WEBVTT

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Subcommittee will come to order . Today ,

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the subcommittee will receive testimony

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on the posture of the United States

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Army . First , I'd like to welcome our

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two witnesses , Secretary of the Army ,

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Daniel Driscoll , and General

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Christopher Le Neve , the Acting Chief

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of Staff and Vice Chief of Staff of the

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United States Army . Mr . Secretary ,

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thank you for joining us again .

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General Lalive , I note this is your

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first appearance before the

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subcommittee . Welcome and we look

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forward to hearing from you . The

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United States Army remains a preeminent

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fighting force in the world . Today we

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face a multitude of threats from across

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the globe that only grow in complexity

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and scale . As threats evolve , it's

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imperative that we prioritize

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investments that not only contribute to

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the current readiness , but also

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provide us with a decisive advantage on

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any future battlefield . Against this

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backdrop , the Army's continuous

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transformation efforts to become a

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leaner . More lethal force are being

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tested . Such threats have been no more

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visible than what we have witnessed as

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a result of Operation Epic Fury . Our

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ability to intercept and defeat

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sophisticated missile threats has been

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tested by a proliferation of low-cost

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one-way attack drones used to overwhelm

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air and missile defense systems .

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Unfortunately , we have suffered the

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threats of not addressing this

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technology as we continue to mourn 6 US

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soldiers who were killed last month in

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Kuwait due to an Iranian drone strike .

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I understand the Army has invested

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close to $1 billion in counter UAS

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capability this fiscal year , and I'm

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interested in learning more about how

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you intend to get these systems into

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the hands of the warfighter sooner .

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Recent conflicts in the Central Command

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theater of operations also underscored

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the need for low-cost mass munitions .

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While our most exquisite munitions have

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proven successful on the battlefield .

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We must also invest in capability to

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drive the cost curve down in order to

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meet that challenge of an increasingly

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complex security environment ,

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including future events that may unfold

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in the Indo-Pacific . We must obtain

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and sustain the ability to field

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affordable effectors at . The army has

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also made significant bets in aviation

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to maintain relevance in a potential

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conflict in the Pacific . The biggest

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request includes over $2 billion to

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accelerate the filling of the MV 75 .

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In favor of legacy aircraft programs ,

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I look forward to hearing how the Army

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plans to achieve this objective both on

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time and on budget to secure greater

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operational access in the Indo-Pacific

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theater . Lastly , the ability to

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rapidly procure and deliver cutting

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edge technologies and capabilities

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depends on a manufacturing base that

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can scale and flex when called to . The

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subcommittee has made historic

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investments to reduce the fragility of

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our lower tier suppliers and

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non-traditional manufacturers

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responsible for the production of

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critical components . That inevitable

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lethality on the battlefield that will

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enable lethality on the battlefield . I

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hope you'll discuss today how your

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fiscal year 27 budget plans to address

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this challenge to maximize capability

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and capacity in the industrial base .

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With that , I recognize the

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distinguished ranking member , Ms .

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McCollum for her opening remarks .

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Thank you , Mr . Chair . Thank you for

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the courtesy you always extend me . Um ,

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general , um , Mr . Secretary , welcome ,

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uh , to the committee , and as the

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chair said , we need information and

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look forward to a fruitful discussion

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on the army's fiscal year 2027 budget

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request . First , I want to express to

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both of you my condolences for the loss

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of now 7 soldiers recently in the

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Middle East . Mr . Secretary , to you

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personally , I wanna thank you . For

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your engagement with me at the Dover

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Air Force Base regarding the funeral

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for Master Sergeant Nicole Amore from

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White Bear Lake , Minnesota . I can

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tell you , my voice is a little soft

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talking about Nicole too , so thank you

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so much , Mr . Womack . I'm gonna tell

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you how personally , how much I know

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firsthand your engagement meant to the

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family and to the entire community .

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So thank you so very much . It was a

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very trying time and you and those that

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you tasked with , with it performed in

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a way that we expect when we leave no

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one behind . Thank you so much . The

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subcommittee would also need a status

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on the 200 soldiers that have been

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wounded in the conflict . Turning to

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the budget request , for the 2nd year

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in a row , this hearing has been held

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without full details of the Army's

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request , and that is very

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disappointing . Even though the budget

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was dropped on April 3 , the

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administration still has not provided

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to us the justification documents for

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their request . We need the details

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when the budget is made public . That's

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the only way we can do our job properly

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to do the oversight that we are tasked

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with . To be clear , the size of the

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requests for defense spending is

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shocking , and in the base budget , the

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Department of Defense requests over

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$200 billion over last year's enacted

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levels . When combined with the

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mandatory funding for defense requests

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through the reconciliation bill ,

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that's an increase of $400 billion .

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That's nearly a 44% increase in defense

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spending over the last year . In

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essence , we will see the department's

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request approach $1.6

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trillion . This request does not ,

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however , include the cost to cover the

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president's excursion , which is a war

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in Iran . Now the president also

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proposes to cut domestic investments to

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the non-defense budget by

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$73 billion or by 10% .

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There's even cuts to NASA by 67% ,

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which is striking given how the Artemis

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mission has captured the attention of

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Americans , and we will know we will

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learn much from that mission that will

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help with our national and economic

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security . We know that cuts to other

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appropriation bills will deeply impact

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our national security , particularly

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cuts to education . Engineering , math ,

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science , cyber , computer programming ,

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they're all cut , and that all is

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affected to cuts in education . It

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means that when it comes to our future

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national security workforce , the

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president's budget is not doing the

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justice it needs to have happen for the

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next generation . When it comes to our

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future national security workforce ,

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the president's budget will , in my

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opinion , make our military suffer

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because it decimates our workforce

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development that we need all across the

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board . The previous cuts to the State

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Department of 30% also affect our

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mission , and I believe your capability

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to do your mission as successfully as

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possible . The previous Secretary of

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Defense for President Trump once warned

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us in this room that if we cut the

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State Department , we will be forced to

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buy more ammunition . Just look at

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South America or the Middle East and

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see what that warning was all about

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that he was predicting . For the army ,

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the request includes an $18 billion

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increase to its discretionary level

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with more funds for procurement .

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That's an increase for missiles which

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attracts the Secretary Deputy's

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acceleration plans for munitions . Now

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we know the administration monitors the

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level of munitions , but we must come

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up with a better solution for taking

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out drones . Using Patriot missiles

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that cost $3 million each is not cost

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effective . And it's not sustainable .

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There's a billion dollars increase for

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operations and maintenance activities

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for maneuver units . These funds and

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training operations that maintain

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readiness . The committee must know

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that these funds are being used for

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mission and how they're being used . I

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say this because military personnel

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have been used in such ways over the

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past years that I do find concerning .

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For example , the National Guard

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continuing to pick up . Uh , trash here

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in our nation's capital . We're

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continuing to assist with the Southern

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Border Commission under the

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jurisdiction of the Department of

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Homeland Security . I don't see these

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missions as improving the readiness for

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our troops . I see them as degrading

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their readiness . The committee must

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understand what exercises and

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deployments the army expects ,

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especially with the combatant commands .

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So gentlemen , I hope you reach out to

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us soon with the details of your

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budgets are released . Mr . Secretary ,

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one side , we've been having several

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meetings . We need to know , and I know

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it's in a classified setting , exactly

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where the army is with its munitions ,

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exactly . And we don't want to hear

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that OMB is holding on to the release

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of that information . Thank you , Mr .

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Chair . Thank you gentle lady , and I'd

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like to turn to the chairman of the

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full committee and my good friend

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Chairman Tom Cole . Mr . Chairman , the

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floor is yours . Thank you very much ,

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Mr . Chairman , and , uh , delighted to

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be here with you and Ranking Member

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McCollum . Um , this hearing , uh ,

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could not have come at a more

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consequential time . The global

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security landscape has only continued

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to grow more complex and volatile .

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Among these challenges before us are

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the ongoing operations in the Central

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Command Theater . And a pacing threat

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in the Indo-Pacific that does not pause

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while our forces may be elsewhere .

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Operation Epic Fury has proven that the

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American military might is the strength

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freedom can count on . Our soldiers ,

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weapons systems , and stockpiles must

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never be taken for granted . They are

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the foundation of our ability to

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sustain prolonged conflict while

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countering other threats across the

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globe . Make no mistake , China

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continues to modernize its military ,

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expand its global influence , and

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assert its posture in the Indo-Pacific ,

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whether the United States is watching

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or not . The United States Army's role

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in deterring this threat and prevailing

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if deterrence fails has never been more

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important . Long-range precision fires

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provide us with the capability to

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strike with accuracy over vast

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distances and are a necessary necessity

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if the United States is to maintain its

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competitive advantage against both peer

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and near peer adversaries . I look

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forward to hearing how the Army is

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prioritizing . The development and

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deployment of these capabilities to

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ensure overmatch . Equally urgent is

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our ability to produce munitions and

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maintain inventory . Recent global

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conflicts stressed the importance of

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magazine depth , and Operation Epic

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Fury has stressed this even further .

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We cannot afford the hollow magazines

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in a high-intensity protracted conflict .

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I hope to hear an honest assessment of

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where we stand today . And what

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investments the Army is making to

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bolster our readiness , both for the

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near and long term . And to our troops

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at home and abroad , we're grateful for

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your service and we're committed to

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ensuring that you have uh what you need

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to succeed and come home safely . We

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certainly will continue to back you

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with the full strength of the United

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States of America . And with that , let

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me , I want to offer a couple of uh

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remarks that are not in my , my formal

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testimony . Uh , just for the next , uh ,

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just for the record . First , I want to

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agree very much with the ranking member .

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Uh , we really do need more information

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than we have now . Uh , we're gonna end

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up delaying this , not beyond the

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schedule , but we scheduled it later

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because , frankly , for the committee

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to have the information that it needs ,

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it , you know , to make decisions , uh ,

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is taking us a while . I don't put that ,

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Mr . Secretary , on you and the Army .

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I put that on OMB , but there's more

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information . That we're going to need ,

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I would much prefer that we could have

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moved and we will have a very

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aggressive schedule . We will certainly

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have a robust

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proposal for the committee when we do

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full markup , and we certainly want to

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work with the administration and

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certainly with the president on what

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he's trying to achieve , but we're

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going to need more information to be

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able to do that , and I know we'll get

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your cooperation , frankly , we'll get

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OMB's cooperation too , but The sooner

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is better . Uh , and so my friend , uh ,

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from Minnesota is exactly right when

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she raises that issue . She , I think

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she speaks for the whole committee .

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Second point I want to make , uh , is

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about you . Uh , I've had the

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opportunity to be on this committee for

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a lot of years . I've seen a lot of

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secretaries of the Army . Uh , we have

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because of Fort Sill and , frankly , in

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other parts of the state , McAllister

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Ammunition depot , a very close

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association with the Army . I just

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wanna tell you , I think you are doing

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an outstanding job . You are the right

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person in the right place at the right

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time . I appreciate the energy . I

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appreciate the practical experience in

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uniform , as well as what you bring

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from your experience out of uniform .

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And I think you can be a

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transformational . I think you will be

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a transformational Secretary of the

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Army in a period that we need it . So ,

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you certainly have my full confidence

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and support . I think probably the full

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confidence and support of everybody on

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this committee . You've been assigned

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an enormous task to undertake at an

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enormously difficult and challenging

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time . We want to be helpful , but

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we're absolutely convinced you're the

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right person in the right place to

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deliver . Second , and I would never

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ask you to address this , but I will

13:51.976 --> 13:54.142
tell you , and not directed at you , I

13:54.142 --> 13:56.365
do , uh , and I never interface in fear

13:56.365 --> 13:58.476
of change of command . That's not our

13:58.476 --> 14:00.698
place , that's not our responsibility .

14:00.698 --> 14:00.630
I respect the authority of the

14:00.630 --> 14:02.797
commander in Chief of the entire chain

14:02.797 --> 14:06.179
to do their job , but I'm a huge fan of ,

14:06.190 --> 14:08.190
uh , the last Chief of Staff of the

14:08.190 --> 14:11.340
Army . Uh , I think , um , uh , General

14:11.340 --> 14:13.969
George is , uh , a great patriot . I've

14:13.969 --> 14:16.025
seen him , talked with him before he

14:16.025 --> 14:18.191
was chief , worked with him as chief .

14:18.191 --> 14:20.136
I've seen him interact with , uh ,

14:20.136 --> 14:22.080
soldiers , returning soldiers from

14:22.080 --> 14:24.247
theater in my district , interact with

14:24.247 --> 14:26.469
other officers down at Fort Sill . He's

14:26.469 --> 14:29.520
an outstanding , uh , uh , general

14:29.520 --> 14:31.687
officer , outstanding chief of staff ,

14:31.950 --> 14:34.172
and I just want the record to reflect ,

14:34.172 --> 14:36.394
uh how much we regret , I've personally

14:36.394 --> 14:39.190
regret at least , he's no longer in

14:39.190 --> 14:41.357
active service . Uh , he's a real loss

14:41.357 --> 14:43.760
to us , in my opinion . But again , I'm

14:43.760 --> 14:45.704
sure the successor will be equally

14:45.704 --> 14:48.479
capable . We've had a long train of

14:48.479 --> 14:50.812
really fine officers from the army come ,

14:50.812 --> 14:52.909
and I have high confidence that the

14:52.909 --> 14:55.669
success will do well . But General

14:55.669 --> 14:58.020
George is a real loss , and I think a

14:58.020 --> 15:00.359
great American , and I just wish him

15:00.359 --> 15:02.581
well in whatever his next endeavor is .

15:02.581 --> 15:04.748
I wanted that officially on the record

15:06.809 --> 15:08.809
just to reflect my admiration for a

15:08.809 --> 15:10.920
lifetime of service to this country .

15:10.920 --> 15:12.698
Uh , which I wish had continued

15:12.698 --> 15:14.920
somewhat longer . With that , again , I

15:14.920 --> 15:17.253
look forward to the testimony , uh , Mr .

15:17.253 --> 15:19.309
Chairman , and , uh , again , I wish

15:19.309 --> 15:21.476
you well in your tenure . You're going

15:21.476 --> 15:23.698
to be a great secretary for us . That I

15:23.698 --> 15:25.976
yield back . Thank you , Mr . Chairman ,

15:25.976 --> 15:27.698
and I appreciate your comments

15:27.698 --> 15:29.920
regarding General George . I think most

15:29.920 --> 15:31.865
of us here agree , agree with your

15:31.865 --> 15:33.865
comments . General George was to be

15:33.865 --> 15:35.979
congratulated on the work he did for

15:35.979 --> 15:37.757
this country and the service he

15:37.757 --> 15:40.739
provided , uh , and we hold him in high

15:40.739 --> 15:43.679
esteem . With that , it's my privilege

15:43.679 --> 15:46.760
to introduce for testimony Secretary

15:46.760 --> 15:48.871
Driscoll of the United States Army to

15:48.880 --> 15:52.070
take 5 minutes . Chairman Cole ,

15:52.390 --> 15:54.279
Chairman Calvert , Ranking Member

15:54.279 --> 15:56.501
McCollum , distinguished members , it's

15:56.501 --> 15:58.723
a privilege to address you today . Um ,

15:58.723 --> 16:01.057
and before I do the rest of the remarks ,

16:01.057 --> 16:03.279
very sincerely , um , thank you for the

16:03.279 --> 16:05.223
kind words . It means a lot , um ,

16:05.223 --> 16:07.334
working well with all of you has been

16:07.334 --> 16:07.270
amazing , and I think our army has

16:07.270 --> 16:09.429
benefited a lot from that . I've been

16:09.429 --> 16:11.485
the Secretary of the Army for 1 year

16:11.485 --> 16:13.707
and 51 days , and I am incredibly proud

16:13.707 --> 16:15.485
to represent soldiers and their

16:15.485 --> 16:18.059
families , and I'm equally humbled . In

16:18.059 --> 16:20.226
February , we honored 3 Medal of Honor

16:20.226 --> 16:22.510
recipients . As a prisoner of war ,

16:22.669 --> 16:24.669
Master Sergeant Edmonds prevented a

16:24.669 --> 16:26.510
Nazi officer from executing his

16:26.510 --> 16:28.750
soldiers . Sergeant Major Richardson

16:28.750 --> 16:31.010
called air strikes on his own location

16:31.010 --> 16:32.989
to save his platoon , and Staff

16:32.989 --> 16:34.989
Sergeant Ollis deliberately stepped

16:34.989 --> 16:37.156
between a suicide bomber and a wounded

16:37.156 --> 16:39.960
comrade to shield him . In one ceremony ,

16:40.210 --> 16:42.210
we honor valor above and beyond the

16:42.210 --> 16:45.210
call of duty spanning 1945 to 2013 ,

16:45.669 --> 16:48.570
3 generations of heroes . It shows that

16:48.570 --> 16:51.530
courage is in our soldiers' DNA . It is

16:51.530 --> 16:54.570
ingrained in over 250 years of service

16:54.570 --> 16:57.099
and sacrifice . As all of you know ,

16:57.179 --> 16:59.290
our soldiers are the very best in the

16:59.290 --> 17:01.401
world . They're bold , decisive , and

17:01.401 --> 17:03.940
they can solve any problem that we face

17:03.940 --> 17:05.996
that faces them . That's why I spent

17:05.996 --> 17:09.060
over 130 days on the road across 17

17:09.060 --> 17:11.420
countries and 25 states to hear

17:11.420 --> 17:14.000
directly from our soldiers . I saw

17:14.000 --> 17:16.056
their barracks , ate with them , put

17:16.056 --> 17:18.222
hands on their new and old equipment ,

17:18.222 --> 17:20.444
and had candid face to face discussions

17:20.444 --> 17:22.500
with soldiers of every single rank .

17:22.640 --> 17:24.751
What I heard was clear . Our soldiers

17:24.751 --> 17:26.751
are ready to innovate and win , but

17:26.751 --> 17:28.862
bureaucracy and regulations are still

17:28.862 --> 17:30.696
holding them back . Getting what

17:30.696 --> 17:32.862
soldiers need to win , making the army

17:32.862 --> 17:35.029
budget work for them is definitionally

17:35.029 --> 17:37.560
a bipartisan topic , and I know all of

17:37.560 --> 17:39.959
you agree with that . So everything we

17:39.959 --> 17:42.126
do in this room , in the Pentagon , in

17:42.126 --> 17:44.348
the Capitol building should support our

17:44.348 --> 17:46.930
soldiers . You've supported our army

17:46.930 --> 17:49.209
for decades and our army wouldn't be

17:49.209 --> 17:51.320
what it is today without all of you .

17:51.930 --> 17:54.050
But we all know that the system that

17:54.050 --> 17:56.410
should benefit soldiers still remains

17:56.410 --> 17:58.920
broken . Soldiers , their quality of

17:58.920 --> 18:00.976
life and their battlefield advantage

18:00.976 --> 18:03.142
isn't always the number one budget and

18:03.142 --> 18:05.476
oversight priority . It's a simple fact ,

18:05.476 --> 18:07.531
and we need your help to continue to

18:07.531 --> 18:09.869
change it . We need legislation that

18:09.869 --> 18:11.980
secures our right to repair so we can

18:11.980 --> 18:14.229
fix our equipment organically , improve

18:14.229 --> 18:16.173
readiness , and mitigate contested

18:16.173 --> 18:19.219
logistics . We need relief from laws

18:19.219 --> 18:21.550
enacted before World War II that limit

18:21.550 --> 18:23.606
how we manage dining and services on

18:23.606 --> 18:26.449
our installations . They simply degrade

18:26.449 --> 18:29.160
quality of life and waste resources ,

18:29.329 --> 18:32.069
and we need more budget flexibility .

18:32.689 --> 18:34.729
Thank you so much for last year's

18:34.729 --> 18:36.951
progress , but we must go further so we

18:36.951 --> 18:38.785
can adapt quickly to threats and

18:38.785 --> 18:41.007
transform faster than our adversaries .

18:41.569 --> 18:43.680
We all know that technological change

18:43.680 --> 18:45.958
is accelerating exponentially and thus ,

18:45.958 --> 18:49.219
warfare is evolving constantly . Speed ,

18:49.369 --> 18:51.660
innovation , and adaptability are more

18:51.660 --> 18:54.020
important than ever now . And your help

18:54.020 --> 18:56.187
to either lower barriers to innovation

18:56.187 --> 18:58.409
or stick to the decades-long status quo

18:58.409 --> 19:00.579
makes all the difference . I invite

19:00.579 --> 19:02.746
every single one of you to continue to

19:02.746 --> 19:04.912
do what you already do and engage with

19:04.912 --> 19:06.857
our army and see the changes we're

19:06.857 --> 19:08.912
making firsthand . We are partnering

19:08.912 --> 19:11.135
with private industry to bring the best

19:11.135 --> 19:13.412
tech talent and tradecraft to the army .

19:13.412 --> 19:15.579
We are bringing private capital to our

19:15.579 --> 19:17.690
bases to unlock dormant resources and

19:17.690 --> 19:19.912
offset the delays and constraints built

19:19.912 --> 19:21.969
into our federal budget process . We

19:21.969 --> 19:24.080
are blazing a trail for our nation on

19:24.080 --> 19:25.849
nuclear energy , counter drone

19:25.849 --> 19:28.810
capabilities , and military AI and data

19:28.810 --> 19:31.489
center applications . Despite

19:31.489 --> 19:33.211
regulatory constraints , we're

19:33.211 --> 19:35.267
delivering better soldier quality of

19:35.267 --> 19:37.211
life through campus-style dining ,

19:37.211 --> 19:38.989
barracks Wi Fi . And 3D printed

19:38.989 --> 19:41.489
barracks material construction . Even

19:41.489 --> 19:43.489
though it can seem like the deck is

19:43.489 --> 19:45.489
stacked against us sometimes and we

19:45.489 --> 19:47.711
exert colossal efforts to overcome some

19:47.711 --> 19:49.822
of these barriers , the United States

19:49.822 --> 19:51.878
Army is a beacon of transformation .

19:51.949 --> 19:54.030
Imagine what we can do if we weren't

19:54.030 --> 19:56.400
bound by the red tape . We can do more

19:56.400 --> 19:58.511
if you help us find the right balance

19:58.511 --> 20:00.567
between regulation and oversight and

20:00.567 --> 20:02.789
flexibility and speed . We can take our

20:02.789 --> 20:04.956
budget further if you help us tap into

20:04.956 --> 20:07.122
America's entrepreneur entrepreneurial

20:07.122 --> 20:09.178
spirit and unlock our soldiers' true

20:09.178 --> 20:11.410
potential . We can move faster if you

20:11.410 --> 20:13.188
help us shed the dead weight of

20:13.188 --> 20:15.410
obsolete equipment and invest in modern

20:15.410 --> 20:17.466
capabilities that propel us into the

20:17.466 --> 20:19.521
future . And with your help , we can

20:19.521 --> 20:21.354
assure that our army remains the

20:21.354 --> 20:23.410
dominant land fighting force for the

20:23.410 --> 20:25.577
next 250 years . Thank you so much for

20:25.577 --> 20:27.466
having us , and I look forward to

20:27.466 --> 20:29.829
answering your questions . Thank you ,

20:29.869 --> 20:32.150
Mr . Secretary . Uh , General Lali ,

20:33.410 --> 20:35.521
Lane , uh , please take 5 minutes for

20:35.521 --> 20:38.619
your opening remarks . Chairman Cole ,

20:38.839 --> 20:40.783
and Chairman Calvert , and Ranking

20:40.783 --> 20:42.950
Member of McCollum , thank you for the

20:42.950 --> 20:44.839
opportunity to appear before this

20:44.839 --> 20:47.061
subcommittee today . Everything I do as

20:47.061 --> 20:49.061
the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army

20:49.061 --> 20:51.061
begins and ends with one question .

20:51.061 --> 20:53.283
Does this make our soldiers more lethal

20:53.283 --> 20:55.450
and ready to fight and win when called

20:55.450 --> 20:57.880
upon ? Today , over 212,000 soldiers

20:57.880 --> 21:00.102
are deployed or forward postured across

21:00.102 --> 21:02.800
160 countries , securing our interests

21:02.800 --> 21:04.911
in the Western Hemisphere , deterring

21:04.911 --> 21:06.967
aggression in the Indo-Pacific , and

21:06.967 --> 21:09.022
responding to threats worldwide . In

21:09.022 --> 21:11.244
the Middle East , our soldiers continue

21:11.244 --> 21:13.189
to defend US forces and partners ,

21:13.410 --> 21:15.709
sustaining layered air and missile

21:15.709 --> 21:18.189
defense systems and maintaining our

21:18.189 --> 21:20.550
long range strike capabilities . Army

21:20.550 --> 21:22.717
sustainment forces are postured across

21:22.717 --> 21:24.939
the theater , moving fuel , munitions ,

21:24.939 --> 21:26.939
and medical support , while command

21:26.939 --> 21:29.161
posts continue to integrate joint fires

21:29.161 --> 21:31.106
and intelligence to respond to any

21:31.106 --> 21:33.310
threat . Operations overseas are

21:33.310 --> 21:35.477
sustained by the command structure and

21:35.477 --> 21:38.339
ready forces we maintain at home . We

21:38.339 --> 21:40.395
consolidated Army North and South in

21:40.395 --> 21:42.283
the Western Hemisphere Command to

21:42.283 --> 21:44.339
create a single unified headquarters

21:44.339 --> 21:46.506
responsible for homeland defense . And

21:46.506 --> 21:48.228
in the Indo-Pacific , the Army

21:48.228 --> 21:50.339
maintains 91,000 troops and committed

21:50.339 --> 21:53.219
$1.3 billion to the Pacific Deterrence

21:53.219 --> 21:56.000
Initiative . The commanding in Korea

21:56.000 --> 21:57.833
showed me that years of combined

21:57.833 --> 22:00.000
training and shared risk with regional

22:00.000 --> 22:02.000
partners creates relationships that

22:02.000 --> 22:04.680
cannot be forged in crisis . We're

22:04.680 --> 22:06.902
building readiness for the future fight

22:06.902 --> 22:08.847
at our combat training centers and

22:08.847 --> 22:11.819
having commanded the ops group at JRTC ,

22:12.000 --> 22:14.040
I know the value of our CTCs . It's

22:14.040 --> 22:15.873
where we train our soldiers in a

22:15.873 --> 22:18.719
complex environment in the mud to test

22:18.719 --> 22:22.430
how well they'll be able to fix complex

22:22.430 --> 22:24.770
problems against an adversary . We

22:24.770 --> 22:26.770
cannot field modern kit while

22:26.770 --> 22:28.930
sustaining aging systems that consume

22:28.930 --> 22:32.130
time , money and manpower . Divesting

22:32.130 --> 22:33.770
legacy platforms reduces the

22:33.770 --> 22:35.881
maintenance demand that falls hardest

22:35.881 --> 22:38.130
on our junior soldiers . This is why we

22:38.130 --> 22:40.352
restructured our acquisition process to

22:40.352 --> 22:42.408
close the distance between soldiers'

22:42.408 --> 22:44.408
feedback and program decisions from

22:44.408 --> 22:46.530
years to months . And you'll see this

22:46.530 --> 22:48.474
reflected in the capabilities that

22:48.474 --> 22:50.530
we're accelerating . Next generation

22:50.530 --> 22:52.419
command and control fundamentally

22:52.419 --> 22:54.586
changes the speed of decision making .

22:54.586 --> 22:56.586
Connecting sensors , shooters , and

22:56.586 --> 22:58.641
commanders , closing the gap between

22:58.641 --> 23:00.863
information and action at every echelon

23:00.969 --> 23:03.329
across all of our systems . We're

23:03.329 --> 23:05.496
progressing the XM30 infantry fighting

23:05.496 --> 23:08.010
vehicle , unveiled the M1E3 prototype

23:08.010 --> 23:10.121
years ahead of schedule , and fielded

23:10.121 --> 23:12.489
the AMP to replace the M113 , which

23:12.489 --> 23:15.729
entered service in 1960 , 7 years

23:15.729 --> 23:18.140
before I was born . In RV Aviation ,

23:18.180 --> 23:20.291
we're on track to deliver a prototype

23:20.291 --> 23:23.540
of the MB 75 Cheyenne by the FY 27 ,

23:23.619 --> 23:25.563
increasing the speed , range , and

23:25.563 --> 23:27.452
survivability required for future

23:27.452 --> 23:29.563
operations . But none of this matters

23:29.563 --> 23:31.563
if we can't produce and sustain its

23:31.563 --> 23:33.452
scale . That's why we continue to

23:33.452 --> 23:35.939
modernize our OIB , expanding industry

23:35.939 --> 23:38.459
partnerships to enhanced use leases and

23:38.459 --> 23:41.030
advanced manufacturing . Industrial

23:41.030 --> 23:42.900
capacity is important , but the

23:42.900 --> 23:45.067
strength of our army is only as strong

23:45.067 --> 23:47.122
as our ability to retain experienced

23:47.122 --> 23:49.390
soldiers , and whether the force we're

23:49.390 --> 23:51.612
building reflects the standards that we

23:51.612 --> 23:53.949
claim to uphold . That standard

23:53.949 --> 23:56.060
includes $4 billion in infrastructure

23:56.060 --> 23:58.829
investments throughout 2026 . and to

23:58.829 --> 24:00.940
improve nutrition , we're rolling out

24:00.940 --> 24:03.107
campus-style dining , which has been a

24:03.107 --> 24:05.329
huge success across 5 installations and

24:05.329 --> 24:07.385
planning an additional 6 . And we're

24:07.385 --> 24:09.680
scaling our holistic health . And

24:09.680 --> 24:12.069
fitness program across all compost .

24:12.439 --> 24:14.383
And these investments are having a

24:14.383 --> 24:16.383
measurable impact . It shows in our

24:16.383 --> 24:18.550
recruiting trends , our numbers are up

24:18.550 --> 24:20.717
across all of our categories and we're

24:20.717 --> 24:22.772
exceeding last year's target . Thank

24:22.772 --> 24:24.828
you for your continued support as we

24:24.828 --> 24:26.828
sustain the best army the world has

24:26.828 --> 24:28.883
ever seen . That will not change and

24:28.883 --> 24:30.995
this we will defend and thank you for

24:30.995 --> 24:33.050
acknowledging our losses . Thank you

24:33.050 --> 24:35.161
for the prayers of the families , and

24:35.161 --> 24:35.119
thank you for the support that you

24:35.119 --> 24:37.420
continue to provide to those families .

24:37.569 --> 24:39.939
Thank you . Thank you , General . Thank

24:39.939 --> 24:42.161
you for your comments . Uh , I'll start

24:42.161 --> 24:44.106
the questioning and we'll have a 5

24:44.106 --> 24:46.439
minute round around the , uh , the room .

24:46.540 --> 24:49.699
Obviously , war has changed . We saw

24:49.699 --> 24:52.780
that dramatically in Ukraine when the

24:52.780 --> 24:55.420
war first started . The artillery was

24:55.420 --> 24:57.587
the weapon of choice . Probably 70% of

24:57.587 --> 24:59.642
the munitions used 155 rounds on our

24:59.642 --> 25:02.900
side . And some introduction of drones

25:02.900 --> 25:05.067
on the Ukrainian side , very little on

25:05.067 --> 25:07.067
the Russian side in the beginning .

25:07.067 --> 25:09.289
That's totally flipped . The Ukrainians

25:09.289 --> 25:11.599
now are making 350,000 drones a month .

25:12.180 --> 25:14.402
The Russians a similar amount . They've

25:14.402 --> 25:16.624
attached artificial intelligence to the

25:16.624 --> 25:18.770
drones where they cannot be jammed ,

25:18.839 --> 25:21.579
and they continue to evolve the drones

25:21.579 --> 25:24.540
on the battlefield almost daily .

25:26.260 --> 25:28.859
Obviously during Operation Epic Ferry

25:28.859 --> 25:32.819
we saw low cost one-way attack drones

25:32.819 --> 25:35.041
that were used to overwhelm our air and

25:35.041 --> 25:36.708
missile defense systems . The

25:36.708 --> 25:38.763
proliferation of this capability not

25:38.763 --> 25:41.699
only underpins the need to field

25:41.699 --> 25:43.755
effective counter UAS technologies ,

25:43.755 --> 25:46.949
but low cost effectors . General ,

25:48.920 --> 25:50.976
given the urgency of these threats ,

25:50.976 --> 25:53.310
how is the Army ensuring that the most

25:53.310 --> 25:57.290
capable counter UAS technology are

25:57.290 --> 26:00.430
rapidly fielding to soldiers , and

26:00.430 --> 26:02.486
Secretary , if you could add in what

26:02.486 --> 26:04.430
steps is the Army going to take to

26:04.430 --> 26:06.229
accelerate . The development of

26:06.229 --> 26:08.650
deployment of cost-effective kinetic

26:08.650 --> 26:11.270
and non-kinetic counter UAS technology .

26:12.489 --> 26:14.322
Sure , thanks for thanks for the

26:14.322 --> 26:16.790
question . Our secretary has pushed us

26:17.489 --> 26:19.711
very hard to move as fast as possible ,

26:19.770 --> 26:22.310
provide the latest equipment to our

26:22.310 --> 26:24.199
soldiers in the field , and we've

26:24.199 --> 26:26.449
pushed numerous new systems to include

26:26.449 --> 26:29.569
MROs and some other counter drone

26:30.010 --> 26:33.510
capabilities into R and CENCOM

26:34.930 --> 26:37.500
to help counter the threat . It's

26:37.500 --> 26:40.020
holistic , sir , so we are tied in very

26:40.020 --> 26:42.242
closely with the Joint Interagency Task

26:42.242 --> 26:46.180
Force 401 that the Army started . So

26:46.180 --> 26:49.760
that's working to get new capabilities

26:49.760 --> 26:52.099
as fast as possible into our soldiers'

26:52.099 --> 26:54.210
hands , one , to experiment with them

26:54.210 --> 26:55.988
and then to scale it as fast as

26:55.988 --> 26:57.932
possible to get it in the hands of

26:57.932 --> 27:00.099
soldiers forward , and then we're tied

27:00.099 --> 27:01.821
in incredibly closely with the

27:01.821 --> 27:05.209
Department of War's Defense Autonomous

27:05.209 --> 27:08.290
Working Group . That is at a higher

27:08.290 --> 27:11.770
level working to get systems as fast as

27:11.770 --> 27:15.130
possible in our hands . This is a huge

27:15.130 --> 27:17.297
undertaking . So . You hit on a couple

27:17.297 --> 27:20.319
other points . We're also going after ,

27:20.329 --> 27:22.496
and the Secretary is pushing us really

27:22.496 --> 27:24.607
hard on this , to go after as fast as

27:24.607 --> 27:27.250
possible low cost munitions to be able

27:27.250 --> 27:31.170
to help counter these UAS and to go

27:31.170 --> 27:33.392
after companies that say they can scale

27:33.392 --> 27:35.614
and scale fast , and we're working with

27:35.614 --> 27:37.880
them . With our team to do it , but it

27:37.880 --> 27:40.920
also is a part of our organic

27:40.920 --> 27:43.087
industrial base that we have to retool

27:43.087 --> 27:46.079
these facilities to be able to help us

27:46.079 --> 27:49.920
produce at scale the munitions and

27:49.920 --> 27:52.142
the systems that we're going to need to

27:52.142 --> 27:54.142
counter this threat , not only that

27:54.142 --> 27:55.753
we're seeing right now , but

27:55.753 --> 27:57.976
potentially we're going to see with our

27:57.976 --> 28:00.790
pacing threat . Chairman , um ,

28:02.290 --> 28:04.290
I think that the answer in a lot of

28:04.290 --> 28:06.346
ways is not very , um , and what the

28:06.346 --> 28:08.401
ranking member said , I , I couldn't

28:08.401 --> 28:10.512
possibly agree with anymore about the

28:10.512 --> 28:12.679
cost of interceptors and the math just

28:12.679 --> 28:14.846
not scaling , but a lot of people have

28:14.846 --> 28:17.068
been saying that for a very long time .

28:17.068 --> 28:19.123
Um , fundamentally , one of the core

28:19.123 --> 28:21.290
problems was our own bureaucracy , our

28:21.290 --> 28:21.180
own infrastructure , our own decision

28:21.180 --> 28:24.540
making organizations had decayed from

28:24.540 --> 28:26.939
any sort of speed and rationality . And

28:26.939 --> 28:29.106
so the , the reason we've been able to

28:29.106 --> 28:31.430
move fast since the conflict in Iran

28:31.430 --> 28:34.500
started is because of work 1012 , 14

28:34.500 --> 28:36.459
months ago to reorganize our

28:36.459 --> 28:38.570
acquisitions department . and convert

28:38.570 --> 28:41.066
over from PEOs to PAEs and practically

28:41.066 --> 28:43.288
what that did is it took us from like a

28:43.288 --> 28:45.399
16-step decision making process where

28:45.399 --> 28:47.622
each of the bodies along those 16 steps

28:47.622 --> 28:49.677
could veto it and start it back over

28:49.677 --> 28:51.566
and it could take 2 to 7 years to

28:51.566 --> 28:53.455
purchase something . Sometimes we

28:53.455 --> 28:55.677
consolidated it down , we put everybody

28:55.677 --> 28:57.788
into a group who could make decisions

28:57.788 --> 28:59.899
on the fly . And so when the Conflict

28:59.899 --> 29:01.899
kicked off within about 8 days . We

29:01.899 --> 29:04.010
were able to go purchase what General

29:04.010 --> 29:06.288
Lane was referencing these 13,000 mops ,

29:06.288 --> 29:08.344
which are incredible . They're about

29:08.344 --> 29:10.510
$15,000 apiece right now . We think as

29:10.510 --> 29:12.788
they scale they'll get to less than 10 ,

29:12.788 --> 29:14.899
and we're able to take shaheed's down

29:14.899 --> 29:17.066
that cost $300,000 to $50,000 which is

29:17.066 --> 29:17.021
amazing because that puts us on the

29:17.021 --> 29:19.077
right end of the cost curve , and we

29:19.077 --> 29:21.299
will make that trade all day long . And

29:21.299 --> 29:23.299
so a lot of the things the army has

29:23.299 --> 29:25.243
worked on in the previous year are

29:25.243 --> 29:27.188
paying dividends as we try to make

29:27.188 --> 29:29.243
decisions quickly today . Yeah , I'm

29:29.243 --> 29:31.243
gonna turn this over to the ranking

29:31.243 --> 29:33.465
member , but for this to comment , some

29:33.465 --> 29:35.688
of this is a dual use capability . We ,

29:35.688 --> 29:37.410
we have the Olympics coming to

29:37.410 --> 29:39.354
California . We have the World Cup

29:39.354 --> 29:42.839
coming up here in just a few weeks and

29:43.150 --> 29:45.800
obviously we have high security

29:45.800 --> 29:47.911
concerns and that capability needs to

29:47.911 --> 29:50.390
be shared obviously with the private

29:50.390 --> 29:54.040
security people and hopefully

29:54.040 --> 29:56.096
that is taking place and that you're

29:56.439 --> 29:59.640
all working together . Uh , yes , sir .

29:59.819 --> 30:02.579
Um , because of my role as acting

30:02.579 --> 30:04.801
director of ATF , we , we have a pretty

30:04.801 --> 30:06.746
strong tie in to the Department of

30:06.746 --> 30:08.857
Justice , and so we've hosted on Fort

30:08.857 --> 30:12.319
Meyer , um , 350 state and local police

30:12.319 --> 30:14.280
departments all came in . We are

30:14.280 --> 30:17.319
sinking them into the , uh , GAA 401

30:17.319 --> 30:19.486
that General Laneev is talking about .

30:19.486 --> 30:21.486
We have kicked , we have launched a

30:21.486 --> 30:23.375
marketplace that's an Amazon-like

30:23.375 --> 30:25.152
marketplace where counter drone

30:25.152 --> 30:27.152
technology suppliers can list their

30:27.152 --> 30:29.430
products . We , the United States Army ,

30:29.430 --> 30:31.541
are . Viewing it almost like Consumer

30:31.541 --> 30:33.597
Reports and then state and local and

30:33.597 --> 30:33.270
federal law enforcement officers across

30:33.270 --> 30:35.603
the country can purchase from this site .

30:35.603 --> 30:37.659
We've already had purchases and then

30:37.659 --> 30:39.770
very crucially , everyone on the site

30:39.770 --> 30:41.992
is basically agreeing to try to use the

30:41.992 --> 30:44.214
same site picture to monitor the drones

30:44.214 --> 30:46.214
because one of the problems is they

30:46.214 --> 30:48.381
cross so many jurisdictions . You need

30:48.381 --> 30:50.437
to be able to have everybody see the

30:50.437 --> 30:52.381
same thing to react . And so we're

30:52.381 --> 30:54.548
really optimistic that this is a whole

30:54.548 --> 30:56.603
of government approach with a lot of

30:56.603 --> 30:58.826
buy-in for these big events coming up .

30:58.826 --> 31:02.130
Thank you . Ms . McCollum . Thank you .

31:02.209 --> 31:05.439
uh , Mr . Secretary , I'm gonna ask a

31:05.439 --> 31:07.606
question here , but I'm gonna set this

31:07.606 --> 31:11.050
up . Um , since , uh , on November 15th

31:11.050 --> 31:14.219
for , for decades , um , someone from

31:14.219 --> 31:16.890
the , the Secretary of Defense as chief ,

31:16.910 --> 31:20.800
uh , would come in and we would , uh ,

31:20.810 --> 31:22.754
get a , get a briefing kind of the

31:22.754 --> 31:25.040
whole picture , and it wasn't an audit ,

31:25.050 --> 31:28.050
but the , but the health of the finance

31:28.050 --> 31:29.883
for the department . That hasn't

31:29.883 --> 31:32.160
happened . In decades that even isn't

31:32.160 --> 31:34.319
happening anymore and as you pointed

31:34.319 --> 31:36.430
out you've only been Secretary of the

31:36.430 --> 31:40.140
Army for 1 year , uh , 51 days , and

31:40.310 --> 31:42.479
thank you for , for taking on added

31:42.479 --> 31:44.423
responsibility . I'd forgotten all

31:44.423 --> 31:46.701
about being acting director of alcohol ,

31:46.701 --> 31:48.923
Firearms and tobacco , so thank , thank

31:48.923 --> 31:51.599
you for , for , for that . Um , so

31:51.640 --> 31:54.119
please know this is not personal , but

31:54.119 --> 31:56.439
we're doing our job here and so we're

31:56.439 --> 31:58.661
gonna ask for your help in doing that .

31:58.661 --> 32:01.329
Um , uh , in the 2nd , uh , in the ,

32:01.479 --> 32:03.535
the army's budget , you requested to

32:03.535 --> 32:05.729
compress lines and procurement and

32:05.729 --> 32:08.420
research and development . And I'm

32:08.420 --> 32:10.839
concerned about that because the budget

32:10.839 --> 32:14.300
request also at the same time cuts

32:14.300 --> 32:16.500
financial management and audit

32:16.500 --> 32:19.900
readiness lines , OK ? By

32:19.900 --> 32:23.780
$200 million . And so , that ,

32:23.880 --> 32:25.880
that's a concern because we've been

32:25.880 --> 32:28.047
trying to get audits and I always have

32:28.047 --> 32:30.213
to give the Marine Corps . A big shout

32:30.213 --> 32:32.269
out . They've done it . People say ,

32:32.269 --> 32:34.213
well , they're , they're , they're

32:34.213 --> 32:36.547
smaller . I'm just gonna say maybe , no ,

32:36.547 --> 32:38.713
I'm not gonna say that . I'm not gonna

32:38.713 --> 32:38.180
pick a favorite child here , but , but

32:38.180 --> 32:40.236
they , but they , but they've done ,

32:40.236 --> 32:42.540
they've done audits , OK . So , um ,

32:42.859 --> 32:44.970
I'm gonna ask for the reason for this

32:44.970 --> 32:47.192
cut as part of the , the , the question

32:47.192 --> 32:49.415
that I'm gonna set up . So I'm gonna go

32:49.415 --> 32:51.637
back to the lines . The army has , uh ,

32:51.637 --> 32:53.803
increases for the next gen command and

32:53.803 --> 32:56.369
control . On several areas applications ,

32:56.729 --> 32:59.040
infrastructure , data , and transport .

32:59.380 --> 33:01.530
So in prior years these lines were

33:01.530 --> 33:03.939
broken out by area into better

33:03.939 --> 33:06.106
understanding of how each one of these

33:06.106 --> 33:08.106
individual programs are going to be

33:08.106 --> 33:10.569
advanced or changed . This year the

33:10.569 --> 33:13.959
budget request is bundled into 4 lines

33:13.959 --> 33:17.780
down from 41 . So without having audits

33:17.780 --> 33:19.891
that we can go back and read and look

33:19.891 --> 33:23.489
at , these lines become . In a way ,

33:23.530 --> 33:25.930
our way of doing the , the , the check

33:25.930 --> 33:28.520
and balance working with you to get the

33:28.520 --> 33:31.170
res the best result to not only

33:31.170 --> 33:33.226
complete mission , bring people home

33:33.226 --> 33:35.170
safely , but to protect taxpayers'

33:35.170 --> 33:37.449
dollars . So the compression , this

33:37.449 --> 33:40.849
makes it a huge challenge for us to do

33:40.849 --> 33:43.890
our job because we're , we're about the

33:43.890 --> 33:46.859
dollars and cents , right ? So , um .

33:47.569 --> 33:50.369
The other side of this , and I'm going

33:50.369 --> 33:53.530
to just say this loud and clear , I

33:53.530 --> 33:55.697
don't believe this is your intention ,

33:55.930 --> 33:59.069
but it has an unintended consequence

33:59.719 --> 34:01.830
when you compress these activities to

34:01.830 --> 34:03.830
make it easier for the army than to

34:03.830 --> 34:05.830
move funds without keeping Congress

34:05.830 --> 34:07.497
involved . So we might have a

34:07.497 --> 34:09.608
discussion about what you're going to

34:09.608 --> 34:11.608
do , but without the lines we don't

34:11.608 --> 34:13.775
have the accountability for both of us

34:13.775 --> 34:15.941
on what you're going to do . Um , so I

34:15.941 --> 34:18.108
know that these upgrades are necessary

34:18.108 --> 34:20.163
to maintain the effective and secure

34:20.163 --> 34:22.275
communications for the army , but how

34:22.275 --> 34:24.163
are you gonna work with us , uh ,

34:24.163 --> 34:26.330
especially not just the Congress , but

34:26.330 --> 34:28.275
the folks who are in charge of the

34:28.275 --> 34:30.441
dollars and cents on this to make sure

34:30.441 --> 34:32.552
missions accomplished , taxpayers are

34:32.552 --> 34:35.469
protected , um , how , how we are going

34:35.469 --> 34:37.413
to , uh , know how these funds are

34:37.413 --> 34:39.580
going to be executed and keep track of

34:39.580 --> 34:42.718
them , so , um . You know , we need to

34:42.718 --> 34:44.940
have a discussion about how we're gonna

34:44.940 --> 34:47.519
get back to old school on this , unless

34:47.519 --> 34:50.118
you're gonna tell me that the audit's

34:50.118 --> 34:52.638
on track and we're gonna get one next

34:52.638 --> 34:55.739
year . Mr . Secretary , um , ranking

34:55.739 --> 34:58.208
member . This is a question I would

34:58.208 --> 35:00.264
have answered completely differently

35:00.264 --> 35:03.009
last year . The nuance of the reply has

35:03.009 --> 35:04.898
been a painful lesson to learn as

35:04.898 --> 35:06.898
Secretary of the Army over the last

35:06.898 --> 35:09.065
year . We , the Army over decades have

35:09.065 --> 35:11.628
created a bad reinforcing cycle where

35:12.049 --> 35:14.160
we've asked you to trust us . We have

35:14.160 --> 35:16.105
spent a lot of money in a way that

35:16.105 --> 35:18.327
didn't defend taxpayers right for their

35:18.327 --> 35:20.979
dollar to be spent . As safely as

35:20.979 --> 35:23.146
possible , we have had failed programs

35:23.146 --> 35:25.257
with not enough oversight and we have

35:25.257 --> 35:27.257
failed the budget the entire time ,

35:27.257 --> 35:29.479
which is naturally , I think , inclined

35:29.479 --> 35:31.479
um all of you to say , OK , well we

35:31.479 --> 35:33.590
need more specificity in the budget .

35:33.590 --> 35:35.257
We're going to go from what I

35:35.257 --> 35:37.368
understand . 20 line items as of like

35:37.368 --> 35:39.590
the 80s and now I think we're over 1200

35:39.590 --> 35:41.535
line items and I think it's a very

35:41.535 --> 35:43.701
natural reaction to that . The problem

35:43.701 --> 35:45.646
has been it reinforces some of the

35:45.646 --> 35:47.757
worst traits of our purchasing system

35:47.757 --> 35:49.923
because in each of those line items we

35:49.923 --> 35:52.090
get , we get Um , very narrowly locked

35:52.090 --> 35:54.090
into buying things and particularly

35:54.090 --> 35:56.439
when it's tech related around data or

35:56.439 --> 35:58.610
moving information , we are purchasing

35:58.610 --> 36:00.721
things that are generally outdated by

36:00.721 --> 36:02.777
the day we purchase them and then we

36:02.777 --> 36:04.888
have a very hard time adapting to the

36:04.888 --> 36:07.054
speed of the innovation cycle . And so

36:07.054 --> 36:09.221
the reason we We are here . The United

36:09.221 --> 36:08.530
States Army has got to own a lot of

36:08.530 --> 36:12.449
responsibility for not doing an

36:12.449 --> 36:14.338
effective enough job , being good

36:14.338 --> 36:16.338
custodians of dollars and providing

36:16.338 --> 36:18.505
transparency for your constitutionally

36:18.505 --> 36:20.671
mandated role . Um , I , I think , are

36:20.671 --> 36:22.838
we going to pass the audit next year ?

36:22.838 --> 36:25.060
If you had asked me four months ago , I

36:25.060 --> 36:27.282
would have said unequivocally no . Um ,

36:27.282 --> 36:30.159
the army . had been working with a

36:30.159 --> 36:33.060
provider whose materiality threshold

36:33.239 --> 36:35.760
was very low , meaning they saw

36:35.760 --> 36:37.816
materiality in everything , and what

36:37.816 --> 36:39.982
that practically meant for the army is

36:39.982 --> 36:41.649
we had to do things like have

36:41.649 --> 36:43.816
depreciation schedules for every piece

36:43.816 --> 36:43.800
of equipment or many pieces of

36:43.800 --> 36:46.239
equipment that are just impractical for

36:46.239 --> 36:48.072
an organization of our size with

36:48.072 --> 36:50.239
equipment all over the world . We have

36:50.239 --> 36:52.183
since created a new plan . We have

36:52.183 --> 36:54.295
pulled up from the army doing its own

36:54.295 --> 36:54.189
audit . We're doing a Pentagon level

36:54.189 --> 36:56.699
audit now . Um , which gives me hope

36:56.699 --> 36:58.755
that it is possible that it could be

36:58.755 --> 37:00.810
done next year . I don't know what I

37:00.810 --> 37:03.032
would put the odds are , but I think we

37:03.032 --> 37:05.143
have a much stronger chance next year

37:05.143 --> 37:07.310
to provide the clarity that , um , has

37:07.310 --> 37:09.477
been legislated to us than in previous

37:09.477 --> 37:11.366
years to the , the purpose of the

37:11.366 --> 37:11.060
consolidation , and I can appreciate

37:11.479 --> 37:13.701
the caution for us wanting to blend the

37:13.701 --> 37:15.312
lines . The purpose from our

37:15.312 --> 37:17.479
perspective for something like NextGen

37:17.479 --> 37:19.257
C2 is the speed of innovation .

37:19.257 --> 37:21.312
Requires us to shift dollars between

37:21.312 --> 37:23.735
back-end systems like what Cisco offers

37:23.735 --> 37:25.624
to actually be the piping and the

37:25.624 --> 37:27.402
plumbing to get our information

37:27.402 --> 37:29.513
somewhere to a data pool to then have

37:29.513 --> 37:31.624
AI help us process it and get it back

37:31.624 --> 37:33.902
out to the warfighter . All of that is ,

37:33.902 --> 37:36.013
I mean , we can look at any newspaper

37:36.013 --> 37:38.179
and see what's going on with OpenAI or

37:38.179 --> 37:40.179
anthropic these days . The speed of

37:40.179 --> 37:42.291
these innovations doesn't allow us to

37:42.291 --> 37:44.457
stay as Predetermined where the dollar

37:44.457 --> 37:46.679
will go . And so what I'm hopeful to do

37:46.679 --> 37:48.846
with the committee is find a mechanism

37:48.846 --> 37:50.679
where you feel like you have the

37:50.679 --> 37:52.902
transparency you need , and I think the

37:52.902 --> 37:54.957
best way to do it is to show you the

37:54.957 --> 37:57.013
vantage dashboard that we've built ,

37:57.013 --> 37:59.013
which basically gives us a lot more

37:59.013 --> 38:01.235
visibility . into where the dollars are

38:01.235 --> 38:03.235
going and give your teams access so

38:03.235 --> 38:05.457
that they can run their own reports and

38:05.457 --> 38:05.054
they can hold us accountable to doing

38:05.054 --> 38:07.165
what we all have agreed those dollars

38:07.165 --> 38:08.887
should do without specifically

38:08.887 --> 38:11.110
requiring so many line items . Well , I

38:11.110 --> 38:13.334
might agree with some of what you've

38:13.334 --> 38:17.149
said . But this needs to be a two-way

38:17.149 --> 38:19.639
conversation . Um , without the audit ,

38:20.129 --> 38:22.296
if this is how we used to audit , then

38:22.296 --> 38:25.060
a conversation has to take place with

38:25.060 --> 38:28.500
our clerks and with us on what we need

38:28.500 --> 38:31.959
to see . I , I hear loud and clear that

38:31.959 --> 38:34.126
you know what you would like to do and

38:34.126 --> 38:36.292
I might not disagree with all , all of

38:36.292 --> 38:38.600
it . I might not disagree with much of

38:38.600 --> 38:41.800
it , but we have ways in which we use

38:41.800 --> 38:43.856
those lines that you're probably not

38:43.856 --> 38:47.179
cognizant of and so I think

38:47.679 --> 38:50.000
rather than just hand , hand it to this

38:50.000 --> 38:52.222
committee , and I'll include the Senate

38:52.222 --> 38:54.389
in it to the Senate committee and just

38:54.389 --> 38:56.556
say , hey , this is how we're gonna do

38:56.556 --> 38:58.699
it from now on when we don't have an

38:58.709 --> 39:02.560
audit . It is not it , it , it ,

39:02.590 --> 39:05.610
it sets both of us up for friction and

39:05.610 --> 39:07.777
possible failure for what we both want

39:07.777 --> 39:09.999
to accomplish . I hope that makes sense

39:09.999 --> 39:12.166
to you . The other thing you mentioned

39:12.166 --> 39:14.388
about the audit , there were parameters

39:14.388 --> 39:16.610
and things that were supposed to happen

39:16.610 --> 39:18.721
within the audit , so I would like to

39:18.721 --> 39:22.219
see kind of what your I'd like to see

39:22.219 --> 39:24.108
if they'd line up and match or if

39:24.108 --> 39:26.330
you've , you've changed things , and if

39:26.330 --> 39:28.386
things needed to be changed from the

39:28.386 --> 39:30.386
way the audit was first requested ,

39:30.386 --> 39:32.608
then here again I think Congress has to

39:32.608 --> 39:34.775
be included in that discussion because

39:34.860 --> 39:36.916
we were the ones who wrote the rules

39:36.916 --> 39:38.860
for the audit . You see what I'm ,

39:38.860 --> 39:41.082
where I'm getting at ? Yes ma'am . So I

39:41.082 --> 39:43.082
look forward to working with you on

39:43.082 --> 39:42.540
that and we'll follow up , ma'am .

39:43.100 --> 39:45.378
Thank you , Ranking Member . Thank you ,

39:45.378 --> 39:47.600
uh , the full committee Chairman , Mr .

39:47.600 --> 39:47.060
Cole . Thank you very much , Mr .

39:47.179 --> 39:49.346
Chairman . Uh , Mr . Secretary , and ,

39:49.346 --> 39:51.512
uh , General , I invite you to comment

39:51.512 --> 39:53.623
on this as well after the Secretary's

39:53.623 --> 39:55.623
remarks if it's appropriate and you

39:55.623 --> 39:57.735
choose to . Uh , last few years , the

39:57.735 --> 39:59.846
Army's requested , uh , less than the

39:59.846 --> 40:02.939
minimum production rate of 36 platforms

40:02.939 --> 40:06.050
or sets for the Paladin program . Kind

40:06.050 --> 40:08.469
of risking , um , uh , product , the

40:08.469 --> 40:10.691
production line , stoppages , workforce

40:10.691 --> 40:13.750
layoffs . The fiscal year 2027 requests

40:13.750 --> 40:17.389
zero out of Paladin procurement despite

40:17.389 --> 40:20.790
having only awarded 518 of the original

40:20.790 --> 40:24.350
acquisition objectives of 689 sets .

40:24.629 --> 40:26.740
And I guess what I'm trying to figure

40:26.740 --> 40:28.907
out , and perhaps you can enlighten me

40:28.907 --> 40:31.073
on . Is , number one , is this because

40:31.073 --> 40:33.240
of budget constraints or are we moving

40:33.240 --> 40:35.462
on from the platform ? Is it a decision

40:35.462 --> 40:38.750
to make a change there , or , you know ,

40:39.030 --> 40:42.310
again , we don't know what might or

40:42.310 --> 40:44.639
might not be in the

40:46.125 --> 40:48.985
$350 billion request that's coming

40:48.985 --> 40:51.364
later down the road , is it , is that

40:51.364 --> 40:53.531
something that would be put in there ?

40:53.531 --> 40:55.531
I'm just trying to figure out where

40:55.531 --> 40:57.753
we're headed on the program and whether

40:57.753 --> 40:59.808
the objective is to get rid of it or

40:59.808 --> 41:01.864
deploy it or do it in some different

41:01.864 --> 41:05.850
way . Sure , uh , I would

41:05.850 --> 41:08.300
go first real fast . So , sir , uh , I

41:08.300 --> 41:10.633
was a private on , on a pallet and , uh ,

41:10.633 --> 41:12.979
you know , a long time ago . So , the

41:12.979 --> 41:15.090
system's a great system , but we need

41:15.090 --> 41:17.580
to move to a lighter , uh , system . I ,

41:17.689 --> 41:19.689
when you , when you look at what it

41:19.689 --> 41:21.856
takes to get a pallet in someplace and

41:21.856 --> 41:23.967
you get what it takes to get highmars

41:23.967 --> 41:26.439
and how , uh , the capabilities of that

41:26.580 --> 41:28.747
weapon system compared to the pallet ,

41:28.747 --> 41:30.858
and there's , there's no comparison .

41:30.858 --> 41:32.747
So , we're looking forward to our

41:32.747 --> 41:36.090
pacing threat . We need to move to

41:36.669 --> 41:39.189
systems that weigh a lot less so we can

41:39.189 --> 41:42.030
get it where it needs to be in a time

41:42.030 --> 41:44.909
of need . And to specifically answer

41:44.909 --> 41:46.798
your question , Chairman , we are

41:46.798 --> 41:48.798
looking at a mobile tactical cannon

41:49.070 --> 41:51.189
which can in place , I think it's 40

41:51.189 --> 41:53.550
seconds versus 15 minutes , which

41:53.550 --> 41:55.661
matters a lot with the drone threat .

41:55.739 --> 41:57.906
If you look at the flood in Ukraine on

41:57.906 --> 41:59.989
either side , um , it's just really

41:59.989 --> 42:02.211
hard to move out and get fires ready to

42:02.211 --> 42:04.378
go , and then I mean you have to do it

42:04.378 --> 42:06.545
incredibly quickly . The paladins just

42:06.545 --> 42:08.656
incapable of it at speed and so while

42:08.656 --> 42:10.711
we think that Paladin will be in our

42:10.711 --> 42:12.933
lives for a while because we want to be

42:12.933 --> 42:14.822
good custodians of the assets the

42:14.822 --> 42:16.822
American taxpayer has given us . We

42:16.822 --> 42:18.822
think that new purchases to balance

42:18.822 --> 42:18.774
that platform out should be something

42:18.774 --> 42:21.107
different . Believe me , Mr . Secretary ,

42:21.107 --> 42:23.274
we've been looking for a new gun for a

42:23.274 --> 42:25.385
long , long time , and we've had gone

42:25.385 --> 42:27.607
through multiple iterations . So , uh ,

42:27.607 --> 42:29.774
I'm just trying to get a feel for what

42:29.774 --> 42:31.941
the , the plan is and , and what we're

42:31.941 --> 42:34.052
looking towards . So that's a helpful

42:34.052 --> 42:36.969
response , um . Given that , I mean ,

42:37.050 --> 42:40.050
how does this hold in procurement , and

42:40.050 --> 42:42.217
I think you've answered part of this ,

42:42.217 --> 42:44.439
aligned with the Army's stated priority

42:44.439 --> 42:46.550
of long range precision fires . You ,

42:46.550 --> 42:48.717
you haven't abandoned obviously that .

42:48.717 --> 42:50.606
You're just looking for a new way

42:50.606 --> 42:52.828
forward or a new instrument . Yes sir .

42:52.828 --> 42:54.939
And if you look at the Koreans have a

42:54.939 --> 42:57.161
very good version with Hanw , there are

42:57.161 --> 42:57.010
a lot of solutions that other nations

42:57.010 --> 42:59.850
have used , um , and we as an army have

42:59.850 --> 43:01.794
got to . Capture a lot of that new

43:01.794 --> 43:03.885
innovation and fires and so but this

43:03.885 --> 43:06.107
will be part of a balanced portfolio of

43:06.107 --> 43:08.329
fires . So are you comfortable that you

43:08.329 --> 43:10.441
have a pretty clear vision of what it

43:10.441 --> 43:12.552
is you want to do going forward , you

43:12.552 --> 43:14.718
know , it's one thing to decide , OK ,

43:14.718 --> 43:16.829
we need to move something different ,

43:16.829 --> 43:18.941
but what ? I mean , what would be the

43:18.941 --> 43:21.052
next iteration for long-term fires in

43:21.052 --> 43:23.052
your view ? Yes sir , I think we do

43:23.052 --> 43:25.764
have a pretty good view of where we're

43:25.764 --> 43:28.739
going . I think out of all of the new

43:28.739 --> 43:31.020
PAEs that the secretary and team

43:31.020 --> 43:34.360
created . Our fires portfolio team

43:35.239 --> 43:37.719
is , is probably the best

43:38.899 --> 43:41.260
organized right now . I mean it's only

43:41.260 --> 43:45.219
been coming up on 4 or 5 months that

43:45.219 --> 43:48.189
we've organized in this manner . But

43:48.189 --> 43:51.110
they've been pushing pretty , pretty

43:51.110 --> 43:53.429
fast . Uh , Lieutenant General Lozano

43:53.429 --> 43:56.429
is in charge of it , so it's a mix of

43:56.429 --> 43:58.596
the system . So we think there's a lot

43:58.596 --> 44:00.909
of promise in the uh the mobile

44:00.909 --> 44:03.280
tactical cannon as the Secretary talked

44:03.280 --> 44:05.620
about . We've been in , you know , uh ,

44:05.790 --> 44:07.901
search for , you know , a system like

44:07.901 --> 44:10.123
this . We think that it can be produced

44:10.123 --> 44:12.179
now . We'd like it to be on a common

44:12.179 --> 44:14.840
chassis so our systems are easier

44:16.260 --> 44:19.979
to maintain across the force , and

44:19.979 --> 44:22.250
we're not walking away from long range

44:22.250 --> 44:24.250
fires . We have to have them in our

44:24.250 --> 44:26.306
inventory based off of what we think

44:26.306 --> 44:28.528
the pacing threat is , what we know the

44:28.528 --> 44:30.528
pacing threat is , but just look at

44:30.528 --> 44:32.361
what's going on right now in the

44:32.361 --> 44:34.417
opening salvo of the fight in Iran .

44:34.417 --> 44:36.739
The army had a crucial part of that

44:36.739 --> 44:40.189
with our fires . Well , I would love to

44:40.189 --> 44:42.270
get , and I'm not going to take the

44:42.270 --> 44:44.270
committee's time on this , but just

44:44.270 --> 44:46.270
perhaps privately to get a brief on

44:46.270 --> 44:48.469
this in terms of again where you think

44:48.469 --> 44:50.790
we're headed . I understand this is a

44:50.790 --> 44:52.623
time of great change , and we're

44:52.623 --> 44:55.350
learning , as my friend Mr . Calvert

44:55.350 --> 44:57.790
said , uh , this war in Ukraine started

44:57.790 --> 45:00.012
at one kind of war and has evolved into

45:00.012 --> 45:02.234
another one , and I don't know that any

45:02.234 --> 45:04.123
of us saw that coming at the very

45:04.123 --> 45:06.290
beginning of this conflict , so it's a

45:06.290 --> 45:08.123
transformational time . Uh , but

45:08.123 --> 45:10.290
obviously , uh , uh , as you mentioned

45:10.290 --> 45:12.290
yourself , general , we , we have a

45:12.290 --> 45:14.346
pacing threat . We , we , this is an

45:14.346 --> 45:16.679
area where we have always excelled . We ,

45:16.679 --> 45:19.070
we outdo everybody else . Uh , I ,

45:19.270 --> 45:21.270
that's an edge I don't want to lose

45:21.270 --> 45:24.020
down the road , so . Again , I've seen

45:24.020 --> 45:27.340
a lot of starts and stops in , in long

45:27.340 --> 45:29.979
range artillery acquisition over the

45:29.979 --> 45:32.659
last 20 years , you know , everything

45:32.659 --> 45:35.100
from the Crusader to the endless , lots

45:35.100 --> 45:37.267
of systems that were talked about that

45:37.267 --> 45:39.699
never happened , and , uh , you know ,

45:39.780 --> 45:41.699
I think that may be one of the

45:41.699 --> 45:44.100
challenges that we have now , that

45:44.100 --> 45:46.433
perhaps we missed opportunities earlier .

45:46.433 --> 45:48.322
I , I just don't want to see that

45:48.322 --> 45:51.629
happen again . I've got a lot of other

45:51.629 --> 45:54.010
questions , but I'm not going to over

45:54.300 --> 45:56.449
overstay my welcome , Mr . Chairman ,

45:56.469 --> 45:58.510
and again , thank you very much .

45:58.810 --> 46:00.977
Appreciate the information . Thank you

46:00.977 --> 46:03.088
gentlemen . You'll be happy to submit

46:03.088 --> 46:05.088
the questions , I might be here for

46:05.088 --> 46:07.310
another round . Oh yeah , we could , we

46:07.310 --> 46:09.477
could if you want another round , Mr .

46:09.477 --> 46:13.340
Chairman , we will have one . Uh , Mr .

46:13.350 --> 46:16.030
Case , thank you , Mr . Chair . Mr .

46:16.070 --> 46:18.550
Secretary , uh , first of all , I , I

46:18.550 --> 46:20.669
endorse the comments of the chair of

46:20.669 --> 46:22.891
the full committee and the chair of the

46:22.891 --> 46:24.891
ranking committee regarding General

46:24.891 --> 46:27.110
George . Um , I personally had very

46:27.110 --> 46:28.777
high confidence , uh , in his

46:28.777 --> 46:30.832
leadership at a really critical time

46:30.832 --> 46:33.449
for our army and our country , and now

46:33.510 --> 46:35.621
I personally have to start over again

46:35.621 --> 46:37.788
with an uncertain result in a critical

46:37.788 --> 46:40.120
time . When you collectively , the

46:40.120 --> 46:42.320
president , the secretary , and

46:42.320 --> 46:45.969
yourself . Decide to summarily fire the

46:45.969 --> 46:48.919
chief of staff of the army publicly ,

46:49.050 --> 46:50.772
overtly , and I would even say

46:50.772 --> 46:53.830
humiliatingly and cruelly , um ,

46:54.139 --> 46:56.028
without any offer apparently of a

46:56.028 --> 46:58.330
graceful exit , you at least owe

46:58.330 --> 47:02.209
Congress The public and I think most

47:02.209 --> 47:04.070
importantly the soldiers some

47:04.070 --> 47:06.689
explanation which you did not do and

47:06.689 --> 47:08.770
you consciously chose not to and in

47:08.770 --> 47:11.209
doing so you created and compounded

47:11.209 --> 47:13.530
numerous issues including morale

47:13.810 --> 47:17.219
uncertainty . And distrust , and I do

47:17.219 --> 47:19.386
not believe that that is acceptable or

47:19.386 --> 47:21.552
should be acceptable . So I want to be

47:21.552 --> 47:23.719
really clear now . I can go on because

47:23.719 --> 47:25.886
I don't need a response , but I feel I

47:25.886 --> 47:27.941
need to offer you the opportunity to

47:27.941 --> 47:27.649
respond . And if you don't want to ,

47:27.699 --> 47:29.810
that's fine . I'll just go on with my

47:29.810 --> 47:31.755
questions . I'm happy to respond ,

47:31.755 --> 47:33.588
Congressman . I , I was in North

47:33.588 --> 47:35.755
Carolina when General George was asked

47:35.755 --> 47:37.755
to put in his resignation paperwork

47:37.755 --> 47:39.699
with my family for my kids' spring

47:39.699 --> 47:41.755
break . Um , when we drove back from

47:41.755 --> 47:41.429
North Carolina , I drove straight to

47:41.429 --> 47:43.373
General George's house . We walked

47:43.373 --> 47:45.707
right in and we all gave him a hug . Um ,

47:45.707 --> 47:47.879
there , there is no person , uh , that

47:48.080 --> 47:50.302
has more respect for General George and

47:50.302 --> 47:52.358
his 42 years of service , his Purple

47:52.358 --> 47:54.358
Heart , his wife Patty , um , their

47:54.358 --> 47:56.469
grandkids , their kids . Um , I adore

47:56.469 --> 47:58.080
them , and he was an amazing

47:58.080 --> 48:00.136
transformational leader . That being

48:00.136 --> 48:02.191
said , The civilian leadership , the

48:02.191 --> 48:04.191
design of our system is that they ,

48:04.191 --> 48:04.010
they get to pick the leaders that they

48:04.010 --> 48:06.360
want , um , and we execute on those

48:06.360 --> 48:08.249
orders . And what I can say about

48:08.249 --> 48:10.304
General Le Neve sitting beside me is

48:10.304 --> 48:12.360
his family , his kids are in serving

48:12.360 --> 48:14.416
now . He served 35 years , has led a

48:14.416 --> 48:17.550
lot of our most important formations ,

48:17.760 --> 48:19.982
and what is so amazing about the United

48:19.982 --> 48:22.093
States Army is , and we've done calls

48:22.093 --> 48:24.260
with all of our leadership over . Last

48:24.260 --> 48:26.204
week , the United States Army goes

48:26.204 --> 48:28.371
rolling along for the last 250 years .

48:28.371 --> 48:30.427
We have amazing leaders all over the

48:30.427 --> 48:32.427
world who can step in at a moment's

48:32.427 --> 48:34.649
notice and keep fighting for our army .

48:34.649 --> 48:36.982
Um , and my commitment to you , I think ,

48:36.982 --> 48:36.800
is as you get to know General Laneve ,

48:36.850 --> 48:39.050
you will find him to be a patriotic

48:39.050 --> 48:40.772
American too , whose family is

48:40.772 --> 48:42.969
multi-generational service . Uh , but

48:42.969 --> 48:45.870
just to wrap back up , uh , I too love

48:45.870 --> 48:48.070
General George . I suggest that you

48:48.070 --> 48:49.959
would take lessons from history ,

48:49.959 --> 48:52.790
especially President Truman's firing of

48:52.790 --> 48:54.623
General MacArthur , which he did

48:54.623 --> 48:56.790
publicly and with an explanation , and

48:56.790 --> 48:58.957
there was a great outcry over it , but

48:58.957 --> 49:01.068
we all knew why . And in time I think

49:01.068 --> 49:03.068
we all , most of us at least agreed

49:03.068 --> 49:05.179
with that , so we'll leave it at that

49:05.179 --> 49:07.179
for now . I'm trying to , uh , make

49:07.179 --> 49:09.870
sense of your , uh , FY 2027 budget ,

49:10.310 --> 49:12.199
uh , especially the allocation as

49:12.199 --> 49:14.030
between discretionary and

49:14.030 --> 49:16.250
reconciliation . Because we're of

49:16.250 --> 49:18.417
course dealing here with discretionary

49:18.449 --> 49:20.449
and yet your budget overall is a

49:20.449 --> 49:22.282
combination of discretionary and

49:22.282 --> 49:25.729
reconciliation and I do not exactly

49:25.729 --> 49:27.896
understand and maybe this is coming in

49:27.896 --> 49:29.840
the delayed justifications why you

49:29.840 --> 49:31.396
chose to put some things in

49:31.396 --> 49:33.570
discretionary versus reconciliation .

49:33.969 --> 49:36.025
So if I'm taking a look at basically

49:36.025 --> 49:38.025
your four buckets , uh , I'm seeing

49:38.025 --> 49:40.247
that in your procurement summary you're

49:40.247 --> 49:41.939
putting about 41% . Uh , into

49:41.939 --> 49:43.879
reconciliation in research and

49:43.879 --> 49:46.046
development , you're putting less than

49:46.046 --> 49:48.120
1% uh into reconciliation . Your

49:48.120 --> 49:50.342
personnel , you're not putting anything

49:50.342 --> 49:52.620
even though you did put personnel , uh ,

49:52.669 --> 49:56.560
in reconciliation FY 26 . And then if I

49:56.560 --> 49:58.616
understand correctly on your ONM you

49:58.616 --> 50:01.739
got about 14% . So I'm not exactly , uh ,

50:01.800 --> 50:03.856
following your rationale here and by

50:03.856 --> 50:05.856
the way , your , your , your , your

50:05.856 --> 50:07.967
approach that you're following in the

50:07.967 --> 50:07.840
army seems to be quite different from

50:07.840 --> 50:10.007
the other services , so that in and of

50:10.007 --> 50:12.229
itself is its own question . But just ,

50:12.229 --> 50:14.860
just to , you know , focus on one

50:14.860 --> 50:16.916
particular area which I'm not sure I

50:16.916 --> 50:19.027
understand , I'm look I'm I'm looking

50:19.027 --> 50:21.919
at your procurement summary . Which is

50:21.919 --> 50:24.810
41% reconciliation , missile

50:24.810 --> 50:28.689
procurement is all of that . What is

50:28.689 --> 50:32.600
missile procurement in FY 27 ,

50:32.610 --> 50:34.830
and why is that all in reconciliation

50:34.830 --> 50:37.810
and is any of that directly or

50:37.810 --> 50:41.729
indirectly related to drawdown in

50:42.290 --> 50:46.260
Iran ? Yes , sir . So thank

50:46.260 --> 50:48.550
you for the question . So , uh , in ,

50:48.739 --> 50:50.961
in the reconciliation , we have missile

50:50.961 --> 50:52.850
procurement . We have some , uh ,

50:52.850 --> 50:55.370
earmarked for uh OIB , uh ,

50:55.379 --> 50:57.290
modernization , and we have some

50:57.290 --> 51:00.360
facility improvements . Uh , and then

51:00.540 --> 51:02.762
when you , in the procurement , it's to

51:02.762 --> 51:05.610
go after the systems that we , uh , you

51:05.610 --> 51:07.332
know , spoke about in the very

51:07.332 --> 51:09.443
beginning , which is the , you know ,

51:09.443 --> 51:11.443
the transformational platforms that

51:11.443 --> 51:13.277
we're , we're looking for . Next

51:13.277 --> 51:15.600
generation C2 , it's the MB-75 , uh ,

51:15.610 --> 51:17.832
that , that Abrahams tank replacement .

51:17.832 --> 51:20.370
So , um , you know , they're , they're

51:20.370 --> 51:23.330
both in , in , in both of those , um .

51:24.530 --> 51:26.697
Why did you , why did you load so much

51:26.697 --> 51:28.919
in procurement into reconciliation when

51:28.919 --> 51:31.086
you didn't do that in the other , um ,

51:31.219 --> 51:34.840
in , in the other lines ? Um , in

51:34.840 --> 51:36.840
partnership with , uh , OSW and the

51:36.840 --> 51:39.007
Deputy Secretary of War , this was the

51:39.007 --> 51:41.007
plan we came up with , and I'm very

51:41.007 --> 51:43.229
happy , Congressman , to follow up with

51:43.229 --> 51:45.396
more details and rationality or office

51:45.396 --> 51:44.209
if that's helpful . OK , well ,

51:44.399 --> 51:46.510
probably for , for the full committee

51:46.510 --> 51:48.732
because I think this is something we're

51:48.732 --> 51:48.340
all sorting through is why

51:48.800 --> 51:51.419
discretionary versus reconciliation .

51:51.429 --> 51:53.096
And by the way , what is your

51:53.096 --> 51:54.873
contingency plan if we don't do

51:54.873 --> 51:57.151
reconciliation at the amount ? Are you ,

51:57.151 --> 51:59.207
are you then gonna reprioritize your

51:59.207 --> 52:01.096
missile procurement back into the

52:01.096 --> 52:03.262
discretionary budget , or is that just

52:03.262 --> 52:05.485
a lower priority ? You know , those are

52:05.485 --> 52:07.651
the questions that we have . Yes sir ,

52:07.651 --> 52:06.729
we can follow up with the full

52:06.729 --> 52:08.840
committee , sir . Thank you . I yield

52:08.840 --> 52:11.070
back . Thank you ,

52:13.780 --> 52:15.891
Mr . Chairman for the time and thanks

52:15.891 --> 52:18.002
to the gentlemen for their service to

52:18.002 --> 52:20.250
our country . I will at the outset

52:20.750 --> 52:22.870
associate myself with the remarks of

52:22.870 --> 52:26.590
Chairman Cole both as it concerns

52:26.590 --> 52:30.350
the work of our Secretary of the

52:30.350 --> 52:32.820
Army , Mr . Driscoll .

52:34.350 --> 52:37.030
I wholeheartedly agree with what he

52:37.030 --> 52:39.949
said about your Capability and about

52:39.949 --> 52:42.610
your demonstrated leadership in the

52:42.610 --> 52:46.169
greatest army on the planet and

52:46.169 --> 52:49.649
also for his remarks about General

52:49.649 --> 52:51.760
George . I found Randy George to be a

52:51.760 --> 52:54.090
patriotic American . I won't go through

52:54.090 --> 52:55.757
all of his background , but a

52:55.757 --> 52:58.840
distinguished . Representative of our

52:58.840 --> 53:00.896
army and I too regret the fact under

53:00.896 --> 53:04.060
the conditions that he left the service ,

53:04.520 --> 53:08.439
and I think that our country

53:08.439 --> 53:10.639
will regret that circumstance . That's

53:10.639 --> 53:14.520
another story . Secretary Driscoll . We

53:14.520 --> 53:16.687
understand the Army's need to innovate

53:16.687 --> 53:18.687
and produce to ensure that we never

53:18.687 --> 53:20.798
fight a fair fight , that we're ready

53:20.798 --> 53:22.742
to dominate at a moment's notice .

53:22.742 --> 53:25.370
That's what we do as an army . We also

53:25.370 --> 53:27.259
understand it can be difficult to

53:27.259 --> 53:29.729
update a modernize doctrine to keep up

53:29.729 --> 53:32.290
with the innovation that we've spoken a

53:32.290 --> 53:35.129
lot about today . Sometimes they don't

53:35.129 --> 53:37.810
move at the same speed .

53:38.850 --> 53:41.820
So my question is what mechanisms exist

53:41.820 --> 53:45.100
or should exist to update doctrine and

53:45.100 --> 53:48.300
force design fast enough to incorporate

53:48.300 --> 53:51.899
these systems , because without the

53:51.899 --> 53:53.939
marriage of these two speed , and

53:53.939 --> 53:55.995
that's been a constant theme in your

53:55.995 --> 53:59.949
remarks today , if we don't Accomplish

53:59.949 --> 54:02.005
speed in the doctrinal aspect , then

54:02.005 --> 54:05.570
the innovation sometimes can be

54:05.570 --> 54:08.659
slow . To the table , can you help us ?

54:09.060 --> 54:11.171
Yes , sir . Um , one of the things we

54:11.171 --> 54:13.393
did , um , with the Army Transformation

54:13.393 --> 54:15.504
Initiative was consolidating down how

54:15.504 --> 54:17.727
we train and where we purchase into one

54:17.727 --> 54:19.782
command , and that may seem slightly

54:19.782 --> 54:21.838
esoteric or just , um , bureaucratic

54:21.838 --> 54:24.860
speak for . Nothingness , but it is

54:24.860 --> 54:27.027
actually very substantive because both

54:27.027 --> 54:29.229
those groups used to exist in a silo .

54:29.419 --> 54:31.530
Despite best attempts , when you have

54:31.530 --> 54:33.752
two different command structures , they

54:33.752 --> 54:33.659
move out on their own . And what we

54:33.659 --> 54:35.881
have learned from Ukraine in particular

54:35.881 --> 54:39.060
is the software and the TTPs for drones

54:39.060 --> 54:41.939
is updating weekly or biweekly , and

54:41.939 --> 54:44.050
you have got to be able to adjust and

54:44.050 --> 54:45.828
adapt . And so that is one core

54:45.828 --> 54:47.772
fundamental step we made to how we

54:47.772 --> 54:49.883
actually think about these things and

54:49.883 --> 54:51.995
then . Another thing that we're doing

54:51.995 --> 54:54.217
is we have SAGU who's been working with

54:54.217 --> 54:56.161
Ukraine since the very beginning .

54:56.161 --> 54:58.328
They're sending out weekly newsletters

54:58.328 --> 55:00.439
and updates about what the Ukrainians

55:00.439 --> 55:02.606
are doing to adjust and adapt . We are

55:02.606 --> 55:04.828
partnering with allies like the British

55:04.828 --> 55:06.939
and the Israelis to get their lessons

55:06.939 --> 55:09.106
too , and we know , Congressman , that

55:09.106 --> 55:11.272
it's exactly what you were saying . If

55:11.272 --> 55:13.161
we get the right equipment to our

55:13.161 --> 55:15.328
soldiers but don't adjust our TTPs and

55:15.328 --> 55:17.161
don't train them on it , that is

55:17.161 --> 55:17.020
completely insufficient just as it is

55:17.020 --> 55:19.131
to train them , but not give them the

55:19.131 --> 55:21.187
things they need to fight and win an

55:21.187 --> 55:23.879
unfair fight . General , I consider

55:23.879 --> 55:26.101
part of the secret sauce of our ability

55:26.101 --> 55:28.046
as an army are the combat training

55:28.046 --> 55:30.268
center rotations that our military goes

55:30.268 --> 55:33.899
through . How are these innovations and

55:33.899 --> 55:36.860
this doctrinal change finding its way

55:36.860 --> 55:40.280
into our CTCs ? Sure , thanks for the

55:40.280 --> 55:42.336
question . Oh , I , I've been , uh ,

55:42.336 --> 55:44.949
accused of being a CTC zealot , uh ,

55:44.959 --> 55:47.015
over the years . I think they're the

55:47.015 --> 55:49.181
most important ingredient that we have

55:49.181 --> 55:51.800
that produces an army that can fight

55:51.800 --> 55:54.199
and win anywhere . You know , part of

55:54.199 --> 55:57.340
the CTC program , uh , always has been

55:57.840 --> 56:00.439
the experiment , uh , with new TTPs

56:00.439 --> 56:02.606
there . I mean , that , that's where a

56:02.606 --> 56:04.939
brigade commander gets the ability . To ,

56:04.939 --> 56:08.129
you know , fight and experiment with ,

56:08.300 --> 56:10.870
uh , with , you know , new ways to , to

56:10.870 --> 56:13.389
look at the battlefield , and , and

56:13.389 --> 56:15.611
then to take those lessons learned from

56:15.611 --> 56:17.500
the rotation and propagate it out

56:17.500 --> 56:19.556
across the army . We're not going to

56:19.556 --> 56:21.611
step away from the importance of our

56:21.611 --> 56:23.833
CTCs . We can't . They're too important

56:23.833 --> 56:27.159
to us . But because now there are CTCs

56:27.159 --> 56:29.449
don't . Don't straddle two different

56:29.449 --> 56:32.010
commands , forces command and , and uh

56:32.010 --> 56:34.232
trade act like it used to be . It's all

56:34.232 --> 56:36.729
under one command under T2com . The

56:36.729 --> 56:38.889
ability to experiment with new

56:38.889 --> 56:41.111
equipment and get those lessons learned

56:41.111 --> 56:43.850
back into the training base is faster

56:43.850 --> 56:45.961
than I've ever seen , uh , since I've

56:45.961 --> 56:48.183
been in the military , and I think it's

56:48.183 --> 56:50.239
going to go even faster with some of

56:50.239 --> 56:52.350
the new things that the Combined Arms

56:52.350 --> 56:54.572
Center is experimenting with an AI data

56:54.572 --> 56:58.409
platform that is able to To get us our

56:58.409 --> 57:00.520
doctrine at a much faster pace to get

57:00.520 --> 57:02.840
it out to our formations , and to

57:02.840 --> 57:04.951
integrate that into the training base

57:04.951 --> 57:07.118
at speed that we haven't seen before .

57:07.118 --> 57:09.173
We're trying to take advantage of it

57:09.173 --> 57:11.340
all , but that change in one command

57:11.340 --> 57:13.396
that really takes a soldier from the

57:13.396 --> 57:15.800
living room , through recruiting ,

57:16.209 --> 57:18.265
through the training base and out to

57:18.265 --> 57:21.179
their first unit , and then Uh , also

57:21.179 --> 57:23.179
at the combat training centers that

57:23.179 --> 57:25.068
they own , as they're looking and

57:25.068 --> 57:27.123
working with the gear that that same

57:27.123 --> 57:29.300
command who owns the P&Es is churning

57:29.300 --> 57:31.189
out , uh , so you're getting that

57:31.189 --> 57:34.050
soldier touch point . At a much faster

57:34.050 --> 57:36.050
pace in the acquisition process and

57:36.050 --> 57:37.939
then we're also testing it at the

57:37.939 --> 57:40.106
combat training centers . So there's a

57:40.106 --> 57:42.161
lot of synergy there that we haven't

57:42.161 --> 57:44.217
had before , but we cannot walk away

57:44.217 --> 57:46.328
from what the CTC has also produced ,

57:46.328 --> 57:48.106
which is the basic blocking and

57:48.106 --> 57:50.328
tackling that our formations have to be

57:50.328 --> 57:52.106
able to have to be able to kick

57:52.106 --> 57:54.328
anybody's butt in the world . You still

57:54.328 --> 57:56.550
have to have somebody prepared to close

57:56.550 --> 57:59.040
with and destroy the enemy when , when

57:59.040 --> 58:01.340
needed . Secretary , did you want to

58:01.340 --> 58:03.507
address the the topic ? Uh , the , the

58:03.507 --> 58:05.600
very last bit was , um , just to the

58:05.600 --> 58:07.767
portion of the T2 com and all of these

58:07.767 --> 58:10.219
changes that have occurred . One of my

58:10.219 --> 58:12.441
surprises has been when I came into the

58:12.441 --> 58:14.608
role , like , why didn't this happen a

58:14.608 --> 58:16.719
while ago ? And one of the reasons is

58:16.719 --> 58:18.941
you have so many , and I , I don't mean

58:18.941 --> 58:18.820
this in a pejorative way , but

58:18.820 --> 58:20.987
entrenched interests for where we have

58:20.987 --> 58:23.042
our headquarters , where we have our

58:23.042 --> 58:25.153
employees , where it's just everybody

58:25.153 --> 58:27.487
gets used to the thing and it is really ,

58:27.487 --> 58:29.653
really hard to change it , um , and so

58:29.653 --> 58:31.598
the , the . Very sincerely and not

58:31.598 --> 58:33.598
intending to be sycophantic without

58:33.598 --> 58:35.820
President Trump's air cover and without

58:35.820 --> 58:38.042
Secretary of War providing a shield for

58:38.042 --> 58:40.209
the kind of discomfort that comes from

58:40.209 --> 58:42.376
these changes , the United States Army

58:42.376 --> 58:42.060
could never have made these changes .

58:43.439 --> 58:45.217
Real quickly , a question about

58:45.217 --> 58:46.939
munitions . I know this entire

58:46.939 --> 58:49.860
committee is concerned about the rapid

58:51.479 --> 58:55.000
supply degradation on our

58:55.000 --> 58:57.500
munitions to either of you .

58:59.300 --> 59:03.010
Is this a true risk to our

59:03.010 --> 59:06.330
country if we don't resupply ourselves ,

59:06.370 --> 59:08.092
if we don't engage the defense

59:08.092 --> 59:10.449
industrial base to produce the type of

59:10.449 --> 59:12.671
munitions that are going to be required

59:12.671 --> 59:15.005
in the next fight wherever that is ? Uh ,

59:15.005 --> 59:16.838
Congressman , I'd say this is an

59:16.838 --> 59:19.005
incredible opportunity for our country

59:19.005 --> 59:21.530
to put , put munitions back on the

59:21.530 --> 59:23.520
shelf and in the magazine that are

59:23.520 --> 59:27.000
built for , uh , scale and are built to

59:27.000 --> 59:28.722
be a balance for the exquisite

59:28.722 --> 59:30.667
munitions that we had historically

59:30.667 --> 59:33.000
purchased over the last 30 and 40 years .

59:33.000 --> 59:35.000
Our requirements documents , and we

59:35.000 --> 59:34.550
have to own this as an army , had

59:34.550 --> 59:36.750
gotten out of hand . It was when we

59:36.750 --> 59:38.917
went to market to get a new . Pistol .

59:38.917 --> 59:41.028
The requirement document was over 400

59:41.028 --> 59:43.194
pages to describe a pistol , and so we

59:43.194 --> 59:45.417
have done that nearly in every instance

59:45.417 --> 59:47.417
of purchasing in the last couple of

59:47.417 --> 59:49.583
decades . The opportunity right now as

59:49.583 --> 59:52.524
we rearm and become even stronger to do

59:52.524 --> 59:54.691
this right and to do it rationally and

59:54.691 --> 59:56.691
to do it the way the Ukrainians are

59:56.691 --> 59:58.857
doing it and the Israelis and a lot of

59:58.857 --> 01:00:00.802
other nations around the world , I

01:00:00.802 --> 01:00:02.913
think will make us stronger than ever

01:00:02.913 --> 01:00:02.629
at the end of it . Thank you to the

01:00:02.629 --> 01:00:05.830
gentlemen . Thank you . It's my

01:00:05.830 --> 01:00:08.790
pleasure to recognize the ranking

01:00:08.790 --> 01:00:10.790
member of the full committee , Mr .

01:00:10.790 --> 01:00:13.123
Laura . Thank you very , very much , uh ,

01:00:13.123 --> 01:00:15.179
Mr . Chairman and the ranking member

01:00:15.179 --> 01:00:16.901
and the Uh , chair of the full

01:00:16.901 --> 01:00:19.179
committee to my colleagues , uh , it's ,

01:00:19.179 --> 01:00:21.659
it's a day of hearings , uh , so I

01:00:21.659 --> 01:00:24.040
appreciate the opportunity to , uh , uh ,

01:00:24.100 --> 01:00:26.433
to be able to ask some questions and to ,

01:00:26.433 --> 01:00:28.656
uh , to listen , listen to the answer .

01:00:28.656 --> 01:00:30.878
I , I have to start with saying , I , I

01:00:30.878 --> 01:00:34.139
think it was maybe 2 days , uh , I met ,

01:00:34.199 --> 01:00:36.143
I had the opportunity to meet with

01:00:36.143 --> 01:00:39.739
General George , um , and it was a , it

01:00:39.739 --> 01:00:42.020
was a great meeting , so I was , uh , I

01:00:42.020 --> 01:00:44.939
was really very upset and disturbed .

01:00:45.290 --> 01:00:48.830
At how summarily he was dismissed

01:00:49.169 --> 01:00:51.439
um and uh that uh

01:00:53.479 --> 01:00:55.750
I just think that was really handled

01:00:55.750 --> 01:00:58.840
very , very poorly with a man of that

01:00:58.840 --> 01:01:01.820
rank and uh and , and , and knowledge .

01:01:02.449 --> 01:01:05.770
The other person as well , I'm still

01:01:05.770 --> 01:01:09.719
trying to figure out why the Uh , the

01:01:09.719 --> 01:01:12.449
head of the Army chaplains was let go

01:01:12.449 --> 01:01:14.919
as well . I mean that just seems , I ,

01:01:15.010 --> 01:01:17.177
I , I don't know what the reasoning is

01:01:17.177 --> 01:01:19.288
and I can't fathom what the reasoning

01:01:19.288 --> 01:01:21.454
is in letting someone who had by all ,

01:01:21.610 --> 01:01:23.721
you know , accounts has done a very ,

01:01:23.721 --> 01:01:25.943
very good , capable job in that piece ,

01:01:25.943 --> 01:01:28.939
so , um , but , uh , but thank you all

01:01:28.939 --> 01:01:31.106
for being here . Uh , Mr . Secretary ,

01:01:31.106 --> 01:01:33.328
from preliminary documents that we have

01:01:33.328 --> 01:01:35.661
received funding for Army aviation . Uh ,

01:01:35.919 --> 01:01:38.810
in 2027 drops from about $4.1 billion

01:01:38.810 --> 01:01:41.550
to $1.9 billion . That $2 billion

01:01:41.550 --> 01:01:43.770
dollar cut that includes reduction to

01:01:43.770 --> 01:01:46.010
the Chinooks , uh , Apaches where

01:01:46.010 --> 01:01:48.530
there's no longer a line , uh , the

01:01:48.530 --> 01:01:50.929
Black Hawks , um , uh , while funding

01:01:50.929 --> 01:01:54.570
for the future of Flora , um , uh , it

01:01:54.570 --> 01:01:57.110
increases significantly . Uh , the MP

01:01:57.110 --> 01:01:59.679
75 . At the same time , the president's

01:01:59.679 --> 01:02:02.199
national security strategy , a strategy ,

01:02:02.250 --> 01:02:04.639
that document which I have here and

01:02:04.639 --> 01:02:06.583
which I've read , uh , states that

01:02:06.583 --> 01:02:08.583
quote , the American national power

01:02:08.583 --> 01:02:10.695
depends on a strong industrial sector

01:02:10.695 --> 01:02:13.649
capable of meeting both peacetime and

01:02:13.649 --> 01:02:15.929
wartime production demands , end quote .

01:02:16.250 --> 01:02:18.250
So I'm concerned that cutting these

01:02:18.250 --> 01:02:20.169
programs so sharply weakens that

01:02:20.169 --> 01:02:22.090
industrial base , including the

01:02:22.090 --> 01:02:25.090
workforce and suppliers that support

01:02:25.090 --> 01:02:27.840
Army aviation . The decisions have real

01:02:27.840 --> 01:02:29.870
consequences . Reductions to the

01:02:29.870 --> 01:02:31.926
Chinook program affect approximately

01:02:31.926 --> 01:02:35.320
13,000 jobs across 320

01:02:35.320 --> 01:02:39.239
suppliers in 39 states , with an

01:02:39.239 --> 01:02:42.760
estimated $848 million economic impact .

01:02:43.080 --> 01:02:45.080
The decision to fund only one Black

01:02:45.080 --> 01:02:48.699
Hawk in 2027 may affect 240 suppliers

01:02:49.280 --> 01:02:52.080
across 41 states , and Sikorsky

01:02:52.080 --> 01:02:54.840
programs alone support more than 55,000

01:02:54.840 --> 01:02:57.510
jobs nationwide . At the same time ,

01:02:57.760 --> 01:03:01.560
the reductions are occurring before the

01:03:01.560 --> 01:03:03.616
future long-range assault aircraft ,

01:03:03.616 --> 01:03:06.379
Flora has even reached a flyable

01:03:06.679 --> 01:03:10.439
prototype . Um , and , and

01:03:10.439 --> 01:03:13.129
again , I had this conversation with

01:03:13.129 --> 01:03:15.320
General George , um , there's

01:03:15.320 --> 01:03:18.300
conflicting views as to the timeline .

01:03:18.669 --> 01:03:21.750
Um , and , and it's , it talked about

01:03:21.750 --> 01:03:24.389
the end of December to looking at the

01:03:24.389 --> 01:03:28.330
end of the decade , 2029 or 2030 before

01:03:28.510 --> 01:03:31.310
we're really , uh , online . So for me

01:03:31.310 --> 01:03:33.540
it raises a concern about the potential

01:03:33.540 --> 01:03:37.149
gap in capability for both the active

01:03:37.149 --> 01:03:40.439
army and for the um Uh , uh ,

01:03:40.449 --> 01:03:44.310
reserve components . So , uh , how does

01:03:44.310 --> 01:03:46.254
this quote cut everything approach

01:03:46.254 --> 01:03:48.530
align with the administration's stated

01:03:48.530 --> 01:03:50.030
priority of sustaining and

01:03:50.030 --> 01:03:52.086
strengthening the defense industrial

01:03:52.086 --> 01:03:54.197
base ? Um , I , I think so , but I'll

01:03:54.197 --> 01:03:56.252
ask the question , do you understand

01:03:56.252 --> 01:03:58.419
the difficulty of reopening lines that

01:03:58.419 --> 01:04:00.949
close , um , and what steps are being

01:04:00.949 --> 01:04:02.949
taken to ensure that we do not lose

01:04:03.090 --> 01:04:05.201
critical production capacity that may

01:04:05.201 --> 01:04:07.368
be needed to surge in the future . And

01:04:07.368 --> 01:04:09.534
did the army consult with the industry

01:04:09.534 --> 01:04:11.757
before making these decisions ? If so ,

01:04:11.757 --> 01:04:13.757
who and when ? Um , I , I will open

01:04:13.757 --> 01:04:15.868
ranking member and then hand it to my

01:04:15.868 --> 01:04:18.201
colleague General La Neve , um , to the ,

01:04:18.201 --> 01:04:20.423
to the employees of Sikorsky and all of

01:04:20.423 --> 01:04:22.646
the suppliers for the Black Hawk . That

01:04:22.646 --> 01:04:24.757
has been one of our best platforms we

01:04:24.757 --> 01:04:26.979
have , uh , had as an army . As much as

01:04:26.979 --> 01:04:29.090
I , I wanna , I , I love , you know ,

01:04:29.090 --> 01:04:30.923
there isn't anything better than

01:04:30.923 --> 01:04:33.090
Sikorsky and Black Hawks , but I think

01:04:33.090 --> 01:04:35.201
this is a bigger , wider issue of the

01:04:35.201 --> 01:04:37.368
industrial base in this area of , of ,

01:04:37.368 --> 01:04:39.701
uh , Army aviation , uh , at , at large .

01:04:39.701 --> 01:04:41.629
So I , I , I , I , I , I wanna .

01:04:43.939 --> 01:04:45.995
Talk about the whole spectrum here .

01:04:45.995 --> 01:04:48.106
When you talk about Chinook , there's

01:04:48.106 --> 01:04:50.106
no longer an Apache line . You know

01:04:50.620 --> 01:04:52.564
Lakotas may be used for some other

01:04:52.564 --> 01:04:54.320
purpose , but I think it's a

01:04:54.699 --> 01:04:56.755
potentially very serious issue . Yes

01:04:56.755 --> 01:04:59.899
ma'am . This is similar to how we're

01:04:59.899 --> 01:05:01.843
thinking about fires and how we're

01:05:01.843 --> 01:05:04.010
thinking about ground vehicles and how

01:05:04.010 --> 01:05:06.177
we're thinking about the counter drone

01:05:06.177 --> 01:05:07.899
and drone . We think we need a

01:05:07.899 --> 01:05:09.788
portfolio of solutions and we are

01:05:09.788 --> 01:05:13.465
overindexed right now on a solution

01:05:13.465 --> 01:05:15.687
that is a little bit , it's cheaper and

01:05:15.687 --> 01:05:17.909
so we have a lot of them . They will be

01:05:17.909 --> 01:05:17.905
in our Blackhawks will be in our lives ,

01:05:18.104 --> 01:05:20.504
as will Chinooks and as will Apaches

01:05:20.504 --> 01:05:23.649
for a very long time . But the Flora

01:05:23.649 --> 01:05:25.816
investment is necessary because if you

01:05:25.816 --> 01:05:27.538
look at the Indo-Pacific , the

01:05:27.538 --> 01:05:29.649
distances we have to go and the speed

01:05:29.649 --> 01:05:31.482
with which we have to move , our

01:05:31.482 --> 01:05:31.409
current platforms are just not

01:05:31.409 --> 01:05:33.520
sufficient in and of themselves . And

01:05:33.520 --> 01:05:35.242
so as part of the portfolio of

01:05:35.242 --> 01:05:37.465
solutions , we need to , as a country ,

01:05:37.465 --> 01:05:39.800
we believe , overinvest in Florida to

01:05:39.800 --> 01:05:41.856
get it online as quickly as possible

01:05:41.969 --> 01:05:43.979
and then have it as part of a

01:05:43.979 --> 01:05:46.290
constellation of options that we have

01:05:46.290 --> 01:05:48.830
for different theaters . Yes , ma'am ,

01:05:48.899 --> 01:05:51.010
if I , if I could add , and thank you

01:05:51.010 --> 01:05:53.232
for the question . Uh , you know , we ,

01:05:53.232 --> 01:05:55.343
we know that we're gonna have those ,

01:05:55.343 --> 01:05:57.566
uh , platforms , uh , in our system for

01:05:57.566 --> 01:05:59.455
a long time . We're gonna have to

01:05:59.455 --> 01:06:01.566
modernize the , the Black Hawk , um ,

01:06:01.566 --> 01:06:04.550
to , to continue , uh , on its path to

01:06:04.550 --> 01:06:06.550
supporting us until we get the full

01:06:06.860 --> 01:06:09.590
complement of the Cheyenne . And I

01:06:09.590 --> 01:06:11.870
think as you , you brought up a great

01:06:11.870 --> 01:06:14.389
point about the OIB and , and the

01:06:14.389 --> 01:06:16.611
investments that have to be made in the

01:06:16.611 --> 01:06:18.722
OIB and I , and I think if you take a

01:06:18.722 --> 01:06:20.833
look at How we're , we're going after

01:06:20.833 --> 01:06:23.000
the , the Cheyenne , and we want to be

01:06:23.000 --> 01:06:25.000
able to produce some of those parts

01:06:25.000 --> 01:06:27.590
immediately in the OIB and keep Corpus

01:06:27.590 --> 01:06:31.429
Christi as as vibrant as possible .

01:06:31.600 --> 01:06:33.767
We , we think there's a , you know , a

01:06:33.830 --> 01:06:36.560
piece in here , you know , for both .

01:06:36.919 --> 01:06:38.975
Then there's the other part of being

01:06:38.975 --> 01:06:42.520
able to produce the , the spare parts

01:06:42.520 --> 01:06:46.229
that we need ourselves for the

01:06:46.879 --> 01:06:49.300
our rotary wing fleet . And there's

01:06:49.300 --> 01:06:51.356
some technical data that we think we

01:06:51.356 --> 01:06:53.300
should have the ability to use for

01:06:53.300 --> 01:06:55.356
advanced manufacturing to be able to

01:06:55.356 --> 01:06:57.522
keep these aircraft flying . If , if ,

01:06:57.522 --> 01:07:00.750
if , if I can just say I think there's

01:07:00.750 --> 01:07:03.429
$100 million in the , uh , in the

01:07:03.429 --> 01:07:05.096
budget for every year for the

01:07:05.096 --> 01:07:07.469
modernization of the black hole and the

01:07:07.469 --> 01:07:09.550
integration of that with , with what

01:07:09.550 --> 01:07:11.939
you're doing , but , uh , uh , look , I ,

01:07:12.030 --> 01:07:15.340
I , I understand . The Cadillac of

01:07:15.340 --> 01:07:17.451
helicopters , uh , this is , which is

01:07:17.451 --> 01:07:21.320
what the now named Cheyenne , uh , is ,

01:07:21.699 --> 01:07:25.139
um , but there is a need for these

01:07:25.139 --> 01:07:28.699
other efforts and that's , that is , is

01:07:28.699 --> 01:07:31.969
only that leads to a question of what ,

01:07:31.989 --> 01:07:33.989
what happens . I mean we're dealing

01:07:33.989 --> 01:07:36.045
with the active component , but what

01:07:36.045 --> 01:07:38.045
happens with the National Guard , I

01:07:38.045 --> 01:07:40.899
might add the 13 service people of the

01:07:40.899 --> 01:07:43.459
13 service people who have been killed

01:07:43.459 --> 01:07:47.139
in the Iran conflict here , 9 were

01:07:47.139 --> 01:07:51.020
reservists , so we are looking at how

01:07:51.020 --> 01:07:54.040
are we providing the best .

01:07:54.939 --> 01:07:58.340
To the guard while we're moving and

01:07:58.340 --> 01:08:01.729
again , There needs to be some accuracy

01:08:01.889 --> 01:08:05.209
in terms of when , if we don't have a

01:08:05.209 --> 01:08:08.129
flyable prototype at

01:08:08.129 --> 01:08:12.129
1818 months from now . And

01:08:12.139 --> 01:08:15.370
then before it comes online , We're

01:08:15.370 --> 01:08:17.592
talking a number of years and that's if

01:08:17.592 --> 01:08:20.250
there's no problems at all . I'm just

01:08:20.250 --> 01:08:22.629
trying to point out , I think there is

01:08:22.629 --> 01:08:25.990
a real serious issue here with regard

01:08:26.200 --> 01:08:29.890
to this gap . Uh , and that is in terms

01:08:29.890 --> 01:08:32.959
of a A national security strategy

01:08:32.959 --> 01:08:36.660
document that talks about a strong

01:08:36.660 --> 01:08:40.359
industrial sector uh capable of meeting

01:08:40.359 --> 01:08:43.540
both peacetime and wartime production

01:08:43.540 --> 01:08:46.259
demands . I think we are falling short

01:08:46.259 --> 01:08:48.680
in that effort and I love to , my time

01:08:48.680 --> 01:08:51.200
is more than up , but I want to say I'd

01:08:51.200 --> 01:08:53.367
like to continue that conversation and

01:08:53.367 --> 01:08:55.256
I think we ought to continue that

01:08:55.270 --> 01:08:57.381
conversation about what we are losing

01:08:57.381 --> 01:08:59.603
in this process . Thank you very much ,

01:08:59.603 --> 01:09:01.826
thank you , Mr . Chairman . I thank you

01:09:01.826 --> 01:09:03.720
gentle lady . Mr . Carter .

01:09:07.359 --> 01:09:09.589
Thank you , Mr . Chairman . Uh , my

01:09:09.589 --> 01:09:11.756
voice is a little better today . It'll

01:09:11.756 --> 01:09:13.879
be a little better tomorrow too , but

01:09:13.879 --> 01:09:15.990
right now it sounds pretty terrible .

01:09:16.979 --> 01:09:19.146
First of all , thank you for coming to

01:09:19.146 --> 01:09:21.499
visit Fort Hood . It was a treat having

01:09:21.499 --> 01:09:24.858
you there . I was very impressed with

01:09:24.858 --> 01:09:27.938
your , your knowledge and your

01:09:27.938 --> 01:09:31.599
enthusiasm . Uh , it impressed me a lot .

01:09:32.019 --> 01:09:34.130
Uh , you're welcome to come any other

01:09:34.130 --> 01:09:36.241
time , and next time we'll put you up

01:09:36.241 --> 01:09:39.418
at the Driscoll Hotel in Austin , OK ?

01:09:40.919 --> 01:09:44.149
Uh Last year's Defense

01:09:44.149 --> 01:09:45.371
Appropriations bill .

01:09:47.890 --> 01:09:50.040
Congress invested in developing a

01:09:50.040 --> 01:09:53.549
ruggedized fuel fuel flexible

01:09:53.919 --> 01:09:57.770
power system designed to For contested

01:09:57.770 --> 01:10:00.560
logistics , contained environments ,

01:10:01.169 --> 01:10:05.089
our soldiers need energy , reliable

01:10:05.450 --> 01:10:07.689
and efficient systems that support

01:10:07.689 --> 01:10:10.129
their survivability , operational

01:10:10.129 --> 01:10:12.850
flexibility and ensure their mission's

01:10:12.850 --> 01:10:15.589
success . How is the Army evaluating

01:10:16.169 --> 01:10:19.029
the operational benefits of these fuel

01:10:19.370 --> 01:10:22.479
agnostic low signature power systems ,

01:10:23.049 --> 01:10:25.330
particularly their ability to operate ?

01:10:25.839 --> 01:10:29.680
Across diverse and ungraded fuel

01:10:29.680 --> 01:10:32.509
sources . What steps are being

01:10:33.490 --> 01:10:37.129
taken to accelerate their fielding to

01:10:37.129 --> 01:10:40.770
reduce logistic logistical risk and

01:10:40.770 --> 01:10:43.410
strengthen energy resilience in the

01:10:43.410 --> 01:10:46.490
Indo-Pacific and other contested

01:10:46.490 --> 01:10:48.930
environments ? Sure , thanks for the

01:10:48.930 --> 01:10:51.490
question . Uh , we , we're , we're

01:10:51.490 --> 01:10:53.601
looking at the wide range . We're not

01:10:53.601 --> 01:10:57.330
stepping away from any , uh , Any power

01:10:57.330 --> 01:10:59.441
sources out there that will meet this

01:10:59.441 --> 01:11:01.163
needs . You , you hit on a key

01:11:01.163 --> 01:11:03.274
component uh for how we're gonna have

01:11:03.274 --> 01:11:05.497
to organize ourselves and uh to be able

01:11:05.497 --> 01:11:07.608
to fight in the Pacific . So when you

01:11:07.608 --> 01:11:10.759
look at uh our new vehicles that we're

01:11:10.759 --> 01:11:12.703
going after , the ISV and then the

01:11:12.703 --> 01:11:15.209
heavy ISV , there's a power generation

01:11:15.830 --> 01:11:17.941
uh capability that we've asked for in

01:11:17.941 --> 01:11:20.052
each one of these platforms so we can

01:11:20.052 --> 01:11:23.560
run . Uh , C2 nodes , uh , we can

01:11:23.560 --> 01:11:25.959
provide , uh , power at the edge that

01:11:25.959 --> 01:11:28.181
we know that we're going to need , uh ,

01:11:28.181 --> 01:11:30.237
in the , in the future battlefield .

01:11:30.237 --> 01:11:32.879
Power Power is one of those , uh , you

01:11:32.879 --> 01:11:36.259
know , elements , uh , that , uh , is ,

01:11:36.310 --> 01:11:39.160
is continually , uh , the demand for it

01:11:39.160 --> 01:11:41.000
based off of our new technology

01:11:41.000 --> 01:11:43.167
continues to grow . So we have to have

01:11:43.167 --> 01:11:45.410
power generation . In our platforms

01:11:45.410 --> 01:11:47.743
that we're going after and you'll , you ,

01:11:47.743 --> 01:11:49.799
you'll be able to see that across uh

01:11:49.799 --> 01:11:53.080
the systems that we're asking for . And

01:11:53.080 --> 01:11:55.247
Judge , um , it was awesome getting to

01:11:55.247 --> 01:11:57.413
spend time with you and , um , see the

01:11:57.413 --> 01:11:59.524
campus-style dining and , um , yeah ,

01:11:59.524 --> 01:12:01.524
we look forward if anybody wants to

01:12:01.524 --> 01:12:00.740
learn more about that , to tell you

01:12:00.740 --> 01:12:02.907
about what we're doing for Army's Food

01:12:02.907 --> 01:12:05.060
Services , but , um , energy is a

01:12:05.060 --> 01:12:07.060
massive , I think we're seeing this

01:12:07.060 --> 01:12:09.004
play out domestically with AI data

01:12:09.004 --> 01:12:11.171
center . It's just kind of the News of

01:12:11.171 --> 01:12:13.282
the day , but modern warfare requires

01:12:13.282 --> 01:12:15.504
an immense amount of energy that has to

01:12:15.504 --> 01:12:17.671
get pushed forward to very difficult ,

01:12:17.680 --> 01:12:19.847
congested places in the world , and we

01:12:19.847 --> 01:12:22.779
are actively working on it . Batteries .

01:12:22.830 --> 01:12:25.359
We're investing a lot in what can hold

01:12:25.359 --> 01:12:27.720
the energy . Small nuclear reactors is

01:12:27.720 --> 01:12:29.942
something the Army has been tasked with

01:12:29.942 --> 01:12:32.164
on behalf of the federal government and

01:12:32.164 --> 01:12:34.276
the Pentagon . To , to , um , to , to

01:12:34.276 --> 01:12:36.331
get on an army base by 2028 and what

01:12:36.331 --> 01:12:38.276
we're cautiously optimistic is the

01:12:38.276 --> 01:12:40.442
learnings from that will be able to be

01:12:40.442 --> 01:12:42.609
pushed forward to the Indo-Pacific and

01:12:42.609 --> 01:12:44.553
to places like Guam that just have

01:12:44.553 --> 01:12:47.600
inconsistent power supplies . Well ,

01:12:47.609 --> 01:12:49.850
it's very important . I , I watched a

01:12:49.850 --> 01:12:53.430
rail gun operate at , at UT .

01:12:54.620 --> 01:12:58.189
And it is very impressive , but it

01:12:58.189 --> 01:13:00.750
takes a huge amount of power . Right

01:13:00.750 --> 01:13:03.629
now I think only the Navy is carrying

01:13:03.629 --> 01:13:06.379
that much power to make that gun work ,

01:13:06.830 --> 01:13:10.750
but it is awesome . The , the ,

01:13:10.870 --> 01:13:13.509
the big one will knock out 3 square

01:13:13.509 --> 01:13:15.899
blocks with no powder . It doesn't

01:13:15.899 --> 01:13:19.109
explode , centrifugal force , just

01:13:19.109 --> 01:13:21.189
destroys everything . It's pretty

01:13:21.189 --> 01:13:25.069
amazing . Um , I ,

01:13:25.149 --> 01:13:28.589
if I got time for another Another

01:13:28.640 --> 01:13:31.709
question . OK . Um

01:13:34.430 --> 01:13:37.799
Secretary Driscoll , when you were last

01:13:37.799 --> 01:13:39.855
appeared before this committee , you

01:13:39.855 --> 01:13:42.359
highlighted how we can't afford to

01:13:42.359 --> 01:13:45.870
expand multimillion dollar interceptors

01:13:46.279 --> 01:13:48.529
against low cost unmanned aerial

01:13:48.529 --> 01:13:50.751
systems , and that's what we're talking

01:13:50.751 --> 01:13:53.529
about . Across this country , uh ,

01:13:53.720 --> 01:13:55.776
there are people that are working on

01:13:55.776 --> 01:13:58.560
this , and , but to be specific , in my

01:13:58.560 --> 01:14:01.430
district , There , there's a company

01:14:01.970 --> 01:14:04.410
that's developed an autonomous weapons

01:14:04.410 --> 01:14:08.390
system . Called the bulldog . That

01:14:08.390 --> 01:14:10.750
has demonstrated real promise in

01:14:10.750 --> 01:14:13.990
countering low-cost , fast-moving drone

01:14:13.990 --> 01:14:17.310
threats . These efforts reflect the

01:14:17.310 --> 01:14:20.450
kind of innovation our industrial base

01:14:20.750 --> 01:14:24.629
needs , and this is young entrepreneurs

01:14:24.990 --> 01:14:27.569
that have come up with a solution . Uh ,

01:14:27.830 --> 01:14:30.359
are you familiar with this ? And how's

01:14:30.359 --> 01:14:32.479
the army talking about partnering up

01:14:32.479 --> 01:14:34.646
with that ? Yes , sir , um , we've had

01:14:34.646 --> 01:14:36.646
the bullfrog team into the office a

01:14:36.646 --> 01:14:38.812
couple of times , um , under Giada 401

01:14:38.812 --> 01:14:40.923
that General Laneve referenced . They

01:14:40.923 --> 01:14:43.146
have tested it . The , the , the key to

01:14:43.146 --> 01:14:45.589
a future successful air defense is

01:14:45.759 --> 01:14:47.930
layered solutions at different varying

01:14:47.930 --> 01:14:49.986
degrees of cost . There may be times

01:14:49.986 --> 01:14:52.152
where you want to use a couple million

01:14:52.152 --> 01:14:54.319
dollar Patriot interceptor because the

01:14:54.319 --> 01:14:56.374
risk is so high . But you'd strongly

01:14:56.374 --> 01:14:58.208
prefer to use something like the

01:14:58.208 --> 01:15:00.374
Bullfrog , which is just a round fired

01:15:00.374 --> 01:15:02.708
at a threat . And for the Shahid drones ,

01:15:02.708 --> 01:15:04.819
that round is really effective if you

01:15:04.819 --> 01:15:06.819
can get it to the right place . And

01:15:06.819 --> 01:15:08.819
what technology is doing is a human

01:15:08.819 --> 01:15:10.930
being would have a pretty hard time .

01:15:10.930 --> 01:15:12.874
Reacting quickly enough to a drone

01:15:12.874 --> 01:15:15.097
swarm to be able to use that tool where

01:15:15.097 --> 01:15:17.263
technology with AI is probably there .

01:15:17.263 --> 01:15:19.486
And so , um , very specifically to your

01:15:19.486 --> 01:15:21.374
question , Judge , we are testing

01:15:21.374 --> 01:15:23.374
bullfrog . It is in our pipeline of

01:15:23.374 --> 01:15:25.541
things we are exploring , and we think

01:15:25.541 --> 01:15:27.541
solutions like that and others like

01:15:27.541 --> 01:15:29.763
directed energy and lasers will be part

01:15:29.763 --> 01:15:31.708
of a constellation that we'll have

01:15:31.708 --> 01:15:33.930
going forward . Well , I shot the , the

01:15:33.930 --> 01:15:36.263
thing , and it impressed me . Thank you ,

01:15:36.263 --> 01:15:38.430
Mr . Chairman . Thank you , Ms . Lee .

01:15:38.830 --> 01:15:40.997
Uh , thank you , Mr . Chairman . Thank

01:15:40.997 --> 01:15:43.052
you both for being here and for your

01:15:43.052 --> 01:15:46.870
service . Uh , Secretary , I agree with ,

01:15:46.879 --> 01:15:48.959
uh , you and your approach with the

01:15:48.959 --> 01:15:52.029
Army Transformation initiative , uh ,

01:15:52.439 --> 01:15:54.606
but we as congress members have a duty

01:15:54.606 --> 01:15:56.959
to our constituents and taxpayers to

01:15:56.959 --> 01:15:59.839
ensure that one , we're equipping our

01:15:59.839 --> 01:16:02.040
war fighters , uh , in the most

01:16:02.040 --> 01:16:05.390
effective way but also efficiently and ,

01:16:05.470 --> 01:16:08.689
and not wasting tax dollars . Um , so

01:16:08.689 --> 01:16:10.890
we have to ensure accountability and

01:16:10.890 --> 01:16:13.899
also prevent fraud . So I , uh ,

01:16:13.970 --> 01:16:15.930
associate myself with , uh , the

01:16:15.930 --> 01:16:17.979
ranking member's comments about

01:16:18.009 --> 01:16:20.729
auditing , um , but there's obviously a

01:16:20.729 --> 01:16:24.720
balance between , uh , moving into , uh ,

01:16:24.729 --> 01:16:27.089
innovation and acquisition and

01:16:27.089 --> 01:16:30.729
diversifying our , uh , base , but also

01:16:30.729 --> 01:16:33.729
ensuring that , uh , we can meet

01:16:33.729 --> 01:16:36.330
wartime production demands in a

01:16:36.330 --> 01:16:39.370
sustainable way . So I wanted to just

01:16:39.370 --> 01:16:41.890
ask you what measurable progress has

01:16:41.890 --> 01:16:45.049
the army made uh in diversifying our

01:16:45.049 --> 01:16:47.490
base and what are you doing to ensure

01:16:47.490 --> 01:16:50.569
that new entrants , uh , will be able

01:16:50.569 --> 01:16:53.089
to scale to meet , uh , wartime

01:16:53.089 --> 01:16:55.540
production demands ? Congresswoman , um ,

01:16:55.700 --> 01:16:57.811
to the , to the audit question , um ,

01:16:58.020 --> 01:17:00.959
you deserve transparency and your ,

01:17:01.009 --> 01:17:02.979
your voters demand you to hold us

01:17:02.979 --> 01:17:05.201
accountable . Um , these are their hard

01:17:05.201 --> 01:17:07.312
earned dollars that are being lent to

01:17:07.312 --> 01:17:09.423
us on their behalf , and , um , there

01:17:09.423 --> 01:17:12.620
are many tools today that exist in

01:17:12.620 --> 01:17:14.859
private sector companies that provide

01:17:14.859 --> 01:17:16.526
this transparency or at least

01:17:16.526 --> 01:17:18.692
significantly more transparency . Um ,

01:17:18.692 --> 01:17:21.169
and we as an army have underinvested in

01:17:21.169 --> 01:17:23.391
those historically because we have been

01:17:23.391 --> 01:17:25.558
focused in , I think , uh , my opinion

01:17:25.558 --> 01:17:27.613
on some of the wrong ways to provide

01:17:27.613 --> 01:17:29.391
transparency . And so I am very

01:17:29.391 --> 01:17:31.336
optimistic that this year you will

01:17:31.336 --> 01:17:33.391
start to see massive improvements in

01:17:33.391 --> 01:17:35.725
how we can answer your team's questions ,

01:17:35.770 --> 01:17:37.881
very quickly on where the dollars are

01:17:37.881 --> 01:17:39.881
going and are we using them how you

01:17:39.881 --> 01:17:41.826
intended us to for the getting new

01:17:41.826 --> 01:17:43.937
entrants into the the broader defense

01:17:43.937 --> 01:17:46.640
industrial base . It is a , um , again ,

01:17:46.720 --> 01:17:48.776
this is one of the lessons that I've

01:17:48.776 --> 01:17:50.720
learned in the year . It is a more

01:17:50.720 --> 01:17:50.620
complicated nuanced problem than I had

01:17:50.620 --> 01:17:52.842
assumed . Um , I think I was the one on

01:17:52.842 --> 01:17:55.064
record within my first couple of months

01:17:55.064 --> 01:17:57.120
saying I would count as a success if

01:17:57.120 --> 01:17:59.231
one of the defense primes went out of

01:17:59.231 --> 01:18:01.231
business in the 1st 2 years and the

01:18:01.231 --> 01:18:03.453
remainder were stronger . Um , and what

01:18:03.453 --> 01:18:05.453
I have since learned is the defense

01:18:05.453 --> 01:18:07.564
primes , the same unvirtual . cycle I

01:18:07.564 --> 01:18:09.842
was describing with the ranking member ,

01:18:09.842 --> 01:18:09.495
the defense primes have just had to be

01:18:09.495 --> 01:18:11.774
built to survive those , and so they

01:18:11.774 --> 01:18:13.718
have had to survive our regulatory

01:18:13.718 --> 01:18:15.885
difficulties . They've had to have big

01:18:15.885 --> 01:18:17.941
balance sheets to be able to survive

01:18:17.941 --> 01:18:20.163
the CRs where we can't actually spend .

01:18:20.163 --> 01:18:22.274
The average Secretary of the Army , I

01:18:22.274 --> 01:18:24.330
believe , is only in the seat for 23

01:18:24.330 --> 01:18:26.552
months . And so my signal for demand is

01:18:26.552 --> 01:18:28.607
not sufficient for most companies to

01:18:28.607 --> 01:18:30.830
invest behind it . And so . The defense

01:18:30.830 --> 01:18:32.941
primes have basically taken advantage

01:18:32.941 --> 01:18:32.890
of regulatory arbitrage and big balance

01:18:32.890 --> 01:18:34.834
sheets to survive and thrive for a

01:18:34.834 --> 01:18:37.112
while . And so how do we overcome that ?

01:18:37.112 --> 01:18:39.112
I think the way we overcome that is

01:18:39.112 --> 01:18:41.279
through things like FU that we started

01:18:41.279 --> 01:18:43.446
this year , which is $750 million from

01:18:43.446 --> 01:18:43.330
the army that we already had in our

01:18:43.330 --> 01:18:45.729
budget that we reallocated to investing

01:18:45.729 --> 01:18:47.840
in small and medium businesses around

01:18:47.840 --> 01:18:51.084
the country and actually for the Good

01:18:51.084 --> 01:18:53.314
ones making sure that we , the army can

01:18:53.314 --> 01:18:56.165
buy amounts that allow them to employ

01:18:56.165 --> 01:18:58.276
more workers to go out to the markets

01:18:58.276 --> 01:19:00.498
and raise if they need to and grow into

01:19:00.498 --> 01:19:02.665
medium and large businesses to balance

01:19:02.665 --> 01:19:04.721
out who we purchase from . It is our

01:19:04.721 --> 01:19:06.832
first attempt , along with some other

01:19:06.832 --> 01:19:09.054
things like collapsing down how we make

01:19:09.054 --> 01:19:11.165
our purchasing decisions that we hope

01:19:11.165 --> 01:19:13.387
improve it , but it is a space where we

01:19:13.387 --> 01:19:15.554
still need to grow a lot . Great , can

01:19:15.554 --> 01:19:17.721
I , can I jump in because you know one

01:19:17.721 --> 01:19:17.580
of the things that one of the

01:19:17.580 --> 01:19:19.524
directions the secretary has , has

01:19:19.524 --> 01:19:21.970
pushed us in our acquisition team . I ,

01:19:22.049 --> 01:19:24.105
I think it's actually doing a really

01:19:24.105 --> 01:19:26.105
good job of this . I mean , a small

01:19:26.105 --> 01:19:28.049
company might come and say , hey ,

01:19:28.049 --> 01:19:30.160
here's , here's what we can do , uh ,

01:19:30.160 --> 01:19:32.382
for this price point , and , you know ,

01:19:32.382 --> 01:19:34.549
your first , your first reaction would

01:19:34.549 --> 01:19:36.660
be like , yeah , we want 1,000,000 of

01:19:36.660 --> 01:19:38.771
those immediately . We dig through it

01:19:38.771 --> 01:19:40.993
to see if they can even scale . If they

01:19:40.993 --> 01:19:42.938
can't scale , we're moving on . If

01:19:42.938 --> 01:19:46.049
there's not a promise , uh , not a

01:19:46.049 --> 01:19:48.105
promise from them , but you know , a

01:19:48.105 --> 01:19:50.327
promise that we can see across the line

01:19:50.327 --> 01:19:52.327
that they will be able to scale and

01:19:52.327 --> 01:19:54.770
scale fast and get the price point down ,

01:19:55.330 --> 01:19:58.770
then we go pretty hard in with them to

01:19:58.770 --> 01:20:00.770
see where they can go . But there's

01:20:00.770 --> 01:20:02.826
been a couple of companies that have

01:20:02.826 --> 01:20:02.370
come up and said , hey , this is what

01:20:02.370 --> 01:20:04.470
we can do . And you look on the

01:20:04.470 --> 01:20:06.581
backside and there's no promise and ,

01:20:06.581 --> 01:20:08.748
and we've moved away from that because

01:20:08.748 --> 01:20:10.859
he's enabled us to be able to do this

01:20:10.859 --> 01:20:12.914
at a , at a much faster pace . Thank

01:20:12.914 --> 01:20:15.549
you . Just along those lines , um , can

01:20:15.549 --> 01:20:17.549
you just tell us , uh , what you're

01:20:17.549 --> 01:20:20.270
using to evaluate whether you're

01:20:20.270 --> 01:20:22.589
delivering faster timelines , lower

01:20:22.589 --> 01:20:25.709
costs , or , and better outcomes ? What

01:20:25.709 --> 01:20:27.931
are the , what are the metrics you , or

01:20:27.931 --> 01:20:30.153
how are you guaranteeing like measuring

01:20:30.153 --> 01:20:32.990
that ? Um , so our , our new PAE

01:20:32.990 --> 01:20:34.823
structure , the , the , the best

01:20:34.823 --> 01:20:36.934
descriptor of it , I think to me is ,

01:20:36.934 --> 01:20:39.046
is these new acquisition teams that ,

01:20:39.046 --> 01:20:42.859
um , model how like a Tesla , um , or a ,

01:20:43.189 --> 01:20:45.300
um , uh , a more modern company would

01:20:45.300 --> 01:20:47.356
do things which is the equivalent of

01:20:47.356 --> 01:20:49.300
having your manufacturers and your

01:20:49.300 --> 01:20:49.069
engineers and your accountants all

01:20:49.069 --> 01:20:51.560
co-located . To solve through these

01:20:51.560 --> 01:20:53.782
problems and to be able to bring in new

01:20:53.782 --> 01:20:55.616
entrants to the , to the idea of

01:20:55.616 --> 01:20:57.838
measuring specifically right now we are

01:20:57.838 --> 01:21:00.600
coming up with new toolkits to try to

01:21:00.600 --> 01:21:02.720
do that . It is hard across different

01:21:02.720 --> 01:21:04.887
verticals to see who is succeeding and

01:21:04.887 --> 01:21:07.109
who is failing . And one of the reasons

01:21:07.109 --> 01:21:09.053
this , the problem perpetuated and

01:21:09.053 --> 01:21:10.799
existed for 30 and 40 years is

01:21:10.799 --> 01:21:13.021
measurement is hard . And so it is hard

01:21:13.021 --> 01:21:15.132
for you to be able to say , hey , you

01:21:15.132 --> 01:21:17.132
are on pace with what you told me ,

01:21:17.132 --> 01:21:17.009
because there's all sorts of

01:21:17.009 --> 01:21:19.009
externalities that can make it , so

01:21:19.009 --> 01:21:20.953
it's just difficult to measure and

01:21:20.953 --> 01:21:23.176
judge . But what we have done for these

01:21:23.176 --> 01:21:25.342
new 6 PAEs is we've asked them to come

01:21:25.342 --> 01:21:27.342
up with their own scorecard . We're

01:21:27.342 --> 01:21:29.509
going to compare the scorecards across

01:21:29.509 --> 01:21:31.565
the different 6 , see which ones are

01:21:31.565 --> 01:21:33.787
working , and then scale that scorecard

01:21:33.787 --> 01:21:33.209
across all 6 . And then the very last .

01:21:33.299 --> 01:21:35.521
The thing I'll say is one of the PAEs ,

01:21:35.521 --> 01:21:37.743
if anybody's ever read the book Scrum ,

01:21:37.743 --> 01:21:39.910
which is about kind of modern software

01:21:39.910 --> 01:21:39.540
development , we actually have one of

01:21:39.540 --> 01:21:41.339
the PAEs using that model of

01:21:41.339 --> 01:21:43.172
development , which is what most

01:21:43.172 --> 01:21:45.283
Silicon Valley companies , or many of

01:21:45.283 --> 01:21:47.450
them would have been using in the last

01:21:47.450 --> 01:21:49.450
30 years , which is totally new and

01:21:49.450 --> 01:21:49.220
different for the Pentagon , and we're

01:21:49.220 --> 01:21:51.442
going to measure their outcomes against

01:21:51.442 --> 01:21:53.387
the other 5 to see if that type of

01:21:53.387 --> 01:21:55.664
model can work in the Pentagon . Great ,

01:21:55.664 --> 01:21:57.720
thank you . Thank you , Mr . Elsey .

01:21:57.720 --> 01:21:59.720
Thank you Mr . Chairman . Thank you

01:21:59.720 --> 01:22:01.720
both for being here . You're double

01:22:01.720 --> 01:22:03.959
headed now and the mission is large ,

01:22:04.120 --> 01:22:06.120
especially in a time of war , as we

01:22:06.120 --> 01:22:08.720
look at a $1.5 trillion budget , that's

01:22:08.720 --> 01:22:10.942
a demand signal from the administration

01:22:10.942 --> 01:22:13.220
that we should be on a wartime footing .

01:22:13.220 --> 01:22:15.276
I think we need to talk about that a

01:22:15.276 --> 01:22:17.498
little bit more , but as we look at the

01:22:17.498 --> 01:22:19.776
world as it is , if it were 1938 . FDR ,

01:22:19.776 --> 01:22:21.942
even 3 years before we got involved in

01:22:21.942 --> 01:22:24.164
World War II , recognized the need of a

01:22:24.164 --> 01:22:26.164
growing threat across the world and

01:22:26.164 --> 01:22:25.890
said we need to start building the

01:22:25.890 --> 01:22:28.399
arsenal of democracy . We're calling it

01:22:28.399 --> 01:22:30.689
the arsenal of freedom now , so we must

01:22:30.689 --> 01:22:32.745
understand that that's going to cost

01:22:32.745 --> 01:22:34.856
more to prevent the war , but when it

01:22:34.856 --> 01:22:37.100
has to fight . I appreciate what you

01:22:37.100 --> 01:22:39.211
said , Mr . Secretary , about housing

01:22:39.211 --> 01:22:41.322
and food and improved barracks across

01:22:41.322 --> 01:22:43.500
the force , and that's that's judges

01:22:43.500 --> 01:22:45.556
love language right there is that we

01:22:45.556 --> 01:22:47.939
need to be doing more faster . As we

01:22:47.939 --> 01:22:50.580
went to Lithuania a year ago , they

01:22:50.580 --> 01:22:52.469
have the capability of building a

01:22:52.469 --> 01:22:54.524
beautiful new barracks in 6 months ,

01:22:54.524 --> 01:22:56.636
and for us it takes years and years ,

01:22:56.636 --> 01:22:58.747
long after the mold has already taken

01:22:58.747 --> 01:23:00.580
effect . And so I appreciate you

01:23:00.580 --> 01:23:02.747
wanting to do that as well as the food

01:23:02.747 --> 01:23:04.913
and the raises that we're asking for .

01:23:04.913 --> 01:23:07.080
To echo , Judge , the bullfrog's got a

01:23:07.080 --> 01:23:09.136
tremendous capability , and I'm glad

01:23:09.136 --> 01:23:10.969
that it's becoming apparent with

01:23:10.969 --> 01:23:13.089
respect to the MV-75 Cheyenne , great

01:23:13.089 --> 01:23:15.609
name . The tribes were very honored by

01:23:15.609 --> 01:23:18.970
that . What we've entered into in

01:23:18.970 --> 01:23:21.129
aviation as a helicopter pilot and a

01:23:21.129 --> 01:23:24.569
jet pilot myself is a new threshold , a

01:23:24.569 --> 01:23:26.970
new envelope of flight that is

01:23:26.970 --> 01:23:29.290
absolutely necessary . The MV-22 has

01:23:29.290 --> 01:23:31.457
proven itself time and again . And the

01:23:31.457 --> 01:23:33.623
MV 75 likewise will do the same . It's

01:23:33.623 --> 01:23:36.220
twice as fast . It travels almost 3

01:23:36.220 --> 01:23:38.419
times as far with twice the altitude .

01:23:38.700 --> 01:23:40.939
The survivability of both those in that

01:23:40.939 --> 01:23:43.299
aircraft and those might be on the

01:23:43.299 --> 01:23:45.410
ground that it's going to go rescue ,

01:23:45.410 --> 01:23:47.466
it's imperative that this thing gets

01:23:47.466 --> 01:23:49.577
funded and yes , it's going to cost a

01:23:49.577 --> 01:23:51.910
little more . What I would ask about is ,

01:23:51.910 --> 01:23:53.966
and General George was on board with

01:23:53.966 --> 01:23:57.240
this as well , is I read from General

01:23:57.240 --> 01:23:59.919
Gill , the PAE for maneuver , said if I

01:23:59.919 --> 01:24:02.141
was king and I had all the money in the

01:24:02.141 --> 01:24:04.252
world and all the engineers and there

01:24:04.252 --> 01:24:06.419
were no limits , we'd probably be able

01:24:06.419 --> 01:24:05.910
to do it in a matter of months . I

01:24:05.910 --> 01:24:07.966
would argue take out the engineers .

01:24:08.240 --> 01:24:10.573
And you can do it in a couple of months .

01:24:10.573 --> 01:24:12.796
Get rid of the minions . We've got this

01:24:12.796 --> 01:24:14.907
problem in the Navy . Get rid of them

01:24:14.907 --> 01:24:17.129
in the Army . This thing stopped flying

01:24:17.129 --> 01:24:19.296
in 2021 . So basically what we stopped

01:24:19.296 --> 01:24:21.184
flying in 2021 , you could get it

01:24:21.184 --> 01:24:23.296
flying again , and that's the MV-75 .

01:24:23.296 --> 01:24:25.462
So I'd like to hear from you guys what

01:24:25.462 --> 01:24:27.351
you think about the MV-75 and its

01:24:27.351 --> 01:24:29.462
development and getting it fielded as

01:24:29.462 --> 01:24:32.770
fast as possible . Sir , uh , sir , I

01:24:32.770 --> 01:24:35.048
think you're spot on , and I , I think ,

01:24:35.048 --> 01:24:37.720
uh , uh , this system is gonna be uh

01:24:37.729 --> 01:24:40.529
for us revolutionary . Um , the , the

01:24:40.529 --> 01:24:42.585
distance alone that this is gonna be

01:24:42.585 --> 01:24:44.930
able to provide us is what we need for

01:24:44.930 --> 01:24:47.450
the fight in the Pacific . Uh , and ,

01:24:47.609 --> 01:24:49.831
and we're gonna be able to put a lot of

01:24:49.831 --> 01:24:52.053
capabilities on this too . Um , there's

01:24:52.053 --> 01:24:54.276
been a lot of questions about medevac ,

01:24:54.276 --> 01:24:56.498
you know , how are we walking away from

01:24:56.498 --> 01:24:56.250
medevac ? We're not . I mean , but

01:24:56.250 --> 01:24:58.870
there's a A capability of , you know ,

01:24:59.109 --> 01:25:01.331
almost like a sled that can come , come

01:25:01.331 --> 01:25:03.553
in and out that we're looking at . Um ,

01:25:03.790 --> 01:25:05.734
so , uh , uh , we're gonna , we're

01:25:05.734 --> 01:25:07.901
gonna , we are taking a lot of lessons

01:25:07.901 --> 01:25:09.629
learned , uh , from the MV-22

01:25:09.629 --> 01:25:11.740
development . Uh , so it's , it's not

01:25:11.740 --> 01:25:13.685
like we're starting from scratch .

01:25:13.685 --> 01:25:15.629
We're , we've , we've been working

01:25:15.629 --> 01:25:17.685
closely with our Marine Corps , uh ,

01:25:17.685 --> 01:25:19.796
our brothers and sisters to move this

01:25:19.796 --> 01:25:22.129
as fast as possible . The other thing I ,

01:25:22.129 --> 01:25:24.419
I would like to throw out is we're not

01:25:24.419 --> 01:25:26.697
waiting for that first , uh , you know ,

01:25:26.697 --> 01:25:28.530
aircraft to come . We're , we're

01:25:28.530 --> 01:25:30.308
training in it right now in our

01:25:30.308 --> 01:25:32.086
simulators , so when we get the

01:25:32.086 --> 01:25:34.086
aircraft , we can be sprinting with

01:25:34.086 --> 01:25:36.308
this as fast as possible . And , and if

01:25:36.308 --> 01:25:38.530
I'd like to go back to it , sure , uh ,

01:25:38.530 --> 01:25:40.808
you , you talked about , uh , you know ,

01:25:40.808 --> 01:25:42.975
barracks and how fast other people can

01:25:42.975 --> 01:25:44.641
do it . We really need , uh ,

01:25:44.641 --> 01:25:46.863
everybody's help on , on Milon reform .

01:25:46.863 --> 01:25:50.120
I mean , it costs 68% more to build .

01:25:50.629 --> 01:25:53.359
Uh , a set of barracks , uh , that you

01:25:53.359 --> 01:25:55.581
know you can do in the outside sector a

01:25:55.581 --> 01:25:58.609
heck of a lot cheaper , 68% more , uh ,

01:25:58.750 --> 01:26:00.660
because of all the , the , uh ,

01:26:00.669 --> 01:26:03.069
bureaucracy and red tape that's

01:26:03.069 --> 01:26:05.125
involved in that , and we , we would

01:26:05.125 --> 01:26:07.970
welcome to work with you all on reform .

01:26:09.490 --> 01:26:11.657
Congressman , I don't want to take all

01:26:11.657 --> 01:26:13.768
your time . You want me to , I'm very

01:26:13.768 --> 01:26:15.934
excited to reply . All right , um , so

01:26:15.934 --> 01:26:18.101
Cheyenne , we , we do calls , the long

01:26:18.101 --> 01:26:20.212
10 in the pole is the software , um ,

01:26:20.212 --> 01:26:22.379
because I had the same feeling , and I

01:26:22.379 --> 01:26:21.850
was actually horrified when I found out

01:26:21.850 --> 01:26:23.961
the prototype flew in or the whatever

01:26:23.961 --> 01:26:26.294
they use a different word for prototype .

01:26:26.294 --> 01:26:28.406
Uh , flew in 2021 . Like , uh , we've

01:26:28.406 --> 01:26:30.572
all wanted it , and this is an example

01:26:30.572 --> 01:26:30.450
of just a broken system not getting us

01:26:30.450 --> 01:26:33.640
here . But , um , General Elec uh , GE

01:26:33.640 --> 01:26:35.973
Aerospace has been working harder on it .

01:26:35.973 --> 01:26:37.918
We do a call or I do a call nearly

01:26:37.918 --> 01:26:39.918
every month with the CEO of Textron

01:26:39.918 --> 01:26:42.084
Bell , um , and GE talking through how

01:26:42.084 --> 01:26:44.370
can we possibly go any faster . Um , I

01:26:44.370 --> 01:26:46.370
believe we are at the front edge of

01:26:46.370 --> 01:26:48.203
speed until you can start to use

01:26:48.203 --> 01:26:50.479
generative , um , like AI created code

01:26:50.479 --> 01:26:52.590
and the FAA and others are willing to

01:26:52.590 --> 01:26:54.812
accept that risk . I think we are going

01:26:54.812 --> 01:26:57.035
as fast as possible . Um , but the last

01:26:57.035 --> 01:26:59.146
bit is what is so exciting about this

01:26:59.146 --> 01:27:01.090
platform is , and this should blow

01:27:01.090 --> 01:27:03.146
everyone's minds in the room , we're

01:27:03.146 --> 01:27:03.116
actually just doing it right where

01:27:03.116 --> 01:27:05.375
there will be USB ports . There will be

01:27:05.516 --> 01:27:08.315
plug and play , open modular system and

01:27:08.315 --> 01:27:10.996
architecture so that as technology

01:27:10.996 --> 01:27:13.218
evolves , excuse me , we're able to put

01:27:13.218 --> 01:27:15.385
that new technology into this platform

01:27:15.385 --> 01:27:17.607
in a way that the closed systems of the

01:27:17.607 --> 01:27:19.718
past just have never allowed us . And

01:27:19.718 --> 01:27:21.774
the last example I will use , and um

01:27:21.774 --> 01:27:23.996
perhaps I'm glad the ranking members in

01:27:23.996 --> 01:27:25.718
here , is we had a knob in the

01:27:25.718 --> 01:27:28.052
Blackhawk . That we can 3D print for $3 .

01:27:28.052 --> 01:27:30.218
It's , it's literally just a knob like

01:27:30.218 --> 01:27:32.329
a radio knob , and so we can print 3D

01:27:32.329 --> 01:27:34.607
print it for $3 . We have had to buy 4 ,

01:27:34.607 --> 01:27:36.718
replace that knob 4 times a month for

01:27:36.718 --> 01:27:38.774
the last 20 years , and because they

01:27:38.774 --> 01:27:38.301
will not sell us the knob , we have had

01:27:38.301 --> 01:27:41.102
to pay $40,000 to replace the entire

01:27:41.102 --> 01:27:43.782
piece of equipment . And so this , what

01:27:43.782 --> 01:27:45.838
we are doing with the Cheyenne is we

01:27:45.838 --> 01:27:48.062
are requiring and demanding and we have

01:27:48.062 --> 01:27:50.395
all of the intellectual property rights .

01:27:50.395 --> 01:27:52.451
So this will never happen again . We

01:27:52.451 --> 01:27:54.173
will 3D print the knob and the

01:27:54.173 --> 01:27:53.901
helicopter will get back in the air .

01:27:54.919 --> 01:27:56.808
Thank you . Thank you . My time's

01:27:56.808 --> 01:27:58.870
expired . Thank you gentlemen . Mr .

01:27:58.939 --> 01:28:01.050
Aguilar . Thank you , Mr . Chairman .

01:28:01.430 --> 01:28:03.652
Mr . Secretary , you're cited in recent

01:28:03.652 --> 01:28:05.874
articles about the appointment of Major

01:28:05.874 --> 01:28:08.041
General Antoinette Gant for command of

01:28:08.041 --> 01:28:10.609
the military district of Washington and

01:28:10.669 --> 01:28:12.669
the striking of four names from the

01:28:12.669 --> 01:28:14.558
one-star promotion list that drew

01:28:14.558 --> 01:28:16.509
suspicions of racial and gender

01:28:16.509 --> 01:28:18.649
discrimination . The same promotion

01:28:18.649 --> 01:28:20.593
list was in the news about a month

01:28:20.593 --> 01:28:22.427
prior . Uh , in what was seen as

01:28:22.427 --> 01:28:24.093
personal retribution from the

01:28:24.093 --> 01:28:26.093
administration against a particular

01:28:26.093 --> 01:28:28.260
individual , Colonel Dave Butler , can

01:28:28.260 --> 01:28:29.927
you elaborate on why the four

01:28:29.927 --> 01:28:31.816
individuals were removed from the

01:28:31.816 --> 01:28:33.816
promotion list ? Um , Congressman ,

01:28:33.816 --> 01:28:35.871
mechanistically , um , the , the way

01:28:35.871 --> 01:28:38.038
that the list works is , um , it comes

01:28:38.038 --> 01:28:39.982
out of our promotion board . Me as

01:28:39.982 --> 01:28:42.093
Secretary of the Army sees the list .

01:28:42.093 --> 01:28:44.316
We pass it up to OSW . OSW passes it to

01:28:44.316 --> 01:28:46.371
the White House , and then the White

01:28:46.371 --> 01:28:48.593
House sends a scroll with certain names

01:28:48.593 --> 01:28:50.538
to the Senate . Um , I do not know

01:28:50.538 --> 01:28:52.871
specifically where it is in the process .

01:28:52.871 --> 01:28:54.982
I believe that a scroll has been sent

01:28:54.982 --> 01:28:56.982
to the Senate . Um , but once , and

01:28:56.982 --> 01:28:59.038
this isn't trying to be escapatory .

01:28:59.038 --> 01:29:00.982
Once it leaves our department , we

01:29:00.982 --> 01:29:03.149
don't have a lot as much oversight and

01:29:03.149 --> 01:29:05.149
visibility into it . And so that is

01:29:05.149 --> 01:29:08.660
what I know to be true . What criteria ,

01:29:08.779 --> 01:29:11.560
um , ways you assemble the list is you ,

01:29:11.580 --> 01:29:14.220
uh , within your control , um , before

01:29:14.220 --> 01:29:16.620
you send it on , uh , what criteria do

01:29:16.620 --> 01:29:18.731
you use for someone who's going to be

01:29:18.731 --> 01:29:22.419
promoted to a one star ? General or Mr .

01:29:22.529 --> 01:29:24.807
Secretary , either one , I , I have it ,

01:29:24.807 --> 01:29:26.751
so , um , Congressman , I give the

01:29:26.751 --> 01:29:28.918
guidance to the board who , um , looks

01:29:28.918 --> 01:29:30.862
at the number of colonels that are

01:29:30.862 --> 01:29:32.918
available for promotion . That the ,

01:29:32.918 --> 01:29:35.085
the promotion from colonel to one-star

01:29:35.085 --> 01:29:36.862
general is , uh , an incredibly

01:29:36.862 --> 01:29:39.085
difficult process . I think only 4% get

01:29:39.085 --> 01:29:41.140
through . I give the guidance to the

01:29:41.140 --> 01:29:43.251
board . Soldiers meet , soldiers make

01:29:43.251 --> 01:29:45.418
their decisions , and out comes a list

01:29:45.418 --> 01:29:47.640
from that soldier-led promotion process

01:29:47.640 --> 01:29:47.560
that comes to me to review to ensure

01:29:47.560 --> 01:29:49.727
the process was done correctly , which

01:29:49.727 --> 01:29:51.671
it was . I pass forward the list .

01:29:52.160 --> 01:29:54.327
During , during your tenure , have you

01:29:54.327 --> 01:29:56.438
struck a name from the list or or has

01:29:56.438 --> 01:29:58.493
everything that has gone through the

01:29:58.493 --> 01:30:00.827
board and has made its way to your desk ,

01:30:00.827 --> 01:30:02.882
you have passed on ? Uh , I've never

01:30:02.882 --> 01:30:05.104
struck a name . But you don't know with

01:30:05.104 --> 01:30:07.216
uh with respect to these four names ,

01:30:07.216 --> 01:30:09.509
you don't know where in the process ,

01:30:10.140 --> 01:30:12.140
um , if names were dropped , and if

01:30:12.140 --> 01:30:14.084
that scroll was sent to the Senate

01:30:14.084 --> 01:30:16.140
without those names , you don't know

01:30:16.140 --> 01:30:18.251
where in the process that I'm reading

01:30:18.251 --> 01:30:20.140
the same things that are publicly

01:30:20.140 --> 01:30:19.950
available , Congressman , that you are .

01:30:20.410 --> 01:30:22.466
Do you think the public attention on

01:30:22.466 --> 01:30:24.709
what has previously been kind of .

01:30:25.279 --> 01:30:27.479
Nonpartisan , you know , military

01:30:27.479 --> 01:30:29.779
merit-based . Do you think that , that ,

01:30:29.859 --> 01:30:32.081
that should give , how do you think the

01:30:32.081 --> 01:30:34.248
public should react to the merit-based

01:30:34.248 --> 01:30:36.470
system if there is politicization , you

01:30:36.470 --> 01:30:38.526
know , within that process along the

01:30:38.526 --> 01:30:41.100
way ? Um , I , I don't intend to dodge

01:30:41.100 --> 01:30:42.989
your question . It's just hard to

01:30:42.989 --> 01:30:44.989
answer the hypotheticals of how the

01:30:44.989 --> 01:30:47.211
public should react , sir . And in , in

01:30:47.211 --> 01:30:49.433
my current role , um , my understanding

01:30:49.433 --> 01:30:51.656
is the law has been followed the entire

01:30:51.656 --> 01:30:53.489
time . How do you feel about the

01:30:53.489 --> 01:30:55.711
merit-based system ? I think the United

01:30:55.711 --> 01:30:58.020
States Army has had an amazing 250 year

01:30:58.020 --> 01:31:00.339
history , having gotten to travel now

01:31:00.339 --> 01:31:02.506
to 25 states and all over the world to

01:31:02.506 --> 01:31:04.617
see our soldiers . I think that every

01:31:04.617 --> 01:31:06.728
single soldier I have talked to , and

01:31:06.728 --> 01:31:08.895
perhaps because of the dynamic and the

01:31:08.895 --> 01:31:10.895
power difference between me and the

01:31:10.895 --> 01:31:12.950
soldier I'm talking to , they're not

01:31:12.950 --> 01:31:12.500
telling me what they're thinking , but

01:31:12.859 --> 01:31:14.748
going all the way back to when my

01:31:14.748 --> 01:31:16.803
granddad served in World War II , my

01:31:16.803 --> 01:31:18.803
dad was in Vietnam and I was in . I

01:31:18.803 --> 01:31:20.859
hope my son and daughter serve . The

01:31:20.859 --> 01:31:22.915
meritocracy that has existed is what

01:31:22.915 --> 01:31:25.137
has made it so great , and I think that

01:31:25.137 --> 01:31:27.248
the vast majority of soldiers believe

01:31:27.248 --> 01:31:29.581
the meritocracy is still alive and well .

01:31:29.581 --> 01:31:31.748
I agree . I agree with everything that

01:31:31.748 --> 01:31:33.692
you said . The concern would be an

01:31:33.692 --> 01:31:35.939
erosion of that system and if that

01:31:35.939 --> 01:31:39.299
merit-based system . Um , now has to be

01:31:39.299 --> 01:31:41.479
filtered through a political lens ,

01:31:42.180 --> 01:31:44.609
then I think we have huge concerns ,

01:31:44.700 --> 01:31:46.811
and I think that that is not a system

01:31:47.140 --> 01:31:49.740
that your that your grandfather went

01:31:49.740 --> 01:31:51.907
through , that you went through , that

01:31:51.907 --> 01:31:54.018
your that your father went through in

01:31:54.018 --> 01:31:56.240
the service . And so that's the concern

01:31:56.240 --> 01:31:58.351
that we have . Look , we've got a lot

01:31:58.351 --> 01:32:00.573
of questions . This committee has a lot

01:32:00.573 --> 01:32:00.299
of questions about the numbers and

01:32:00.299 --> 01:32:03.080
categories , but I do think like the

01:32:03.089 --> 01:32:05.455
the The root of what I'm trying to get

01:32:05.455 --> 01:32:07.455
to from my question is the American

01:32:07.455 --> 01:32:10.154
public needs to understand and it needs

01:32:10.154 --> 01:32:13.115
to feel certain in the decision making

01:32:13.115 --> 01:32:15.395
that has happened . You want us to give

01:32:15.395 --> 01:32:19.234
you resources . We love and respect and

01:32:19.234 --> 01:32:21.395
lift up the service members who are

01:32:21.395 --> 01:32:23.617
helping us . We also need to understand

01:32:23.617 --> 01:32:27.274
that the process is fair , that the

01:32:27.274 --> 01:32:30.680
process is just , and That's the

01:32:30.680 --> 01:32:34.200
concern that I have with this . I'm a

01:32:34.200 --> 01:32:36.256
little surprised that you're reading

01:32:36.256 --> 01:32:39.399
this information at the same time we

01:32:39.399 --> 01:32:41.677
are . If that's how you're finding out ,

01:32:41.759 --> 01:32:43.926
then I think that's a bit of a problem

01:32:43.926 --> 01:32:45.926
along the way as well and something

01:32:45.926 --> 01:32:48.459
that if I was on the board , I would

01:32:48.459 --> 01:32:51.720
have concerns about as well . So I'll

01:32:51.720 --> 01:32:54.053
I'll leave it there for now . Thank you ,

01:32:54.053 --> 01:32:53.990
Mr . Secretary . Thank you , Mr .

01:32:54.000 --> 01:32:57.729
Chairman . Thank you , Mr . Joyce .

01:32:58.620 --> 01:33:00.620
Thank you Mr . Chairman , Secretary

01:33:00.620 --> 01:33:02.620
Driscoll , Driscoll , and General ,

01:33:02.620 --> 01:33:04.564
thank you for being here today . I

01:33:04.564 --> 01:33:06.787
applaud what you're doing right now and

01:33:06.787 --> 01:33:09.009
your commitment to developing this next

01:33:09.009 --> 01:33:11.009
generation of combat vehicles . You

01:33:11.009 --> 01:33:12.898
noted in your written statement ,

01:33:12.898 --> 01:33:14.564
Secretary , that provided the

01:33:14.564 --> 01:33:16.787
subcommittee that the new M1E3 Abrahams

01:33:16.787 --> 01:33:19.009
tank is lighter , more fuel efficient ,

01:33:19.009 --> 01:33:21.009
more lethal , and better suited for

01:33:21.009 --> 01:33:23.231
future conflicts . The tank is designed

01:33:23.231 --> 01:33:25.231
to adapt to a wide range of threats

01:33:25.231 --> 01:33:24.959
including drones and long-range

01:33:24.959 --> 01:33:27.181
precision weapons . Can you discuss the

01:33:27.181 --> 01:33:29.292
importance of this army's accelerated

01:33:29.292 --> 01:33:31.459
schedule for the new Abrahams tank and

01:33:31.459 --> 01:33:33.681
how its significant weight reduction is

01:33:33.681 --> 01:33:35.626
helpful to you ? Absolutely . Um ,

01:33:35.626 --> 01:33:37.737
Congressman , weight is everything in

01:33:37.737 --> 01:33:39.681
moving , um , our equipment , um ,

01:33:39.681 --> 01:33:41.626
across the world . Um , one of the

01:33:41.626 --> 01:33:43.626
things we failed at so miserably is

01:33:43.626 --> 01:33:45.681
when we created the Booker tank . It

01:33:45.681 --> 01:33:47.903
was actually too heavy to go over 11 of

01:33:47.903 --> 01:33:47.879
13 bridges . I think it was at Fort

01:33:47.879 --> 01:33:50.560
Campbell . Um , and if you just

01:33:50.560 --> 01:33:52.504
extrapolate that out to the entire

01:33:52.504 --> 01:33:54.560
world , the usefulness of a piece of

01:33:54.560 --> 01:33:56.782
equipment is how frequently you can use

01:33:56.782 --> 01:33:58.616
it . And so what is similarly so

01:33:58.616 --> 01:34:01.140
amazing to the M1 for the M1E3 that is ,

01:34:01.160 --> 01:34:03.950
uh , uh . The same way the Cheyenne is

01:34:03.950 --> 01:34:06.319
being built is open architecture . It

01:34:06.319 --> 01:34:08.160
will be autonomously able to be

01:34:08.160 --> 01:34:10.879
controlled outside the vehicle . It can

01:34:10.879 --> 01:34:12.935
serve as a power generation source .

01:34:12.935 --> 01:34:15.046
And so when we think of all the power

01:34:15.046 --> 01:34:17.101
that's required on the battlefield ,

01:34:17.101 --> 01:34:19.212
you need heavier equipment to be able

01:34:19.212 --> 01:34:21.268
to move a lot of that power . And so

01:34:21.268 --> 01:34:23.268
this tank can serve as a recharging

01:34:23.268 --> 01:34:25.490
station for a lot of the equipment that

01:34:25.490 --> 01:34:25.430
our soldiers need . And then the very

01:34:25.430 --> 01:34:28.115
last . I think a lot of people , in my

01:34:28.115 --> 01:34:30.282
opinion , are overindexing on the plot

01:34:30.282 --> 01:34:32.171
in Ukraine for what the future of

01:34:32.171 --> 01:34:34.004
warfare will look like . That is

01:34:34.004 --> 01:34:36.059
probably much more similar to trench

01:34:36.059 --> 01:34:38.171
warfare back in the World War than it

01:34:38.171 --> 01:34:41.555
is to the vast array of conflicts that

01:34:41.555 --> 01:34:43.722
we could find ourselves in . And so if

01:34:43.722 --> 01:34:45.388
we find ourselves in an urban

01:34:45.388 --> 01:34:47.388
environment or if we find ourselves

01:34:47.388 --> 01:34:49.555
moving quickly , the tank is still the

01:34:49.555 --> 01:34:51.666
king of battle . Um , can you discuss

01:34:51.666 --> 01:34:53.444
how the army is approaching the

01:34:53.444 --> 01:34:55.611
development of lower cost systems such

01:34:55.611 --> 01:34:55.399
as incorporating artificial

01:34:55.399 --> 01:34:57.399
intelligence and commercial off the

01:34:57.399 --> 01:34:59.621
shelf hardware , and would you consider

01:34:59.621 --> 01:35:01.843
the major , what would you consider the

01:35:01.843 --> 01:35:03.788
major cost drivers of our tactical

01:35:03.788 --> 01:35:05.843
missile programs , and how would you

01:35:05.843 --> 01:35:07.955
recommend addressing those challenges

01:35:07.955 --> 01:35:07.919
becoming more cost efficient without

01:35:07.919 --> 01:35:11.189
sacrificing effectiveness ? That's all ,

01:35:11.279 --> 01:35:13.501
it hit the , the backside of that one .

01:35:13.501 --> 01:35:15.723
This guy's from Pittsburgh , so I don't

01:35:15.723 --> 01:35:17.668
know here I am from Pittsburgh , a

01:35:17.668 --> 01:35:19.668
Steelers fan . I think everybody in

01:35:19.668 --> 01:35:21.723
this room is a Steeler fan and knows

01:35:21.723 --> 01:35:23.779
that the Steelers are in first place

01:35:23.779 --> 01:35:25.946
right now . As a long suffering Browns

01:35:25.946 --> 01:35:28.279
fan , I'll take that into consideration .

01:35:28.279 --> 01:35:30.370
Sure , so when you look at , uh ,

01:35:30.740 --> 01:35:33.620
munitions alone , it's , it's a depth

01:35:33.620 --> 01:35:37.419
of the magazine , um , so it's the , uh ,

01:35:37.560 --> 01:35:39.560
exquisite munitions that cost , you

01:35:39.560 --> 01:35:41.838
know , a , a high price point that the ,

01:35:41.859 --> 01:35:43.859
the primes are producing , but then

01:35:43.859 --> 01:35:46.026
there's the , the lower cost ones that

01:35:46.026 --> 01:35:48.026
I've talked about earlier that . We

01:35:48.026 --> 01:35:50.470
have to have as well at scale , uh , to

01:35:50.470 --> 01:35:52.414
have the magazine depth that we're

01:35:52.414 --> 01:35:54.526
gonna need for , uh , pacing threat .

01:35:54.759 --> 01:35:58.279
Uh , the , the AI piece there , you

01:35:58.279 --> 01:36:00.620
know , we're going to have AI

01:36:02.410 --> 01:36:05.160
through multiple of our systems in the

01:36:05.160 --> 01:36:07.200
future , and especially in , in our

01:36:07.200 --> 01:36:09.200
command and control systems alone ,

01:36:09.359 --> 01:36:11.248
just based off the amount of data

01:36:11.248 --> 01:36:14.240
that's coming at our commanders at any

01:36:14.240 --> 01:36:16.018
given point in time , and we're

01:36:16.018 --> 01:36:18.184
investing heavily in that to make sure

01:36:18.184 --> 01:36:20.296
that we get it right in our systems .

01:36:20.296 --> 01:36:22.950
It's , it's a big part of our C2 push

01:36:22.950 --> 01:36:26.149
that we're looking for . One of the

01:36:26.149 --> 01:36:28.260
things we're doing , Congressman , on

01:36:28.260 --> 01:36:30.093
our bases , um , that , um , I'm

01:36:30.093 --> 01:36:32.093
incredibly excited about that , the

01:36:32.093 --> 01:36:33.871
President , President Trump has

01:36:33.871 --> 01:36:36.038
empowered us to take advantage of this

01:36:36.038 --> 01:36:38.205
amazing asset that the American people

01:36:38.205 --> 01:36:37.669
have given the army . We have millions

01:36:37.669 --> 01:36:40.149
of acres of land that are underutilized

01:36:40.149 --> 01:36:42.470
and , um , a couple of months ago we

01:36:42.470 --> 01:36:44.709
put out a call for data center

01:36:44.709 --> 01:36:46.931
providers to see if they would come use

01:36:46.931 --> 01:36:49.098
their own dollars to build on our land

01:36:49.098 --> 01:36:51.209
and we would get some of the off-take

01:36:51.209 --> 01:36:53.098
or some of the , the power that's

01:36:53.098 --> 01:36:55.209
created on our land . Um , and we are

01:36:55.209 --> 01:36:57.431
partnering with two of the largest ones

01:36:57.431 --> 01:36:59.487
in the nation who build for a lot of

01:36:59.487 --> 01:36:59.470
the hyper scales , and that was

01:36:59.470 --> 01:37:01.770
intended to be an experiment to

01:37:01.770 --> 01:37:03.826
basically say , well , what else now

01:37:03.826 --> 01:37:05.992
can we do on our land ? And so 3 weeks

01:37:05.992 --> 01:37:08.850
ago a call to industry closed where we

01:37:08.850 --> 01:37:10.850
said send us your ideas and we have

01:37:10.850 --> 01:37:13.072
from the largest private equity funds ,

01:37:13.072 --> 01:37:15.072
the largest commercial companies to

01:37:15.072 --> 01:37:17.128
small and medium businesses all over

01:37:17.128 --> 01:37:19.017
the country , sent us in over 200

01:37:19.017 --> 01:37:22.149
pretty well baked . Proposals for

01:37:22.149 --> 01:37:24.371
things that we can do on our army bases

01:37:24.371 --> 01:37:26.709
and so we are working to work with

01:37:26.709 --> 01:37:29.149
Commerce and Treasury and OMB to figure

01:37:29.149 --> 01:37:31.371
out what is the right way to plug these

01:37:31.371 --> 01:37:33.890
into to how the army fields itself ,

01:37:34.229 --> 01:37:36.396
how do we tie it into our arsenals and

01:37:36.396 --> 01:37:38.562
our depots , but my best guess is what

01:37:38.562 --> 01:37:40.562
we will find in a year or two is by

01:37:40.562 --> 01:37:42.785
letting these private companies in , we

01:37:42.785 --> 01:37:44.896
will continue the transformation that

01:37:44.896 --> 01:37:47.118
we must do that Lenny was talking about

01:37:47.118 --> 01:37:49.118
to be able to use things like AI to

01:37:49.118 --> 01:37:51.229
fight the modern fight . Great . Keep

01:37:51.229 --> 01:37:51.220
up the great work . Thank you . Are you

01:37:51.220 --> 01:37:55.140
back ? Thank you

01:37:55.140 --> 01:37:57.251
Mr . Chairman . Sorry to be late . We

01:37:57.251 --> 01:38:00.910
have 3 consecutively planned hearings

01:38:00.910 --> 01:38:03.750
this morning , um , and so I can't be ,

01:38:03.870 --> 01:38:05.537
and I happen to be on those 3

01:38:05.537 --> 01:38:07.370
committees , so it's been a very

01:38:07.370 --> 01:38:10.490
interesting morning , um . I wanted to

01:38:10.490 --> 01:38:12.810
say it's a pleasure to welcome you to

01:38:12.810 --> 01:38:15.143
this committee and congratulations , Mr .

01:38:15.143 --> 01:38:17.330
Secretary , and General , thank you .

01:38:17.490 --> 01:38:19.712
Coming from an army and marine family ,

01:38:19.712 --> 01:38:21.768
thank you for what you do . My first

01:38:21.768 --> 01:38:23.879
question is , based on everything you

01:38:23.879 --> 01:38:26.959
know at this point , does the Trump

01:38:26.959 --> 01:38:29.439
administration view Russia as an ally ,

01:38:29.799 --> 01:38:32.930
as an adversary , or is it undecided ?

01:38:33.279 --> 01:38:35.446
Mr . Secretary , have you been on , in

01:38:35.446 --> 01:38:37.668
on meetings ? Do you , how , how do you

01:38:37.668 --> 01:38:41.609
answer my question ? Um , congresswoman ,

01:38:41.790 --> 01:38:45.169
uh , adversary . Adversary . Hmm .

01:38:45.839 --> 01:38:49.089
Um , so , um , I wanted to ask , uh ,

01:38:49.250 --> 01:38:51.770
Ukraine , uh , was hit by horrific

01:38:51.770 --> 01:38:54.750
Russian strikes last night , and , um ,

01:38:55.629 --> 01:38:58.709
That's become normal , but there were

01:38:58.709 --> 01:39:02.339
sanctions placed . On Russia that the

01:39:02.339 --> 01:39:05.220
Trump administration then lifted . Um ,

01:39:06.330 --> 01:39:09.459
but Then I don't , I don't know what's

01:39:09.459 --> 01:39:11.515
going to happen . It's like we're in

01:39:11.515 --> 01:39:13.681
freefall , uh , but that earned Russia

01:39:13.681 --> 01:39:17.120
about $10 billion which allows them to

01:39:17.220 --> 01:39:20.720
to continue . Of the war in

01:39:20.819 --> 01:39:22.875
Ukraine . It will prolong the war in

01:39:22.875 --> 01:39:26.439
Ukraine . Um , I don't really

01:39:26.439 --> 01:39:28.606
understand what this administration is

01:39:28.606 --> 01:39:30.328
doing relative to our historic

01:39:30.328 --> 01:39:32.495
relationships with people who actually

01:39:32.495 --> 01:39:35.640
believe in liberty , um , but Putin

01:39:35.640 --> 01:39:37.751
always seems to be let off the hook .

01:39:38.080 --> 01:39:41.859
So , um , I don't know

01:39:41.859 --> 01:39:44.026
what can be done . Do you expect those

01:39:44.026 --> 01:39:47.729
sanctions ? To be reimposed , uh , and

01:39:47.729 --> 01:39:50.129
if so , for how long ? I was told they

01:39:50.129 --> 01:39:52.970
may have just been put on again . That

01:39:52.970 --> 01:39:54.748
this on and off , I mean , what

01:39:54.748 --> 01:39:56.748
happened ? What happened inside the

01:39:56.748 --> 01:39:58.950
administration ? Congresswoman , uh ,

01:39:59.060 --> 01:40:01.282
under my Title 10 authorities , I can't

01:40:01.282 --> 01:40:03.227
speak to the sanctions , but I can

01:40:03.227 --> 01:40:05.227
speak to the United States Army has

01:40:05.227 --> 01:40:07.393
stood by and stood with the Ukrainians

01:40:07.393 --> 01:40:09.727
from the very first day of the war . Um ,

01:40:09.727 --> 01:40:09.540
I've been to Kiev . I've spent a lot of

01:40:09.540 --> 01:40:11.373
time with a lot of the Ukrainian

01:40:11.373 --> 01:40:13.779
leadership . They have fundamentally

01:40:13.779 --> 01:40:16.001
altered how humans engage in conflict .

01:40:16.140 --> 01:40:18.419
They have done an absolutely amazing

01:40:18.419 --> 01:40:20.530
job of innovating , and I am publicly

01:40:20.530 --> 01:40:22.697
on record saying we are learning a lot

01:40:22.697 --> 01:40:24.863
from them and we are changing to a lot

01:40:24.863 --> 01:40:27.197
of the lessons that they have taught us .

01:40:27.197 --> 01:40:29.252
And so I cannot answer your specific

01:40:29.252 --> 01:40:31.141
question , but I can say we , the

01:40:31.141 --> 01:40:33.086
United States Army have stood with

01:40:33.086 --> 01:40:35.086
Ukraine from the beginning . Well ,

01:40:35.086 --> 01:40:37.252
I'll do anything to help you . You let

01:40:37.252 --> 01:40:39.363
me know what you need because I think

01:40:39.363 --> 01:40:41.530
that what has been happening with this

01:40:41.530 --> 01:40:43.641
administration . Uh , relative to our

01:40:43.641 --> 01:40:45.752
historic relationships is appalling ,

01:40:45.830 --> 01:40:48.052
and I've never seen anything like it in

01:40:48.052 --> 01:40:50.219
my career and I have a long one . So ,

01:40:50.219 --> 01:40:52.330
uh , let me move to industrial base .

01:40:52.330 --> 01:40:54.163
Thank you , gentlemen , for even

01:40:54.163 --> 01:40:56.386
knowing it used to exist in our country

01:40:56.386 --> 01:40:58.608
and some of us ran for office to try to

01:40:58.608 --> 01:41:00.497
recover it . I look at Mr . Joyce

01:41:00.497 --> 01:41:02.719
smiling at me . We know what we've been

01:41:02.719 --> 01:41:04.774
through . We welcome you to Northern

01:41:04.774 --> 01:41:06.886
Ohio anytime . We make the tanks , we

01:41:06.886 --> 01:41:08.997
make the Wranglers . We made the Jeep

01:41:08.997 --> 01:41:11.274
going back , you know , half a century .

01:41:11.274 --> 01:41:13.608
We have the best GM propulsion facility .

01:41:13.608 --> 01:41:16.240
We have Ford Heavy truck . We made the

01:41:16.240 --> 01:41:19.959
Stryker . We know something about

01:41:19.959 --> 01:41:23.640
moving armies with equipment ,

01:41:24.040 --> 01:41:26.799
and we also know quite a bit about

01:41:26.799 --> 01:41:30.660
ammunition , so . We really aren't seen

01:41:30.660 --> 01:41:33.229
by the country . The people that work

01:41:33.229 --> 01:41:37.089
here , um , a few do , um , but

01:41:37.270 --> 01:41:40.589
I really would invite you or people you

01:41:40.589 --> 01:41:43.270
send to our region because I truly

01:41:43.270 --> 01:41:45.214
believe , for instance , I'll just

01:41:45.214 --> 01:41:47.270
mention one unit which is a National

01:41:47.270 --> 01:41:49.214
Guard unit , uh , our F-16 unit at

01:41:49.214 --> 01:41:51.390
Toledo . It's among the 10 best in the

01:41:51.390 --> 01:41:53.729
country , but it's a guard unit , so

01:41:53.990 --> 01:41:56.101
Army maybe doesn't see them . I don't

01:41:56.101 --> 01:41:58.410
know , but , um , the I , when I

01:41:58.410 --> 01:42:01.850
compliment the pilots , I say . You are

01:42:01.850 --> 01:42:05.379
just so good . And They say it's due to

01:42:05.379 --> 01:42:07.819
the maintainers congresswoman . Next

01:42:07.819 --> 01:42:10.850
door to this F-16 unit is a

01:42:10.850 --> 01:42:14.459
reserve unit , uh , engineering , an

01:42:14.459 --> 01:42:16.879
engineering battalion , 983rd Army ,

01:42:17.220 --> 01:42:20.020
and I'm saying to myself , OK , so , I

01:42:20.020 --> 01:42:22.200
believe those who maintain .

01:42:23.330 --> 01:42:26.620
Innovate and they have ideas , but we

01:42:26.620 --> 01:42:28.676
don't organize that too well . We're

01:42:28.676 --> 01:42:30.729
very bureaucratized , uh , at the

01:42:30.729 --> 01:42:32.951
federal level , but I'm just urging you

01:42:32.951 --> 01:42:35.007
to think about places where you have

01:42:35.007 --> 01:42:38.899
exceptional people near where industry

01:42:38.899 --> 01:42:42.799
what remains of it exists and both

01:42:42.979 --> 01:42:45.146
David and I represent Cleveland Cliffs

01:42:45.146 --> 01:42:47.140
that's just one steel company , we

01:42:47.140 --> 01:42:49.160
didn't have that . I mean that was

01:42:49.160 --> 01:42:51.160
missing . We didn't have steel as a

01:42:51.160 --> 01:42:53.493
country . We lost Gary , Indiana . It's ,

01:42:53.493 --> 01:42:56.419
uh , now Cleveland Cliffs is there too ,

01:42:57.000 --> 01:42:59.959
but we're just rebuilding , so I don't

01:42:59.959 --> 01:43:02.819
think we're properly structured to

01:43:03.759 --> 01:43:05.926
put together some of these assets that

01:43:05.926 --> 01:43:08.037
we have . We have Warren Tank Command

01:43:08.037 --> 01:43:10.439
up in Michigan , um , but I just think

01:43:10.439 --> 01:43:12.439
we need to think harder about those

01:43:12.439 --> 01:43:14.550
inventive minds of people who operate

01:43:14.550 --> 01:43:16.540
this equipment . Um , I was on a

01:43:16.540 --> 01:43:19.759
striker when I was in Kuwait , but , um ,

01:43:20.379 --> 01:43:22.540
the , when we got into Iraq , it was

01:43:22.540 --> 01:43:25.020
obvious that the turret was going up

01:43:25.020 --> 01:43:27.076
and down , and I'm not an engineer ,

01:43:27.076 --> 01:43:28.964
but I got that fixed . I'm just a

01:43:28.964 --> 01:43:31.060
congresswoman , and I thought , how

01:43:31.060 --> 01:43:33.620
could we miss that ? And so how do we

01:43:33.620 --> 01:43:35.620
better look at your assets to go to

01:43:35.620 --> 01:43:37.676
those places where we have potential

01:43:37.979 --> 01:43:40.146
that is not met , and I would just ask

01:43:40.146 --> 01:43:42.090
you to think about that question .

01:43:42.120 --> 01:43:44.231
Ma'am , uh , you know , first , thank

01:43:44.231 --> 01:43:46.176
you for the question . I , my , my

01:43:46.176 --> 01:43:48.342
mother's side of the family comes from

01:43:48.342 --> 01:43:50.398
East Liverpool , Ohio . Long line of

01:43:50.398 --> 01:43:52.509
welders , yes , of course they're all

01:43:52.509 --> 01:43:55.479
Steeler fans . Yeah , so , so , ma'am ,

01:43:55.600 --> 01:43:58.740
I , I , so . We have a lot of equipment .

01:44:00.049 --> 01:44:02.160
We have a lot of things in the United

01:44:02.160 --> 01:44:04.327
States Army . The most important thing

01:44:04.327 --> 01:44:06.549
we have is our soldiers , and they will

01:44:06.549 --> 01:44:10.370
innovate , and they will fix things at

01:44:10.370 --> 01:44:13.850
the point of need if we enable them to

01:44:13.850 --> 01:44:16.049
be able to do it . So the right to

01:44:16.049 --> 01:44:18.910
repair . Um , the technical data we

01:44:18.910 --> 01:44:21.109
need , the ability to produce our own

01:44:21.109 --> 01:44:23.276
parts because the supply chain can't ,

01:44:23.290 --> 01:44:26.669
can't keep up with it , uh , we had

01:44:26.669 --> 01:44:28.549
soldiers reverse engineer , uh ,

01:44:28.629 --> 01:44:31.390
tailfin , uh , that goes on a tank of a ,

01:44:31.589 --> 01:44:33.680
of a helicopter . Normally it costs

01:44:33.680 --> 01:44:36.180
$14,000 just to , you know , replace

01:44:36.180 --> 01:44:39.040
this little tail fin . Soldiers reverse

01:44:39.040 --> 01:44:41.096
engineered it , uh , printed it . It

01:44:41.096 --> 01:44:43.939
was $3000 to be able to execute that .

01:44:44.520 --> 01:44:46.839
If we unleash them , they will fix all

01:44:46.839 --> 01:44:48.895
these problems . We just have to get

01:44:48.895 --> 01:44:50.895
rid of a little bit of the red tape

01:44:50.895 --> 01:44:53.117
that's holding us back to be able to do

01:44:53.117 --> 01:44:55.006
it . And I think there's a middle

01:44:55.006 --> 01:44:57.061
ground in here . We have to , as the

01:44:57.061 --> 01:44:56.919
secretary said , we have to do this in

01:44:56.919 --> 01:44:58.863
the very beginning in our , in our

01:44:58.863 --> 01:45:01.030
contracting to ensure that we have the

01:45:01.030 --> 01:45:03.363
technical data to be able to execute it .

01:45:03.363 --> 01:45:05.669
And then the ability to let us produce

01:45:05.939 --> 01:45:07.828
the parts that we need to get the

01:45:07.828 --> 01:45:09.995
equipment that is our legacy equipment

01:45:09.995 --> 01:45:12.161
that we say legacy , but it's going to

01:45:12.161 --> 01:45:14.383
be in our , in our inventory for a long

01:45:14.383 --> 01:45:16.830
time as we are uh moving to produce uh

01:45:16.830 --> 01:45:19.680
newer platforms that our soldiers

01:45:19.939 --> 01:45:22.060
should be able to repair it . We owe

01:45:22.060 --> 01:45:25.700
them uh the , the ability and the right

01:45:25.700 --> 01:45:28.229
to be able to do it , uh , because they ,

01:45:28.299 --> 01:45:30.521
they're proud of their equipment . Uh ,

01:45:30.521 --> 01:45:32.632
you all bought it for us . We want to

01:45:32.632 --> 01:45:34.799
maintain it . We just want to have the

01:45:34.799 --> 01:45:37.021
ability to do it , but you also want to

01:45:37.021 --> 01:45:39.188
reinvent it for the future , general ,

01:45:39.188 --> 01:45:41.299
right ? OK , thanks the gentle lady .

01:45:41.839 --> 01:45:44.006
By the way , Andderal is putting their

01:45:44.006 --> 01:45:46.117
major plant in the state of Ohio , so

01:45:46.117 --> 01:45:48.540
you got a modern facility , 500,000

01:45:48.540 --> 01:45:52.350
square feet . What's that ? Well , it's

01:45:52.350 --> 01:45:54.406
in Ohio , close enough . Yeah . Does

01:45:54.406 --> 01:45:56.461
that , is that headquartered in your

01:45:56.461 --> 01:45:58.683
district ? No , it's not in my , well ,

01:45:58.870 --> 01:46:02.609
very close to my . Ms .

01:46:02.689 --> 01:46:06.479
McCollum , um , thank you . uh , Mr .

01:46:06.490 --> 01:46:08.890
Secretary , I look forward , uh , to

01:46:08.890 --> 01:46:10.946
having our staff follow up with your

01:46:10.946 --> 01:46:13.001
staff on the next , uh , gen Command

01:46:13.001 --> 01:46:15.057
and Control and the lines , and that

01:46:15.057 --> 01:46:17.001
might give you an example and your

01:46:17.001 --> 01:46:19.223
staff an example of how we use , how we

01:46:19.223 --> 01:46:21.334
use the lines so we can work together

01:46:21.334 --> 01:46:23.501
on that . We started out talking about

01:46:23.501 --> 01:46:25.446
procurement needs to get fixed . I

01:46:25.446 --> 01:46:27.390
couldn't . Agree with you more and

01:46:27.390 --> 01:46:27.245
general , you ended up talking about

01:46:27.245 --> 01:46:30.084
how we have to fix a contracting so we

01:46:30.084 --> 01:46:32.084
look forward to working with you on

01:46:32.084 --> 01:46:34.028
that . On , on the last note , you

01:46:34.028 --> 01:46:36.084
heard a lot about General George and

01:46:36.084 --> 01:46:38.140
how much we really appreciated his ,

01:46:38.140 --> 01:46:39.973
his service . We appreciate your

01:46:39.973 --> 01:46:41.806
service too . We look forward to

01:46:41.806 --> 01:46:43.917
working with you , Mr . Chera yield .

01:46:43.917 --> 01:46:45.806
Thank you . Uh , before , uh , we

01:46:45.806 --> 01:46:48.028
conclude , I wanna thank , uh , both of

01:46:48.028 --> 01:46:49.917
you for attending today . Uh , we

01:46:49.917 --> 01:46:52.195
appreciate your service to our country .

01:46:52.195 --> 01:46:54.195
It's invaluable that the department

01:46:54.195 --> 01:46:56.084
continue to keep the subcommittee

01:46:56.084 --> 01:46:58.680
informed as we move along . All of us

01:46:58.680 --> 01:47:00.291
in this room hate continuing

01:47:00.291 --> 01:47:03.160
resolutions , and so help us , help you

01:47:03.160 --> 01:47:05.049
get us the information we need as

01:47:05.049 --> 01:47:07.271
quickly as possible so we can get these

01:47:07.271 --> 01:47:11.160
appropriation bills done on time . And

01:47:11.160 --> 01:47:13.104
with that , this concludes today's

01:47:13.104 --> 01:47:13.240
hearing .