WEBVTT

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This hearing will come to order . This

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morning we held a hearing on the

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posture of the US . Indo-Pacific

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Command and US Forces Korea at the

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outset , I would like to thank Admiral

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Poparo and General Brunson for their

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distinguished service to our country .

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This committee appreciates their

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service and we're grateful for the

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ethos , ethos that has long been the

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defining characteristic of America's

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general and flag officers . Thank you ,

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gentlemen . Um , we speak

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today . And we meet today at a time of

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global turmoil . Despite the doubts of

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our own intelligence community and many

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others , Ukraine continues to

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outperform conventional wisdom . Now in

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the 5th year of Putin's illegal war of

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choice . In the Middle East , President

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Trump's taken decisive action to end 47

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years of aggression by the Ayatollahs .

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But amid those wars we must remember

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this China is the leader of the axis

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of aggressors . The People's Republic

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of China intends to and is capable of

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preventing an American-led 21st century .

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We cannot ignore the implications of Xi

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Jinping's aggression . The Chinese

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Communist Party and its People's

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Liberation Army have spent decades

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studying the American way of war . This

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has informed their massive military

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modernization effort . The PLA now

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feels the world's largest navy . Its

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nuclear triad is growing at a

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breathtaking pace , and it possesses an

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increasingly capable air force armed

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with world class munitions . China's

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military strategy has transitioned . It

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has moved from a mostly . A symmetric

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competitive approach to a more

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comprehensive strategy . Their goal is

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to achieve decisive advantage over the

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US and our allies in the Indo-Pacific .

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We also recognize the danger posed by a

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nuclear-armed North Korea .

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Kim Jong Un is a cruel and ruthless

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despot . Worse , he possesses nuclear

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weapons and , and he possesses the

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means to deliver them . He has

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demonstrated a high tolerance for risk

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taking . And he is backed by his

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nuclear armed partners Xi and Putin .

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The North Korean army has gained

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valuable insights on modern warfare

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from its experience supporting Russia's

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invasion of Ukraine . North Korea will

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remember what it learned from drone and

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missile use in Ukraine . It continues

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to learn lessons right now it is

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thinking about how to employ these

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capabilities on the Korean Peninsula .

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Russia has repaid Kim for supporting

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its illegal invasion of Ukraine by

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providing North Korea with advanced

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military technology and financial

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relief . While Vladimir Putin creates

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mayhem in Europe , it is not lost on

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this committee that he also actively

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works to undermine the existing order

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in the Indo-Pacific . Putin has

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revitalized his partnership with the

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Kim . Regime and he has deepened

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Russia's comprehensive strategic

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partnership with Xi and the Chinese

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Communist Party . The growing

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alignment of our adversaries throws

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into sharp relief the enduring

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importance of America's allies and the

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way they help protect our strategic

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interests . For decades , our

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alliance bonds , including NATO .

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Have provided a comparative advantage

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over authoritarian states like China ,

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North Korea , Russia , and Iran .

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These alliances continue to pay

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dividends for the United States .

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People need to stop saying otherwise .

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It is not helpful when American leaders

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speak of our alliances with derision .

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But we must be clear about the numerous

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political , strategic , and moral

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benefits that our country receives from

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its alliances . Some have suggested

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that our allies have become little more

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than dependent on the United States .

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These skeptics argue that the United

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States must shift . The burden

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And that word shift is what I have a

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problem with . They argue that we must

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shift the burden of defense and

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deterrence from the United States and

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onto our allies in Europe and Asia . I

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do not agree with these skeptics . Of

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course I'm glad to see America's allies

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stepping up as they are doing all over

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the world , but there's a difference

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between burden shifting and burden

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sharing . The president has called for

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increased burden sharing , and I

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support that , but the way we execute

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that vision matters . We Americans have

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a massive stake in maintaining a

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favorable balance of power in both Asia

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and Europe . It remains a vital

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interest of the United States and

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cannot yet be delegated to others , not

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even to our closest allies . Burden

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shifting suggests that the United

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States has a limited stake in conflicts

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that erupt or could erupt in these key

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regions . Burden shifting implies

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abdication rather than collective

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responsibility . Upholding our interest

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in the Indo-Pacific requires the

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cultivation of a a robust alliance

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network , what we call burden sharing .

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Which I agree with the Western Pacific

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is far from the American homeland , and

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that distance has long placed a premium

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on strong and persistent forward

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presence in the region . This presence

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allows us to defend our interests in

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the Indo-Pacific and to project power

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from there into other regions of the

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world . It's worth noting that

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America's alliance network is comprised

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of like-minded democracies and free

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market economies . The importance of

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this fact cannot be overstated . Unlike

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our Unlike um .

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Um , authoritarian countries , the

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foundation of the US alliance network

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is built upon the explicit support

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of its respective electorates . Our

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alliances depend on each nation's

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internal domestic political support .

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Again , this is crucial . Every

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military alliance requires negotiation

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and compromise . Every military

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alliance requires negotiation and

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compromise . Alliances by definition

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are a two-way street . They require

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patience and appreciation for the

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political drivers of the parties and a

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willingness to undertake political ,

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military , and economic risk on behalf

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of one another . Popular support from

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free people gives legitimacy to those

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necessary compromises . We must

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continue to modernize our alliances to

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match today's threats and capabilities ,

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but any reform should make us stronger

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and safer . They should not detract

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from the strategic imperative of

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deterring aggression and coercion by

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China , North Korea , and Russia . I

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look forward to hearing how our

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witnesses are working with our Japanese ,

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South Korean , Filipino , Australian .

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And Taiwanese allies , among others

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to strengthen our strategic position in

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the Indo-Pacific . With that , I thank

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our witnesses for being here , and I

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turn to my colleague Ranking Member

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Reed , Senator Reed . Well , thank you

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very much , Mr . Chairman , and , uh ,

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Admiral Parro , General Brunton ,

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welcome and thank you for your

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distinguished service , uh , over a

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lifetime of dedication to the country

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and to , uh , the men and women that

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you lead . Please convey our

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appreciation and support for these

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extraordinary Americans that you

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command and lead . President Trump's

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war of choice in Iran has resulted in

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significant military posture changes in

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the Indo-Pacific region and on the

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Korean Peninsula . Over the past two

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months , President Trump has

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transferred major military capabilities

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out of your theaters to Central Command ,

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including a carrier strike group , an

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amphibious ready group , various

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missile defense capabilities , and

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other munitions . Admiral Paparo and

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General Brunson , uh , I would like to

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understand your assessment of the

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effect of these transfers on your

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capabilities . Long range strike

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weapons and missile interceptors are

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not quickly replaced . At current

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production rates , reconsidering what

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we have expended could take years . The

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decisions President Trump has made in

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Iran will impact your readiness in the

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Indo-Pacific for a long time to come .

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I'm also deeply concerned about what

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our adversaries are learning . China

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and North Korea have watched the United

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States engage in sustained high

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intensity warfare , requiring massive

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expenditures of the exact munitions

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that munitions that are most critical

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for deterrence in the Indo-Pacific . I

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would like your candid assessments of

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what lessons that Beijing and Pyongyang

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are drawing from this conflict and how

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those lessons may affect their

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long-term planning . Relatedly ,

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Admiral Paparra , on December 8th , the

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president announced that he would allow

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the sale of advanced H-200

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semiconductor ships to China , a

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category of chip previously prohibited

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because of its ability to accelerate

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Chinese military capabilities ,

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including artificial intelligence .

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This committee has long agreed on a

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bipartisan basis that our national

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defense is predicated on maintaining a

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qualitative technological edge over

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China . I want to know whether

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Indopaycom was consulted before this

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decision was made and whether you

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believe selling advanced semiconductor

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chips to China is consistent with

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maintaining a favorable balance of

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military power in the Indo-Pacific .

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General Bronson , there are also

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persistent and troubling reports that

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the administration is considering

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significant reductions to US force

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posture in South Korea . Last year you

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testified that America's presence in

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Korea provides , in your words ,

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unmatched access , unmatched deterrence

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at minimal cost . You also made clear

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that US force presence in Korea is not

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solely about North Korea . Our presence

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creates dilemmas for China in the

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Yellow Sea and imposes cost on Russia

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in the East Sea . I would ask for your

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assessment of what troop reductions

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would mean for deterrence across those

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threat vectors . I would also note that

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this committee voted to include a

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provision in the fiscal year 2026 NDAA

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to prohibit any reduction of troops in

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Korea without a full assessment of the

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risk involved and certification to

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Congress . Admiral Paparo , General

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Brunson , you lead our forces in the

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most strategically consequential

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theater in the world , partialed

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against the most capable capable

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potential adversaries the United States

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faces . The decisions being made in the

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White House right now on its wars of

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choice , on munitions , on

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semiconductor sales , on America's

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alliances will determine whether

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deterrence holds . I thank you for your

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leadership at this critical time , and

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I look forward to your testimony .

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Thank you , Mr . Chairman . I

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understand each of you has um Opening

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statements , who'd like to go first ?

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Admiral Poparo , you are recognized ,

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sir . Chairman , rank and member ,

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members of the committee , thank you

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very much for the opportunity to speak

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with you uh today . Uh , first I'll

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call attention to Sergeant Major Eric

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Cook , United States Marine Corps right

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behind me , and his charge is the

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fighting forces morale , that

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combination of physical , mental and

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spiritual readiness that is the key

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factor in combat . This is the essence

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of readiness and the ability to prevail .

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Morale that Sergeant Major Cook leads ,

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uh , and our enlisted force led by our

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highly professional NCO corps are the

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backbone , the body , and the soul of

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the joint force , and I'd like to

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acknowledge , uh , Sergeant Major Cook .

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And all that he represents as discussed ,

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the Indo-Pacific is the defining

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strategic theater of the 21st century

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where all four lines of effort in the

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national defense strategy conferge ,

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that is safeguarding the United States

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homeland . Especially including those

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elements that are in the Indo-Pacific ,

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uh , deterring China , deepening burden

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sharing with our allies and partners ,

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and supercharging the defense

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industrial base . Indo-Pacific Command

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puts those priorities into action every

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single day . The sea has long been a

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highway for trade and a vector for

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power projection , and it's also

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becoming increasingly an end unto

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itself as a source of food , energy ,

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minerals , and strategic leverage .

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China's force design since 2009

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reflects that reality . Since 2024 ,

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China has delivered 12 submarines ,

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including nuclear attack submarines and

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nuclear ballistic missile submarines ,

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an aircraft carrier , 2 cruisers , 10

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destroyers , 7 frigates , as well as

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amphibious and combat logistics force .

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That scale is for the projection of

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power , coercion , and to enforce the

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rules in every relationship . North

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Korea continues to threaten the US

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homeland and our allies with nuclear

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weapons and ballistic missiles , and

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Russia has increased its force posture

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of air , missile , maritime in the

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Indo-Pacific , and the increasing

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strategic cooperation among them all

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is deeply concerning . Our strategy is

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clear to deny China from achieving its

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objectives through military aggression

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to deter . Deterrence is our highest

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duty . We deter with dynamic combat

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power , conducting operations every day

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with allies and partners and across

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domains . Our allies and partners

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increase our combat capability and

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capacity , expand our maneuver space ,

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and extend operational reach and

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strengthen deterrence . Yesterday we

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began the largest ever exercise

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Balaatan in the Republic of the

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Philippines . This exercise

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demonstrates a significant leap in

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allied firepower , integrating US

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land-based Tomahawks with Philippine

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Bramos missiles and Japanese anti-ship

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missiles . Our alliances are rapidly

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fielding advanced capabilities . We're

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adapting to the changing character of

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warfare , and we're driving towards .

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Information and decision superiority .

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We're accelerating decision making

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through our AI enabled headquarters and

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our AI enabled commands , strengthening

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our posture , improving integrated air

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and missile defenses , hardening key

15:47.994 --> 15:49.934
infrastructure , and increasing

15:49.934 --> 15:52.559
munitions throughput . Congress and the

15:52.559 --> 15:55.200
department have provided the resources .

15:55.210 --> 15:58.440
Now industry must deliver . With your

15:58.440 --> 16:00.960
continued support , we'll preserve

16:00.960 --> 16:03.440
peace through strength and defend a

16:03.440 --> 16:06.239
free and open Indo-Pacific . I now

16:06.239 --> 16:08.280
defer to General Brunson and most

16:08.280 --> 16:10.299
especially your questions . General

16:10.299 --> 16:14.210
Brunson , you recognized , sir . Thank

16:14.210 --> 16:16.377
you , Chairman Wicker , Ranking Member

16:16.377 --> 16:18.377
Reed , distinguished members of the

16:18.377 --> 16:20.043
committee . Thank you for the

16:20.043 --> 16:22.400
opportunity to speak to today alongside

16:22.400 --> 16:24.511
Emerald Poparo regarding the security

16:24.511 --> 16:26.567
environment in the Republic of Korea

16:26.567 --> 16:28.770
and Northeast Asia . I would like to

16:28.770 --> 16:30.881
first thank those who sit behind me ,

16:30.881 --> 16:33.103
who got me here to this hearing today ,

16:33.103 --> 16:35.869
have helped me to prepare and represent

16:35.869 --> 16:38.809
the members of our force forward in the

16:38.809 --> 16:41.159
United States Forces Korea . I'd also

16:41.159 --> 16:43.760
extend my gratitude to the 17 other

16:43.760 --> 16:45.599
United Nations member states ,

16:46.280 --> 16:48.679
Australia , Belgium , Canada , Colombia ,

16:48.840 --> 16:51.830
Denmark , France , Germany , Greece ,

16:52.119 --> 16:54.119
Italy , Netherlands , New Zealand ,

16:54.159 --> 16:57.000
Norway , the Philippines , South Africa ,

16:57.200 --> 16:59.144
Thailand , Turkey , and the United

16:59.144 --> 17:01.630
Kingdom . But I especially thank the

17:01.630 --> 17:03.830
Korean people for their continued

17:03.830 --> 17:05.989
partnership , hospitality , and

17:05.989 --> 17:08.550
commitment to our alliance . The Korean

17:08.550 --> 17:10.640
Peninsula is key strategic terrain

17:10.790 --> 17:12.568
vital to defending the American

17:12.568 --> 17:14.670
homeland and advancing American

17:14.670 --> 17:17.229
interests in the region . Our forces in

17:17.229 --> 17:19.062
Korea are modernizing to address

17:19.062 --> 17:21.390
rapidly evolving strategic dilemmas .

17:22.149 --> 17:24.371
That's why my focus remains strictly on

17:24.371 --> 17:26.639
capabilities over numbers . While our

17:26.639 --> 17:28.399
presence is a baseline , it's

17:28.399 --> 17:30.455
imperative that we maintain focus on

17:30.455 --> 17:32.838
the precise capabilities that must be

17:32.838 --> 17:35.718
resident on the peninsula . To truly

17:35.718 --> 17:37.885
understand this shift from capacity to

17:37.885 --> 17:40.088
capability , I encourage the committee

17:40.088 --> 17:42.338
to observe the tri-command firsthand .

17:42.918 --> 17:45.639
Should you visit us , you will see , as

17:45.639 --> 17:48.520
Senator Shaheen has . The readiness

17:48.520 --> 17:50.839
exemplified by our service members ,

17:50.959 --> 17:52.626
civil servants , allies , and

17:52.626 --> 17:55.160
interagency partners who defend the

17:55.160 --> 17:57.790
homelands . Across the peninsula , our

17:57.790 --> 18:00.000
warfighters build readiness . Some

18:00.000 --> 18:03.060
examples include 8th Army's continued

18:03.280 --> 18:05.949
work along with our rotational force ,

18:06.199 --> 18:09.280
and which has led them to exceed 90% on

18:09.280 --> 18:11.920
most of their readiness metrics . The

18:11.920 --> 18:14.270
continued integration of 7th Air Force ,

18:14.520 --> 18:17.079
Marine Corps Forces Korea , Naval

18:17.079 --> 18:19.130
Forces Korea , Special Operations

18:19.130 --> 18:22.020
Command Korea , and Space Forces Korea .

18:22.560 --> 18:24.880
Those components into Indo-Paycom

18:24.880 --> 18:27.959
exercises demonstrate the potential to

18:27.959 --> 18:30.150
project power from Korea in support of

18:30.150 --> 18:31.817
deterrence across the greater

18:31.817 --> 18:34.380
Indo-Pacific . A key component of

18:34.380 --> 18:37.219
readiness is our facilities . We're

18:37.219 --> 18:38.997
improving our infrastructure to

18:38.997 --> 18:42.400
synchronize US space forces and other

18:42.699 --> 18:44.819
components while seizing theater

18:44.819 --> 18:46.819
opportunities to conduct integrated

18:46.819 --> 18:50.180
sustainment . And forward repair with

18:50.180 --> 18:52.124
our allies , partners in the joint

18:52.124 --> 18:54.810
force . And across the information

18:54.810 --> 18:56.866
domain , we not only communicate the

18:56.866 --> 18:58.921
centrality of the region to American

18:58.921 --> 19:00.977
interests , but actively maneuver to

19:00.977 --> 19:02.770
neutralize misinformation and

19:02.770 --> 19:05.410
disinformation . The TR Command ,

19:05.650 --> 19:07.689
United Nations Command , Combined

19:07.689 --> 19:09.770
Forces Command , and US Forces Korea

19:09.770 --> 19:12.770
stand ready and capable , capable to

19:12.770 --> 19:14.826
support a favorable balance of power

19:14.826 --> 19:16.492
across the region that deters

19:16.492 --> 19:18.609
aggression , supports a free and open

19:18.609 --> 19:20.810
Indo-Pacific . Our presence in the

19:20.810 --> 19:22.754
region is a driving force that has

19:22.754 --> 19:25.609
evolved our alliances over decades from

19:25.609 --> 19:27.609
dependencies to true partnerships .

19:28.099 --> 19:30.321
While our cooperation and commitment to

19:30.321 --> 19:32.543
the region has maintained the armistice

19:32.543 --> 19:35.660
and deterred large scale conflict , our

19:35.660 --> 19:38.329
forces must remain vigilant . Together

19:38.329 --> 19:40.800
with the department , our agency teams ,

19:40.859 --> 19:42.915
the United States Congress , and our

19:42.915 --> 19:45.248
multi multinational allies and partners ,

19:45.260 --> 19:47.038
we will continue to demonstrate

19:47.420 --> 19:49.642
American strength in the region so that

19:49.642 --> 19:52.300
a favorable peace prevails . Under one

19:52.300 --> 19:54.859
flag , we go together , Kachik Kashida .

19:58.000 --> 20:01.079
You may have to help the transcriber on

20:01.079 --> 20:04.160
that last sentence , general , uh , you ,

20:04.319 --> 20:08.050
you , um , gave us a , a number of

20:08.050 --> 20:10.040
countries . Why did you list them

20:10.040 --> 20:13.849
specifically , sir ? Chairman , what I

20:13.849 --> 20:16.099
hope to do is to thank them for their

20:16.099 --> 20:18.420
continued contribution to the core of

20:18.420 --> 20:20.699
the United Nations command . Each of

20:20.699 --> 20:22.755
those companies that I'm , countries

20:22.755 --> 20:24.921
that I mentioned has over the year and

20:24.921 --> 20:27.088
a half or so that I've been in command

20:27.088 --> 20:29.500
had officers and soldiers within our

20:29.500 --> 20:31.444
headquarters in the United Nations

20:31.444 --> 20:33.650
command , sir . OK , thank you very

20:33.650 --> 20:37.439
much for that . Um , Admiral , I , I

20:37.439 --> 20:39.550
wanna ask about our overseas military

20:39.550 --> 20:41.383
bases . Of course , we , we know

20:41.383 --> 20:43.599
they're not sovereign US territory .

20:43.680 --> 20:46.180
The territory belongs to the various

20:46.439 --> 20:49.430
countries who host us . Um ,

20:51.290 --> 20:53.890
Uh , all allies and partners require

20:53.890 --> 20:56.849
some form of prior consultation before

20:56.849 --> 20:59.530
allowing US forces to operate from

20:59.530 --> 21:02.050
their sovereign territory . That is a

21:02.050 --> 21:04.383
correct statement , is it not , Admiral ?

21:04.383 --> 21:06.810
Yes , Chairman . And , uh , as it

21:06.819 --> 21:09.209
previewed in its national defense

21:09.209 --> 21:12.130
strategy and the Aus review , DOD is

21:12.130 --> 21:14.670
now pressing allies to provide

21:14.670 --> 21:18.199
uncaveated , uncaveated and

21:18.199 --> 21:21.339
unimpeded access . From bases located

21:21.339 --> 21:23.380
in their country , uh , is this

21:23.380 --> 21:25.880
realistic , and I , I've , I have three

21:26.619 --> 21:28.675
questions which I'll just ask all at

21:28.675 --> 21:31.339
once , um , our overseas bases provide

21:31.339 --> 21:35.020
enormous benefit . Um , is it ?

21:35.719 --> 21:39.339
Uh , realistic to seek uncaveated and

21:39.430 --> 21:42.000
unconstrained access to these bases ,

21:42.319 --> 21:46.060
is there anything you want to do now

21:46.359 --> 21:49.560
that you cannot do under existing

21:49.560 --> 21:51.920
basing arrangements ? And is it

21:51.920 --> 21:54.719
realistic to expect our allies , even

21:54.719 --> 21:56.459
our closest ones , to provide

21:56.599 --> 22:00.260
unfettered access basing and overflight

22:00.479 --> 22:03.180
with no operational restrictions ?

22:03.969 --> 22:05.802
Chairman , I , I think that it's

22:05.802 --> 22:09.229
sensible uh to gain assurances that in

22:09.229 --> 22:11.451
the unforgiving hour , we'll be able to

22:11.451 --> 22:14.089
employ those bases for our own planning .

22:14.400 --> 22:16.329
And I think it's pragmatic to

22:16.329 --> 22:18.496
understand that each of our allies and

22:18.496 --> 22:21.890
partners will experience various civil

22:21.890 --> 22:24.130
pressures within those that they that

22:24.130 --> 22:26.880
they govern , and I think going a long

22:26.880 --> 22:29.329
way to gain assurances from our

22:29.329 --> 22:32.290
partners is a practical and sensible

22:32.290 --> 22:34.650
approach . I think it enhances our

22:34.650 --> 22:36.872
plannings , but I think it also must be

22:36.872 --> 22:38.872
approached with the pragmatism that

22:38.872 --> 22:41.094
each government is accountable to their

22:41.094 --> 22:43.206
people and will make deeper decisions

22:43.206 --> 22:45.372
when the unforgiving hour comes . Um ,

22:45.589 --> 22:48.469
OK , it's , is the , the , my , my

22:48.469 --> 22:51.189
second follow-up question was what can

22:51.189 --> 22:54.030
we not do now ? Is there anything we

22:54.030 --> 22:57.270
cannot currently do under existing

22:57.270 --> 23:00.729
basing arrangements ? Chairman , there

23:00.729 --> 23:02.785
are frequent occasions when we would

23:02.785 --> 23:05.449
prefer to execute certain operations or

23:05.449 --> 23:08.449
certain live fire operations , and our

23:08.449 --> 23:11.810
host nations are sensitive for domestic

23:11.810 --> 23:14.910
reasons . And so it's always a

23:15.369 --> 23:17.449
negotiation with our allies and

23:17.449 --> 23:19.560
partners , and we always do so within

23:19.560 --> 23:22.250
the faith that our allies and partners

23:22.250 --> 23:24.270
want to go as . As far as they

23:24.270 --> 23:26.492
practically can , but certainly there's

23:26.492 --> 23:29.040
always limits on , or there's , you

23:29.040 --> 23:31.207
know , I should say there's frequently

23:31.949 --> 23:34.116
instances where there's things that we

23:34.116 --> 23:36.338
would like to do , uh , but we can't do

23:36.338 --> 23:39.199
it because the host government is

23:39.199 --> 23:41.920
sensitive to public opinion . It is in

23:41.920 --> 23:44.959
the presence of populations , and we

23:44.959 --> 23:47.680
work through it with good faith . Um ,

23:47.729 --> 23:49.951
OK , and then in a minute and a half we

23:49.951 --> 23:52.739
have , um , let's talk about , um .

23:53.530 --> 23:57.349
Replacing both exquisite traditional

23:57.349 --> 24:01.319
munitions and newer low cost munitions ,

24:01.449 --> 24:03.459
uh , we fired a lot of weapons in

24:03.459 --> 24:07.160
Operation Epic Fury . Um , Secretary

24:07.160 --> 24:09.010
Feinberg has a plan to increase

24:09.010 --> 24:12.150
production of , um , exquisite

24:12.609 --> 24:14.387
munitions such as those made by

24:14.387 --> 24:15.869
Lockheed and Raytheon .

24:17.969 --> 24:21.209
Um , will that take time and , uh , can

24:21.209 --> 24:23.265
you give us an idea of how much time

24:23.530 --> 24:26.790
and , um , is it time also to go all in

24:26.790 --> 24:30.550
on low cost ? Munitions including

24:30.550 --> 24:32.606
cruise missiles , hypersonics , long

24:32.606 --> 24:35.390
range drones , and unmanned surface

24:35.609 --> 24:38.650
vessels . Senator , yes and yes , and

24:38.650 --> 24:40.817
the traditional defense primes have to

24:40.817 --> 24:42.928
innovate to go faster . I think it'll

24:42.928 --> 24:45.039
take 1 to 2 years for them to scale .

24:45.039 --> 24:47.329
It won't be soon enough , and I think

24:47.329 --> 24:49.510
that we really must press the system

24:49.510 --> 24:52.229
with non-traditional vendors bringing ,

24:52.369 --> 24:55.829
bringing to bear . low cost munitions

24:55.829 --> 24:58.069
such as hypersonics , low cost cruise

24:58.069 --> 25:00.291
missiles , and then across a variety of

25:00.291 --> 25:03.790
droned and unmanned systems , is it

25:03.790 --> 25:05.989
possible , thank you for your answer

25:05.989 --> 25:08.630
there , particularly on the low cost

25:08.630 --> 25:11.030
munitions . Is it possible for us to

25:11.030 --> 25:14.910
incentivize the exquisite manufacturers

25:14.910 --> 25:16.799
such as Lockheed , Raytheon , and

25:16.799 --> 25:19.719
others to go faster ? It most certainly

25:19.719 --> 25:21.775
is , and I , you know , I think that

25:21.775 --> 25:23.941
the department is putting a great deal

25:23.941 --> 25:26.052
of accountability and pressure on the

25:26.052 --> 25:28.052
primes . Thus far , the progress is

25:28.052 --> 25:30.640
good , and I'm eager for more . And so

25:30.640 --> 25:32.807
are we . Thank you very much , Senator

25:32.807 --> 25:35.150
Reid . Thank you very much Mr .

25:35.160 --> 25:37.104
Chairman and uh General Poparo and

25:37.104 --> 25:38.938
General Brunson . First , let me

25:38.938 --> 25:41.199
commend your staff , uh , from my early

25:41.199 --> 25:43.421
experience I know how hard it is to sit

25:43.421 --> 25:45.643
at attention . Uh , so thank you . Well

25:45.643 --> 25:48.439
done . Well done , uh , Admiral Paparo ,

25:48.560 --> 25:52.000
uh . I'll just follow on , uh , the

25:52.000 --> 25:53.722
chairman's question , which is

25:53.722 --> 25:55.944
basically , we've extended a great deal

25:55.944 --> 25:57.889
of ordinance in the , uh , Iranian

25:57.959 --> 26:01.680
combat . Uh , it has some effect on

26:01.680 --> 26:03.180
you , uh ,

26:05.510 --> 26:07.677
The question going forward though is ,

26:07.677 --> 26:10.430
is if we resume a rate of fire similar

26:10.430 --> 26:12.869
to what we were doing , did you , do

26:12.869 --> 26:14.980
you have an idea of how long we could

26:14.980 --> 26:17.670
fire without creating severe effects on

26:17.670 --> 26:20.520
your command ? Uh , first , I

26:20.520 --> 26:22.409
acknowledge your statement , uh ,

26:22.409 --> 26:24.576
ranking member , and , uh , you know ,

26:24.576 --> 26:26.853
I deliver that in a classified setting ,

26:26.853 --> 26:28.798
but there are finite limits to the

26:28.798 --> 26:30.964
magazine , and I have all the faith in

26:30.964 --> 26:33.076
the world that they're being employed

26:33.076 --> 26:32.890
judiciously . Thank you very much ,

26:32.989 --> 26:36.140
Admiral . Uh , General Brunson , uh .

26:38.250 --> 26:41.660
Our present military situation in South

26:41.660 --> 26:43.493
Korea , I assume , but you could

26:43.493 --> 26:45.819
confirm that is creating some

26:45.819 --> 26:48.219
significant strategic and operational

26:48.219 --> 26:50.275
dilemmas for the Chinese . Could you

26:50.275 --> 26:52.099
indicate and discuss those ?

26:54.540 --> 26:57.729
A rank ranking member in , uh , in , in

26:57.729 --> 27:00.140
the open , what I would say is that we

27:00.140 --> 27:02.251
have positional advantage currently .

27:02.540 --> 27:04.707
I've , uh , I've written articles that

27:04.707 --> 27:06.929
are out there right now that talk about

27:06.929 --> 27:08.984
the positional advantage achieved by

27:08.984 --> 27:11.151
changing our perspective of looking at

27:11.151 --> 27:13.262
a map differently . It places us with

27:13.262 --> 27:15.429
interior lines inside the first island

27:15.429 --> 27:17.540
chain , and what that allows us to do

27:17.540 --> 27:19.651
from that position alone is , uh , as

27:19.651 --> 27:22.239
we operate on um OAIs given to us by

27:22.239 --> 27:25.150
Indoaycom , it allows us to operate

27:25.150 --> 27:27.483
from a different aperture , if you will ,

27:27.483 --> 27:29.539
to project power into the region and

27:29.539 --> 27:31.650
achieve effect , significant effect I

27:31.650 --> 27:33.817
might add . I also believe that uh the

27:33.817 --> 27:35.817
imposition of costs is a thing that

27:35.817 --> 27:38.199
happens when we marry capabilities with

27:38.290 --> 27:40.770
position on the ground geographically ,

27:40.939 --> 27:43.219
and that I would call or term posture

27:43.219 --> 27:45.339
truly is the marrying of the

27:45.339 --> 27:47.619
capabilities with the right positioning

27:47.819 --> 27:49.541
and then to be able to achieve

27:49.541 --> 27:51.541
significant effect . Thank you very

27:51.541 --> 27:54.290
much . Uh , in my opening statement ,

27:54.660 --> 27:57.540
Papa , I talked about the proposed sale

27:57.540 --> 28:01.079
of chips , the H200 chip . Uh ,

28:01.900 --> 28:04.122
do you have any concerns that you would

28:04.180 --> 28:08.089
like to comment upon ? Ranking member ,

28:08.189 --> 28:10.500
I want every competitive advantage that

28:10.500 --> 28:12.722
the United States of America can have ,

28:12.750 --> 28:14.920
and that includes AI powered warfare .

28:15.030 --> 28:17.170
IndoPaycom is an AI powered

28:17.430 --> 28:19.609
headquarters . The Chinese by their

28:19.609 --> 28:21.831
philosophy are fast followers . They've

28:21.831 --> 28:23.609
taken every bit of intellectual

28:23.609 --> 28:26.170
property that's ever been shared to the

28:26.170 --> 28:28.329
trade and technology stack , and

28:28.329 --> 28:30.440
they've not only implemented it , but

28:30.440 --> 28:32.496
they've improved upon it . So I have

28:32.496 --> 28:34.329
deep concerns with anything that

28:34.329 --> 28:37.130
enables them to become a better AI

28:37.130 --> 28:38.797
powered headquarters than our

28:38.797 --> 28:40.741
headquarters . Well , I share your

28:40.741 --> 28:42.797
concerns , Admiral . I think they're

28:42.797 --> 28:44.959
legitimate and compelling , uh , and

28:45.410 --> 28:46.329
thank you .

28:49.229 --> 28:52.640
Amber and What lessons do you think the

28:52.640 --> 28:54.807
Chinese have learned from uh Operation

28:54.807 --> 28:57.979
Epic Fury ? Rank and member , I , I

28:57.979 --> 29:00.090
think that number 1 , I think they're

29:00.090 --> 29:02.090
impressed by the operational acumen

29:02.090 --> 29:04.257
that's been demonstrated by the United

29:04.257 --> 29:07.300
States and our partners . Uh , number 2 ,

29:07.400 --> 29:10.599
I think they see the power of , uh ,

29:10.609 --> 29:12.498
small , low-cost munitions on the

29:12.498 --> 29:15.420
ability to hold key geography at risk ,

29:15.459 --> 29:18.050
and so have we . And , and we see that ,

29:18.060 --> 29:20.849
and who implements that the fastest is

29:20.849 --> 29:23.300
absolutely the best , uh , is going to

29:23.300 --> 29:25.709
be the best year in the 21st century .

29:25.969 --> 29:29.770
And I think the key is that our forces

29:29.770 --> 29:31.714
learned a lot , including a lot of

29:31.714 --> 29:34.099
combat experience . We have to continue

29:34.099 --> 29:37.060
to accelerate that learning and bring

29:37.060 --> 29:39.171
that to bear . That's a key advantage

29:39.171 --> 29:41.338
that the Indo-Pacific forces that have

29:42.339 --> 29:45.040
engaged in combat in this operation

29:45.040 --> 29:47.900
that our would-be adversaries have not

29:47.900 --> 29:50.479
had , and we need to accelerate that .

29:51.010 --> 29:53.140
A quick final question . I have a few

29:53.140 --> 29:56.339
seconds remaining . Uh , there is

29:56.339 --> 29:59.819
roughly analogies between the situation

29:59.819 --> 30:02.619
in Taiwan and Ukraine . Asymmetric

30:02.619 --> 30:06.020
warfare will be what the Taiwanese

30:06.020 --> 30:07.909
practices against the , the , the

30:07.909 --> 30:11.079
Chinese . So are we focusing now

30:11.079 --> 30:14.099
on the lessons from Ukraine , drone

30:14.099 --> 30:17.319
warfare , uh , all the ingenuity of the

30:17.319 --> 30:19.800
Ukrainian ? Is that the , the approach

30:19.979 --> 30:22.146
that we're taking with the Taiwanese ?

30:22.319 --> 30:24.541
Sir , that's a , uh , you know , that's

30:24.541 --> 30:26.486
a key emphasis . You're quite well

30:26.486 --> 30:28.597
aware of the Hellscape strategy , the

30:28.597 --> 30:30.689
fact that low-cost munitions , drone

30:30.689 --> 30:34.089
war makes assault much , much more

30:34.089 --> 30:36.609
costly to assaulting forces . Bringing

30:36.609 --> 30:38.831
those lessons to bear to the max extent

30:38.831 --> 30:41.030
possible is an imperative . Thank you

30:41.030 --> 30:43.030
very much , gentlemen . Thank you .

30:43.030 --> 30:45.308
Thank you , Senator Fisher . Thank you ,

30:45.308 --> 30:47.419
Mr . Chairman , and thank , uh , both

30:47.419 --> 30:49.630
of you gentlemen and the , the members

30:49.630 --> 30:51.869
of our military that you served with

30:51.869 --> 30:53.869
for the important work you do every

30:53.869 --> 30:56.709
single day . Thank you , Admiral . The

30:56.709 --> 30:58.876
current program of record for at least

30:58.876 --> 31:02.839
100 B-21 bombers . That's

31:02.839 --> 31:05.449
not sufficient . When accounting for

31:05.449 --> 31:07.810
both nuclear and conventional bomber

31:07.810 --> 31:09.977
requirements , would you agree that we

31:09.977 --> 31:13.750
need to procure at least 145 B-21s ,

31:14.250 --> 31:16.449
and shouldn't we be seriously

31:16.449 --> 31:19.869
considering at least 200 ? Senator

31:19.869 --> 31:21.980
Fisher , good morning . I would favor

31:21.980 --> 31:25.800
200 B1 B-21 bombers , uh , not just for

31:25.800 --> 31:27.856
the nuclear deterrence mission , but

31:27.856 --> 31:30.979
for penetrating strike capabilities ,

31:31.609 --> 31:33.498
uh , and I couldn't be a stronger

31:33.498 --> 31:35.500
advocate . Thank you . We need to

31:35.520 --> 31:37.760
consider both Stratcom's requirements

31:37.760 --> 31:39.790
and yours and EOPaycom as well ,

31:40.000 --> 31:42.060
correct ? Senator , I would say that

31:42.060 --> 31:44.219
and , and StratCom is , you know ,

31:44.739 --> 31:47.017
absolutely among my strongest partners .

31:47.017 --> 31:49.420
We're in lockstep on this and uh we

31:49.420 --> 31:51.253
don't view a separateness of our

31:51.253 --> 31:53.459
individual requirement . Uh , we view

31:53.459 --> 31:55.699
ourselves as teammates side by side on

31:55.699 --> 31:59.069
the journey . Thank you . Uh , also ,

31:59.339 --> 32:01.599
while the nuclear threats are often ,

32:02.770 --> 32:04.826
often considered Stratcom . The more

32:04.826 --> 32:07.180
numerous and capable or they obviously

32:07.180 --> 32:10.160
have a serious implications in Indoecon

32:10.160 --> 32:12.800
and your mission . Can you describe

32:12.800 --> 32:16.180
your view of China's nuclear expansion

32:16.229 --> 32:18.479
and the impact that more numerous and

32:18.479 --> 32:21.560
capable Chinese nuclear forces in the

32:21.560 --> 32:25.239
region have from your perspective as a

32:25.239 --> 32:27.459
geographic combatant commander ?

32:28.109 --> 32:29.998
Senator , in the next 5 years , I

32:29.998 --> 32:32.739
expect , uh , China's nuclear arsenal

32:32.739 --> 32:36.089
to nearly double . And that taken in

32:36.089 --> 32:39.010
some with their comprehensive strategic

32:39.010 --> 32:41.121
partner , their no limits partnership

32:41.121 --> 32:43.589
with Russia and with their arsenal ,

32:44.689 --> 32:48.069
it's a concern . We've got to overmatch

32:48.069 --> 32:50.180
that capability . We have to continue

32:50.180 --> 32:53.844
to modernize the US nuclear . Deterrent ,

32:54.625 --> 32:56.775
including tactical nuclear forces .

32:57.104 --> 32:59.048
You've mentioned the importance of

32:59.048 --> 33:02.025
allies and partners , and in the

33:02.025 --> 33:04.344
Indo-Pacific region that includes

33:04.344 --> 33:07.625
several that depend upon our nuclear

33:07.625 --> 33:10.104
umbrella , our nuclear deterrence

33:10.104 --> 33:13.469
guarantees . Based on your interaction

33:13.469 --> 33:15.691
with these allies and partners , how do

33:15.691 --> 33:18.089
you believe they would view a delay or

33:18.089 --> 33:19.645
cancellation of our nuclear

33:19.645 --> 33:22.920
modernization effort or rhetoric to

33:22.920 --> 33:26.489
that effect , and to what extent would

33:26.489 --> 33:29.229
they be concerned ? Senator , you

33:29.229 --> 33:31.270
rightly identify it would be a deep

33:31.270 --> 33:33.381
concern on the part of our allies and

33:33.381 --> 33:35.548
partners . They defend very strongly .

33:35.548 --> 33:37.492
They depend , I shouldn't say they

33:37.492 --> 33:40.949
depend . We together rely very strongly

33:40.949 --> 33:43.989
on extended deterrence . They'd view

33:43.989 --> 33:45.989
that with the concern and they'd be

33:45.989 --> 33:48.979
right to . Admiral , uh , you know ,

33:49.150 --> 33:51.510
know as well as anyone the challenges

33:51.510 --> 33:54.189
that are posed by the vast distances in

33:54.189 --> 33:56.540
the Indo-Pacific and being able to

33:56.540 --> 33:58.596
connect those ships and the aircraft

33:58.596 --> 34:01.170
with fuel , that's gonna be crucial .

34:01.510 --> 34:03.510
Uh , in your opening statement you

34:03.510 --> 34:06.790
stated our tanker fleet falls below

34:06.790 --> 34:09.310
requirements . How are you working with

34:09.310 --> 34:11.949
General Reed at Transcom to address

34:11.949 --> 34:14.909
those , uh , refueling needs and really

34:14.909 --> 34:18.340
shortfalls that we have ? Senator , uh ,

34:18.360 --> 34:20.471
you know , I , I'm , you know , I , I

34:20.471 --> 34:22.638
could tell you in a classified setting

34:22.638 --> 34:24.860
how many millions of pounds it takes to

34:24.860 --> 34:26.693
be in the air to support our air

34:26.693 --> 34:28.804
refueling requirements , and I'd also

34:28.804 --> 34:30.971
add our combat logistics force and our

34:30.971 --> 34:33.389
at sea fuel requirements as well . Um ,

34:33.479 --> 34:35.659
I strongly applaud the Air Force's

34:36.300 --> 34:38.719
standing back up the tanker fleet and

34:38.719 --> 34:41.550
refreshing it . And you know I'd be in

34:41.550 --> 34:43.717
favor of anything that accelerates our

34:43.717 --> 34:47.030
ability to put fuel in the air . Thank

34:47.030 --> 34:50.659
you , uh , General Brunson , back to

34:50.659 --> 34:52.590
our nuclear deterrence and the

34:52.590 --> 34:55.070
importance it has for our allies and

34:55.070 --> 34:58.570
our partners , can you , uh , comment

34:58.570 --> 35:02.129
on how important that relationship is ,

35:02.189 --> 35:05.149
uh , between , uh , the US and ROK ?

35:07.629 --> 35:10.330
Uh , yes , uh , Senator , it has a ,

35:10.550 --> 35:13.330
has a tremendous , um , it goes

35:13.330 --> 35:15.219
tremendously far in helping us to

35:15.219 --> 35:17.790
assure our allies of our will and our

35:17.790 --> 35:20.590
intent . Um , so to that end , we've

35:20.590 --> 35:22.757
developed a staff section , the J-10 ,

35:22.757 --> 35:24.701
which works along and serves as an

35:24.701 --> 35:26.868
interface between Rock Stratcom and US

35:26.868 --> 35:30.070
StratCom . Uh , we've also participated

35:30.070 --> 35:32.403
fully in the nuclear consultative group ,

35:32.403 --> 35:34.514
and these things all allow our allies

35:34.514 --> 35:37.000
to focus on other things in the region .

35:37.409 --> 35:39.530
Vice being confounded about are they

35:39.530 --> 35:41.929
protected ? are they covered ? So our

35:41.929 --> 35:44.209
assurance through extended deterrence

35:44.209 --> 35:47.010
is incredibly important for us being

35:47.010 --> 35:49.530
allies . Thank you very much . Thank

35:49.530 --> 35:51.697
you , Mr . Chair . Thank you , Senator

35:51.697 --> 35:54.270
Fisher . I have , uh , Senator Hirono

35:54.270 --> 35:56.770
and then Senator Tuberville . Senator

35:56.770 --> 35:57.330
Hirono .

36:02.590 --> 36:05.149
Thank you very much for your service

36:05.149 --> 36:07.479
and leadership . Admiral Papa , you've

36:07.479 --> 36:10.360
been uh very candid about your concerns

36:10.360 --> 36:12.471
with the US military's magazine depth

36:12.471 --> 36:14.416
over the last several years and of

36:14.416 --> 36:17.229
course , uh with the uh illegal war in ,

36:17.600 --> 36:20.080
uh , Iran , and you noted today that

36:20.080 --> 36:22.136
you're , uh , you believe that the ,

36:22.136 --> 36:24.540
this the magazine is being judiciously .

36:24.899 --> 36:26.955
Employed , uh , uh , I'm not so sure

36:26.955 --> 36:29.010
about that , but , uh , you did note

36:29.010 --> 36:32.219
that we need to have a better mix . I

36:32.219 --> 36:34.330
think , um , I think that's where you

36:34.330 --> 36:36.052
were going , better mix of the

36:36.052 --> 36:37.886
exquisite high cost , low volume

36:37.886 --> 36:40.239
systems with affordable high volume

36:40.239 --> 36:42.840
munitions . You did note that , uh ,

36:43.189 --> 36:45.179
that , that we are working with

36:45.179 --> 36:48.340
non-traditional vendors to help us

36:48.340 --> 36:51.280
produce these other types of munitions .

36:51.739 --> 36:54.379
So I'm I'm curious to know that how are

36:54.379 --> 36:56.979
we doing that ? Are , are we providing

36:56.979 --> 36:59.659
encouragement to these non-traditional

36:59.659 --> 37:02.330
vendors to help us with , uh ,

37:02.340 --> 37:04.620
providing the unmanned systems and the

37:04.620 --> 37:07.280
other munitions that you are seeking to ,

37:07.540 --> 37:11.169
uh , develop ? Morning in Aloha Center .

37:12.469 --> 37:14.525
Yes , most certainly . Uh , first is

37:14.525 --> 37:16.790
that we're working with the Defense

37:16.790 --> 37:20.110
Innovation Unit , uh , we have funded

37:20.110 --> 37:23.229
multiple tests including the employment

37:23.229 --> 37:27.199
of a low-cost hypersonic weapon . Off

37:27.199 --> 37:31.080
of US aircraft this summer and so

37:31.080 --> 37:33.136
yes , we've encouraged , yes , we've

37:33.136 --> 37:35.959
advocated for DIU experimentation , and

37:35.959 --> 37:38.126
we've advocated very strongly with the

37:38.126 --> 37:40.520
department for contracting these

37:40.520 --> 37:42.298
capabilities . Those contracted

37:42.298 --> 37:44.320
capabilities are reflected in this

37:44.320 --> 37:47.439
year's budget submission with orders in

37:47.439 --> 37:50.040
the hundreds if not thousands of these

37:50.040 --> 37:53.639
systems . That's an area that , uh ,

37:53.649 --> 37:56.250
I would like to , uh , provide more

37:56.250 --> 37:58.959
support because clearly we need to uh

37:58.959 --> 38:00.681
really move toward the kind of

38:00.681 --> 38:02.681
innovations that you have very much

38:02.681 --> 38:04.681
advocated for the , the , the times

38:04.681 --> 38:06.848
that I have worked with you . So thank

38:06.848 --> 38:08.737
you very much for your continuing

38:08.737 --> 38:10.903
leadership in this regard . I did want

38:10.903 --> 38:13.209
to mention uh that although you are not

38:13.209 --> 38:15.209
directly involved with the military

38:15.209 --> 38:17.320
services continuing negotiations with

38:17.320 --> 38:19.098
the state of Hawaii . Regarding

38:19.098 --> 38:21.042
extending the use of very critical

38:21.042 --> 38:23.042
military training lands in Hawaii .

38:23.042 --> 38:24.987
Without those training lands , for

38:24.987 --> 38:27.098
example , the , uh , it would be very

38:27.098 --> 38:28.987
hard to justify , uh , the army's

38:28.987 --> 38:31.153
presence in Hawaii and therefore the ,

38:31.153 --> 38:33.860
the impact on national security . So I

38:33.860 --> 38:36.959
just , uh , wanted to bring the

38:36.959 --> 38:39.610
importance of the significance of these

38:39.610 --> 38:43.360
negotiations and , um , uh , the , the .

38:44.500 --> 38:47.179
Particularly for the army to continue

38:47.179 --> 38:49.179
to negotiate in good faith with the

38:49.179 --> 38:51.739
state to come to a resolution

38:51.739 --> 38:55.100
acceptable to all parties and not short

38:55.100 --> 38:57.419
circuit the discussions by seeking to

38:57.419 --> 39:00.169
condemn the land without fully

39:00.169 --> 39:02.058
exhausting the avenues and I just

39:02.058 --> 39:04.979
wanted to get your brief uh thoughts on

39:04.979 --> 39:06.535
the the importance of these

39:06.535 --> 39:08.757
negotiations and how these negotiations

39:09.169 --> 39:11.330
should proceed . Senate

39:13.010 --> 39:15.500
engagement is critical . Fahakaloa is

39:15.500 --> 39:17.278
absolutely indispensable to the

39:17.278 --> 39:19.540
nation's defense . It's indispensable

39:19.540 --> 39:21.818
to deterrence here in the Indo-Pacific ,

39:21.949 --> 39:24.489
and I'm strongly in favor of every ,

39:25.060 --> 39:28.659
every effort that leads to

39:28.659 --> 39:32.419
a favorable outcome to maintain 25th ID

39:32.419 --> 39:35.300
and in fact , United States Army's

39:35.300 --> 39:38.020
continued usage of Pohakaloa training

39:38.020 --> 39:41.139
area as well as all of the other key

39:41.139 --> 39:43.580
land lease issues that we're dealing

39:43.580 --> 39:45.580
with in the state of Hawaii , which

39:45.580 --> 39:48.820
also includes Air Force , Navy , Space

39:48.820 --> 39:51.459
Force , and then Marine usage . And so

39:51.459 --> 39:53.659
across the joint force I'm strongly in

39:53.659 --> 39:56.409
favor of building . Towards , uh ,

39:56.419 --> 39:58.939
consensus and sensible solutions , I

39:58.939 --> 40:00.939
think the key words here are , uh ,

40:00.939 --> 40:03.161
consensus because I think it would be ,

40:03.179 --> 40:05.401
uh , not in the interest of our , the ,

40:05.401 --> 40:07.800
the military's presence in Hawaii , uh ,

40:07.810 --> 40:10.239
if the , these negotiations are somehow

40:10.580 --> 40:12.620
short circuited and that there is

40:12.620 --> 40:14.780
resort to condemnation that would not

40:14.780 --> 40:16.947
go over very well I would say with the

40:16.947 --> 40:20.139
people of Hawaii . So , um , any , uh .

40:20.750 --> 40:22.917
Input that you have toward those kinds

40:22.917 --> 40:24.939
of negotiations would be much

40:24.939 --> 40:27.189
appreciated . Amira , we are seeing

40:27.189 --> 40:29.300
increasing cooperation between Iran ,

40:29.379 --> 40:31.790
Russia , North Korea , and China . And

40:31.790 --> 40:34.750
as US forces remain heavily engaged in

40:34.750 --> 40:36.861
the Middle East , how are you working

40:36.861 --> 40:39.083
with the regional allies , particularly

40:39.083 --> 40:41.860
Japan , uh Republic of Korea , and

40:41.860 --> 40:44.270
Australia to increase cooperation and

40:44.270 --> 40:46.850
coordination among our partners and .

40:47.290 --> 40:50.090
The Indo-Pacific AOR Senator , all

40:50.090 --> 40:52.201
those relationships are in a strong ,

40:52.330 --> 40:54.530
strong upward trajectory , including

40:54.530 --> 40:57.449
the relationships among them , and , um ,

40:57.489 --> 40:59.770
it is a daily matter of duty to work

40:59.770 --> 41:02.330
closely with all the allies . I just

41:02.330 --> 41:04.274
also wanna mention that as we talk

41:04.274 --> 41:06.386
about the importance of strengthening

41:06.386 --> 41:08.608
our allies , we should not forget . The

41:08.608 --> 41:10.830
our compact island nations and the fact

41:10.830 --> 41:12.997
that we should be working very closely

41:12.997 --> 41:14.929
to support the , the our compact

41:14.929 --> 41:16.929
nations and other island nations as

41:16.929 --> 41:19.850
China is very much extending itself in

41:19.850 --> 41:22.429
the in the Pacific area with regard to

41:22.610 --> 41:24.949
establishing stronger relations with

41:25.169 --> 41:27.391
Palau , Marshall Islands , Micronesia ,

41:27.439 --> 41:29.550
other island nations , but let us not

41:29.550 --> 41:31.328
forget our , uh , island nation

41:31.328 --> 41:33.510
partners . Will do , Senator , and ,

41:33.669 --> 41:35.469
and , uh , Republic of Palau ,

41:35.590 --> 41:37.423
Federated States of Micronesia ,

41:37.423 --> 41:39.646
Republic of the Marshall Islands , uh ,

41:39.646 --> 41:41.423
continue to be areas of Chinese

41:41.423 --> 41:43.669
encroachment across the gray zone ,

41:43.870 --> 41:46.949
across elements of elite capture , and

41:46.949 --> 41:48.909
maintaining a close focus on those

41:48.909 --> 41:51.590
relationships is incredibly important

41:51.590 --> 41:53.757
to the defense of the United States of

41:53.757 --> 41:55.979
America . Thank you , Mr . Chairman and

41:55.979 --> 41:59.820
our relationships with . With those

41:59.820 --> 42:02.479
peoples are very strong .

42:03.300 --> 42:06.179
And appreciated . Senator Tuberville .

42:06.379 --> 42:08.546
Thank you . Good morning , gentlemen .

42:08.546 --> 42:10.860
Uh , Admiral , what flexibility and

42:10.860 --> 42:14.580
capability does NOPaycom gain if we

42:14.580 --> 42:17.820
were able to fill 16 Columbia class

42:17.820 --> 42:20.810
submarines versus 12 ? Senator , good

42:20.810 --> 42:23.080
morning . It's the addition of 64

42:23.080 --> 42:25.247
missile tubes . It enhanced , it would

42:25.247 --> 42:28.439
enhance our ability to provide extended

42:28.439 --> 42:31.169
deterrence . Uh , it would enhance our

42:31.169 --> 42:33.530
overall readiness , uh , not just for

42:33.530 --> 42:36.090
strategic weapons , but for tactical

42:36.090 --> 42:38.729
weapons , and , uh , I'm strongly in

42:38.729 --> 42:41.439
favor of , uh , enhancing that , and

42:41.689 --> 42:43.850
you'll find me a strong vote yes on

42:43.850 --> 42:46.550
increasing our uh Colombia inventory .

42:46.929 --> 42:49.199
Thank you . Uh , to another subject ,

42:49.280 --> 42:51.391
our competition with China isn't just

42:51.391 --> 42:53.280
about military strength . It also

42:53.280 --> 42:55.336
includes monetary strength as well .

42:55.336 --> 42:57.280
You know , last year , the Chinese

42:57.280 --> 42:59.391
Communist Party's main monetary think

42:59.391 --> 43:01.709
tank published research . On Bitcoin as

43:01.709 --> 43:04.550
a s strategic asset . You know , this

43:04.550 --> 43:06.550
came after President Trump moved to

43:06.550 --> 43:08.772
establish a strategic Bitcoin reserve .

43:09.179 --> 43:11.012
Admiral , how does leadership in

43:11.012 --> 43:13.179
Bitcoin impact leverage , resilience ,

43:13.179 --> 43:15.512
deterrence for Indopaycom against China ?

43:15.512 --> 43:17.401
And do you think that a strategic

43:17.401 --> 43:19.949
Bitcoin reserve helps America compete

43:19.949 --> 43:22.879
against China ? Senator , uh , our ,

43:23.280 --> 43:26.040
you know , our research into Bitcoin is

43:26.040 --> 43:28.280
as a computer science tool . It's the

43:28.280 --> 43:30.479
combination of cryptography , a

43:30.479 --> 43:33.239
blockchain , and a proof of work . And

43:33.239 --> 43:36.129
Bitcoin shows incredible potential as a ,

43:36.459 --> 43:39.239
uh , as a computer science tool that

43:39.239 --> 43:41.800
through the proof of work protocols is

43:41.800 --> 43:44.280
a , actually imposes more cost than

43:44.280 --> 43:46.610
just the algorithmic securing of

43:46.610 --> 43:48.721
networks and our ability to operate .

43:49.000 --> 43:52.610
And uh Bitcoin is a reality . It is a

43:52.610 --> 43:55.969
valuable computer science tool as a

43:55.969 --> 43:59.610
power projection , and outside of the

43:59.610 --> 44:01.832
economic formulation of it , it has got

44:01.832 --> 44:03.721
really important computer science

44:03.721 --> 44:06.110
applications for cybersecurity . Thank

44:06.110 --> 44:08.166
you . What , what recommendations do

44:08.166 --> 44:10.388
you have for us here in Congress on how

44:10.388 --> 44:12.388
to , how the US can lead on Bitcoin

44:12.388 --> 44:16.280
competition ? Uh , you know , I , I

44:16.280 --> 44:18.613
have to go deeper on that with you , uh ,

44:18.613 --> 44:20.836
for the record , and I , I , I can go ,

44:20.836 --> 44:23.169
I can go deeper on that case , but , uh ,

44:23.169 --> 44:26.399
Bitcoin is a reality . Uh , it is a

44:26.510 --> 44:30.479
peer to peer , uh , zero trust transfer

44:30.479 --> 44:32.870
of value . Anything that supports the

44:33.040 --> 44:35.151
all instruments of national power for

44:35.151 --> 44:37.318
the United States of America is to the

44:37.318 --> 44:39.800
good . Thank you . I'll have to go back

44:39.800 --> 44:41.856
and listen to that answer to kind of

44:41.856 --> 44:43.911
decipher it . Most of us in , you're

44:43.911 --> 44:45.911
way over our head . Go ahead . Um .

44:46.550 --> 44:48.929
General , uh , what we're seeing as far

44:48.929 --> 44:51.370
as changes in strategic environment

44:51.610 --> 44:53.777
with respect to North Korea , what are

44:53.777 --> 44:57.419
we seeing ? Senator , thank you for

44:57.419 --> 44:59.530
the question . Uh , one of the things

44:59.530 --> 45:01.697
that we're seeing , if we were to just

45:01.697 --> 45:03.530
take this from , um , you know ,

45:03.530 --> 45:05.586
political , military , and then just

45:05.586 --> 45:07.641
informational or intelligence view ,

45:07.641 --> 45:09.752
what we're seeing with them is , uh ,

45:09.752 --> 45:12.086
politically , KJU is firmly in his seat .

45:12.239 --> 45:14.399
I think militarily what we see is a

45:14.399 --> 45:16.639
more experienced force that's been

45:16.639 --> 45:18.806
forward into the conflict in Ukraine ,

45:19.149 --> 45:22.080
come back , trained other forces , and

45:22.080 --> 45:24.250
taken best advantage of the offsets

45:24.250 --> 45:26.679
that were learned in that fight and

45:26.679 --> 45:28.957
begun to employ them in their training .

45:28.957 --> 45:30.790
Uh , informationally and through

45:30.790 --> 45:33.669
intelligence , what we find is , uh , a

45:33.669 --> 45:36.229
continued isolated population in that

45:36.229 --> 45:39.370
country and less communication south

45:39.370 --> 45:41.610
with the government in Korea . Um ,

45:41.750 --> 45:43.870
there are no overtures toward peace

45:43.870 --> 45:46.389
from the North to the South , and we

45:46.389 --> 45:48.860
see increasing hardness , if you will ,

45:49.110 --> 45:51.399
in terms of that relation . So every

45:51.399 --> 45:54.350
overture is rebuffed . And there are no

45:54.350 --> 45:56.461
more outreaches from the north to the

45:56.461 --> 45:58.628
south . What kind of reactions are you

45:58.628 --> 46:00.794
seeing from the conflict in the Middle

46:00.794 --> 46:04.560
East from the North Koreans ? Uh ,

46:04.649 --> 46:06.871
Senator , is , is mentioned in closed ,

46:06.871 --> 46:09.149
uh , we are seeing reflections , and I ,

46:09.149 --> 46:11.010
I would just say , um , they're

46:11.010 --> 46:14.050
watching that with a wary eye by virtue

46:14.050 --> 46:17.719
of the , um , the use of , of munitions

46:17.719 --> 46:19.886
and the things that we've done in that

46:19.886 --> 46:22.108
conflict currently and how quickly that

46:22.108 --> 46:24.330
occurred . Thank you . Thank you , Mr .

46:24.330 --> 46:26.052
Chairman . Thank you , Senator

46:26.052 --> 46:27.941
Tuberville and Admiral Paparo , I

46:27.941 --> 46:29.941
believe you told Senator Tuberville

46:29.941 --> 46:33.040
that that you hope to supplement your

46:33.040 --> 46:35.879
answer on the record with regard to

46:35.879 --> 46:38.120
Bitcoin . Yes , sir , I will , I will

46:38.120 --> 46:40.120
respond on the record . Thank you .

46:40.120 --> 46:42.064
I'll put it in plain English too .

46:42.800 --> 46:45.080
Thank you . Well , Senator Tuberville

46:45.080 --> 46:47.330
will not be the only one who , um ,

46:47.760 --> 46:49.427
goes back over that , Senator

46:49.427 --> 46:52.250
Blumenthal . Thank you , Mr . Chairman .

46:52.300 --> 46:54.520
Thank you both for your service and

46:54.979 --> 46:58.020
really critical roles . Admiral , uh ,

46:58.149 --> 47:01.179
I apologize that I was unable to attend

47:01.179 --> 47:03.068
the closed session because of the

47:03.068 --> 47:05.068
conflict . So my question really is

47:05.068 --> 47:07.820
based on . Public reporting and I know .

47:09.159 --> 47:12.229
That there was some coverage of various

47:12.229 --> 47:15.340
topics in the closed session , uh , but

47:15.340 --> 47:19.000
I am tremendously concerned about the

47:19.000 --> 47:22.000
impact of the transfer , the drawdown

47:22.000 --> 47:25.300
of munitions and capabilities to the

47:25.300 --> 47:29.139
Middle East . I'm under the

47:29.139 --> 47:32.189
impression that the impact has been

47:32.189 --> 47:35.969
serious . Would you agree ? Well ,

47:36.090 --> 47:38.370
Senator , I think we maintain deep

47:38.370 --> 47:41.689
magazines and there's no walking away

47:41.689 --> 47:45.110
from the quantitative use of weapons

47:45.419 --> 47:49.050
and our way forward is to supercharge

47:49.050 --> 47:51.272
our defense industrial base and equally

47:51.272 --> 47:52.939
important is to innovate with

47:52.939 --> 47:54.883
non-traditional primes . Would you

47:54.883 --> 47:57.050
agree with me that the American people

47:57.050 --> 48:00.280
really need and deserve to know more

48:00.280 --> 48:02.800
about what the impact will be so they

48:02.800 --> 48:05.679
can appreciate the seriousness of the

48:05.679 --> 48:09.580
cost of the Iran war and the

48:10.600 --> 48:13.439
Really urgent need to replenish and

48:13.439 --> 48:17.070
restock . Munitions and and other

48:17.070 --> 48:19.292
resources for your command and others .

48:19.870 --> 48:22.148
Uh , I acknowledge it , sir , and , um ,

48:22.250 --> 48:24.250
you know , and , uh , the secret is

48:24.250 --> 48:26.729
addressing it , uh , as I can see .

48:27.310 --> 48:29.421
Well , I hope that there will be more

48:29.870 --> 48:31.926
truth telling to the American people

48:31.926 --> 48:34.189
about the need to build the industrial

48:34.189 --> 48:37.310
base and to provide more of the

48:37.310 --> 48:39.088
resources that you need because

48:39.088 --> 48:41.254
otherwise the American people are just

48:41.254 --> 48:43.580
going to assume . We don't have any

48:43.580 --> 48:46.879
need to do it . Um , the

48:46.889 --> 48:50.389
cooperation between Russia and North

48:50.389 --> 48:54.090
Korea is deepening militarily .

48:54.669 --> 48:57.090
My understanding is that North Korea

48:57.090 --> 48:59.840
has transferred millions of artillery

48:59.840 --> 49:02.070
shells , rockets , ballistic missiles ,

49:02.110 --> 49:05.189
and other resources to Russia for use

49:05.189 --> 49:07.590
in Ukraine , and that North Korea has

49:07.590 --> 49:09.757
provided more than 10,000 troops right

49:09.757 --> 49:13.500
now . Fighting , actually

49:13.500 --> 49:16.919
fighting uh on the front line in

49:17.340 --> 49:18.896
Ukraine , is that correct ?

49:21.679 --> 49:23.679
That's , that's correct , Senator .

49:23.679 --> 49:26.530
Thank you , General Bronson . Um , and

49:26.530 --> 49:29.409
in turn , Russia is providing North

49:29.409 --> 49:33.030
Korea with Food , energy supplies , and

49:33.030 --> 49:35.141
maybe most importantly , technology ,

49:35.469 --> 49:37.770
correct ? Yes , Senator , that's

49:37.770 --> 49:40.040
correct . How significant in your view

49:40.040 --> 49:43.449
militarily is that cooperation , and I

49:43.449 --> 49:45.889
understand it's growing . Yes , Senator ,

49:46.000 --> 49:48.222
uh , it's , it's significant due to the

49:48.222 --> 49:50.110
fact that , uh , they're able to

49:50.239 --> 49:52.909
alleviate their research , development ,

49:53.090 --> 49:55.689
uh , training and evaluation or testing

49:55.689 --> 49:57.810
and evaluation . Uh , they're getting

49:57.810 --> 49:59.532
ready-made equipment . They're

49:59.532 --> 50:01.588
receiving training . They're putting

50:01.588 --> 50:03.921
those things into operation immediately .

50:03.921 --> 50:06.500
Uh , Admiral , um , I was very

50:06.500 --> 50:10.159
interested in your three meta trends

50:10.610 --> 50:14.600
in your testimony . And particularly as

50:14.600 --> 50:17.379
to the growing .

50:18.629 --> 50:22.090
Capability of asymmetric . Warfare

50:22.090 --> 50:25.050
cheap . Masked , unmanned .

50:25.889 --> 50:28.739
Warfare we've seen in Ukraine . Uh , I

50:28.739 --> 50:31.620
assume your comments are based on the

50:31.620 --> 50:34.590
Iran war as well . How does that bear

50:34.590 --> 50:38.250
on the Chinese calculus ? Given

50:38.250 --> 50:41.929
that Taiwan is smaller , fewer numbers

50:41.929 --> 50:45.110
of . Troops , but .

50:46.270 --> 50:49.729
Highly capable in cyber and

50:50.139 --> 50:53.129
also in providing those unmanned

50:53.469 --> 50:56.909
asymmetric forces against maybe a

50:56.909 --> 51:00.129
very significant Chinese invasion , but

51:00.310 --> 51:03.229
maybe Something that the Chinese ought

51:03.229 --> 51:06.250
to be more wary about . Senator

51:06.250 --> 51:08.306
Blumenthal , I , I think the Chinese

51:08.306 --> 51:10.194
are deeply worried about it , and

51:10.194 --> 51:12.361
they're trying to reckon with it as we

51:12.361 --> 51:14.472
do , which I think that why all of us

51:14.472 --> 51:16.639
together have got to reckon with these

51:16.639 --> 51:18.639
three mega trend and the mega trend

51:18.639 --> 51:20.861
around it and the changing character of

51:20.861 --> 51:22.917
warfare . I think that their view is

51:22.917 --> 51:25.028
that they want to build a drone force

51:25.028 --> 51:26.750
that would be a vanguard of an

51:26.750 --> 51:28.972
assaulting force , and in the end , all

51:28.972 --> 51:30.919
things being equal , the mass

51:30.919 --> 51:33.040
deployment and employment of cheap

51:33.040 --> 51:35.560
expendable munitions will favor the

51:35.560 --> 51:39.100
defensive so long as we pursue it .

51:39.379 --> 51:42.139
Uh , fully , uh , with mass , with

51:42.139 --> 51:44.306
numbers , with sustainability and with

51:44.306 --> 51:47.280
AI tools that , uh , enable us to , uh ,

51:47.290 --> 51:50.350
command it , uh , and outmatch our , uh ,

51:50.379 --> 51:52.657
potential adversaries . In other words ,

51:52.657 --> 51:54.546
as long as we continue supporting

51:54.546 --> 51:58.040
Taiwan with those resources . Yes sir ,

51:58.120 --> 52:01.419
and Taiwan's continued pursuit in and

52:01.419 --> 52:03.641
of itself of its own defense , which is

52:03.641 --> 52:05.919
a key factor . Thank you . Thanks , Mr .

52:05.919 --> 52:07.641
Chairman . Thank you , Senator

52:07.641 --> 52:09.919
Blumenthal . Senator Ernst . Thank you ,

52:09.919 --> 52:12.030
Mr . Chair , and again , thank you so

52:12.030 --> 52:14.252
much , gentlemen for being here today .

52:14.252 --> 52:16.363
We appreciate your service as well as

52:16.363 --> 52:18.308
your teams in protecting our great

52:18.308 --> 52:21.159
nation . Uh , when Iran closed the

52:21.159 --> 52:23.500
Strait of Hormuz , it , it directly

52:23.500 --> 52:25.810
threatened the energy security of a

52:25.810 --> 52:27.889
number of our allies in the

52:27.889 --> 52:31.370
Indo-Pacific , uh , Japan , South Korea ,

52:31.489 --> 52:34.649
the Philippines , and these are key

52:34.649 --> 52:37.969
allies for us , and they assist us with

52:37.969 --> 52:39.747
the deterrence in that region .

52:40.030 --> 52:42.239
President Trump's national security

52:42.239 --> 52:45.120
strategy rightly treats American energy

52:45.120 --> 52:48.209
dominance as a strategic asset . It's

52:48.209 --> 52:51.479
not just an economic one . So Admiral

52:51.479 --> 52:55.080
Poparo , um , does , does IndoPaycom

52:55.080 --> 52:57.679
currently treat allied energy

52:57.679 --> 53:00.179
dependence as a strategic vulnerability

53:00.439 --> 53:04.239
when doing its planning ? Senator Ernst ,

53:04.320 --> 53:06.542
good morning . Yes , absolutely we do .

53:06.542 --> 53:08.439
We track energy reserves for each

53:08.439 --> 53:11.719
partner , including also potentially

53:11.719 --> 53:14.800
each potential competitor as well , and

53:14.800 --> 53:18.239
uh we do view , uh we do view the

53:18.239 --> 53:20.854
vulnerabilities of not just . Where the

53:20.854 --> 53:22.895
energy is coming from , but also

53:22.895 --> 53:25.062
through the straits through which they

53:25.062 --> 53:28.175
travel , Malacca , Lumbok , Sunda ,

53:28.534 --> 53:30.735
among others as being key critical

53:30.735 --> 53:33.094
geography , as the ability to impose

53:33.094 --> 53:36.334
costs , uh , as well as the ability to

53:36.334 --> 53:40.139
defend . Key strategic waterways and

53:40.500 --> 53:43.020
I affirm the ability of the United

53:43.020 --> 53:45.780
States increasingly to be a net energy

53:45.780 --> 53:48.899
provider also in the Indo-Pacific to

53:48.899 --> 53:51.209
escape the vulnerability of those key

53:51.209 --> 53:53.265
choke points . OK , and that's a key

53:53.265 --> 53:56.915
point too , I think . Greater US oil

53:56.915 --> 54:00.225
and and LNG supplies to our allies can

54:00.225 --> 54:02.544
reduce the leverage that any of our

54:02.544 --> 54:04.804
adversaries would have on those

54:04.804 --> 54:07.594
countries . In your assessment , do you

54:07.594 --> 54:10.705
think we are moving fast enough to make

54:10.705 --> 54:14.645
American energy a meaningful pillar

54:15.185 --> 54:17.475
of allied resilience in the

54:17.475 --> 54:21.030
Indo-Pacific ? I never ever affirm

54:21.030 --> 54:23.252
satisfaction with where we are in terms

54:23.252 --> 54:25.197
of national strength . OK , well ,

54:25.197 --> 54:27.252
thanks for the truthful answer there

54:27.252 --> 54:29.308
and , and I would concur with that .

54:29.308 --> 54:31.530
Thank you . Um , now , uh , moving on ,

54:31.530 --> 54:33.641
General Brunson , uh , for you , uh ,

54:33.669 --> 54:35.891
Russia's war in Ukraine has become kind

54:35.891 --> 54:38.750
of a two-way military exchange between

54:38.750 --> 54:42.639
Putin and Kim Jong Un . We see a

54:42.639 --> 54:44.709
lot whether it's the liquid fuel

54:44.709 --> 54:46.709
ballistic missile program that goes

54:46.709 --> 54:49.310
back to North Korea ,

54:50.439 --> 54:52.161
Russian military and technical

54:52.161 --> 54:55.709
assistance personnel coming from North

54:55.709 --> 54:59.090
Korea to assist Russia in the war in

54:59.090 --> 55:02.600
Ukraine , we could go on and on . So

55:02.600 --> 55:05.959
what we have seen means that Iran is

55:05.959 --> 55:09.169
taking a look at . Uh , uh , what's

55:09.169 --> 55:11.889
going on ? There's a real world test

55:11.889 --> 55:14.879
bed going on in Iran right now . Uh ,

55:14.889 --> 55:17.709
we've seen the same in Ukraine . So ,

55:18.280 --> 55:21.020
uh , with all of these exchanges going

55:21.020 --> 55:24.500
on , what specific capabilities are you

55:24.500 --> 55:26.955
seeing ? Seeing that the DPRK has

55:26.955 --> 55:29.625
actually gained from these experiences ,

55:29.955 --> 55:32.754
what do they stand to gain today or

55:32.754 --> 55:35.844
immediately that would assist them , uh ,

55:35.875 --> 55:38.715
as they're assessing , uh , the United

55:38.715 --> 55:40.826
States and our partner nations in the

55:40.826 --> 55:44.620
Indo-Pacific ? Uh , Senator , um , you

55:44.620 --> 55:46.787
know , as mentioned previously , we're

55:46.787 --> 55:48.787
seeing it in their training . We're

55:48.787 --> 55:50.953
seeing the things that they're doing ,

55:50.953 --> 55:52.898
those are immediate gains . Uh , I

55:52.898 --> 55:55.009
think at the operational level , what

55:55.009 --> 55:57.176
they're finding is , um , they are far

55:57.176 --> 55:59.287
more , they're learning to become far

55:59.287 --> 56:01.453
more accurate with their employment of

56:01.453 --> 56:03.509
their fires . I think that's a thing

56:03.509 --> 56:05.564
when you see that Seoul sits some 60

56:05.564 --> 56:08.100
miles south of the DMZ . I also believe

56:08.100 --> 56:10.322
that , uh , in terms of technology that

56:10.322 --> 56:12.600
they've garnered from this association .

56:12.830 --> 56:15.370
It's allowed them to operate in spectra

56:15.370 --> 56:17.481
that they haven't before , so they're

56:17.481 --> 56:19.648
operating the EMS , they're working on

56:19.648 --> 56:22.050
electronic warfare , uh , and it's also

56:22.189 --> 56:24.356
enabled them to do things in the cyber

56:24.356 --> 56:26.522
realm that they hadn't been able to do

56:26.522 --> 56:28.356
before . So when you look at the

56:28.356 --> 56:30.467
cryptocurrency theft , uh , and other

56:30.467 --> 56:32.745
things that they're learning from this ,

56:32.745 --> 56:34.689
you know , almost this levant that

56:34.689 --> 56:36.870
exists now from Russia into DPRK into

56:36.870 --> 56:39.429
China and then beyond into Iran , I

56:39.429 --> 56:41.373
think that we have to be concerned

56:41.373 --> 56:44.250
about the The transitive nature of

56:44.250 --> 56:46.449
technology and TTPs that are going to

56:46.449 --> 56:48.671
move across that same Levon over time .

56:48.810 --> 56:51.649
So , General , would you assess those ,

56:51.889 --> 56:54.000
all of those different areas that you

56:54.000 --> 56:56.000
had just , you just spoke to , uh ,

56:56.050 --> 56:57.810
would you say that these are

56:57.810 --> 57:00.090
incremental gains or are these

57:00.090 --> 57:03.270
significant meaningful shifts for DPRK ?

57:03.770 --> 57:06.030
I would say , uh , Senator , for DPRK ,

57:06.209 --> 57:08.639
these are significant shifts in their

57:08.639 --> 57:10.695
ability to do these things that they

57:10.695 --> 57:12.583
never had to work on themselves ,

57:12.583 --> 57:14.969
largely given , um , the quid pro quo

57:14.969 --> 57:16.747
nature that we would talk about

57:16.747 --> 57:18.747
initially when this first started .

57:18.747 --> 57:20.913
This is a full partnership between two

57:20.913 --> 57:22.858
nations now . Yeah , thank you . I

57:22.858 --> 57:25.025
think this is something we really need

57:25.025 --> 57:27.025
to sit up and pay attention to . So

57:27.025 --> 57:29.247
thank you very much , gentlemen . Thank

57:29.247 --> 57:31.413
you , Mr . Chair . Thank you , Senator

57:31.413 --> 57:33.636
Ernst . We have , uh , Shaheen and then

57:33.636 --> 57:35.802
Sheehy . Senator Shaheen , thank you ,

57:35.802 --> 57:38.025
Mr . Chairman , and thank you , Admiral

57:38.025 --> 57:40.080
Poparo and General Brunson for being

57:40.080 --> 57:42.080
here for your service and thank you

57:42.080 --> 57:44.136
both for all of the time and support

57:44.136 --> 57:46.247
you provided to our bipartisan Codell

57:46.247 --> 57:48.413
that went to the Indo-Pacific a couple

57:48.413 --> 57:50.636
of weeks ago . Admiral Poparo , we very

57:50.636 --> 57:52.469
much appreciated the briefing in

57:52.469 --> 57:55.110
Honolulu and your insights into Taiwan ,

57:55.360 --> 57:57.304
Japan , and South Korea , which we

57:57.304 --> 58:00.870
visited . And while we were in Taiwan ,

58:01.000 --> 58:03.000
we had a , a very good meeting with

58:03.000 --> 58:06.149
President Lai , um , and with members

58:06.149 --> 58:09.020
of their Yuan , their legislative body .

58:09.709 --> 58:11.598
And we talked with them about the

58:11.598 --> 58:14.310
importance of passing the $40 billion

58:14.310 --> 58:16.366
special defense budget that they are

58:16.366 --> 58:20.149
still debating . Can you speak to why

58:20.149 --> 58:22.889
this is important , um , and your

58:23.189 --> 58:25.300
perspective on how important it would

58:25.300 --> 58:27.949
be for , uh , Taiwan to pass that

58:27.949 --> 58:30.939
special defense budget ? Good morning ,

58:31.020 --> 58:34.209
Senator Shaheen . Uh , first of all ,

58:34.320 --> 58:36.649
nothing has changed in the American

58:36.649 --> 58:38.371
policy on Taiwan and the three

58:38.371 --> 58:40.649
communiques , the Taiwan Relations Act ,

58:40.649 --> 58:42.482
the six assurances , our foreign

58:42.482 --> 58:44.770
military sales with Taiwan are not out

58:44.770 --> 58:47.530
of the norm over the , you know ,

58:47.810 --> 58:50.820
almost 50 years of Taiwan Relations Act .

58:51.229 --> 58:54.959
And so , uh , we can't want Taiwan's

58:54.959 --> 58:57.840
defense more than they want it itself ,

58:58.159 --> 59:00.048
and it's not a chicken in the egg

59:00.048 --> 59:02.270
because you're not going to get chicken

59:02.270 --> 59:04.437
or eggs if you starve the chicken . So

59:04.437 --> 59:06.492
it's very important for them to fund

59:06.492 --> 59:08.659
their own defense . Well , thank you ,

59:08.659 --> 59:10.659
I agree , and we made the case that

59:10.659 --> 59:12.881
there were two reasons to pass it . One

59:12.881 --> 59:12.679
was to send a message to China , but

59:12.679 --> 59:14.919
also send a message to the American

59:14.919 --> 59:17.360
Congress , um , which is very

59:17.360 --> 59:19.527
supportive of Taiwan and would like to

59:19.527 --> 59:22.389
see this action taken . Um , General

59:22.389 --> 59:25.310
Brunson , you kindly mentioned our

59:25.310 --> 59:27.870
visit to Camp Humphreys . I was very

59:27.870 --> 59:31.389
impressed by , um , that visit , and it

59:31.389 --> 59:33.611
was my first time , so it was nice to ,

59:33.790 --> 59:36.469
to hear the perspective from all of the

59:36.469 --> 59:39.189
men and women serving there . Um , and

59:39.189 --> 59:41.310
in South Korea , we also had a very

59:41.310 --> 59:43.330
good meeting with the Lee

59:43.330 --> 59:46.600
administration , um , who President Lee .

59:47.389 --> 59:50.810
was um very focused on reaching the

59:50.810 --> 59:54.100
transfer of OPCO by the end of his

59:54.100 --> 59:56.449
administration . Now , you talked about

59:56.449 --> 59:58.560
the importance of capabilities versus

59:58.560 --> 01:00:01.209
capacity , which was a point that we

01:00:01.209 --> 01:00:03.790
made to him as well , but can you

01:00:04.290 --> 01:00:06.409
outline what the key capabilities are

01:00:06.409 --> 01:00:09.689
that the US provides and that we need

01:00:09.689 --> 01:00:11.411
to continue to provide for the

01:00:11.411 --> 01:00:15.020
foreseeable future ? Senator ,

01:00:15.129 --> 01:00:17.351
first , thank you for your visit . It ,

01:00:17.351 --> 01:00:19.610
uh , it means a lot , uh , when we get

01:00:19.610 --> 01:00:21.777
a touch of home , when you're 13 hours

01:00:21.777 --> 01:00:23.554
off , like I know my wife's not

01:00:23.554 --> 01:00:26.570
watching this right now , um , but it

01:00:26.570 --> 01:00:28.681
means a lot when we have you all come

01:00:28.681 --> 01:00:30.681
out and visit us . So please , uh ,

01:00:30.681 --> 01:00:32.848
come back again . Um , when we look at

01:00:32.848 --> 01:00:35.014
the , the things that we provide right

01:00:35.014 --> 01:00:36.959
now , um , there , there's no true

01:00:36.959 --> 01:00:39.760
analog to critical but more limited in ,

01:00:39.919 --> 01:00:42.429
in Hangul . So what we have to do is

01:00:42.429 --> 01:00:44.651
really take a look at , and as I'm sure

01:00:44.651 --> 01:00:46.596
you were involved in conversations

01:00:46.596 --> 01:00:49.149
about this wartime OPCO and that it's a

01:00:49.149 --> 01:00:52.590
conditions-based transfer , um , as we

01:00:52.590 --> 01:00:54.790
continue to ferret out the conditions

01:00:54.790 --> 01:00:56.846
and the capabilities that have to be

01:00:56.846 --> 01:00:59.012
resident within that Republic of Korea

01:00:59.012 --> 01:01:01.409
force for us to do this , maintaining

01:01:01.409 --> 01:01:03.629
conditions-based , uh , for this

01:01:03.629 --> 01:01:05.629
transfer , I think that we'll learn

01:01:05.629 --> 01:01:07.685
over time what things we're going to

01:01:07.685 --> 01:01:09.962
still need to do alongside our partner .

01:01:10.250 --> 01:01:12.472
Uh , I can't give you an answer on that

01:01:12.472 --> 01:01:15.060
right now , ma'am , um , because we

01:01:15.060 --> 01:01:17.282
have to continue to work to ensure that

01:01:17.282 --> 01:01:19.780
political expediency doesn't outpace

01:01:19.780 --> 01:01:21.739
the conditions . We've got to stay

01:01:21.739 --> 01:01:23.899
focused on the conditions because the

01:01:23.899 --> 01:01:26.121
United States is safer that way and the

01:01:26.121 --> 01:01:28.232
Republic of Korea is safer that way .

01:01:28.232 --> 01:01:30.177
So we'll continue to focus there ,

01:01:30.177 --> 01:01:32.343
ma'am . I'll sort of take that for the

01:01:32.343 --> 01:01:34.399
record to come back to you , uh , on

01:01:34.399 --> 01:01:36.621
what we find out as we continue to work

01:01:36.621 --> 01:01:38.699
through our roadmap to get to OPcon

01:01:38.699 --> 01:01:41.439
transfer , right . Um , Admiral Paparo ,

01:01:41.510 --> 01:01:44.149
you've answered this question in

01:01:45.689 --> 01:01:48.649
Sort of in various ways , um , Senator

01:01:48.649 --> 01:01:50.593
Reid raised it , a couple of other

01:01:50.593 --> 01:01:53.489
people raised it , um , but can you

01:01:53.489 --> 01:01:57.050
talk about how Ultimately you think ,

01:01:57.489 --> 01:01:59.729
or I guess we can't say until we know

01:01:59.729 --> 01:02:01.451
the outcome , but how , what's

01:02:01.451 --> 01:02:03.562
happening in the Middle East and Iran

01:02:03.562 --> 01:02:05.889
affects how the PRC views the United

01:02:05.889 --> 01:02:09.090
States and how it might affect their

01:02:09.090 --> 01:02:11.570
thinking about their other activities

01:02:11.570 --> 01:02:14.889
in the region . Well , Senator ,

01:02:14.979 --> 01:02:17.379
there's , um , you know , there's no

01:02:17.379 --> 01:02:19.212
substitute for prevailing on the

01:02:19.212 --> 01:02:21.212
battlefield , so I , I could not be

01:02:21.212 --> 01:02:24.770
more stronger in favor of , of the

01:02:24.770 --> 01:02:26.992
operation that's ongoing in CENCO right

01:02:26.992 --> 01:02:29.739
now , and the success of that is very

01:02:29.739 --> 01:02:31.517
important for deterrence in the

01:02:31.517 --> 01:02:33.860
Indo-Pacific . And then as we bring

01:02:33.860 --> 01:02:37.189
those combat lessons learned . Into our

01:02:37.189 --> 01:02:39.709
own operations , uh , and you know

01:02:39.709 --> 01:02:42.030
we're directly involved , including in

01:02:42.030 --> 01:02:44.229
the theater itself with potential

01:02:44.229 --> 01:02:46.129
missile strikes on Diego Garcia ,

01:02:46.429 --> 01:02:49.919
maritime in maritime interdiction

01:02:49.919 --> 01:02:52.086
operations we're conducting as well as

01:02:52.086 --> 01:02:55.179
actioning of uh of uh . Iranian combat

01:02:55.179 --> 01:02:59.179
vessels and so I think that , you

01:02:59.179 --> 01:03:02.860
know what I want the PRC to

01:03:02.860 --> 01:03:05.840
see is that is that the United States

01:03:06.199 --> 01:03:09.879
employs capability and will in response

01:03:10.179 --> 01:03:12.899
to aggression , and I don't want them

01:03:12.899 --> 01:03:16.300
to doubt that in any way and that that

01:03:16.300 --> 01:03:18.411
supports deterrence and deterrence is

01:03:18.411 --> 01:03:20.540
our highest duty . Thank you . Thank

01:03:20.540 --> 01:03:22.429
you , Mr . Chairman . Thank you ,

01:03:22.429 --> 01:03:26.100
Senator Shaheen . Senator Sheehy . Good

01:03:26.100 --> 01:03:28.870
morning , gentlemen . Uh , last time we ,

01:03:29.090 --> 01:03:31.146
we faced an adversary in the Western

01:03:31.146 --> 01:03:32.979
Pacific where both of you , uh ,

01:03:33.050 --> 01:03:35.709
currently have dominion over . We were

01:03:35.709 --> 01:03:37.931
fighting , you know , a nation that was

01:03:37.931 --> 01:03:39.987
roughly the size of my home state of

01:03:39.987 --> 01:03:42.098
Montana with a population of fraction

01:03:42.098 --> 01:03:44.265
of the size of America with an economy

01:03:44.265 --> 01:03:46.487
also that fraction of the size . And we

01:03:46.487 --> 01:03:48.598
had a robust industrial base that was

01:03:48.598 --> 01:03:50.765
capable of mass manufacturing at scale

01:03:50.765 --> 01:03:52.487
relatively quickly . Today our

01:03:52.487 --> 01:03:54.376
adversary will be the size of our

01:03:54.376 --> 01:03:56.598
entire nation with a population roughly

01:03:56.598 --> 01:03:58.709
4 to 5 times the size of our own with

01:03:58.709 --> 01:04:00.765
an economy that's comparable . We'll

01:04:00.765 --> 01:04:02.820
face a considerably more challenging

01:04:02.820 --> 01:04:04.929
military and economic picture , uh ,

01:04:05.090 --> 01:04:07.146
should the unthinkable happen . Uh ,

01:04:07.146 --> 01:04:09.312
Admiral , I'll start with you . Do you

01:04:09.312 --> 01:04:11.423
feel our current fleet makeup both in

01:04:11.423 --> 01:04:14.209
size and , and ship composition is what

01:04:14.209 --> 01:04:16.431
you would need if you were fighting the

01:04:16.431 --> 01:04:18.542
fight in the Western Pacific ? And if

01:04:18.542 --> 01:04:20.598
not , uh , what does it need to look

01:04:20.598 --> 01:04:22.376
like from a quantity as well as

01:04:22.376 --> 01:04:24.542
composition standpoint to be the , the

01:04:24.542 --> 01:04:26.709
fleet that you need to win ? Yes sir ,

01:04:26.709 --> 01:04:28.542
the year I , um , Senator , good

01:04:28.542 --> 01:04:30.542
morning , um , the year I came into

01:04:30.542 --> 01:04:33.570
service , America delivered an aircraft

01:04:33.570 --> 01:04:37.010
carrier , 5 attack submarines , a

01:04:37.010 --> 01:04:39.080
ballistic missile submarine , 2

01:04:39.080 --> 01:04:42.889
cruisers , 5 DDG 51 class destroyers ,

01:04:42.969 --> 01:04:45.080
a Knox class destroyer . In fact , in

01:04:45.080 --> 01:04:48.250
total , 40 years ago , America

01:04:48.250 --> 01:04:51.870
delivered 31 warships in a single year .

01:04:52.209 --> 01:04:54.800
That was on a $4.5 trillion economy

01:04:55.020 --> 01:04:57.979
with a total population that is 2/3 of

01:04:57.979 --> 01:05:00.090
the current size of the United States

01:05:00.090 --> 01:05:03.020
of America . So re-industrialization of

01:05:03.020 --> 01:05:06.169
America is a strategic imperative , uh ,

01:05:06.419 --> 01:05:08.530
especially per my opening statement .

01:05:08.610 --> 01:05:11.280
Uh , so , uh , I , I think that , uh ,

01:05:11.330 --> 01:05:13.709
and I think , uh , new habits of mind ,

01:05:13.889 --> 01:05:16.679
new habits of action , commercial and

01:05:16.679 --> 01:05:18.929
defense innovation , commercial and

01:05:18.929 --> 01:05:21.770
defense integration are strategic

01:05:21.770 --> 01:05:24.169
priorities for the 21st century , and

01:05:24.169 --> 01:05:27.084
despite the changing character . War of

01:05:27.084 --> 01:05:30.685
drone warfare , of cheap strike is

01:05:30.685 --> 01:05:33.675
that moving energy , mass , and people

01:05:33.675 --> 01:05:36.645
over long distances by sea most

01:05:36.645 --> 01:05:39.524
efficiently and by air most quickly

01:05:39.524 --> 01:05:42.784
will continue to be a timeless element

01:05:42.784 --> 01:05:46.739
of combat power . What class of

01:05:46.739 --> 01:05:48.961
ship do you not have that you feel that

01:05:48.961 --> 01:05:51.719
you will need ? I don't have enough

01:05:51.719 --> 01:05:54.310
amphibious ships . We don't have enough

01:05:54.439 --> 01:05:56.661
surface destroyers . We certainly don't

01:05:56.661 --> 01:05:58.883
have enough attack submarines , and our

01:05:58.883 --> 01:06:01.530
trajectory is on the wrong side . I

01:06:01.530 --> 01:06:04.250
would favor greater amounts of combat

01:06:04.250 --> 01:06:07.290
logistics force ships . I'd

01:06:07.290 --> 01:06:11.030
favor a great number of medium

01:06:11.449 --> 01:06:13.616
USVs , unmanned surface vessels , with

01:06:13.616 --> 01:06:17.080
the ability to provide fires , sensors ,

01:06:17.330 --> 01:06:20.169
decoys , the ability to do long range

01:06:20.169 --> 01:06:24.070
distributed ASW , so I'd see that .

01:06:24.729 --> 01:06:27.010
And so , you know , and we are

01:06:27.010 --> 01:06:29.121
currently on a trajectory to employ .

01:06:29.570 --> 01:06:32.909
Or rather to acquire thousands

01:06:33.250 --> 01:06:35.909
of smaller unmanned surface vessels .

01:06:36.530 --> 01:06:39.270
And so I think our fleet designs within

01:06:39.270 --> 01:06:42.689
the last battle force assessment , our

01:06:42.689 --> 01:06:45.560
last BFSA is a really good . Leaping

01:06:45.560 --> 01:06:48.679
off point for what the future force

01:06:48.679 --> 01:06:51.560
design is going to be , but I'd I'd

01:06:51.560 --> 01:06:53.679
favor greater mass and scale across

01:06:53.679 --> 01:06:56.340
every class of ships and then include

01:06:57.209 --> 01:06:59.439
medium and large unmanned surface

01:06:59.439 --> 01:07:01.830
vessels for that purpose . Well ,

01:07:01.879 --> 01:07:04.046
quantity has a quality all its own and

01:07:04.046 --> 01:07:05.879
replaceability and speed of that

01:07:05.879 --> 01:07:08.000
replaceability are key . Um , I , I'd

01:07:08.000 --> 01:07:10.111
like to , uh , I think it's fantastic

01:07:10.111 --> 01:07:11.944
that we have a White House and a

01:07:11.944 --> 01:07:14.000
bipartisan Senate , uh , and House ,

01:07:14.000 --> 01:07:16.222
and of course the Secretary of the Navy

01:07:16.222 --> 01:07:17.944
and SECW are all talking about

01:07:17.944 --> 01:07:20.111
shipbuilding , which is the first time

01:07:20.111 --> 01:07:22.222
we've ever heard that in , you know ,

01:07:22.222 --> 01:07:24.556
40+ years . I think that's a good thing ,

01:07:24.556 --> 01:07:24.030
but I think we're still lacking

01:07:24.030 --> 01:07:26.252
specificity . It's like every day I see

01:07:26.252 --> 01:07:28.586
a press release about shipbuilding this ,

01:07:28.586 --> 01:07:30.808
shipbuilding that . Um , but we need to

01:07:30.808 --> 01:07:32.863
get very specific on what , how many

01:07:32.863 --> 01:07:34.919
frigates , how many destroyers , how

01:07:34.919 --> 01:07:37.141
many cruisers , what those capabilities

01:07:37.141 --> 01:07:39.252
have to be , um , how are we going to

01:07:39.252 --> 01:07:41.141
put a lot of lead from ships onto

01:07:41.141 --> 01:07:40.870
ground before we land marines there ,

01:07:40.879 --> 01:07:42.990
because right now we don't have ships

01:07:42.990 --> 01:07:45.157
that send lead anymore . We have ships

01:07:45.157 --> 01:07:47.323
that have lots of electronic gadgets ,

01:07:47.323 --> 01:07:49.435
but when we have to put a lot of lead

01:07:49.435 --> 01:07:48.879
through the air and land it on an

01:07:48.879 --> 01:07:51.101
island before 18 year old kids hit that

01:07:51.101 --> 01:07:53.268
beach , we can't do that anymore , and

01:07:53.268 --> 01:07:55.490
that's a problem . So , uh , I think we

01:07:55.490 --> 01:07:57.435
need to have a very clear-eyed and

01:07:57.435 --> 01:07:59.490
specific discussion about that . And

01:07:59.490 --> 01:08:01.712
finally , my reigning Tom , I'd ask you

01:08:01.712 --> 01:08:01.179
to talk about our base infrastructure ,

01:08:01.229 --> 01:08:03.709
either one of you across the Pacific .

01:08:03.949 --> 01:08:06.116
We used to have island bases that span

01:08:06.116 --> 01:08:09.270
the entire Pacific Command , and those

01:08:09.270 --> 01:08:11.492
were key unsinkable aircraft carriers .

01:08:11.492 --> 01:08:13.714
We've closed a lot of them down . We've

01:08:13.714 --> 01:08:15.937
let them decay . I'd like to hear about

01:08:15.937 --> 01:08:18.048
what you view our path is here in the

01:08:18.048 --> 01:08:20.214
near future to revitalize those pieces

01:08:20.214 --> 01:08:22.548
of infrastructure . That'll be critical .

01:08:22.548 --> 01:08:24.890
Senator , uh , we're in the process of ,

01:08:24.899 --> 01:08:26.810
uh , greatly building out our key

01:08:26.810 --> 01:08:28.540
critical basing infrastructure

01:08:28.540 --> 01:08:30.859
throughout the Pacific with key

01:08:30.859 --> 01:08:32.692
projects , Tinian Saipan and the

01:08:32.692 --> 01:08:35.220
Marianas , that's US sovereign , uh ,

01:08:35.229 --> 01:08:38.390
homeland . With projects in the

01:08:38.390 --> 01:08:40.509
Federated States of Micronesia in the

01:08:40.509 --> 01:08:42.676
Republic of the Marshall Islands , our

01:08:42.676 --> 01:08:46.069
efforts in Palau , and then through our

01:08:46.069 --> 01:08:49.410
UMMC enhancing our capabilities

01:08:50.080 --> 01:08:52.390
for our rotational forces with

01:08:52.390 --> 01:08:54.446
Australia , as well as upgrading our

01:08:54.446 --> 01:08:57.669
bases currently for a lot of our basing

01:08:57.669 --> 01:09:00.560
support . We ask for the committee's

01:09:00.560 --> 01:09:02.930
continued commitment to H-2B visas .

01:09:03.200 --> 01:09:06.640
Without the extension to 2035 , our

01:09:06.640 --> 01:09:08.751
projects will go 10 years over and be

01:09:08.751 --> 01:09:12.160
1.5x the money on achieving that kind

01:09:12.160 --> 01:09:15.120
of a , uh , on a posture . As we're

01:09:15.120 --> 01:09:17.176
thinking about the 21st century , we

01:09:17.176 --> 01:09:19.419
think about it as in terms of bases .

01:09:19.798 --> 01:09:22.758
Rather I should say places and not

01:09:22.758 --> 01:09:24.758
necessarily bases with that kind of

01:09:24.758 --> 01:09:26.702
footprint , but having distributed

01:09:26.702 --> 01:09:28.849
stores , having distributed piers ,

01:09:28.969 --> 01:09:32.208
ports , energy capability throughout

01:09:32.208 --> 01:09:35.729
the Indo-Pacific that diversifies our

01:09:35.729 --> 01:09:37.840
footprint , it doesn't concentrate us

01:09:37.840 --> 01:09:39.562
in one place and allows us the

01:09:39.562 --> 01:09:42.949
principles of expanded maneuver . Well ,

01:09:42.988 --> 01:09:45.044
thanks for your time , gentlemen . I

01:09:45.044 --> 01:09:46.710
agree decentralizing our base

01:09:46.710 --> 01:09:46.659
infrastructure is a strategic

01:09:46.659 --> 01:09:47.992
imperative . Uh , we're

01:09:47.992 --> 01:09:50.159
overconcentrated in too many spots and

01:09:50.159 --> 01:09:52.215
that that's a vulnerability . Uh , I

01:09:52.215 --> 01:09:53.937
also think from an acquisition

01:09:53.937 --> 01:09:56.159
standpoint we have to get more creative

01:09:56.159 --> 01:09:57.826
base leasing , public-private

01:09:57.826 --> 01:09:59.881
partnerships . The traditional Milon

01:09:59.881 --> 01:09:59.588
process is too slow , too inefficient .

01:09:59.668 --> 01:10:01.949
We can't expect , uh , this to be

01:10:01.949 --> 01:10:04.116
government run and get there on time .

01:10:04.116 --> 01:10:06.338
Pan Am built our bases before World War

01:10:06.338 --> 01:10:08.505
II as a commercial company , so , uh ,

01:10:08.505 --> 01:10:10.616
we need to get creative on that . But

01:10:10.616 --> 01:10:09.789
thanks for your time , gentlemen . Safe

01:10:09.789 --> 01:10:11.956
travels . I associate myself with your

01:10:11.956 --> 01:10:15.189
comments , Senator . That's , that's

01:10:15.189 --> 01:10:18.979
good to know , um . Let me

01:10:18.979 --> 01:10:22.240
just point out , uh , Senator Sheehy

01:10:22.240 --> 01:10:25.439
and , and Admiral and General , that ,

01:10:25.589 --> 01:10:28.979
uh , um , over a decade ago on a

01:10:28.979 --> 01:10:31.970
bipartisan basis , this committee and

01:10:31.970 --> 01:10:34.081
the Congress and the President of the

01:10:34.081 --> 01:10:36.359
United States enacted a law that

01:10:36.399 --> 01:10:40.089
established 355 ships as the

01:10:40.089 --> 01:10:43.660
minimum fleet we should have , um .

01:10:44.819 --> 01:10:46.819
Clearly there's going to have to be

01:10:46.959 --> 01:10:50.450
more specificity um as we

01:10:50.450 --> 01:10:53.910
actually begin to uh order those and

01:10:53.919 --> 01:10:56.890
and start laying the keel but that has

01:10:56.890 --> 01:10:58.779
been the bipartisan policy of the

01:10:58.779 --> 01:11:00.959
United States of America for over a

01:11:00.959 --> 01:11:04.950
decade and and I too uh join

01:11:05.169 --> 01:11:08.950
Senator Sheehy in being um heartened

01:11:09.330 --> 01:11:11.250
that that um .

01:11:13.060 --> 01:11:16.459
Even in a climate when there's much uh

01:11:16.459 --> 01:11:19.459
disagreement on uh very significant

01:11:19.459 --> 01:11:21.859
issues between Democrats and

01:11:21.859 --> 01:11:24.419
Republicans and , um , and House

01:11:24.419 --> 01:11:26.720
members and Senate members , there is ,

01:11:27.060 --> 01:11:30.299
uh , consensus on that , and , and we

01:11:30.299 --> 01:11:32.410
need to take this opportunity to move

01:11:32.410 --> 01:11:34.899
on that with that , I will uh recognize

01:11:34.899 --> 01:11:37.220
Senator King . Thank you , Mr . Chair ,

01:11:37.229 --> 01:11:39.229
and to our witnesses . I appreciate

01:11:39.229 --> 01:11:41.451
your testimony . Um , my first question

01:11:41.451 --> 01:11:43.507
is sort of some news of the day . So

01:11:43.507 --> 01:11:45.729
Admiral Paparo , you talked about the ,

01:11:45.729 --> 01:11:47.785
uh , joint exercise going on between

01:11:47.785 --> 01:11:49.951
the US and the Philippines right now .

01:11:49.951 --> 01:11:51.840
During that exercise , Japan is a

01:11:51.890 --> 01:11:54.001
participant for the first time rather

01:11:54.001 --> 01:11:55.890
than just an observer , and Prime

01:11:55.890 --> 01:11:57.834
Minister Takeichi just in the last

01:11:57.834 --> 01:12:00.290
couple of hours announced that Japan is

01:12:00.290 --> 01:12:03.529
now going to allow robust export of

01:12:03.529 --> 01:12:05.696
lethal defense technologies . The sort

01:12:05.696 --> 01:12:08.370
of pacifist post-World War II Japanese

01:12:08.370 --> 01:12:10.689
constitution meant . They did not allow

01:12:10.689 --> 01:12:13.399
export of defense items . More recently ,

01:12:13.410 --> 01:12:15.750
they've allowed specific exports of

01:12:16.089 --> 01:12:18.649
search and rescue , mine sweeping ,

01:12:18.770 --> 01:12:21.129
surveillance , uh , but now they're

01:12:21.129 --> 01:12:23.296
going to allow the export of of lethal

01:12:23.296 --> 01:12:27.270
defense items to the 17 nations with

01:12:27.270 --> 01:12:29.326
which they have defense agreements ,

01:12:29.326 --> 01:12:31.492
including the United States , UK , and

01:12:31.492 --> 01:12:33.714
other allies . I know what China thinks

01:12:33.714 --> 01:12:35.937
about this , they hate it . Um , how is

01:12:35.937 --> 01:12:37.992
this , how does the US view this and

01:12:37.992 --> 01:12:40.214
how do allies in the region view this ?

01:12:41.740 --> 01:12:44.620
Well , uh , Senator , uh , you know , I

01:12:44.620 --> 01:12:47.220
could not be any more , uh , you know ,

01:12:47.540 --> 01:12:49.762
supportive of the US-Japan alliance . I

01:12:49.762 --> 01:12:51.984
mean , that's the understatement of the

01:12:51.984 --> 01:12:54.096
year is , is that it's absolutely the

01:12:54.096 --> 01:12:56.096
centerpiece of our of our system of

01:12:56.096 --> 01:12:58.207
network alliance and alliances in the

01:12:58.207 --> 01:12:59.818
Indo-Pacific . And , uh , my

01:12:59.818 --> 01:13:02.140
appreciation for Japan's leadership in

01:13:02.140 --> 01:13:05.330
this , uh , is , is meeting the day ,

01:13:05.339 --> 01:13:09.060
is that in the way that , uh , Prime

01:13:09.060 --> 01:13:11.171
Minister Shinzo Abe coined the phrase

01:13:11.171 --> 01:13:13.338
the free and open Indo-Pacific . Prime

01:13:13.338 --> 01:13:16.140
Minister Taichi is demonstrating that

01:13:16.140 --> 01:13:17.584
same kind of leadership ,

01:13:17.740 --> 01:13:20.379
transformational leadership , and Japan

01:13:20.379 --> 01:13:22.640
is demonstrating transformational

01:13:22.979 --> 01:13:24.812
leadership in the Indo-Pacific ,

01:13:24.812 --> 01:13:26.646
including their participation in

01:13:26.646 --> 01:13:28.479
exercises . the bilaterals , the

01:13:28.479 --> 01:13:30.368
reciprocal access agreements that

01:13:30.368 --> 01:13:33.234
they're executing with our partners and

01:13:33.234 --> 01:13:35.567
allies throughout the Indo-Pacific , uh ,

01:13:35.754 --> 01:13:37.254
it's important to continue

01:13:37.254 --> 01:13:40.214
co-production with the Japanese under

01:13:40.214 --> 01:13:43.395
the , under the , under conditions of

01:13:43.395 --> 01:13:45.562
operational and information security ,

01:13:45.595 --> 01:13:47.915
uh , and , you know , we're we're we're

01:13:47.915 --> 01:13:50.234
strongly supportive . It's one of the

01:13:50.234 --> 01:13:52.401
absolute bright spots in the strategic

01:13:52.401 --> 01:13:54.456
environment . One of the issues that

01:13:54.456 --> 01:13:57.259
we've often had in the past is . The

01:13:57.259 --> 01:13:59.315
history of some of challenge between

01:13:59.709 --> 01:14:02.029
Japan and Korea , you know , we might ,

01:14:02.109 --> 01:14:04.331
we have great relations with both , and

01:14:04.331 --> 01:14:06.165
I think there's strong relations

01:14:06.165 --> 01:14:08.220
between both nations , but sometimes

01:14:08.220 --> 01:14:10.109
moves in the defense space in one

01:14:10.109 --> 01:14:12.109
nation or the other can create some

01:14:12.109 --> 01:14:14.220
potential friction . I read the , the

01:14:14.220 --> 01:14:16.442
er Korean statement about this Japanese

01:14:16.442 --> 01:14:18.442
announcement , and I thought it was

01:14:18.442 --> 01:14:20.776
sort of measured and generally positive .

01:14:20.776 --> 01:14:22.831
Is that your sense as well , General

01:14:22.831 --> 01:14:25.410
Brunson , Admiral Paparro ? Um , uh ,

01:14:25.459 --> 01:14:27.681
you know , I'll say that the trilateral

01:14:27.681 --> 01:14:29.903
cooperation between the United States ,

01:14:29.903 --> 01:14:31.799
the Republic of Korea , and Japan

01:14:32.220 --> 01:14:34.640
continues to be on an upward trajectory .

01:14:35.189 --> 01:14:38.350
It's been , it's been the sign of great

01:14:38.350 --> 01:14:41.839
leadership both in Japan and Korea ,

01:14:42.080 --> 01:14:46.069
and in my view that continued progress

01:14:46.069 --> 01:14:49.509
has continued into the Lee

01:14:49.660 --> 01:14:51.716
administration as it was in the Yoon

01:14:51.716 --> 01:14:54.120
administration , and I'll pass over to

01:14:54.490 --> 01:14:56.919
General Bronson . General Bronson . Uh ,

01:14:57.189 --> 01:14:59.133
yes , yes , sir . Uh , Senator , I

01:14:59.133 --> 01:15:01.300
would wholeheartedly agree with that ,

01:15:01.330 --> 01:15:02.830
and , and there are future

01:15:02.830 --> 01:15:04.663
opportunities , you know , we're

01:15:04.663 --> 01:15:06.830
talking about Balaatan right now , but

01:15:06.830 --> 01:15:09.108
we've got RIMPAC that's coming up soon ,

01:15:09.108 --> 01:15:11.163
and , uh , they'll be ship to ship ,

01:15:11.163 --> 01:15:13.219
they'll be side by side in that . We

01:15:13.219 --> 01:15:15.163
had Cobra Gold recently where both

01:15:15.163 --> 01:15:17.189
Japan and Korea were there . Those

01:15:17.189 --> 01:15:19.589
exercises . So we've got to continue to

01:15:19.589 --> 01:15:21.520
through the Indo Paycom exercise

01:15:21.520 --> 01:15:23.830
program , continue to make sure we

01:15:23.830 --> 01:15:25.941
bring our teammates together and then

01:15:26.140 --> 01:15:28.196
existentialism has a quality all its

01:15:28.196 --> 01:15:30.390
own as well , uh , when you have two

01:15:30.390 --> 01:15:32.640
great nations , partners of our own ,

01:15:32.870 --> 01:15:35.229
uh , who are increasingly under threat

01:15:35.229 --> 01:15:37.430
and coercion from China . Well , I

01:15:37.430 --> 01:15:39.374
think that a lot of credit goes to

01:15:39.374 --> 01:15:42.220
Japan and , and Korea for this , um ,

01:15:42.270 --> 01:15:44.437
but I also think there's , while we're

01:15:44.437 --> 01:15:46.659
on the subject of bipartisan advances .

01:15:46.870 --> 01:15:48.814
This is something where the US has

01:15:48.814 --> 01:15:50.648
really played , I think , a very

01:15:50.648 --> 01:15:52.759
helpful role in dialogue with both of

01:15:52.759 --> 01:15:54.870
these allies to help them grow closer

01:15:54.870 --> 01:15:57.109
and so give them credit , give their

01:15:57.109 --> 01:15:59.442
civilian and military leadership credit .

01:15:59.442 --> 01:16:01.950
I think , um , presidents of , of both

01:16:01.950 --> 01:16:03.950
parties in recent years have really

01:16:03.950 --> 01:16:06.006
helped them grow closer and you guys

01:16:06.006 --> 01:16:07.783
get credit for that too , and I

01:16:07.783 --> 01:16:10.006
appreciate it . One last question about

01:16:10.006 --> 01:16:11.950
um about Acus , I was in Australia

01:16:11.950 --> 01:16:14.117
recently , Admiral Paparo . And really

01:16:14.117 --> 01:16:16.330
trying to dig in and 37 events in 7

01:16:16.330 --> 01:16:18.930
days in 4 cities , is Australia sort of

01:16:18.930 --> 01:16:20.986
meeting its commitments under pillar

01:16:20.986 --> 01:16:23.310
one and pillar two , and I heard a lot ,

01:16:23.759 --> 01:16:25.815
answered some tough questions on our

01:16:25.815 --> 01:16:27.703
end , and I was impressed , but I

01:16:27.703 --> 01:16:29.703
wonder , are you satisfied with the

01:16:29.703 --> 01:16:31.926
pace of upgrades to sterling that could

01:16:31.926 --> 01:16:33.759
support the increased rotational

01:16:33.759 --> 01:16:35.426
presence of US Virginia class

01:16:35.426 --> 01:16:37.600
submarines ? So from a shore shore

01:16:37.600 --> 01:16:39.822
power standpoint and for the capability

01:16:39.822 --> 01:16:41.767
that they have with a tender and a

01:16:41.767 --> 01:16:43.878
marine security detachment , we could

01:16:43.878 --> 01:16:45.878
move submarines to Sterling today .

01:16:46.189 --> 01:16:48.356
That's been the progress at Stirling .

01:16:48.356 --> 01:16:50.522
I laid eyes on it multiple times . The

01:16:50.522 --> 01:16:52.633
commitment is there . The progress is

01:16:52.633 --> 01:16:54.856
there . Uh , the place where we have to

01:16:54.856 --> 01:16:56.689
make the most progress is in the

01:16:56.689 --> 01:16:58.870
defense industrial base to deliver the

01:16:58.870 --> 01:17:01.910
capability . But , uh , our partners in

01:17:01.910 --> 01:17:04.839
Australia , UK , uh , through Pillar 1

01:17:04.839 --> 01:17:07.939
and Pillar 2 . Um , you know , is that

01:17:07.939 --> 01:17:10.410
it's been full throttle . Now it's ,

01:17:10.459 --> 01:17:12.626
it's , it's now as much up to industry

01:17:12.626 --> 01:17:14.750
as anything else to deliver . Great

01:17:14.750 --> 01:17:16.917
message . Thanks . Thank you , Senator

01:17:16.917 --> 01:17:19.028
Kaine . Our two senators from Florida

01:17:19.028 --> 01:17:21.250
keep tripping over themselves trying to

01:17:21.250 --> 01:17:23.139
defer to each other . I think the

01:17:23.139 --> 01:17:25.140
latest is that Senator Scott is

01:17:25.140 --> 01:17:28.589
recognized . Thanks , mute , Moody .

01:17:29.339 --> 01:17:31.561
Um , Admiral , General Brunson , thanks

01:17:31.561 --> 01:17:33.672
for being here . Thanks to , uh , the

01:17:33.672 --> 01:17:35.728
men and women that serve , uh , with

01:17:35.728 --> 01:17:37.783
you . So , um , thanks for defending

01:17:37.783 --> 01:17:39.839
the freedom of this country . So , I

01:17:39.839 --> 01:17:39.790
think we all travel , talk to allies ,

01:17:39.950 --> 01:17:42.061
and here's what I keep hearing . They

01:17:42.061 --> 01:17:44.172
want to buy our weapons , but the FMS

01:17:44.172 --> 01:17:46.394
process has got a bunch of issues , and

01:17:46.394 --> 01:17:48.561
they can't get the weapons in a timely

01:17:48.561 --> 01:17:50.450
manner . I think part of it's the

01:17:50.450 --> 01:17:52.561
government , part of it's our defense

01:17:52.561 --> 01:17:54.728
prime's , uh , fault . Can each of you

01:17:54.728 --> 01:17:56.894
explain why it's so beneficial for our

01:17:56.894 --> 01:17:56.259
allies and partners in the in the

01:17:56.259 --> 01:17:58.370
Pacific to buy American-made military

01:17:58.370 --> 01:18:01.040
equipment ? Morning , Senator Scott .

01:18:01.439 --> 01:18:03.272
It's the interoperability of the

01:18:03.272 --> 01:18:05.799
capability and the absolute product

01:18:05.799 --> 01:18:08.520
superiority of the weapons themselves .

01:18:08.839 --> 01:18:10.728
Those two those two factors , the

01:18:10.728 --> 01:18:12.728
ability to fight and win today with

01:18:12.728 --> 01:18:14.950
each other , the ability to interchange

01:18:14.950 --> 01:18:16.728
weapons so that we can gain the

01:18:16.728 --> 01:18:18.950
flexibility of the , of the magazines ,

01:18:18.950 --> 01:18:20.728
and it's the fact that American

01:18:20.728 --> 01:18:22.919
military commitment is the best in the

01:18:22.919 --> 01:18:25.660
world and it ain't even close . Joan

01:18:25.660 --> 01:18:28.279
Bronson . Yes , yes , sir , I would ,

01:18:28.310 --> 01:18:30.310
uh , wholeheartedly agree with that

01:18:30.310 --> 01:18:32.350
from the human technological and

01:18:32.350 --> 01:18:34.830
procedural interoperability that comes

01:18:34.830 --> 01:18:37.299
of buying that great American equipment ,

01:18:37.549 --> 01:18:39.810
it just makes our work a lot simpler

01:18:40.069 --> 01:18:42.390
and it ensures that we've got the right

01:18:42.390 --> 01:18:45.069
capabilities in place . Do the current

01:18:45.069 --> 01:18:47.180
lead times for foreign military sales

01:18:47.180 --> 01:18:49.236
hinder our ability to build capacity

01:18:49.236 --> 01:18:53.060
and deter communist China ? Yes . Yes ,

01:18:53.169 --> 01:18:55.839
Senator Given the recent deployment of

01:18:55.839 --> 01:18:57.950
the thirty-first Marine Expeditionary

01:18:57.950 --> 01:19:00.399
Unit from IndoPECO to CENTCOM area of

01:19:00.399 --> 01:19:02.600
responsibility , how has this shift

01:19:02.600 --> 01:19:04.711
affected you and your crisis response

01:19:04.711 --> 01:19:07.959
capacity in the Indo-Pacific ? Well ,

01:19:08.290 --> 01:19:10.330
we've accounted for it using other

01:19:10.330 --> 01:19:12.441
marine expeditionary units , and so ,

01:19:12.450 --> 01:19:14.506
you know , as you'll know , a marine

01:19:14.506 --> 01:19:16.506
expeditionary unit is approximately

01:19:16.506 --> 01:19:18.672
1600 troops , but , uh , Marine Marine

01:19:18.672 --> 01:19:22.470
Rotational Force Darwin has responded .

01:19:22.770 --> 01:19:26.370
Other MUU KMF has . Responded and so

01:19:26.370 --> 01:19:29.959
between 3rd meth and 1 MF we've been

01:19:29.959 --> 01:19:32.350
able to provide that combat capability .

01:19:32.770 --> 01:19:36.529
31st MU is a seaborne power projection

01:19:36.529 --> 01:19:38.770
capability that is designed as a

01:19:38.770 --> 01:19:41.430
flexible worldwide responsive force .

01:19:41.799 --> 01:19:43.910
Um , we , you know , the Marine Corps

01:19:43.910 --> 01:19:46.319
has accounted for that with other ready

01:19:46.319 --> 01:19:49.120
forces out of 1 , out of 1 meth and out

01:19:49.120 --> 01:19:53.000
of 3 meth , and so , um , I don't view

01:19:53.000 --> 01:19:55.167
that there , so , you know , certainly

01:19:55.167 --> 01:19:57.359
from a from a seaborne crisis response

01:19:57.359 --> 01:20:00.359
force standpoint , that force is also .

01:20:00.470 --> 01:20:03.629
Available as being inherently mobile in

01:20:03.629 --> 01:20:05.990
times of crisis to move back into the

01:20:05.990 --> 01:20:08.470
Indo-Pacific and it's my job to

01:20:08.470 --> 01:20:10.581
identify the indications and warnings

01:20:10.581 --> 01:20:13.069
and place the demand signal if we , if

01:20:13.069 --> 01:20:16.629
we need that uh our ANTIB readiness is

01:20:16.629 --> 01:20:18.990
a driving factor for our seaborne .

01:20:19.430 --> 01:20:22.660
Readiness crisis response capability

01:20:22.660 --> 01:20:24.830
with the Marine Corps , and we've got

01:20:24.830 --> 01:20:26.941
to continue to pay close attention to

01:20:26.941 --> 01:20:30.629
our amphibious force and increase our

01:20:30.629 --> 01:20:32.573
number of amphibious ships and the

01:20:32.573 --> 01:20:35.439
readiness of those ships . Thank you ,

01:20:35.500 --> 01:20:37.722
Admiral . In prior testimony , you said

01:20:37.722 --> 01:20:39.833
logistics remain a critical challenge

01:20:39.833 --> 01:20:41.833
in the Indo-Pacific because of long

01:20:41.833 --> 01:20:43.667
distances and widely distributed

01:20:43.667 --> 01:20:45.722
operations . So , is it correct that

01:20:45.722 --> 01:20:47.944
the Pacific Air Forces are working with

01:20:47.944 --> 01:20:49.944
innovative companies to demonstrate

01:20:49.944 --> 01:20:51.611
dual-use autonomous air cargo

01:20:51.611 --> 01:20:53.833
operations in theater this year ? Yes ,

01:20:53.833 --> 01:20:55.833
sir . Uh , AF works in coordination

01:20:55.833 --> 01:20:58.200
with PACCAF is doing experimentation .

01:20:58.509 --> 01:21:01.069
In order to be able to put a 20-foot

01:21:01.069 --> 01:21:03.013
shipping container anywhere in the

01:21:03.013 --> 01:21:05.720
world employing unmanned capability ,

01:21:05.750 --> 01:21:07.861
and we can't go fast enough on that .

01:21:08.669 --> 01:21:10.558
So do you see a role for aircraft

01:21:10.558 --> 01:21:12.447
autonomy for addressing logistics

01:21:12.447 --> 01:21:14.780
challenges going forward ? I see a role .

01:21:14.780 --> 01:21:16.836
I see it being indispensable for the

01:21:16.836 --> 01:21:18.891
future . And how are we going to get

01:21:18.891 --> 01:21:20.613
this all done ? Well , I think

01:21:20.613 --> 01:21:22.780
innovating faster , investing faster .

01:21:22.959 --> 01:21:25.609
I think that taking risk in our

01:21:25.609 --> 01:21:28.709
investments , risks in such a way that

01:21:29.240 --> 01:21:31.184
program failure means that you can

01:21:31.184 --> 01:21:33.240
rededicate those monies to another

01:21:33.240 --> 01:21:35.439
vendor that's able to do it , but

01:21:35.830 --> 01:21:38.290
cultivating a competitive environment

01:21:38.839 --> 01:21:42.645
by Allocating funds to innovative and

01:21:42.645 --> 01:21:44.756
experimental companies by getting the

01:21:44.756 --> 01:21:46.964
technical community to rapidly grant

01:21:46.964 --> 01:21:49.044
the authority to operate to those

01:21:49.044 --> 01:21:52.404
companies and to trade our strategic

01:21:52.404 --> 01:21:54.884
risk by taking a little bit of program

01:21:54.884 --> 01:21:58.084
risk as we've done in the past . Thanks

01:21:58.084 --> 01:22:00.306
both of you again . Thank you , Moody .

01:22:01.040 --> 01:22:04.850
Rapid-fire questions and rapid-fire

01:22:05.049 --> 01:22:07.009
answers . Senator Kelly .

01:22:10.100 --> 01:22:13.189
I didn't see our left one . Thank you ,

01:22:13.319 --> 01:22:16.700
Mr . Chairman . Um , So Admiral

01:22:16.700 --> 01:22:19.430
Poparo , um , Congress right now is

01:22:19.430 --> 01:22:22.660
actively considering my Ships for

01:22:22.660 --> 01:22:24.930
America Act alongside the President's

01:22:25.310 --> 01:22:27.790
maritime action plan , and this is to

01:22:27.790 --> 01:22:31.229
rebuild US commercial shipbuilding and

01:22:31.229 --> 01:22:34.009
shipbuilding capacity and to strengthen

01:22:34.680 --> 01:22:37.819
our maritime industrial base , grow the

01:22:37.819 --> 01:22:40.229
workforce , all those things I think we

01:22:40.229 --> 01:22:43.330
all recognize that we need . And it's

01:22:43.330 --> 01:22:46.879
because of decades of decline in

01:22:46.879 --> 01:22:49.450
commercial shipbuilding . Which has

01:22:49.450 --> 01:22:51.770
created , in my view , a national

01:22:51.770 --> 01:22:54.689
security risk . It's also weakened our

01:22:54.689 --> 01:22:57.490
ability to build and sustain naval

01:22:57.490 --> 01:23:00.229
vessels . With Senator Scott , you

01:23:00.229 --> 01:23:03.390
talked about amphibs . So given that

01:23:03.390 --> 01:23:06.200
linkage , do you agree that

01:23:06.200 --> 01:23:09.240
revitalizing our commercial , maritime

01:23:09.240 --> 01:23:12.279
industrial base is essential to

01:23:12.279 --> 01:23:15.180
strengthening navy shipbuilding and

01:23:15.180 --> 01:23:19.040
reducing the delays in delivering ships

01:23:19.040 --> 01:23:22.879
like AMIBs or another Virginia class

01:23:22.879 --> 01:23:26.379
submarine , etc . And how urgent ,

01:23:26.479 --> 01:23:28.257
urgent is it that we make these

01:23:28.257 --> 01:23:31.959
investments now ? To ensure that we

01:23:31.959 --> 01:23:34.180
can meet the demands in the

01:23:34.180 --> 01:23:37.490
Indo-Pacific . Senator , Senator Kelly ,

01:23:37.560 --> 01:23:39.671
good morning . I strongly affirm that

01:23:39.671 --> 01:23:41.560
statement . US overall commercial

01:23:41.560 --> 01:23:45.430
shipbuilding is 0.1% of global capacity .

01:23:46.169 --> 01:23:48.910
China enjoys over 50% of global

01:23:48.910 --> 01:23:51.049
shipbuilding capacity . Their

01:23:51.049 --> 01:23:54.370
civil-military fusion system is how

01:23:54.370 --> 01:23:56.370
they've employed so much more naval

01:23:56.370 --> 01:23:58.770
shipbuilding capacity . Having the

01:23:58.770 --> 01:24:00.881
workforce that can move with alacrity

01:24:00.881 --> 01:24:02.937
from one type ship to another , just

01:24:02.937 --> 01:24:06.140
the basic trades , regaining that is

01:24:06.140 --> 01:24:09.709
absolutely essential for our defense in

01:24:09.709 --> 01:24:12.149
the 21st century . Yeah , we need to

01:24:12.149 --> 01:24:14.870
train the welders , pipe fitters ,

01:24:15.029 --> 01:24:16.870
electricians , but also have the

01:24:16.870 --> 01:24:19.500
companies that supply pipes and valves

01:24:19.500 --> 01:24:22.549
and steel . You have a bigger overall

01:24:22.549 --> 01:24:25.709
maritime industry that's gonna help us

01:24:25.709 --> 01:24:29.229
build naval vessels . Another topic I

01:24:29.229 --> 01:24:31.890
wanna touch on , we talked a little bit

01:24:32.390 --> 01:24:36.350
uh earlier today about Ukraine and

01:24:36.350 --> 01:24:39.830
how it relates to uh the Western

01:24:39.830 --> 01:24:43.000
Pacific in a fight with China ,

01:24:43.549 --> 01:24:46.149
which I do not believe is inevitable .

01:24:46.709 --> 01:24:49.750
I think we should do , um , what we can

01:24:49.750 --> 01:24:52.109
to avoid a conflict with a near peer

01:24:52.109 --> 01:24:54.053
adversary , especially one who has

01:24:54.053 --> 01:24:55.942
nuclear weapons , with an arsenal

01:24:55.942 --> 01:24:58.419
that's growing . Um , The

01:24:59.330 --> 01:25:01.608
Ukrainians and the Russians , you know ,

01:25:01.608 --> 01:25:04.359
have learned that autonomous systems in

01:25:04.359 --> 01:25:08.330
a land war is very the key to success .

01:25:08.370 --> 01:25:10.537
I was in a hospital in Ukraine about a

01:25:10.537 --> 01:25:13.649
year ago and met with 10 . Uh , injured

01:25:13.649 --> 01:25:16.089
soldiers , 9 of them were injured

01:25:16.089 --> 01:25:18.930
because of FPVs . 1 had stepped on a

01:25:18.930 --> 01:25:21.000
landmine , which may have been put

01:25:21.000 --> 01:25:24.870
there by a drone . So drone warfare

01:25:24.930 --> 01:25:28.529
is where the casualty , uh , the

01:25:28.529 --> 01:25:31.270
casualties are created in this war .

01:25:32.240 --> 01:25:34.160
When you think about the Western

01:25:34.160 --> 01:25:37.430
Pacific with islands fighting from one

01:25:37.430 --> 01:25:40.640
island to the next , maybe eventually

01:25:40.640 --> 01:25:43.720
on Taiwan , how do you , how do you

01:25:43.720 --> 01:25:47.140
think these systems will evolve to be

01:25:47.279 --> 01:25:49.799
useful and what should we be doing here

01:25:49.799 --> 01:25:53.399
at home ? We're certainly gaining , you

01:25:53.399 --> 01:25:55.600
know , gaining an education here , but

01:25:55.600 --> 01:25:57.600
what should we be doing now to make

01:25:57.600 --> 01:25:59.600
sure we have the autonomous systems

01:25:59.600 --> 01:26:01.767
that'll work in a fight in the Western

01:26:01.767 --> 01:26:05.250
Pacific ? Senator , it's not just ,

01:26:05.299 --> 01:26:07.540
it's not just land warfare too . In

01:26:07.540 --> 01:26:09.651
addition to that point , it's assault

01:26:09.651 --> 01:26:11.873
warfare , you know , which is one power

01:26:11.873 --> 01:26:14.040
wants to take another power's land and

01:26:14.040 --> 01:26:16.096
subjugate its citizens , and those ,

01:26:16.096 --> 01:26:18.040
those , uh , principles of assault

01:26:18.540 --> 01:26:20.373
matter from ground assault , air

01:26:20.373 --> 01:26:22.596
assault , airborne assault , amphibious

01:26:22.596 --> 01:26:24.651
assault . And so the lessons are all

01:26:24.651 --> 01:26:27.540
salient , which is that you raise the

01:26:27.540 --> 01:26:29.339
cost of assault , which , which

01:26:29.339 --> 01:26:32.759
doctrinally is always 3 to 1 . But the

01:26:32.759 --> 01:26:36.200
proliferation of mass cheap kill makes

01:26:36.200 --> 01:26:39.500
it more like a 20 to 1 or a 100 to 1

01:26:39.500 --> 01:26:42.479
ratio , and all things being equal , if

01:26:42.479 --> 01:26:44.812
all sides are employing to their utmost ,

01:26:44.959 --> 01:26:47.750
it makes assault much more costly and

01:26:47.750 --> 01:26:50.680
favors the defender . And so we can't

01:26:50.680 --> 01:26:52.839
move fast enough in this meta trend .

01:26:53.200 --> 01:26:56.629
And what , what characterizes it is not

01:26:56.629 --> 01:26:59.549
that it is unmanned , it is that it's

01:26:59.549 --> 01:27:02.890
cheap . The unmannedness is what makes

01:27:02.890 --> 01:27:06.870
it cheap kill . And , and so , um , you

01:27:06.870 --> 01:27:09.310
know what , I think , uh , moving

01:27:09.310 --> 01:27:11.725
quickly , innovating quickly . Granting

01:27:11.725 --> 01:27:14.345
authorities quickly , experimenting ,

01:27:14.924 --> 01:27:17.285
taking risks by programming and by

01:27:17.285 --> 01:27:20.794
feeding those industries as it is

01:27:20.794 --> 01:27:24.325
in the 1.5 , you know , in this year's

01:27:24.325 --> 01:27:27.084
budget submission , I think I think

01:27:27.084 --> 01:27:29.028
that's the way ahead . Thank you ,

01:27:29.028 --> 01:27:32.520
Admiral . Thank you very much , uh ,

01:27:32.629 --> 01:27:34.629
Senator Sullivan . Thank you , Mr .

01:27:34.629 --> 01:27:36.796
Chairman , Admiral , General , good to

01:27:36.796 --> 01:27:39.018
see you both . Thank you for your great

01:27:39.018 --> 01:27:42.279
service to our country and Uh , your

01:27:42.279 --> 01:27:44.390
staffs too . I know they're doing all

01:27:44.390 --> 01:27:46.501
the hard work there , so I appreciate

01:27:46.501 --> 01:27:48.835
that . Admiral , I wanted to , actually ,

01:27:48.835 --> 01:27:51.001
General and Admiral , I want to follow

01:27:51.001 --> 01:27:53.223
on Senator Ernst's question on energy .

01:27:53.359 --> 01:27:55.819
Um , You know , my state , we're

01:27:55.819 --> 01:27:58.220
working on a huge LNG project . We've

01:27:58.220 --> 01:28:00.540
been working on it for a number of

01:28:00.540 --> 01:28:03.479
years , uh . We were the first place

01:28:03.479 --> 01:28:05.590
anywhere in the world to export LNG .

01:28:05.590 --> 01:28:07.646
We started exporting LNG to Japan in

01:28:07.646 --> 01:28:10.890
the late 1960s from Alaska . No choke

01:28:10.890 --> 01:28:14.359
points . 6 day cargo shipment .

01:28:15.180 --> 01:28:17.124
Um , there's a lot of choke points

01:28:17.124 --> 01:28:19.291
around the world . The Panama Canal is

01:28:19.291 --> 01:28:21.513
one too . So all the Gulf LNG we get to

01:28:21.513 --> 01:28:24.290
Asia also , uh , takes a lot of time .

01:28:24.589 --> 01:28:26.700
You mentioned , uh , well , she asked

01:28:26.700 --> 01:28:28.756
you the question , Senators , are we

01:28:28.756 --> 01:28:30.867
moving fast enough ? Uh , I like your

01:28:30.867 --> 01:28:33.169
answer . We can never move fast enough .

01:28:33.470 --> 01:28:35.870
But would it help our allies , and of

01:28:35.870 --> 01:28:37.759
course our military . That you're

01:28:37.759 --> 01:28:39.981
responsible for , Admiral , in Alaska ,

01:28:40.399 --> 01:28:42.799
to have a 1050 to 100 year supply of

01:28:42.799 --> 01:28:45.109
clean burning Alaska natural gas . We

01:28:45.109 --> 01:28:47.490
have one of the largest . Reserves of

01:28:47.490 --> 01:28:49.379
natural gas on the north slope of

01:28:49.379 --> 01:28:51.601
Alaska and anywhere on the planet . But

01:28:51.601 --> 01:28:54.529
it would help , would it help to get

01:28:54.529 --> 01:28:57.330
that to our allies very soon , Japan ,

01:28:57.799 --> 01:29:00.970
Korea , Taiwan . Thailand , the

01:29:00.970 --> 01:29:02.803
Philippines , they're all really

01:29:02.803 --> 01:29:05.370
interested in this project . And uh

01:29:05.370 --> 01:29:07.148
we're trying to get the federal

01:29:07.148 --> 01:29:09.314
government , federal agencies to focus

01:29:09.314 --> 01:29:11.259
on the president has made it a top

01:29:11.370 --> 01:29:13.609
strategic priority , highlighted it in

01:29:13.609 --> 01:29:16.290
the State of the Union last year . Um ,

01:29:17.169 --> 01:29:20.649
How would that help you ? Senator

01:29:20.649 --> 01:29:22.871
Sullivan , good morning . Uh , it would

01:29:22.871 --> 01:29:24.982
first of all , we track the number of

01:29:24.982 --> 01:29:26.982
LNG reserves among our Indo-Pacific

01:29:26.982 --> 01:29:30.009
partners is in single and low double

01:29:30.009 --> 01:29:33.330
digit weeks , and LNG as a as

01:29:33.330 --> 01:29:37.189
a key critical element of powering the ,

01:29:37.410 --> 01:29:41.169
uh , societal resilience , the economic

01:29:41.169 --> 01:29:43.689
resilience of tightening our

01:29:43.689 --> 01:29:45.680
partnerships across the security ,

01:29:46.120 --> 01:29:49.490
energy , trade , technology stack . And

01:29:49.490 --> 01:29:53.009
then to do so unfettered by choke

01:29:53.009 --> 01:29:55.370
points that would be adversaries could

01:29:55.370 --> 01:29:58.410
close where we could do the picking and

01:29:58.410 --> 01:30:00.609
choosing of our partners to link those

01:30:00.609 --> 01:30:02.609
things . All those would be greatly

01:30:02.609 --> 01:30:04.649
enhancing for security in the

01:30:04.649 --> 01:30:06.705
Indo-Pacific . So this project would

01:30:06.705 --> 01:30:09.319
literally be like a Virtual pipeline to

01:30:09.319 --> 01:30:11.779
Japan and Korea . You couldn't touch it ,

01:30:12.040 --> 01:30:14.959
and it would power economies . Uh , it

01:30:14.959 --> 01:30:17.160
would power economies of the 21st

01:30:17.160 --> 01:30:20.299
century tigers such as Vietnam ,

01:30:20.709 --> 01:30:23.589
Philippines , Indonesia , Malaysia .

01:30:23.750 --> 01:30:25.861
It'd be a game changer . I had one of

01:30:25.861 --> 01:30:28.083
my colleagues talk about this being the

01:30:28.083 --> 01:30:30.384
private sector American energy counter

01:30:30.384 --> 01:30:32.625
to the China Belt and Road Initiative .

01:30:32.734 --> 01:30:34.567
Would you agree with that , uh ,

01:30:34.567 --> 01:30:36.678
assessment ? I would , yes , sir . So

01:30:36.678 --> 01:30:38.901
you're a strong supporter of the Alaska

01:30:38.901 --> 01:30:41.012
LNG project , I take it , very strong

01:30:41.012 --> 01:30:43.067
supporter and of maintaining the sea

01:30:43.067 --> 01:30:45.123
lines of communication , uh , in the

01:30:45.123 --> 01:30:47.234
North Pacific , including dominance .

01:30:47.234 --> 01:30:49.456
Good . I , I'm hoping the White House ,

01:30:49.456 --> 01:30:48.785
well , they're , they're , they're

01:30:48.785 --> 01:30:50.896
great on this too . The Department of

01:30:50.896 --> 01:30:53.007
Energy , everybody , uh , seeing this

01:30:53.007 --> 01:30:55.229
is really important . Let me , uh , Let

01:30:55.229 --> 01:30:58.229
me turn to um . Progress on basing , uh ,

01:30:58.330 --> 01:31:00.441
we've talked about before , Admiral .

01:31:00.441 --> 01:31:00.439
Uh , do you think we're

01:31:00.439 --> 01:31:03.419
overconcentrated on Guam ? I think the ,

01:31:03.430 --> 01:31:06.149
uh , MLCon that we're looking at is ,

01:31:06.649 --> 01:31:09.270
uh , about 50 billion over the next ,

01:31:09.410 --> 01:31:12.290
uh , 4 to 5 years . As you know , we

01:31:12.290 --> 01:31:14.669
were able to get your help was great .

01:31:15.129 --> 01:31:18.129
The , um , reopening of the ADA Naval

01:31:18.129 --> 01:31:20.351
Base out on the Aleutian Island chain ,

01:31:20.351 --> 01:31:22.185
which just for people who aren't

01:31:22.185 --> 01:31:24.209
familiar with that , uh , it's 1100

01:31:24.209 --> 01:31:27.419
miles west of Hawaii . Um , how

01:31:27.419 --> 01:31:29.475
important is aid act to this idea of

01:31:29.475 --> 01:31:31.641
being overconcentrated in a place like

01:31:31.641 --> 01:31:33.863
Guam , and do we need to distribute our

01:31:33.863 --> 01:31:35.752
forces more ? I don't think we're

01:31:36.000 --> 01:31:38.222
overconcentrated on Guam . I think it's

01:31:38.222 --> 01:31:40.819
important we don't . Gold plate the

01:31:40.819 --> 01:31:42.930
solution . I think it's an imperative

01:31:42.930 --> 01:31:45.041
to defend it , uh , but I don't think

01:31:45.041 --> 01:31:47.979
that it , it , it , it is the single

01:31:47.979 --> 01:31:50.299
point of power projection . Uh , I

01:31:50.299 --> 01:31:52.299
think that there are , uh , I , you

01:31:52.299 --> 01:31:54.299
know , I see in the behavior of our

01:31:54.299 --> 01:31:56.299
would-be adversaries , particularly

01:31:56.299 --> 01:31:58.466
together , direct threats on Alaska as

01:31:58.466 --> 01:32:00.521
a key economic center of gravity for

01:32:00.521 --> 01:32:02.632
the United States of America , as a ,

01:32:02.632 --> 01:32:04.743
you know , as a key point that they'd

01:32:04.743 --> 01:32:07.021
like to attack . Uh , I see , Alas , I ,

01:32:07.021 --> 01:32:09.243
I see it as a different firing vector .

01:32:09.319 --> 01:32:11.486
And so overconcentrated , no , I think

01:32:11.486 --> 01:32:13.819
we're under concentrated on other areas .

01:32:13.919 --> 01:32:16.370
But how does AIDACA reopening that help

01:32:16.370 --> 01:32:18.537
with regard to distributing our forces

01:32:18.537 --> 01:32:20.770
and Having that capacity which we're

01:32:20.770 --> 01:32:22.992
now starting to build up because of the

01:32:22.992 --> 01:32:25.326
Working Families Tax Cuts Act last year ,

01:32:25.326 --> 01:32:27.548
uh , you know , I , well , uh , Guam is

01:32:27.548 --> 01:32:29.689
a , is a closer firing position than

01:32:29.689 --> 01:32:32.000
Hawaii , San Diego , almost every point

01:32:32.000 --> 01:32:34.439
in the Pacific , not Guam , ADA , yeah ,

01:32:34.810 --> 01:32:37.089
yeah , uh , the geography of it on the

01:32:37.089 --> 01:32:39.200
great circle route , if you look on a

01:32:39.200 --> 01:32:41.311
non-Mercator map , it looks like it's

01:32:41.311 --> 01:32:43.700
way far away . But geographically , you

01:32:43.700 --> 01:32:46.439
know , it's , it's on par with Guam and

01:32:46.439 --> 01:32:48.550
other firing positions . It's another

01:32:48.550 --> 01:32:50.883
vector , a projection of American power ,

01:32:50.979 --> 01:32:53.620
and it's also another vector that our

01:32:53.620 --> 01:32:55.564
would-be adversaries would like to

01:32:55.564 --> 01:32:57.676
strike . Thank you . Thank you , Mr .

01:32:57.676 --> 01:32:59.564
Chairman . Thanks . Sorry for the

01:32:59.564 --> 01:33:02.359
misspeak . No , that's OK . And thank

01:33:02.359 --> 01:33:04.879
you for the clarification , Senator

01:33:04.879 --> 01:33:06.935
Peters . Thank you , Mr . Chairman .

01:33:06.935 --> 01:33:08.990
Gentlemen , thank you for being here

01:33:08.990 --> 01:33:11.101
and thank you for your service to our

01:33:11.101 --> 01:33:13.101
country . General Poparo , um , you

01:33:13.101 --> 01:33:15.268
have often spoken about the importance

01:33:15.268 --> 01:33:17.046
of allies and partners and have

01:33:17.046 --> 01:33:19.268
highlighted the critical role they play

01:33:19.268 --> 01:33:21.879
in supporting IndoPaycom . Uh , these

01:33:21.879 --> 01:33:23.935
allies and partners have become even

01:33:23.935 --> 01:33:26.101
more important , uh , with IndoPpaycom

01:33:26.101 --> 01:33:28.212
resources being shifted to the Middle

01:33:28.212 --> 01:33:31.229
East for the ongoing war in Iran . So

01:33:31.229 --> 01:33:33.396
my question for you , sir , is how are

01:33:33.396 --> 01:33:36.149
you ensuring operations in Iran do not

01:33:36.149 --> 01:33:38.660
impact our regional deterrences , uh ,

01:33:38.870 --> 01:33:40.926
including ongoing collaboration with

01:33:40.926 --> 01:33:43.148
our regional allies and partners in the

01:33:43.148 --> 01:33:45.092
area ? And how are you ensuring we

01:33:45.092 --> 01:33:47.203
maintain these critical relationships

01:33:47.203 --> 01:33:49.092
during a time of increased global

01:33:49.092 --> 01:33:52.009
insecurity ? Morning , Senator Peters

01:33:53.120 --> 01:33:55.640
I think our entrepreneurial approach to

01:33:55.640 --> 01:33:57.473
maintaining our operations , our

01:33:57.473 --> 01:33:59.473
activities , our exercises with our

01:33:59.473 --> 01:34:01.751
Indo-Pacific partners has been one key ,

01:34:01.751 --> 01:34:04.290
and Blakatan is an example where there

01:34:04.290 --> 01:34:07.919
are 18,500 plus troops , 19,000 in the

01:34:07.919 --> 01:34:10.129
biggest Bakatan ever in the way that

01:34:10.129 --> 01:34:12.240
we've been able to shift capabilities

01:34:12.240 --> 01:34:14.790
around to maintain those . Those

01:34:14.790 --> 01:34:17.049
operations and our exercises , uh ,

01:34:17.140 --> 01:34:19.196
Japan is participating for the first

01:34:19.196 --> 01:34:21.362
time ever in Balakatan , and that's an

01:34:21.362 --> 01:34:23.529
example of our deepening alliances and

01:34:23.529 --> 01:34:26.060
our partnerships . Uh , our

01:34:26.060 --> 01:34:28.759
Indo-Pacific allies are stepping up ,

01:34:29.319 --> 01:34:31.486
uh , from a presence standpoint in the

01:34:31.486 --> 01:34:34.490
dynamic demonstration . Of combat power

01:34:34.490 --> 01:34:37.310
and then we continue to maintain , you

01:34:37.310 --> 01:34:40.870
know , a deep reserve of ready

01:34:40.870 --> 01:34:44.290
combat forces including forces on Japan

01:34:44.430 --> 01:34:47.229
and forces in San Diego , forces in

01:34:47.229 --> 01:34:49.390
fact all across the western United

01:34:49.390 --> 01:34:51.959
States . You know , I'm not saying that .

01:34:52.455 --> 01:34:54.975
That there's not been , uh , you know ,

01:34:55.095 --> 01:34:57.825
some Indo-PeCO forces that have gone

01:34:57.825 --> 01:34:59.975
and that , uh , and that , you know ,

01:35:00.024 --> 01:35:02.191
it's nothing at all , but we have been

01:35:02.191 --> 01:35:04.535
able to account for those forces that

01:35:04.535 --> 01:35:06.935
are in CENTCOM and there's no

01:35:06.935 --> 01:35:08.991
substitute for the combat experience

01:35:08.991 --> 01:35:11.415
those those forces in CENTCOM are

01:35:11.415 --> 01:35:14.654
conducting . That's an advantage our

01:35:14.654 --> 01:35:16.598
would-be adversaries do not have ,

01:35:16.895 --> 01:35:18.839
right , right . Well , thank you .

01:35:19.009 --> 01:35:21.231
General , uh , Brunson , uh , following

01:35:21.231 --> 01:35:23.453
the war , uh , uh , the war with Iran ,

01:35:23.453 --> 01:35:25.899
the , uh , the DOD has withdrawn THAAD

01:35:25.899 --> 01:35:28.259
missile defense systems from the Korean

01:35:28.259 --> 01:35:30.660
Peninsula and has repositioned them to

01:35:30.660 --> 01:35:32.882
the Middle East . Uh , this move , uh ,

01:35:32.939 --> 01:35:35.106
was opposed by the Korean government ,

01:35:35.106 --> 01:35:37.272
uh , in part because they believe that

01:35:37.272 --> 01:35:39.328
it basically weakened the deterrence

01:35:39.328 --> 01:35:41.383
against North Korea . So my question

01:35:41.383 --> 01:35:43.439
for you , sir , is how do you assess

01:35:43.439 --> 01:35:45.606
the impact of moving these systems out

01:35:45.606 --> 01:35:47.495
of the Korean Peninsula ? And the

01:35:47.495 --> 01:35:49.439
resulting impact on your deterrent

01:35:49.439 --> 01:35:51.161
strategy against North Korea .

01:35:53.180 --> 01:35:55.180
Senator , thanks for the question .

01:35:55.180 --> 01:35:57.513
We've , we've not moved any TAA systems .

01:35:58.180 --> 01:36:00.402
So THAAD still remains on the peninsula

01:36:00.402 --> 01:36:02.250
currently . We , we are sending

01:36:02.250 --> 01:36:06.220
munitions forward and those are sitting

01:36:06.220 --> 01:36:09.620
right now waiting to move . OK , so

01:36:09.620 --> 01:36:12.379
there were previous moves where radars

01:36:12.379 --> 01:36:14.546
were taking forward . Uh , this was in

01:36:14.546 --> 01:36:17.899
advance of Midnight Hammer . Um , some

01:36:17.899 --> 01:36:20.177
of those things have not come back yet ,

01:36:20.259 --> 01:36:22.426
but the SAD systems themselves , sir ,

01:36:22.569 --> 01:36:24.625
remain on Peninsula , and you expect

01:36:24.625 --> 01:36:27.100
them to , uh , to remain there ? Sir ,

01:36:27.220 --> 01:36:29.331
and you expect them to remain there .

01:36:30.379 --> 01:36:32.660
Yes , Senator , we , we do . We , we

01:36:32.660 --> 01:36:34.882
moved them around . I think that's what

01:36:34.882 --> 01:36:37.180
got into the information space . I was

01:36:37.180 --> 01:36:39.500
dynamically moving those around so that

01:36:39.500 --> 01:36:41.919
I could then sequence them into Osan

01:36:41.919 --> 01:36:45.459
Air Base to prepare them to , uh , move

01:36:45.459 --> 01:36:48.180
the munitions , and , uh , that caused

01:36:48.180 --> 01:36:50.513
a big kerfuffle on the peninsula . Well ,

01:36:50.513 --> 01:36:52.513
good . So then you clarified it for

01:36:52.513 --> 01:36:54.847
everybody here today . Yes , sir . Good .

01:36:54.847 --> 01:36:57.124
Thank you . Uh , Admiral Paparo , yeah ,

01:36:57.124 --> 01:36:58.847
as you know , the , uh , KC-46

01:36:58.847 --> 01:37:00.680
refueling tanker , uh , not only

01:37:00.680 --> 01:37:02.569
strengthens our ability to , uh ,

01:37:02.569 --> 01:37:04.569
project power , uh , despite , uh ,

01:37:04.569 --> 01:37:06.513
China's growing threats , but also

01:37:06.513 --> 01:37:08.680
enhances our interoperability with our

01:37:08.680 --> 01:37:10.458
partner nations as well . So my

01:37:10.458 --> 01:37:12.569
question for you is , given the sheer

01:37:12.569 --> 01:37:12.529
size of the Indo-Pacific , how critical

01:37:12.529 --> 01:37:15.390
are KC-46 tankers for enabling , uh ,

01:37:15.399 --> 01:37:18.069
these operations ? And with Japan now

01:37:18.069 --> 01:37:20.470
acquiring , uh , KC-46 , how does that

01:37:20.729 --> 01:37:23.007
shared platform enhance our operations ,

01:37:23.049 --> 01:37:25.990
uh , in the region ? At a center , at a

01:37:25.990 --> 01:37:28.212
classified level , you'd be awed by how

01:37:28.212 --> 01:37:30.434
many millions of pounds of fuel we must

01:37:30.434 --> 01:37:32.434
have airborne during our , our most

01:37:32.434 --> 01:37:34.546
pacing operations in order to succeed

01:37:34.546 --> 01:37:36.879
in conflict . I applaud the Air Force's ,

01:37:37.100 --> 01:37:39.709
uh , you know , accelerated acquisition ,

01:37:39.830 --> 01:37:42.109
acquisition of KC-46 , reopening the

01:37:42.109 --> 01:37:44.330
line , and we can't go fast enough .

01:37:44.870 --> 01:37:46.926
Great . Thank you . Thank you , Mr .

01:37:46.926 --> 01:37:48.759
Chairman . Thank you very much ,

01:37:48.759 --> 01:37:51.779
Senator Moody . Thank you , Mr .

01:37:51.790 --> 01:37:54.339
Chairman and , uh , Admiral General ,

01:37:54.379 --> 01:37:56.546
thank you for being here today and for

01:37:56.970 --> 01:37:59.026
Having so much energy to get through

01:37:59.026 --> 01:38:01.137
all of this , uh , in one morning , I

01:38:01.137 --> 01:38:03.303
guess that's no , um , unique thing in

01:38:03.303 --> 01:38:06.089
the military . Uh , this is my first

01:38:06.089 --> 01:38:07.922
open hearing as a member of this

01:38:07.922 --> 01:38:09.978
committee . It's , it's certainly an

01:38:09.978 --> 01:38:12.145
honor , and I am in awe of anyone that

01:38:12.145 --> 01:38:13.700
signs up to make this their

01:38:13.700 --> 01:38:15.867
professional career and dedicate their

01:38:15.867 --> 01:38:17.978
lives to this . The oldest boy in our

01:38:17.978 --> 01:38:20.089
family is , has done that , and I , I

01:38:20.089 --> 01:38:23.830
so respect you and thank you . Um . I

01:38:23.830 --> 01:38:25.830
appreciated also the opportunity to

01:38:25.830 --> 01:38:28.163
meet with you personally prior to today ,

01:38:28.163 --> 01:38:30.879
and , um , I hope you know I am here to

01:38:30.879 --> 01:38:32.990
support , uh , your men and women and

01:38:32.990 --> 01:38:34.879
forces in whatever way you need .

01:38:34.950 --> 01:38:36.894
Certainly , uh , it's my hope that

01:38:36.894 --> 01:38:39.117
everyone on this committee , uh , comes

01:38:39.117 --> 01:38:41.172
here with that intention . Uh , as I

01:38:41.172 --> 01:38:44.799
look to , um , The

01:38:44.799 --> 01:38:48.399
future of America's military , um .

01:38:49.370 --> 01:38:51.481
I know much of , of what we're trying

01:38:51.481 --> 01:38:53.850
to do now is align the our military

01:38:53.850 --> 01:38:55.729
power with our industrial and

01:38:55.729 --> 01:38:57.896
innovation base here at home . I think

01:38:57.896 --> 01:38:59.840
you said that is something that we

01:38:59.840 --> 01:39:01.729
should prioritize and that moving

01:39:01.729 --> 01:39:03.785
forward to keep pace with innovation

01:39:03.785 --> 01:39:05.896
and technology , we have to do that .

01:39:06.089 --> 01:39:09.250
Um , I'm , my question for you is , and

01:39:09.250 --> 01:39:11.417
I , I wholly support that . I see that

01:39:11.417 --> 01:39:13.160
this , our president and this

01:39:13.160 --> 01:39:15.271
administration has placed an emphasis

01:39:15.271 --> 01:39:17.438
on that and has stood ready to support

01:39:17.438 --> 01:39:21.379
that . Um . Is that what you think

01:39:21.379 --> 01:39:23.779
we must do to keep pace with China ?

01:39:23.899 --> 01:39:26.500
And what ranks equal to that and

01:39:26.500 --> 01:39:30.390
prioritization to do that ? Senator , I ,

01:39:30.470 --> 01:39:32.526
I , you know , I think the extent to

01:39:32.526 --> 01:39:34.581
which in the early 1990s is that the

01:39:34.581 --> 01:39:36.870
defense space went into the defense

01:39:36.870 --> 01:39:38.981
space and left some of the commercial

01:39:38.981 --> 01:39:41.709
spaces . I think that was a , uh , I

01:39:41.709 --> 01:39:44.042
don't want to call it a strategic error ,

01:39:44.042 --> 01:39:46.229
but it was a strategic accident . In

01:39:46.229 --> 01:39:48.850
the way that it used to be that

01:39:49.270 --> 01:39:51.649
commercial and military

01:39:52.830 --> 01:39:56.029
integration was a key strength and each

01:39:56.029 --> 01:39:59.759
fed off of each other . So refinding

01:40:00.029 --> 01:40:02.890
that connection between civilian

01:40:02.890 --> 01:40:06.109
innovation . And and

01:40:06.810 --> 01:40:10.410
military innovation , I think is really

01:40:10.410 --> 01:40:12.770
key and essential in this changing

01:40:12.770 --> 01:40:14.937
character of warfare while we meet the

01:40:14.937 --> 01:40:17.029
strategic moment with the changing

01:40:17.569 --> 01:40:21.009
technical environment , the technical

01:40:21.009 --> 01:40:23.176
revolution that we're living in now at

01:40:23.176 --> 01:40:25.790
this time , and then having a military

01:40:26.529 --> 01:40:30.359
that is the most tech savvy military in

01:40:30.359 --> 01:40:32.081
the world is going to be a key

01:40:32.081 --> 01:40:35.620
competitive advantage . In addition to ,

01:40:35.750 --> 01:40:37.790
to trying to bring innovation ,

01:40:37.950 --> 01:40:41.129
industrialization back to the homeland ,

01:40:41.319 --> 01:40:43.597
uh , this administration and certainly ,

01:40:43.597 --> 01:40:45.763
uh , many of us on this committee also

01:40:45.910 --> 01:40:48.270
are eager to see and are valuing more

01:40:48.270 --> 01:40:50.870
of our both formal and informal allies

01:40:50.870 --> 01:40:53.203
throughout the world , stepping up , uh ,

01:40:53.203 --> 01:40:56.689
being more players , uh , and ensuring .

01:40:57.479 --> 01:40:59.423
Peace and stability throughout the

01:40:59.423 --> 01:41:03.250
world , um . I , I think

01:41:03.250 --> 01:41:05.417
watching what's happening in , in , in

01:41:05.417 --> 01:41:07.639
your , the theater under your command ,

01:41:07.639 --> 01:41:09.750
I , I think watching what some of our

01:41:09.750 --> 01:41:11.861
allies and partners are doing in that

01:41:11.861 --> 01:41:13.917
region where they're responding more

01:41:13.917 --> 01:41:15.861
actively , asserting sovereignty ,

01:41:15.861 --> 01:41:18.028
pushing back against coercive action ,

01:41:18.028 --> 01:41:19.861
certainly as it relates to China

01:41:19.861 --> 01:41:21.750
encroaching upon some territorial

01:41:21.750 --> 01:41:23.472
waters . Are you noticing that

01:41:23.472 --> 01:41:25.859
happening more ? Do you think , um ,

01:41:26.169 --> 01:41:28.391
there are things that we can do in , in

01:41:28.391 --> 01:41:30.391
Congress or even . Uh , with your ,

01:41:30.689 --> 01:41:32.800
within the military to encourage more

01:41:32.800 --> 01:41:35.089
of that . Senator , I , I do see

01:41:35.089 --> 01:41:37.200
increasing cooperation . One of these

01:41:37.200 --> 01:41:40.310
examples is Japan's active member

01:41:40.310 --> 01:41:43.390
participation in Balakatan . The fact

01:41:43.390 --> 01:41:46.709
that Japan is actively participating in

01:41:46.709 --> 01:41:50.020
a Philippine . Exercise that affirms

01:41:50.020 --> 01:41:52.180
its ability to defend itself , this

01:41:52.180 --> 01:41:55.169
reciprocal access agreements . That

01:41:55.169 --> 01:41:58.140
Japan has made with Australia , uh ,

01:41:58.290 --> 01:42:00.970
the , the growing the growing

01:42:00.970 --> 01:42:03.303
relationships in every exercise program ,

01:42:03.649 --> 01:42:06.009
including with Indonesia , uh , in

01:42:06.009 --> 01:42:09.169
Super Garuda Shield , in Malaysia with

01:42:09.169 --> 01:42:11.310
Kara Strike and Bersama Warrior ,

01:42:11.370 --> 01:42:13.770
throughout the theater , we see the

01:42:13.770 --> 01:42:16.290
partnerships nation to nation are

01:42:16.290 --> 01:42:19.509
growing . Certainly our role at

01:42:19.509 --> 01:42:21.500
Indo-Pacific Command is one to

01:42:21.500 --> 01:42:24.390
cultivate that , but we're frequently

01:42:24.390 --> 01:42:27.229
very pleasantly surprised at the nation

01:42:27.229 --> 01:42:29.173
to nation connections that they're

01:42:29.173 --> 01:42:31.062
making in and of themselves , and

01:42:31.062 --> 01:42:32.950
rightly so , because each is a

01:42:32.950 --> 01:42:34.728
sovereign and each lives in the

01:42:34.728 --> 01:42:36.339
neighborhood , and those are

01:42:36.339 --> 01:42:38.506
relationships that go back centuries .

01:42:38.506 --> 01:42:40.561
Thank you so much . Thank you , Mr .

01:42:40.561 --> 01:42:42.783
Chairman . Admiral , thank you for your

01:42:42.783 --> 01:42:44.950
answer there and Senator Moody , thank

01:42:44.950 --> 01:42:48.040
you for um . Um , Directing our

01:42:48.040 --> 01:42:50.040
attention to that to that aspect of

01:42:50.040 --> 01:42:52.040
what we need to consider and let me

01:42:52.040 --> 01:42:53.984
also just observe , welcome to the

01:42:53.984 --> 01:42:56.709
committee . And , um , uh , let me

01:42:56.709 --> 01:42:59.850
observe , um , that , that looking

01:43:00.589 --> 01:43:04.040
down the dais , uh , at , um ,

01:43:04.229 --> 01:43:06.285
Senator Slotkin and looking down the

01:43:06.285 --> 01:43:09.529
dais at you , Senator Moody , it seems ,

01:43:10.109 --> 01:43:12.870
uh , to me that only a month or two ago

01:43:12.870 --> 01:43:15.430
I was down there at , at the end of

01:43:15.430 --> 01:43:19.060
that dais and , uh . Here , here I am ,

01:43:19.160 --> 01:43:22.620
um . Um , in , in this capacity ,

01:43:23.339 --> 01:43:25.395
um , so , uh , thank you very , very

01:43:25.395 --> 01:43:27.172
much , and with that , I , um ,

01:43:27.279 --> 01:43:29.501
recognize Senator Slotkin . Thank you ,

01:43:29.600 --> 01:43:31.933
Chairman , and welcome to Senator Moody .

01:43:31.933 --> 01:43:34.267
Happy to have you on the committee . Um ,

01:43:34.267 --> 01:43:36.267
Admiral Poparo , um , thank you for

01:43:36.267 --> 01:43:38.489
everything you do . You're one of our ,

01:43:38.489 --> 01:43:40.656
our country's greatest experts on Asia

01:43:40.656 --> 01:43:42.919
and on China . Um , and I , I'm

01:43:42.919 --> 01:43:45.086
thinking about the summit that's about

01:43:45.086 --> 01:43:47.030
to happen in a month . Huge summit

01:43:47.030 --> 01:43:49.308
between President Trump and Xi Jinping .

01:43:49.308 --> 01:43:51.419
And I'm , I'm having , I'm personally

01:43:51.419 --> 01:43:53.779
struggling with what our policy and our

01:43:53.779 --> 01:43:56.100
plan is going into that summit . And

01:43:56.100 --> 01:43:58.299
just to review the bidding , we put

01:43:58.299 --> 01:44:00.521
tariffs on a whole bunch of things . At

01:44:00.521 --> 01:44:02.500
one point , we had more tariffs on

01:44:02.500 --> 01:44:05.779
Canada than we did on China . On ag ,

01:44:06.140 --> 01:44:08.307
China used to be our biggest purchaser

01:44:08.307 --> 01:44:10.589
of soybeans . Now we're approving

01:44:10.589 --> 01:44:12.689
billions of dollars to bail out US

01:44:12.689 --> 01:44:15.149
farmers . Unfair trade practices ,

01:44:15.189 --> 01:44:17.500
which we know China is legend for .

01:44:17.700 --> 01:44:20.830
There's been zero moves made to hold

01:44:20.830 --> 01:44:23.370
them accountable . On technology ,

01:44:23.669 --> 01:44:25.169
we've given China our most

01:44:25.169 --> 01:44:27.529
sophisticated AI chips , chips that our

01:44:27.529 --> 01:44:29.751
own American companies are desperate to

01:44:29.751 --> 01:44:31.839
get their hands on . We've picked a

01:44:31.839 --> 01:44:33.839
fight with Anthropic , which is our

01:44:33.839 --> 01:44:36.839
most advanced AI tools embedded in DOD

01:44:36.839 --> 01:44:39.061
systems . When we're in the middle of a

01:44:39.061 --> 01:44:41.172
really important AI race with China .

01:44:41.879 --> 01:44:43.859
Um , we've cut plans to impose

01:44:43.859 --> 01:44:46.229
sanctions on China for assault typhoon ,

01:44:46.240 --> 01:44:48.979
for cyberattack . We've cut research

01:44:48.979 --> 01:44:50.979
and development in our universities

01:44:50.979 --> 01:44:53.720
while China is surging ahead . Um , and

01:44:53.720 --> 01:44:56.200
now we're headed to the summit . So I

01:44:56.200 --> 01:44:58.330
will admit that I am concerned about

01:44:58.330 --> 01:45:00.799
what we're going to offer and get from

01:45:00.799 --> 01:45:04.220
this summit . Um , and in particular ,

01:45:04.479 --> 01:45:06.701
I'm from Michigan , so we're watching ,

01:45:06.830 --> 01:45:08.680
you know , the president came to

01:45:08.680 --> 01:45:11.720
Detroit in January and said out loud in

01:45:11.720 --> 01:45:13.831
Detroit that , you know , it might be

01:45:13.831 --> 01:45:16.089
time to allow Chinese vehicles to be

01:45:16.089 --> 01:45:18.311
sold in the United States . A bit of an

01:45:18.311 --> 01:45:22.220
earthquake in my state . So I've asked

01:45:22.220 --> 01:45:24.580
General Austin this years ago , um ,

01:45:24.819 --> 01:45:26.930
because I am really concerned for the

01:45:26.930 --> 01:45:29.060
national security implications of

01:45:29.060 --> 01:45:32.259
having , uh , Chinese vehicles with all

01:45:32.259 --> 01:45:34.370
the data and all the surveillance and

01:45:34.370 --> 01:45:36.648
all the cameras and all the 3D mapping ,

01:45:36.899 --> 01:45:39.220
um , all that stuff sent back to

01:45:39.220 --> 01:45:41.331
Beijing . So I'd just like to ask you

01:45:41.331 --> 01:45:44.770
from a security perspective . Would you

01:45:44.770 --> 01:45:47.290
want an adversarial nation to have high

01:45:47.290 --> 01:45:50.810
fidelity 3D maps of every military base

01:45:50.810 --> 01:45:53.569
and installation in the United States ?

01:45:53.930 --> 01:45:56.097
No , Senator , we should do everything

01:45:56.097 --> 01:45:58.152
in our power to prevent that . Would

01:45:58.152 --> 01:46:00.097
you want your adversary , I'm just

01:46:00.097 --> 01:46:02.263
thinking about war planning from being

01:46:02.263 --> 01:46:02.129
at the Pentagon , you know , the data ,

01:46:02.290 --> 01:46:04.457
we'd like to have on an adversary when

01:46:04.457 --> 01:46:06.623
we do war planning . Would you want an

01:46:06.623 --> 01:46:08.979
adversary to have maps , 3D high

01:46:08.979 --> 01:46:11.049
fidelity maps of every power plant ,

01:46:11.299 --> 01:46:14.299
port , highway , and bridge in America ?

01:46:14.939 --> 01:46:17.161
No , Senator , I'm sure they're working

01:46:17.161 --> 01:46:19.272
towards that . Um , would you want an

01:46:19.272 --> 01:46:22.490
adversary to be able to hack cars in

01:46:22.490 --> 01:46:25.089
the United States and remotely pilot

01:46:25.089 --> 01:46:28.149
them from Beijing ? No , Senator .

01:46:29.500 --> 01:46:31.667
Would you want an adversary to be able

01:46:31.667 --> 01:46:33.833
to conduct cyber espionage through any

01:46:33.833 --> 01:46:35.833
phone , any Bluetooth device into a

01:46:35.833 --> 01:46:38.410
vehicle in the United States ? Neither

01:46:38.410 --> 01:46:40.521
a vehicle nor anything else . You get

01:46:40.521 --> 01:46:42.632
my point . I mean , I know this isn't

01:46:42.632 --> 01:46:42.600
your , your area , you know , of

01:46:42.600 --> 01:46:45.310
expertise , but I will say . Um , uh ,

01:46:45.450 --> 01:46:47.617
from a national security perspective ,

01:46:47.617 --> 01:46:49.339
let alone an economic security

01:46:49.339 --> 01:46:51.228
perspective , we are watching the

01:46:51.228 --> 01:46:53.394
potential deals that this president is

01:46:53.394 --> 01:46:56.649
going to make in that summit with deep

01:46:56.649 --> 01:46:59.479
concern . And it has not missed

01:46:59.479 --> 01:47:01.312
anyone's notice that some of the

01:47:01.312 --> 01:47:03.479
biggest investors in the Chinese firms

01:47:03.680 --> 01:47:05.624
are , uh , you know , big American

01:47:05.624 --> 01:47:07.680
investors , Berkshire Hathaway , big

01:47:07.680 --> 01:47:09.847
whatever . And so we are , we are very

01:47:09.847 --> 01:47:12.069
concerned that in the hustle and bustle

01:47:12.069 --> 01:47:14.236
to make deals , we are gonna give away

01:47:14.236 --> 01:47:16.359
the farm . We're gonna give away

01:47:16.359 --> 01:47:18.303
security issues here in the United

01:47:18.303 --> 01:47:20.526
States . So I just want Wanted to get ,

01:47:20.526 --> 01:47:22.526
um , one of our nation's experts on

01:47:22.526 --> 01:47:24.303
record on the national security

01:47:24.303 --> 01:47:26.248
implications . I think it's like a

01:47:26.248 --> 01:47:28.415
driving surveillance package . I think

01:47:28.415 --> 01:47:30.415
they are chomping at the bit to get

01:47:30.415 --> 01:47:32.581
access to the United States of America

01:47:32.581 --> 01:47:34.637
and map every corner of this country

01:47:34.637 --> 01:47:36.859
and have geolocation on every leader in

01:47:36.859 --> 01:47:38.859
this country . And I just wanted to

01:47:38.859 --> 01:47:41.081
raise that to the attention . We have a

01:47:41.081 --> 01:47:43.137
bill coming up in NDAA . Just to ban

01:47:43.240 --> 01:47:45.540
Chinese vehicles from any sensitive

01:47:45.540 --> 01:47:48.200
military location as a bare minimum ,

01:47:48.279 --> 01:47:50.439
but I , I would say my first bill in

01:47:50.439 --> 01:47:52.606
this body was to ban Chinese cars from

01:47:52.606 --> 01:47:54.772
ever being sold here , and I pray that

01:47:54.772 --> 01:47:56.883
that is not where we are going from a

01:47:56.883 --> 01:47:58.995
national security perspective in less

01:47:58.995 --> 01:48:01.161
than a month . So , thank you for your

01:48:01.161 --> 01:48:03.439
time and I yield back . Senator Cotton ,

01:48:03.439 --> 01:48:05.550
welcome , Admiral General . Thank you

01:48:05.550 --> 01:48:07.495
for being here and thanks for your

01:48:07.495 --> 01:48:07.390
service and the men and women you

01:48:07.390 --> 01:48:09.557
represent . Um , Admiral Papa , I know

01:48:09.557 --> 01:48:11.501
there's been a lot of conversation

01:48:11.501 --> 01:48:13.450
today about our munitions and the

01:48:13.450 --> 01:48:15.561
effect that the Iran war is having on

01:48:15.561 --> 01:48:17.609
it , um , but in reality , it's not

01:48:17.609 --> 01:48:19.498
just the Iran war , and it's only

01:48:19.498 --> 01:48:21.276
lasted for 7 weeks . We've been

01:48:21.276 --> 01:48:23.660
supporting Ukraine now for 4 years , um ,

01:48:24.129 --> 01:48:26.129
and some critics of that effort had

01:48:26.129 --> 01:48:28.296
cited the munitions challenges we have

01:48:28.296 --> 01:48:30.518
as well . But isn't it fair to say that

01:48:30.518 --> 01:48:34.120
neither Ukraine nor Iran Caused the

01:48:34.120 --> 01:48:36.342
munitions challenges that we have , but

01:48:36.342 --> 01:48:38.342
rather exposed just how brittle our

01:48:38.342 --> 01:48:40.564
defense industrial base is and why it's

01:48:40.564 --> 01:48:42.731
so important to rebuild it rapidly . I

01:48:42.731 --> 01:48:44.953
acknowledge and agree with you . It's ,

01:48:44.953 --> 01:48:47.120
it , um , most of our problems are our

01:48:47.120 --> 01:48:50.370
own . So , in a hypothetical world

01:48:50.370 --> 01:48:53.169
where you never had Operation Epic Fury

01:48:53.169 --> 01:48:55.502
or Midnight Hammer , or for that matter ,

01:48:55.502 --> 01:48:57.725
you didn't have , uh , Vladimir Putin's

01:48:57.725 --> 01:49:01.080
second invasion of Russia . It might

01:49:01.080 --> 01:49:03.302
not have been exposed , but our defense

01:49:03.302 --> 01:49:05.358
industrial base , especially when it

01:49:05.358 --> 01:49:07.469
comes to munitions production , would

01:49:07.469 --> 01:49:09.247
have still had those underlying

01:49:09.247 --> 01:49:09.180
challenges . It just might not have

01:49:09.180 --> 01:49:11.513
been focused on quite so much . I agree ,

01:49:11.513 --> 01:49:14.580
Senator . Thank you , um , on

01:49:14.580 --> 01:49:17.790
Taiwan , um . I know you talked with

01:49:17.790 --> 01:49:20.270
Senator Shaheen about their defense

01:49:20.270 --> 01:49:23.330
budget . There's also the question , um ,

01:49:23.709 --> 01:49:26.069
about national resolve . What's your ,

01:49:26.149 --> 01:49:28.482
I mean , it's a hard thing to judge and ,

01:49:28.482 --> 01:49:30.427
and it's , it's more a question of

01:49:30.427 --> 01:49:32.593
political judgment and statecraft than

01:49:32.593 --> 01:49:34.593
it is military matters , but what ,

01:49:34.593 --> 01:49:36.760
what's your sense as a career military

01:49:36.760 --> 01:49:38.990
man of Taiwan and , and their

01:49:38.990 --> 01:49:41.779
willingness to . Go to the mattresses

01:49:41.779 --> 01:49:45.049
to defend their nation . I have a great

01:49:45.049 --> 01:49:48.509
deal of faith in Taiwan's military-age

01:49:48.509 --> 01:49:51.399
population's willingness , capability ,

01:49:51.410 --> 01:49:53.629
and will to defend themselves , orders

01:49:53.629 --> 01:49:55.185
of magnitude above others .

01:49:58.229 --> 01:50:00.173
I was going to ask you to name the

01:50:00.173 --> 01:50:02.285
others , but I guess that would be in

01:50:02.285 --> 01:50:01.870
politics , so I won't ask you to do

01:50:01.870 --> 01:50:04.379
that . Um , well , what I'll say is

01:50:04.379 --> 01:50:07.029
that , uh , Ukraine demonstrated

01:50:07.029 --> 01:50:09.430
relatively low numbers in polling

01:50:09.430 --> 01:50:12.589
pre-conflict , and they've responded as

01:50:12.589 --> 01:50:15.370
admirably as admirably as a society can .

01:50:15.990 --> 01:50:18.930
Taiwan's polling is orders of magnitude

01:50:18.930 --> 01:50:21.819
above that . Leading me to positively

01:50:21.819 --> 01:50:23.763
assert their willingness to defend

01:50:23.763 --> 01:50:25.986
themselves just common sense . Like you

01:50:25.986 --> 01:50:25.939
don't have to have access to that kind

01:50:25.939 --> 01:50:28.161
of data . Just I , I think common sense

01:50:28.161 --> 01:50:30.272
would say if you're sitting in Taiwan

01:50:30.272 --> 01:50:32.217
and you're a mom or dad and you're

01:50:32.217 --> 01:50:34.383
worried about your son's or daughter's

01:50:34.383 --> 01:50:36.495
future , grandma or grandpa , and you

01:50:36.495 --> 01:50:38.606
look at what communist China has done

01:50:38.606 --> 01:50:40.717
in , say , Macau and Hong Kong , um ,

01:50:40.717 --> 01:50:42.495
once they gain control of those

01:50:42.495 --> 01:50:44.717
territories , you wouldn't want them to

01:50:44.717 --> 01:50:44.419
gain control of your territory . Is

01:50:44.419 --> 01:50:46.310
that correct ? Yes sir . Does the

01:50:46.310 --> 01:50:48.629
military have full and proper focus on

01:50:48.629 --> 01:50:50.851
that threat ? Um , you know , for , for

01:50:50.851 --> 01:50:53.129
us , we're a globe spanning superpower ,

01:50:53.390 --> 01:50:56.310
and Bob Gates once testified in this

01:50:56.310 --> 01:50:58.750
committee after he had left the

01:50:58.750 --> 01:51:00.917
department and was probably a bit more

01:51:00.917 --> 01:51:03.083
free to speak that we have a perfect ,

01:51:03.083 --> 01:51:05.306
almost perfect record of predicting our

01:51:05.306 --> 01:51:07.417
next war since Vietnam . We've gotten

01:51:07.417 --> 01:51:09.639
it wrong every single time . Whether it

01:51:09.639 --> 01:51:11.990
was Grenada or Panama or Iraq the 1st

01:51:11.990 --> 01:51:15.370
or 2nd time or the Balkans , Ukraine ,

01:51:15.629 --> 01:51:18.770
what have you . That's why our military

01:51:18.770 --> 01:51:20.326
plans for so many different

01:51:20.326 --> 01:51:22.492
contingencies , why we have guys up in

01:51:22.492 --> 01:51:24.437
Arctic warfare school or in jungle

01:51:24.437 --> 01:51:26.437
warfare school or in desert warfare

01:51:26.437 --> 01:51:28.548
school . Obviously if you're Taiwan's

01:51:28.548 --> 01:51:30.770
military , from the time you raise your

01:51:30.770 --> 01:51:32.992
hand to enlist as a private to the time

01:51:32.992 --> 01:51:32.450
you're the chief of defense , there is

01:51:32.450 --> 01:51:35.549
one and only one military contingency

01:51:35.810 --> 01:51:37.921
that you should be thinking about and

01:51:37.921 --> 01:51:40.143
planning for . Does their military have

01:51:40.143 --> 01:51:42.143
that kind of single-minded focus in

01:51:42.143 --> 01:51:44.088
your assessment ? I do see that in

01:51:44.088 --> 01:51:45.977
their military , and I think that

01:51:45.977 --> 01:51:48.143
they're working really hard . Uh , and

01:51:48.143 --> 01:51:50.254
I'm seeing success in their , uh , in

01:51:50.254 --> 01:51:52.421
their building the kind of operational

01:51:52.421 --> 01:51:54.588
concepts that will lead for them to be

01:51:54.588 --> 01:51:56.699
successful in thwarting an invasion .

01:51:56.699 --> 01:51:59.740
OK , um , and , uh , I , I know again

01:51:59.740 --> 01:52:01.962
you talked to Senator Shaheen about the

01:52:01.962 --> 01:52:04.018
defense budget . The , the leader of

01:52:04.018 --> 01:52:06.129
the opposition , uh , recently took a

01:52:06.129 --> 01:52:08.073
trip to communist China , a pretty

01:52:08.073 --> 01:52:10.229
chummy trip if you ask me . Um , does

01:52:10.229 --> 01:52:12.396
that raise concerns with you ? I don't

01:52:12.396 --> 01:52:14.451
want to expect you to comment on the

01:52:14.451 --> 01:52:16.618
domestic internal politics of Taiwan ,

01:52:16.618 --> 01:52:18.562
but about the direction of defense

01:52:18.562 --> 01:52:20.680
spending in the future . I think the

01:52:20.680 --> 01:52:22.624
proof will be in the pudding . The

01:52:22.624 --> 01:52:24.736
passage of the special defense budget

01:52:24.736 --> 01:52:26.847
will tell us how committed they are .

01:52:26.847 --> 01:52:26.700
OK . All right , thank you , gentlemen .

01:52:26.870 --> 01:52:29.890
Thank you , Senator . Thank you very

01:52:29.890 --> 01:52:32.490
much , uh , Senator Cotton , Senator ,

01:52:32.609 --> 01:52:35.979
uh , Rosen . Thank you , Chairman

01:52:35.979 --> 01:52:37.812
Wicker , Ranking Member Reed for

01:52:37.812 --> 01:52:40.035
holding this hearing . Of course , uh ,

01:52:40.035 --> 01:52:42.312
General Admiral , good to see you both ,

01:52:42.312 --> 01:52:44.423
and we just recently were , uh , uh ,

01:52:44.423 --> 01:52:46.368
hosted us in your , uh , beautiful

01:52:46.368 --> 01:52:48.479
office , and , uh , thank you , thank

01:52:48.479 --> 01:52:50.479
you for that and thank you both for

01:52:50.479 --> 01:52:52.535
your service to the country . I know

01:52:52.535 --> 01:52:54.590
we're focused a lot on China , and I

01:52:54.590 --> 01:52:56.701
just want to focus a little bit for a

01:52:56.701 --> 01:52:58.757
second on their cyber threats . So ,

01:52:58.757 --> 01:53:00.868
Admiral Poparo , as you stated in our

01:53:00.868 --> 01:53:02.757
recent meeting , the cyber threat

01:53:02.757 --> 01:53:04.590
landscape in the Indo-Pacific is

01:53:04.590 --> 01:53:06.812
increasingly complex . China's emerging

01:53:06.812 --> 01:53:08.979
as a significant and evolving actor in

01:53:08.979 --> 01:53:10.979
the cyber domain . So as we look to

01:53:10.979 --> 01:53:13.201
enhance our posture and partnerships in

01:53:13.201 --> 01:53:15.423
the critical region , It's essential we

01:53:15.423 --> 01:53:17.201
understand the scope of Chinese

01:53:17.201 --> 01:53:19.312
activities and how we can effectively

01:53:19.312 --> 01:53:21.479
counter their influence , particularly

01:53:21.479 --> 01:53:20.759
when it comes to cyber threats ,

01:53:21.049 --> 01:53:23.770
disinformation , uh , uh , rampant ,

01:53:23.970 --> 01:53:26.830
and the targeting of infrastructure .

01:53:27.330 --> 01:53:29.274
So Admiral , how do you assess the

01:53:29.274 --> 01:53:30.941
China . cyber threats , their

01:53:30.941 --> 01:53:33.108
capabilities . How's Indoaycom working

01:53:33.108 --> 01:53:34.663
to expand your mill to mill

01:53:34.663 --> 01:53:36.608
cybersecurity cooperation with our

01:53:36.608 --> 01:53:39.450
regional allies and partners to defend

01:53:39.450 --> 01:53:41.506
against , uh , I guess an all of the

01:53:41.506 --> 01:53:43.479
above attack from the PRC sreion .

01:53:43.910 --> 01:53:46.720
Morning , Senator Rosen . Um , cyber is

01:53:46.720 --> 01:53:48.831
the first battle , and in fact , um ,

01:53:49.000 --> 01:53:52.160
you know , we're engaged in cyber . The

01:53:52.160 --> 01:53:54.540
PRC are engaged in cyber operations

01:53:54.879 --> 01:53:57.470
worldwide , and that includes not just

01:53:57.470 --> 01:53:59.526
salt typhoon and bull typhoon from a

01:53:59.526 --> 01:54:02.640
mill to milt standpoint . are essential

01:54:04.290 --> 01:54:07.419
operations where exposing the PRC's

01:54:07.419 --> 01:54:10.240
penetration of our allied and partners

01:54:10.779 --> 01:54:12.890
is really key and then assisting them

01:54:12.890 --> 01:54:15.259
in closing those vulnerabilities , and

01:54:15.259 --> 01:54:17.259
it's very important for the allied

01:54:17.259 --> 01:54:19.037
force moving forward that we're

01:54:19.037 --> 01:54:21.490
operating under the conditions of

01:54:21.500 --> 01:54:23.620
operational security and cyber is the

01:54:23.620 --> 01:54:26.029
biggest . Vulnerability on that . Could

01:54:26.029 --> 01:54:28.430
you expand on their cyber enabled

01:54:28.430 --> 01:54:30.549
disinformation that they used to sway

01:54:30.549 --> 01:54:33.109
the regional allies and shape the South

01:54:33.109 --> 01:54:35.810
China Sea narrative ? United front is

01:54:35.910 --> 01:54:38.669
absolutely unfettered and in a way in

01:54:38.669 --> 01:54:40.613
the United States of America , the

01:54:40.613 --> 01:54:42.780
government is constrained to the truth

01:54:42.780 --> 01:54:44.870
and the press is free . In the PRC ,

01:54:44.910 --> 01:54:46.743
the press is constrained and the

01:54:46.743 --> 01:54:48.688
government is free to lie and they

01:54:48.688 --> 01:54:50.799
spread lies about the United States ,

01:54:50.799 --> 01:54:53.021
about our allies and partners and their

01:54:53.021 --> 01:54:55.520
political enemies worldwide . Uh , they

01:54:55.520 --> 01:54:59.399
are active , uh , and , um , uh ,

01:54:59.520 --> 01:55:01.580
that's , that's all over the theater

01:55:01.580 --> 01:55:03.413
and in fact all over the world .

01:55:03.413 --> 01:55:05.580
They're a united front . We have a lot

01:55:05.580 --> 01:55:07.802
to do in that regard . I'm going to ask

01:55:07.802 --> 01:55:07.600
my next question to both of you a

01:55:07.600 --> 01:55:09.433
little bit about the Indo-Paycom

01:55:09.433 --> 01:55:12.040
strategy because the 2026 National

01:55:12.040 --> 01:55:13.651
Defense strategy removes the

01:55:13.651 --> 01:55:15.707
designation of the Indo-Pacific as a

01:55:15.707 --> 01:55:17.839
priority theater and no longer refers

01:55:17.839 --> 01:55:19.839
to China as the pacing challenge ,

01:55:20.040 --> 01:55:21.929
placing increased emphasis on the

01:55:21.929 --> 01:55:24.339
Western Hemisphere instead . Compounded

01:55:24.339 --> 01:55:26.561
with the ongoing military operations in

01:55:26.561 --> 01:55:28.672
other theaters , it raises concerns ,

01:55:28.672 --> 01:55:30.617
of course , that the resources and

01:55:30.617 --> 01:55:32.339
attention required to maintain

01:55:32.339 --> 01:55:34.283
stability in the IndoPEcom area of

01:55:34.283 --> 01:55:36.506
responsibility , but that they're being

01:55:36.506 --> 01:55:38.759
diverted elsewhere , degrading our US

01:55:38.759 --> 01:55:41.879
and allies' readiness in the Pacific ,

01:55:42.620 --> 01:55:45.629
so . I'm going to ask this , um .

01:55:46.509 --> 01:55:48.676
To both of you for the short time that

01:55:48.676 --> 01:55:51.779
I have left . What do you assess the

01:55:51.779 --> 01:55:53.946
Chinese and North Koreans are learning

01:55:53.946 --> 01:55:56.112
about the US military and our military

01:55:56.112 --> 01:55:58.112
strate strategy from Operation Epic

01:55:58.112 --> 01:56:01.279
Fury and what challenges does that face

01:56:01.279 --> 01:56:03.500
for us as we think about the NDAA and

01:56:03.500 --> 01:56:06.890
what we have to um . Maybe readjust for

01:56:07.200 --> 01:56:09.200
to both of you , please . Senator ,

01:56:09.200 --> 01:56:11.089
I'll I'll offer that the national

01:56:11.089 --> 01:56:13.200
defense strategy notes that deterring

01:56:13.200 --> 01:56:15.144
China is the second line of effort

01:56:15.144 --> 01:56:17.256
right behind defending the homeland .

01:56:17.256 --> 01:56:19.478
And so I , I will say that I , that the

01:56:19.478 --> 01:56:21.560
department is focused on a denial

01:56:21.560 --> 01:56:23.640
defense starting at the first island

01:56:23.640 --> 01:56:26.439
chain . And the Department of Defense

01:56:26.439 --> 01:56:30.000
is focused on uh deterring Chinese

01:56:30.000 --> 01:56:32.870
aggression , uh , and , uh , and so ,

01:56:32.959 --> 01:56:35.939
and so , um , I'll say that and in our

01:56:35.939 --> 01:56:38.040
alliances and partnerships , these

01:56:38.040 --> 01:56:40.207
alliances and partnerships continue on

01:56:40.207 --> 01:56:42.609
a growth trajectory . Uh , really

01:56:42.609 --> 01:56:44.729
across the Indo-Pacific , including

01:56:44.729 --> 01:56:46.850
North American and , uh , our , our

01:56:46.850 --> 01:56:49.520
Canadian partners , uh , and so , uh ,

01:56:49.609 --> 01:56:52.669
you know , I , I , I , I , uh , I , I'm ,

01:56:52.810 --> 01:56:56.089
and our operations elsewhere are , are

01:56:56.089 --> 01:56:58.149
accounted for , for , with some

01:56:58.330 --> 01:57:01.589
entrepreneurial creativity and , um ,

01:57:01.740 --> 01:57:03.796
for now , I , you know , I don't see

01:57:03.796 --> 01:57:05.830
any real cost . And imposed on our

01:57:05.830 --> 01:57:08.509
ability to deter , uh , China , and I ,

01:57:08.629 --> 01:57:10.796
you know , I'm sorry to take exception

01:57:10.796 --> 01:57:13.018
with the statement , but the , the four

01:57:13.018 --> 01:57:15.549
pillars of the NDS , I , I really do

01:57:15.549 --> 01:57:17.605
see , I guess my question was more ,

01:57:17.605 --> 01:57:19.771
I'll give a moment for General Bronson

01:57:19.771 --> 01:57:21.882
was more , what do you think as we're

01:57:21.882 --> 01:57:24.049
in a war right now our adversaries are

01:57:24.049 --> 01:57:26.105
learning about us , our capabilities

01:57:26.105 --> 01:57:29.029
and our strategies , um , and how will

01:57:29.029 --> 01:57:31.140
that change the plan , but I , I only

01:57:31.140 --> 01:57:33.251
have a few seconds left , so I wanted

01:57:33.251 --> 01:57:35.085
to give a moment to . Go ahead ,

01:57:35.085 --> 01:57:38.359
Bronson . Ma'am , as , as we look at

01:57:38.359 --> 01:57:40.303
our , our friends , partners , and

01:57:40.303 --> 01:57:42.192
allies in the region , one of the

01:57:42.192 --> 01:57:44.759
things that I think is absolutely , uh ,

01:57:44.779 --> 01:57:48.250
noteworthy is where we sit . So , you

01:57:48.250 --> 01:57:50.479
were just in Korea , we sit right there

01:57:50.479 --> 01:57:52.535
with our partners , right there with

01:57:52.535 --> 01:57:55.120
our ally to be more exact , and what

01:57:55.120 --> 01:57:57.859
that gives us is an opportunity to

01:57:57.919 --> 01:58:00.359
absolutely demonstrate to them every

01:58:00.359 --> 01:58:02.520
day by our continued involvement with

01:58:02.520 --> 01:58:06.240
them . Uh , settling disputes face to

01:58:06.240 --> 01:58:08.184
face by having our officers inside

01:58:08.184 --> 01:58:10.450
their headquarters , planning alongside

01:58:10.450 --> 01:58:13.790
them for the defense of that land . And

01:58:13.790 --> 01:58:16.012
so I think that you , you could look at

01:58:16.012 --> 01:58:18.012
the document , you , you also don't

01:58:18.012 --> 01:58:20.068
have the secure or a secret annex to

01:58:20.068 --> 01:58:22.234
that . You could just take that at its

01:58:22.234 --> 01:58:24.346
face , but I think our presence means

01:58:24.346 --> 01:58:26.568
so much more . If you look at the , the

01:58:26.568 --> 01:58:28.750
triangle of mutual defense treaties in

01:58:28.750 --> 01:58:30.830
and around the Pacific and Japan ,

01:58:31.419 --> 01:58:33.419
Korea , and the Philippines , we're

01:58:33.419 --> 01:58:35.250
there . And I think that speaks

01:58:35.350 --> 01:58:38.310
abundantly and makes abundantly clear

01:58:38.310 --> 01:58:40.669
what it means to us to be allied

01:58:40.669 --> 01:58:42.729
alongside folk in the region . And

01:58:42.729 --> 01:58:44.930
we're a buttress . We're a hedge , a

01:58:44.930 --> 01:58:47.490
true hedge against the coercion that's

01:58:47.490 --> 01:58:49.490
there because we're paying into the

01:58:49.490 --> 01:58:51.768
things that are going on in the region .

01:58:52.529 --> 01:58:54.696
Can I have a re-attack on what's up to

01:58:54.696 --> 01:58:56.839
the chairman reattack on the so I can

01:58:56.839 --> 01:58:58.950
give the senator an answer and send a

01:58:58.950 --> 01:59:00.783
non-answer . No , senator , no ,

01:59:00.783 --> 01:59:02.950
Admiral Paparo , I'm not gonna . Yes ,

01:59:02.950 --> 01:59:05.416
yes , go ahead . Thank you . One ,

01:59:05.496 --> 01:59:07.552
they're impressed by the operational

01:59:07.552 --> 01:59:09.774
acumen that's being demonstrated by the

01:59:09.774 --> 01:59:11.885
Joint Force . Number 2 , they see the

01:59:11.885 --> 01:59:14.496
power of AI and intelligized warfare ,

01:59:14.576 --> 01:59:17.255
as they call it , as a 21st century

01:59:17.255 --> 01:59:19.996
advantage . They're right to see that .

01:59:20.735 --> 01:59:23.976
And , and then I think they see the

01:59:23.976 --> 01:59:26.651
power of unmanned technology . As an

01:59:26.651 --> 01:59:29.941
imposer of costs and we see the same

01:59:29.941 --> 01:59:31.885
thing and I'm I'm really sorry for

01:59:31.885 --> 01:59:34.163
giving you a non-answer when you asked .

01:59:34.163 --> 01:59:35.997
00 no , that's fine . We're just

01:59:35.997 --> 01:59:38.219
thinking about what we have to plan for

01:59:38.219 --> 01:59:40.052
in this NDAA and just want to be

01:59:40.052 --> 01:59:42.052
focused on some lessons we might be

01:59:42.052 --> 01:59:41.651
learning now . Thank you . Thank you ,

01:59:41.702 --> 01:59:43.924
Mr . Chairman . Senator Rosen , I think

01:59:43.924 --> 01:59:46.091
you'll agree that actually the answers

01:59:46.091 --> 01:59:49.021
from both of these witnesses have been .

01:59:50.259 --> 01:59:53.979
Very open and uh and candid , and

01:59:53.979 --> 01:59:56.201
we appreciate that . I do agree . Thank

01:59:56.201 --> 01:59:58.368
you , Senator Banks . Thank you , Mr .

01:59:58.368 --> 02:00:00.479
Chairman . Admiral , let's pick up on

02:00:00.479 --> 02:00:02.646
what you just said , uh , pick up from

02:00:02.646 --> 02:00:04.701
there . Can you be more specific and

02:00:04.701 --> 02:00:06.479
talk about how the PLA is using

02:00:06.479 --> 02:00:08.646
artificial intelligence to enhance its

02:00:08.646 --> 02:00:11.589
military capability ? Yes sir , at this

02:00:11.589 --> 02:00:14.509
level , I think um they see AI's power

02:00:14.509 --> 02:00:16.910
from a targeting standpoint , mass data

02:00:16.910 --> 02:00:20.470
analytics to quickly discern where the

02:00:20.470 --> 02:00:23.750
target is , given the covariance among

02:00:23.750 --> 02:00:25.639
all of the factors that come into

02:00:25.639 --> 02:00:27.806
various sensors . I think they see the

02:00:27.806 --> 02:00:30.229
power of AI for strategic decision

02:00:30.229 --> 02:00:32.549
making , to know the game that you're

02:00:32.549 --> 02:00:35.509
playing , to be able to suss out what

02:00:35.509 --> 02:00:38.185
an adversary's intentions are . I think

02:00:38.185 --> 02:00:40.074
they're right to see that and who

02:00:40.074 --> 02:00:42.544
masters that technology and more

02:00:42.544 --> 02:00:44.544
importantly , the adoption of that

02:00:44.544 --> 02:00:46.655
capability is the one that's going to

02:00:46.655 --> 02:00:48.766
have the offset advantage in the 21st

02:00:48.766 --> 02:00:50.933
century . Can you measure what do they

02:00:50.933 --> 02:00:53.100
have an edge on us ? I mean , have you

02:00:53.100 --> 02:00:55.322
measured them versus us when it came to

02:00:55.322 --> 02:00:56.877
comes to AI with . Military

02:00:56.877 --> 02:00:58.766
capabilities . I think the United

02:00:58.766 --> 02:01:00.899
States has product superiority in

02:01:01.120 --> 02:01:04.959
agentic tools and as well as LLM

02:01:04.959 --> 02:01:07.600
tools . Uh , I think the United States

02:01:07.600 --> 02:01:11.069
has product superiority in compute , uh ,

02:01:11.109 --> 02:01:13.540
which powers those . I think the PRC

02:01:13.540 --> 02:01:16.459
has got some key advantages in robotics ,

02:01:16.589 --> 02:01:18.533
and we've got to move faster , and

02:01:18.533 --> 02:01:21.279
those robotics can be employed for

02:01:21.279 --> 02:01:24.194
cheap at scale kill capable . Abilities

02:01:24.334 --> 02:01:26.854
and we have to increase our game on

02:01:26.854 --> 02:01:29.685
that and I think that our lead is a

02:01:29.685 --> 02:01:32.915
tenuous lead of 6 months to 12 months

02:01:32.915 --> 02:01:35.137
at the most , and we've got to maintain

02:01:35.137 --> 02:01:38.334
and advance that lead with an emphasis

02:01:38.334 --> 02:01:42.334
on data , on compute , on application ,

02:01:42.575 --> 02:01:44.575
including AI application , and most

02:01:44.575 --> 02:01:46.519
importantly on human adoption . So

02:01:46.519 --> 02:01:48.631
that's really concerning , especially

02:01:48.631 --> 02:01:50.742
coming from you because no one in the

02:01:50.742 --> 02:01:50.294
world understands all of this stuff and

02:01:50.294 --> 02:01:52.516
how important it is . Than you do , and

02:01:52.516 --> 02:01:54.461
I take it from that that you would

02:01:54.461 --> 02:01:58.089
agree that AI is a dual use technology

02:01:58.089 --> 02:02:00.311
that enables military power . Yes sir ,

02:02:00.311 --> 02:02:02.470
I do . Um , how big of a strategic

02:02:02.470 --> 02:02:06.250
advantage is it for the US ? To

02:02:06.250 --> 02:02:09.370
have more and better high-end chips

02:02:09.370 --> 02:02:11.370
than China does to develop our AI .

02:02:11.370 --> 02:02:13.259
This is at the heart of compute .

02:02:13.290 --> 02:02:15.890
High-end chips enables fast compute at

02:02:15.890 --> 02:02:18.450
lower sources of energy , at greater

02:02:18.450 --> 02:02:22.129
volumes . High-end chips is

02:02:22.129 --> 02:02:25.959
Moore's Law personified , and having

02:02:25.959 --> 02:02:28.209
that advantage is an absolute critical

02:02:28.209 --> 02:02:30.450
pillar of those . Maybe this down for

02:02:30.450 --> 02:02:32.689
us and explain a little bit more why

02:02:32.689 --> 02:02:34.967
that's the case . You know , the , the ,

02:02:34.967 --> 02:02:38.919
the complexity , the

02:02:38.919 --> 02:02:41.479
short distance , the short distance of

02:02:41.479 --> 02:02:43.779
compute and the exchange of electrons

02:02:44.000 --> 02:02:46.560
makes our chips faster , able to

02:02:46.560 --> 02:02:49.979
compute more data faster at

02:02:50.200 --> 02:02:53.000
lower energy levels . It increases the

02:02:53.000 --> 02:02:55.200
efficiency of our computers . It

02:02:55.200 --> 02:02:57.759
enables us to compute faster and at

02:02:57.759 --> 02:03:00.660
higher volumes and At lower energy

02:03:00.660 --> 02:03:03.200
requirements , uh , it's a key critical

02:03:03.200 --> 02:03:05.899
advantage that along with data and then

02:03:05.899 --> 02:03:08.500
the software and firmware applications

02:03:08.500 --> 02:03:10.620
that pile on top of it . We've got to

02:03:10.620 --> 02:03:13.899
maintain our lead on that , including

02:03:13.899 --> 02:03:16.470
our AI tools , uh , both our large

02:03:16.470 --> 02:03:19.379
language models and our uh agentic

02:03:19.379 --> 02:03:22.700
models at Frontier AI . So take that a

02:03:22.700 --> 02:03:25.979
step further , how , um , what , what

02:03:25.979 --> 02:03:27.939
would happen if our advantage was

02:03:27.939 --> 02:03:30.990
eroded . By the Chinese getting access

02:03:30.990 --> 02:03:33.101
to advanced chips that they otherwise

02:03:33.101 --> 02:03:35.268
don't have access to , that they can't

02:03:35.268 --> 02:03:37.434
produce domestically . How , how would

02:03:37.434 --> 02:03:40.950
that impact us , uh , Militarily in

02:03:40.950 --> 02:03:42.950
this in this AI competition that we

02:03:42.950 --> 02:03:45.720
have with China , increasing with AI ,

02:03:46.060 --> 02:03:48.819
the ability to compute better and

02:03:48.819 --> 02:03:52.200
faster is the ability to think better

02:03:52.299 --> 02:03:56.299
and faster , and And every other

02:03:56.299 --> 02:03:59.819
form of warfare , whether it is

02:04:00.580 --> 02:04:03.970
drone warfare , missile warfare , all

02:04:03.970 --> 02:04:05.799
of those forms of warfare are

02:04:05.799 --> 02:04:08.580
commoditized , and so the overarching

02:04:08.580 --> 02:04:12.140
factor around all of it is compute and

02:04:12.140 --> 02:04:14.029
decision superiority . That's the

02:04:14.029 --> 02:04:17.500
combination of our ability to compute

02:04:17.500 --> 02:04:19.859
and the ability of our ability to adopt .

02:04:19.939 --> 02:04:22.272
So I want to be really clear about this .

02:04:22.850 --> 02:04:25.950
If the PLA has access to more advanced

02:04:26.089 --> 02:04:29.649
AI , It would likely improve its war

02:04:29.649 --> 02:04:31.816
fighting capabilities as you just said

02:04:31.816 --> 02:04:33.760
at the expense of American service

02:04:33.760 --> 02:04:35.927
members in the event of a conflict . I

02:04:35.927 --> 02:04:37.927
associate myself directly with that

02:04:37.927 --> 02:04:40.149
comment , not likely , undoubtedly ,

02:04:40.290 --> 02:04:42.457
yeah , thank you . Thank you again for

02:04:42.457 --> 02:04:44.512
your , for being candid and for your

02:04:44.512 --> 02:04:46.770
leadership and all that you , general ,

02:04:46.850 --> 02:04:49.017
thank you for your service as well . I

02:04:49.017 --> 02:04:52.589
yield back . And thank you , Senator

02:04:52.589 --> 02:04:55.359
Banks for that line of questioning . I

02:04:55.359 --> 02:04:58.240
wanna thank both of our witnesses , um ,

02:04:58.439 --> 02:05:01.759
and also I wanna thank the the team of

02:05:01.759 --> 02:05:05.049
uh servicemen and civilian leadership

02:05:05.049 --> 02:05:08.160
seated behind you for their service to

02:05:08.160 --> 02:05:10.382
our country . This has been a very good

02:05:10.382 --> 02:05:13.120
hearing . Feel free , um , and feel

02:05:13.120 --> 02:05:16.759
encouraged to supplement , um , your

02:05:16.759 --> 02:05:20.750
answers . Um , uh , on the record ,

02:05:21.339 --> 02:05:23.970
if , um , if you so choose , and I

02:05:23.970 --> 02:05:27.819
think we will um . Ask for

02:05:27.819 --> 02:05:29.763
questions for the record to be due

02:05:30.109 --> 02:05:32.189
within 2 business days of the

02:05:32.189 --> 02:05:34.430
conclusion of this hearing , which

02:05:34.430 --> 02:05:36.490
occurs right now . We are adjourned .