WEBVTT

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Subcommittee will come to order . I ask

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unanimous consent that the chair be

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authorized to declare a recess at any

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time without objection so ordered .

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Today we will hear from our witnesses

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on the Defense Intelligence Enterprise

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and how the enterprise is postured for

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fiscal year 2027 and beyond . This year ,

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I'm pleased to include the National

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Geospatial Intelligence Agency or NGA

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with our panel of leaders from the

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Defense Intelligence community .

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Welcome , ma'am . The US intelligence

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community is comprised of 18

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organizations , 9 of which are elements

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of the Department of War . They provide

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a variety of capabilities supporting

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national defense . And intelligence

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requirements in their missions .

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Intelligence enables leaders to make

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informed decisions , especially now in

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the increasingly complex world that we

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live in . We continue to face

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challenges with threats that span the

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entire globe , including non-state

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actors , well-known terrorist

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organizations , the narco-terrorists

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right here in our own Western

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Hemisphere , and the ever evolving

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threats from our traditional

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adversaries such as China , Russia ,

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Iran , and North Korea . Our

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warfighters and policymakers depend on

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validated actionable intelligence to

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execute their missions and return home

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safely , and the men and women who

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support the defense intelligence

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enterprise , civilians and service

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members alike , need the resent tools ,

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resources , facilities , and support to

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deliver on our intelligence

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requirements . By ensuring our defense

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intelligence enterprise has what it

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needs and our intelligence intelligence

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efforts are synchronized , we increase

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our warfighters' lethality ,

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survivability and capacity to provide

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for our nation's defense and counter

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whatever threats may arise now and in

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the future . This is a challenging task

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at hand and one that we look forward to

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working with the department on . That

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is why we are here today , to learn

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from key representatives of this

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critically important community about

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our current posture and how we can work

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together to better support the

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enterprise . Understanding each of your

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roles in this effort will help us

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ensure that your organizations have the

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capabilities that you need and the

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resources required to accomplish your

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mission . I'd like to welcome today's

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witnesses from the Defense Intelligence

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Enterprise , Mr . Bradley Hansel ,

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Undersecretary of War for Intelligence

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and Security , General , General Rudd ,

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Commander , US Cyber Command and

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Director of National Security Agency .

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Uh , Lieutenant General Adams ,

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director of the Defense Intelligence

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Agency , and Lieutenant General

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Michelle Breedenamp , director of the

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National Geospatial Intelligence Agency .

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In the interest of time , I ask that

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the witnesses keep their opening

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remarks to 5 minutes or less so that we

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have sufficient time for questions and

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answers , and we're hoping that some

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more members show up here in a minute .

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I apologize . We're going to , we're

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starting anyways here , but Uh , it's

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been a hectic day and , uh , no , no

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one's actually sure what's going on

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with the votes , uh , throughout the

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day . So that's part of the , part of

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the issue here . But , uh , with that ,

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uh , I , I , I , I , I want , once ,

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once again I want to thank the

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witnesses for being here and I'm going

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to turn it over now to Mr . Crowe for

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any opening remarks he might have .

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Thank you , Doctor Jackson , and thank

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you to our defense intelligence leaders

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for being here today to provide

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testimony . Today's hearing is about

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whether our defense intelligence

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enterprise is resourced appropriately ,

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postured effectively , and operating as

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a cohesive unit . We ask a great deal

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of our intelligence professionals .

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They are expected to anticipate

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adversary actions across all domains

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while integrating vast streams of data

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into clear decision ready insights .

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That mission is only getting harder .

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Adversaries are more agile , more

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networked , and more willing to exploit

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any vulnerabilities in our own system .

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The global security environment is

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testing our defense , security , and

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intelligence apparatus in unprecedented

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ways , with challenges ranging from

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cyber threats to the proliferation of

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nuclear weapons and delivery systems to

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force protection and an active conflict

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in the Middle East . Intelligence is

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our first line of defense against these

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and many other threats . It supports

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our operations , prevents strategic

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surprise , and ensures the safety of

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our service members . The need for an

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agile , capable , and synchronized

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defense intelligence enterprise is in

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one that works closely with allies and

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partners cannot be overstated . That's

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why I consistently and must again

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stress the importance of our alliances .

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Our ability to collaborate with global

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partners , including sharing relevant

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intelligence across agencies and

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enterprises is part of what makes us

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better and stronger than our

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adversaries . Make no mistake , these

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are turbulent times that demand serious

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people . We built a system with deep

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expertise across multiple agencies and

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commands . That specialization is a

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strength , but it can also be a

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weakness if those entities are not

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fully aligned , information is not

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shared in real time , priorities are

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not coordinated , and if resources are

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not allocated with a unified strategy

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in mind . So today I want to better

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understand three core issues . First ,

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resourcing . Are our defense

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intelligence agencies funded and

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staffed to meet the demands of the

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current threat environment ? Are there

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critical gaps in analytic capability ,

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collection capacity , or emerging

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technology investments that this

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committee needs to address ? Second ,

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posture . How are , are you positioning

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your organizations to respond to the

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most pressing challenges we face today ?

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Are we structured to compete

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effectively in a world where threats

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are increasingly transregional and

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cross-domain ? And are we agile enough

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to adapt as those threats evolve ? And

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third , integration . Perhaps most

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importantly , how well are you working

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together ? Are there barriers ,

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cultural , bureaucratic , legal , or

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technical that still prevent seamless

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collaboration across agencies and with

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our partners and allies ? What steps

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are you taking to break down silos and

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where do you need additional

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authorities or support to do so ? I

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remain committed to working with all of

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you to ensure your organizations have

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the resourcing and authorities required

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to conduct what the nation asks of you .

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I look forward to hearing from the

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witnesses on these and other issues

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today . Thank you , Chairman . Thank

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you . All right , well , we'll now hear

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from our witnesses , then we'll move

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into a question and answer session

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immediately following , uh , all the

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questions that we have . We will

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reconvene for a brief classified

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session . It will take place in Rayburn

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2337 immediately after this . So we

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will begin , uh , with opening

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statements and Mr . Hensel , we'll

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start with you . Thank you , Chairman .

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Chairman Jackson , Ranking Member Crow ,

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and distinguished members of the

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subcommittee . Thank you for the

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opportunity today to testify on the

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fiscal year 2017 budget and the posture

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of the Defense Intelligence and

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Security Enterprise and its support to

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the 2026 National Defense Strategy . As

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the Undersecretary of Defense for

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Intelligence and Security , I'm honored

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and humbled to represent the men and

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women of the DCCE who serve our nation .

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I appear before you today alongside the

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generals we entrust to lead our combat

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support agencies . With President

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Trump's support , we have the right

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leaders for the moment . In

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implementing the president's national

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security strategy , the NDS established

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the department's strategic approach

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along 4 lines of effort . The

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intelligence and security enterprise

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stands ready to support each . First ,

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defend the homeland by investing in the

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intelligence capabilities necessary to

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detect and counter adversary threats in

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the Western Hemisphere , from

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countering narco-terrorists to

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strategic deterrence , and to ensuring

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that DES is postured to support all

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efforts to secure our borders . Deter

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China in the Indo-Pacific by funding

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survivable ISR capabilities , improving

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our , our targeting capability and

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dramatically enhancing our collection

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in the theater . We also make necessary

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investments to ensure we can operate at

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the speed and scale needed in the

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Pacific . Increase burden sharing as

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mentioned by um by you Congressman by

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leveraging established by leveraging

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established and emerging intelligence

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sharing relationships with our allies

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and partners to better coordinate our

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operations , activities and resources ,

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maximizing our return on investment and

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our ability to buy down shared risk .

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Supercharge the US defense industrial

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base by strengthening the integration

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of the intelligence and acquisition

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communities , enhancing intelligence

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and security capabilities to protect

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critical technologies and supply chains ,

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and mitigate key security risks while

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transforming the security strategy to

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support these lines of effort , the FY

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27 president's budget request for the

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department . Intelligence and security

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mission leverages the combined

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resources of the Department of War and

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the National Intelligence Program in a

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coordinated fashion . While many of the

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specifics are classified , I can and

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and but I'm happy to share in the

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following session . I can share here

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that the DCCE is making major

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investments in space-based ISR to meet

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the challenge of deterring China ,

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stabilizing and expanding permissive

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airborne ISR to support immediate and

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enduring combat and command

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requirements , transforming the human

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enterprise to operate in a world of

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ubiquitous technical surveillance . And

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investing in the CSA's to accomplish

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the no fail mission of adopting AI and

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leveraging our vast amounts of

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intelligence data to scale against all

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threats . To accomplish all these

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efforts and meet our mandate , I have

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found it necessary to ensure all

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enterprise operations , activities and

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and investments support three

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foundational principles . First ,

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realign the enterprise to a new risk

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paradigm . We must effectively measure

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and assess relative risk for

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warfighters and policymakers . We must

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also ensure our posture is laser

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focused on supporting NDS priorities .

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Secondly , maximize enterprise effects

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from our current investments , which

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will require the DCE . To be , to be

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outcome focused and exceptional and

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measuring ROI to adequately inform

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opportunity costs . To achieve these

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effects demands we are all mission

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focused and apply an enterprise lens to

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our activities . Lastly , we must

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aggressively modernize the enterprise

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to ensure we are not only taking care

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of today's warfighters , but also the

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warfighters of tomorrow . This will

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require new technologies . New ways of

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thinking and the right workforce

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aligned to the challenges we will

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collectively face in the future . In

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conclusion , the president's budget

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request postures the dice to begin the

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transformation needed to deliver the

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timely , accurate , And relevant

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intelligence and security needed to

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successfully execute the NDS . The

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support and partnership of this

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subcommittee will continue to be

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critical in achieving the president's

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vision of peace through strength . I

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thank you for the opportunity to

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testify today , and I look forward to

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answering your questions here and on

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our follow-on closed session . Thank

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you . Thank you very much , uh ,

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General Rudd . You're recognized for 5

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minutes . Chairman Jackson , Ranking

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Member Crow , distinguished members of

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the subcommittee , I'm honored to

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represent the men and women of the

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National Security Agency and US Cyber

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Command . I'm grateful for your support .

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Thank you for this opportunity to

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testify before you today alongside my

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Defense Intelligence and Security

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enterprise colleagues . The strategic

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environment we face today is dynamic

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and complex , defined by great power

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threats and simultaneous flashpoints of

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crisis and conflict . While the nature

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of war remains unchanged , the

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character of warfare is evolving at an

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ever increasing pace . Influencing all

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of this is the rapid advancement of

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technology , including artificial

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intelligence that is central to this

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transformation of warfare . The nation

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and adversaries we face , the nation

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and the adversaries we face demand

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speed and agility in our signals

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intelligence and cyber capabilities .

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Foreign intelligence , harnessing the

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power of our data , strategic

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campaigning , and a bias to action are

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essential to supporting the warfighter .

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Shaping the environment and

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strengthening partnerships . The men

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and women of the National Security

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Agency alongside the United States

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Cyber Command are the world leaders in

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this arena . Recent events including

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our support to Operations Epic Fury and

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Absolute resolve , make it clear that

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the powerful combination of signals

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intelligence provided by NSA and cyber

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effects delivered by US Cyber Command

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continues to have outsized impacts in

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protecting the homeland , delivering

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deterrence , and providing support to

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combat operations . Our foremost

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priority is to defend the US homeland .

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NSA has made a priority , made it a

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priority to protect Americans ,

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America's interests throughout the

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Western Hemisphere through our efforts

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to produce foreign intelligence that

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can be used to prevent narcoterrorists

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from trafficking lethal narcotics into

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our country and to deter and defend

12:33.679 --> 12:35.457
against cyber threats to the US

12:35.457 --> 12:37.739
homeland . As we maintain strategic

12:37.739 --> 12:39.906
discipline and our focus on our number

12:39.906 --> 12:42.700
one priority , NSA remains vigilant to

12:42.700 --> 12:45.000
our global challenges , including

12:45.000 --> 12:46.667
efforts to deter China in the

12:46.667 --> 12:49.299
Indo-Pacific . Operation Epic Fury

12:49.299 --> 12:51.521
demonstrates the incredible warfighting

12:51.521 --> 12:53.820
support that NSA and US Cybercom

12:54.380 --> 12:56.460
deliver on behalf of the nation , on

12:56.460 --> 12:58.682
behalf of the joint force , and against

12:58.682 --> 13:00.849
our strategic priorities and threats .

13:01.559 --> 13:03.900
In support of US Central Command , NSA

13:03.900 --> 13:05.789
has played a critical role in our

13:05.789 --> 13:07.789
ability to deliver insight into the

13:07.789 --> 13:09.622
adversary and generate strategic

13:09.622 --> 13:11.844
advantage on the battlefield . Emerging

13:11.844 --> 13:13.789
technologies and increasing global

13:13.789 --> 13:15.844
interconnectedness continue to drive

13:15.844 --> 13:18.409
change at an unprecedented rate . As a

13:18.409 --> 13:20.020
technically oriented foreign

13:20.020 --> 13:22.242
intelligence organization that supports

13:22.242 --> 13:24.187
the intelligence community and war

13:24.187 --> 13:26.849
fighter , NSA must posture itself to

13:26.849 --> 13:29.119
succeed through speed , scale ,

13:29.409 --> 13:32.210
innovation , and integration . The

13:32.210 --> 13:34.377
research and development of technology

13:34.377 --> 13:36.488
is a constant , not an exception . It

13:36.488 --> 13:38.210
helps us stay ahead of foreign

13:38.210 --> 13:40.043
adversaries who are also working

13:40.043 --> 13:42.154
feverishly to develop capabilities to

13:42.154 --> 13:44.849
be used against us . This requires a

13:44.849 --> 13:47.016
highly skilled workforce , a workforce

13:47.016 --> 13:48.849
that embraces innovation , and a

13:48.849 --> 13:50.460
broadened approach for agile

13:50.460 --> 13:52.571
collaboration across government , the

13:52.571 --> 13:54.460
private sector , and our partners

13:54.460 --> 13:56.750
around the world . In closing , I'd

13:56.750 --> 13:58.750
like to emphasize the importance of

13:58.750 --> 14:00.861
intelligence derived from Section 702

14:00.861 --> 14:02.417
of the Foreign Intelligence

14:02.417 --> 14:04.639
Surveillance Act to the missions that I

14:04.639 --> 14:06.583
mentioned . This authority , which

14:06.583 --> 14:08.250
allows NSA to collect foreign

14:08.250 --> 14:10.417
intelligence on non-US persons located

14:10.417 --> 14:12.859
overseas that use US communications

14:12.859 --> 14:14.915
infrastructure , is vital to keeping

14:14.915 --> 14:16.915
the nation safe . I look forward to

14:16.915 --> 14:18.748
continuing the conversation with

14:18.748 --> 14:20.970
Congress about 702's importance and the

14:20.970 --> 14:23.192
rigorous compliance program that guides

14:23.192 --> 14:25.303
our use of it . Maintaining the trust

14:25.303 --> 14:27.470
and confidence of our nation's leaders

14:27.470 --> 14:29.637
and the public remains our top focus .

14:29.950 --> 14:32.172
Thank you again for inviting me today .

14:32.172 --> 14:34.061
Your support is what allows us to

14:34.061 --> 14:36.006
achieve positive national security

14:36.006 --> 14:38.061
outcomes for the nation , and I look

14:38.061 --> 14:40.283
forward to your questions . Thank you .

14:40.283 --> 14:42.117
Thank you , General . Lieutenant

14:42.117 --> 14:41.869
General Adams , you're recognized for 5

14:41.869 --> 14:45.119
minutes . Chairman Jackson , Ranking

14:45.119 --> 14:47.341
Member Crow , and distinguished members

14:47.341 --> 14:49.397
of the subcommittee , thank you very

14:49.397 --> 14:51.619
much for the opportunity to discuss the

14:51.619 --> 14:53.286
Defense Intelligence Agency's

14:53.286 --> 14:55.008
assessment of its challenges ,

14:55.008 --> 14:56.897
priorities , and resourcing . I'm

14:56.897 --> 14:58.730
honored to testify alongside the

14:58.730 --> 15:00.841
Honorable Hansel , General Rudd , and

15:00.841 --> 15:03.063
Lieutenant John Briednkamp . The United

15:03.063 --> 15:04.897
States confronts an increasingly

15:04.897 --> 15:06.397
complex threat environment

15:06.397 --> 15:08.452
characterized by adversaries who are

15:08.452 --> 15:10.286
modernizing their capabilities ,

15:10.286 --> 15:12.508
cooperating in unprecedented ways , and

15:12.508 --> 15:14.619
seeking asymmetric advantages against

15:14.619 --> 15:17.130
the joint force . These adversaries

15:17.130 --> 15:19.549
aspire to shape the international order

15:19.549 --> 15:22.030
in their favor . To meet these

15:22.030 --> 15:24.141
challenges , the Defense Intelligence

15:24.141 --> 15:26.590
Agency is dedicated to providing timely ,

15:26.909 --> 15:29.076
actionable intelligence to support the

15:29.076 --> 15:31.298
warfighter , our national leaders , and

15:31.298 --> 15:35.109
the department . The over 16,500 men

15:35.109 --> 15:37.220
and women of the Defense Intelligence

15:37.220 --> 15:40.530
Agency serving in over 140 countries

15:40.869 --> 15:43.036
around the globe are focused every day

15:43.036 --> 15:45.147
on delivering that intelligence , and

15:45.147 --> 15:47.369
that that it strengthens the defense of

15:47.369 --> 15:49.313
our homeland , enhances warfighter

15:49.313 --> 15:51.150
lethality , and counters foreign

15:51.150 --> 15:53.070
intelligence threats , as well as

15:53.070 --> 15:55.349
strengthens intelligence sharing with

15:55.349 --> 15:58.109
our partners and allies . Over the past

15:58.109 --> 16:00.140
year , DIA has provided critical

16:00.140 --> 16:02.859
intelligence , enabling hundreds of

16:02.859 --> 16:05.081
operations , demonstrating the value of

16:05.081 --> 16:06.915
our partnerships , and delivered

16:06.915 --> 16:08.859
thousands of intelligence products

16:08.859 --> 16:11.026
directly to the combatant commanders .

16:11.026 --> 16:13.248
Let me begin with the threats to the US

16:13.248 --> 16:14.970
homeland . Along our borders ,

16:14.970 --> 16:17.137
transnational criminal organizations ,

16:17.137 --> 16:19.303
organizations , drug traffickers , and

16:19.303 --> 16:21.248
terrorist groups are attempting to

16:21.248 --> 16:23.470
circumvent US law , law enforcement and

16:23.470 --> 16:25.470
harm US citizens . DIA continues to

16:25.470 --> 16:27.526
leverage its analytic , collection ,

16:27.526 --> 16:29.637
scientific and technical capabilities

16:29.637 --> 16:31.803
to support both the department and law

16:31.803 --> 16:33.637
enforcement efforts . Beyond our

16:33.637 --> 16:35.192
borders , our adversaries ,

16:35.192 --> 16:37.192
particularly China and Russia , are

16:37.192 --> 16:39.303
developing long-range and novel power

16:39.303 --> 16:41.415
projection capabilities to target the

16:41.415 --> 16:43.470
homeland . They continue to seek new

16:43.470 --> 16:45.637
avenues to threaten our cyber networks

16:45.637 --> 16:47.748
and our critical infrastructure . DIA

16:47.748 --> 16:49.637
supports homeland missile defense

16:49.637 --> 16:51.581
across core intelligence functions

16:51.581 --> 16:53.581
focused against the threat spectrum

16:53.581 --> 16:55.526
from pre-launch to post-conflict .

16:55.526 --> 16:57.415
These threats to the homeland are

16:57.415 --> 16:59.637
compounded by unprecedented adversarial

16:59.637 --> 17:01.780
cooperation across multiple domains .

17:02.239 --> 17:04.800
Beijing , Moscow , Pyongyang , and

17:04.800 --> 17:07.540
Tehran are enhancing ties to undermine

17:07.540 --> 17:09.939
the influence of the US and our allies .

17:11.010 --> 17:13.066
Chief among these adversaries is the

17:13.066 --> 17:15.089
People's Republic of China . The

17:15.089 --> 17:17.033
Chinese Communist Party is rapidly

17:17.033 --> 17:19.256
developing military capabilities across

17:19.256 --> 17:21.367
all warfare domains designed to seize

17:21.367 --> 17:23.422
Taiwan by force , while deterring US

17:23.422 --> 17:25.200
intervention . China's military

17:25.200 --> 17:27.367
modernization continues at an alarming

17:27.367 --> 17:29.367
pace . China now operates more than

17:29.367 --> 17:31.422
1200 satellites on orbit , enhancing

17:31.422 --> 17:35.329
its ability to ubiquitously surveil the

17:35.329 --> 17:37.599
globe . Its nuclear warhead stockpile

17:37.599 --> 17:39.949
has surpassed 600 operational warheads

17:40.040 --> 17:43.000
with projections exceeding 1000 by 2030 .

17:44.109 --> 17:46.165
Beijing also continues dangerous and

17:46.165 --> 17:48.276
aggressive actions in the South China

17:48.276 --> 17:49.998
Sea , particularly against the

17:49.998 --> 17:51.998
Philippines , using water cannons ,

17:51.998 --> 17:54.165
ramming , and other coercive tactics .

17:54.165 --> 17:56.109
Russia remains as both a strategic

17:56.109 --> 17:58.220
threat to the US and an immediate and

17:58.220 --> 18:00.276
aggressive threat to its neighbors .

18:00.276 --> 18:02.165
Despite sustaining over 1 million

18:02.165 --> 18:01.969
casualties since the start of its

18:01.969 --> 18:04.250
invasion of Ukraine , Moscow maintains

18:04.250 --> 18:06.028
the economic , industrial , and

18:06.028 --> 18:08.194
demographic means to sustain the war ,

18:08.194 --> 18:10.361
at least through this year . Russia is

18:10.361 --> 18:12.528
also dramatically expanding its use of

18:12.528 --> 18:14.361
unmanned systems and integrating

18:14.361 --> 18:16.083
lessons learned from Ukraine .

18:16.083 --> 18:18.250
Importantly , Russia's nuclear arsenal

18:18.250 --> 18:20.306
remains the world's largest and most

18:20.306 --> 18:22.472
diverse . Turning to the Middle East ,

18:22.472 --> 18:24.417
DIA continues to support an active

18:24.417 --> 18:26.417
conflict environment . Iran and its

18:26.417 --> 18:28.472
proxies remain engaged in operations

18:28.472 --> 18:30.417
against US , Israeli , and partner

18:30.417 --> 18:32.194
interests . Despite significant

18:32.194 --> 18:33.972
degradation of Iranian military

18:33.972 --> 18:36.139
capabilities through coalition strikes

18:36.139 --> 18:38.139
during Operation Epic Fury , Tehran

18:38.139 --> 18:40.028
retains thousands of missiles and

18:40.028 --> 18:41.750
one-way attack UAVs capable of

18:41.750 --> 18:43.639
threatening US and partner forces

18:43.639 --> 18:45.583
throughout the region . Iraqi Shia

18:45.583 --> 18:47.583
militias have conducted hundreds of

18:47.583 --> 18:49.806
attacks against the US forces since the

18:49.806 --> 18:51.917
operation began , demonstrating their

18:51.917 --> 18:54.139
commitment to Tehran , Tehran , despite

18:54.139 --> 18:56.139
suffering operational limitations .

18:56.250 --> 18:58.083
North Korea has strengthened its

18:58.083 --> 19:00.139
relationship with Russia , deploying

19:00.139 --> 19:02.417
more than 150 ballistic missiles , and ,

19:02.417 --> 19:04.639
and has sent more than 12,000 troops to

19:04.639 --> 19:06.806
support Russian operations . Pyongyang

19:06.806 --> 19:08.694
is using this cooperation to gain

19:08.694 --> 19:10.806
combat experience , advanced military

19:10.806 --> 19:10.719
technology , and economic benefits .

19:11.130 --> 19:13.241
North Korea also continues developing

19:13.241 --> 19:15.019
its nuclear arsenal and missile

19:15.019 --> 19:17.074
capabilities , including a new solid

19:17.074 --> 19:19.241
propellant propellant ICBM designed to

19:19.241 --> 19:21.430
challenge the homeland . Underpinning

19:21.430 --> 19:23.652
all of these threats is an accelerating

19:23.652 --> 19:25.374
technological competition that

19:25.374 --> 19:27.486
represents a fundamental shift in the

19:27.486 --> 19:29.708
character of warfare . China and Russia

19:29.708 --> 19:29.030
are investing heavily in artificial

19:29.030 --> 19:31.630
intelligence , biotechnology , quantum

19:31.630 --> 19:32.963
sciences , and advanced

19:32.963 --> 19:34.963
microelectronics , all of which are

19:34.963 --> 19:36.741
foundational to future military

19:36.741 --> 19:38.408
innovation . China is already

19:38.408 --> 19:40.574
integrating AI into uncrewed systems ,

19:40.574 --> 19:42.741
decision support , ISR and cyber ops .

19:42.869 --> 19:44.980
The proliferation of unmanned systems

19:44.980 --> 19:47.202
globally , combined with AI advancement

19:47.202 --> 19:49.313
creates ever expanding threats to the

19:49.313 --> 19:51.536
US critical infrastructure . Chairman ,

19:51.536 --> 19:53.258
ranking member , meeting these

19:53.258 --> 19:55.147
challenges demand an intelligence

19:55.147 --> 19:57.369
enterprise that is agile , innovative ,

19:57.369 --> 19:59.258
and integrated . It also requires

19:59.258 --> 20:01.369
sustained congressional support . I'm

20:01.369 --> 20:01.349
honored to lead the Defense

20:01.349 --> 20:03.405
Intelligence Agency representing its

20:03.405 --> 20:05.738
talented and dedicated global workforce .

20:05.790 --> 20:07.790
While these threats are serious and

20:07.790 --> 20:09.846
complex , I'm confident that the men

20:09.846 --> 20:12.012
and women of DIA working alongside our

20:12.012 --> 20:14.012
intelligence community partners and

20:14.012 --> 20:16.179
with your continued support , have the

20:16.179 --> 20:18.401
expertise , dedication , and innovative

20:18.401 --> 20:20.401
spirit to meet this moment . I look

20:20.401 --> 20:20.099
forward to your questions and to

20:20.099 --> 20:22.321
working together to defend our nation .

20:22.321 --> 20:23.988
Thank you . Thank you , sir .

20:23.988 --> 20:26.210
Lieutenant General Breedenkamp , you're

20:26.210 --> 20:28.377
recognized for 5 minutes . Thank you ,

20:28.377 --> 20:30.655
Chairman Jackson , Ranking Member Crow ,

20:30.655 --> 20:32.488
and distinguished members of the

20:32.488 --> 20:34.839
subcommittee . I am honored to testify

20:35.060 --> 20:37.171
before you today representing the men

20:37.171 --> 20:38.838
and the women of the National

20:38.838 --> 20:41.180
Geospatial Intelligence Agency and

20:41.180 --> 20:43.380
alongside my Defense Intelligence

20:43.380 --> 20:46.060
Enterprise colleagues . Thank you for

20:46.060 --> 20:48.390
your steadfast support of NGA and the

20:48.390 --> 20:50.459
critical mission we perform for the

20:50.459 --> 20:53.189
nation . In alignment with the National

20:53.189 --> 20:55.790
Defense strategy , NGA provides

20:55.790 --> 20:58.150
critical geospatial intelligence to

20:58.150 --> 21:00.910
national leadership , and as a combat

21:00.910 --> 21:03.430
support agency , we deliver accurate ,

21:03.640 --> 21:05.473
timely , and decisive G GON that

21:05.473 --> 21:07.362
enables the warfighters' decision

21:07.362 --> 21:10.250
advantage . NGA's professionals provide

21:10.250 --> 21:11.806
the foundational geospatial

21:11.806 --> 21:14.489
intelligence that supports operations

21:14.489 --> 21:17.329
across all domains and informs national

21:17.329 --> 21:19.729
security decisions . Supporting

21:19.729 --> 21:22.609
homeland defense is paramount to NGA's

21:22.609 --> 21:25.209
mission . We provide intelligence

21:25.209 --> 21:27.479
support to border security operations ,

21:27.890 --> 21:30.439
countering narco-terrorist networks ,

21:30.760 --> 21:32.609
and maintaining maritime domain

21:32.609 --> 21:34.890
awareness throughout the hemisphere ,

21:35.319 --> 21:37.489
all essential capabilities for

21:37.489 --> 21:40.640
defending the homeland . NGA also

21:40.640 --> 21:42.696
supports deterrent operations in the

21:42.696 --> 21:45.810
Indo-Pacific . We enable denial

21:45.810 --> 21:48.143
operations along the first island chain ,

21:48.680 --> 21:51.339
support posture decisions , and provide

21:51.339 --> 21:52.959
the geospatial foundational

21:52.959 --> 21:55.760
intelligence necessary for operational

21:55.760 --> 21:59.380
planning . China challenges us across

21:59.380 --> 22:02.140
all elements of national power while

22:02.140 --> 22:04.300
coercively seeking to expand its

22:04.300 --> 22:07.619
influence , and GON is essential to

22:07.619 --> 22:10.449
countering that challenge . Even as we

22:10.449 --> 22:13.930
maintain focus on priority areas , NGA

22:13.930 --> 22:16.449
retains the capability to respond to

22:16.449 --> 22:19.650
emergent crises globally . We continue

22:19.650 --> 22:21.872
to provide indications and warning from

22:21.872 --> 22:24.000
Russia's activities in Europe to

22:24.000 --> 22:26.290
emerging threats in Africa and

22:26.290 --> 22:28.770
throughout the Middle East . NGA has

22:28.770 --> 22:30.992
consistently delivered mission critical

22:30.992 --> 22:33.329
GON to the joint force and our partners

22:33.329 --> 22:36.550
across the globe . Our fiscal year 27

22:36.550 --> 22:38.717
budget request reflects our commitment

22:38.717 --> 22:40.670
to the national defense strategy

22:40.670 --> 22:43.150
priorities through investments in

22:43.150 --> 22:45.229
ground infrastructure to support new

22:45.229 --> 22:48.229
sensors , artificial intelligence and

22:48.229 --> 22:50.310
machine learning capabilities to

22:50.310 --> 22:52.829
process exponentially increasing

22:52.829 --> 22:55.910
volumes of geospatial data , and

22:55.910 --> 22:58.243
technology to accelerate geo collection ,

22:58.430 --> 23:01.439
processing , and production . To keep

23:01.439 --> 23:03.383
pace with the ever-changing global

23:03.383 --> 23:05.920
environment , NGA must transform our

23:05.920 --> 23:08.599
capabilities and operations . We are

23:08.599 --> 23:11.439
pursuing cutting edge technology to

23:11.439 --> 23:14.000
achieve integration at operational

23:14.000 --> 23:16.439
speed and scale . Artificial

23:16.439 --> 23:19.099
intelligence is constantly evolving ,

23:19.239 --> 23:21.520
and we are committed to leveraging AI .

23:22.109 --> 23:24.670
With advanced data analytics , computer

23:24.670 --> 23:27.699
vision , and automation to maintain our

23:27.699 --> 23:30.550
competitive edge to rapidly deliver

23:30.550 --> 23:33.420
actionable intelligence . Our workforce

23:33.420 --> 23:35.339
must also transform , and as a

23:35.339 --> 23:37.760
data-centric agency , we're building

23:37.760 --> 23:40.260
the skill sets and the capabilities

23:40.260 --> 23:42.689
necessary for modern GON operations .

23:43.060 --> 23:44.949
We're developing a highly skilled

23:44.949 --> 23:46.949
workforce with a culture that truly

23:46.949 --> 23:48.893
embraces emerging technologies and

23:48.893 --> 23:52.459
innovation . Partnership remains

23:52.459 --> 23:54.570
essential to our mission success . We

23:54.570 --> 23:56.403
leverage capabilities across the

23:56.403 --> 23:58.890
intelligence community , our allies and

23:58.890 --> 24:01.459
our partners and increasingly with

24:01.459 --> 24:03.459
commercial industry and the private

24:03.459 --> 24:06.170
sector . Commercial geo capabilities

24:06.170 --> 24:08.650
are a force multiplier for NGA ,

24:08.930 --> 24:11.097
expanding our capacity to meet mission

24:11.097 --> 24:14.319
demands . NGA stands ready to deliver

24:14.319 --> 24:16.750
timely actionable GON in support of the

24:16.750 --> 24:19.000
warfighter and for the security of our

24:19.000 --> 24:22.040
nation . We remain mission focused and

24:22.040 --> 24:23.707
committed to transforming our

24:23.707 --> 24:26.079
capabilities to meet the demands of the

24:26.079 --> 24:28.560
future environment . I would like to

24:28.560 --> 24:30.338
thank the subcommittee for your

24:30.338 --> 24:32.504
leadership and your unwavering support

24:32.504 --> 24:34.227
to NGA . And I look forward to

24:34.227 --> 24:36.449
answering any of your questions in this

24:36.449 --> 24:38.449
session and in our closed session .

24:38.449 --> 24:40.782
Thank you very much . Thank you , ma'am .

24:40.782 --> 24:42.782
So we'll go to questions now . I'll

24:42.782 --> 24:45.119
start by recognizing myself , uh , for

24:45.119 --> 24:47.341
5 minutes . And what I'd like to do , I

24:47.341 --> 24:49.119
think , uh , Lieutenant General

24:49.119 --> 24:51.286
Breednkamp , you just addressed a part

24:51.286 --> 24:53.008
of my question in your opening

24:53.008 --> 24:55.175
statement . So I'll go to General Rudd

24:55.175 --> 24:57.341
and Lieutenant General Adams with this

24:57.341 --> 24:59.341
particular question , but , uh , my

24:59.341 --> 25:01.341
question revolves around , um , the

25:01.341 --> 25:03.063
amount of information that our

25:03.063 --> 25:05.008
intelligence analysts sift through

25:05.008 --> 25:07.286
continues to grow , uh , exponentially .

25:07.286 --> 25:09.341
Uh , how is the defense intelligence

25:09.341 --> 25:11.452
enterprise incorporating advancements

25:11.452 --> 25:13.619
in artificial intelligence in order to

25:13.619 --> 25:15.730
assist our intelligence personnel ? I

25:15.730 --> 25:17.897
know , uh , Lieutenant General Adams ,

25:17.897 --> 25:17.189
you talked about what the Chinese are

25:17.189 --> 25:19.609
doing . Uh , how , how are we , uh ,

25:20.069 --> 25:21.958
how are we using AI to assist our

25:21.958 --> 25:24.125
intelligence personnel and making sure

25:24.125 --> 25:26.291
they're delivering timely and accurate

25:26.291 --> 25:28.513
analysis while still providing the same

25:28.513 --> 25:30.736
level of analytic rigor and integrity ?

25:30.736 --> 25:30.270
We'll start with you , General Redden .

25:32.930 --> 25:35.041
Chairman , I , I , I appreciate the ,

25:35.041 --> 25:37.489
uh , focus and emphasis . This is , as

25:37.489 --> 25:39.656
we all know , critical technology that

25:39.656 --> 25:42.530
we have to , as , as America and as our

25:42.930 --> 25:46.170
defense intelligence community , we

25:46.170 --> 25:48.170
have to , we have to master it . We

25:48.170 --> 25:50.281
have to understand it . We have to be

25:50.281 --> 25:52.559
able to look offensively , defensively ,

25:52.559 --> 25:54.781
what are the applications with it , and

25:54.781 --> 25:57.003
I , I can tell you that that's what the

25:57.003 --> 25:56.890
men and women of NSA are doing . We've

25:56.890 --> 25:59.109
got a robust effort around this .

25:59.650 --> 26:02.959
Across a number of our efforts in the

26:02.959 --> 26:06.619
enterprise and and We ,

26:07.010 --> 26:09.010
again , day in and day out , have ,

26:09.010 --> 26:11.229
have put a very robust effort around

26:11.229 --> 26:13.396
that . That one of , you know , one of

26:13.396 --> 26:16.369
the keys to this is really making sure

26:16.369 --> 26:18.258
that we can understand it first ,

26:18.258 --> 26:20.258
figure out where the application of

26:20.258 --> 26:22.480
this , as General Adams mentioned , the

26:22.480 --> 26:24.647
adversaries are going to leverage it .

26:24.647 --> 26:26.869
And we have to , we have to be faster .

26:26.869 --> 26:28.980
We have to be able to scale it across

26:28.980 --> 26:30.702
the entirety of our department

26:30.702 --> 26:32.813
warfighting efforts , and it's got to

26:32.813 --> 26:34.609
enable how we see , sense and

26:34.609 --> 26:36.665
understand where the threats are and

26:36.665 --> 26:38.720
then how we enable direct support to

26:38.720 --> 26:40.387
the warfighters . Thank you ,

26:40.900 --> 26:43.178
Lieutenant General Adams , I'd ask you ,

26:43.178 --> 26:45.344
uh , kind of similar , but also , uh ,

26:45.344 --> 26:47.400
to ask you also , uh , an additional

26:47.400 --> 26:49.456
question of , are we , uh , I'm sure

26:49.456 --> 26:51.567
that probably within the department ,

26:51.567 --> 26:53.178
uh , the , uh , intelligence

26:53.178 --> 26:55.400
communities are working together , uh ,

26:55.400 --> 26:57.289
and sharing information . Is that

26:57.289 --> 26:59.456
happening throughout the entire . Uh ,

26:59.456 --> 27:02.035
the entire IC our , our , our efforts

27:02.035 --> 27:05.224
and advances in artificial intelligence

27:05.224 --> 27:07.354
being routinely shared so that we're

27:07.354 --> 27:09.632
not duplicating efforts and , uh , and ,

27:09.675 --> 27:11.675
and , you know , one components not

27:11.675 --> 27:13.786
learning something that would benefit

27:13.786 --> 27:16.008
everybody else that they haven't , uh ,

27:16.008 --> 27:15.755
that they haven't shared with them .

27:16.530 --> 27:18.752
Hey , Chairman Jackson , thank , thanks

27:18.752 --> 27:20.974
for the , uh , the question , and I , I

27:20.974 --> 27:23.141
echo General Rudd's comments . I would

27:23.141 --> 27:25.419
say at the Defense Intelligence Agency ,

27:25.419 --> 27:27.474
as our mission is to incorporate and

27:27.474 --> 27:29.197
consolidate a whole picture of

27:29.197 --> 27:31.474
intelligence , not just one single end ,

27:31.474 --> 27:33.308
but the , the , the foundational

27:33.308 --> 27:35.419
military intelligence collective . We

27:35.419 --> 27:37.900
take . SIGI , we take eoin , we take

27:37.900 --> 27:40.067
human and merge it all together . That

27:40.067 --> 27:42.122
is a massive amount of information .

27:42.122 --> 27:44.719
And , uh , and we have very , very good

27:45.020 --> 27:48.099
talented analysts , but they need tools

27:48.099 --> 27:49.810
for them to process all that

27:49.810 --> 27:51.754
information and produce the output

27:51.754 --> 27:53.921
that's demanded of our . Warfighter by

27:53.921 --> 27:56.319
our warfighter , by our policymakers ,

27:56.359 --> 27:59.560
and by those who acquire systems . And

27:59.560 --> 28:01.782
so at the Defense Intelligence Agency ,

28:02.270 --> 28:04.439
we recognized this a number of years

28:04.439 --> 28:07.599
ago and actually organized last year an

28:07.599 --> 28:11.000
effort . It was a pilot . Um , it was

28:11.000 --> 28:13.079
called Task Force Sabre , and we

28:13.079 --> 28:15.135
isolated a group of folks , talented

28:15.135 --> 28:17.280
folks from across all directorates

28:17.280 --> 28:20.640
inside of DIA who had expertise in

28:20.640 --> 28:22.760
analysis , expertise in collection ,

28:22.979 --> 28:25.090
expertise in science and technology ,

28:25.160 --> 28:27.560
expertise in integrating with the

28:27.560 --> 28:29.680
combatant commands , and put them

28:29.680 --> 28:32.239
together . And gave them the resources

28:32.239 --> 28:34.520
they need and access to through

28:34.520 --> 28:37.920
commercial available capabilities and

28:37.920 --> 28:40.142
some capabilities that had been piloted

28:40.142 --> 28:42.310
and pioneered at the NSA , some that

28:42.310 --> 28:44.421
had been piloted and pioneered at the

28:44.421 --> 28:47.839
CIA and looked to them to define the

28:47.839 --> 28:49.920
path for the Defense Intelligence

28:49.920 --> 28:53.020
Agency . There was a great deal at NGA

28:53.020 --> 28:55.959
that they did with , with their , their

28:55.959 --> 28:58.160
systems there in AI . And so we've

28:58.160 --> 29:00.239
merged all that together . And to

29:00.239 --> 29:02.461
answer your question , that that was at

29:02.461 --> 29:04.683
the tail end of your question , there's

29:04.683 --> 29:06.350
constant sharing and constant

29:06.350 --> 29:08.017
integration . And I think the

29:08.017 --> 29:10.183
department has done a very good job in

29:10.183 --> 29:12.239
consolidating in the CDAO . Uh , the

29:12.239 --> 29:15.300
ability to access services to prevent ,

29:15.660 --> 29:17.780
uh , vendors who have very good

29:17.780 --> 29:19.947
capabilities out there that would tend

29:19.947 --> 29:22.099
to go and sell General Rudd the same

29:22.099 --> 29:24.266
thing that they sell me that they sell

29:24.266 --> 29:26.210
General Breeding camp in different

29:26.210 --> 29:28.543
transactions for the same thing 3 times .

29:28.543 --> 29:30.488
It's been consolidated through the

29:30.488 --> 29:32.155
department , so I applaud the

29:32.155 --> 29:34.377
department in that effort . But we have

29:34.377 --> 29:36.543
since graduated the Task Force Sabre ,

29:36.543 --> 29:38.766
and we've now moved it into the defense

29:38.766 --> 29:40.988
modernization accelerator . Uh , and we

29:40.988 --> 29:43.043
will be talking to you in the budget

29:43.043 --> 29:45.210
hearings coming up . And as we proceed

29:45.210 --> 29:47.377
through , uh , this next , next budget

29:47.377 --> 29:47.192
cycle , we're looking to , to bump that

29:47.192 --> 29:49.192
up in a hub and spoke model , where

29:49.192 --> 29:51.192
we'll have a centralized repository

29:51.192 --> 29:53.511
inside of DIA for all the tools and

29:53.511 --> 29:55.622
capabilities . And then the spokes go

29:55.622 --> 29:57.844
out to the different applications . And

29:57.844 --> 30:00.072
so the analysis folks in , in DI will

30:00.072 --> 30:02.151
come and say we need a better way to

30:02.151 --> 30:05.391
process our um finished intelligence ,

30:05.472 --> 30:07.639
what tools are available . And so , So

30:07.639 --> 30:09.843
I'm excited about it . It does require

30:09.843 --> 30:12.004
not just access to technology , but

30:12.004 --> 30:14.723
upgrading , upscaling , and , and

30:14.723 --> 30:16.484
improving the knowledge of the

30:16.484 --> 30:18.651
workforce , and we have initiatives to

30:18.651 --> 30:20.817
do that as well . But it's an exciting

30:20.817 --> 30:22.928
time to be in the intelligence agency

30:22.928 --> 30:24.595
as we take advantage of these

30:24.595 --> 30:26.762
capabilities , sir . Thank you . And I

30:26.762 --> 30:26.593
know you're , you're probably working

30:26.593 --> 30:28.815
on this as well , but some of the other

30:28.815 --> 30:30.982
entities I've visited , I think one of

30:30.982 --> 30:33.204
the biggest areas for AI is obviously ,

30:33.204 --> 30:34.815
you mentioned the sources of

30:34.815 --> 30:36.871
intelligence that you're gathering .

30:36.871 --> 30:36.456
from everybody , but it is an open

30:36.456 --> 30:38.623
source , uh , there's a massive amount

30:38.623 --> 30:40.623
of stuff out in the open source now

30:40.623 --> 30:42.845
that I think would go unnoticed without

30:42.845 --> 30:45.178
the assistance of AI . Absolutely . And ,

30:45.178 --> 30:47.289
and we've seen it work , uh , go into

30:47.289 --> 30:49.536
overtime during this conflict in terms

30:49.536 --> 30:52.276
of the availability of relative

30:52.776 --> 30:54.832
important open source intelligence ,

30:54.832 --> 30:57.536
and we have through our S&T directorate ,

30:57.696 --> 30:59.696
a specific entity that's , that's

30:59.696 --> 31:01.640
designed to , to accelerate that .

31:01.640 --> 31:04.319
Postman is the kind of Development , uh ,

31:04.349 --> 31:06.405
developmental tool that they built .

31:06.405 --> 31:08.959
It's taking what was kind of an ad hoc ,

31:09.270 --> 31:11.326
uh , type of approach to open source

31:11.326 --> 31:13.326
intelligence and , and defining the

31:13.326 --> 31:15.381
tradecraft , defining the collection

31:15.381 --> 31:17.381
strategies , the requirements , and

31:17.381 --> 31:19.548
then organizing it and serializing the

31:19.548 --> 31:21.103
outputs of that open source

31:21.103 --> 31:23.103
intelligence , and it gets woven in

31:23.103 --> 31:25.159
with all the other intelligence on a

31:25.159 --> 31:27.048
daily basis . Thank you , sir . I

31:27.048 --> 31:29.326
appreciate that . And Mr . Hansel , uh ,

31:29.326 --> 31:28.979
on the , on the same topic here , could

31:28.979 --> 31:31.579
you describe how your office , um , you

31:31.579 --> 31:33.246
and your office work with the

31:33.246 --> 31:35.023
Department of War's digital and

31:35.023 --> 31:36.912
Artificial Intelligence Office to

31:36.912 --> 31:39.079
develop AI policies , uh , so that the

31:39.079 --> 31:40.635
needs of the enterprise are

31:40.635 --> 31:42.801
incorporated , incorporated into these

31:42.801 --> 31:44.912
department-wide policies , and , uh ,

31:44.912 --> 31:47.135
does recent department-wide guidance on

31:47.135 --> 31:49.099
AI allow for our intelligence

31:49.099 --> 31:51.043
components to meet the potentially

31:51.043 --> 31:53.043
unique intelligence needs that they

31:53.043 --> 31:55.989
have ? Thank you for the question ,

31:56.229 --> 31:58.390
Congressman . Uh , just to the , the

31:58.390 --> 32:00.334
last point and Congressman Crowe's

32:00.334 --> 32:02.390
point about collaboration . Uh , and

32:02.390 --> 32:04.501
why one of my priorities is to making

32:04.501 --> 32:06.779
sure we have an enterprise lens on the ,

32:06.779 --> 32:08.890
on the AI front specifically . Uh , I

32:08.890 --> 32:11.057
definitely get your point about how we

32:11.057 --> 32:10.800
address in the department , but the

32:10.800 --> 32:12.967
amount of money we're spending and the

32:12.967 --> 32:15.319
criticality of , of the effect is such

32:15.319 --> 32:17.430
that we have to coordinate seamlessly

32:17.430 --> 32:19.430
across the USG and , and in my , my

32:19.430 --> 32:21.263
dual hat role as the Director of

32:21.263 --> 32:23.319
Defense Intelligence , I , I do feel

32:23.319 --> 32:24.986
like we're , we're doing that

32:24.986 --> 32:27.319
effectively across the IC to your point ,

32:27.319 --> 32:29.319
uh , within the Department of War .

32:29.420 --> 32:31.587
This is certainly a focus , you'll see

32:31.587 --> 32:33.753
a major effort in our budget that will

32:33.753 --> 32:36.087
be reflected in the department's budget ,

32:36.087 --> 32:38.540
um , and I would say absolutely , yes ,

32:38.660 --> 32:41.500
the policy , uh , is there today , but

32:41.500 --> 32:43.780
the , the , the cycle rate of which we

32:43.780 --> 32:45.836
will have to readdress policy issues

32:45.836 --> 32:48.002
will be unprecedented . So right now ,

32:48.002 --> 32:50.339
I think , uh , the biggest challenge is

32:50.339 --> 32:52.660
making sure that we can truly share our

32:52.660 --> 32:55.000
data in a secure way that can allow us .

32:55.439 --> 32:57.606
Uh , to exploit the best insights . If

32:57.606 --> 33:00.829
we do not , if we are unable to , um ,

33:01.920 --> 33:05.719
Provide multi AI enriched insights , we

33:05.719 --> 33:07.663
will not be able to operate at the

33:07.663 --> 33:09.552
speed and scale necessary for the

33:09.552 --> 33:11.719
future fight . And so , um , to answer

33:11.719 --> 33:13.886
your question directly , yes , today ,

33:13.886 --> 33:15.997
but I think it's a , it's a continued

33:15.997 --> 33:15.979
focus that , that will have to remain

33:15.979 --> 33:18.000
throughout the adoption of the

33:18.000 --> 33:20.150
technology . Thank , thank you . I

33:20.150 --> 33:22.261
appreciate that and I agree . I think

33:22.261 --> 33:24.594
the policy has to keep up with the , uh ,

33:24.594 --> 33:26.594
with the , with the capabilities or

33:26.594 --> 33:28.761
else we won't be able to compete . And

33:28.761 --> 33:30.928
with that , I recognize Mr . Crowe for

33:30.928 --> 33:33.039
as much time as you might need . Uh ,

33:33.039 --> 33:35.094
thank you , Chairman . Um , Director

33:35.094 --> 33:37.317
Adams , I'm gonna go back to you . Um ,

33:37.317 --> 33:39.372
I know the DIA does a lot to support

33:39.372 --> 33:41.594
ongoing operations , and one of that is

33:41.594 --> 33:43.650
you , one of the , the functions you

33:43.660 --> 33:46.500
all perform is , uh , involving in the

33:46.500 --> 33:48.611
targeting process specifically . So ,

33:48.780 --> 33:50.947
can you just describe very briefly the

33:50.947 --> 33:53.099
role that DIA plays in the targeting

33:53.099 --> 33:56.770
cycle , uh , and more specifically . Uh ,

33:56.930 --> 33:59.097
these ongoing support that you provide

33:59.097 --> 34:00.708
to combatant commands during

34:00.708 --> 34:03.910
contingency operations . In in

34:03.910 --> 34:06.188
targeting , uh , yeah , yes , sir . Um ,

34:06.270 --> 34:08.437
and , uh , with regards to targeting ,

34:08.437 --> 34:11.239
it is a very specific and defined

34:11.239 --> 34:13.620
process . It's , it's outlined by two

34:13.620 --> 34:16.070
specific chairman of the Joint Chiefs

34:16.070 --> 34:18.540
instructions . One is targeting . The

34:18.540 --> 34:20.651
other is the development of no strike

34:20.651 --> 34:22.762
and collateral damage methodologies .

34:22.762 --> 34:24.929
Uh , the , the overall , and I'll just

34:24.929 --> 34:27.207
kind of hit at an enterprise-wide , uh ,

34:27.207 --> 34:29.429
view , and then I , but I can deep dive

34:29.429 --> 34:29.384
on any of the specific portions of it ,

34:29.434 --> 34:31.323
just the top level , yeah , so we

34:31.323 --> 34:33.267
maintain the foundational military

34:33.267 --> 34:35.212
database of all infrastructure and

34:35.212 --> 34:37.323
order of battle , uh , that , that is

34:37.323 --> 34:39.101
the the reference that everyone

34:39.101 --> 34:41.323
leverages and everyone ties into it and

34:41.323 --> 34:43.323
uses it and pulls from it , uh , in

34:43.323 --> 34:45.989
that . Database , the instructions , uh ,

34:45.999 --> 34:48.989
allow us to create , uh , a model . Uh ,

34:48.999 --> 34:51.438
each record has a certain BE number ,

34:51.718 --> 34:53.718
uh , and it has all the , the , the

34:53.718 --> 34:55.885
defined properties and things that you

34:55.885 --> 34:57.940
would need to know about that , that

34:57.940 --> 34:59.829
item , and it's updated regularly

34:59.829 --> 35:01.662
depending on the priority of the

35:01.662 --> 35:03.774
theater or the type of target it is .

35:03.774 --> 35:05.996
And the command commands , do they give

35:05.996 --> 35:09.019
you , um , guidelines to develop those

35:09.029 --> 35:11.307
those packages ? Like how , how do you ,

35:11.307 --> 35:13.585
what's the request ? So what's the The ,

35:13.585 --> 35:15.696
the , the poll , so to speak , so the

35:15.696 --> 35:17.862
overall poll comes from plans that are

35:17.862 --> 35:19.870
out there in terms of , um , what ,

35:19.949 --> 35:22.629
what types of targets might be needed

35:22.629 --> 35:24.851
to achieve the operational goals of the

35:24.851 --> 35:27.073
commander , uh , and then from that the

35:27.073 --> 35:29.073
database is built and then the main

35:29.073 --> 35:31.129
database is responding to or or lays

35:31.129 --> 35:33.090
over like op plans , for example ,

35:33.510 --> 35:35.709
correct ? OK . And so with that

35:35.709 --> 35:38.300
database , when a plan is beginning to

35:38.300 --> 35:41.449
be executed , that uh database is used

35:41.449 --> 35:44.149
by the combatant command to , uh , to

35:44.149 --> 35:46.482
pull what , what is in that database to ,

35:46.550 --> 35:48.494
to leverage . And then there's a a

35:48.494 --> 35:51.330
deliberate process by which we , the

35:51.330 --> 35:53.552
Defense Intelligence Agency does not do

35:53.649 --> 35:55.927
targeting , we do support to targeting .

35:55.927 --> 35:57.871
And so the targeting occurs at the

35:57.871 --> 35:59.705
combatant command . Uh , they go

35:59.705 --> 36:01.649
through their process of lining up

36:01.649 --> 36:05.260
through a variety of defined steps of

36:05.260 --> 36:07.427
how they're going to leverage the data

36:07.427 --> 36:09.427
from the database . Um , they can ,

36:09.709 --> 36:12.830
once that data is used and those lists

36:12.830 --> 36:15.629
are developed , they can request from

36:15.629 --> 36:18.040
us vetting . Not required , but it ,

36:18.159 --> 36:20.215
but what the vetting would provide ,

36:20.215 --> 36:22.326
and it's not just to us , vetting can

36:22.326 --> 36:25.909
be provided by the CIA , DIA , NGA , uh ,

36:25.919 --> 36:29.080
NSA , and it reviews and responds to

36:29.080 --> 36:31.080
the lists that they've developed on

36:31.080 --> 36:33.639
their targets . And in that we assess

36:33.639 --> 36:36.350
intel gain and loss based on what their

36:36.350 --> 36:38.183
operational plan is , as well as

36:38.183 --> 36:40.406
potential collateral damage from that .

36:40.406 --> 36:42.628
And is there any type of regular update

36:42.628 --> 36:44.850
interval or is that only in response to

36:44.850 --> 36:47.072
a request from a combatant command to .

36:47.072 --> 36:49.610
Or to to vet the database is updated

36:50.350 --> 36:52.629
regularly . And I will say you asked ,

36:52.750 --> 36:54.750
uh , you gentlemen both asked about

36:54.750 --> 36:56.861
resourcing . That's one of the things

36:56.861 --> 36:58.972
that , uh , we are most challenged at

36:58.972 --> 37:01.083
because it in our old system , MIDB ,

37:01.260 --> 37:03.590
it was a very manual process . And so

37:03.590 --> 37:05.479
we would have to prioritize using

37:05.860 --> 37:07.749
communications with the combatant

37:07.749 --> 37:10.100
commands , uh , a subset of that , and

37:10.100 --> 37:12.429
some would be , uh , updated at each

37:12.429 --> 37:14.709
target has a category on it and it has

37:14.709 --> 37:18.100
a refresh interval of 6 months , 1 year ,

37:18.199 --> 37:20.979
2 years , 5 years , no , no refresh if

37:20.979 --> 37:23.159
there's no anticipated change . And

37:23.260 --> 37:25.899
that , that's where we get behind at

37:25.899 --> 37:27.899
times and , and that's where we can

37:27.899 --> 37:30.066
actually potentially leverage not only

37:30.066 --> 37:32.232
the new foundational database , Mars ,

37:32.290 --> 37:34.346
which is a modernized database , but

37:34.346 --> 37:37.219
also , uh , automation and AI . In

37:37.219 --> 37:40.350
conjunction with that process to try to

37:40.350 --> 37:43.030
take advantage of that technology . And

37:43.030 --> 37:45.308
then once the vetting , if it's chosen ,

37:45.429 --> 37:47.669
is chosen to be done , it gets back to

37:47.669 --> 37:49.780
the combat command , and then they do

37:49.780 --> 37:51.836
the final validation . And then it's

37:51.836 --> 37:53.891
the combatant commander who puts the

37:53.891 --> 37:56.409
targets from that process on the plan

37:56.409 --> 37:59.889
and executes the plan . So , um , there

37:59.889 --> 38:02.189
are public reports about this strike on

38:02.189 --> 38:04.245
the girls' school in Iran that would

38:04.245 --> 38:06.659
indicate that it was a US strike , uh ,

38:06.699 --> 38:09.010
and it occurred because of outdated

38:09.469 --> 38:11.750
targeting , right ? That , that it was

38:11.750 --> 38:13.870
on an old targeting set that hadn't

38:13.870 --> 38:16.000
been updated . Uh , the US military

38:16.000 --> 38:17.889
thought it was one thing , it was

38:17.889 --> 38:19.944
something else . So I'm not going to

38:19.944 --> 38:22.111
ask you specifically about that strike

38:22.111 --> 38:23.944
because I know that's under 15-6

38:23.944 --> 38:26.167
investigation and uh that , that , that

38:26.167 --> 38:28.000
process will continue , but uh ,

38:28.000 --> 38:30.056
generally , how would something like

38:30.056 --> 38:32.222
that happen ? Would that just be a gap

38:32.222 --> 38:34.350
between the interval that you just

38:34.350 --> 38:36.350
described that , uh , would , would

38:36.350 --> 38:38.889
dictate the vetting and the timeline

38:38.889 --> 38:41.419
for updating the targeting ? I , I

38:41.419 --> 38:44.659
would say , uh , I am fully supporting ,

38:44.989 --> 38:47.310
uh , uh , Central Command's

38:47.310 --> 38:49.477
investigation because I want to answer

38:49.477 --> 38:52.110
to that question as well , because we

38:52.110 --> 38:54.629
have built our targeting plan and

38:54.629 --> 38:56.573
process and our orders that , that

38:56.573 --> 39:00.030
manage the process through decades of ,

39:00.149 --> 39:02.370
of work , right ? And we , I want to

39:02.370 --> 39:04.770
ensure if there is a flaw in our system ,

39:05.409 --> 39:07.631
it the , I'm guaranteed the 15 . 6 will

39:07.631 --> 39:09.798
determine that , and we will , we will

39:09.798 --> 39:12.344
fix that flaw . But as of right now , I

39:12.344 --> 39:14.824
cannot guess what the , the , the

39:14.824 --> 39:18.024
problem was or , or , or make any guess

39:18.024 --> 39:20.304
as to , or presume what the

39:20.304 --> 39:22.735
investigation might reveal . OK . And

39:22.735 --> 39:25.685
then the last question is about legal ,

39:25.945 --> 39:29.425
um , uh , legal elements like laws of

39:29.425 --> 39:31.985
war , law of armed conflict . At what

39:31.985 --> 39:35.320
point do , do targeting Uh , sets and

39:35.320 --> 39:38.800
packages get vetted for , uh , legality

39:38.800 --> 39:41.078
with the law of war . So the , the , I ,

39:41.159 --> 39:43.270
I talked about those steps . The last

39:43.270 --> 39:45.159
step I mentioned was validation .

39:45.159 --> 39:47.103
That's where operational and legal

39:47.103 --> 39:49.280
review takes place and , and , um ,

39:49.560 --> 39:51.893
whether it complies with the law of war .

39:51.893 --> 39:54.116
So that's the final step before it gets

39:54.116 --> 39:56.550
approved by the combatant command . And

39:56.550 --> 39:58.639
do you currently have any concerns

39:58.639 --> 40:00.965
about the Sourcing or capacity for is

40:00.965 --> 40:03.304
that's done by JAG officers . It's done

40:03.304 --> 40:05.145
by the , the combatant commander

40:05.145 --> 40:07.256
defines who his cell is that does his

40:07.256 --> 40:09.201
target validation . It likely will

40:09.201 --> 40:11.367
include , and , and I don't know . I ,

40:11.367 --> 40:13.478
I can get you a detailed answer as to

40:13.478 --> 40:15.645
like what the composition of that team

40:15.645 --> 40:17.423
would be , but so the combatant

40:17.423 --> 40:19.645
commanders are doing that , yes , legal

40:19.645 --> 40:21.812
review element that validation , yes ,

40:21.812 --> 40:24.089
OK . And , and sitting here today , uh ,

40:24.089 --> 40:26.034
I know you're not at the combatant

40:26.034 --> 40:28.312
command level , but sitting here today ,

40:28.312 --> 40:30.534
are you aware of any concerns that have

40:30.534 --> 40:32.756
been raised in the last 6 months , uh ,

40:32.756 --> 40:34.756
by any of those cells , uh , any of

40:34.756 --> 40:36.701
those JAG officers involved , uh ,

40:36.701 --> 40:38.534
about , um , the legality of any

40:38.540 --> 40:40.780
targeting sets ? I am not , sir . No .

40:40.870 --> 40:42.870
OK . All right , thank you . You're

40:42.870 --> 40:45.530
back . Thank you , Mr . Amade . You're

40:45.530 --> 40:47.697
recognized for 5 minutes . Thank you ,

40:47.697 --> 40:49.879
Chairman . The 2026 annual threat

40:49.879 --> 40:51.823
assessment highlights intensifying

40:51.823 --> 40:54.530
competition with China and ongoing

40:54.530 --> 40:56.697
conflict with Iran . We are positioned

40:56.697 --> 40:58.586
to meet these challenges , but it

40:58.586 --> 41:00.252
requires fully resourcing our

41:00.252 --> 41:02.197
intelligence agencies and aligning

41:02.197 --> 41:04.363
every dollar with the national defense

41:04.363 --> 41:06.363
strategy . We must make disciplined

41:06.363 --> 41:08.197
choices without compromising the

41:08.197 --> 41:08.090
presence , responsiveness , and

41:08.090 --> 41:10.312
regional coverage our commanders depend

41:10.312 --> 41:13.780
on . Many point to AI as a way to . To

41:13.780 --> 41:16.002
do more with fewer people , and it is a

41:16.002 --> 41:18.224
powerful force multiplier , but we know

41:18.224 --> 41:20.580
it has its limitations . As we

41:20.580 --> 41:22.747
integrate new technologies , we should

41:22.747 --> 41:24.247
not trade away the skilled

41:24.247 --> 41:26.302
professionals and the human eyes and

41:26.302 --> 41:28.302
ears , whose judgment and expertise

41:28.302 --> 41:30.524
allows us to anticipate and prevent the

41:30.524 --> 41:32.691
next global crisis before it unfolds .

41:34.080 --> 41:37.439
General Brandenkamp , adversaries like

41:37.439 --> 41:39.679
China and Russia now have near instant

41:39.679 --> 41:41.346
access to the same commercial

41:41.346 --> 41:43.780
high-resolution imagery the US uses .

41:44.159 --> 41:46.080
How is the National Geospatial

41:46.080 --> 41:47.913
Intelligence Agency evolving its

41:47.913 --> 41:49.913
tradecraft to ensure that even with

41:49.913 --> 41:52.136
identical raw data , the US maintains a

41:52.136 --> 41:54.191
superior decision advantage over its

41:54.191 --> 41:57.739
facing threats ? Congressman , thank

41:57.739 --> 41:59.739
you for the question and absolutely

41:59.739 --> 42:01.961
that is something that we're absolutely

42:01.961 --> 42:05.209
uh looking into and executing , uh ,

42:05.219 --> 42:06.830
changes and transformational

42:06.830 --> 42:08.830
initiatives , right , on how we set

42:08.830 --> 42:12.060
ourselves apart from how , uh , I would

42:12.060 --> 42:13.860
say private sector industry are

42:13.860 --> 42:16.600
executing their , um , imagery

42:16.820 --> 42:18.987
collection operations . The tradecraft

42:18.987 --> 42:21.439
that I think specifically for NGA that

42:21.439 --> 42:23.606
we're having to leverage is we do have

42:23.606 --> 42:25.550
to leverage much more on the , the

42:25.550 --> 42:27.439
technology side than we've had to

42:27.439 --> 42:29.606
historically . Um , I know we've had a

42:29.606 --> 42:31.760
lot of discussion about AIML , um ,

42:32.040 --> 42:34.149
computer vision , new technologies ,

42:34.239 --> 42:37.840
but those , um , critical technologies

42:37.840 --> 42:41.780
and elements are essential for the way

42:41.879 --> 42:44.479
we execute our mission in NGA not only

42:44.479 --> 42:46.701
today , but I would say even more so in

42:46.701 --> 42:48.868
the future . And we have to take those

42:48.868 --> 42:51.219
technologies and inculcate those into

42:51.219 --> 42:53.899
our tradecraft and our methodologies in

42:53.899 --> 42:56.300
terms of how we not only do that for

42:56.300 --> 42:59.820
tasking , um , the sensors , but also

42:59.820 --> 43:02.300
how we integrate that into our

43:02.300 --> 43:06.260
processing . Um , also in our analytics ,

43:06.550 --> 43:09.270
um , in our dissemination at various

43:09.270 --> 43:11.214
classified levels or classified or

43:11.214 --> 43:13.909
unclassified levels , um , for not only

43:13.909 --> 43:15.520
our war fighters but for our

43:15.520 --> 43:17.631
policymakers and for our partners and

43:17.631 --> 43:19.709
allies that are out there , um , so

43:19.709 --> 43:22.290
that's one area that I would say , um ,

43:22.350 --> 43:24.350
is how we're leveraging those

43:24.350 --> 43:26.590
technologies and inculcating that into

43:26.590 --> 43:29.030
our tradecraft and how we do more of

43:29.030 --> 43:32.020
the high-end . Um , national technical

43:32.020 --> 43:34.820
means and , uh , and geospatial

43:34.820 --> 43:37.080
intelligence , whether it's collect

43:37.080 --> 43:40.639
analysis or production for our agency

43:41.219 --> 43:43.275
and that'll maintain our competitive

43:43.275 --> 43:45.510
advantage . And some other areas ,

43:45.709 --> 43:47.931
Congressman , that um I would ask if we

43:47.931 --> 43:49.987
could talk those in closed session .

43:51.560 --> 43:53.671
Thank you . And you've emphasized the

43:53.671 --> 43:55.838
NGA doesn't look at physical terrain ,

43:55.838 --> 43:58.004
it also looks at human geography where

43:58.004 --> 44:00.282
people get their water , how they vote ,

44:00.282 --> 44:00.110
religious or ethnic identities . Can

44:00.110 --> 44:02.054
you explain why that's important ?

44:02.969 --> 44:05.929
Absolutely those elements actually

44:05.929 --> 44:09.050
provide much of the context that enable

44:09.050 --> 44:10.883
not only our warfighters but our

44:10.883 --> 44:13.330
nationally national policymakers to

44:13.330 --> 44:15.780
understand . Just the , the global

44:15.780 --> 44:18.040
perspective and the human dimension

44:18.040 --> 44:20.879
that affects whether it's the economy

44:20.879 --> 44:23.580
that can impact a nation , whether it's

44:23.580 --> 44:26.820
the economic resources that will also

44:26.820 --> 44:28.979
impact the nation or a war fighting

44:28.979 --> 44:31.620
element for an adversary , and so we do

44:31.620 --> 44:34.020
take those particular areas into

44:34.020 --> 44:36.540
account and we layer those in with a

44:36.540 --> 44:39.649
number of our other . Um , geospatial

44:39.649 --> 44:43.100
intelligence , components to then paint

44:43.100 --> 44:46.500
that fuller picture for the warfighters

44:46.500 --> 44:49.100
as well as the policymakers to clearly

44:49.100 --> 44:51.322
understand the geopolitical environment

44:51.322 --> 44:53.790
and I would say the global world that

44:53.790 --> 44:55.846
we have to operate in holistically .

44:55.939 --> 44:58.719
Thank you and Secretary . The

44:58.719 --> 45:00.775
intelligence community's 2026 annual

45:00.775 --> 45:02.719
threat assessment makes clear that

45:02.719 --> 45:04.941
China , Russia , Iran , North Korea all

45:04.941 --> 45:07.108
want to undermine America's America as

45:07.108 --> 45:09.052
a superpower , but says that their

45:09.052 --> 45:10.719
partnership remains shallow ,

45:10.719 --> 45:12.941
transactional , undermined by competing

45:12.941 --> 45:14.775
strategic goals . And how is our

45:14.775 --> 45:14.310
defense intelligence enterprise

45:14.310 --> 45:16.199
exploiting our enemies' divergent

45:16.199 --> 45:18.366
interests to prevent them from forming

45:18.366 --> 45:20.532
a unified military alliance to make it

45:20.532 --> 45:23.899
more difficult to stop ? Congressman ,

45:24.169 --> 45:26.113
er , in this , in this session , I

45:26.113 --> 45:27.780
would just say that um we are

45:27.780 --> 45:29.391
constantly ensuring that the

45:29.391 --> 45:31.379
intelligence collected informs our

45:31.379 --> 45:35.179
diplomatic process er with uh globally

45:35.179 --> 45:37.719
and informs all of our strategies and

45:38.060 --> 45:40.060
uh in a follow on session , I'd be

45:40.060 --> 45:42.449
happy to provide details . Thank you .

45:42.530 --> 45:44.600
I yelled back . Mr . Ryan , you

45:44.600 --> 45:46.767
recognized for 5 minutes . Thank you ,

45:46.770 --> 45:49.120
Mr . Chair . Uh , thank you all for

45:49.129 --> 45:51.296
being here , the work you're doing and

45:51.296 --> 45:53.462
the work you've done over each of your

45:53.462 --> 45:55.740
careers in , in service to our country .

45:55.740 --> 45:57.407
Um , I wanna start with you ,

45:57.407 --> 45:59.462
Undersecretary , uh , Something I've

45:59.462 --> 46:01.296
been working on that I know is a

46:01.296 --> 46:03.129
priority for you as well is SCIF

46:03.129 --> 46:05.240
accreditation , speeding up , getting

46:05.240 --> 46:07.540
great , the best of American commercial

46:07.540 --> 46:09.596
technology to serve all of , all the

46:09.596 --> 46:11.707
mission needs that we've talked about

46:11.707 --> 46:14.040
and everybody's sort of alluded to this .

46:14.040 --> 46:16.207
Um , we've been trying to work on this

46:16.207 --> 46:18.429
in the NDAA . Last , last year , we had

46:18.429 --> 46:18.300
a provision to address this ,

46:18.379 --> 46:20.157
ultimately directing , uh , the

46:20.157 --> 46:22.379
department to report on the feasibility

46:22.379 --> 46:24.546
of accelerating , uh , construction of

46:24.546 --> 46:26.657
SCIFs and accreditation . And then in

46:26.657 --> 46:28.879
2025 , uh , worked on a requirement for

46:28.879 --> 46:30.935
a pilot program for access to shared

46:30.935 --> 46:33.101
classified commercial infrastructure .

46:33.101 --> 46:35.157
I know this is something that , um ,

46:35.157 --> 46:37.323
rightly , uh , that the administration

46:37.323 --> 46:39.546
is prioritizing it as well . How's that

46:39.546 --> 46:41.601
going ? What else can we do to speed

46:41.601 --> 46:40.959
this up ? It's one of the biggest pain

46:40.959 --> 46:43.237
points that I'm sure you all hear from ,

46:43.237 --> 46:45.919
that we hear from , um , and just a

46:45.919 --> 46:47.808
quick high-level update on that ,

46:47.808 --> 46:49.919
please . Absolutely , Congressman , I

46:49.919 --> 46:51.949
would just say it often goes over

46:51.949 --> 46:53.782
unnoticed , but it's an absolute

46:53.782 --> 46:55.893
critical element of supercharging our

46:55.893 --> 46:58.116
dip . Not only will we have to increase

46:58.116 --> 47:00.338
the volume of providers , but the , the

47:00.338 --> 47:02.060
composition of the defense and

47:02.060 --> 47:04.116
industrial base will have to include

47:04.116 --> 47:04.080
more non-traditional players . And so

47:04.439 --> 47:06.606
our speed to service , we , we have to

47:06.606 --> 47:08.520
be a , a good partner in bringing

47:08.520 --> 47:10.576
non-traditional players rapidly into

47:10.576 --> 47:12.631
the ecosystem . I think , I think it

47:12.631 --> 47:14.853
comes down to two parts , Congressman .

47:14.853 --> 47:16.964
First , we can certainly do more with

47:16.964 --> 47:19.187
the existing . Um , process , it , it's

47:19.187 --> 47:21.076
a passion of mine to make sure we

47:21.076 --> 47:23.076
achieve efficiencies here . I think

47:23.076 --> 47:25.242
there's synergies between the SAPF and

47:25.242 --> 47:27.464
SCIF accreditation , uh , process , and

47:27.464 --> 47:29.298
there's synergies across all the

47:29.298 --> 47:31.242
accreditators to make sure we're ,

47:31.242 --> 47:33.409
we're we're maximizing what we can get

47:33.409 --> 47:33.389
out of our current investment . That

47:33.389 --> 47:35.445
won't be enough . We have to think .

47:35.445 --> 47:37.556
Innovatively about what options exist

47:37.820 --> 47:40.300
between nothing and a full legacy acc

47:40.300 --> 47:43.989
acc accredited SCIF or FCL . Um ,

47:44.060 --> 47:46.227
there's a pilot program going on and I

47:46.227 --> 47:48.393
think , uh , SCIF as a service or some

47:48.393 --> 47:50.449
of the commercial options or smaller

47:50.449 --> 47:52.560
options are certainly something we'll

47:52.560 --> 47:52.300
have to integrate in our overall

47:52.300 --> 47:55.199
strategy . Agree and again appreciate

47:55.199 --> 47:57.199
the leadership on this and anything

47:57.199 --> 47:59.366
that we can be doing as a subcommittee

47:59.366 --> 48:01.032
and a committee . Um , I know

48:01.032 --> 48:02.977
colleagues as well on a bipartisan

48:02.977 --> 48:05.143
basis , uh , agree on this . So please

48:05.143 --> 48:07.310
let us know , especially coming into ,

48:07.310 --> 48:09.366
um , into this cycle . Uh , shifting

48:09.366 --> 48:11.532
gears a little bit , uh , I , I wanted

48:11.532 --> 48:13.532
to ask , It , it , it is a delicate

48:13.532 --> 48:15.755
subject , but I think it is important .

48:15.755 --> 48:17.643
Uh , I was a very junior military

48:17.643 --> 48:19.810
intelligence officer , uh , lowly army

48:19.810 --> 48:21.755
captain , but , um , it was always

48:21.755 --> 48:23.643
foundational to us that our , our

48:23.643 --> 48:26.080
analyses were fully objective , uh ,

48:26.129 --> 48:28.929
and no biases , particularly any

48:28.929 --> 48:31.050
political influence in assessments ,

48:31.090 --> 48:33.129
whether for tactical operations or

48:33.129 --> 48:35.310
certainly strategic . Um ,

48:35.330 --> 48:37.552
Undersecretary , can you talk about why

48:37.552 --> 48:39.663
General Cruz was fired on August 22nd

48:39.663 --> 48:40.489
of 2025 ?

48:43.659 --> 48:45.939
I , I , I , I , I am aware of why Jane

48:45.939 --> 48:47.883
Cruz , you were in the job at that

48:47.883 --> 48:49.939
point , right ? I think you had just

48:49.939 --> 48:52.139
started , yes . I , I , I am aware of

48:52.139 --> 48:54.472
the , uh , circumstances surrounding it ,

48:54.472 --> 48:56.583
but I don't think it'd be appropriate

48:56.583 --> 48:56.169
in an open hearing to discuss the

48:56.169 --> 48:58.225
details . Well , the only reason I'm

48:58.225 --> 49:00.336
asking in the hearing , and I'm happy

49:00.336 --> 49:02.613
to follow up on , I guess , classified ,

49:02.613 --> 49:02.459
even though it shouldn't be classified ,

49:02.570 --> 49:05.379
but there's been no explanation

49:05.379 --> 49:08.780
provided , and I think given what then

49:08.780 --> 49:11.250
followed after the The , the , the best

49:11.250 --> 49:13.306
public explanation we have heard was

49:13.306 --> 49:15.083
that there was concern about an

49:15.083 --> 49:17.194
assessment from the agency related to

49:17.194 --> 49:19.770
the level of destruction or as the

49:19.770 --> 49:21.937
president said obliteration of Iranian

49:21.937 --> 49:24.550
nuclear sites in June . Obviously a

49:24.550 --> 49:26.606
very delicate , complex assessment ,

49:26.909 --> 49:28.965
but the timing there , I think for a

49:28.965 --> 49:31.500
lot of us so concern about sending

49:31.500 --> 49:35.110
messages about assessments . Um , and

49:35.110 --> 49:37.166
then of course , what's going on now

49:37.166 --> 49:39.550
bleeding into that . Um , so maybe I'll

49:39.550 --> 49:42.350
just ask , uh , each of our uniformed

49:42.350 --> 49:44.628
leaders to just reaffirm on the record ,

49:44.628 --> 49:46.572
please , your , your commitment to

49:46.572 --> 49:49.149
ensuring that your analysis are

49:49.149 --> 49:51.038
objective , apolitical , and that

49:51.038 --> 49:53.371
you're giving your best military advice ,

49:53.371 --> 49:55.482
uh , when it comes to these matters ,

49:55.482 --> 49:57.593
um , particularly as we're engaged in

49:57.593 --> 50:00.439
combat General Rudd . Congressman ,

50:00.560 --> 50:02.782
that's exactly what we're doing . Thank

50:02.782 --> 50:05.030
you , sir . Absolutely , and it's

50:05.030 --> 50:07.086
written in our tradecraft , uh , and

50:07.086 --> 50:09.363
it's , and it's followed by our people ,

50:09.363 --> 50:12.300
absolutely . Absolutely , Congressman ,

50:12.899 --> 50:15.540
thank you . And again I'm asking , I've

50:15.540 --> 50:17.484
heard a multitude of concerns from

50:17.484 --> 50:19.707
folks in the force about this and would

50:19.707 --> 50:21.762
encourage that , you know , I'm sure

50:21.762 --> 50:23.707
you're handling this at some level

50:23.707 --> 50:25.984
internally in your formations , but Um ,

50:25.984 --> 50:28.040
it's just foundational to our safety

50:28.040 --> 50:30.629
and to the trust , and , um , I , I

50:30.629 --> 50:32.740
would welcome further clarification .

50:32.740 --> 50:34.851
We in Congress have been given none ,

50:34.851 --> 50:37.229
including classified briefings , and I

50:37.229 --> 50:39.340
think that should be a concern that's

50:39.340 --> 50:41.229
not partisan , but that is , uh ,

50:41.229 --> 50:43.396
objective . So , uh , thanks and happy

50:43.396 --> 50:45.673
to follow up and I'll , I'll yell back .

50:45.673 --> 50:48.007
Thank you , Mr . Nor for 5 minutes . Uh ,

50:48.007 --> 50:49.896
Mr . Chairman , I do not have any

50:49.896 --> 50:52.229
questions for an open session . I yield .

50:52.229 --> 50:54.007
Thank you , Mr . Train . You're

50:54.007 --> 50:56.173
recognized for 5 minutes . Thank you ,

50:56.173 --> 50:58.285
Chairman . Thank you , ranking member

50:58.285 --> 50:57.830
for today's hearing . Uh , thank you

50:57.830 --> 50:59.886
for all the witnesses for being here

50:59.886 --> 51:01.663
and General Rudd , it was great

51:01.663 --> 51:03.886
speaking to you last Thursday . I would

51:03.886 --> 51:05.886
like to again begin my testimony by

51:05.886 --> 51:07.997
acknowledging the service members who

51:07.997 --> 51:09.830
have been killed in Iran and the

51:09.830 --> 51:11.997
hundreds more who have been injured as

51:11.997 --> 51:13.941
a result of this war . My thoughts

51:13.941 --> 51:13.830
remain with their families and the

51:13.830 --> 51:15.941
military families missing their loved

51:15.941 --> 51:17.774
ones . When our men and women in

51:17.774 --> 51:19.886
uniform are sent into a conflict , it

51:19.886 --> 51:21.997
is the responsibility of our military

51:21.997 --> 51:23.941
leaders to protect them , and that

51:23.941 --> 51:26.108
cannot happen without the intelligence

51:26.108 --> 51:28.274
community . The fundamental purpose of

51:28.274 --> 51:30.441
our defense intelligence enterprise is

51:30.441 --> 51:32.441
to keep our people safe , either to

51:32.441 --> 51:34.330
give our service members the best

51:34.330 --> 51:36.497
possible picture about what they're up

51:36.497 --> 51:38.608
against or to neutralize threats that

51:38.608 --> 51:40.663
everyday Americans never had to know

51:40.663 --> 51:42.886
about . Most of this work is behind the

51:42.886 --> 51:45.108
scenes , but it is an essential part of

51:45.108 --> 51:47.330
what our national security and national

51:47.330 --> 51:50.560
defense does . That is why it is so

51:50.560 --> 51:52.616
important that our national security

51:52.616 --> 51:54.449
officials have the best possible

51:54.449 --> 51:56.504
information and why I , I introduced

51:56.504 --> 51:58.838
along with my colleagues , Rep Perrigan ,

51:58.838 --> 52:01.004
Strickland , and Bacon , the Combating

52:01.004 --> 52:03.227
Chinese Communist Party Influence Act .

52:03.227 --> 52:04.782
This bill would require the

52:04.782 --> 52:06.782
intelligence community community to

52:06.782 --> 52:08.838
produce a comprehensive report about

52:08.838 --> 52:10.949
the CCP's growing presence across the

52:10.949 --> 52:12.893
world and provide our intelligence

52:12.893 --> 52:15.070
community with a clear evidence-based

52:15.070 --> 52:17.510
picture about the CCP's threat to

52:17.510 --> 52:20.070
American security , our alliances , and

52:20.070 --> 52:22.919
our economic interests . My first

52:22.919 --> 52:25.189
question to Lieutenant General Adams ,

52:25.600 --> 52:28.000
how would a comprehensive interagency

52:28.000 --> 52:30.360
report on the growing threat of the CCP

52:30.360 --> 52:32.560
improve coordination among the defense

52:32.560 --> 52:34.760
intelligence enterprise and support

52:34.760 --> 52:38.010
special operations moving forward ? Uh ,

52:38.250 --> 52:40.472
Congressman , thanks for the question .

52:40.472 --> 52:42.694
And I , I hope that the requirement for

52:42.694 --> 52:44.583
the report , uh , allows it to be

52:44.583 --> 52:47.149
written in a classified , uh , format ,

52:47.179 --> 52:49.401
because there are many reports that are

52:49.419 --> 52:51.820
generated , uh , along this theme , if

52:51.820 --> 52:54.620
you will , uh , that , that are put

52:54.620 --> 52:56.898
together in an unclassified format and ,

52:56.899 --> 52:59.370
and you , you really need to talk , uh ,

52:59.459 --> 53:01.459
at a classified level to get to the

53:01.459 --> 53:03.292
true nature . I think to respond

53:03.292 --> 53:05.348
specifically to your question , uh ,

53:05.348 --> 53:07.348
right now , the integration is very

53:07.348 --> 53:09.459
tight . Uh , it would only tighten it

53:09.459 --> 53:11.626
and it would allow us to , uh , refine

53:11.626 --> 53:14.500
our planning , refine our approach to ,

53:14.510 --> 53:16.788
uh , countering China , and , uh , and ,

53:16.788 --> 53:19.189
uh , and align , uh , efforts to

53:19.189 --> 53:21.133
magnify them and also to eliminate

53:21.133 --> 53:23.245
redundancies . Great . And to address

53:23.245 --> 53:25.356
what you just brought up , there will

53:25.356 --> 53:27.300
be a classified annex to it . Uh ,

53:27.300 --> 53:29.300
General Rudd , how might , uh , the

53:29.300 --> 53:31.522
National Security Agency benefit from a

53:31.522 --> 53:31.510
comprehensive report about the growing

53:31.510 --> 53:35.260
CCP threat ? Congressman ,

53:35.379 --> 53:37.490
certainly , uh , anything that took ,

53:37.580 --> 53:41.060
takes a holistic look at the , the ,

53:41.120 --> 53:43.287
the pacing challenge that we thread is

53:43.287 --> 53:45.453
going to be beneficial to , to all the

53:45.453 --> 53:47.453
members of this , this team and the

53:47.453 --> 53:49.509
colleagues , and certainly , uh , we

53:49.509 --> 53:51.231
welcome it . Thank you . And I

53:51.231 --> 53:53.231
appreciate many of my colleagues in

53:53.231 --> 53:55.342
bringing up AI today . Uh , I want to

53:55.342 --> 53:57.564
build on that , those questions . Why I

53:57.564 --> 53:59.676
think we can all agree that AI can be

53:59.676 --> 54:01.676
powerful , a powerful tool , I hope

54:01.676 --> 54:03.842
that we can also agree that guardrails

54:03.842 --> 54:05.787
are essential to protect sensitive

54:05.787 --> 54:08.009
intelligence . Uh , information and the

54:08.009 --> 54:07.889
service members responsible for

54:07.889 --> 54:10.399
executing missions aided by AI . Uh ,

54:10.489 --> 54:12.600
General Rudd , how does Cyber Command

54:12.600 --> 54:14.489
protect against AI attacks by our

54:14.489 --> 54:16.545
adversaries ? Following up on that ,

54:16.545 --> 54:18.378
how can the defense intelligence

54:18.378 --> 54:20.211
enterprise improve cybersecurity

54:20.211 --> 54:22.156
specifically as it relates to AI ?

54:23.870 --> 54:25.814
Congressman , I , I appreciate the

54:25.814 --> 54:27.814
question . Uh , clearly it's , it's

54:27.814 --> 54:29.926
something that you would expect us to

54:29.926 --> 54:32.370
be focused heavily on and ensuring that

54:32.370 --> 54:34.570
we're ahead of our adversary on their

54:34.570 --> 54:37.169
use of critical technology such as AI

54:37.169 --> 54:39.969
and uh . The specifics and details

54:39.969 --> 54:42.129
probably more appropriate in a in a

54:42.129 --> 54:44.296
classified setting , but I , I , I can

54:44.296 --> 54:46.199
reassure you that uh . The , the

54:46.199 --> 54:48.032
principles that I outlined in my

54:48.032 --> 54:50.032
opening statement , speed , scale ,

54:50.032 --> 54:52.032
innovation , and integration , they

54:52.032 --> 54:54.199
apply absolutely to this mission space

54:54.199 --> 54:56.477
as well as everything that we're doing .

54:56.477 --> 54:58.588
So what , what I can tell you in this

54:58.588 --> 55:00.699
setting , we're moving very fast , as

55:00.699 --> 55:02.889
fast as we can to address it . We're

55:02.889 --> 55:05.000
going to look at the scale of it both

55:05.000 --> 55:07.649
on offense , defense from a red team ,

55:07.760 --> 55:10.050
from a blue team , and uh figure out

55:10.050 --> 55:12.280
the most creative , innovative ways to

55:12.370 --> 55:14.830
tackle the problem . And of course it's

55:14.830 --> 55:16.886
got to be integrated with the entire

55:16.886 --> 55:18.719
joint force in support of of the

55:18.719 --> 55:20.774
warfighter . Thank you , General and

55:20.774 --> 55:22.886
Secretary Hansel , if an AI generated

55:22.886 --> 55:25.108
intelligence assessment turns out to be

55:25.108 --> 55:27.274
wrong and leads to a bad decision that

55:27.274 --> 55:29.608
endangers a service member or a mission ,

55:29.608 --> 55:31.608
is there a policy at the department

55:31.608 --> 55:33.663
that tells us who is accountable for

55:33.663 --> 55:36.800
that mistake ? Congressman , there's

55:36.800 --> 55:39.110
certainly accountability at at at every

55:39.110 --> 55:41.919
echelon for all of our uh policy

55:41.919 --> 55:44.040
decisions , and I would just say that

55:44.040 --> 55:47.120
as the capability enhances and that we

55:47.120 --> 55:49.342
integrate it deeper and deeper into our

55:49.342 --> 55:51.620
systems , we are refining the policies ,

55:51.620 --> 55:53.509
um , because I , we , I certainly

55:53.509 --> 55:56.239
recognize a , a new set of issues will ,

55:56.360 --> 55:58.600
will , will emerge that don't exist

55:58.600 --> 56:00.267
today , namely , my other has

56:00.267 --> 56:02.433
Undersecretary for Secure Intelligence

56:02.433 --> 56:04.322
and Security . Um , a , a slew of

56:04.322 --> 56:07.560
security issues , uh , will , um , will

56:07.560 --> 56:10.310
emerge as we rapidly adapt , uh , uh ,

56:10.360 --> 56:12.760
implement the technology , and , and so

56:12.760 --> 56:14.816
similar to my prior answer , I would

56:14.816 --> 56:18.389
say , um . Yes , today , and we need to

56:18.389 --> 56:20.800
continually update it as the structure

56:20.800 --> 56:22.856
changes , uh , with the technology .

56:22.856 --> 56:24.911
Thank you , Secretary . My time's up

56:24.911 --> 56:27.244
and I yield back , Chairman . Thank you ,

56:27.244 --> 56:26.949
uh , Mr . Luttrell . You're recognized

56:26.949 --> 56:30.479
for 5 minutes . Apologies for my

56:30.479 --> 56:32.590
tardiness , Mr . Chairman . I'm gonna

56:32.590 --> 56:34.757
hold off to the class right here . You

56:34.757 --> 56:36.923
got it . OK , I actually have one more

56:36.923 --> 56:39.257
quick question I want to ask real quick ,

56:39.257 --> 56:41.479
uh , and I would ask this of our active

56:41.479 --> 56:41.320
duty General , Lieutenant General ,

56:41.439 --> 56:44.149
Lieutenant General , uh , just , um . I ,

56:44.189 --> 56:46.300
I was , I was curious , you know , in

56:46.300 --> 56:48.356
the one of the key priorities in the

56:48.356 --> 56:50.522
National Defense strategy is increased

56:50.522 --> 56:52.689
burden sharing with our allies and our

56:52.689 --> 56:54.967
partners . And I was just curious , uh ,

56:54.967 --> 56:57.189
is that taking place at the appropriate

56:57.189 --> 56:59.411
level ? Are we sharing information with

56:59.411 --> 57:01.633
our partners and our allies and equally

57:01.633 --> 57:03.689
important , I guess my question is ,

57:03.689 --> 57:05.689
are our allies and partners sharing

57:05.689 --> 57:05.669
intel with us at an appropriate level ,

57:07.370 --> 57:09.648
General Rudd or whoever wants to start .

57:10.320 --> 57:12.669
Chairman , uh , I appreciate that , uh ,

57:13.360 --> 57:16.060
question . I , I would caveat it with ,

57:16.600 --> 57:18.679
take it , consider the fact that I'm

57:18.679 --> 57:20.846
not quite 30 days in the , in the role

57:20.846 --> 57:22.820
yet , so the entirety of our

57:23.080 --> 57:25.302
relationship to partnership still to be

57:25.302 --> 57:27.413
explored , but what I've seen to date

57:27.413 --> 57:29.459
and especially As you look at the

57:29.459 --> 57:31.939
current efforts to support CETCOM in ,

57:32.419 --> 57:34.530
in this , in this conflict that we're

57:34.530 --> 57:38.500
in , um . Really unbelievable teamwork

57:38.500 --> 57:40.560
across a host of partners , uh , to

57:40.560 --> 57:43.120
enable us to do that . So I , I think

57:43.120 --> 57:45.231
the short answer is yes . I think the

57:45.231 --> 57:47.287
first piece of that though really is

57:47.820 --> 57:49.320
Inextricably linked to the

57:49.320 --> 57:52.260
relationships and NSA and Cybercom both

57:52.260 --> 57:54.500
have a long history of deep

57:54.500 --> 57:56.611
relationships with a number of allies

57:56.611 --> 57:58.500
and partners across the globe and

57:58.500 --> 58:00.667
certainly we'll we'll look to build on

58:00.667 --> 58:02.833
that as we execute the priority within

58:02.833 --> 58:05.219
the strategies to enable them to do

58:05.219 --> 58:08.699
more . Thank you , sir . Mr . Chairman ,

58:08.780 --> 58:11.340
um , on the 11th of February , I

58:11.340 --> 58:14.139
checked in the DIA as the director at

58:14.139 --> 58:17.020
8:00 a.m. and on 11:00 a.m. I was on a

58:17.020 --> 58:20.340
talent call with uh the IDI director of

58:20.340 --> 58:23.860
Israel . And throughout the nearly a

58:23.860 --> 58:26.138
little over 2 months' time , I've been ,

58:26.260 --> 58:29.360
uh , on the job , I have had constant ,

58:29.860 --> 58:32.689
valuable , important sharing

58:32.689 --> 58:35.379
conversations with not just Israel ,

58:35.580 --> 58:37.802
but our Five Eyes partners and beyond .

58:37.870 --> 58:39.759
And uh it's only been a couple of

58:39.759 --> 58:41.759
months and we already have plans to

58:41.759 --> 58:44.790
visit with uh additional uh directors

58:44.790 --> 58:47.012
of intelligence around the world . Uh ,

58:47.100 --> 58:49.510
each of our partners , you , you talked

58:49.510 --> 58:51.750
about burden sharing . Each of our

58:51.750 --> 58:54.129
partners has a variety of authorities

58:54.310 --> 58:57.330
and capabilities that some exceed ours

58:57.550 --> 59:00.570
and some are less than ours . And it's

59:00.570 --> 59:02.237
the combination and the , the

59:02.237 --> 59:04.800
interwoven , uh , mix of all those

59:04.800 --> 59:06.967
authorities and capabilities that make

59:06.967 --> 59:08.967
us more powerful . Uh , I would say

59:09.209 --> 59:11.570
this crisis has , has increased the

59:11.570 --> 59:13.792
amount of conversations I've had in the

59:13.792 --> 59:16.209
sharing of information both from allies

59:16.209 --> 59:18.810
to me and from us to them , uh , to

59:18.810 --> 59:20.810
ensure that we're successful on the

59:20.810 --> 59:23.143
battlefield . I have a two-star general ,

59:23.143 --> 59:25.032
uh , who works for me in my front

59:25.032 --> 59:27.199
office , who's the deputy director for

59:27.199 --> 59:29.477
coalition integration from Canada . Uh ,

59:29.477 --> 59:32.250
and so , um , I think that it's never

59:32.250 --> 59:34.417
been more powerful , uh , particularly

59:34.417 --> 59:36.583
with the Five Eyes , but beyond that .

59:36.583 --> 59:38.861
So , yes , yes , sir . Thank you , sir ,

59:38.861 --> 59:40.917
ma'am . Yes , Chairman , um , burden

59:40.917 --> 59:43.479
sharing is , uh , absolutely happening ,

59:43.489 --> 59:45.729
and I will say , uh , depending on the

59:45.729 --> 59:47.785
ally and the partner , the scope and

59:47.785 --> 59:49.785
the scale is different , but what I

59:49.785 --> 59:51.951
have seen , especially with the , uh ,

59:51.951 --> 59:54.062
the effort coming out of the national

59:54.062 --> 59:56.173
defense strategy and the guidance and

59:56.173 --> 59:58.285
the direction that's been provided to

59:58.285 --> 59:58.250
us , it's given us the ability to

59:58.250 --> 01:00:00.439
really engage , and we've seen

01:00:00.439 --> 01:00:02.550
tremendous , uh , results from that .

01:00:02.550 --> 01:00:04.717
Um , I do have some vignettes and some

01:00:04.717 --> 01:00:06.661
statistics I can share in a closed

01:00:06.661 --> 01:00:08.661
forum . Um , but I think , uh , the

01:00:08.661 --> 01:00:11.590
reciprocal , uh , uh , approach that we

01:00:11.590 --> 01:00:13.701
have with sharing with our allies and

01:00:13.701 --> 01:00:15.919
partners and them also providing with

01:00:15.919 --> 01:00:18.100
their capabilities , not just on the

01:00:18.100 --> 01:00:20.267
intelligence side , but even even from

01:00:20.267 --> 01:00:22.649
a commercial side , um , has been

01:00:22.649 --> 01:00:24.816
absolutely impactful , especially with

01:00:24.816 --> 01:00:26.871
some of our most recent operations .

01:00:26.871 --> 01:00:29.038
Thank you , ma'am . Mr . Crowe , you ,

01:00:29.038 --> 01:00:31.316
uh , you're good . OK . Does any other ,

01:00:31.316 --> 01:00:33.205
any other members have any , uh ,

01:00:33.205 --> 01:00:32.949
follow-up questions they'd like to ask ?

01:00:33.790 --> 01:00:36.012
OK , with that , we're going to adjourn

01:00:36.012 --> 01:00:38.290
and meet uh for the classified session .

01:00:38.290 --> 01:00:38.679
This meeting is adjourned .