WEBVTT

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The hearing will come to order .

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Welcome to our witnesses today and

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thank you for your service to this

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country . We look forward to hearing

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your testimony . As everyone here

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understands , the United States faces a

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very different threat environment than

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ever before . Our adversaries are

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developing non-ballistic threats ,

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including hypersonic and long-range

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cruise missiles designed to hold our

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homeland at risk . Our adversaries have

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also spent decades building

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multi-layered defensive systems often

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referred to in the past as anti-access

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area denial capabilities . While the

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department did begin programs to

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modernize our ability to defend against

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limited . At ICBM attacks from a rogue

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actor , the United States has failed to

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make a similar investment to defend

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against a broader range of attacks . We

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now have a real opportunity to build a

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homeland defense architecture capable

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of meeting the threats that we

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currently face . General Gutlein , you

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have been granted extraordinary

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authorities as the direct reporting

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program manager for Golden Dome . While

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I appreciate our conversations on

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Golden Dome in classified settings , I

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look forward to you sharing more with

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the American public this afternoon on

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why we need to improve our missile

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defense posture and how you plan to do

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so in a cost effective manner .

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Lieutenant General Collins , I look

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forward to hearing what progress has

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been made on enduring missile defense

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agency programs , including the next

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generation interceptor and glide phase

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interceptor , as well as how MDA is

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supporting Golden Dome . Assistant

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Secretary Berkowitz , your deep

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expertise in missile defense and

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deterrence policy is an invaluable

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resource for this department , and I

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appreciate your frankness and insight

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into the risks and the opportunities

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before us . General Lozano , the

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Army's contributions towards regional

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and forward deploy missile defense

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systems cannot be overstated . I look

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forward to hearing more about these

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systems and an update on the defense of

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Guam . With that , I would recognize

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Senator King for any opening remarks .

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Thank you , Madam Chair . I'm gonna

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submit my opening remarks for the

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record , some very detailed points that

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I think will come up in the hearing ,

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and we can proceed directly to our

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witnesses . Thank you . Thank you ,

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Senator King . Again , welcome to our

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panel today . Secretary Berkowitz ,

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would you begin with your opening

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comments , please ?

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Chairman Fisher , Ranking Member King ,

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and distinguished members of the

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committee , thank you for the

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opportunity to testify on the

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Department of War's missile defense

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activities . It's an honor to appear

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with my colleagues , General Gutlein ,

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Lieutenant General Collins , and

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Lieutenant General Lozano . America

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faces intensifying strategic

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competition in the security environment .

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The pace and scale of the threat is

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unprecedented . Our rivals are

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expanding , diversifying , and

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increasing the sophistication of their

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arsenals of missiles and aerial weapons .

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They are integrating offensive strike

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and missile defense systems into joint

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operations to deny access and impose

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costs by threatening America's safety ,

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territorial integrity , and economic

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prosperity . Rivals aim to undermine

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our political will , societal cohesion

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and morale , and ability to project

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power . President Trump is restoring

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American strength to meet these

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challenges and secure peace . He issued

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an executive order to field and operate

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the Golden Dome for America , a

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comprehensive next generation defense

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against the most catastrophic threats

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facing the United States . The Golden

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Dome will protect our homeland ,

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citizens , critical infrastructure ,

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and second strike capability . The

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president's Golden Dome for America

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initiative is the cornerstone of our

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homeland defense posture . It's a

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necessary and pragmatic response to the

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growing threat posed by ballistic ,

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hypersonic , and advanced cruise

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missiles , as well as other next

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generation aerial weapons . The Golden

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Dome will complement our nuclear

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deterrent . Today our capability to

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defend the nation is limited , and its

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effectiveness is eroding against

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increasingly advanced threats . The

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Golden Dome will rectify this by

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creating a layered defense and depth of

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the United States . It will defend

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against accidental , unauthorized ,

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rogue decapitation and coercive attacks .

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In contrast to the current limited

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defense system consisting of a single

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layer of ground-based mid-course

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defense interceptors , multiple

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terrestrial and space-based defensive

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layers will complicate adversary attack

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planning and provide more engagement

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opportunities to destroy incoming

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threats . Combined with the prospect of

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retaliation , the Golden Dome will

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strengthen deterrence by denying

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adversaries the ability to achieve

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their objectives through coercion or

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aggression . Moreover , it will save

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lives and limit damage should

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deterrence break down . The cost of the

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Golden Dome , while significant , is a

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necessary investment to protect assets

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of truly incalculable value , the lives

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of our citizens and the territory

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territorial integrity of our nation .

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The cost of failing to defend our

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homeland would be infinitely greater .

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China is our pacing competitor . We

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will deter China from a position of

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strength with the denial defense along

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the first island chain . Our regional

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missile defense posture centered on

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Aegis destroyers , as well as terminal

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high altitude area defense and Patriot

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batteries , provides a forward deployed ,

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layered integrated air and missile

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defense network . As Operation Epic

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Fury underscores , regional missile

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defense is essential to protect and

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defend our forces , allies , and

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partners . Our global alliances will

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remain a strategic vantage if our

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allies and partners invest properly in

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defense . The department will continue

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to pursue opportunities for missile

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defense and defeat cooperation to

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increase burden sharing capacity and

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interoperability . We're also

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supercharging the US defense industrial

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base by cutting bureaucratic red tape ,

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empowering program leaders to take

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calculated risks , and leveraging

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private sector innovation . We must

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accelerate the delivery of critical

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missile defense and defeat capabilities

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at scale . In closing , with the

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continued support of Congress , the War

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Department will invest in the missile

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defense and defeat programs necessary

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to achieve peace through strength .

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Thank you , and I look forward to your

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questions . Thank you , Mr . Secretary .

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General Gutlein , welcome . You are

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recognized for your opening comments .

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Chairwoman Fisher , Ranking Member King ,

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and distinguished members of the

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subcommittee , thank you for the

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opportunity to report on the progress

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of Golden Dome for America . We're here

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today because the global strategic

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landscape has changed . For the first

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time in a generation , our nation's

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margin of safety has vanished . While

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we have been focused on the away game ,

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our adversaries have been working

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around the clock to challenge us at

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home , and today , the homeland is

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exposed and relatively undefended . A

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new generation of advanced air and

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missile threats , unprecedented in

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their speed , numbers , and lethality ,

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now holds the American homeland at risk .

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Our adversaries are not just expressing

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the intent , they are demonstrating the

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capability to threaten our families and

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our way of life . This threat is not

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theoretical . We see it unfolding in

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front of our own eyes every day on our

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televisions . It is real . It is

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growing , and we must meet it with

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American resolve . Golden Dome for

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America is the administration's bold

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and decisive answer to this danger . It

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is the cornerstone of our strategy to

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rapidly improve the defensive equation

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of the homeland and to ensure peace

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through strength . This is not another

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weapons system . It is a layered

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integrated shield designed to defend

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the homeland against the full spectrum

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of advanced threats . This vision is

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ambitious , but it is achievable . The

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foundational technology exists today ,

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and we are moving with the utmost

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urgency to bring it to bear . Our

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strategy is built on speed ,

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affordability , and partnerships . My

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priority is establishing a unified

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command and control network to link our

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existing battle-proven systems and

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field credible defenses now . With the

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resources authorized by this community ,

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this committee , we are also investing

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in next generation technology to

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dramatically increase our defensive

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capacity and fundamentally drive down

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the cost per intercept for generations

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to come . Make no mistake , the

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greatest challenge here is not

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technical , it is organizational .

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Success requires forging unity of

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effort across the federal government ,

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and as the Golden Dome director , I

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have been granted unprecedented

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authorities to do just that . The

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leaders on this panel before you today

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along with NORTHCOM represent this new

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way of doing business . We are working

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as one team . NORTHCOM is my number one

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customer . The missile defense agency

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is integrating the architecture and

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delivering cutting edge capabilities .

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The Army is building the operational

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framework and policy is deterring our

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adversaries . In addition , we are

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transforming our relationship with the

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industrial base , using innovative

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partnerships and prize-based

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competitions to unleash the full power

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of American innovation . Golden Dome is

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a generational investment in the

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security of our nation . It is a

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promise to the American people and a

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clear message to our adversaries that

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their reckless and aggressive actions

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will not go unanswered . With your

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continued support and resourcing , we

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will deliver a defense that protects

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every American . We owe nothing less to

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our children and our children's

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children . Thank you , and I look

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forward to your questions . Thank you ,

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General Gutlain . General Collins ,

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welcome . You were recognized for your

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comments . Thank you , ma'am . Good

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afternoon , Chair Fisher , Ranking

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Member King , and distinguished members

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of the subcommittee . Thank you for

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your continued unwavering support of

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the missile defense mission . Since its

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initial founding as the Strategic

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Defense Initiative Office in 1983 , and

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through its current establishment as

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the Missile Defense Agency in 2002 ,

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the men and women of this missile

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defense enterprise have made the

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impossible possible , hitting a bullet

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with a bullet , and we have integrated

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disparate capabilities from services ,

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agencies , and nations into an

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effective weapons system proven in

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combat in recent years , months and

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days . We have developed , globally

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delivered , and evolved the missile

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defense system since it went

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operational in 2004 to address evolving

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threats , leverage new technology , and

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align with the nation's national policy .

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MDA has leveraged its extensive

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experience in integrating , testing ,

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and delivering technologically advanced

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missile defense systems to deliver on

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its promises and commitments to our

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nation and provide the warfighter the

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battle-proven lethal and effective

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systems that have saved thousands of

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lives . This team has adapted to the

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changing character of war , but the

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mission is not done . Recent operations

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have only highlighted the increasing ,

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increasing pace of change , and MDA is

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increasing our acquisition tempo to

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maintain relevancy . Today , MDA is

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pressing ahead to continue developing

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and delivering the disruptive , lethal ,

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resilient , agile , and affordable

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capabilities required today and

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tomorrow for the defense of the US

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homeland , our deployed forces , and

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our international partners . We

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continue our transformation into the

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fast and agile enterprise the nation

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needs , and we are renewing our focus

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on delivering cutting edge capabilities

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across the air , land , sea , and space

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domains . With the ongoing transition

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and transfer of proven missile defense

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systems , MDA will invest more

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purposefully in the development ,

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experimentation , integration , testing ,

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and delivery of breakthrough

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technologies and foundational missile

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defense capabilities . MDA will

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continue to develop and test system

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elements , components , and

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technologies for this new generation of

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capabilities , what we're calling

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Missile Defense System Next , and it

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will continue to operate as the system

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of systems integrator for the homeland

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defense architecture . Developed and

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delivered by the Office of the Golden

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Dome for America . MDA is aligned with

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Golden Dome , I with General Gutlein ,

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to deliver the critical capabilities

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required to defend our homeland and our

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nation's interests . In closing , I'd

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like to honor those who have paid the

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ultimate price in the service to our

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country and thank those warfighters ,

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civilians , contractor professionals ,

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and their families , uh , of those

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operating the missile defense system

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around the world , around the clock in

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harm's way today . They honor us with

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their selflessness and sacrifice . I

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greatly appreciate your steadfast

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support for MDA and your commitment to

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providing the resources necessary to

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execute the missile defense mission .

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Recent conflicts have proven and

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cemented the vital role missile defense

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plays in the strategic environment and

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on the battlefield . Thank you . I look

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forward to your questions . Thank you ,

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General Collins . General Lozano , you

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are recognized for your comments , sir .

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Chairman Fisher , Ranking Member King ,

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and members of this subcommittee ,

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thank you for the opportunity to appear

13:35.846 --> 13:37.623
before you today to discuss the

13:37.623 --> 13:39.790
criticality of defending the island of

13:39.790 --> 13:41.568
Guam . On behalf of Army senior

13:41.568 --> 13:43.512
leadership , we thank you for your

13:43.512 --> 13:45.512
continued support of our soldiers ,

13:45.512 --> 13:47.790
sailors , airmen , marines , guardians ,

13:47.809 --> 13:50.809
civilians , and their families . Guam

13:50.809 --> 13:53.142
is an undisputable part of the homeland ,

13:53.142 --> 13:55.198
and I cannot overstate its strategic

13:55.198 --> 13:57.330
criticality as the home of American

13:57.330 --> 13:59.809
citizens . Defending Guam is

13:59.809 --> 14:02.640
unquestionable . It is a

14:02.640 --> 14:04.929
geostrategic location that makes it

14:04.929 --> 14:07.130
central to the deterrence efforts

14:07.409 --> 14:09.169
against our adversaries in the

14:09.169 --> 14:11.609
Indo-Pacific , serving as a critical

14:11.609 --> 14:14.440
hub for power projection , logistics ,

14:14.690 --> 14:17.770
and regional operations . Our ongoing

14:17.770 --> 14:20.070
efforts center on defending against

14:20.070 --> 14:22.929
increasingly sophisticated and evolving

14:22.929 --> 14:25.630
threats . As the joint program

14:25.630 --> 14:27.690
acquisition executive , our

14:27.690 --> 14:29.301
organization is charged with

14:29.301 --> 14:31.634
synchronizing the development , testing ,

14:31.634 --> 14:33.246
integration , fielding , and

14:33.246 --> 14:35.412
sustainment of the Guam defense system

14:35.412 --> 14:38.049
components . These components span

14:38.049 --> 14:40.609
across 25 prototype efforts and

14:40.609 --> 14:43.409
programs of record in the Army , Air

14:43.409 --> 14:45.650
Force , Navy , and the missile Defense

14:45.650 --> 14:48.210
Agency . The joint program acquisition

14:48.210 --> 14:50.369
executive also serves as the material

14:50.369 --> 14:52.890
developer for the Guam Defense System

14:52.890 --> 14:55.669
battle manager . This suite of products

14:55.669 --> 14:57.630
allows current service and agency

14:57.630 --> 14:59.789
developed weapons systems and command

14:59.789 --> 15:02.190
and control to behave as a unified

15:02.190 --> 15:04.960
system . Guam currently hosts multiple

15:04.960 --> 15:07.127
systems that not only deliver critical

15:07.127 --> 15:09.630
defensive capabilities but also provide

15:09.630 --> 15:11.710
soldiers with valuable training and

15:11.710 --> 15:14.349
hands-on experience . In the past year ,

15:14.429 --> 15:16.549
the army has fielded a lower tier air

15:16.549 --> 15:18.969
missile defense sensor known as LTAMS ,

15:19.429 --> 15:21.429
and that battery is on the island .

15:21.429 --> 15:23.760
Additionally , a terminal high altitude

15:23.760 --> 15:26.070
area defense battery known as Task

15:26.070 --> 15:28.679
Force Talon is fully integrated and

15:28.679 --> 15:30.909
actively operated by soldiers stationed

15:30.909 --> 15:34.650
there . And ANTIPY6 radar panel

15:34.650 --> 15:36.817
provided by the missile defense agency

15:36.817 --> 15:38.849
also serves as a key element of the

15:38.849 --> 15:40.793
Guam defense system architecture ,

15:40.969 --> 15:44.530
contributing to a comprehensive 360

15:44.530 --> 15:47.130
degree coverage of the island with

15:47.130 --> 15:49.609
initial operating capability taking

15:49.609 --> 15:52.640
place in fiscal year 27 , the GDS

15:52.640 --> 15:55.369
architecture will continue to evolve to

15:55.369 --> 15:57.280
outpace the threat and could

15:57.280 --> 15:59.280
incorporate new technologies in the

15:59.280 --> 16:02.380
future such as directed energy . Thank

16:02.380 --> 16:04.491
you once again for the opportunity to

16:04.491 --> 16:06.324
be here . I look forward to your

16:06.324 --> 16:08.658
questions about the Guam defense system .

16:08.658 --> 16:10.547
Thank you . Thank you , General .

16:10.549 --> 16:12.700
Assistant Secretary Berkowitz , I'd

16:12.700 --> 16:14.799
like to begin with you and General

16:14.799 --> 16:17.859
Gutlein in this setting .

16:19.159 --> 16:23.080
What threats is GDA being designed to

16:23.080 --> 16:25.679
defend against and perhaps more

16:25.679 --> 16:28.460
importantly , how well is the homeland

16:28.460 --> 16:30.659
defended against those threats today ?

16:32.109 --> 16:34.331
Uh , thank you for the opportunity to ,

16:34.331 --> 16:37.559
uh , to underscore a critical rationale

16:37.559 --> 16:40.640
for the program . Um , as I indicated

16:40.640 --> 16:43.640
in my opening statements , um , we are

16:43.640 --> 16:45.440
in a very complex and dangerous

16:45.440 --> 16:47.880
security environment where our rivals

16:47.880 --> 16:50.260
have , uh , dramatically expanded .

16:50.700 --> 16:53.630
Their missile and aerial arsenals . Um ,

16:53.940 --> 16:55.884
those include ballistic missiles ,

16:55.940 --> 16:58.619
hypersonic missiles , advanced cruise

16:58.619 --> 17:01.059
missiles , and other advanced aerial

17:01.059 --> 17:03.859
weapons systems . Um , the threat they

17:03.859 --> 17:06.140
pose , whether nuclear armed or even

17:06.140 --> 17:09.579
conventional , are , are truly grave

17:09.579 --> 17:12.579
threats to our homeland , to the

17:12.579 --> 17:14.690
American population , to our critical

17:14.690 --> 17:16.690
infrastructures , and to our second

17:16.690 --> 17:18.690
strike capability . And that is the

17:18.690 --> 17:20.579
reason why the president took the

17:20.579 --> 17:23.050
initiative to , uh , to order the

17:23.050 --> 17:25.106
department to pursue the Golden Dome

17:25.106 --> 17:27.979
Initiative . Um . If you could remind

17:27.979 --> 17:29.868
me about your second part of your

17:29.868 --> 17:31.757
question , please , can we defend

17:31.757 --> 17:33.701
against those threats today ? Um ,

17:34.020 --> 17:37.040
today we have a very limited ,

17:37.579 --> 17:41.290
um , Ground-based , uh ,

17:41.439 --> 17:44.140
single layer homeland defense system

17:44.239 --> 17:46.540
that was specifically designed against

17:46.760 --> 17:49.079
a small-scale rogue attack from North

17:49.079 --> 17:53.079
Korea . And we have very

17:53.079 --> 17:56.839
limited capability against any other

17:56.839 --> 17:59.061
attack with ballistic missiles , and we

17:59.061 --> 18:01.030
have no defense against hypersonic

18:01.030 --> 18:04.359
weapons or cruise missiles today . I

18:04.359 --> 18:06.470
should say advanced cruise missiles .

18:06.470 --> 18:08.581
General Gutla , would you like to add

18:08.581 --> 18:10.692
anything to that ? Yes , Chairwoman .

18:10.692 --> 18:12.859
So Golden Dome is designed to go after

18:12.859 --> 18:15.192
the next generation aerial threats , uh ,

18:15.192 --> 18:17.303
which includes , uh , unmanned aerial

18:17.303 --> 18:19.303
systems against our homeland , uh ,

18:19.303 --> 18:21.526
cruise missiles , hypersonic , uh , and

18:21.526 --> 18:23.581
maneuvering hypersonic missiles , as

18:23.581 --> 18:25.581
well as ballistics from the air and

18:25.581 --> 18:27.637
ballistics from the sea . Today , as

18:27.637 --> 18:29.859
Secretary Berkowitz discussed , we were

18:29.859 --> 18:31.803
really focused on the rogue nation

18:31.803 --> 18:33.748
intercontinental ballistic missile

18:33.748 --> 18:35.803
threat to protect the homeland , and

18:35.803 --> 18:37.859
then we relied on our oceans to take

18:37.859 --> 18:39.803
the fight to the enemy . Uh , that

18:39.803 --> 18:41.803
distance has been quickly eroded by

18:41.803 --> 18:43.970
their technology . Uh , so Golden Dome

18:43.970 --> 18:46.137
is is protecting for both conventional

18:46.137 --> 18:47.970
threats that we see unfolding on

18:47.970 --> 18:49.859
television every day , as well as

18:49.859 --> 18:51.970
nuclear capable threats that could be

18:51.970 --> 18:54.137
brought against the homeland . General

18:54.137 --> 18:56.137
Gutlein , in the president's fiscal

18:56.137 --> 18:58.415
year 27 budget request for Golden Dome ,

18:58.415 --> 19:02.359
it included uh over $17 billion

19:02.359 --> 19:05.160
in the mandatory portion of the request .

19:05.180 --> 19:07.780
In this setting , can you tell us why

19:07.780 --> 19:10.420
it is critical for these funds to be

19:10.420 --> 19:13.540
provided to Golden Dome this cycle and

19:13.540 --> 19:15.859
what happens if we wait to fund these

19:15.859 --> 19:19.500
programs until fiscal , fiscal year 28

19:19.500 --> 19:22.670
or even later ? Thank you , Chairman ,

19:22.750 --> 19:24.972
for that , that question . Uh , today ,

19:24.972 --> 19:26.694
as we stated , the homeland is

19:26.694 --> 19:28.806
relatively undefended , and what we ,

19:28.806 --> 19:30.917
our number one objective is to change

19:30.917 --> 19:33.028
the homeland defense equation as fast

19:33.028 --> 19:35.194
as we , as we possibly can , uh , with

19:35.194 --> 19:36.917
the objective of delivering an

19:36.917 --> 19:38.806
operational capability to protect

19:38.806 --> 19:38.469
against those next generation aerial

19:38.469 --> 19:41.349
threats by the summer of 2028 . And are

19:41.349 --> 19:45.329
you , are you ready , um , in your plan

19:45.910 --> 19:48.910
to be able to put that $17 billion to ,

19:49.310 --> 19:53.239
to good use and then to be ready in FY

19:53.239 --> 19:56.829
28 , uh , for more funding to continue

19:56.829 --> 19:58.996
the buildout ? Absolutely , Chairman .

19:59.219 --> 20:01.497
Chairman , Chairman , we've completely ,

20:01.497 --> 20:03.052
uh , uh , gotten the entire

20:03.052 --> 20:05.108
architecture approved . Uh , we know

20:05.108 --> 20:07.219
what the testing strategy is going to

20:07.219 --> 20:09.386
be to get us to the summer of 28 , and

20:09.386 --> 20:09.140
we are postured to rapidly put those

20:09.140 --> 20:11.199
funds on contract , uh , efficiently

20:11.199 --> 20:12.859
and affordably to deliver an

20:12.859 --> 20:15.081
operational capability in the summer of

20:15.081 --> 20:17.430
28 . Great . And what's the total

20:17.430 --> 20:19.949
projected cost of Golden Dome and , and

20:19.949 --> 20:22.510
how will you ensure that the taxpayers'

20:22.510 --> 20:25.369
money is gonna be spent responsibly ?

20:25.510 --> 20:29.380
What what's gonna happen if portions of

20:29.380 --> 20:32.810
the planned architecture turn out to be .

20:33.719 --> 20:36.469
Not feasible , uh , from a cost

20:36.469 --> 20:38.839
perspective . Chairman , that's a great

20:38.839 --> 20:40.895
question . Currently , the estimated

20:40.895 --> 20:43.061
cost of Golden Dome with the objective

20:43.061 --> 20:46.520
architecture out into the 2030s is $185

20:46.520 --> 20:48.687
billion . That's the $175 billion that

20:48.687 --> 20:50.798
the president announced when he stood

20:50.798 --> 20:52.909
up Golden Dome plus an additional $10

20:52.909 --> 20:54.464
billion to accelerate space

20:54.464 --> 20:54.400
capabilities that were not originally

20:54.400 --> 20:56.880
part of our architecture . We have

20:56.880 --> 20:58.880
built the foundation of Golden Dome

20:58.880 --> 21:02.319
upon a scalable , uh , modular

21:02.319 --> 21:05.069
architecture . Using affordable

21:05.069 --> 21:06.902
elements and taking advantage of

21:06.902 --> 21:09.069
competition , innovation from industry

21:09.069 --> 21:11.291
to deliver those elements , and we have

21:11.291 --> 21:13.402
scaled it so that it is multi-layered

21:13.402 --> 21:16.329
and uh integrated . If any component of

21:16.329 --> 21:18.662
the architecture cannot deliver on time ,

21:18.662 --> 21:20.662
we have pathways to pivot away from

21:20.662 --> 21:22.607
that and , and embrace a different

21:22.607 --> 21:24.829
technology . Thank you , General Guttle

21:24.829 --> 21:27.410
and Senator King . I have a much , much

21:27.410 --> 21:29.521
more general , couple of more general

21:29.521 --> 21:31.430
questions . Number one , I'm very

21:31.430 --> 21:33.541
concerned about the way this is being

21:33.541 --> 21:36.400
funded . In this year's budget , almost

21:36.400 --> 21:39.880
25% of the budget is in this uh

21:40.920 --> 21:44.040
reconciliation slush fund that doesn't

21:44.040 --> 21:46.096
go through the normal appropriations

21:46.096 --> 21:48.207
process . It makes defense a partisan

21:48.640 --> 21:50.918
process , which I think is unfortunate .

21:51.280 --> 21:54.290
And I , I don't , I mean , the senator

21:54.290 --> 21:56.346
and I were here in the days of OCO .

21:56.346 --> 21:58.930
This is son of OCCO , and it's a fund

21:58.930 --> 22:01.229
that doesn't have the oversight of the

22:01.229 --> 22:03.250
United States Congress . Yes , it's

22:03.250 --> 22:05.139
authorized by Congress , but in a

22:05.139 --> 22:07.410
purely partisan way . And since I've

22:07.410 --> 22:09.632
been sitting on this committee , all of

22:09.632 --> 22:11.910
our work has been bipartisan until now .

22:12.479 --> 22:14.930
And I don't understand how this all

22:14.930 --> 22:17.152
happened , and you talk about mandatory

22:17.152 --> 22:19.374
spending . Mandatory spending is Social

22:19.374 --> 22:22.010
Security and Medicare . This isn't

22:22.010 --> 22:24.066
mandatory spending , and this is the

22:24.066 --> 22:26.232
American taxpayers' dollars , and it's

22:26.232 --> 22:28.288
our responsibility to shepherd those

22:28.288 --> 22:31.520
dollars and to approve and work through

22:31.520 --> 22:33.410
and have oversight over programs

22:33.410 --> 22:35.410
created . I thought Mr . Harwich is

22:35.410 --> 22:37.299
interesting . You said it was the

22:37.299 --> 22:39.569
president's initiative and continued

22:39.569 --> 22:41.736
support of Congress . So the president

22:41.736 --> 22:43.791
gets to say we're going to do a $150

22:43.791 --> 22:45.958
200 dollars , $300 billion project and

22:45.958 --> 22:48.291
Congress can sit meekly by and say , OK ,

22:48.291 --> 22:50.513
we'll write the check for you . I don't

22:50.513 --> 22:52.625
understand . I'm , I'm very disturbed

22:52.625 --> 22:54.902
by the precedent that this has created ,

22:54.902 --> 22:56.847
which is basically for this year I

22:56.847 --> 22:59.013
understand is about 25% of the defense

22:59.013 --> 23:01.280
budget is out of the consideration of

23:01.280 --> 23:03.336
the Appropriations Committee and the

23:03.336 --> 23:05.280
Armed Services Committee , and the

23:05.280 --> 23:07.502
chairman of our committee is reduced to

23:07.502 --> 23:09.669
saying . Will you hopefully follow the

23:09.669 --> 23:11.891
precedents of Congress ? We've heard it

23:11.891 --> 23:14.058
saying at mutual at multiple committee

23:14.058 --> 23:16.113
meetings rather than the the process

23:16.113 --> 23:18.280
that is supposed to take place , which

23:18.280 --> 23:20.502
is the president proposes that Congress

23:20.502 --> 23:22.613
considers the risks and the costs and

23:22.613 --> 23:25.079
and enables and authorizes the program .

23:25.640 --> 23:27.807
I , I don't know if any of you want to

23:27.807 --> 23:29.973
respond to this , but I really am very

23:29.973 --> 23:32.140
concerned about the process that we're

23:32.140 --> 23:33.973
talking about here . None of you

23:33.973 --> 23:33.880
personally have any responsibility ,

23:33.979 --> 23:36.130
but . But we're talking about taking

23:36.349 --> 23:38.869
25% of the defense budget away from the

23:38.869 --> 23:40.480
Appropriations Committee and

23:40.480 --> 23:42.536
effectively away from the , from the

23:42.536 --> 23:44.258
authorizing the Armed Services

23:44.258 --> 23:47.069
Committee and handing it to OMB . In

23:47.069 --> 23:49.125
the White House , that's not the way

23:49.125 --> 23:51.236
our system is supposed to work . Mr .

23:51.236 --> 23:53.347
Horwitz , can you give me some reason

23:53.347 --> 23:55.513
why it should be done this way and not

23:55.513 --> 23:57.458
through the ordinary appropriation

23:57.458 --> 23:59.513
process that's stood this country in

23:59.513 --> 23:59.410
good stead for a couple of 100 years .

24:00.859 --> 24:03.081
Uh , yes , Senator , I'd like to answer

24:03.081 --> 24:06.209
the question , um . My understanding is

24:06.209 --> 24:09.949
that um the the rationale for uh

24:09.949 --> 24:11.838
making the request as part of the

24:11.838 --> 24:14.469
reconciliation part of the budget is to

24:14.469 --> 24:16.949
accelerate the president's initiative

24:17.189 --> 24:19.300
and to provide a flexibility . That's

24:19.300 --> 24:21.467
another way of saying we don't want to

24:21.467 --> 24:23.411
mess with that messy congressional

24:23.411 --> 24:25.356
thing where they consider and have

24:25.356 --> 24:27.522
hearings , right ? You just want to do

24:27.522 --> 24:29.633
it . Because the president wants it ,

24:29.633 --> 24:31.967
is that what you're saying ? Accelerate ?

24:31.967 --> 24:31.589
No , sir . What I'm saying is that this

24:31.589 --> 24:34.560
is a one-time request for a plus up to

24:34.560 --> 24:36.616
accelerate . This is the 2nd year of

24:36.616 --> 24:38.782
reconciliation . This isn't a one-time

24:38.782 --> 24:40.949
request . This is year number 2 . Um ,

24:40.949 --> 24:43.171
the other part of the rationale is that

24:43.171 --> 24:45.449
it provides flexibility given the , uh ,

24:45.449 --> 24:47.449
the changing , the rapidly changing

24:47.449 --> 24:49.616
dynamic of advanced technology , sir .

24:49.819 --> 24:52.560
Well , I , I , I really don't like this ,

24:52.569 --> 24:54.680
uh , process . I think it's , I think

24:54.680 --> 24:56.902
it's a huge mistake and I think we're ,

24:57.270 --> 24:59.437
Congress , it's one more abdication of

24:59.437 --> 25:01.770
Congress's responsibility and authority ,

25:01.770 --> 25:03.770
uh , to take care of the taxpayers'

25:03.770 --> 25:06.339
money . Um , General Lozano , what's

25:06.339 --> 25:08.617
the cost of defending Guam , the , the ,

25:08.617 --> 25:10.728
uh , what you outlined , what's the ,

25:10.728 --> 25:12.939
what's the total cost of the , of the

25:12.939 --> 25:14.828
defense that you outlined in your

25:14.828 --> 25:18.800
testimony ? Uh ,

25:18.869 --> 25:20.980
thank you , sir , for your question .

25:20.980 --> 25:23.640
Um , right now we're tracking a total

25:23.640 --> 25:27.359
cost of about 3.5 billion ,

25:27.520 --> 25:31.439
sir . OK , 3.5 billion . So the total

25:31.439 --> 25:33.661
cost of Golden Dome projected , I think

25:33.661 --> 25:36.750
is $175 billion divide that . I'm not

25:36.750 --> 25:38.806
very good at doing math in my head ,

25:38.806 --> 25:41.028
but , uh , that comes out . What , what

25:41.028 --> 25:43.250
is it ? I , I , I'll , I'll do it right

25:43.250 --> 25:47.160
in , in front of you , divided by 3.5 .

25:48.439 --> 25:52.119
Uh , it would be about 50,000 .

25:53.349 --> 25:55.589
Times that I mean we're we're talking

25:55.589 --> 25:57.949
about a very significant cost . General

25:57.949 --> 26:00.430
Gutlein , can you do Golden Dome and

26:00.430 --> 26:02.486
protect like Guam is being protected

26:02.630 --> 26:05.750
with that $175 billion budget ? We can

26:05.750 --> 26:07.750
absolutely protect the homeland for

26:07.750 --> 26:10.310
$175 billion . Senator . The difference

26:10.310 --> 26:12.979
is Guam is a point defense , and it is ,

26:12.989 --> 26:15.310
uh , uh , uh , needs to be

26:15.310 --> 26:17.254
self-contained and self-defended ,

26:17.254 --> 26:19.421
whereas the protection of the homeland

26:19.421 --> 26:21.477
is an area defense . It's similar to

26:21.477 --> 26:23.588
you say area defense . What does that

26:23.588 --> 26:23.479
mean ? That means the whole country ,

26:23.589 --> 26:25.811
Montana , isn't necessarily going to be

26:25.811 --> 26:27.589
protected or Iowa Iowa . You're

26:27.589 --> 26:29.756
protecting everything simultaneously .

26:29.756 --> 26:31.700
So if you were trying to protect a

26:31.700 --> 26:31.650
single jewel in a museum . You would

26:31.650 --> 26:33.817
have to put down an enormous amount of

26:33.817 --> 26:35.706
protection measures and defensive

26:35.706 --> 26:37.928
measures to protect that one jewel . If

26:37.928 --> 26:37.800
you step back and you're trying to

26:37.800 --> 26:40.260
protect the entire museum , you can now

26:40.260 --> 26:42.579
go back to a regional defense , protect

26:42.579 --> 26:44.357
the perimeter without having to

26:44.357 --> 26:46.357
dedicate all those point defenses .

26:46.357 --> 26:48.190
That's really the big difference

26:48.190 --> 26:50.301
between the way we're protecting Guam

26:50.301 --> 26:49.530
and the way we're going to protect the

26:49.530 --> 26:51.859
homeland . So the , the budget that you

26:51.859 --> 26:53.748
have , you can protect the entire

26:53.748 --> 26:55.699
homeland , the , the villages of

26:55.699 --> 26:58.900
Louisiana or New Mexico or Montana or

26:58.900 --> 27:01.569
Maine . Uh , with the system that

27:01.569 --> 27:03.736
you're proposing , it's not , it's not

27:03.736 --> 27:05.791
designed to protect particular areas

27:05.791 --> 27:07.958
like the national capital or the major

27:07.958 --> 27:09.958
metropolitan areas . Golden Dome is

27:09.958 --> 27:12.180
designed to protect the entire homeland

27:12.180 --> 27:14.236
from that array of threats , whether

27:14.236 --> 27:16.458
that be counter UAS , cruise missiles ,

27:16.458 --> 27:18.680
hypersonics , or even , ballistics from

27:18.680 --> 27:20.902
the air , ballistics from the sea , the

27:20.902 --> 27:20.609
entire homeland to include Alaska and

27:20.609 --> 27:22.729
Hawaii . And after Guam , uh , the

27:22.729 --> 27:24.729
defense of Guam is delivered , Guam

27:24.729 --> 27:26.673
will be part of the defense of the

27:26.673 --> 27:28.618
homeland as well . My time is up .

27:28.618 --> 27:28.290
We'll have a 2nd round , I presume ,

27:28.410 --> 27:32.380
Madam Chair . Yes . Since

27:32.380 --> 27:34.602
we have no other members here , I think

27:34.602 --> 27:36.936
we'll continue if you're good with that ,

27:36.936 --> 27:39.158
Senator King . Uh , General Gutlein and

27:39.158 --> 27:41.380
General Collins , I have a question for

27:41.380 --> 27:43.547
you . Can you walk us through the role

27:43.547 --> 27:45.491
that Missile Defense Agency has in

27:45.491 --> 27:48.439
supporting Golden Dome ? I don't know

27:48.439 --> 27:50.606
how you wanna work this . Who wants to

27:50.606 --> 27:52.939
start ? Uh , if you're OK , Madam Chair ,

27:52.939 --> 27:54.939
uh , Chairwoman , I'll start . Uh ,

27:55.079 --> 27:57.246
what we wanted to do is take advantage

27:57.246 --> 27:59.468
of the vast resources and the expertise

27:59.468 --> 28:01.579
of the Missile Defense Agency , which

28:01.579 --> 28:03.412
has been around , uh , for , for

28:03.412 --> 28:05.523
several , uh , decades . So under the

28:05.523 --> 28:07.746
authorities' memo that the Secretary of

28:07.746 --> 28:09.912
War gave me . They aligned the Missile

28:09.912 --> 28:11.968
Defense Agency under the operational

28:11.968 --> 28:14.190
control of Golden Dome to do the system

28:14.190 --> 28:16.135
to systems integration , to do the

28:16.135 --> 28:18.468
testing , and to do the transition from ,

28:18.468 --> 28:20.579
uh , uh , development into operations

28:20.579 --> 28:22.801
to take advantage of the vast expertise

28:22.801 --> 28:24.857
and resources of the missile Defense

28:24.857 --> 28:27.079
Agency . So under Golden Dome , General

28:27.079 --> 28:29.190
Collins is actually dual-hatted as my

28:29.190 --> 28:30.857
deputy for systems to systems

28:30.857 --> 28:32.968
engineering , as well as the director

28:32.968 --> 28:34.690
for the missile Defense Agency

28:35.010 --> 28:37.177
reporting to the director for research

28:37.177 --> 28:39.010
and engineering within the , the

28:39.010 --> 28:41.232
Department of War . Thank you , General

28:41.232 --> 28:43.800
Collins and in your answer , if you

28:43.800 --> 28:45.967
could , if you could talk a little bit

28:45.967 --> 28:47.959
about that integration that we did

28:47.959 --> 28:50.126
yesterday at our meeting in classified

28:50.126 --> 28:52.348
and if you could bring that up a little

28:52.348 --> 28:54.829
bit . Yes , ma'am . Thank you . Uh ,

28:55.400 --> 28:57.400
certainly , uh , to build on , uh ,

28:57.400 --> 28:59.678
General Gutlein's , uh , comments , uh ,

28:59.678 --> 29:01.678
missile defense agency , uh , and I

29:01.678 --> 29:03.900
mentioned in my opening comments , uh ,

29:03.900 --> 29:06.122
we have a long history of integrating ,

29:06.122 --> 29:08.344
uh , disparate capabilities into , uh ,

29:08.344 --> 29:10.511
effective combat proven , uh , missile

29:10.511 --> 29:12.622
defense systems , uh , and . Uh , the

29:12.622 --> 29:14.844
big asset , uh , that comes with Golden

29:14.844 --> 29:17.122
Dome is , is part of that as well . Uh ,

29:17.122 --> 29:19.122
one additional thing I , I , we are

29:19.122 --> 29:21.178
also an acquirer of , of a number of

29:21.178 --> 29:23.344
that , of those capabilities as well .

29:23.344 --> 29:23.339
So we are acquiring capabilities to

29:23.339 --> 29:25.228
deliver , uh , and then we're the

29:25.228 --> 29:27.450
integration lead for Golden Dome across

29:27.450 --> 29:29.617
all the services and agencies as we go

29:29.617 --> 29:31.783
forward . Uh , that integration role ,

29:31.783 --> 29:33.950
uh , really covers down on a number of

29:33.950 --> 29:35.672
different , uh , parts of what

29:35.672 --> 29:37.506
integration means . There's Uh ,

29:37.506 --> 29:39.561
there's program integration , making

29:39.561 --> 29:41.395
sure all of the acquisitions and

29:41.395 --> 29:41.270
deliveries and schedules are integrated ,

29:41.390 --> 29:43.334
integrated together . Uh , earlier

29:43.334 --> 29:45.501
today , ma'am , we talked about , uh ,

29:45.501 --> 29:47.612
an integrated master schedule and how

29:47.612 --> 29:49.723
we're , uh , in an integrating office

29:49.723 --> 29:52.001
that we stood up , uh , are really the ,

29:52.001 --> 29:53.668
the source of bringing in the

29:53.668 --> 29:55.779
capabilities , uh , and the schedules

29:55.779 --> 29:55.349
from all of the different partners ,

29:55.550 --> 29:57.661
integrating those together so General

29:57.661 --> 29:59.949
Gule has insight , uh , into execution

29:59.949 --> 30:02.005
as well as all the interdependencies

30:02.005 --> 30:03.893
across the , uh , Uh , across the

30:03.893 --> 30:06.005
enterprise . Uh , another integration

30:06.005 --> 30:08.060
is systems integration , more of the

30:08.060 --> 30:10.171
technical integration piece . Uh , my

30:10.171 --> 30:12.282
chief engineer at the Missile Defense

30:12.282 --> 30:14.449
Agency has worked shoulder to shoulder

30:14.449 --> 30:16.782
with General Gule's chief engineer . Uh ,

30:16.782 --> 30:18.505
and they really make sure that

30:18.505 --> 30:20.338
technically , uh , the technical

30:20.338 --> 30:22.393
integration , the requirements , the

30:22.393 --> 30:21.770
interfaces , and the management of

30:21.770 --> 30:23.819
those interfaces are tied together

30:23.819 --> 30:26.152
seamlessly so that when the kit arrives ,

30:26.209 --> 30:28.380
it all works together as a single

30:28.380 --> 30:30.491
weapon system . Uh , and then we're ,

30:30.491 --> 30:32.713
we're building below that as well . How

30:32.713 --> 30:34.824
do we integrate with operations ? How

30:34.824 --> 30:34.650
do we integrate with , integrate with

30:34.650 --> 30:36.983
the warfighter interagency and the like .

30:36.983 --> 30:38.983
And so all of those are part of the

30:38.983 --> 30:41.206
integrating office and it's really part

30:41.206 --> 30:43.428
of the DNA of Missile Defense Agency in

30:43.428 --> 30:45.539
support of General Gutline and Golden

30:45.539 --> 30:47.706
Dome for America . I'd ask any witness

30:47.706 --> 30:51.010
this we're looking at a generational

30:51.010 --> 30:53.420
investment here in homeland defense and

30:53.650 --> 30:56.089
we wanna make sure it's , um , it's

30:56.089 --> 30:58.290
going to be what we need in order to

30:58.290 --> 31:01.569
meet the threats that we have . Are you ,

31:01.589 --> 31:04.969
um , working with industry so we have

31:05.069 --> 31:07.969
the best concepts and technology

31:08.310 --> 31:12.069
available for this and when you , when

31:12.069 --> 31:14.469
you work with industry partners , the ,

31:14.630 --> 31:17.969
the 2nd and 3rd tier of suppliers , um ,

31:18.229 --> 31:20.349
are you making sure that those supply

31:20.349 --> 31:22.869
lines , uh , can't be exploited in the

31:22.869 --> 31:26.060
future or even now ? The Chairwoman ,

31:26.109 --> 31:28.109
I'll take that . We are absolutely

31:28.109 --> 31:30.550
working in partnership with industry .

31:30.630 --> 31:32.686
I have personally met with well over

31:32.686 --> 31:35.469
400 individual companies over the past

31:35.469 --> 31:38.829
6 to 8 months to , to share with them

31:38.829 --> 31:40.885
my problems , but also to understand

31:40.885 --> 31:43.479
how they can solve our problems . Uh ,

31:43.560 --> 31:45.227
we have , uh , stood up to C2

31:45.227 --> 31:47.282
consortium , the Command and Control

31:47.282 --> 31:49.338
Consortium , which includes both the

31:49.338 --> 31:51.504
traditional contractors as well as new

31:51.504 --> 31:53.727
entrants . Uh , they are , there are 11

31:53.727 --> 31:53.599
of them now working in partnership to

31:53.599 --> 31:55.821
deliver our next generation command and

31:55.821 --> 31:57.821
control capability . And then as of

31:57.821 --> 31:59.877
last week , we stood up what we call

31:59.877 --> 32:02.043
the ecosystem hub . Uh , the ecosystem

32:02.043 --> 32:04.210
hub is a one-stop shop for industry to

32:04.210 --> 32:06.210
come do business with Golden Dome .

32:06.210 --> 32:08.099
It's a single point of entry . It

32:08.099 --> 32:10.432
includes two-way communications to , uh ,

32:10.432 --> 32:12.655
uh , have transparent dialogue back and

32:12.655 --> 32:14.321
forth . Uh , it has strategic

32:14.321 --> 32:16.321
matchmaking . I can connect them to

32:16.321 --> 32:18.599
anybody in the federal government , uh ,

32:18.599 --> 32:20.710
that may be in need of their services

32:20.710 --> 32:22.932
or their capabilities . Uh , it has a ,

32:22.932 --> 32:25.099
a , security and resilience element to

32:25.099 --> 32:27.266
it . We have brought on companies like

32:27.266 --> 32:29.321
Exeter and Govini to do supply chain

32:29.321 --> 32:31.488
resilience down to the multiple levels

32:31.488 --> 32:33.543
deep into the supply chain , uh , to

32:33.543 --> 32:35.543
look for alternatives to expand the

32:35.543 --> 32:37.710
supply chain , uh , and diversify it .

32:37.710 --> 32:39.766
And then we have also partnered them

32:39.766 --> 32:41.932
with a red team that goes in and helps

32:41.932 --> 32:41.910
them figure out . How the threat's

32:41.910 --> 32:43.799
going to manifest itself , how to

32:43.799 --> 32:45.910
protect and defend themselves against

32:45.910 --> 32:47.521
that threat , uh , in a very

32:47.521 --> 32:49.799
transparent and partnering type manner .

32:49.799 --> 32:49.510
So we're embracing industry like we've

32:49.510 --> 32:51.621
never embraced industry in the past .

32:52.050 --> 32:56.030
Thank you , General Senator King . Uh

32:57.140 --> 32:59.196
What's the estimate of the number of

32:59.196 --> 33:01.839
missiles , UAVs , and other uh attack

33:01.839 --> 33:04.900
uh elements that China has ?

33:06.550 --> 33:10.130
What do we know ? Senator , those

33:10.130 --> 33:12.408
numbers are classified , uh , but they ,

33:12.410 --> 33:14.632
they , they range depending on the type

33:14.632 --> 33:16.743
of threat from several 100 to several

33:16.743 --> 33:18.910
tens of thousands . Well , I guess one

33:18.910 --> 33:20.966
of my questions about Golden Dome is

33:20.966 --> 33:22.966
that the cornerstone of our defense

33:22.966 --> 33:24.688
strategy for 80 years has been

33:24.688 --> 33:26.449
deterrence . Mutually assured

33:26.449 --> 33:28.505
destruction , and we lived through a

33:28.505 --> 33:30.616
period of the second half of the 20th

33:30.616 --> 33:32.671
century where we faced an aggressive

33:32.800 --> 33:35.209
adversary with a lot of capability ,

33:35.280 --> 33:37.224
strategic missiles , bombers , the

33:37.224 --> 33:40.979
whole range . Without any golden

33:40.979 --> 33:44.290
dome . And what protected us

33:44.290 --> 33:48.089
wasn't sensors and and missiles ,

33:48.209 --> 33:51.849
but the idea of deterrence that if we

33:51.849 --> 33:53.849
are struck , we will strike back in

33:53.849 --> 33:56.209
such a way as to impose unacceptable

33:56.209 --> 33:59.270
costs on the adversary . What has

33:59.270 --> 34:02.849
changed ? That makes this

34:03.849 --> 34:07.349
new initiative necessary from

34:07.609 --> 34:09.609
the experience that we had with the

34:09.609 --> 34:11.776
Soviet Union in the in the second half

34:11.776 --> 34:14.129
of the of the 20th century . They had

34:14.129 --> 34:16.330
bombers , they had missiles , they had

34:16.330 --> 34:18.949
strategic capability , they had ICBMs .

34:19.479 --> 34:21.423
Uh , and that's what we're talking

34:21.423 --> 34:24.129
about that , that China has . Why is it

34:24.129 --> 34:26.639
that we suddenly need a , a , a defense

34:26.639 --> 34:29.969
shield when we went without one for 70

34:29.969 --> 34:32.908
years and it worked ? Mr . Horowitz ,

34:33.438 --> 34:35.605
thank you for the question , Senator .

34:36.250 --> 34:38.489
And I'm , I'm not , I am being a little

34:38.489 --> 34:40.711
argumentative , but I'm , I'm genuinely

34:41.219 --> 34:43.610
skeptical and want to understand why

34:43.610 --> 34:45.929
we're , why this is necessary now when

34:45.929 --> 34:48.169
it wasn't necessary when we faced a

34:48.169 --> 34:50.010
similar threat , perhaps more

34:50.010 --> 34:52.232
aggressive from the Soviet Union . Um ,

34:52.649 --> 34:54.760
well , thank you for the question . I

34:54.760 --> 34:56.871
think it is a very important question

34:56.871 --> 34:58.816
that the Congress and the American

34:58.816 --> 35:01.129
public . must understand to be able to

35:01.129 --> 35:03.340
support the program's rationale . What

35:03.340 --> 35:05.340
I'd say is that the strategic

35:05.340 --> 35:07.396
environment has changed dramatically

35:07.396 --> 35:09.580
since the end of the Cold War and that

35:09.580 --> 35:11.879
we're no longer facing just a single

35:12.409 --> 35:14.739
monolithic threat . Uh , we're now

35:14.739 --> 35:17.560
facing multiple nuclear armed rivals

35:18.219 --> 35:20.919
who have increasingly sophisticated .

35:22.060 --> 35:24.340
missile and aerial capabilities first

35:24.340 --> 35:26.062
off . The second thing I'd say

35:26.062 --> 35:28.062
deterrence , I mean , we're , while

35:28.062 --> 35:30.229
this is all going on , we're upgrading

35:30.229 --> 35:32.229
our own triad very substantially in

35:32.229 --> 35:35.860
terms of our ICBMs in terms of

35:35.860 --> 35:38.689
new bombers and new nuclear submarines ,

35:38.780 --> 35:41.699
so . Why won't deterrence work with

35:41.699 --> 35:43.810
China if it worked for 50 years or 80

35:43.810 --> 35:47.300
years with the Russians ? I believe

35:47.300 --> 35:49.244
that strategic stability cannot be

35:49.244 --> 35:52.780
based on US societal vulnerability to

35:52.780 --> 35:55.620
assured retaliation . Our competitors

35:55.620 --> 35:57.760
clearly do not accept that their

35:58.010 --> 36:00.121
Societal vulnerability contributes to

36:00.121 --> 36:03.379
stability . Both Russia and China ,

36:04.120 --> 36:06.800
and for that matter , other actors have

36:06.800 --> 36:09.239
long pursued their own integrated air

36:09.239 --> 36:11.520
and missile defense systems . Their

36:11.520 --> 36:13.760
objections to US missile defenses are

36:13.760 --> 36:15.871
not really about preserving strategic

36:15.871 --> 36:18.038
stability . They're aimed at weakening

36:18.038 --> 36:19.816
or constraining our own defense

36:19.816 --> 36:22.040
capabilities that would complicate

36:22.040 --> 36:24.379
their ability to use coercive threats

36:24.600 --> 36:27.479
or to attack the United States . In

36:27.479 --> 36:29.423
short , what they've been doing is

36:29.423 --> 36:31.368
insisting that US vulnerability is

36:31.368 --> 36:33.201
stabilizing while simultaneously

36:33.201 --> 36:35.399
rejecting such vulnerability for

36:35.399 --> 36:37.830
themselves . As I said earlier , um ,

36:38.360 --> 36:40.360
the Golden Dome is intended to be a

36:40.360 --> 36:42.360
complement to our nuclear deterrent

36:42.570 --> 36:44.570
because in , because in conjunction

36:44.570 --> 36:47.379
with our nuclear triad . A homeland

36:47.379 --> 36:49.601
missile defense capability will provide

36:49.601 --> 36:52.419
us both a sword and a shield that will

36:52.419 --> 36:55.139
have a synergistic benefit to

36:55.139 --> 36:56.972
strengthen deterrence and should

36:56.972 --> 36:58.972
deterrence fail , it will provide a

36:58.972 --> 37:01.669
means to protect the territorial

37:01.669 --> 37:03.780
integrity of the nation and the lives

37:03.780 --> 37:06.002
of our citizens . Thank you , General .

37:06.500 --> 37:08.722
Knowing that we're in an open setting .

37:09.060 --> 37:11.171
Can you explain how Golden Dome would

37:11.171 --> 37:13.116
work ? You , you , in answer to my

37:13.116 --> 37:15.338
question about Guam , you said , well ,

37:15.338 --> 37:17.171
this isn't like Guam . We're not

37:17.171 --> 37:19.282
protecting particular places . By the

37:19.282 --> 37:21.504
way , I , I did my math . If we , if we

37:21.504 --> 37:23.727
protected particular places in the US ,

37:23.727 --> 37:25.893
we could do 50 if we had the same cost

37:25.893 --> 37:27.782
that we have in Guam . But you're

37:27.782 --> 37:30.116
saying the system doesn't work that way .

37:30.116 --> 37:32.116
Can you , can you give us the , the

37:32.116 --> 37:34.004
concept of , of how it would work

37:34.004 --> 37:35.949
rather than having THAAD batteries

37:35.949 --> 37:38.729
around Kansas City , for example ? If

37:38.729 --> 37:40.570
you look at the way we

37:43.969 --> 37:46.025
absolutely , ranking member , if you

37:46.025 --> 37:48.302
look at the way we fight the away game ,

37:48.302 --> 37:50.413
every one of our weapons systems have

37:50.413 --> 37:49.729
to be self-contained so that it can

37:49.729 --> 37:51.729
operate in a bare bones environment

37:51.729 --> 37:54.007
that it can operate independently , uh ,

37:54.007 --> 37:56.340
disconnected from the larger enterprise .

37:56.340 --> 37:58.451
That is not the way we need to defend

37:58.451 --> 38:00.618
the United States . Rather than having

38:00.618 --> 38:00.520
all those point defenses being able to

38:00.520 --> 38:02.909
operate independently . We can actually

38:02.909 --> 38:04.850
bring that capability back to the

38:04.850 --> 38:07.040
United States , integrate it , network

38:07.040 --> 38:09.510
it in new and innovative ways , layer

38:09.510 --> 38:11.288
it , bring to bear multi-domain

38:11.288 --> 38:13.399
capabilities , automate it , uh , and

38:13.399 --> 38:15.500
then take advantage of the next

38:15.500 --> 38:17.222
generation level of processing

38:17.222 --> 38:19.333
artificial intelligence to make sense

38:19.333 --> 38:21.556
out of a greater array of data to get a

38:21.556 --> 38:23.611
better fire control solution . So it

38:23.611 --> 38:25.500
allows us doesn't it the missiles

38:25.500 --> 38:28.110
coming from China . What's the defense

38:28.719 --> 38:31.919
Is it a , is it a , I mean , you used a

38:31.919 --> 38:34.197
lot of words there , but I still don't ,

38:34.197 --> 38:36.252
I , I , I , I , are we still talking

38:36.252 --> 38:38.280
about Thads and Patriots , or we're

38:38.280 --> 38:40.280
talking about uh something entirely

38:40.280 --> 38:42.560
different ? Frank , remember we're

38:42.560 --> 38:44.560
talking about something different .

38:44.560 --> 38:46.504
Well , tell us what it is . We are

38:46.504 --> 38:48.671
integrating and networking an array of

38:49.120 --> 38:52.399
effectors and an array of sensors using

38:52.399 --> 38:55.550
next-gen technology . To get a greater

38:56.090 --> 38:58.530
magazine depth at a lower cost per

38:58.530 --> 39:01.750
intercept . OK , so when you talk

39:01.750 --> 39:03.972
magazine depth , we still are talking .

39:04.810 --> 39:08.719
Some kind of kinetic response . We are

39:08.719 --> 39:10.886
talking about kinetics . We're talking

39:10.886 --> 39:13.080
about , uh , uh , uh , non-kinetics .

39:13.449 --> 39:15.810
We're talking about left of launch . Uh ,

39:15.939 --> 39:17.995
we are talking about a whole host of

39:17.995 --> 39:20.050
capabilities and a layered effect to

39:20.050 --> 39:22.217
include directed energy . And bring it

39:22.217 --> 39:24.500
to bear in new and innovative ways . We

39:24.500 --> 39:26.620
cannot go into the specifics of the

39:26.620 --> 39:28.787
effectors nor the magazine depth , but

39:28.787 --> 39:30.898
it is a different set of capabilities

39:30.898 --> 39:32.898
than what we currently have for the

39:32.898 --> 39:34.953
away game . You said directed energy

39:34.953 --> 39:36.953
just because you knew that that was

39:36.953 --> 39:36.939
something I was going to respond to .

39:37.139 --> 39:39.306
Thank you . Yeah , it does . It does .

39:39.780 --> 39:41.891
Thank you very much . And again , I'm

39:41.891 --> 39:44.113
not trying to be argumentative , but my

39:44.113 --> 39:46.336
job is to represent the American people

39:46.336 --> 39:48.558
who I think deserve to understand . How

39:48.558 --> 39:50.780
this thing would work , why we're doing

39:50.780 --> 39:52.891
it , whether it will in fact increase

39:52.891 --> 39:54.891
our security , and as I said at the

39:54.891 --> 39:57.169
beginning , uh , how it's being funded .

39:57.169 --> 39:56.780
Thank you . Thank you very much ,

39:56.820 --> 40:00.709
gentlemen . Thank

40:00.709 --> 40:03.989
you , Senator King . If Senator Rosen's

40:03.989 --> 40:07.149
ready , she just joined us . Take your

40:07.149 --> 40:10.379
time , get a breath . Before 5:30 , but

40:10.790 --> 40:13.810
today I was uh you made good time then .

40:14.800 --> 40:17.899
OK , good to see you .

40:19.909 --> 40:22.020
Good afternoon , everyone . Thank you

40:22.020 --> 40:24.187
for being here . Thank you for holding

40:24.187 --> 40:26.540
the hearing and uh . Thank you for your

40:26.540 --> 40:28.620
service to our country . I really

40:28.620 --> 40:31.070
appreciate that and uh . Well

40:32.489 --> 40:34.378
I'm gonna talk a little bit about

40:34.409 --> 40:36.419
Golden Dome and the vulnerabilities

40:36.419 --> 40:38.586
that are there . Wait , I'm gonna move

40:38.586 --> 40:40.863
this a little bit closer . There we go .

40:40.899 --> 40:42.489
So the proposed Golden Dome

40:42.489 --> 40:44.600
architecture represents a significant

40:44.600 --> 40:46.979
expansion of the US missile defense

40:46.979 --> 40:49.570
network . Integrating a wide variety of

40:49.570 --> 40:51.792
systems , numerous touch points that of

40:51.792 --> 40:54.429
course have to be protected . An

40:54.429 --> 40:56.707
example would be the command , control ,

40:56.707 --> 40:58.818
battle management , and communication

40:58.818 --> 41:00.985
system that serves as a global network

41:00.985 --> 41:03.207
linking disparate disparate sensors and

41:03.207 --> 41:05.669
shooters . So , General Gutlein , can

41:05.669 --> 41:07.891
you talk to me about how the department

41:07.891 --> 41:10.310
is addressing the wide variety of

41:10.310 --> 41:12.477
systems and numerous touch points that

41:12.477 --> 41:14.810
need to be protected in such a complex

41:14.949 --> 41:18.510
interconnected system ? Thank you ,

41:18.590 --> 41:20.646
Senator . The , the threats that you

41:20.646 --> 41:22.979
were talking about are , are , are , uh .

41:23.239 --> 41:25.489
Very detrimental to our capabilities .

41:25.879 --> 41:27.935
When we first stood up Golden Dome ,

41:27.935 --> 41:30.157
the first thing we did was architecting

41:30.157 --> 41:32.046
cyber resiliency from the start .

41:32.046 --> 41:33.879
Whereas traditionally our legacy

41:33.879 --> 41:36.046
systems had to be uh architected after

41:36.046 --> 41:38.212
the fact , we actually brought to bear

41:38.212 --> 41:40.323
cyber resiliency from the beginning .

41:40.323 --> 41:42.490
Then we stood up a what we call the uh

41:42.490 --> 41:44.860
GDA ecosystem hub . It's actually a

41:44.860 --> 41:47.489
collaborative effort with industry , uh ,

41:47.500 --> 41:50.379
to help them protect their IP and to

41:50.379 --> 41:52.546
protect their systems . So we have red

41:52.546 --> 41:54.546
teams that can go into industry and

41:54.620 --> 41:56.620
show them how the threat's going to

41:56.620 --> 41:58.787
manifest itself and how to protect and

41:58.787 --> 42:00.898
defend themselves against that threat

42:00.898 --> 42:03.064
in a very collaborative and partnering

42:03.064 --> 42:05.231
way going forward . From a command and

42:05.231 --> 42:07.231
control perspective , we brought to

42:07.231 --> 42:09.287
bear some of the leaders of industry

42:09.287 --> 42:11.287
that know how to do this . They are

42:11.287 --> 42:13.398
architecting in cyber resiliency from

42:13.398 --> 42:15.564
the very foundation of our command and

42:15.564 --> 42:17.750
control capability that brings to bear

42:17.750 --> 42:20.770
all the legacy C2 systems . Uh , GDA

42:20.770 --> 42:22.881
becomes basically the glue layer , if

42:22.881 --> 42:25.103
you will , uh , federating all of these

42:25.103 --> 42:27.270
in a machine to machine interface with

42:27.270 --> 42:29.326
cyber resiliency as a foundation . I

42:29.326 --> 42:31.548
think that's really critical because if

42:31.548 --> 42:33.603
we don't work with the public sector

42:33.603 --> 42:35.937
that interconnectivity that puts points ,

42:35.937 --> 42:35.639
every touch points a point of

42:35.639 --> 42:39.560
vulnerability to your point and um . I

42:39.560 --> 42:41.719
wanna talk about building on that . I

42:41.719 --> 42:43.775
appreciate what you're doing there ,

42:43.775 --> 42:45.830
bringing in industry partners , uh ,

42:45.830 --> 42:47.997
building that cyber resiliency in from

42:47.997 --> 42:50.052
the bottom or from the bottom , from

42:50.052 --> 42:52.108
the top , from , from every side , I

42:52.108 --> 42:51.959
guess we'll say it like that , but I

42:51.959 --> 42:54.310
wanna ask you that . To consider that

42:54.600 --> 42:57.560
adversaries like China are employing

42:57.560 --> 43:00.000
already jamming capabilities , other

43:00.000 --> 43:02.389
technical means to confuse our missile

43:02.389 --> 43:04.679
defense systems , what measures are you

43:04.679 --> 43:06.429
taking then to , to ensure the

43:06.429 --> 43:08.760
integrity of the data layer and prevent

43:08.760 --> 43:10.927
that cyber interference from degrading

43:10.927 --> 43:12.704
our defensive response during a

43:12.704 --> 43:16.439
conflict ? We have built in a layered ,

43:16.790 --> 43:19.110
uh , set of capabilities , multi-domain

43:19.110 --> 43:21.221
set of capabilities so that we do not

43:21.221 --> 43:23.277
have a single point of failure . And

43:23.277 --> 43:25.166
where we can , we have pulled our

43:25.166 --> 43:27.388
capabilities off of the grid to be able

43:27.388 --> 43:29.166
to operate independently at the

43:29.166 --> 43:31.166
tactical edge if necessary . And if

43:31.166 --> 43:33.443
they are disconnected from the broader ,

43:33.443 --> 43:35.554
uh , enterprise , if you will . Thank

43:35.554 --> 43:37.721
you . Um , I want to move on to talk a

43:37.721 --> 43:39.777
little bit about , um , some lessons

43:39.777 --> 43:41.832
learned in missile defense . Because

43:41.832 --> 43:43.999
our current real world air and missile

43:43.999 --> 43:46.221
defense in the Middle East in Ukraine ,

43:46.479 --> 43:48.368
uh , well , we know they provided

43:48.368 --> 43:50.312
insights into how advanced air and

43:50.312 --> 43:52.423
missile defense systems perform under

43:52.423 --> 43:54.535
extreme stress . So these engagements

43:54.535 --> 43:56.201
have highlighted not only the

43:56.201 --> 43:58.035
effectiveness of layered defense

43:58.035 --> 44:00.257
architectures but also the challenges ,

44:00.257 --> 44:02.146
and I so appreciate your focus on

44:02.146 --> 44:04.201
resiliency , redundancy , and all of

44:04.201 --> 44:06.201
that . It's just critical . But the

44:06.201 --> 44:08.590
challenges are posed by high volume ,

44:08.879 --> 44:11.101
mixed threat types . It includes cruise

44:11.101 --> 44:12.879
missiles , ballistic missiles ,

44:12.879 --> 44:14.990
unmanned aerial systems , in addition

44:14.990 --> 44:16.823
to adversary tactics designed to

44:16.823 --> 44:19.310
exploit our system's limitations . So

44:19.310 --> 44:21.879
General Collins , can you describe how

44:21.879 --> 44:23.879
the department is incorporating the

44:23.879 --> 44:26.101
lessons learned from the recent air and

44:26.101 --> 44:28.101
missile defense operations into its

44:28.101 --> 44:30.719
testing and evaluation evaluation

44:30.719 --> 44:32.830
process and what steps are you , um ,

44:33.229 --> 44:35.959
Are you taking going forward to uh uh

44:35.969 --> 44:39.439
validate , um , or update our systems

44:39.439 --> 44:41.550
before they're deployed again ? Thank

44:41.550 --> 44:43.830
you , Senator Rosen . Uh , very

44:43.830 --> 44:45.886
important question . We've certainly

44:45.886 --> 44:47.941
had a number of lessons learned over

44:47.941 --> 44:49.774
the last couple of years in , in

44:49.774 --> 44:51.663
Ukraine , as you mentioned , uh ,

44:51.663 --> 44:51.659
defense of Israel , as well as in just

44:51.659 --> 44:53.826
the last couple of months with , I was

44:53.826 --> 44:55.937
gonna say the Middle East too , but ,

44:55.937 --> 44:55.590
uh , we'll stick to this and very much

44:55.590 --> 44:57.870
in , in OEF as well . Uh , and I think

44:57.870 --> 44:59.570
you've really tagged into the

44:59.590 --> 45:01.812
increasing complexity and a scale and a

45:01.812 --> 45:04.560
layering that we have not seen or , uh ,

45:04.669 --> 45:06.669
or planned for in the past . It's ,

45:06.669 --> 45:09.002
it's really , uh , it's increasing at a ,

45:09.002 --> 45:11.113
at a , at a . It's an ever-increasing

45:11.113 --> 45:13.336
rate , and the ability to do integrated

45:13.336 --> 45:13.149
battle management and integrated

45:13.149 --> 45:15.260
command and control is , is paramount

45:15.260 --> 45:17.427
to the success of these weapon systems

45:17.427 --> 45:20.149
going forward . We have , uh , during

45:20.149 --> 45:23.590
the , uh , operation , we meet with the

45:23.590 --> 45:25.701
warfighter every single day . We pull

45:25.701 --> 45:27.949
data from the systems every single day

45:27.949 --> 45:30.179
and analyze every data source from

45:30.179 --> 45:32.629
every weapon system . And we have been

45:32.629 --> 45:35.669
feeding that data back to the operators .

45:36.070 --> 45:37.959
Uh , they have been making , uh ,

45:37.959 --> 45:40.181
tactics changes , technique , procedure

45:40.181 --> 45:42.126
changes within a day of seeing the

45:42.126 --> 45:43.959
adversary make a change as we go

45:43.959 --> 45:45.626
forward . In addition , we're

45:45.626 --> 45:47.909
distilling those down into upgrades and

45:47.909 --> 45:50.020
advancements . Of the weapons systems

45:50.020 --> 45:52.235
that we are responsible for , uh , as

45:52.235 --> 45:54.402
well as , uh , you know , working with

45:54.402 --> 45:56.457
the army on their systems . Uh , and

45:56.457 --> 45:58.513
we've put hundreds of updates out to

45:58.513 --> 46:00.457
the field in the last two years to

46:00.457 --> 46:02.965
Aegis , to THAAD , to C2BMC , uh , in

46:02.965 --> 46:05.187
response to the capabilities that we've

46:05.187 --> 46:07.459
seen , uh , There are still

46:07.459 --> 46:09.570
capabilities that we need to continue

46:09.570 --> 46:11.515
to drive forward in . Uh , I think

46:11.515 --> 46:13.348
salvo size and the complexity of

46:13.348 --> 46:15.515
integrated salvo size , uh , is a , is

46:15.515 --> 46:17.620
a very , uh , tough problem to scale

46:17.620 --> 46:20.020
the system into as we move forward .

46:20.100 --> 46:22.156
One of our key technology thrusts in

46:22.156 --> 46:24.267
the future for Missile Defense Agency

46:24.267 --> 46:26.489
and in support of Golden Dome . Uh , is

46:26.489 --> 46:28.322
to make sure that we can get the

46:28.322 --> 46:30.322
lethality , affordability , and the

46:30.322 --> 46:32.322
scalability into the future weapons

46:32.322 --> 46:34.433
systems that we bring to bear so that

46:34.433 --> 46:36.656
we can really get the magazine depth at

46:36.656 --> 46:38.767
the as affordable cost as possible to

46:38.767 --> 46:40.933
take out these threats . Uh , and then

46:40.933 --> 46:40.590
with the agility of open systems

46:40.590 --> 46:43.449
architectures , Uh , and government

46:43.449 --> 46:45.770
ownership of the baselines and the

46:45.770 --> 46:47.770
technology baselines , that's gonna

46:47.770 --> 46:49.770
help us be agile as well as we move

46:49.770 --> 46:49.129
forward . I think those are all

46:49.129 --> 46:51.296
fundamental things that we're bringing

46:51.296 --> 46:53.462
to bear to make sure we're as agile as

46:53.462 --> 46:55.629
possible against this , uh , nefarious

46:55.629 --> 46:57.740
threat . Well , thank you . I have so

46:57.740 --> 46:59.907
many more questions . I'll submit them

46:59.907 --> 47:02.129
for the record , but yes . Oh , can I ?

47:02.129 --> 47:04.330
OK , I didn't know . Oh , OK . Well ,

47:04.409 --> 47:07.010
thank you . Well , I wanted to kind of

47:07.010 --> 47:09.250
finish up on this because , um .

47:09.979 --> 47:11.701
There's been a high demand and

47:11.701 --> 47:13.646
expenditure of our missile defense

47:13.646 --> 47:15.757
systems , right ? So what's the state

47:15.757 --> 47:17.757
of our inventory and our industry's

47:17.757 --> 47:19.899
capacity to replenish , um , those

47:19.899 --> 47:21.899
missile reserves ? How , how are we

47:21.899 --> 47:23.843
gonna do ? How do you think we are

47:23.843 --> 47:26.066
faring on that ? We're coming up on the

47:26.066 --> 47:28.800
NDAA , um , so many lessons learned

47:29.100 --> 47:31.211
about what's going on between Ukraine

47:31.211 --> 47:33.378
and the Middle East about what else we

47:33.378 --> 47:35.378
need to do , but can you talk to me

47:35.378 --> 47:37.656
about that ? Yes , Senator . Uh , well ,

47:37.656 --> 47:39.822
the , well , the inventories are , are

47:39.822 --> 47:39.439
sensitive and we could , uh , uh , we

47:39.439 --> 47:41.383
could take those , uh , the actual

47:41.383 --> 47:43.929
numbers offline . Uh , scale is

47:43.929 --> 47:46.207
extremely important as we move forward .

47:46.207 --> 47:48.373
And for a couple of years now , I've ,

47:48.373 --> 47:50.262
I've , I've been in , uh , in the

47:50.262 --> 47:52.429
hearings talking about our , we needed

47:52.429 --> 47:54.651
increased focus on capacity and , and ,

47:54.651 --> 47:56.707
and we have been building a capacity

47:56.707 --> 47:58.929
debt , uh , where we have not maximized

47:58.929 --> 48:01.207
our production lines to meet the needs ,

48:01.207 --> 48:03.540
uh , that the warfighter has identified .

48:03.540 --> 48:05.485
Uh , that changed last year . Uh ,

48:05.485 --> 48:07.429
Deputy Feinberg , Deputy Secretary

48:07.429 --> 48:09.596
Feinberg has really focused , uh , the

48:09.596 --> 48:11.485
Munitions Acceleration Council on

48:11.485 --> 48:13.651
engaging industry , bringing the right

48:13.651 --> 48:15.762
sustained focus , the right sustained

48:15.762 --> 48:17.985
resources , uh , to move the needle and

48:17.985 --> 48:20.459
speed up capacity to what we need , uh ,

48:20.580 --> 48:22.802
not what fits in , uh , to the budget .

48:22.939 --> 48:25.106
And , uh , and that's a very different

48:25.106 --> 48:27.510
way to look at this problem . Uh , we

48:27.929 --> 48:30.669
will , it will take time , uh , to

48:30.810 --> 48:33.060
scale the , the , uh , supply chain ,

48:33.290 --> 48:35.512
uh , to grow it and , and receive the ,

48:35.512 --> 48:37.568
we have to identify it and before we

48:37.568 --> 48:39.568
can begin to scale it and where the

48:39.568 --> 48:41.679
challenges are . Yes , ma'am . And in

48:41.679 --> 48:43.790
this president's budget that has been

48:43.790 --> 48:45.957
released , uh , there is a significant

48:45.957 --> 48:47.734
increase to all of the critical

48:47.734 --> 48:49.790
munitions that we require to include

48:49.790 --> 48:52.012
missile defense interceptor inventories

48:52.012 --> 48:54.068
as we move forward , uh , and then I

48:54.068 --> 48:56.123
would just say , uh . We got here by

48:56.123 --> 48:57.846
not having sustained focus and

48:57.846 --> 49:00.068
resources on , on munitions . We really

49:00.068 --> 49:02.179
need to sustain the resources and the

49:02.179 --> 49:04.401
focus on munitions in the years to come

49:04.401 --> 49:06.568
to replenish the stocks and get us the

49:06.568 --> 49:08.901
magazine depth that we need . Thank you .

49:08.901 --> 49:11.123
I , can I ask one more about staffing ?

49:11.123 --> 49:13.290
Well , perfect . I have , I have a few

49:13.290 --> 49:13.149
more , but uh , I'll finish up with

49:13.149 --> 49:16.070
this one . I wanna , wanna stay with

49:16.070 --> 49:19.360
you again , General Collins . Um , our

49:19.360 --> 49:22.000
missile defense agency staffing , so if

49:22.000 --> 49:23.889
you're the director , you oversee

49:23.889 --> 49:26.729
global organization , 9000 military ,

49:26.879 --> 49:29.046
civilian , and contract personnel , so

49:29.046 --> 49:30.768
a lot of people . So given the

49:30.768 --> 49:33.239
ambitious , uh , Golden Dome initiative ,

49:33.639 --> 49:35.750
uh , how is the administration's push

49:35.750 --> 49:37.639
to reduce the federal workforce ,

49:37.639 --> 49:39.528
eliminate contracts affected your

49:39.528 --> 49:41.695
agency's ability to really manage this

49:41.695 --> 49:43.806
massive expansion ? How do you get to

49:43.806 --> 49:45.972
be nimble , bring in the people that .

49:45.972 --> 49:48.195
You need to as you're learning more and

49:48.195 --> 49:50.195
more every day the data sets coming

49:50.195 --> 49:52.810
down every day from real time , um , um ,

49:53.729 --> 49:56.729
events in the , uh , AOR and theater is

49:56.729 --> 49:59.070
really changing what we , what we know .

49:59.209 --> 50:02.929
So how are you , um , um , managing

50:02.929 --> 50:06.070
this massive expansion for Golden Dome ,

50:06.649 --> 50:08.929
uh , dwindling missile stockpiles , of

50:08.929 --> 50:10.929
course you have to collaborate with

50:10.929 --> 50:13.169
industry , um . And work with our

50:13.169 --> 50:15.449
allies . So tell me or tell us what ,

50:15.600 --> 50:17.822
what you need to do , what we should be

50:17.822 --> 50:20.010
thinking about as , as we manage this

50:20.010 --> 50:21.899
going forward , seeing what we're

50:21.899 --> 50:24.232
learning every single day . Yes , ma'am .

50:24.429 --> 50:26.707
Uh , I will say missile defense agency ,

50:26.707 --> 50:28.651
uh , a strength of missile defense

50:28.651 --> 50:30.689
agency is the long depth of , of

50:30.689 --> 50:32.911
knowledge and experience we have , uh ,

50:33.489 --> 50:35.489
with an unmatched commitment to the

50:35.489 --> 50:37.489
mission from the entire workforce ,

50:37.489 --> 50:39.545
whether they be the civilians , uh ,

50:39.545 --> 50:41.822
the , the military , or the contractor ,

50:41.822 --> 50:43.989
and we continue to have that . Uh , we

50:43.989 --> 50:46.156
have , we have reduced the size of the

50:46.156 --> 50:48.378
missile defense agency last year . Uh ,

50:48.378 --> 50:50.600
but we were specific in focusing on the

50:50.600 --> 50:52.711
on areas that made us faster and made

50:52.711 --> 50:54.933
us more agile as we move forward , uh ,

50:54.933 --> 50:56.933
and we're at a , at a manning level

50:56.933 --> 50:59.419
today that continues to support , uh ,

50:59.439 --> 51:01.389
us moving faster . Do you have the

51:01.389 --> 51:03.639
authority though to hire people in new

51:03.639 --> 51:06.080
areas or things that are emerged as

51:06.080 --> 51:08.191
you're learning from what's happening

51:08.191 --> 51:10.191
real time , you may see you need to

51:10.191 --> 51:12.439
plus up on something in a place you

51:12.439 --> 51:14.649
didn't expect , right ? Yes , ma'am .

51:14.790 --> 51:16.790
Uh , as the director of the missile

51:16.790 --> 51:18.512
Defense Agency , I do have the

51:18.512 --> 51:20.512
flexibility to pivot , identify the

51:20.512 --> 51:22.734
competencies that we require , uh , and

51:22.734 --> 51:24.734
then the authorities to go hire the

51:24.734 --> 51:26.957
right people into the right professions

51:26.957 --> 51:29.179
and whether that's , uh , engaging them

51:29.179 --> 51:31.401
through contract hirings or through the

51:31.401 --> 51:33.568
civilian workforce as well , uh , I do

51:33.568 --> 51:33.320
have hiring , uh , authorities , uh ,

51:33.370 --> 51:35.592
to be able to identify those . uh , and

51:35.592 --> 51:37.814
we have started , uh , some tiger teams

51:37.814 --> 51:39.981
within the agency to make sure we do a

51:39.981 --> 51:42.885
full competency survey . Of the agency

51:42.885 --> 51:44.996
to identify if there's any areas that

51:44.996 --> 51:47.163
we , uh , we may be a little thin on ,

51:47.163 --> 51:49.274
especially as we move into some new ,

51:49.274 --> 51:51.552
new areas like artificial intelligence ,

51:51.552 --> 51:53.552
machine learning , even some of the

51:53.552 --> 51:53.264
applications of that to quantum and

51:53.264 --> 51:55.208
crypto and those types . Those are

51:55.208 --> 51:57.153
probably some growth areas that we

51:57.153 --> 51:59.264
still need to , uh , uh , address and

51:59.264 --> 52:01.320
get to . Uh , and then I'll tell you

52:01.320 --> 52:00.504
the last thing that we're probably

52:00.504 --> 52:02.671
really fortunate because we're located

52:02.671 --> 52:04.893
in Huntsville , Alabama , we're located

52:04.893 --> 52:07.060
in Colorado Springs , we're located in

52:07.060 --> 52:09.226
the Northern Virginia area . Fantastic

52:09.226 --> 52:11.448
incubators for technical talent . Yes ,

52:11.448 --> 52:13.671
ma'am . Yeah , well , thank you . Thank

52:13.671 --> 52:13.629
you again for your service and

52:13.629 --> 52:16.459
commitment , and , uh , um , we're

52:16.459 --> 52:18.626
learning a lot and we're gonna have to

52:18.626 --> 52:20.792
be nimble and agile to meet the , uh ,

52:20.792 --> 52:23.126
emerging threats . So thank you so much .

52:23.126 --> 52:25.237
Thank you , Madam Chair . Thank you ,

52:25.237 --> 52:27.292
Senator Rosen . We're happy that you

52:27.292 --> 52:29.348
were able to join us today on , on a

52:29.348 --> 52:31.403
Monday . It's , I know it's hard for

52:31.403 --> 52:33.810
you . Uh , General Collins , last

52:33.810 --> 52:35.977
question I have for you . Can you give

52:35.977 --> 52:37.977
us an update on the next generation

52:37.977 --> 52:40.810
interceptor program ? Yes , Senator .

52:40.879 --> 52:42.823
Thank you for that question . Uh ,

52:42.823 --> 52:44.990
next-gen interceptor , uh , we've been

52:44.990 --> 52:47.268
talking about it for a number of years .

52:47.268 --> 52:47.179
It is the future of the homeland

52:47.179 --> 52:49.290
defense , the ground-based mid-course

52:49.290 --> 52:51.623
defense , homeland defense against , uh ,

52:51.623 --> 52:53.401
pier and rogue intercontinental

52:53.401 --> 52:56.709
ballistic missiles . Uh , That program

52:56.709 --> 52:58.987
is still executing . That is still our ,

52:58.987 --> 53:01.042
our largest , uh , and , and highest

53:01.042 --> 53:03.209
priority program when it comes to that

53:03.209 --> 53:05.376
defense of the homeland , uh , against

53:05.376 --> 53:07.542
the , the peer threat . Um , uh , that

53:07.542 --> 53:09.598
program continues . Uh , a couple of

53:09.598 --> 53:11.931
years ago , we were , uh , we , uh , Uh ,

53:11.931 --> 53:14.042
we did a , a down select , an earlier

53:14.042 --> 53:16.153
down select and planned , uh , due to

53:16.153 --> 53:18.265
priorities . Uh , and since then , we

53:18.265 --> 53:20.265
did replan about 18 months ago . We

53:20.265 --> 53:22.320
replanned , uh , the delivery of the

53:22.320 --> 53:24.153
program based on some issues and

53:24.153 --> 53:24.080
concerns with the solid rocket motor .

53:24.399 --> 53:26.621
We are continuing to drive that program

53:26.621 --> 53:28.732
forward . Uh , the end of this year ,

53:28.732 --> 53:31.110
we are on track for the all the round

53:31.110 --> 53:33.909
full system critical design review to

53:33.909 --> 53:36.149
close the design phase of the next-gen

53:36.149 --> 53:38.229
interceptor program , uh , and

53:38.229 --> 53:40.396
completely move into the manufacturing

53:40.396 --> 53:42.340
and test phase of that as we drive

53:42.340 --> 53:46.250
towards 1st , 1st flight test in 2029 .

53:46.780 --> 53:50.530
Uh , we have no open major

53:50.530 --> 53:52.808
liens against the design of the system ,

53:52.909 --> 53:54.909
uh , which is a , is a plus at this

53:54.909 --> 53:57.131
point in the time of the program . Uh ,

53:57.131 --> 53:58.853
we are , as we transition into

53:58.853 --> 54:01.076
manufacturing , identifying and finding

54:01.076 --> 54:03.020
some issues with some of these new

54:03.020 --> 54:05.298
systems , the solid rocket motor , the ,

54:05.298 --> 54:07.409
uh , inertial uh , measurement unit ,

54:07.409 --> 54:09.520
uh , as well as some in the sensors ,

54:09.520 --> 54:11.465
uh , and we're working to buy down

54:11.465 --> 54:13.687
those risks and move forward as quickly

54:13.687 --> 54:15.798
as possible to make sure we , uh , we

54:15.798 --> 54:17.798
pull the date as far to the left as

54:17.798 --> 54:17.750
possible . General Glo , General Gule ,

54:17.810 --> 54:19.699
and I are regularly talking about

54:19.699 --> 54:21.750
next-gen interceptor . And the

54:21.750 --> 54:24.649
important part it plays in the layered

54:24.939 --> 54:26.883
defense of our homeland as we move

54:26.883 --> 54:29.110
forward . Thank you . And General

54:29.110 --> 54:32.270
Lozano . Good afternoon .

54:33.379 --> 54:35.919
Afternoon ma'am . Chairman Wicker and I

54:35.919 --> 54:37.840
had the opportunity to visit the

54:37.840 --> 54:41.169
Pacific , uh , last August and , and ,

54:41.179 --> 54:44.600
uh , spend some time on Guam and trying

54:44.600 --> 54:47.639
to assess the situation there . Can you

54:47.639 --> 54:50.149
give us an update on the imple

54:50.149 --> 54:53.280
implementation of the defenses of Guam ?

54:55.330 --> 54:57.163
Yes , ma'am . Thank you for your

54:57.163 --> 54:59.739
question . So the program is executing

54:59.739 --> 55:02.719
on schedule and on budget . I'm very

55:02.719 --> 55:04.941
proud of all the work that has occurred

55:04.941 --> 55:07.399
thus far to deploy early capabilities

55:07.399 --> 55:09.800
onto Guam , uh , as a part of the

55:09.800 --> 55:11.959
Army's transformation in contact

55:11.959 --> 55:13.959
initiative and also working closely

55:13.959 --> 55:15.848
with the Air Force , uh , and the

55:15.848 --> 55:17.903
missile defense agency . As I stated

55:17.903 --> 55:20.015
earlier , not only do we have a THAAD

55:20.015 --> 55:22.070
battery out there . Uh , but we also

55:22.070 --> 55:23.959
have elements of the Air Force's

55:23.959 --> 55:26.199
airbase air defense capabilities on

55:26.199 --> 55:28.479
Anderson Air Force Base . We also have

55:28.479 --> 55:30.368
a couple of , uh , lower tier air

55:30.368 --> 55:32.659
missile defense sensors , uh , an AP

55:32.659 --> 55:35.840
sensor , and a couple of integrated air

55:35.840 --> 55:38.118
missile defense battle command systems ,

55:38.118 --> 55:41.120
IBCS engagement operations centers . So

55:41.120 --> 55:43.231
we've started infiltrating capability

55:43.231 --> 55:45.360
out onto the island early so that we

55:45.360 --> 55:47.582
could start working through some of the

55:47.582 --> 55:49.749
integration challenges that we've . We

55:49.749 --> 55:51.582
forecasted we might face when we

55:51.582 --> 55:53.638
started planning what the defense of

55:53.638 --> 55:55.693
Guam might look like . This has also

55:55.693 --> 55:57.471
provided an opportunity for the

55:57.471 --> 55:59.360
ninety-fourth Air Missile Defense

55:59.360 --> 56:01.527
Command to start sending soldiers down

56:01.527 --> 56:03.870
to Guam to start training on these , uh ,

56:03.879 --> 56:05.712
systems so that they could start

56:05.712 --> 56:08.760
developing Cops and , uh , uh , tactics ,

56:08.800 --> 56:10.800
techniques and procedures , what we

56:10.800 --> 56:12.967
call TTPs on how to operate and employ

56:12.967 --> 56:15.239
the system . Uh , right now we will

56:15.239 --> 56:17.629
conduct our integrated flight . Uh ,

56:17.639 --> 56:21.080
test campaign , uh , 26 this year at

56:21.080 --> 56:23.199
White Sands Missile Range that'll act

56:23.199 --> 56:26.280
as a graduation opportunity , a , a

56:26.280 --> 56:28.879
test missile , missile flight test

56:28.879 --> 56:30.990
campaign for us , uh , and then we'll

56:30.990 --> 56:33.399
start flowing , uh , the bulk of the

56:33.399 --> 56:36.679
systems out to Guam in the 2728 time

56:36.679 --> 56:38.800
frame . So everything remains on

56:38.800 --> 56:41.078
schedule . Everything remains on track ,

56:41.078 --> 56:43.300
the development of the capability , the

56:43.300 --> 56:45.244
production of the systems , and so

56:45.244 --> 56:47.411
we're looking forward to continuing to

56:47.411 --> 56:49.689
mature and evolve that capability , uh ,

56:49.689 --> 56:51.633
so that it maintains its relevancy

56:51.633 --> 56:53.856
against the threats we intend to face ,

56:53.856 --> 56:56.133
ma'am , thank you , sir . Senator King .

56:56.590 --> 56:58.646
One final question going back to the

56:58.646 --> 57:00.550
beginning of my comments , uh ,

57:01.350 --> 57:03.270
Secretary Berkowitz , what is the

57:03.270 --> 57:06.070
justification for this bifurcated

57:06.070 --> 57:08.330
budget process that we've experienced

57:08.510 --> 57:10.621
last year and this year for the first

57:10.621 --> 57:12.899
time in , in , in my experience ? What ,

57:13.449 --> 57:15.727
why , why do we need to do it this way ,

57:16.070 --> 57:18.709
which is a radical departure from how

57:18.709 --> 57:20.765
defense budgets have been built over

57:20.765 --> 57:23.098
the years ? What , what , what , what's ,

57:23.098 --> 57:24.598
what's the justification ?

57:27.010 --> 57:29.232
Senator , I'd have to give you the same

57:29.232 --> 57:31.343
answer I , I gave before with request

57:31.343 --> 57:32.899
with respect to the request

57:32.899 --> 57:35.121
specifically for Golden Dome , which is

57:35.121 --> 57:37.370
within my portfolio . The , the , the

57:37.370 --> 57:39.949
broader budget construction is , is

57:39.949 --> 57:41.449
well outside of my area of

57:41.449 --> 57:45.149
responsibility is a one-time , well ,

57:45.179 --> 57:47.179
for this year 20 ones , what , what

57:47.179 --> 57:50.500
they didn't . I , I , I don't , I don't

57:50.500 --> 57:52.389
understand why Golden Dome is any

57:52.389 --> 57:55.739
different than B-21 or any other

57:55.739 --> 57:57.683
defense initiative that requires a

57:57.683 --> 57:59.517
special budgetary treatment that

57:59.517 --> 58:01.659
basically takes it largely out of the

58:01.659 --> 58:03.770
purview of Congress and congressional

58:03.770 --> 58:07.010
oversight . Sir , the , the answer is

58:07.010 --> 58:10.629
the , the flexibility to , to address

58:10.629 --> 58:13.870
uh . The dynamics of advancing

58:13.870 --> 58:16.550
technology , um , and to accelerate the

58:16.550 --> 58:19.000
president's priority . Well , that's

58:19.000 --> 58:21.222
not a very satisfactory answer , I must

58:21.222 --> 58:24.070
say . All of the things you said could

58:24.070 --> 58:26.280
apply to any other major weapons

58:26.280 --> 58:28.558
program that we've had in this country ,

58:28.558 --> 58:31.229
and I just don't understand why all of

58:31.229 --> 58:33.399
a sudden 25% of the defense budget is

58:33.399 --> 58:35.199
off limits for the normal

58:35.199 --> 58:37.199
appropriations process , but that's

58:37.199 --> 58:39.360
something I'll take up with , uh , I

58:39.360 --> 58:41.471
think there's a hearing tomorrow with

58:41.471 --> 58:44.310
Secretary Hegseth Thursday , so , uh ,

58:44.560 --> 58:46.989
warn him . Thank you .

58:50.050 --> 58:52.217
Thank you , Senator King . I'd like to

58:52.217 --> 58:54.520
thank the panel for being here today

58:54.520 --> 58:57.159
and , uh , giving us some really good

58:57.159 --> 58:59.270
information . Appreciate your service

58:59.270 --> 59:01.739
again . If we have , uh , questions for

59:01.739 --> 59:04.399
the record , those need to be submitted

59:04.580 --> 59:06.659
and I hope you will answer them in a

59:06.659 --> 59:08.860
timely manner . With that , the

59:08.860 --> 59:10.540
subcommittee hearing is adjourned .