592 all very capable in progressing 2163 01:23:23,592 --> 01:23:25,814 programs . I think , as you highlight , 2164 01:23:26,413 --> 01:23:28,413 institutionalizing those beyond the 2165 01:23:28,413 --> 01:23:30,635 pilot that they are into something that 2166 01:23:30,635 --> 01:23:32,857 is a part of our mainstream system that 2167 01:23:32,857 --> 01:23:34,913 can then be treated with Tricare and 2168 01:23:34,913 --> 01:23:37,080 with our VA systems is a critical next 2169 01:23:37,080 --> 01:23:39,246 step . And I very much appreciate your 2170 01:23:39,246 --> 01:23:41,413 point about institutionalizing it . We 2171 01:23:41,413 --> 01:23:43,635 can't just treat this as a one-off . We 2172 01:23:43,635 --> 01:23:45,812 know the problem exists . We've got to 2173 01:23:45,812 --> 01:23:48,053 record . We've got to document , and 2174 01:23:48,053 --> 01:23:49,997 we've got to . Have people who can 2175 01:23:49,997 --> 01:23:52,053 treat it . We need to have dedicated 2176 01:23:52,053 --> 01:23:54,315 resources to support our troops who are 2177 01:23:54,315 --> 01:23:56,715 suffering from brain injuries . The 2178 01:23:56,715 --> 01:23:58,715 Trump administration has plunged us 2179 01:23:58,715 --> 01:24:01,835 into a war and is asking Congress for a 2180 01:24:01,835 --> 01:24:05,715 record $1.5 trillion for 2181 01:24:05,715 --> 01:24:08,636 the Pentagon . It is outrageous that we 2182 01:24:08,636 --> 01:24:10,956 would be cutting corners on treating 2183 01:24:10,956 --> 01:24:13,234 wounded warriors . Thank you , Admiral . 2184 01:24:13,234 --> 01:24:15,345 I look forward to working with you on 2185 01:24:15,345 --> 01:24:17,289 this . Thank you , Mr . Chairman . 2186 01:24:17,289 --> 01:24:19,234 Thank you , Senator Rosen . Well , 2187 01:24:19,234 --> 01:24:21,345 thank you , Chairman Wicker , Ranking 2188 01:24:21,345 --> 01:24:23,456 Member Reed , and , uh , uh thank you 2189 01:24:23,456 --> 01:24:25,512 for , uh , well , I saw you a little 2190 01:24:25,512 --> 01:24:27,678 bit earlier today , so thank you again 2191 01:24:27,678 --> 01:24:29,734 for your service and , and for being 2192 01:24:29,734 --> 01:24:31,845 here . Um , I wanna talk a little bit 2193 01:24:31,845 --> 01:24:33,956 about operational tempo and readiness 2194 01:24:33,956 --> 01:24:35,845 reporting because cyber operation 2195 01:24:35,845 --> 01:24:37,845 forces will of course have , well , 2196 01:24:37,845 --> 01:24:37,319 they're always in high demand , but 2197 01:24:37,319 --> 01:24:39,541 they've been in extra high demand since 2198 01:24:39,541 --> 01:24:41,597 CyberCom was established , which has 2199 01:24:41,597 --> 01:24:43,708 been exacerbated by the challenges of 2200 01:24:43,708 --> 01:24:45,819 getting the unit readiness numbers up 2201 01:24:45,819 --> 01:24:47,708 at the same time . Now that we're 2202 01:24:47,708 --> 01:24:49,875 fighting wars in multiple theaters , I 2203 01:24:49,875 --> 01:24:51,930 have to imagine that the operational 2204 01:24:51,930 --> 01:24:53,597 tempo of those forces is also 2205 01:24:53,597 --> 01:24:55,763 increasing dramatically . So , General 2206 01:24:55,763 --> 01:24:57,875 Rudd , uh , could you give us a sense 2207 01:24:57,875 --> 01:24:59,986 of what the trend is for the up tempo 2208 01:24:59,986 --> 01:25:02,560 or cybern Mission Force , please ? 2209 01:25:03,770 --> 01:25:05,660 Thanks , Senator Rosen . I , I 2210 01:25:05,660 --> 01:25:07,771 appreciate uh the attention on this , 2211 01:25:07,771 --> 01:25:10,819 this topic . As you described and as we 2212 01:25:10,819 --> 01:25:13,660 would expect , very high demand and a 2213 01:25:13,660 --> 01:25:15,799 very high operational tempo for our , 2214 01:25:16,020 --> 01:25:19,120 our cyber warriors . In support in real 2215 01:25:19,120 --> 01:25:22,399 time 24/7 of the joint force across a 2216 01:25:22,399 --> 01:25:25,560 number of problem sets and so this 2217 01:25:25,560 --> 01:25:27,616 really speaks to the heart of one of 2218 01:25:27,616 --> 01:25:29,959 the attributes of Cybercom 2.00 that we 2219 01:25:29,959 --> 01:25:32,520 refer to as optimized unit phasing . So 2220 01:25:32,520 --> 01:25:34,799 think of a cycle upon which you rotate 2221 01:25:34,799 --> 01:25:38,089 again . This is where we have a lot to 2222 01:25:38,089 --> 01:25:40,629 gain from understanding SOCOM's model 2223 01:25:41,140 --> 01:25:44,310 for years , both Admiral Bradley and I 2224 01:25:44,310 --> 01:25:46,143 were part of a system that had a 2225 01:25:46,143 --> 01:25:48,366 rotational force effort . Now granted , 2226 01:25:48,366 --> 01:25:50,560 there's surges , um , and we account 2227 01:25:50,560 --> 01:25:52,504 for those , but part of the way we 2228 01:25:52,504 --> 01:25:54,727 accounted for that is size of the force 2229 01:25:54,727 --> 01:25:56,838 and bringing in . sufficient capacity 2230 01:25:57,049 --> 01:25:59,529 to be able to operationally employ the 2231 01:25:59,529 --> 01:26:02,560 force continuously across a number of 2232 01:26:02,560 --> 01:26:04,449 problem sets . Well , that's good 2233 01:26:04,449 --> 01:26:06,504 because you didn't know what my next 2234 01:26:06,504 --> 01:26:08,282 question would be , but it's to 2235 01:26:08,282 --> 01:26:10,116 Secretary Sutton . The status of 2236 01:26:10,116 --> 01:26:12,116 implementing the 97 recommendations 2237 01:26:12,116 --> 01:26:14,282 from Cybercom 2.0 . What is that ? And 2238 01:26:14,282 --> 01:26:16,330 the resources , speaking of to your 2239 01:26:16,330 --> 01:26:18,497 point , General , the resources needed 2240 01:26:18,497 --> 01:26:20,497 to implement them , especially when 2241 01:26:20,497 --> 01:26:22,830 setting up three enabling organizations . 2242 01:26:24,049 --> 01:26:26,160 Senator , thank you for that question 2243 01:26:26,160 --> 01:26:28,327 and for your continued focus on this , 2244 01:26:28,327 --> 01:26:30,327 on the cyber topic over the years . 2245 01:26:30,327 --> 01:26:32,549 From an implementation perspective , as 2246 01:26:32,549 --> 01:26:34,827 you mentioned , there's a lot of tasks , 2247 01:26:34,827 --> 01:26:36,882 so the approach that we're taking is 2248 01:26:36,882 --> 01:26:39,105 that within my office I've built a core 2249 01:26:39,105 --> 01:26:40,938 team that is dedicated to to the 2250 01:26:40,938 --> 01:26:43,049 implementation process and one of the 2251 01:26:43,049 --> 01:26:45,049 things that's really exciting to me 2252 01:26:45,049 --> 01:26:47,009 about that is it , uh , features 2253 01:26:47,009 --> 01:26:49,231 contributions from all of our service . 2254 01:26:49,231 --> 01:26:51,231 Cyber components and we've actually 2255 01:26:51,231 --> 01:26:53,398 brought in people who have been in our 2256 01:26:53,398 --> 01:26:55,620 force for a long time that are now have 2257 01:26:55,620 --> 01:26:57,731 the opportunity to build the system , 2258 01:26:57,731 --> 01:26:59,898 the talent management system that they 2259 01:26:59,898 --> 01:27:01,953 wish they would have had . So , it's 2260 01:27:01,953 --> 01:27:04,176 the unicorns that we're trying to build 2261 01:27:04,176 --> 01:27:06,231 at scope and scale are now coming in 2262 01:27:06,231 --> 01:27:06,049 and helping to write the details , 2263 01:27:06,419 --> 01:27:08,740 build out the assessments we need , and 2264 01:27:08,740 --> 01:27:10,907 come up with the models of how we keep 2265 01:27:10,907 --> 01:27:13,879 careers going , um , to build mastery . 2266 01:27:14,520 --> 01:27:16,870 From a resource perspective , uh , we 2267 01:27:16,870 --> 01:27:19,390 have included funding for the Cyber 2268 01:27:19,390 --> 01:27:21,112 Command 2.0 initiatives in the 2269 01:27:21,112 --> 01:27:23,509 president's 27 budget , including 2270 01:27:23,509 --> 01:27:25,731 funding to start incentive pay to get , 2271 01:27:25,731 --> 01:27:28,279 uh , mastery incentives implemented , 2272 01:27:28,470 --> 01:27:30,569 as well as for some of the enabling 2273 01:27:30,569 --> 01:27:32,569 organizations and some of the other 2274 01:27:32,569 --> 01:27:34,736 service requirements to be able to get 2275 01:27:34,736 --> 01:27:36,958 this to speed and look forward to being 2276 01:27:36,958 --> 01:27:39,013 able to execute that upon passage of 2277 01:27:39,013 --> 01:27:41,180 the budget for FY 27 . Thank you . I , 2278 01:27:41,180 --> 01:27:43,402 I'm gonna stick on cyber operations for 2279 01:27:43,402 --> 01:27:45,402 a minute because I wanna talk about 2280 01:27:45,402 --> 01:27:47,569 intelligence capabilities . So General 2281 01:27:47,569 --> 01:27:49,625 Rodd , um , your responses to , uh , 2282 01:27:49,625 --> 01:27:51,680 our advanced policy questions during 2283 01:27:51,680 --> 01:27:53,902 your nomination process , you mentioned 2284 01:27:53,902 --> 01:27:55,950 the criticality of foundational 2285 01:27:55,950 --> 01:27:58,200 intelligence to support cyberspace 2286 01:27:58,200 --> 01:28:00,033 operations and the need for that 2287 01:28:00,033 --> 01:28:01,644 capability to keep pace with 2288 01:28:01,644 --> 01:28:03,867 operational needs . So as we all know , 2289 01:28:03,867 --> 01:28:06,629 the FY 25 NDAA has set a requirement 2290 01:28:06,629 --> 01:28:08,319 for DOD to establish a cyber 2291 01:28:08,319 --> 01:28:10,759 intelligence capability to provide just 2292 01:28:10,759 --> 01:28:13,000 that sort of foundational intelligence 2293 01:28:13,000 --> 01:28:15,167 support . So General Rudd , have you , 2294 01:28:15,167 --> 01:28:17,389 uh , you have the ability to shape this 2295 01:28:17,389 --> 01:28:19,444 foundational intelligence capability 2296 01:28:19,444 --> 01:28:21,222 from the start . So , could you 2297 01:28:21,222 --> 01:28:23,278 elaborate a little bit more based on 2298 01:28:23,278 --> 01:28:25,222 your experiences at IndoPaycom and 2299 01:28:25,222 --> 01:28:27,167 SOCOM , what you would like to see 2300 01:28:27,167 --> 01:28:28,944 incorporated in this foundation 2301 01:28:28,944 --> 01:28:32,069 intelligence capability , please ? Well , 2302 01:28:32,189 --> 01:28:34,870 Senator , the , the reference to my 2303 01:28:34,870 --> 01:28:36,926 past experience , I would tell you . 2304 01:28:38,100 --> 01:28:40,290 Intelligence drives ops and ops drives 2305 01:28:40,290 --> 01:28:42,401 intelligence and so it's a continuous 2306 01:28:42,401 --> 01:28:44,568 cycle and what we learned over decades 2307 01:28:44,979 --> 01:28:47,500 of fighting alongside each other in a 2308 01:28:47,500 --> 01:28:50,560 variety of places is the intelligence 2309 01:28:50,810 --> 01:28:52,921 apparatus has to be closely linked to 2310 01:28:52,921 --> 01:28:55,088 and understand the operational side of 2311 01:28:55,088 --> 01:28:57,143 this and I haven't had the chance to 2312 01:28:57,143 --> 01:28:59,339 specifically dive into this yet . It's 2313 01:28:59,339 --> 01:29:01,061 going to be part of my initial 2314 01:29:01,061 --> 01:29:03,117 assessment and happy to come back to 2315 01:29:03,117 --> 01:29:05,117 you for the record , uh . As I look 2316 01:29:05,117 --> 01:29:07,172 more closely at that , thank you . I 2317 01:29:07,172 --> 01:29:09,395 look forward to that . We have a lot of 2318 01:29:09,395 --> 01:29:11,672 work to do . Thank you . Mr . Chairman , 2319 01:29:11,672 --> 01:29:13,339 Senator Slotkin , we're doing 2320 01:29:13,339 --> 01:29:15,672 everything we can to keep you from , um , 2321 01:29:15,672 --> 01:29:17,839 asking your question . Senator Banks , 2322 01:29:17,839 --> 01:29:19,895 you're recognized . Thank you , Mr . 2323 01:29:19,895 --> 01:29:22,061 Chairman . General Rudd , can you talk 2324 01:29:22,061 --> 01:29:24,172 about how the PLA is using artificial 2325 01:29:24,172 --> 01:29:26,228 intelligence to enhance its military 2326 01:29:26,228 --> 01:29:30,060 operations ? Senator , I , as you 2327 01:29:30,060 --> 01:29:31,859 would hope and expect , that's 2328 01:29:31,859 --> 01:29:34,419 certainly something that we are paying 2329 01:29:34,419 --> 01:29:36,540 particular attention to , the , the 2330 01:29:36,540 --> 01:29:38,540 details of which I'd , I'd probably 2331 01:29:38,540 --> 01:29:40,651 rather go into in a close . You , you 2332 01:29:40,651 --> 01:29:42,818 can vaguely , but I vaguely , I mean , 2333 01:29:42,818 --> 01:29:44,651 you could vaguely talk about how 2334 01:29:44,651 --> 01:29:46,596 artificial intelligence is used in 2335 01:29:46,596 --> 01:29:48,929 warfare . And gains that they're making , 2336 01:29:48,929 --> 01:29:48,279 I mean , I , I don't think there's 2337 01:29:48,279 --> 01:29:50,501 anything classified about that . Yeah , 2338 01:29:50,501 --> 01:29:52,390 Senator , I appreciate that using 2339 01:29:52,390 --> 01:29:54,501 artificial intelligence . I'm sorry , 2340 01:29:54,501 --> 01:29:56,557 you can agree , you would agree that 2341 01:29:56,557 --> 01:29:58,835 they are using artificial intelligence , 2342 01:29:58,835 --> 01:29:58,419 Senator . I think that's , that's quite 2343 01:29:58,419 --> 01:30:00,641 clear that they are . Yes , sir . Thank 2344 01:30:00,641 --> 01:30:03,379 you . Um , so , um , that being the 2345 01:30:03,379 --> 01:30:05,689 case , would you agree that AI is a 2346 01:30:06,220 --> 01:30:08,720 quote dual use technology . 2347 01:30:10,959 --> 01:30:13,120 Senator , dual use in , in , in what 2348 01:30:13,120 --> 01:30:15,759 sense both for non-military and 2349 01:30:15,759 --> 01:30:18,319 military , I , I , Senator , I think 2350 01:30:18,319 --> 01:30:19,986 that's , that's a fair way to 2351 01:30:19,986 --> 01:30:22,041 characterize it . Um , and how , how 2352 01:30:22,041 --> 01:30:24,263 important is it for the US to have More 2353 01:30:24,263 --> 01:30:27,020 and better high-end chips than what 2354 01:30:27,020 --> 01:30:30,979 China does . Senator , I would take 2355 01:30:30,979 --> 01:30:34,100 that category more broadly and say I 2356 01:30:34,100 --> 01:30:36,779 think it's critical that the US has the 2357 01:30:36,779 --> 01:30:39,560 technological advantage in every aspect 2358 01:30:39,560 --> 01:30:43,060 of war fighting and certainly as we 2359 01:30:43,060 --> 01:30:46,700 see the increase in the advent of the 2360 01:30:46,700 --> 01:30:48,978 application of artificial intelligence . 2361 01:30:49,500 --> 01:30:51,611 We're gonna have to make sure that uh 2362 01:30:51,611 --> 01:30:53,833 we retain and maintain our advantage in 2363 01:30:53,833 --> 01:30:56,056 that and move as fast as we can . You , 2364 01:30:56,056 --> 01:30:58,222 you agree . I mean , I , I , I believe 2365 01:30:58,222 --> 01:31:00,056 we , we have today , we have the 2366 01:31:00,056 --> 01:31:02,056 advantage . I think you would , you 2367 01:31:02,056 --> 01:31:03,778 just said that to maintain our 2368 01:31:03,778 --> 01:31:03,740 advantage . So you agree that we have 2369 01:31:03,740 --> 01:31:05,962 the advantage . What would happen if we 2370 01:31:05,962 --> 01:31:08,129 lost that advantage ? Well , Senator , 2371 01:31:08,129 --> 01:31:10,240 I think this team right here is gonna 2372 01:31:10,240 --> 01:31:12,407 do everything we can to make sure that 2373 01:31:12,407 --> 01:31:14,629 we don't do that . Um , certainly we're 2374 01:31:14,629 --> 01:31:16,573 working furiously to do that , and 2375 01:31:16,573 --> 01:31:18,518 we're not gonna be complacent . We 2376 01:31:18,518 --> 01:31:20,629 won't be satisfied and , uh , In my , 2377 01:31:20,629 --> 01:31:22,740 in my opening statement , I emphasize 2378 01:31:22,740 --> 01:31:25,073 four operating principles speed , scale , 2379 01:31:25,073 --> 01:31:27,240 innovation , and integration . I think 2380 01:31:27,240 --> 01:31:29,407 if we press as hard as we can to apply 2381 01:31:29,407 --> 01:31:31,407 those principles to everything that 2382 01:31:31,407 --> 01:31:33,462 we're doing , but in particular , an 2383 01:31:33,462 --> 01:31:35,796 effort to maintain our advantage in the , 2384 01:31:35,796 --> 01:31:38,169 the highest tech areas . We'll be OK . 2385 01:31:38,319 --> 01:31:40,097 And yet we'll never it would be 2386 01:31:40,097 --> 01:31:42,319 completely unacceptable , wouldn't it , 2387 01:31:42,319 --> 01:31:44,041 General Rudd , if we lost that 2388 01:31:44,041 --> 01:31:46,097 advantage , Chair Chairman , it , it 2389 01:31:46,097 --> 01:31:48,263 would be unacceptable , and we'll make 2390 01:31:48,263 --> 01:31:50,319 sure that , uh , we do everything to 2391 01:31:50,319 --> 01:31:50,089 retain that . Yeah , I , I , I think 2392 01:31:50,089 --> 01:31:52,256 that's , um , I understand there are a 2393 01:31:52,256 --> 01:31:54,256 lot of things that you can't say in 2394 01:31:54,256 --> 01:31:56,033 this setting . But I think it's 2395 01:31:56,033 --> 01:31:58,089 important for the American people to 2396 01:31:58,089 --> 01:32:00,256 know that . The the critical nature of 2397 01:32:00,256 --> 01:32:02,422 us keeping that advantage and the role 2398 01:32:02,422 --> 01:32:04,589 that . Uh , high-end chips play in all 2399 01:32:04,589 --> 01:32:06,589 of it . I mean , you , you , you've 2400 01:32:06,589 --> 01:32:08,390 already agreed that . Um , it's 2401 01:32:08,390 --> 01:32:10,279 important that we maintain high , 2402 01:32:11,149 --> 01:32:13,589 high-end chips for America and for 2403 01:32:13,589 --> 01:32:16,149 American , Ame our , our own use and 2404 01:32:16,149 --> 01:32:18,390 develop our own technologies and how 2405 01:32:18,390 --> 01:32:20,668 dangerous it would be if our adversary . 2406 01:32:21,109 --> 01:32:23,390 Um , gained an advantage on us on that 2407 01:32:23,390 --> 01:32:25,501 front or even that we would give away 2408 01:32:25,501 --> 01:32:27,723 our high-end chips to our adversaries . 2409 01:32:27,723 --> 01:32:30,709 Does that make sense ? Senator , I 2410 01:32:31,430 --> 01:32:34,350 It does make sense . And again , that , 2411 01:32:34,390 --> 01:32:36,790 that's a critical piece of uh how we're 2412 01:32:36,790 --> 01:32:38,901 going to maintain our advantage , and 2413 01:32:38,901 --> 01:32:41,012 we also have to understand and expect 2414 01:32:41,012 --> 01:32:44,109 that capability will be distributed and 2415 01:32:44,109 --> 01:32:46,350 available to others , which is why this 2416 01:32:46,350 --> 01:32:48,589 continuous cycle of maintaining our 2417 01:32:48,589 --> 01:32:51,470 edge is , is really important . Um , 2418 01:32:51,890 --> 01:32:54,001 yeah , I'll , I , I'll move on . Last 2419 01:32:54,001 --> 01:32:55,946 week , President Trump said that , 2420 01:32:55,946 --> 01:32:58,459 quote , America's aging and constrained 2421 01:32:58,799 --> 01:33:01,109 electric grid infrastructure poses an 2422 01:33:01,109 --> 01:33:04,209 increasing threat to national defenses , 2423 01:33:04,680 --> 01:33:06,458 end quote . What , what risk do 2424 01:33:06,458 --> 01:33:08,347 cyberattacks pose to our critical 2425 01:33:08,347 --> 01:33:09,347 infrastructure ? 2426 01:33:12,390 --> 01:33:16,180 Well , Senator , the It's 2427 01:33:16,180 --> 01:33:18,402 certainly a vulnerability , and I think 2428 01:33:18,402 --> 01:33:20,569 that's the awareness and understanding 2429 01:33:20,569 --> 01:33:22,624 of that is the first line of defense 2430 01:33:22,624 --> 01:33:24,458 and then making sure that , uh , 2431 01:33:24,620 --> 01:33:27,660 experts in this field know how to get 2432 01:33:27,660 --> 01:33:29,859 ahead of it , know how to apply the 2433 01:33:29,859 --> 01:33:31,740 best cyber defenses , and , uh , 2434 01:33:32,660 --> 01:33:34,827 Certainly to the extent we're able and 2435 01:33:34,827 --> 01:33:36,993 we have the capacity , we want to make 2436 01:33:36,993 --> 01:33:39,160 sure that we're working with the right 2437 01:33:39,160 --> 01:33:40,827 folks to protect our critical 2438 01:33:40,827 --> 01:33:42,771 infrastructure , and I assume what 2439 01:33:42,771 --> 01:33:45,450 President Trump is saying . About the 2440 01:33:45,589 --> 01:33:47,645 infrastructure that would extend the 2441 01:33:47,645 --> 01:33:50,470 transportation nodes like seaports , 2442 01:33:50,580 --> 01:33:52,636 airports , and railroads . Would you 2443 01:33:52,636 --> 01:33:55,379 agree with that ? Senator , I , I won't 2444 01:33:55,379 --> 01:33:58,720 speculate on , on . What the president 2445 01:33:58,720 --> 01:34:00,942 meant specifically , I haven't had that 2446 01:34:00,942 --> 01:34:02,887 conversation with him , um , but I 2447 01:34:02,887 --> 01:34:04,942 think it's fair , actually , I think 2448 01:34:04,942 --> 01:34:06,998 it's , it's important that we figure 2449 01:34:06,998 --> 01:34:08,998 out what the definition of critical 2450 01:34:08,998 --> 01:34:10,998 infrastructure is , um , prioritize 2451 01:34:10,998 --> 01:34:13,053 where we need to put our efforts and 2452 01:34:13,053 --> 01:34:15,276 resources to safeguard it . Thank you . 2453 01:34:15,276 --> 01:34:17,331 My time has expired . Thank you very 2454 01:34:17,331 --> 01:34:20,060 much , Senator Slotkin . Thank you . Um , 2455 01:34:20,149 --> 01:34:23,029 I wanna , um , support everything that 2456 01:34:23,029 --> 01:34:25,490 Senator Banks just said and just return 2457 01:34:25,490 --> 01:34:27,870 to the topic on the classified AI race . 2458 01:34:27,910 --> 01:34:29,966 I know we can't talk about it here , 2459 01:34:29,966 --> 01:34:32,077 but . Um , I don't think the American 2460 01:34:32,077 --> 01:34:34,243 public understands how important it is 2461 01:34:34,243 --> 01:34:36,077 to win that race , that it's the 2462 01:34:36,077 --> 01:34:38,354 equivalent of winning the nuclear race , 2463 01:34:38,354 --> 01:34:40,410 like whoever gets there first . Um , 2464 01:34:40,430 --> 01:34:43,029 and I think , um , you know , if we 2465 01:34:43,029 --> 01:34:45,700 were healthy as a country , then 2466 01:34:45,700 --> 01:34:47,756 elected officials from both sides of 2467 01:34:47,756 --> 01:34:49,756 the aisle would be focusing on this 2468 01:34:49,756 --> 01:34:51,756 constantly to make sure we win this 2469 01:34:51,756 --> 01:34:54,189 race . Um . In that spirit , um , 2470 01:34:54,450 --> 01:34:56,561 General Rudd , you know , I think the 2471 01:34:56,561 --> 01:34:58,672 thing that has been , congratulations 2472 01:34:58,672 --> 01:35:00,617 on being in the seat . I think the 2473 01:35:00,617 --> 01:35:02,783 thing that , um , has caught , I think 2474 01:35:02,783 --> 01:35:04,783 the attention of a lot of us is the 2475 01:35:04,783 --> 01:35:06,894 announcement in the last 3 or 4 weeks 2476 01:35:06,894 --> 01:35:10,169 by anthropic and then OpenAI of new 2477 01:35:10,169 --> 01:35:12,450 products , Mythos being the anthropic 2478 01:35:12,450 --> 01:35:14,672 product and the OpenAI product having a 2479 01:35:14,672 --> 01:35:18,410 longer name . Um , and they are testing 2480 01:35:18,410 --> 01:35:20,970 this new product very differently than 2481 01:35:20,970 --> 01:35:23,689 a commercial product . They are testing 2482 01:35:23,689 --> 01:35:26,040 it like a weapon . They have provided , 2483 01:35:26,100 --> 01:35:28,267 at least in Anthropic's case , they've 2484 01:35:28,267 --> 01:35:29,989 provided Mythos to like 50 big 2485 01:35:29,989 --> 01:35:32,560 companies for them to test and , and 2486 01:35:32,560 --> 01:35:34,282 stress test and figure out the 2487 01:35:34,282 --> 01:35:36,393 vulnerabilities . Microsoft is one of 2488 01:35:36,393 --> 01:35:38,282 those companies . They're turning 2489 01:35:38,282 --> 01:35:40,227 around and announcing like 270 new 2490 01:35:40,227 --> 01:35:42,270 patches just last week , which we 2491 01:35:42,270 --> 01:35:46,120 assume Mythos picked up , and I was so 2492 01:35:46,120 --> 01:35:48,231 concerned about this . new step we're 2493 01:35:48,231 --> 01:35:50,629 taking in the how it supercharges cyber 2494 01:35:50,629 --> 01:35:52,930 attacks that I did a big Zoom yesterday 2495 01:35:52,930 --> 01:35:56,029 with 350 Michiganders IT professionals 2496 01:35:56,029 --> 01:35:58,229 for our hospitals , our schools on how 2497 01:35:58,229 --> 01:36:01,350 to prepare for this threat . Um , is 2498 01:36:01,350 --> 01:36:04,910 the NSA or CyberCom testing Mythos 2499 01:36:04,910 --> 01:36:08,029 right now and using this moment to test 2500 01:36:08,029 --> 01:36:09,696 out our own vulnerabilities ? 2501 01:36:12,279 --> 01:36:14,209 Senator , this is a critically 2502 01:36:14,209 --> 01:36:16,376 important topic . Uh , I think the way 2503 01:36:16,376 --> 01:36:18,970 you described it was , uh . 2504 01:36:20,279 --> 01:36:24,240 Appropriate and uh you know . I , 2505 01:36:24,370 --> 01:36:26,592 I , what I don't want to do is speak to 2506 01:36:26,592 --> 01:36:28,648 one specific model . I think what we 2507 01:36:28,648 --> 01:36:32,109 need to think about is the application 2508 01:36:32,109 --> 01:36:35,240 and the access to early all future 2509 01:36:35,240 --> 01:36:37,569 models that we see in terms of the 2510 01:36:37,569 --> 01:36:41,299 capability that , uh , The 2511 01:36:41,299 --> 01:36:43,580 the most current models and the new 2512 01:36:43,580 --> 01:36:46,990 models . Potentially imply for both 2513 01:36:47,240 --> 01:36:49,770 defensive . I understand , but our 2514 01:36:49,770 --> 01:36:52,720 nation , our , our , our , our networks , 2515 01:36:52,810 --> 01:36:54,810 we have two companies , right , who 2516 01:36:54,810 --> 01:36:56,532 have , I mean , this is public 2517 01:36:56,532 --> 01:36:58,699 information , right ? They've come out 2518 01:36:58,699 --> 01:37:00,921 with these products in the past month . 2519 01:37:00,921 --> 01:37:03,088 It sent the cybersecurity world in the 2520 01:37:03,088 --> 01:37:05,310 commercial sector kind of spinning that 2521 01:37:05,310 --> 01:37:08,459 we now have this super . Charged AI 2522 01:37:08,459 --> 01:37:10,015 technology that finds these 2523 01:37:10,015 --> 01:37:12,070 vulnerabilities . I'm just asking if 2524 01:37:12,070 --> 01:37:14,015 the Pentagon or NSA is testing out 2525 01:37:14,015 --> 01:37:16,237 either of these two companies' models , 2526 01:37:16,237 --> 01:37:18,459 Senator . Again , we're , we're looking 2527 01:37:18,459 --> 01:37:20,680 at all models that we think have the 2528 01:37:20,680 --> 01:37:23,240 power that , uh , so associated you're , 2529 01:37:23,390 --> 01:37:25,446 I want you to be using them . I want 2530 01:37:25,446 --> 01:37:27,779 you to be experimenting with . Them and , 2531 01:37:27,779 --> 01:37:29,834 uh , but the Pentagon has had a very 2532 01:37:29,834 --> 01:37:31,946 public fight with anthropic . Again , 2533 01:37:31,946 --> 01:37:33,946 this is public information , so I'm 2534 01:37:33,946 --> 01:37:35,890 just making sure that the newest , 2535 01:37:35,890 --> 01:37:37,890 hottest AI empowered cybersecurity 2536 01:37:38,029 --> 01:37:40,251 models are being used by the Pentagon , 2537 01:37:40,669 --> 01:37:43,549 um , on cybersecurity . So I , I , I , 2538 01:37:43,669 --> 01:37:45,780 I'm taking your answer as yes , and , 2539 01:37:45,780 --> 01:37:47,947 and correct me if I'm wrong . Um , let 2540 01:37:47,947 --> 01:37:50,280 me turn to another topic and , you know , 2541 01:37:50,280 --> 01:37:52,447 we're heading towards a summit between 2542 01:37:52,447 --> 01:37:54,447 the president and Xi Jinping . Um , 2543 01:37:54,560 --> 01:37:57,040 Chinese president on May 14th , huge 2544 01:37:57,040 --> 01:37:59,207 deal , right , in the , in the world , 2545 01:37:59,207 --> 01:38:02,680 um , of negotiation and security . Um , 2546 01:38:02,790 --> 01:38:06,160 and I am just concerned that there's a , 2547 01:38:06,319 --> 01:38:08,879 uh , a topic on the table of allowing 2548 01:38:08,879 --> 01:38:11,212 Chinese vehicles into the United States . 2549 01:38:11,212 --> 01:38:13,157 And I think the Chinese have shown 2550 01:38:13,157 --> 01:38:15,640 themselves to be bad actors when it 2551 01:38:15,640 --> 01:38:18,279 comes to collecting data on American 2552 01:38:18,279 --> 01:38:20,919 citizens . They hacked the president 2553 01:38:20,919 --> 01:38:23,141 and vice presidents . Phones during the 2554 01:38:23,141 --> 01:38:26,143 campaign , salt typhoon , Volt typhoon 2555 01:38:26,143 --> 01:38:28,312 getting into our infrastructure . Um , 2556 01:38:28,433 --> 01:38:30,433 they stole a bunch of our records , 2557 01:38:30,433 --> 01:38:32,433 probably yours , definitely mine in 2558 01:38:32,433 --> 01:38:35,073 2016 from , um , OPM . I mean , they 2559 01:38:35,073 --> 01:38:37,752 are not positive actors , and this body 2560 01:38:37,752 --> 01:38:41,263 banned Huawei and TikTok , um , because 2561 01:38:41,263 --> 01:38:43,073 of the data they were taking on 2562 01:38:43,073 --> 01:38:45,735 Americans . So can you just say aloud , 2563 01:38:45,815 --> 01:38:48,096 I asked others in uniform this last 2564 01:38:48,096 --> 01:38:50,416 week , um , do you believe that 2565 01:38:50,416 --> 01:38:53,136 allowing in Chinese cars with LDAR and 2566 01:38:53,136 --> 01:38:55,905 full motion video , geolocation , the 2567 01:38:55,905 --> 01:38:58,335 ability to be hacked via Bluetooth , do 2568 01:38:58,335 --> 01:39:00,416 you believe that that is a threat to 2569 01:39:00,416 --> 01:39:02,305 our military bases , our critical 2570 01:39:02,305 --> 01:39:04,194 infrastructure , and generally to 2571 01:39:04,194 --> 01:39:06,083 collecting on American citizens ? 2572 01:39:09,520 --> 01:39:12,359 Yeah , Senator , I think uh we need to 2573 01:39:12,640 --> 01:39:14,418 take into account any potential 2574 01:39:14,418 --> 01:39:17,120 technological application that poses a 2575 01:39:17,120 --> 01:39:20,089 threat against our , our bases , our 2576 01:39:20,450 --> 01:39:22,672 Our service members and make sure we do 2577 01:39:22,672 --> 01:39:24,506 everything to , I would love the 2578 01:39:24,506 --> 01:39:26,561 chairman's help . I've tried for two 2579 01:39:26,561 --> 01:39:28,728 years in a row to ban Chinese vehicles 2580 01:39:28,728 --> 01:39:30,450 from our military bases . As I 2581 01:39:30,450 --> 01:39:32,561 understand it , abroad , our military 2582 01:39:32,561 --> 01:39:34,728 bases with all these Chinese cars they 2583 01:39:34,728 --> 01:39:36,839 can already get on . Um , they've got 2584 01:39:36,839 --> 01:39:39,061 15% market share in Mexico . So I would 2585 01:39:39,061 --> 01:39:41,283 hope that this committee could at least 2586 01:39:41,283 --> 01:39:43,339 do the banning of them collecting on 2587 01:39:43,339 --> 01:39:45,561 our military bases , and I yield back . 2588 01:39:45,799 --> 01:39:47,910 Thank you very much , Senator Slack , 2589 01:39:47,910 --> 01:39:50,729 and , um , and this concludes today's 2590 01:39:50,729 --> 01:39:52,507 hearing . I'd like to thank our 2591 01:39:52,507 --> 01:39:54,729 witnesses for their testimony , for the 2592 01:39:54,729 --> 01:39:56,896 information of members . Questions for 2593 01:39:56,896 --> 01:39:59,118 the record will be due to the committee 2594 01:39:59,118 --> 01:40:00,785 within 2 business days of the 2595 01:40:00,785 --> 01:40:02,951 conclusion of this hearing . Thank you 2596 01:40:02,951 --> 01:40:05,062 very , very much for your information 2597 01:40:05,062 --> 01:40:07,173 and your testimony today , and we are 2598 01:40:07,173 --> 01:40:07,569 adjourned .