WEBVTT

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Today's hearing will come to order .

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The subcommittee meets today to review

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the department's fiscal year 2027

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budget request for missile defense and

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defeat activities . Testifying before

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the subcommittee today , we have Mr .

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Mark Berkowitz , the Assistant

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Secretary of Defense for Space Policy ,

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General Gregory Glo , Commander of US

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Northern Command and North American

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Aerospace Defense Command , General

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Michael Gutwein , the director of the

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Golden Dome for America Initiative ,

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Lieutenant General Heath Collins ,

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director of Missile Defense Agency .

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And Lieutenant General Sean Gainey ,

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Commander of US Army Space and Missile

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Defense Command and Joint Task Force

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GOLD . Good afternoon and welcome to

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all of you . We appreciate you being

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here with us today . I want to begin by

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recognizing the service of our air and

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missile defense operators . In recent

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weeks , they have served with great

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distinction . Most of all , their

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courage and proficiency has saved lives .

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We salute them . This is

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the first subcommittee hearing to be

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held since the president's budget

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request for upcoming fiscal year 2027

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was released . While we continue to

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await programmatic details , I was

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pleased to see the top line level

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reflects a strong investment in missile

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defense capabilities . Three areas are

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worth highlighting . First , the

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missile Defense Agency's budget for

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research and development would grow

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substantially to over $12.3 billion an

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increase of more than 50% since

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President Trump took office . This

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reflects a renewed focus on MDA's core

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mission of pursuing advanced technology

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development , which is long overdue .

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Second , this budget invests about $23

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billion in the production of missile

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defense interceptors , which makes up

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almost half of the department's broader

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munitions acceleration initiative .

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While conflicts in Ukraine and the

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Middle East have proven the importance

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of magazine death , depth finding for

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interception production has been

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inadequate or funding for interceptor

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production has been inadequate for

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years . As production lines operate at

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or near minimum sustainable rates , our

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industrial base withered . Just two

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years ago , the previous administration

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proposed ending production of the

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Navy's SM3 Block 1B interceptor .

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Congress rejected this decision and

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provided additional funding to continue

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its production , but we were unable to

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address the root of the problem , an

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ever growing gap between the munitions

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demands and the modern battlefield and

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the production capacity we are

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budgeting for . President Trump's 2027

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budget represents the first serious

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effort to course correct and rebuild

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our nation's munitions production

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capacity . This is critical for our

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missile defense enterprise . Third ,

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building upon the historic investment

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this committee made through last year's

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reconciliation bill , the 2027 budget

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seeks over $17.5 billion for the Golden

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Dome Initiative to protect the homeland

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from air and missile defense threats .

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However , funding for both of these

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critical initiatives , Interceptor

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Procurement and Golden Dome , are part

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of the department's $350 billion

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mandatory spending request , which

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depends on the outcome of a broader

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political process that is less

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predictable . As the budget landscape

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evolves in the weeks and months ahead ,

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I hope our witnesses will continue to

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work with this committee to convey the

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importance of this funding and to

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clearly communicate the consequences

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that would come with failing to provide

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it . I also want to express my

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appreciation for the department's

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effort to improve communication with

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this committee about its Golden Dome's

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plans . Challenges remain and

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overclassification will need to be

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addressed . However , the increased

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engagement from particularly General

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Gutlein and Mr . Berkowitz on this

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topic is welcome and deserves to be

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acknowledged . Uh , General Gainey , I

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understand that you'll be retiring this

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summer after 36 years in uniform . We

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thank you and your family , uh , for

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all that you've done on behalf of our

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nation . And Jen

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And General Guillo , uh , just in case

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this is the last time we see you , I

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want to also express our thanks to you

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for your 37 years of service to this

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country . We have enjoyed working with

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you both and have benefited greatly

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from your unwavering professionalism

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and candor .

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And with that , I now recognize the

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ranking member Mr . Molt for his

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opening remarks . Well , thank you very

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much , uh , Mr . Chairman . I , it's an

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honor to be here with all of you , and

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I wanna start where you ended , uh ,

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which is to acknowledge that this is

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Lieutenant Jeff Gainey's last hearing

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before , uh , the committee , and , uh ,

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36 years in uniform , um , in service ,

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not just in your present role , but

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also as a director of the Joint Counter

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UAS Office . You've helped save a lot

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of lives , and we're grateful for that .

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Missile defense has been front and

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center for the last 6 weeks as we have

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seen American missile defenses save the

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lives of an untold number of service

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members and civilians , but we also are

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plainly seeing its limitations . The

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hundreds of wounded service members and

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the families of the 7 Americans killed

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by enemy fire know these limits all too

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well . Missile defense is not

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impenetrable and never will be . It's

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an incredibly finite resource . In many

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cases , we are spending millions of

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dollars a shot to take out $50,000

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drones . And most importantly , missile

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defense is not a strategy . Our

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president has chosen to spend down

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billions of dollars in years' worth of

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interceptor production . And with Iran

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now having locked down the strait ,

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doubled oil prices , alienated our

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allies , strengthened China's hand .

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Forced the president to remove oil

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sanctions against Russia and

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unbelievably against Iran itself . And

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with Iran today directly projecting

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more power against us and our allies

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than it ever has , all for the cost of

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ballistic missiles they will rebuild

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even while they still have plenty to

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shoot at us , the president is now

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losing the war that he started .

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Missile defense will not absolve us of

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poor strategic choices , and it cannot

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prevent our adversaries from finding

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other ways to inflict harm . Every

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conversation about missile defense ,

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both policy and programs , must

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acknowledge these limitations honestly .

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As you all know , I'm supportive of

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many investments in missile defense .

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There are many areas where there is

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strong consensus on this committee . We

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have made robust investments in sensing

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and tracking . We have helped mature

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the regional missile defense

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capabilities that are truly miracles of

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engineering and are saving lives in the

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Gulf today . Patriot Aegis and TAA .

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And we are defending against the

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strategic threat posed by rogue nations

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such as North Korea , who may not be

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deterred by mutually assured

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destruction . I would add that we were

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doing that against Iran as well . But

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when it comes to the strategy , we

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continue to have serious disagreements .

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Many of us here with the administration .

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And the vast majority of those who now

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sing Golden Dome's praises with

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themselves , just hours before Trump

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announced his scheme . I've sat on this

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committee for years and I've never

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heard a colleague , Republican or

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Democrat , advocate spending half a

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trillion dollars on a system to protect

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us from ballistic missiles , but that

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will in fact probably be quite easy for

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our adversaries to engineer around

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before Mr . Trump announced this idea .

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Now I understand that someone willing

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to take on the Pope in the image of

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Jesus Christ probably thinks himself a

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greater theorist of strategic

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deterrence than everyone else as well .

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But our job is not to blindly answer to

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the president . It is to ask tough

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questions on behalf of the American

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people . It is clear to me now that the

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reality does not match what President

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Trump has promised to the American

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people . An impenetrable shield , as he

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says , against all threats . So let me

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be clear , just like other promises the

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president has made , like how tariffs

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will not impact the cost of living , or

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that we do not need commerce that

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transits the Strait of Hormuz , Mr .

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Trump's version of Golden Dome is just

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not the truth . Experts from both sides

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of the aisle have admitted this , both

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from a technical and fiscal perspective ,

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it's impossible to defend , to defend

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all of the United States from any kind

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of threat that could be launched at us .

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As the Middle East shows , even the

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best missile defense is imperfect . Now

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perhaps if we could have a debate about

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exactly what is envisioned for Golden

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Dome , we might be able to agree on the

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right answer . Perhaps a more limited

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version of Homeland missile defense . I

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will certainly be an advocate for more

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missile defense on the homeland than we

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have today . I would love to see many

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of the Patriot batteries defending

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foreign countries , defending our own .

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We might even be able to agree that we

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shouldn't touch the underpinning of our

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strategic stability that has kept the

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world safe from nuclear war . That

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nuclear deterrence based on the concept

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of mutually assured destruction is a

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far better way to deal with Russian and

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Chinese nukes than trying to shoot them

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all down . But unfortunately , the

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administration has chosen to classify

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nearly everything when it comes to the

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architecture and costs of the system ,

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and I have to assume that this is being

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done on purpose . Hegseth , so that he

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does not have to own up to the fact

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that Golden Dome is yet again another

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lie by the president , the American

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people . It's convenient for him

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because he has no problem sharing

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classified information himself whenever

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he'd like to impress a friend . But as

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we continue to evaluate DOD's missile

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defense programs , I will continue to

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ask the hard questions . How will

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expanding US missile defense today

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impact strategic stability tomorrow ?

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Does it raise the incentive for our

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adversaries to strike first ? We are

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already in an arms race . Will this

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accelerate ? Do these choices make our

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nation ? In our world more or less safe ,

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these are the questions and debates we

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must have on the subcommittee . It's

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the oversight we are constitutionally

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required to provide , not just with an

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eye to this year's budget and the NDAA ,

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but with a view towards how our

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decisions will impact the world we

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leave for our children . Thank you , Mr .

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Chairman , and I yield back . I thank

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the gentleman for his opening remarks ,

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and we'll now move to opening

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statements from our witnesses . I would

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note that your prepared statements will

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be made part of the record , but you

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will each have 5 minutes to make some

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opening remarks . I will start with Mr .

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Berkowitz and work our way down . So Mr .

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Berkowitz , you're recognized for 5

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minutes . Uh , thank you , Chairman

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Desarlais , Ranking Member Moulton ,

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and distinguished members of the

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committee . Thank you for the

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opportunity to testify in the

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Department of War's missile defense and

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defeat programs and activities . It's

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an honor to appear with my colleagues

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General Guillo , General Gutlein ,

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Lieutenant General Collins , and

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Lieutenant General Gaining . America

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faces intensifying strategic

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competition in the security environment .

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The pace and scale of the threat is

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unprecedented . Our rivals are

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expanding , diversifying , and

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increasing the sophistication of their

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arsenals for both respect to missiles

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and aerial weapons . They are

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integrating offensive strike and

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missile defense systems into joint

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operations to deny access and impose

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costs . By threatening America's safety ,

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territorial integrity , and economic

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prosperity , rivals aim to undermine

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our political will , social cohesion

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and morale , and ability to project

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power . President Trump is restoring

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American strength to meet these

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challenges and secure peace . He issued

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an executive order to field and operate

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the Golden Dome for America , a

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comprehensive next generation defense

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against the most catastrophic threats

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facing the United States . The Golden

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Dome will protect our homeland ,

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citizens , critical infrastructure ,

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and second strike capability . The

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department's highest priority as

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directed by the president and the

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national defense strategy is the

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defense of the US homeland . The Golden

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Dome is the cornerstone of our homeland

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defense posture . It is a necessary and

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pragmatic response to the growing

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threat posed by ballistic , hypersonic ,

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and advanced cruise missiles , as well

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as next generation aerial weapons .

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Nuclear deterrence complemented by the

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Golden Dome remains the cornerstone of

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US deterrence strategy . Today our

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capability to defend the nation is

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limited and its effectiveness is

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eroding against an increasingly

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advanced set of threats . The Golden

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Dome will rectify this by creating a

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layered defense and depth of the United

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States . It will defend against

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accidental , unauthorized , rogue

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decapitation and coercive attacks . In

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contrast to the current limited defense

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system consisting of a single layer of

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ground-based mid-course defense

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interceptors , multiple terrestrial and

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space-based defensive layers will

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complicate adversary attack planning

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and provide more engagement

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opportunities to destroy incoming

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threats . Combined with the prospect of

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US retaliation , Golden Dome will

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strengthen deterrence by denying

12:36.702 --> 12:38.647
adversaries the ability to achieve

12:38.647 --> 12:40.702
their objectives through coercion or

12:40.702 --> 12:43.080
aggression . Moreover , it will save

12:43.080 --> 12:44.747
lives and limit damage should

12:44.747 --> 12:47.179
deterrents break down . The cost of the

12:47.179 --> 12:49.659
Golden Dome , while significant , is a

12:49.659 --> 12:51.826
necessary investment to protect assets

12:51.826 --> 12:54.340
of truly incalculable value , the lives

12:54.340 --> 12:56.451
of our citizens , and the territorial

12:56.451 --> 12:58.609
integrity of our nation . The cost of

12:58.609 --> 13:00.831
failing to defend our homeland would be

13:00.831 --> 13:03.030
infinitely greater . China is our

13:03.030 --> 13:05.559
pacing competitor . We will deter China

13:05.559 --> 13:07.448
from a position of strength , not

13:07.448 --> 13:09.559
confrontation . The denial defense

13:09.559 --> 13:11.719
along the first island chain . Our

13:11.719 --> 13:13.552
regional missile defense posture

13:14.640 --> 13:16.807
centered on Aegis destroyers , as well

13:16.807 --> 13:18.973
as terminal high altitude area defense

13:18.973 --> 13:21.169
and Patriot batteries , provides a

13:21.169 --> 13:23.391
forward deployed layered integrated air

13:23.391 --> 13:25.349
and missile defense network . As

13:25.349 --> 13:27.549
Operation Epic Fury underscores ,

13:27.979 --> 13:30.090
regional missile defense is essential

13:30.090 --> 13:32.035
to protect and defend our forces ,

13:32.070 --> 13:34.989
allies , and interests abroad . Our

13:34.989 --> 13:36.989
global alliances remain a strategic

13:36.989 --> 13:40.460
advantage if our allies invest properly

13:40.460 --> 13:42.380
in defense . The department will

13:42.380 --> 13:44.436
continue to pursue opportunities for

13:44.436 --> 13:46.491
missile defense , defense and defeat

13:46.491 --> 13:48.658
cooperation to increase burden sharing

13:48.658 --> 13:51.299
capacity and interoperability . We are

13:51.299 --> 13:53.239
also supercharging the US defense

13:53.239 --> 13:55.700
industrial base by cutting bureaucratic

13:55.700 --> 13:57.940
red tape , empowering program leaders

13:57.940 --> 13:59.940
to take calculated risks , and

13:59.940 --> 14:02.107
leveraging private sector innovation .

14:02.419 --> 14:04.363
We must accelerate the delivery of

14:04.363 --> 14:06.363
critical missile defense and defeat

14:06.363 --> 14:08.609
capabilities at scale . In closing ,

14:08.710 --> 14:10.988
with the continued support of Congress ,

14:10.988 --> 14:13.099
the War Department will invest in the

14:13.099 --> 14:15.140
missile defense and defeat programs

14:15.150 --> 14:17.094
necessary to achieve peace through

14:17.094 --> 14:18.983
strength . Thank you , and I look

14:18.983 --> 14:21.206
forward to your questions . I thank the

14:21.206 --> 14:23.206
Honorable Berkowitz for his opening

14:23.206 --> 14:25.206
remarks , and we will now recognize

14:25.206 --> 14:28.250
General Guillo for 5 minutes . Chairman

14:28.250 --> 14:30.309
Desjollet , Ranking Member Moulton ,

14:30.419 --> 14:32.252
and distinguished members of the

14:32.252 --> 14:34.086
subcommittee , thank you for the

14:34.086 --> 14:36.197
opportunity to appear today alongside

14:36.197 --> 14:38.363
this panel of outstanding partners and

14:38.363 --> 14:40.086
to represent the dedicated and

14:40.086 --> 14:42.308
disciplined men and women of the United

14:42.308 --> 14:44.197
States Northern Command and North

14:44.197 --> 14:46.419
American Aerospace Defense Command . As

14:46.419 --> 14:48.530
the strategic environment and missile

14:48.530 --> 14:50.752
threats have grown more complex , NORAD

14:50.752 --> 14:52.475
and NORTHCOM have responded by

14:52.475 --> 14:52.309
fundamentally transforming both

14:52.309 --> 14:55.059
commands , taking on new missions and

14:55.059 --> 14:56.837
rapidly implementing innovative

14:56.837 --> 14:59.059
approaches to safeguard North America .

14:59.390 --> 15:01.612
NORAD and US NORTHCOM remain vigilant ,

15:01.630 --> 15:03.519
capable , and committed to defend

15:03.519 --> 15:05.630
against cruise missile threats as the

15:05.630 --> 15:07.852
commands routinely intercept long-range

15:07.852 --> 15:10.030
bombers and track advanced maritime

15:10.030 --> 15:12.086
platforms in the approaches to North

15:12.086 --> 15:14.252
America while standing ready to defend

15:14.252 --> 15:16.197
against long-range missile attacks

15:16.197 --> 15:18.030
around the clock every day . The

15:18.030 --> 15:19.863
commands have undertaken several

15:19.863 --> 15:22.086
initiatives over the last year to build

15:22.086 --> 15:23.974
on our preparedness to respond to

15:23.974 --> 15:25.697
missile threats , including US

15:25.697 --> 15:27.697
NORTHCOM's activation of Joint Task

15:27.697 --> 15:29.752
Force Gold , which will serve as the

15:29.752 --> 15:31.919
operational arm for the future layered

15:31.919 --> 15:34.086
defense systems provided by the Golden

15:34.086 --> 15:35.974
Dome for America . The ability to

15:35.974 --> 15:37.863
detect , track , and discriminate

15:37.863 --> 15:39.808
threats from sea floor to space is

15:39.808 --> 15:41.909
critical , and NORAD and US NORTHCOM

15:41.909 --> 15:44.020
also continue to pursue modernized

15:44.020 --> 15:46.187
domain awareness systems and defensive

15:46.187 --> 15:48.580
capabilities to meet the challenges of

15:48.580 --> 15:50.679
tomorrow . I remain grateful for the

15:50.679 --> 15:52.623
subcommittee's ongoing support for

15:52.623 --> 15:54.568
space-based airborne moving target

15:54.568 --> 15:56.623
indicator , over the horizon radar ,

15:56.623 --> 15:58.846
airborne early warning , and integrated

15:58.846 --> 16:01.012
undersea surveillance systems , all of

16:01.012 --> 16:02.957
which allow us to detect and track

16:02.957 --> 16:05.200
launch platforms well before they can

16:05.200 --> 16:07.200
threaten the homeland . The men and

16:07.200 --> 16:09.033
women of US NORCO and NORAD have

16:09.033 --> 16:11.144
embraced these new challenges and are

16:11.144 --> 16:13.033
unwavering in our no fail mission

16:13.219 --> 16:15.330
discipline , defense of our homelands

16:15.330 --> 16:17.539
in all domains , from all avenues of

16:17.539 --> 16:19.650
approach against all those who intend

16:19.650 --> 16:21.940
us harm . We appreciate the steadfast

16:21.940 --> 16:24.107
support of this committee , and I look

16:24.107 --> 16:26.329
forward to your questions . We have the

16:26.329 --> 16:28.551
watch . Thank you , General Gil . I now

16:28.551 --> 16:30.960
would turn to General Gutlein for his

16:30.960 --> 16:33.010
remarks . You recognized for five

16:33.010 --> 16:35.030
minutes . Thank you , Chairman ,

16:35.159 --> 16:37.048
Chairman Desjola , Ranking Member

16:37.048 --> 16:39.215
Moulton , and distinguished members of

16:39.215 --> 16:41.270
the subcommittee . Thank you for the

16:41.270 --> 16:41.179
opportunity to report on the progress

16:41.409 --> 16:43.840
of Golden Dome for America . We're here

16:43.840 --> 16:45.784
today because the global strategic

16:45.784 --> 16:47.896
landscape has changed . For the first

16:47.896 --> 16:49.896
time in a generation , our nation's

16:49.896 --> 16:52.007
margin of safety has vanished . While

16:52.007 --> 16:54.229
we have been focused on the away game ,

16:54.229 --> 16:56.118
our adversaries have been working

16:56.118 --> 16:55.960
around the clock to challenge us at

16:55.960 --> 16:58.150
home , and today the homeland is

16:58.150 --> 17:01.140
exposed and relatively undefended . A

17:01.140 --> 17:03.099
new generation of advanced air and

17:03.099 --> 17:05.099
missile threats , unprecedented in

17:05.099 --> 17:07.321
their speed , numbers , and lethality ,

17:07.579 --> 17:10.020
now holds the American homeland at risk .

17:10.380 --> 17:12.602
Our adversaries are not just expressing

17:12.602 --> 17:14.824
the intent , they are demonstrating the

17:14.824 --> 17:17.047
capability to threaten our families and

17:17.047 --> 17:19.102
our way of life . This threat is not

17:19.102 --> 17:21.158
theoretical . We see it unfolding in

17:21.158 --> 17:23.324
front of our own eyes every day on our

17:23.324 --> 17:25.319
televisions . It is real . It is

17:25.319 --> 17:27.400
growing , and we must meet it with

17:27.400 --> 17:29.829
American resolve . Today , Golden

17:29.829 --> 17:31.709
Golden Dome for America is the

17:31.709 --> 17:33.931
administration's bold , decisive answer

17:33.931 --> 17:36.260
to this danger . It is the cornerstone

17:36.260 --> 17:38.427
of our strategy to rapidly improve the

17:38.427 --> 17:40.593
defensive equation of the homeland and

17:40.593 --> 17:42.816
to ensure peace through strength . This

17:42.816 --> 17:45.038
is not another weapons system . It is a

17:45.038 --> 17:47.339
layered , integrated shield designed to

17:47.339 --> 17:49.395
defend the homeland against the full

17:49.395 --> 17:51.339
spectrum of advanced threats . The

17:51.339 --> 17:53.117
vision is ambitious , but it is

17:53.117 --> 17:55.410
achievable . The foundational

17:55.410 --> 17:57.466
technology exists today , and we are

17:57.466 --> 17:59.688
moving with the utmost urgency to bring

17:59.688 --> 18:01.799
it to bear . Our strategy is built on

18:01.799 --> 18:03.380
speed , affordability , and

18:03.380 --> 18:05.619
partnerships . My priority is

18:05.619 --> 18:07.563
establishing a unified command and

18:07.563 --> 18:09.619
control network to link our existing

18:09.619 --> 18:11.508
battle-proven systems and field a

18:11.508 --> 18:13.730
credible defense now . Simultaneously ,

18:13.730 --> 18:15.675
we're investing in next generation

18:15.675 --> 18:17.897
technology to dramatically increase our

18:17.897 --> 18:19.952
defensive capacity and fundamentally

18:19.952 --> 18:22.063
drive down the cost per intercept for

18:22.063 --> 18:24.286
generations to come . Make no mistake ,

18:24.286 --> 18:26.339
no mistake , the greatest challenge

18:26.339 --> 18:28.170
here is not technical , it is

18:28.170 --> 18:30.059
organizational . Success requires

18:30.059 --> 18:32.003
forging unity of effort across the

18:32.003 --> 18:34.170
federal government , and as the Golden

18:34.170 --> 18:36.170
Dome director , I have been granted

18:36.170 --> 18:38.226
unprecedented authorities to do just

18:38.226 --> 18:40.448
that . The leaders on this panel before

18:40.448 --> 18:42.448
you today represent this new way of

18:42.448 --> 18:44.614
doing business . We are all working as

18:44.614 --> 18:46.410
one team . NCO is my number one

18:46.589 --> 18:48.700
customer . The missile Defense Agency

18:48.700 --> 18:50.700
is integrating the architecture and

18:50.700 --> 18:52.867
delivering cutting edge capabilities .

18:52.867 --> 18:54.922
The Army is building the operational

18:54.922 --> 18:57.033
framework and policy is deterring our

18:57.033 --> 18:58.978
adversaries . In addition , we are

18:58.978 --> 19:01.145
transforming our relationship with the

19:01.145 --> 19:03.367
industrial base by innovative ships and

19:03.367 --> 19:05.589
prize-based competitions to unleash the

19:05.589 --> 19:07.589
full power of American innovation .

19:07.640 --> 19:09.449
Golden Dome is a generational

19:09.449 --> 19:11.338
investment in the security of our

19:11.338 --> 19:13.280
nation . It is a promise to the

19:13.280 --> 19:15.447
American people and a clear message to

19:15.447 --> 19:17.669
our adversaries that their reckless and

19:17.669 --> 19:19.391
aggressive actions will not go

19:19.391 --> 19:21.569
unanswered . With your continued

19:21.569 --> 19:23.569
support , we will deliver a defense

19:23.569 --> 19:25.930
that protects every American . We owe

19:25.930 --> 19:27.986
nothing less to our children and our

19:27.986 --> 19:30.208
children's children . Thank you , and I

19:30.208 --> 19:32.680
look forward to your questions . Thank

19:32.680 --> 19:34.624
you , General Gutlein . I will now

19:34.624 --> 19:36.958
recognize General Collins for 5 minutes .

19:37.119 --> 19:39.341
Thank you , Chairman . Good afternoon ,

19:39.341 --> 19:41.397
Chairman DesJarlais , Ranking Member

19:41.397 --> 19:43.563
Moulton , distinguished members of the

19:43.563 --> 19:45.452
subcommittee . Thank you for this

19:45.452 --> 19:47.397
opportunity and for your continued

19:47.397 --> 19:49.230
support of this critical missile

19:49.230 --> 19:50.786
defense mission . Since its

19:50.786 --> 19:52.786
establishment in 2002 , the Missile

19:52.786 --> 19:54.508
Defense Agency has developed ,

19:54.508 --> 19:56.619
delivered , and sustained the missile

19:56.619 --> 19:58.841
defense system . That has recently been

19:58.841 --> 20:01.239
used successfully in days and months of

20:01.239 --> 20:03.670
real-world combat . MDA has leveraged

20:03.670 --> 20:06.003
its extensive experience in integrating ,

20:06.003 --> 20:07.392
testing , and delivering

20:07.392 --> 20:09.226
technologically advanced missile

20:09.226 --> 20:11.114
defense systems to deliver on its

20:11.114 --> 20:13.281
promises and commitments to our nation

20:13.281 --> 20:15.003
and provide the warfighter the

20:15.003 --> 20:16.948
battle-proven lethal and effective

20:16.948 --> 20:18.781
systems that have arguably saved

20:18.781 --> 20:20.781
thousands of lives in recent days .

20:21.089 --> 20:22.922
Today , MDA is pressing ahead to

20:22.922 --> 20:24.978
continue delivering the disruptive ,

20:24.978 --> 20:26.811
lethal , resilient , agile , and

20:26.811 --> 20:28.867
affordable capabilities required for

20:28.867 --> 20:30.978
today and tomorrow for the defense of

20:30.978 --> 20:33.200
the US homeland , our deployed forces ,

20:33.200 --> 20:35.422
and our international partners . MDA is

20:35.422 --> 20:37.256
renewing its focus on delivering

20:37.256 --> 20:39.311
cutting edge capabilities across the

20:39.311 --> 20:41.478
air , land , sea , and space domains .

20:41.478 --> 20:43.700
With the ongoing transition transfer of

20:43.700 --> 20:45.811
proven missile defense systems to the

20:45.811 --> 20:47.756
services , MDA will invest less in

20:47.756 --> 20:51.109
sustainment and upgrades . and

20:51.109 --> 20:53.276
operational support of missile defense

20:53.276 --> 20:55.442
sensors , interceptors , and platforms

20:55.442 --> 20:57.553
and invest more purposefully . In the

20:57.553 --> 20:59.776
development , integration , and testing

20:59.776 --> 21:01.609
of breakthrough technologies and

21:01.609 --> 21:03.220
foundational missile defense

21:03.220 --> 21:05.220
capabilities , MDA will continue to

21:05.220 --> 21:07.165
develop and test system elements ,

21:07.165 --> 21:09.331
components , and technologies for what

21:09.331 --> 21:11.498
we are calling missile defense systems

21:11.498 --> 21:13.665
Next . And it will continue to operate

21:13.665 --> 21:13.369
as a system of systems integrator for

21:13.369 --> 21:15.258
the homeland defense architecture

21:15.258 --> 21:17.369
developed and delivered by the Office

21:17.369 --> 21:19.425
of the Golden Dome for America . MDA

21:19.425 --> 21:21.670
and GDA are operating in lockstep to

21:21.670 --> 21:23.559
deliver the critical capabilities

21:23.559 --> 21:25.781
required to defend our homeland and our

21:25.781 --> 21:28.003
nation's interests . This afternoon , I

21:28.003 --> 21:30.226
would also like to honor those who paid

21:30.226 --> 21:32.281
the ultimate price in the service of

21:32.281 --> 21:32.119
our country and thank those warfighters ,

21:32.239 --> 21:33.739
civilians , and contractor

21:33.739 --> 21:35.850
professionals who operate the missile

21:35.850 --> 21:38.072
defense system around the clock today .

21:38.072 --> 21:41.520
They all make us very proud . I greatly

21:41.520 --> 21:44.079
appreciate the committee's steadfast

21:44.079 --> 21:46.246
support for missile defense agency and

21:46.246 --> 21:48.079
your commitment to providing the

21:48.079 --> 21:50.023
resources necessary to execute the

21:50.023 --> 21:52.246
missile defense mission . Thank you . I

21:52.246 --> 21:52.040
look forward to answering your

21:52.040 --> 21:54.949
questions . Thank you , General Collins ,

21:54.959 --> 21:56.959
and , and last but not least , I

21:56.959 --> 21:58.792
recognize General Gainey for his

21:58.792 --> 22:01.070
opening remarks . Thank you , Chairman .

22:01.070 --> 22:03.126
Chairman Dejolletis , Ranking Member

22:03.126 --> 22:05.237
Moulton , and distinguished guests of

22:05.237 --> 22:07.239
this subcommittee . I am honored to

22:07.239 --> 22:10.680
testify on behalf of nearly 12,500 men

22:10.680 --> 22:12.680
and women of the United States Army

22:12.680 --> 22:14.880
Space and Missile Defense Command , of

22:14.880 --> 22:18.160
which . 2500 are currently

22:18.160 --> 22:20.839
2500 are currently deployed . These

22:20.839 --> 22:22.950
professionals provide credible combat

22:22.950 --> 22:24.783
capabilities so important to our

22:24.783 --> 22:27.010
national defense . I'm so proud of our

22:27.010 --> 22:29.066
space and missile defense formations

22:29.066 --> 22:31.343
who continue to fight a complex threat ,

22:31.489 --> 22:34.119
innovating in real time . We are living

22:34.119 --> 22:36.319
transformation in contact . I am

22:36.319 --> 22:38.541
honored to represent them , and I thank

22:38.541 --> 22:40.541
you for your unwavering support for

22:40.541 --> 22:42.486
them and their families . You have

22:42.486 --> 22:44.597
already heard much about the dramatic

22:44.597 --> 22:46.652
evolving threat . It's clear we have

22:46.652 --> 22:49.290
entered a new air and missile age . Our

22:49.290 --> 22:51.969
adversaries are investing in advanced

22:51.969 --> 22:54.136
long range air and missile strikes and

22:54.136 --> 22:56.247
space-based interdiction capabilities

22:56.247 --> 22:58.329
in hopes of holding our homeland at

22:58.329 --> 23:00.273
risk and preventing Americans from

23:00.273 --> 23:02.218
pursuing our interests abroad . In

23:02.218 --> 23:04.440
response to this change in threat , the

23:04.440 --> 23:06.273
Army has invested into Space and

23:06.273 --> 23:08.329
Missile Defense Command , adding two

23:08.329 --> 23:10.496
division-sized organizations under the

23:10.496 --> 23:12.607
command , the 32nd and 263rd Army Air

23:12.607 --> 23:14.773
and Missile Defense Command . As a war

23:14.773 --> 23:16.718
fighting headquarters , we provide

23:16.718 --> 23:19.051
global ready forces to deter aggression ,

23:19.189 --> 23:21.300
execute part of the joint force , and

23:21.300 --> 23:23.245
defend our homeland against aerial

23:23.245 --> 23:25.189
threats . The effectiveness of our

23:25.189 --> 23:27.439
forces have been pivotal to success in

23:27.439 --> 23:30.079
recent operations . Here we clearly see

23:30.079 --> 23:33.030
space and air and missile defense as a

23:33.030 --> 23:35.030
as a decisive enabler of the modern

23:35.030 --> 23:37.319
combat . Even in contact we are

23:37.319 --> 23:39.430
continuously transforming into a more

23:39.430 --> 23:42.160
mobile and lethal force . My technical

23:42.160 --> 23:44.160
center is pushing the boundaries of

23:44.160 --> 23:46.479
distributed aperture and small form

23:46.479 --> 23:48.800
factor counterpace technology . Right

23:48.800 --> 23:50.633
in step with them , my Space and

23:50.633 --> 23:52.689
missile Defense Center of Excellence

23:52.689 --> 23:54.800
transformed technical innovation into

23:54.800 --> 23:56.911
unit-based transformation , designing

23:56.911 --> 23:59.133
formations , formulating training , and

23:59.133 --> 24:00.911
supporting units to consolidate

24:00.911 --> 24:02.800
innovative gains and applications

24:02.800 --> 24:04.744
against real threats . Meanwhile ,

24:05.130 --> 24:07.130
Joint Task Force Gold , activate in

24:07.130 --> 24:09.520
January has transformed to serve as the

24:09.520 --> 24:11.576
operational arm to NRCO's integrated

24:11.576 --> 24:13.631
air and missile defense enterprise ,

24:13.631 --> 24:15.687
working closely with the Golden Dome

24:15.687 --> 24:17.742
program management team to align all

24:17.742 --> 24:19.798
domain defensive capabilities within

24:19.798 --> 24:22.020
command requirements . Together our one

24:22.020 --> 24:24.076
team is strengthening the profession

24:24.076 --> 24:26.242
across many disciplines , whether that

24:26.242 --> 24:28.131
is my Army astronaut detachment's

24:28.131 --> 24:30.353
central role in America's return to the

24:30.353 --> 24:32.409
moon or my Space and missile Defense

24:32.449 --> 24:34.449
Command schoolhouse training 10,000

24:34.449 --> 24:36.750
students annually to dominate the fight

24:36.890 --> 24:40.770
in space from the ground . SMDC and JTF

24:40.770 --> 24:43.010
Gold deliver value where it matters the

24:43.010 --> 24:46.790
most . And finally , As the Army Air

24:46.790 --> 24:49.359
Defense Enterprise Integrator , I would

24:49.359 --> 24:51.415
be remiss if I did not highlight the

24:51.415 --> 24:53.800
continuous strain on our Army Air and

24:53.800 --> 24:55.967
Missile Defense Force that is the most

24:55.967 --> 24:58.589
deployed force in the Army . We ask so

24:58.589 --> 25:00.589
much of our air and missile defense

25:00.589 --> 25:02.719
forces , and I'm truly amazed at how

25:02.719 --> 25:04.830
they and their families respond every

25:04.830 --> 25:06.869
time they're called . The Army

25:06.869 --> 25:09.000
leadership has responded with MOS

25:09.000 --> 25:11.111
recruiting flexibility through the 14

25:11.111 --> 25:13.800
uniform MOS program . And added

25:13.800 --> 25:15.800
critical skill bonuses , increasing

25:15.800 --> 25:17.800
training opportunities and built-in

25:17.800 --> 25:19.578
station of choice initiatives ,

25:19.578 --> 25:21.633
significantly improving accessions ,

25:21.633 --> 25:23.467
further addressing the off tempo

25:23.467 --> 25:25.522
challenges , the Army integrated air

25:25.522 --> 25:27.689
missile defense is undergoing the most

25:27.689 --> 25:29.522
significant modernization in our

25:29.522 --> 25:31.467
history , filled in the integrated

25:31.467 --> 25:33.578
Battle command system , also known as

25:33.578 --> 25:35.689
IBCS . This will fundamentally change

25:35.689 --> 25:37.522
the way sensors and shooters are

25:37.522 --> 25:39.522
integrated across the battlefield ,

25:39.522 --> 25:41.356
increasing capacity and depth in

25:41.356 --> 25:44.010
achieving an outsized effect . Army AMD

25:44.010 --> 25:46.121
force structure will also increase by

25:46.121 --> 25:49.510
47% by FY 2033 while simultaneously

25:49.510 --> 25:52.150
modernizing the existing force . Over

25:52.150 --> 25:54.229
the past 2.5 years . I've seen

25:54.229 --> 25:57.469
firsthand how our one team at SMDC and

25:57.469 --> 25:59.969
JTF Gold contributes to the lethality

26:00.140 --> 26:02.430
of the Army Joint Force and the defense

26:02.430 --> 26:04.869
of our homeland . Every day brings both

26:04.869 --> 26:07.060
challenges and opportunities . The

26:07.060 --> 26:09.209
interdependent functions of space and

26:09.209 --> 26:11.431
missile defense will play a significant

26:11.431 --> 26:14.310
role in all future conflicts . I look

26:14.310 --> 26:16.366
forward to addressing your questions

26:16.366 --> 26:18.699
today . Thank you . Thank you , General .

26:18.699 --> 26:20.910
We'll now turn to member questions and

26:20.910 --> 26:23.770
I'll start by recognizing myself . And

26:24.410 --> 26:27.140
I have great respect for Ranking Member

26:27.140 --> 26:29.307
Moulton and his service to our country

26:29.307 --> 26:31.529
both in uniform and in Congress , but I

26:31.529 --> 26:34.910
have to say I agree vehemently against

26:34.910 --> 26:38.449
most of what his opening statement was ,

26:38.459 --> 26:42.280
and General Gup , um , I know we're

26:42.280 --> 26:44.719
limited in this setting , but can you

26:44.719 --> 26:46.719
talk about how adversaries approach

26:46.719 --> 26:48.775
integrated air and missile defense ?

26:48.800 --> 26:50.856
Because the core idea of Golden Dome

26:50.856 --> 26:53.022
protecting your territory and critical

26:53.022 --> 26:55.022
infrastructure from air and missile

26:55.022 --> 26:57.133
attack , is this something Russia and

26:57.133 --> 27:00.369
China are already doing ? Yes ,

27:00.500 --> 27:02.611
Chairman , it's a critical question .

27:02.611 --> 27:05.020
Uh , our near peer adversaries , uh ,

27:05.099 --> 27:07.043
do integrate their air and missile

27:07.043 --> 27:09.043
defenses and are providing a pretty

27:09.043 --> 27:10.766
significant , uh , air defense

27:10.766 --> 27:12.877
capability over their cities and over

27:12.877 --> 27:15.609
their key infrastructure . General

27:15.609 --> 27:17.720
Collins , do you have anything to add

27:17.720 --> 27:19.331
on adversary missile defense

27:19.331 --> 27:22.550
capabilities ? So really just to , to

27:22.550 --> 27:25.060
duplicate what General Gulein has said ,

27:25.349 --> 27:27.349
uh , our adversaries are seeing the

27:27.349 --> 27:29.516
utility of missile defense , uh , into

27:29.516 --> 27:31.738
staying in the fight as well , and they

27:31.738 --> 27:33.738
continue to , uh , pursue and , and

27:33.738 --> 27:35.960
proliferate , uh , uh , layered missile

27:35.960 --> 27:37.960
defense as well to , to counter our

27:37.960 --> 27:40.300
activities . And Honorable Berkowitz ,

27:40.500 --> 27:42.444
prior to the president's executive

27:42.444 --> 27:44.900
order creating Golden Dome , US missile

27:44.900 --> 27:46.622
defense policy when it came to

27:46.622 --> 27:48.733
defending the homeland was limited to

27:48.733 --> 27:50.622
threat posed by rogue nations and

27:50.622 --> 27:52.622
accidental launches . Did Russia or

27:52.622 --> 27:54.511
China show similar restraint from

27:54.511 --> 27:56.733
policy perspective in their approach to

27:56.733 --> 27:58.900
missile defense ? No , Chairman , they

27:58.900 --> 28:02.060
did not . Their policy has long been to

28:02.060 --> 28:05.030
not . Use societal vulnerability ,

28:05.150 --> 28:06.761
certainly not their societal

28:06.761 --> 28:08.989
vulnerability as the basis for

28:08.989 --> 28:11.156
strategic stability . They have always

28:11.156 --> 28:12.989
pursued a comprehensive homeland

28:12.989 --> 28:15.359
missile defense . Yes sir . Uh , either

28:15.359 --> 28:17.470
there other generals have anything to

28:17.470 --> 28:20.430
add to that , General Gainey or ? OK ,

28:20.609 --> 28:24.439
um , General , uh , Gutlein ,

28:24.719 --> 28:27.540
how do you see the relationship between

28:27.540 --> 28:29.318
the investments we're making in

28:29.318 --> 28:30.929
space-based interceptors and

28:30.929 --> 28:32.873
ground-based capabilities like NGI

28:32.873 --> 28:34.762
program ? I know when it comes to

28:34.762 --> 28:36.707
missile defense , there's always a

28:36.707 --> 28:38.707
temptation to gravitate towards the

28:38.707 --> 28:40.373
most ambitious capability and

28:40.373 --> 28:42.040
mistakenly , uh , and mistake

28:42.040 --> 28:43.762
complementary systems as being

28:43.762 --> 28:46.439
duplicative . So , uh , developing SBIs

28:46.439 --> 28:48.839
doesn't mean we can abandon the NGI

28:48.839 --> 28:51.770
program , does it ? No , Chairman , it ,

28:51.849 --> 28:54.459
it does not . We as a nation have

28:54.459 --> 28:56.699
traditionally , uh , piled a lot of

28:56.699 --> 28:58.643
requirements on individual weapons

28:58.643 --> 29:00.588
systems , expecting the individual

29:00.588 --> 29:02.532
weapons system to do all the heavy

29:02.532 --> 29:04.699
lifting . Uh , uh , for integrated air

29:04.699 --> 29:04.449
and missile defense , we actually need

29:04.449 --> 29:07.329
a layered multi-domain distributed

29:07.329 --> 29:09.329
architecture to make sure we do not

29:09.329 --> 29:11.496
have any exploitable holes . So all of

29:11.496 --> 29:13.607
those systems that you talked about ,

29:13.607 --> 29:15.829
next generation interceptor , uh , gets

29:15.829 --> 29:17.829
after the ground layer , space gets

29:17.829 --> 29:19.996
after the , uh , the , the boost phase

29:19.996 --> 29:22.107
intercept in mid-course , and then we

29:22.107 --> 29:23.885
need additional layers with the

29:23.885 --> 29:26.051
maritime and with the sea to guarantee

29:26.051 --> 29:28.385
that we have no exploitable holes . Yes ,

29:28.385 --> 29:30.489
sir . Uh General Guillo , you're the

29:30.489 --> 29:32.670
warfighter , and right now , you're

29:32.670 --> 29:34.670
relying on some effective but aging

29:34.670 --> 29:36.839
ground-based interceptors . How

29:36.839 --> 29:38.950
important is it that we replace these

29:38.950 --> 29:42.180
systems with NGI ? Chairman , it's

29:42.180 --> 29:44.402
extremely important that we , uh , keep

29:44.402 --> 29:46.402
NGI on track and if possible , even

29:46.402 --> 29:48.819
pull it to the left , and I work with

29:48.819 --> 29:50.930
Lieutenant General Collins every week

29:50.930 --> 29:53.097
on , on seeing if there's ways that we

29:53.097 --> 29:55.152
can do that , and that's because the

29:55.152 --> 29:56.875
adversaries we're facing . are

29:56.875 --> 29:58.597
relentless in their pursuit of

29:58.597 --> 30:00.708
achieving more capability , trying to

30:00.708 --> 30:03.250
find any exploitable seam in our

30:03.250 --> 30:04.917
defense , and I think they're

30:04.917 --> 30:06.750
cooperating amongst each other ,

30:06.750 --> 30:09.260
sharing information and technical data

30:09.260 --> 30:11.427
and sometimes even weapons in order to

30:11.427 --> 30:14.410
do so . The NGI is essential to ensure

30:14.410 --> 30:17.680
that we can outpace those efforts . And ,

30:17.689 --> 30:19.911
uh , General Collins , MDA is acquiring

30:19.911 --> 30:22.133
NGI and sustaining the current fleet of

30:22.133 --> 30:24.356
interceptors . What is your view on the

30:24.356 --> 30:28.229
need for the NGI program ? Sir , as ,

30:28.300 --> 30:30.467
as General Gule and General Gil have ,

30:30.467 --> 30:33.400
have identified , uh , one , we did do

30:33.400 --> 30:35.349
the miracle , uh , 24 years ago of

30:35.349 --> 30:37.516
developing and fueling the GBI program

30:37.516 --> 30:39.738
in 2 years and putting it in the hole .

30:39.738 --> 30:41.960
Since that time in 20 for , uh , for 22

30:41.960 --> 30:44.390
years , that's been the sole , uh , uh ,

30:44.400 --> 30:46.733
defense mechanism for the United States .

30:46.880 --> 30:48.547
Those systems are aging . The

30:48.547 --> 30:50.769
reliability is being impacted as well .

30:50.769 --> 30:52.991
They were designed for threats from the

30:52.991 --> 30:55.479
past and as the threat , uh , increases

30:55.479 --> 30:57.800
its complexity and capability . Uh , we

30:57.800 --> 30:59.744
need to also increase that . We've

30:59.744 --> 31:01.522
increased the capability of the

31:01.522 --> 31:03.189
inherent GBI design , but the

31:03.189 --> 31:05.300
game-changing step , uh , increase in

31:05.300 --> 31:07.522
capability that NGI brings to bear will

31:07.522 --> 31:10.469
help us to defend both the rogue nation

31:10.469 --> 31:12.800
threat as well as the peer adversary

31:12.800 --> 31:14.689
ICBM threat in the future . It is

31:14.689 --> 31:16.800
critical to be able to do that . OK .

31:16.800 --> 31:19.022
Well , my time is about expired , but I

31:19.022 --> 31:20.967
look forward to the closed setting

31:20.967 --> 31:23.189
where we can do a deeper dive on , on a

31:23.189 --> 31:24.967
lot of these issues , and we'll

31:24.967 --> 31:27.078
certainly have more questions there .

31:27.078 --> 31:29.189
Uh , the ranking member Moulton has ,

31:29.189 --> 31:30.911
he'll be back , uh , but we'll

31:30.911 --> 31:33.540
recognize the gentleman from New Jersey ,

31:33.890 --> 31:35.946
uh , Mr . Norcross , for 5 minutes .

31:35.989 --> 31:38.156
Thank you , Chairman , and I thank all

31:38.156 --> 31:40.489
the witnesses for being here today . Uh ,

31:40.489 --> 31:43.030
talk about what is by any measure an

31:43.030 --> 31:45.469
incredible vision to try to keep our

31:45.469 --> 31:48.030
country safe from all .

31:50.270 --> 31:52.920
That's just From everywhere all the

31:52.920 --> 31:56.680
time and . Is a remarkable

31:56.680 --> 31:59.300
idea . Certainly it's gonna be tough

31:59.839 --> 32:02.920
and many discussions on the actual nuts

32:02.920 --> 32:05.680
and bolts of it , but I just wanna talk

32:05.680 --> 32:07.709
about the cyber threats which can

32:07.709 --> 32:09.760
interrupt any of our systems

32:09.760 --> 32:13.400
potentially . Um , recently , the

32:13.400 --> 32:15.949
Department of Defense and anthropic are

32:15.949 --> 32:19.469
having a , a bit of a spat to suggest

32:19.469 --> 32:21.691
anything less , uh , does not even come

32:21.691 --> 32:25.180
close . Um , the idea of removing .

32:26.780 --> 32:29.579
Their systems from what is currently

32:29.579 --> 32:33.300
being used by many of our branches is

32:33.300 --> 32:35.500
going to be difficult and by any

32:35.500 --> 32:37.722
measurement , it's gonna be expensive .

32:38.209 --> 32:41.420
Uh , the idea that anthropic talked

32:41.420 --> 32:44.349
about the cloud mythos . This new

32:44.349 --> 32:47.910
system that they were so concerned they

32:47.910 --> 32:50.890
are not releasing it but to Project

32:50.890 --> 32:53.630
Glass Wing now why am I talking about

32:53.630 --> 32:56.989
this ? Because they have reported that

32:56.989 --> 33:00.650
this system has been able to detect .

33:01.439 --> 33:04.359
Flaws in our defenses that nobody

33:04.359 --> 33:08.270
thought existed . So there

33:08.270 --> 33:11.550
is currently a designation of anthropic

33:11.550 --> 33:14.829
as supply chain risk and the DOD

33:15.430 --> 33:18.270
has designated anthropic for all our

33:18.270 --> 33:20.670
military to remove whatever piece they

33:20.670 --> 33:24.069
have within 180 days . Uh ,

33:24.510 --> 33:27.430
General Gula , can you talk in the

33:27.430 --> 33:30.349
degree that where we are , uh , what

33:30.349 --> 33:32.910
impact that will have in your world ?

33:35.229 --> 33:37.489
Uh , Representative , it , it is , uh ,

33:38.030 --> 33:40.119
right to call attention to our cyber

33:40.119 --> 33:42.119
vulnerabilities . And from a Golden

33:42.119 --> 33:44.175
Dome perspective , we architected in

33:44.175 --> 33:46.397
cyber resiliency from the beginning and

33:46.397 --> 33:48.563
have set up , uh , what we call , uh ,

33:48.563 --> 33:50.397
uh , ecosystem hub where we have

33:50.397 --> 33:52.619
brought in , uh , external companies to

33:52.619 --> 33:54.619
come in and help us make sure we're

33:54.619 --> 33:56.563
securing the supply chain . One of

33:56.563 --> 33:58.619
which is utilizing , uh , artificial

33:58.619 --> 34:00.730
intelligence . Uh , today , we do not

34:00.730 --> 34:02.675
have anthropic anywhere in the GDA

34:02.675 --> 34:04.786
architecture . Uh , that's the way we

34:04.786 --> 34:04.530
started out of the gate . It just ,

34:04.780 --> 34:06.947
just ended up that way right now , but

34:06.947 --> 34:08.724
I will tell you there are other

34:08.724 --> 34:10.613
suppliers out there of artificial

34:10.613 --> 34:12.669
intelligence , and we are leveraging

34:12.669 --> 34:14.891
those as we go forward to get after the

34:14.891 --> 34:17.002
cyber vulnerability threats . So that

34:17.002 --> 34:19.224
is in the Golden Dome structure that is

34:19.224 --> 34:21.336
within the golden dome structure . If

34:21.336 --> 34:23.558
we can start right down the line to say

34:23.558 --> 34:25.613
in your portfolios , do you have any

34:26.060 --> 34:29.718
anthropic . Products . Congressman ,

34:29.729 --> 34:32.529
for the NORAD NorthCom systems , we

34:32.529 --> 34:35.009
have one , but it's not in our

34:35.009 --> 34:37.120
classified systems , and we're in the

34:37.120 --> 34:39.120
process of transitioning to another

34:39.120 --> 34:41.453
system that we already have on contract ,

34:41.618 --> 34:44.908
so that there is little , if any ,

34:45.569 --> 34:47.736
effect on our operational capability .

34:47.928 --> 34:50.340
Thank you . General Representative

34:50.340 --> 34:52.451
Norcross , uh , same with the Missile

34:52.451 --> 34:54.459
Defense Agency . We have a host of

34:54.459 --> 34:56.681
different AI companies and capabilities

34:56.681 --> 34:58.737
that we apply to our mission set and

34:58.737 --> 35:00.903
how we do business . Uh , Anthropic is

35:00.903 --> 35:00.780
currently not , uh , in that , uh , set ,

35:01.020 --> 35:03.076
and so there's no impact from that .

35:03.076 --> 35:06.370
Terrific . Arnold , uh , same for the

35:06.370 --> 35:08.314
army , uh , none that I'm tracking

35:08.314 --> 35:10.610
personally . Uh , we're working to move

35:10.610 --> 35:13.570
to AI enabled type systems , so no

35:13.570 --> 35:15.792
effect that I see right now . So that's

35:15.792 --> 35:19.590
good news . The one . Major issue is

35:19.590 --> 35:22.030
that they felt this was such a

35:22.030 --> 35:24.699
significant vulnerability that they're

35:24.699 --> 35:27.669
withholding it for distribution , and

35:27.669 --> 35:30.189
they put together Project Glass wing of

35:30.189 --> 35:33.310
the top , uh , tier of , um ,

35:34.290 --> 35:36.512
Like companies that deal in this area ,

35:36.629 --> 35:39.000
so , uh , they're able to find these

35:39.000 --> 35:41.209
vulnerabilities . Hopefully there's

35:41.209 --> 35:43.570
somebody else with their capabilities

35:43.570 --> 35:46.209
to do it . Um , it certainly is

35:46.209 --> 35:48.399
something that we as a nation have to

35:48.399 --> 35:50.455
make sure that we're absolutely sure

35:50.455 --> 35:52.677
all the time . Let me just , uh , shift

35:52.677 --> 35:54.677
gears a little bit . There's been a

35:54.677 --> 35:56.732
number , number of comments over the

35:56.732 --> 35:58.955
course of particularly the last year or

35:58.955 --> 36:00.949
so . That talks about some of the

36:00.949 --> 36:04.629
vulnerabilities and problems that we

36:04.629 --> 36:07.750
have and what will be protecting our

36:07.750 --> 36:10.530
homeland , particularly I'll call them

36:10.530 --> 36:13.050
vertical structures in the offshore

36:13.050 --> 36:15.629
area . Uh , General Gutline , you and I

36:15.629 --> 36:17.669
had a previous conversation to talk

36:17.669 --> 36:20.909
about this , how , uh , the offshore

36:20.909 --> 36:23.270
wind industry is being impacted with

36:23.270 --> 36:26.250
the suggestion is they are going to

36:26.429 --> 36:29.469
inhibit our ability to deal with

36:29.469 --> 36:31.709
incoming missiles , uh , whether it's

36:31.709 --> 36:34.020
offshore wind drilling platforms ,

36:34.229 --> 36:36.396
quite frankly , depending on where you

36:36.396 --> 36:38.340
are , they could be mountains . It

36:38.340 --> 36:40.562
sounds to me as if we've always had the

36:40.562 --> 36:43.830
ability . To address these things , in

36:43.830 --> 36:46.669
your opinion , do you see these

36:46.669 --> 36:49.469
offshore winds platforms and others as

36:49.469 --> 36:52.070
being something that we can't deal with

36:52.070 --> 36:54.070
in the new structure you're putting

36:54.070 --> 36:57.439
together ? Representative , the

36:57.439 --> 36:59.439
challenge I have for protecting the

36:59.439 --> 37:01.661
homeland with General Guillo is to make

37:01.661 --> 37:03.883
sure we have no exploitable holes . The

37:04.320 --> 37:07.389
wind turbines have caused havoc with

37:07.389 --> 37:09.959
our legacy sensors , but from a Golden

37:09.959 --> 37:12.070
Dome perspective , we are approaching

37:12.070 --> 37:14.015
this as a multi-domain distributed

37:14.015 --> 37:15.959
architecture , uh , with redundant

37:15.959 --> 37:18.580
sensors that include sensors in space .

37:19.169 --> 37:21.058
Uh , in addition to that , we are

37:21.058 --> 37:23.280
taking advantage of the next generation

37:23.280 --> 37:25.002
of signal processing to try to

37:25.002 --> 37:27.225
integrate , uh , all this data together

37:27.225 --> 37:29.280
and make rapid sense out of it using

37:29.280 --> 37:31.280
artificial intelligence . So we are

37:31.280 --> 37:32.891
rapidly trying to within our

37:32.891 --> 37:34.780
architecture to work around those

37:34.780 --> 37:34.419
challenges as well as other

37:34.419 --> 37:36.629
geographical challenges around the

37:36.629 --> 37:38.740
homeland . Thank you . I yield back .

37:39.520 --> 37:41.631
Gentleman yields back and I recognize

37:41.631 --> 37:43.853
the gentleman from Ohio , Mr . Turner .

37:44.110 --> 37:45.943
Thank you , Mr . Chairman , uh ,

37:45.943 --> 37:47.999
Gutlein , uh , you and I had a prior

37:47.999 --> 37:50.332
conversation that I want to continue in ,

37:50.332 --> 37:52.388
in this , uh , hearing , and that is

37:52.388 --> 37:54.054
concerning the , uh , current

37:54.054 --> 37:56.277
integration of the air component into ,

37:57.270 --> 37:59.709
um , our current missile defense

37:59.709 --> 38:02.669
structure . If you look to , uh , what

38:02.669 --> 38:04.891
we've been able to accomplish in Middle

38:04.891 --> 38:07.030
East and in the current , uh ,

38:07.040 --> 38:09.151
conflicts that have occurred , as you

38:09.151 --> 38:11.373
and I were discussing with the direct .

38:11.373 --> 38:13.820
Attack that occurred from Iran into

38:13.860 --> 38:16.600
Israel where the United States provided

38:16.600 --> 38:18.879
a backup component of missile defense

38:18.879 --> 38:22.800
to Iron Dome and David Sling and their

38:22.800 --> 38:24.919
missile defense components and of

38:24.919 --> 38:27.239
course the broader conflict that has

38:27.239 --> 38:29.760
occurred now where the United States

38:29.760 --> 38:31.927
assisted not only with Israel but also

38:31.927 --> 38:34.379
providing missile defense to our own

38:34.600 --> 38:37.429
assets and our own military . Uh , and

38:37.429 --> 38:39.262
personnel , but also then to our

38:39.262 --> 38:41.485
broader allies in the missile defense .

38:41.485 --> 38:44.189
It wasn't just , um , our missile

38:44.189 --> 38:46.489
defense architecture , it was also our

38:46.550 --> 38:48.772
air component architecture . And it's ,

38:48.772 --> 38:50.994
uh , great that I'm sitting in front of

38:50.994 --> 38:53.429
3 Air Force personnel and , and not no

38:53.429 --> 38:55.969
uh disparaging to the rest of , of , uh ,

38:56.429 --> 38:58.540
all the , um , the witnesses that are

38:58.540 --> 39:00.151
here , and I appreciate your

39:00.151 --> 39:02.207
participation , but I want to engage

39:02.207 --> 39:04.207
you in an air component integration

39:04.207 --> 39:06.429
discussion as we talk about . Uh , Iron

39:06.429 --> 39:06.250
Dome , because I want to get to , I

39:06.250 --> 39:09.129
believe that there is a , um , a miss

39:09.129 --> 39:11.351
that we're having in the Iron Dome . So

39:11.351 --> 39:12.740
we could first have your

39:12.740 --> 39:14.851
acknowledgement of that currently our

39:14.851 --> 39:17.250
architecture as it's deployed includes

39:17.250 --> 39:19.590
a significant air component integration

39:19.590 --> 39:21.757
with the F-35 that you were discussing

39:21.757 --> 39:24.280
with me , both in . Its sensor suites

39:24.280 --> 39:26.909
in its integration and how it follows

39:27.280 --> 39:29.639
targeting , but also , I'm , I'm aware ,

39:29.840 --> 39:33.120
even um the ability to , uh to use

39:33.120 --> 39:35.590
missiles , uh , it has a , as a

39:35.590 --> 39:37.812
component . Could you speak to that for

39:37.812 --> 39:39.812
a minute as to what we currently do

39:39.812 --> 39:41.868
with the F-35 and our air components

39:41.868 --> 39:43.312
integration ? Thank you ,

39:43.312 --> 39:45.423
Representative . That's , uh , that's

39:45.423 --> 39:47.534
the component of the defense equation

39:47.534 --> 39:49.423
that General Guillo has to , uh ,

39:49.423 --> 39:51.534
execute is the full-on integration of

39:51.534 --> 39:53.757
the multi-domain environment to include

39:53.757 --> 39:53.489
the maritime and the air component .

39:53.889 --> 39:56.111
The air component allows us to push the

39:56.111 --> 39:57.945
defendant area out away from the

39:57.945 --> 39:59.889
homeland . It also gives us a 911

39:59.889 --> 40:02.209
response , uh , in case of a , of a ,

40:02.510 --> 40:04.510
of a threat as you're seeing , uh ,

40:04.510 --> 40:06.649
over in Iran . Uh , what we are doing

40:06.649 --> 40:08.816
from a golden gnome perspective , even

40:08.816 --> 40:10.982
though the air layer is not part of my

40:10.982 --> 40:10.810
architecture , that is part of a

40:10.810 --> 40:12.921
different set of architectures , is I

40:12.921 --> 40:15.032
am integrating that in the , both the

40:15.032 --> 40:16.532
sensor data , uh , and the

40:16.532 --> 40:18.699
communications layer , and then making

40:18.699 --> 40:20.921
sure that my data is transportable back

40:20.921 --> 40:20.729
out to the air layer and the maritime

40:20.729 --> 40:22.896
layer . Well , this is why I'd like to

40:22.896 --> 40:25.118
engage all of you in the conversation ,

40:25.118 --> 40:27.285
including the general . Uh , I believe

40:27.285 --> 40:29.451
that as we do that , uh , that we need

40:29.451 --> 40:31.899
to make certain both in the , uh , as

40:31.899 --> 40:34.459
we look to the F-35 and also the

40:34.459 --> 40:36.626
opportunity of the B-21 , that we need

40:36.626 --> 40:39.040
to ensure Uh , that we take into

40:39.040 --> 40:41.207
consideration the opportunity for that

40:41.207 --> 40:43.484
integration , both the supersonic , uh ,

40:43.484 --> 40:45.596
nature of the B-21 , the hypersonic ,

40:45.596 --> 40:47.651
uh , opportunity of its missiles for

40:47.651 --> 40:49.762
homeland defense , because the Golden

40:49.762 --> 40:51.873
Dome is going to have its space-based

40:51.873 --> 40:53.707
architecture and its terrestrial

40:53.707 --> 40:55.929
architecture . The terrestrial is going

40:55.929 --> 40:57.818
to be static and relatively fixed

40:57.818 --> 40:57.804
space-based , of course . It would be

40:57.804 --> 41:00.104
more fluid , but the agile , flexible ,

41:00.564 --> 41:02.754
multidimensional capability of the air

41:02.754 --> 41:04.921
component provides an opportunity that

41:04.921 --> 41:07.032
we should not miss . And we , I think

41:07.032 --> 41:09.032
we should be forward looking and as

41:09.032 --> 41:10.865
you're passing that baton , that

41:10.865 --> 41:12.976
developmental aspect needs to be made

41:12.976 --> 41:15.084
certain that those platforms are

41:15.084 --> 41:17.165
developing up with you , General .

41:20.850 --> 41:22.850
Congressman , I couldn't agree more

41:22.850 --> 41:24.961
with General Gutlein . In fact , uh ,

41:24.961 --> 41:26.961
the day after he was confirmed , he

41:26.961 --> 41:29.183
flew out to Colorado Springs to talk to

41:29.183 --> 41:30.906
me about , from an operational

41:30.906 --> 41:33.017
perspective , what the needs of NORAD

41:33.017 --> 41:35.239
and NHCO were . And then in addition to

41:35.239 --> 41:37.461
the space space and the , and the upper

41:37.461 --> 41:39.683
layer and , and under layer , we talked

41:39.683 --> 41:41.850
for a great deal of time about what we

41:41.850 --> 41:41.729
call the air layer or the limited air

41:41.729 --> 41:43.896
defense layer for the reasons that you

41:43.896 --> 41:46.379
mentioned , the agility . That that

41:46.379 --> 41:50.199
fighter aircraft and others bring the

41:50.199 --> 41:52.280
9/11 response as General Gulein

41:52.280 --> 41:55.520
described it is integral to any air

41:55.520 --> 41:57.959
defense challenge that we have in the

41:57.959 --> 41:59.681
terminal phase and also in the

41:59.681 --> 42:02.399
mid-course , there's a huge opportunity

42:02.399 --> 42:05.419
for both the B-21 and the F-35 to play .

42:06.340 --> 42:09.270
An absolute essential homeland defense

42:09.570 --> 42:12.449
role in Golden Dome , and I hope that

42:12.449 --> 42:15.149
as we're passing that developmental

42:15.280 --> 42:18.750
baton that the nation's

42:18.750 --> 42:21.889
ingenuity is utilized to ensure that

42:22.129 --> 42:24.689
they're fully tasked . Congressman , I

42:24.689 --> 42:27.169
agree , and I also throw in any

42:27.169 --> 42:29.810
advanced airborne early warning systems

42:29.810 --> 42:32.032
would have capability there as well and

42:32.032 --> 42:34.088
unmanned . Yes sir , thank you all .

42:34.088 --> 42:36.739
I'll get back . Gentleman yields back .

42:36.840 --> 42:38.951
Uh , now recognize the gentleman from

42:38.951 --> 42:40.896
California , Mr . Carvajal , for 5

42:40.896 --> 42:43.007
minutes . Thank you , Mr . Chairman ,

42:43.007 --> 42:45.173
and thank you to all the witnesses for

42:45.173 --> 42:47.229
being here today . The Congressional

42:47.229 --> 42:49.229
Budget Office estimates that Golden

42:49.229 --> 42:53.149
Dome will cost $542 billion over 20

42:53.149 --> 42:55.469
years . The American Enterprise

42:55.469 --> 42:57.358
Institute estimates it could cost

42:57.358 --> 43:01.300
upward of $3 trillion over 20 years .

43:02.000 --> 43:03.889
This is a stark contrast from the

43:03.889 --> 43:07.679
original $175 billion over the three

43:07.679 --> 43:09.810
years that President Trump initially

43:09.810 --> 43:13.570
stated . Surprise , surprise . General

43:13.570 --> 43:15.681
Gutlein , I wanna first thank you for

43:15.681 --> 43:17.889
the great work you've done to make the

43:17.889 --> 43:20.409
defense industrial base more resilient .

43:21.350 --> 43:23.709
And diversifying our supply chains .

43:24.739 --> 43:27.320
Now the question , what do you think

43:27.580 --> 43:31.100
the cost of Golden Dome will be ? And

43:31.110 --> 43:33.443
how long will it take for a Golden Dome .

43:34.239 --> 43:36.520
This golden dome concept to be

43:36.520 --> 43:39.939
operational . Thank you ,

43:39.989 --> 43:42.211
Representative . We're going to deliver

43:42.211 --> 43:44.433
an operational capability by the summer

43:44.433 --> 43:46.489
of 28 . That will be able to protect

43:46.489 --> 43:48.378
the homeland against a variety of

43:48.378 --> 43:50.211
threats . The ultimate objective

43:50.211 --> 43:52.045
architecture is going to be $185

43:52.045 --> 43:53.878
billion . That's $175 billion as

43:53.878 --> 43:55.822
identified by the President of the

43:55.822 --> 43:57.822
United States and an additional $10

43:57.822 --> 43:59.656
billion to accelerate some space

43:59.656 --> 44:01.767
capabilities that were not originally

44:01.767 --> 44:03.989
part of our architecture . Uh , when we

44:03.989 --> 44:06.156
start talking about the different cost

44:06.156 --> 44:05.810
estimates , the first thing I always

44:05.810 --> 44:07.921
say is , first of all , they're not ,

44:07.921 --> 44:07.860
they're not estimating what I'm

44:07.860 --> 44:09.749
building . They're estimating the

44:09.749 --> 44:11.760
modernization or and the , and the

44:11.760 --> 44:13.982
continuation of the legacy systems that

44:13.982 --> 44:16.038
we already have . And they just take

44:16.038 --> 44:18.204
the cost of a legacy legacy system and

44:18.204 --> 44:20.427
they multiply it out and they get these

44:20.427 --> 44:19.439
really large numbers and they say that

44:19.439 --> 44:21.495
must be it . That is not what Golden

44:21.495 --> 44:23.550
Dome is doing . Golden Dome is doing

44:23.550 --> 44:25.383
business differently . We have a

44:25.383 --> 44:24.939
different set of authorities ,

44:25.280 --> 44:27.558
different set of acquisition , uh , uh ,

44:27.558 --> 44:29.724
uh , strategies that we're following .

44:29.724 --> 44:31.669
We're desegregating architecture ,

44:31.669 --> 44:33.669
automating , and , uh , bringing to

44:33.669 --> 44:35.891
bear artificial intelligence , uh , and

44:35.891 --> 44:38.113
we are laser focused on affordability .

44:38.113 --> 44:37.989
So the difference in the architectures

44:37.989 --> 44:40.350
is they are just not estimating what I

44:40.350 --> 44:43.040
am building . Well , it sure would be

44:43.040 --> 44:45.262
good to get that estimation , that list

44:45.262 --> 44:49.020
you have , if not an open in classified

44:49.020 --> 44:50.909
setting so that we could see it .

44:51.159 --> 44:53.560
Because to my understanding , we have

44:53.560 --> 44:55.989
not seen that whatsoever . So it'd be

44:55.989 --> 44:58.211
great to see that at some point . And I

44:58.211 --> 45:00.211
hope you're right , I hope we don't

45:00.211 --> 45:03.719
play this video and interaction in the

45:03.719 --> 45:06.360
summer of 28 and here's something

45:06.360 --> 45:08.416
different . So I'm gonna hold you to

45:08.416 --> 45:10.649
that . Uh , General Collins and General

45:10.649 --> 45:12.982
Guillo , as Golden Dome was being built ,

45:13.570 --> 45:16.149
do you think it is safe to assume our

45:16.149 --> 45:17.929
adversaries are taking note and

45:17.929 --> 45:21.129
designing capabilities to defeat Golden

45:21.129 --> 45:24.840
Dome ? Congressman , I think they are

45:24.840 --> 45:27.760
taking note , uh , their history of

45:27.760 --> 45:29.760
doing that is , is well noted , but

45:29.760 --> 45:32.093
they already , they already were anyway .

45:32.093 --> 45:34.371
Before we started building Golden Dome ,

45:34.371 --> 45:36.204
they're already trying to design

45:36.204 --> 45:35.750
systems that would exploit the

45:35.750 --> 45:38.120
capabilities , uh , that we have , and ,

45:38.179 --> 45:40.512
and so I'm not at all surprised by that .

45:40.512 --> 45:44.080
Thank you , General Collins . I agree

45:44.080 --> 45:46.110
with General Guillo . We've seen

45:46.110 --> 45:47.959
throughout history as we build a

45:47.959 --> 45:50.239
missile defense system , the

45:50.239 --> 45:52.295
adversaries is immediately trying to

45:52.295 --> 45:54.406
counter it , and we've seen that time

45:54.406 --> 45:56.239
and again in those evolutions of

45:56.239 --> 45:58.350
capability and the systems that we're

45:58.350 --> 46:00.295
seeing fielded and demonstrated in

46:00.295 --> 46:02.461
Ukraine and Iran today , uh , even day

46:02.461 --> 46:04.683
to day changes in Iran , they show that

46:04.683 --> 46:06.850
they're a learning organization always

46:06.850 --> 46:08.906
trying to defeat our systems as best

46:08.906 --> 46:11.239
they can , so . Whatever we continue to ,

46:11.239 --> 46:13.295
to pursue and , and make , uh , they

46:13.295 --> 46:15.350
will continually look to defeat it .

46:15.350 --> 46:17.517
Thank you , General Gutlein . Is there

46:17.517 --> 46:19.683
a possibility that when Golden Dome is

46:19.683 --> 46:21.795
finally operational , it will already

46:21.795 --> 46:24.239
be outdated or unable to defend against

46:24.239 --> 46:26.219
defend against new capabilities

46:26.550 --> 46:30.129
deployed by our adversaries ? The

46:30.129 --> 46:32.240
architecture that we're building is a

46:32.240 --> 46:34.462
very flexible open architecture systems

46:34.462 --> 46:36.129
design system of systems type

46:36.129 --> 46:35.850
architecture so that we can

46:35.850 --> 46:38.072
continuously modernize it as the threat

46:38.072 --> 46:39.961
continues to mature . It is not a

46:39.961 --> 46:41.794
static architecture , so we will

46:41.794 --> 46:43.850
continue to upgrade along the way to

46:43.850 --> 46:45.961
get after the threat . Thank you Mr .

46:45.961 --> 46:48.072
Berkowitz . Space capabilities are an

46:48.072 --> 46:50.679
integral are integral to our joint

46:50.679 --> 46:53.760
forces . Space space interceptors are

46:53.760 --> 46:55.538
the keystone of the Golden Dome

46:55.538 --> 46:57.649
architecture . Understanding the fact

46:57.649 --> 46:59.840
that both Russia and the PRC are

46:59.840 --> 47:01.840
developing anti-satellite weapons ,

47:02.239 --> 47:04.183
does the deployment of space-based

47:04.183 --> 47:06.280
interceptors have the potential to

47:06.280 --> 47:08.113
increase the likelihood that our

47:08.113 --> 47:11.199
adversaries will preemptively target

47:11.199 --> 47:13.850
space assets ? Degrading communications

47:13.850 --> 47:16.610
and missile defense simultaneously to

47:16.610 --> 47:20.129
make that constellation inoperable . Uh ,

47:20.250 --> 47:21.861
thank you for the question ,

47:21.861 --> 47:24.083
Representative . I think this is a very

47:24.083 --> 47:26.306
important point to make , uh , so I , I

47:26.306 --> 47:29.169
appreciate the opportunity , um . I

47:29.169 --> 47:31.169
believe our adversaries , uh ,

47:31.409 --> 47:33.520
understand the importance of space to

47:33.520 --> 47:35.465
the United States and our national

47:35.465 --> 47:37.520
defense , and that is the reason why

47:37.520 --> 47:39.076
they have been building and

47:39.076 --> 47:40.742
accelerating a broad array of

47:40.742 --> 47:42.965
counterspace and anti-satellite weapons

47:42.965 --> 47:45.131
capabilities . Uh , they've been doing

47:45.131 --> 47:47.209
so long before , uh , the president

47:47.209 --> 47:49.153
ever announced the Golden Dome for

47:49.153 --> 47:51.570
America or , uh , the fact that we

47:51.570 --> 47:53.681
would have a space layer as , as part

47:53.681 --> 47:55.681
of the overall , uh , multi-layered

47:55.681 --> 47:58.830
defense system , um . It's incumbent

47:58.830 --> 48:01.570
upon the United States and our armed

48:01.570 --> 48:04.510
forces to make sure that we can protect

48:04.510 --> 48:07.060
and defend our interests in space , um ,

48:07.489 --> 48:09.439
and as the has directed in his

48:09.439 --> 48:11.495
executive order in assuring American

48:11.495 --> 48:13.969
space superiority , uh , we , we , the

48:13.969 --> 48:15.969
Department of War , are directed to

48:15.969 --> 48:18.080
ensure that we can detect , counter ,

48:18.449 --> 48:20.616
and , uh , detect , characterize , and

48:20.616 --> 48:22.838
counter all threats to our interests in

48:22.838 --> 48:24.782
space , including the placement of

48:24.782 --> 48:27.005
nuclear weapons in orbit , so . Uh , we

48:27.005 --> 48:29.919
are , uh , very assiduously looking at

48:29.919 --> 48:32.360
those threats , evaluating them , and

48:32.360 --> 48:34.582
determining a broad range of options to

48:34.582 --> 48:36.639
provide to the Secretary and to the

48:36.639 --> 48:38.861
President to ensure that we can protect

48:38.861 --> 48:40.639
all of our interests in space ,

48:40.639 --> 48:42.861
including the space layer of the Golden

48:42.861 --> 48:45.028
Dome for America . Thank you . I yield

48:45.028 --> 48:47.250
back , Mr . Chairman . Thank you . Uh ,

48:47.250 --> 48:49.083
gentleman yields back , uh , now

48:49.083 --> 48:51.306
pleased to recognize the gentleman from

48:51.306 --> 48:53.472
Nebraska , General Bacon . Thank you ,

48:53.472 --> 48:55.528
Chairman . Thank you to all 5 of you

48:55.528 --> 48:55.370
for being here . I appreciate your

48:55.370 --> 48:57.426
leadership and your service and your

48:57.426 --> 48:59.481
hard work . I want to give a special

48:59.481 --> 49:01.592
shout out to General Guillo . He , he

49:01.592 --> 49:03.814
was the 55th Wing commander , two times

49:03.814 --> 49:05.870
removed from me . So , uh , anyway ,

49:05.870 --> 49:07.870
thank you for being here . Iran has

49:07.870 --> 49:10.203
fired well over 1000 ballistic missiles .

49:10.203 --> 49:12.203
And several 1000 rudimentary cruise

49:12.203 --> 49:14.203
missiles in recent weeks based on a

49:14.203 --> 49:16.148
standard shot doctrine , defending

49:16.148 --> 49:18.259
against the ballistic portion of that

49:18.259 --> 49:20.314
threat alone would require more than

49:20.314 --> 49:22.689
3000 interceptors . Yet today US annual

49:22.689 --> 49:26.070
production is roughly 650 Patriot PAC-3

49:26.250 --> 49:28.810
interceptors and fewer than 100 THAAD

49:28.810 --> 49:30.921
interceptors , even though both lines

49:30.921 --> 49:33.143
have announced plans to surge to higher

49:33.143 --> 49:35.629
rates closer later closer to 2030 .

49:36.090 --> 49:38.312
Couple that with foreign military sales

49:38.312 --> 49:40.479
that have not been fulfilled . We have

49:40.479 --> 49:43.209
a serious problem . I know the deputy

49:43.209 --> 49:44.931
secretary has led an effort to

49:44.931 --> 49:47.042
accelerate munitions production , and

49:47.042 --> 49:49.530
the budget request , uh , tens requests

49:49.530 --> 49:51.770
tens of tens of billions to expand

49:51.770 --> 49:53.826
interceptor production . Can each of

49:53.826 --> 49:55.937
you talk about the importance of this

49:55.937 --> 49:57.992
effort for your missionaries and the

49:57.992 --> 49:59.881
need for Congress to provide this

49:59.881 --> 50:01.992
funding to improve what we're doing ?

50:01.992 --> 50:03.714
I'll start with Gerald Gillo .

50:04.929 --> 50:06.939
Congressman , Thanks for having the

50:06.939 --> 50:09.161
fifty-fifth in great shape before I got

50:09.161 --> 50:11.217
there . I should , I should give all

50:11.217 --> 50:13.830
the credit to you . Uh . Having

50:13.840 --> 50:17.120
the right stockpiles gives us

50:17.120 --> 50:20.800
flexibility and also gives us a hedge

50:20.800 --> 50:22.967
against the adversary that we spoke of

50:22.967 --> 50:25.078
a moment ago that is always trying to

50:25.078 --> 50:27.133
increase their capability of finding

50:27.133 --> 50:29.244
new countermeasures , new ways to try

50:29.244 --> 50:31.356
to trick , defeat , or find a seam in

50:31.356 --> 50:33.300
our systems . Therefore , it's not

50:33.300 --> 50:35.522
always a 1 to 1 shot ratio , and having

50:35.522 --> 50:37.800
the required number of interceptors or

50:37.800 --> 50:40.100
defeat mechanisms plus some gives us

50:40.100 --> 50:42.100
that flexibility that I think we'll

50:42.100 --> 50:44.639
need in any future fight . Joe Gutla .

50:46.840 --> 50:49.062
Thank you , Representative Bacon . Uh ,

50:49.080 --> 50:51.840
as you know , we have , uh , optimized

50:51.840 --> 50:54.280
our entire industrial base for

50:54.280 --> 50:57.100
efficiency at the expense of capacity

50:57.239 --> 51:00.110
and scale . Uh , we have , uh ,

51:00.209 --> 51:02.729
relatively shallow supplier base , uh ,

51:02.840 --> 51:04.729
and so what we have been doing is

51:04.729 --> 51:06.729
working with Secretary Feinberg to

51:06.729 --> 51:09.929
rapidly expand the industrial base to

51:09.929 --> 51:13.340
give out multi-year contracts and start

51:13.520 --> 51:15.969
finding alternative suppliers to

51:15.969 --> 51:18.719
increase our munitions production , uh ,

51:18.729 --> 51:20.785
going forward . So that's one of the

51:20.785 --> 51:23.062
lessons learned that we have , uh , uh ,

51:23.062 --> 51:25.118
brought forward . From a Golden Dome

51:25.118 --> 51:27.340
perspective , we're working really hard

51:27.340 --> 51:26.750
to make sure that we use the right

51:26.750 --> 51:29.028
effector against the right threat . Uh ,

51:29.028 --> 51:31.159
bringing to bear multiple layers of

51:31.159 --> 51:33.800
sensor data from multi-domain , uh , to

51:33.800 --> 51:35.967
make rapid sense out of that , to make

51:35.967 --> 51:38.133
sure we send the right effector to get

51:38.133 --> 51:40.189
after the right threat with a modern

51:40.189 --> 51:41.967
IC2 system that we did not have

51:41.967 --> 51:44.022
available in the current conflict in

51:44.022 --> 51:45.856
Iran . Thank you , Joe Collins .

51:46.370 --> 51:48.648
Congressman , thanks for this question .

51:48.648 --> 51:50.814
It's a really important question as we

51:50.814 --> 51:52.814
see a key lesson of OEF that we can

51:52.814 --> 51:54.870
talk about is the need for the right

51:54.870 --> 51:57.037
number of weapons , the right magazine

51:57.037 --> 51:59.370
depth to protect , uh , our assets . Um ,

51:59.370 --> 52:01.540
and , uh , from day one , I've always

52:01.540 --> 52:03.707
said the reason , the way we get there

52:03.707 --> 52:05.873
is through sustained focus , sustained

52:05.873 --> 52:08.040
will , and sustained resources to make

52:08.040 --> 52:10.373
sure we have that appropriate inventory .

52:10.373 --> 52:12.540
Uh , and the last 2 years I've come up

52:12.540 --> 52:14.762
here and we've reported that priorities

52:14.762 --> 52:16.596
were low and we were driving our

52:16.596 --> 52:18.373
industry base to minimum , uh ,

52:18.373 --> 52:20.429
economic quantities or below minimum

52:20.429 --> 52:22.762
economic quantities . That's where this ,

52:22.762 --> 52:24.984
this enterprise has been . Uh , for the

52:24.984 --> 52:26.984
last few years that is being , uh ,

52:26.984 --> 52:28.762
undone this year and , uh , the

52:28.762 --> 52:30.762
activities that the , the deputy is

52:30.762 --> 52:32.929
driving to change industry to get them

52:32.929 --> 52:35.262
to also show the focus and urgency , uh ,

52:35.262 --> 52:37.290
is there . And so now's the time we

52:37.290 --> 52:39.401
will continue to need sustained focus

52:39.401 --> 52:41.457
and sustained resources to make this

52:41.457 --> 52:43.679
happen . Thanks , Jim . Gina , I have a

52:43.679 --> 52:45.790
separate question for you . So I just

52:45.790 --> 52:47.901
let me say it's unacceptable and it's

52:47.901 --> 52:47.810
not your all's fault , but we as a

52:47.810 --> 52:50.370
nation cannot allow . This low

52:50.370 --> 52:52.481
production rate to continue , we have

52:52.481 --> 52:54.870
to as a committee and the Pentagon

52:55.129 --> 52:57.240
solve this because what's going on in

52:57.240 --> 52:59.407
Ukraine . In the Middle East is not an

52:59.407 --> 53:01.740
anomaly . It's the future , and we , we ,

53:01.740 --> 53:03.962
we , so we got to raise our game , uh ,

53:03.962 --> 53:05.851
production . Gerald Gay , I got a

53:05.851 --> 53:07.962
question for you , sir . JTF Gold has

53:07.962 --> 53:09.796
transitioned from a coordination

53:09.796 --> 53:11.962
focused standing task force to a fully

53:11.962 --> 53:13.796
war ready high ops tempo command

53:13.796 --> 53:15.796
operating continuously to defend US

53:15.796 --> 53:17.685
airspace . To add to , to add the

53:17.685 --> 53:19.462
conflict in Iran has prompted a

53:19.462 --> 53:21.407
sustained high alert posture . Joe

53:21.407 --> 53:23.462
Gainey , can you talk ? Can you talk

53:23.462 --> 53:25.518
about how you're managing the stress

53:25.518 --> 53:27.185
and your force given the high

53:27.185 --> 53:27.159
operational demand they're facing ?

53:27.169 --> 53:30.719
We're here it's . Stressful . Yes ,

53:30.840 --> 53:33.062
uh , Representative Bacon , uh , thanks

53:33.062 --> 53:36.679
for that question . Uh , is The Army

53:36.679 --> 53:40.439
AMD force highest deploy rate , uh , in

53:40.439 --> 53:42.328
the Army , uh , it's been a tough

53:42.328 --> 53:44.383
challenge , uh , for us . We've done

53:44.383 --> 53:46.495
several studies , health of the force

53:46.495 --> 53:48.661
studies to try to get after what's the

53:48.661 --> 53:50.883
best way , uh , to assess stress on the

53:50.883 --> 53:52.883
force and implement , uh , areas to

53:52.883 --> 53:54.939
improve , uh , health on the force .

53:54.939 --> 53:56.883
Really it's gonna come down to our

53:56.883 --> 53:58.717
modernization , so . Funding our

53:58.717 --> 54:01.739
modernization to allow us to transition

54:01.739 --> 54:04.260
to our integrated battle command system

54:04.439 --> 54:07.229
will allow us to do more with less , uh ,

54:07.479 --> 54:09.810
being able to integrate . The several

54:09.810 --> 54:12.032
different sensors and shooters together

54:12.032 --> 54:13.810
will provide us that additional

54:13.810 --> 54:16.010
capacity and capability as we move

54:16.010 --> 54:17.843
forward . How it's being handled

54:17.843 --> 54:19.899
currently , I have an amazing , uh ,

54:19.899 --> 54:22.370
command team that's fighting a fight

54:22.370 --> 54:24.314
with my thirty-second Army Air and

54:24.314 --> 54:26.259
Missile Defense Command in contact

54:26.259 --> 54:29.169
right now . And the way they're caring

54:29.169 --> 54:31.169
for our soldiers , energizing our

54:31.169 --> 54:34.050
soldiers . With the strain that we're

54:34.050 --> 54:35.883
putting on our soldiers is truly

54:35.883 --> 54:38.050
amazing . That's how leadership is how

54:38.050 --> 54:37.889
we're getting through it right now .

54:38.129 --> 54:40.185
Thank you , Joel Gay , and I , I , a

54:40.185 --> 54:42.185
lot of times I need to yield back .

54:42.185 --> 54:44.351
Thank you . I thank the gentleman from

54:44.351 --> 54:46.719
Nebraska and I'm now pleased to

54:46.719 --> 54:49.052
recognize the gentleman from New Mexico ,

54:49.052 --> 54:51.419
Mr . Vasquez , for 5 minutes . Thank

54:51.419 --> 54:53.475
you Mr . Chairman . Thank you to our

54:53.475 --> 54:55.586
witnesses for being here today . Uh ,

54:55.586 --> 54:57.808
in New Mexico , Kirtland Air Force Base

54:57.808 --> 54:57.620
and White Sands Missile Range have been

54:57.620 --> 54:59.564
at the forefront of developing and

54:59.564 --> 55:02.179
testing cutting edge missile defense

55:02.179 --> 55:04.012
technology , which includes most

55:04.012 --> 55:05.846
recently the testing of the next

55:05.846 --> 55:08.123
generation of short range interceptors .

55:08.123 --> 55:10.179
It's evident that these bases play a

55:10.179 --> 55:12.012
critical role in air and missile

55:12.012 --> 55:14.179
defense and that the department relies

55:14.179 --> 55:16.235
on to keep our homeland safe . These

55:16.235 --> 55:18.401
two installations offer a unique focus

55:18.401 --> 55:19.957
on growing the department's

55:19.957 --> 55:21.846
understanding and use of directed

55:21.846 --> 55:23.512
energy and electronic warfare

55:23.512 --> 55:25.401
capabilities on the battlefield .

55:25.401 --> 55:27.568
Electronic warfare and directed energy

55:27.568 --> 55:29.623
systems offer relatively inexpensive

55:29.623 --> 55:31.623
but very effective alternatives for

55:31.623 --> 55:33.623
taking down low-cost drones , short

55:33.623 --> 55:35.957
range rockets , artillery , and mortars .

55:36.610 --> 55:38.832
Systems like the Army's directed energy

55:38.832 --> 55:40.777
maneuver , short range air defense

55:40.777 --> 55:43.889
systems , or the Navy's SLC 32 have

55:43.889 --> 55:45.945
demonstrated the potential that this

55:45.945 --> 55:48.167
type of technology could have to defend

55:48.167 --> 55:50.333
against varying missile threats , with

55:50.333 --> 55:52.540
estimations to be as little as $3 per

55:52.540 --> 55:54.860
shot . Uh , my first question is for

55:54.860 --> 55:57.429
Lieutenant Collins . I understand some

55:57.429 --> 55:59.373
of this development and testing is

55:59.373 --> 56:01.651
being done at Kirtland and White Sands .

56:01.651 --> 56:03.540
How is the missile defense agency

56:03.540 --> 56:05.651
working with these two bases to field

56:05.651 --> 56:07.818
this technology and potentially use to

56:07.818 --> 56:09.707
counter varying missile threats ?

56:09.707 --> 56:11.707
Thanks , Congressman . It's a great

56:11.707 --> 56:13.873
question . Uh , we're very much , uh .

56:13.873 --> 56:16.096
All in and focused on bringing directed

56:16.096 --> 56:18.373
energy to the fight as we move forward .

56:18.373 --> 56:20.596
Uh , my directed energy leads in office

56:20.596 --> 56:22.929
are actually on Kirtland Air Force Base .

56:22.929 --> 56:24.873
So we're very closely tied in with

56:24.873 --> 56:27.040
Kirtland Air Force Base , uh , and the

56:27.040 --> 56:29.207
Air Force portions of work uh directed

56:29.207 --> 56:31.540
energy . Uh , and in this budget in our ,

56:31.540 --> 56:30.889
our way forward , we are certainly

56:30.889 --> 56:33.056
putting more attention into bringing ,

56:33.169 --> 56:35.649
uh , potentially game-changing directed

56:35.649 --> 56:38.159
energy , uh , capabilities to bear . Uh ,

56:38.320 --> 56:40.264
in an unmanned platform , uh , air

56:40.264 --> 56:42.487
platform is what we're focused on so we

56:42.487 --> 56:44.598
can bring that capability to the edge

56:44.598 --> 56:46.709
of the fight , uh , and thin the herd

56:46.709 --> 56:48.987
on UAVs potentially , uh , air threats ,

56:48.987 --> 56:51.153
uh , and the like . So we're very into

56:51.153 --> 56:53.320
that and we're , we're driving through

56:53.320 --> 56:55.431
on that experimentation as we , as we

56:55.431 --> 56:55.139
move forward . And then Wiser is just a ,

56:55.189 --> 56:57.639
a national capability of , of air

56:57.639 --> 56:59.528
missile defense testing and so it

56:59.528 --> 57:01.750
always will be . Thank you , Lieutenant

57:01.750 --> 57:03.639
General . I encourage you to keep

57:03.639 --> 57:05.750
utilizing these important bases in my

57:05.750 --> 57:07.806
district which have played a leading

57:07.806 --> 57:10.028
role , as you know , since World War II

57:10.028 --> 57:12.250
in developing this technology . Now let

57:12.250 --> 57:14.417
me turn to , to uh why this applies to

57:14.417 --> 57:14.290
the current threats that we are facing

57:14.290 --> 57:16.290
today . Within the last year , it's

57:16.290 --> 57:18.179
become increasingly apparent that

57:18.179 --> 57:20.012
missiles and interceptors are an

57:20.012 --> 57:22.234
essential requirement of the modern day

57:22.234 --> 57:24.346
battlefield , and depending on the US

57:24.346 --> 57:26.512
interceptor , costs can range anywhere

57:26.512 --> 57:28.734
from $4 to $90 million . From 4 million

57:28.734 --> 57:30.901
to 90 million , and as our adversaries

57:30.901 --> 57:33.123
increasingly employ low cost methods to

57:33.123 --> 57:35.179
force the US to deplete valuable and

57:35.179 --> 57:37.346
expensive interceptors , we must adapt

57:37.346 --> 57:39.179
to limit this cost disparity and

57:39.179 --> 57:41.234
preserve our firepower for when it's

57:41.234 --> 57:43.290
needed the most . Lieutenant General

57:43.290 --> 57:43.120
Collins , uh , what else is the

57:43.120 --> 57:45.620
department doing to pivot ? Uh , to

57:45.620 --> 57:47.564
ensure that our US missile defense

57:47.564 --> 57:50.300
interceptors are adapting to the

57:50.300 --> 57:53.340
strategies of our enemies and that we

57:53.340 --> 57:55.639
can rapidly deploy this new technology

57:55.939 --> 57:57.883
rather than traditional missiles .

57:57.883 --> 58:00.050
Thank you , Congressman . Uh , first ,

58:00.050 --> 58:02.050
uh , in the first lane we have some

58:02.050 --> 58:04.050
very proven systems with incredible

58:04.050 --> 58:06.383
capability that are being proven in the ,

58:06.383 --> 58:08.272
in the desert today . Uh , we are

58:08.272 --> 58:10.328
always striving to figure out how to

58:10.328 --> 58:12.550
drive the cost of those down . Uh , one

58:12.550 --> 58:14.495
through the acceleration , uh , in

58:14.495 --> 58:14.010
quantities that we're going to talk

58:14.010 --> 58:16.121
about , we're going to have a savings

58:16.121 --> 58:17.899
in those , but those are pretty

58:17.899 --> 58:19.788
exquisite , uh , and , and , uh ,

58:19.788 --> 58:21.621
unique weapons , uh , as we move

58:21.621 --> 58:23.621
forward . We are continuing to push

58:23.621 --> 58:25.732
down directed energy and non-kinetics

58:25.732 --> 58:25.290
to , to change the , uh , the cost

58:25.290 --> 58:27.401
equation , uh , and increase magazine

58:27.401 --> 58:29.401
depth . Uh , as well as part of our

58:29.401 --> 58:31.830
push into more disruptive technologies

58:31.830 --> 58:33.941
for the fight , uh , affordability is

58:33.941 --> 58:35.886
actually one of our key technology

58:35.886 --> 58:38.163
thrust areas and bringing that to bear .

58:38.163 --> 58:39.941
Uh , we have started a low-cost

58:39.941 --> 58:42.108
interceptor study , uh , at this point

58:42.108 --> 58:44.219
with , with a few vendors where we're

58:44.219 --> 58:46.219
taking a look at actually pushing a

58:46.219 --> 58:48.274
cost target on , uh , capability and

58:48.274 --> 58:49.941
using . Modern-day design and

58:49.941 --> 58:52.108
manufacturing capabilities to see what

58:52.108 --> 58:54.550
threat base we can cover down with a

58:54.550 --> 58:57.389
reduced-cost weapon to really help . If

58:57.389 --> 58:59.556
we can reduce the cost of the weapon ,

58:59.556 --> 59:01.889
we can increase the magazine depth , uh ,

59:01.889 --> 59:03.945
through that affordability and , and

59:03.945 --> 59:03.389
we're very much starting that process .

59:03.469 --> 59:05.629
We're really , uh , moving forward in

59:05.629 --> 59:07.629
low-cost interceptors and wide area

59:07.629 --> 59:10.350
kill , uh , uh , mechanisms and the

59:10.350 --> 59:12.517
like to make sure that we can continue

59:12.517 --> 59:14.683
to drive , uh , affordability into the

59:14.683 --> 59:16.510
equation . Thank you so much ,

59:16.570 --> 59:18.792
Lieutenant General , and uh I , I can't

59:18.792 --> 59:21.159
stress how important it is as you talk

59:21.159 --> 59:23.560
about those low cost solutions uh for

59:23.560 --> 59:25.719
my district because we have uh some ,

59:25.840 --> 59:28.173
some really innovative small businesses ,

59:28.173 --> 59:30.284
startup companies , spinoffs from our

59:30.284 --> 59:32.229
national labs , uh , that not only

59:32.229 --> 59:34.340
lower the cost of the munition itself

59:34.340 --> 59:36.507
but uh reduce costs of , uh , if we're

59:36.507 --> 59:38.451
doing space getting that weapon or

59:38.451 --> 59:40.562
getting that system into orbit , uh ,

59:40.562 --> 59:42.729
the deployment , the operation and the

59:42.729 --> 59:42.699
maintenance of these systems as well ,

59:42.919 --> 59:45.086
uh , which we are hoping . To be added

59:45.086 --> 59:47.141
as approved vendors into our defense

59:47.141 --> 59:49.363
industrial base . And so I look forward

59:49.363 --> 59:51.530
to seeing how the department maintains

59:51.530 --> 59:53.641
its US missile defense moving forward

59:53.641 --> 59:55.863
and employing these low cost measures .

59:55.863 --> 59:57.975
Thank you , Chairman . I yield back .

59:57.975 --> 59:59.863
Gentleman yields back . We're now

59:59.863 --> 01:00:02.086
pleased to recognize the gentleman from

01:00:02.086 --> 01:00:04.308
Indiana , Mr . Mesmer , for 5 minutes .

01:00:04.308 --> 01:00:06.419
OK , thank you , Chairman , and thank

01:00:06.419 --> 01:00:08.419
you to the witnesses for being here

01:00:08.419 --> 01:00:10.586
today . As co-chair of the Hypersonics

01:00:10.586 --> 01:00:12.641
Caucus , I believe the , in the , in

01:00:12.641 --> 01:00:11.949
the importance of the hypersonic

01:00:11.949 --> 01:00:13.909
missile technology is a crucial ,

01:00:13.989 --> 01:00:16.510
crucial component in America's national

01:00:16.510 --> 01:00:18.732
security platforms , and I look forward

01:00:18.732 --> 01:00:21.066
to hearing your answers . To that point ,

01:00:21.066 --> 01:00:23.288
General Collins , uh , could you get an

01:00:23.288 --> 01:00:22.590
update on the development of the

01:00:22.590 --> 01:00:25.790
glideface interceptor ? Yes , sir .

01:00:25.870 --> 01:00:28.030
Thank you . Uh , as a reminder , uh ,

01:00:28.169 --> 01:00:30.280
glide phase interceptor really is the

01:00:30.280 --> 01:00:32.336
future of hypersonic missile defense

01:00:32.336 --> 01:00:31.949
for the nation . Today , we have

01:00:31.949 --> 01:00:34.282
terminal defense capabilities only , iE ,

01:00:34.560 --> 01:00:36.782
uh , at the very endgame , uh , defense

01:00:36.782 --> 01:00:39.004
capabilities against hypersonic missile

01:00:39.004 --> 01:00:41.116
targets . GPI will bring a capability

01:00:41.116 --> 01:00:43.004
to , to reach out and give you an

01:00:43.004 --> 01:00:45.171
additional layer of capability to help

01:00:45.171 --> 01:00:45.070
thin the herd , increase your , your

01:00:45.070 --> 01:00:46.903
performance against those , that

01:00:46.903 --> 01:00:49.126
hypersonic , that really tough threat .

01:00:49.126 --> 01:00:51.348
Uh , the GPI program , uh , last year ,

01:00:51.348 --> 01:00:53.348
uh , reported due to funding , uh ,

01:00:53.348 --> 01:00:55.514
priorities , uh , we were delaying the

01:00:55.514 --> 01:00:57.681
program . Uh , this year , uh , we are

01:00:57.681 --> 01:01:00.014
actually accelerating that program , uh ,

01:01:00.014 --> 01:01:01.959
with , uh , partial reconciliation

01:01:01.959 --> 01:01:04.014
money , uh , which was just reported

01:01:04.014 --> 01:01:05.959
this past week that we've put that

01:01:05.959 --> 01:01:08.070
reconciliation , reconciliation money

01:01:08.070 --> 01:01:10.237
on contract . We're accelerating today

01:01:10.237 --> 01:01:12.181
from 2035 to 2031 . And bringing a

01:01:12.181 --> 01:01:14.237
land-based capability to the fight .

01:01:14.237 --> 01:01:16.459
Still not fast enough , but that is the

01:01:16.459 --> 01:01:18.514
beginning . Uh , by taking resources

01:01:18.514 --> 01:01:20.570
off the table . Now we are very much

01:01:20.570 --> 01:01:22.403
continuing to look in support of

01:01:22.403 --> 01:01:24.570
General Gutle , how to accelerate more

01:01:24.570 --> 01:01:26.181
and bring hypersonic defense

01:01:26.181 --> 01:01:28.348
capabilities faster . Well , you , you

01:01:28.348 --> 01:01:28.229
answered my second question , and that

01:01:28.229 --> 01:01:30.173
was going to be how we're going to

01:01:30.173 --> 01:01:32.507
accelerate . So thank you for that . Uh ,

01:01:32.507 --> 01:01:34.507
can you comment on the value add of

01:01:34.507 --> 01:01:34.419
working with the Japanese on this

01:01:34.419 --> 01:01:36.697
program ? Is there any potential ? Yes ,

01:01:36.697 --> 01:01:38.641
sir . It's , it's , uh , the , the

01:01:38.641 --> 01:01:40.586
Japanese have been a long-standing

01:01:40.586 --> 01:01:42.752
great partner of ours . Uh , our , our

01:01:42.752 --> 01:01:44.308
best exo , our most capable

01:01:44.308 --> 01:01:46.475
exoatmospheric interceptor today , the

01:01:46.475 --> 01:01:48.300
SM3 Block 2A , that was also

01:01:48.300 --> 01:01:50.411
co-developed with the Japanese . They

01:01:50.411 --> 01:01:52.078
bring a great mindset of , of

01:01:52.078 --> 01:01:54.244
development as well as manufacturing ,

01:01:54.244 --> 01:01:56.411
and so they're a key partner for us on

01:01:56.411 --> 01:01:58.467
the two-way and the expansion of the

01:01:58.467 --> 01:01:58.370
two-way line . Uh , they're also

01:01:58.370 --> 01:02:00.537
bringing that same , uh , capability ,

01:02:00.537 --> 01:02:02.703
uh , and partnership , uh , to bear on

01:02:02.703 --> 01:02:04.759
the GPI program as well , and they ,

01:02:04.759 --> 01:02:06.870
they've been a great partner so far .

01:02:06.870 --> 01:02:06.870
OK . Is there room for more US ,

01:02:07.209 --> 01:02:09.320
Japanese hypersonic joint development

01:02:09.320 --> 01:02:11.542
and production ? Uh , I believe there ,

01:02:11.542 --> 01:02:13.709
there could be . Uh , yes , sir . OK .

01:02:13.709 --> 01:02:15.876
Uh , General Collins , what do you see

01:02:15.876 --> 01:02:15.770
as the bottlenecks and development ,

01:02:16.050 --> 01:02:17.994
development and production of more

01:02:17.994 --> 01:02:21.929
hypersonic systems ? But I

01:02:21.929 --> 01:02:24.262
believe some of the bottlenecks is , uh ,

01:02:24.262 --> 01:02:26.679
is , is , you know , the contain , uh ,

01:02:26.689 --> 01:02:28.856
continued investment in the industry ,

01:02:28.856 --> 01:02:31.022
in the industry base to do that . Uh ,

01:02:31.022 --> 01:02:33.133
even before I was at MDA I was in the

01:02:33.133 --> 01:02:35.245
Air Force buying hypersonic weapons ,

01:02:35.245 --> 01:02:37.411
uh , and there was a very small , some

01:02:37.411 --> 01:02:37.350
of them have good mom and pop garage ,

01:02:37.409 --> 01:02:39.520
uh , manufacturers of some of those .

01:02:39.520 --> 01:02:41.520
Components . Uh , I think sustained

01:02:41.520 --> 01:02:44.054
focus , sustained resources to really

01:02:44.054 --> 01:02:46.074
streamline out the production and

01:02:46.074 --> 01:02:48.241
manufacturing of hypersonics , to take

01:02:48.241 --> 01:02:51.475
it from S&T mom and pop to no kidding ,

01:02:51.544 --> 01:02:53.715
frontline industry manufacturing is

01:02:53.715 --> 01:02:55.882
really required . Uh , we're beginning

01:02:55.882 --> 01:02:58.155
to do that , uh , with our planning for

01:02:58.155 --> 01:03:00.155
GPI and some of the other offensive

01:03:00.155 --> 01:03:01.933
hypersonic weapons . We need to

01:03:01.933 --> 01:03:04.155
continue to do that so that , uh , uh ,

01:03:04.155 --> 01:03:06.211
we're not relying on one or two very

01:03:06.211 --> 01:03:08.280
small entities to scale . Is the

01:03:08.669 --> 01:03:10.836
increased demand signal that we've had

01:03:10.836 --> 01:03:12.836
the last year in funding leading to

01:03:12.836 --> 01:03:14.929
better response from the defense and

01:03:14.929 --> 01:03:17.320
industrial base . Uh , I believe , sir ,

01:03:17.439 --> 01:03:19.661
uh , so , sir , I , I'm not actually in

01:03:19.661 --> 01:03:21.828
the middle of an , uh , of a , uh , of

01:03:21.828 --> 01:03:23.495
an active production line for

01:03:23.495 --> 01:03:25.772
hypersonic weapons . GPI will be there ,

01:03:25.772 --> 01:03:27.883
uh , in a few years . Uh , but , uh ,

01:03:27.883 --> 01:03:29.883
uh , I know how we've been engaging

01:03:29.883 --> 01:03:32.050
industry across the , across the , the

01:03:32.050 --> 01:03:34.050
enterprise for , uh , the munitions

01:03:34.050 --> 01:03:35.995
acceleration activities , uh , has

01:03:35.995 --> 01:03:37.883
really changed how we engage with

01:03:37.883 --> 01:03:40.050
industry and how enga industry engages

01:03:40.050 --> 01:03:42.217
with us . Uh , and so it's been a very

01:03:42.217 --> 01:03:44.106
positive , uh , effort . Anything

01:03:44.106 --> 01:03:46.328
Congress and the MDA can collaborate on

01:03:46.328 --> 01:03:46.040
to make sure these get deployed at the

01:03:46.040 --> 01:03:49.100
speed of relevancy . Uh , yes , sir . I

01:03:49.100 --> 01:03:51.211
think I've said it for , uh , maybe 3

01:03:51.211 --> 01:03:53.433
times . I'll say it a 4th . I think the

01:03:53.433 --> 01:03:55.767
continued support , the continued focus ,

01:03:55.767 --> 01:03:57.933
the continued resources , uh , to help

01:03:57.933 --> 01:03:57.780
us continue to push that those programs

01:03:57.780 --> 01:03:59.613
forward is absolutely critical .

01:03:59.613 --> 01:04:01.558
Perfect . Thank you . Uh , General

01:04:01.558 --> 01:04:03.724
Gutlein , thank you for your update on

01:04:03.724 --> 01:04:05.780
Golden Dome program last week as the

01:04:05.780 --> 01:04:08.058
House side lead on the Golden Dome Act .

01:04:08.058 --> 01:04:10.058
I'm a big supporter of getting this

01:04:10.058 --> 01:04:12.224
program in the field , on schedule and

01:04:12.224 --> 01:04:12.060
on budget , and , uh , would , uh .

01:04:13.080 --> 01:04:15.340
Like you maybe highlight a potential

01:04:15.340 --> 01:04:18.479
hypersonic and ballistic tracking space

01:04:18.479 --> 01:04:21.080
sensor as it could serve in the

01:04:21.280 --> 01:04:23.280
architecture and specifically as it

01:04:23.280 --> 01:04:25.336
pertains to hypersonic and ballistic

01:04:25.336 --> 01:04:29.149
missile defense . Yes , Representative ,

01:04:29.239 --> 01:04:31.295
uh , as I've been talking about , we

01:04:31.295 --> 01:04:33.183
have a multi-domain , uh , set of

01:04:33.183 --> 01:04:35.017
sensors . Uh , some of those are

01:04:35.017 --> 01:04:37.183
space-based sensors , and one of those

01:04:37.183 --> 01:04:39.350
is the missile Defense Agency's , uh ,

01:04:39.350 --> 01:04:41.239
uh , hypersonic ballistic missile

01:04:41.239 --> 01:04:43.239
tracking system . Uh , we have been

01:04:43.239 --> 01:04:43.090
working with the Space Development

01:04:43.090 --> 01:04:45.312
Agency , United States Space Force , to

01:04:45.312 --> 01:04:47.423
accelerate that program and currently

01:04:47.423 --> 01:04:49.479
have a request for a proposal out on

01:04:49.479 --> 01:04:51.423
the street . OK , thank you . Uh ,

01:04:51.469 --> 01:04:53.525
General Collins , one more quickly ,

01:04:53.669 --> 01:04:55.891
how has the SM3 distinguished itself in

01:04:55.891 --> 01:04:58.113
our recent conflicts in the Red Sea and

01:04:58.113 --> 01:05:00.810
Iran ? Sir , it's the premier capacity

01:05:00.810 --> 01:05:03.032
weapon defending from the Eastern Med ,

01:05:03.032 --> 01:05:04.866
both defending Europe as well as

01:05:04.866 --> 01:05:06.921
defending the CENTCO AOR . It's done

01:05:06.921 --> 01:05:09.260
well and executed better than designed .

01:05:09.639 --> 01:05:11.361
OK , thank you . You're back .

01:05:12.389 --> 01:05:14.445
Gentleman yields back . The chair is

01:05:14.445 --> 01:05:16.611
now pleased to recognize the gentleman

01:05:16.611 --> 01:05:18.833
from California , Mr . Whitesides , for

01:05:18.833 --> 01:05:21.056
5 minutes . Thank you , Mr . Chairman .

01:05:21.056 --> 01:05:23.167
First , I want to start off by , uh ,

01:05:23.167 --> 01:05:25.278
saying thanks to each of you for your

01:05:25.278 --> 01:05:24.800
dedicated service to our nation ,

01:05:25.030 --> 01:05:27.141
particularly those who are retiring ,

01:05:27.141 --> 01:05:29.308
uh , recognizing your families for the

01:05:29.308 --> 01:05:32.320
sacrifice that they have carried as you

01:05:32.320 --> 01:05:35.860
lead our armed services . We've now

01:05:35.860 --> 01:05:38.560
been at war with Iran for over 6 weeks .

01:05:39.179 --> 01:05:40.957
What was announced as a limited

01:05:40.957 --> 01:05:43.179
engagement has evolved into a sustained

01:05:43.179 --> 01:05:45.290
kinetic conflict with no clear end in

01:05:45.290 --> 01:05:47.179
sight , marking a significant and

01:05:47.179 --> 01:05:49.290
dangerous escalation in a region that

01:05:49.290 --> 01:05:51.919
is already fraught with instability .

01:05:52.459 --> 01:05:54.626
President Trump's decision to blockade

01:05:54.626 --> 01:05:56.626
the Strait of Hormuz will cause gas

01:05:56.626 --> 01:05:58.739
prices to spike even more than they

01:05:58.739 --> 01:06:00.906
already had . Gas prices are projected

01:06:00.906 --> 01:06:03.780
to rise to over $7 per gallon in

01:06:03.780 --> 01:06:06.739
California if this blockade lasts . The

01:06:06.739 --> 01:06:08.739
president seems to have no coherent

01:06:08.739 --> 01:06:10.850
strategy to end the war or bring down

01:06:10.850 --> 01:06:13.250
gas prices . Increased gas prices are

01:06:13.250 --> 01:06:15.306
now driving inflation throughout our

01:06:15.306 --> 01:06:17.028
economy as the higher price of

01:06:17.028 --> 01:06:19.250
transportation and manufacturing drives

01:06:19.250 --> 01:06:21.959
up costs everywhere . I am deeply

01:06:21.959 --> 01:06:23.792
concerned that this operation is

01:06:23.792 --> 01:06:25.959
currently foundering . By almost every

01:06:25.959 --> 01:06:27.903
metric , it has failed to meet its

01:06:27.903 --> 01:06:29.959
stated strategic goals . We have not

01:06:29.959 --> 01:06:32.126
eliminated the nuclear threat , nor we

01:06:32.126 --> 01:06:34.181
have , nor have we achieved regional

01:06:34.181 --> 01:06:36.126
deterrence . Our adversary retains

01:06:36.126 --> 01:06:38.015
long-term ballistic , drone , and

01:06:38.015 --> 01:06:40.237
industrial capabilities . Furthermore ,

01:06:40.350 --> 01:06:42.360
we must address the grave legal

01:06:42.360 --> 01:06:44.719
precedent being set in this operation .

01:06:45.110 --> 01:06:46.888
The administration continues to

01:06:46.888 --> 01:06:49.389
prosecute a high intensity conflict , a

01:06:49.389 --> 01:06:52.100
war , without a formal declaration of

01:06:52.100 --> 01:06:54.429
war from Congress . This is a direct

01:06:54.429 --> 01:06:56.207
violation of our constitutional

01:06:56.207 --> 01:06:58.510
framework and an end run around the war

01:06:58.510 --> 01:07:00.350
powers resolution , denying the

01:07:00.350 --> 01:07:02.830
American people a voice through their

01:07:02.830 --> 01:07:05.229
elected representatives . Finally , we

01:07:05.229 --> 01:07:07.340
must confront the alarming rate at

01:07:07.340 --> 01:07:09.173
which we are burning through our

01:07:09.173 --> 01:07:11.118
munitions stockpiles . Our current

01:07:11.118 --> 01:07:12.840
expenditure is unsustainable ,

01:07:12.840 --> 01:07:15.062
particularly regarding our inventory of

01:07:15.062 --> 01:07:17.007
interceptors . By exhausting these

01:07:17.007 --> 01:07:19.219
sophisticated long lead time assets in

01:07:19.219 --> 01:07:21.449
this theater , we are rapidly hollowing

01:07:21.449 --> 01:07:23.338
out our own domestic defenses and

01:07:23.338 --> 01:07:25.620
leaving our forces vulnerable to other

01:07:25.620 --> 01:07:27.939
global contingencies . We cannot afford

01:07:27.939 --> 01:07:30.139
to compromise our long-term national

01:07:30.139 --> 01:07:32.379
security for an operation that lacks

01:07:32.379 --> 01:07:35.000
both a legal mandate and a clear path

01:07:35.000 --> 01:07:37.659
to victory . General Gutlein

01:07:39.040 --> 01:07:42.909
Um , Can you share with us

01:07:43.129 --> 01:07:45.810
what is the impact on price and

01:07:45.810 --> 01:07:48.520
timeline to Golden Dome deployment from

01:07:48.520 --> 01:07:49.520
the war in Iran ?

01:07:53.209 --> 01:07:55.979
There has not been a direct cost impact

01:07:55.979 --> 01:07:57.923
on Golden Dome because of the Iran

01:07:57.923 --> 01:08:00.035
conflict . Has there been a scheduled

01:08:00.035 --> 01:08:02.368
impact to your plans ? No , Congressman ,

01:08:02.368 --> 01:08:05.879
there is not . OK . Uh , this is a

01:08:05.879 --> 01:08:08.046
question for any of you . What can you

01:08:08.046 --> 01:08:10.000
say publicly about quantifying the

01:08:10.000 --> 01:08:12.167
impact of the Iran war on the cost and

01:08:12.167 --> 01:08:13.889
timing to restock our depleted

01:08:13.889 --> 01:08:16.000
inventory of expended missile defense

01:08:16.000 --> 01:08:19.999
asset ? General Collins .

01:08:21.909 --> 01:08:23.965
Representative , thank you for the ,

01:08:23.965 --> 01:08:26.242
thank you for the question . Uh , from ,

01:08:26.242 --> 01:08:28.131
from a cost impact , um , I can't

01:08:28.131 --> 01:08:30.353
really , other than we're having to buy

01:08:30.353 --> 01:08:29.628
additional rounds to replenish those ,

01:08:29.708 --> 01:08:31.930
then the cost of those are there . Uh ,

01:08:32.890 --> 01:08:35.001
Really , the impact is being super by

01:08:36.129 --> 01:08:38.185
what we have , what , the deputy had

01:08:38.185 --> 01:08:39.962
already started last year , the

01:08:39.962 --> 01:08:39.720
munitions acceleration work and the

01:08:39.720 --> 01:08:42.770
effort . He had , he had already

01:08:43.350 --> 01:08:45.540
identified the need to maximize all of

01:08:45.540 --> 01:08:48.000
our production , uh , across both the

01:08:48.000 --> 01:08:50.222
defensive as well as offensive weapon ,

01:08:50.222 --> 01:08:53.009
uh , uh , portfolios and began that

01:08:53.009 --> 01:08:55.065
work to drive that forward and , and

01:08:55.065 --> 01:08:57.231
bring that , that capability to bear .

01:08:57.231 --> 01:08:59.398
Uh , the work being done now , it will

01:08:59.398 --> 01:09:01.620
take some time to see the , the benefit

01:09:01.620 --> 01:09:03.676
of that . It will , these weapons do

01:09:03.676 --> 01:09:03.470
take years to , to , to come to

01:09:03.470 --> 01:09:05.526
fruition . Uh , but starting it last

01:09:05.526 --> 01:09:07.692
year as he did , uh , the , the sooner

01:09:07.692 --> 01:09:09.803
you start , the sooner you finish and

01:09:09.803 --> 01:09:11.914
you start seeing those rounds come to

01:09:11.914 --> 01:09:14.310
bear . Um , The weapons expended in the

01:09:14.310 --> 01:09:16.649
last 6 weeks will , will certainly

01:09:17.109 --> 01:09:19.109
drive us , you know , it'll , it'll

01:09:19.109 --> 01:09:21.220
take that amount of time to get those

01:09:21.220 --> 01:09:23.442
rounds back to replenish , uh , as it's

01:09:23.442 --> 01:09:23.379
going to get those production lines .

01:09:23.509 --> 01:09:25.509
All of those weapons do have active

01:09:25.509 --> 01:09:27.787
production lines , so we are every day ,

01:09:27.787 --> 01:09:29.787
uh , producing weapons to replenish

01:09:29.787 --> 01:09:31.953
those . Uh , but it will take a number

01:09:31.953 --> 01:09:33.953
of years to , to replenish . Do you

01:09:33.953 --> 01:09:36.287
have an estimate of the number of years ?

01:09:36.287 --> 01:09:36.254
Uh , no , sir , not at this time . Is

01:09:36.254 --> 01:09:38.421
there a way that you could provide the

01:09:38.421 --> 01:09:40.532
committee with an estimate ? Yes , we

01:09:40.532 --> 01:09:42.698
can . OK . Do you know what time frame

01:09:42.698 --> 01:09:41.734
you might be able to provide that

01:09:41.734 --> 01:09:43.901
estimate ? Uh , it , it should be in ,

01:09:43.901 --> 01:09:46.067
in a matter of , of weeks . In weeks .

01:09:46.067 --> 01:09:48.290
Yes . OK , thanks . I yield back , Mr .

01:09:48.290 --> 01:09:50.345
Chairman . I thank the gentleman for

01:09:50.345 --> 01:09:53.990
yielding and uh I now recognize the

01:09:53.990 --> 01:09:56.350
gentleman from Wisconsin , Mr . Van

01:09:56.350 --> 01:09:58.683
Orden . Thank you , Mr . Thank you , Mr .

01:09:58.683 --> 01:10:02.490
Chairman , um . I wanna double tap real

01:10:02.490 --> 01:10:04.657
quick with uh General Gil or excuse me

01:10:04.657 --> 01:10:06.890
with um General Gulein about the

01:10:06.890 --> 01:10:09.057
production capacity of what's going on

01:10:09.057 --> 01:10:11.223
here . Do , do we really actually have

01:10:11.223 --> 01:10:13.129
a plan that , that's laid out and

01:10:13.129 --> 01:10:15.919
phased so that we can . Have enough

01:10:15.919 --> 01:10:18.229
interceptors to perform the functions

01:10:18.229 --> 01:10:21.879
of Golden Dome . Yes , Representative ,

01:10:21.979 --> 01:10:24.146
we do . There are risks in that plan ,

01:10:24.146 --> 01:10:26.201
but we have identified a schedule of

01:10:26.201 --> 01:10:28.479
deliveries of when we would need those ,

01:10:28.479 --> 01:10:30.201
uh , various sensors , various

01:10:30.201 --> 01:10:31.923
munitions factors , etc . OK ,

01:10:31.923 --> 01:10:34.090
excellent . Um , so I've noticed , I'm

01:10:34.090 --> 01:10:36.201
very observant that you , uh , look a

01:10:36.201 --> 01:10:38.201
little different from the other two

01:10:38.201 --> 01:10:40.423
folks sitting next to you in blue . Can

01:10:40.423 --> 01:10:42.590
you tell me why that is , sir ? United

01:10:42.590 --> 01:10:44.646
States Space Force . You're in Space

01:10:44.646 --> 01:10:46.701
Force , aren't you ? But 31 years in

01:10:46.701 --> 01:10:49.035
the Air Force . OK , well , OK , I just ,

01:10:49.035 --> 01:10:51.459
I , I feel the necessity to clear up

01:10:51.459 --> 01:10:53.570
some things . There are people on the

01:10:53.570 --> 01:10:56.259
subcommittee that mocked , mocked

01:10:56.259 --> 01:10:58.700
openly the formation of Space Force ,

01:10:58.899 --> 01:11:01.740
mocked it like in hearings and on

01:11:01.740 --> 01:11:04.259
television and everything , um , so

01:11:04.259 --> 01:11:06.203
General Glo from your professional

01:11:06.203 --> 01:11:08.148
position , do you think that Space

01:11:08.148 --> 01:11:10.660
Force has been integral in making sure

01:11:10.660 --> 01:11:12.910
that our homeland . Uh , is going to be

01:11:12.910 --> 01:11:15.069
secured now , or is secured now , and

01:11:15.069 --> 01:11:17.350
will be secured further in the future .

01:11:18.029 --> 01:11:20.140
Without question , Congressman , OK .

01:11:20.270 --> 01:11:23.529
And then , so General Gutlein ,

01:11:24.189 --> 01:11:25.967
would you say that you have the

01:11:25.967 --> 01:11:27.745
confidence of General Whiting ?

01:11:29.620 --> 01:11:31.676
Absolutely . And when General Guillo

01:11:31.676 --> 01:11:33.842
said I flew out there to meet with him

01:11:33.842 --> 01:11:35.953
on day one , I also flew out there to

01:11:35.953 --> 01:11:35.379
meet with General Whiting on day one to

01:11:35.379 --> 01:11:37.657
make sure that we are fully integrated ,

01:11:37.657 --> 01:11:39.823
uh , making sure I'm getting after his

01:11:39.823 --> 01:11:41.879
threats , and he understands how I'm

01:11:41.879 --> 01:11:44.046
going to operate in his AOR . OK . And

01:11:44.046 --> 01:11:46.268
General Guillo , do you have confidence

01:11:46.268 --> 01:11:48.490
in General Whiting ? Absolutely , sir .

01:11:48.490 --> 01:11:50.601
So ergo , we could determine that you

01:11:50.601 --> 01:11:52.657
have confidence in General Gutline .

01:11:52.657 --> 01:11:54.879
Without question , and General Grunlein

01:11:54.879 --> 01:11:56.990
is a competent professional is saying

01:11:56.990 --> 01:11:59.299
that uh Golden Dome is not only a

01:11:59.299 --> 01:12:01.410
requirement to protect the homeland ,

01:12:01.410 --> 01:12:03.299
but it's also within the realm of

01:12:03.299 --> 01:12:05.243
possibility of creating within our

01:12:05.243 --> 01:12:08.720
lifetimes . Is that correct ? He has

01:12:08.720 --> 01:12:10.831
told me that and I believe him . OK ,

01:12:10.831 --> 01:12:12.998
so then maybe we should go with people

01:12:12.998 --> 01:12:15.053
that have made decisions in the past

01:12:15.053 --> 01:12:17.053
that have actually panned out to be

01:12:17.053 --> 01:12:19.109
correct . And maybe we should really

01:12:19.109 --> 01:12:21.387
put at a lower threshold of confidence ,

01:12:21.387 --> 01:12:23.498
uh , the opinions of people that have

01:12:23.498 --> 01:12:26.990
proven to be galactically wrong . Let's

01:12:26.990 --> 01:12:29.046
just do that in the future . General

01:12:29.046 --> 01:12:31.268
Gutlein , how much do you interact with

01:12:31.268 --> 01:12:35.009
our Israeli partners ? Currently very

01:12:35.009 --> 01:12:36.676
limited . The majority of the

01:12:36.676 --> 01:12:38.620
interaction is through the Missile

01:12:38.620 --> 01:12:40.620
Defense Agency , which is my deputy

01:12:40.620 --> 01:12:42.842
director for integration . They are the

01:12:42.842 --> 01:12:44.898
primary point of contact right now ,

01:12:44.898 --> 01:12:47.065
but we will have increased involvement

01:12:47.065 --> 01:12:49.120
with our allies in the future . OK .

01:12:49.120 --> 01:12:51.231
And how much of the technologies dual

01:12:51.231 --> 01:12:53.398
use that have we received benefit from

01:12:53.398 --> 01:12:55.509
Israel with their Iron Dome and David

01:12:55.509 --> 01:12:58.189
Sling ? I would say significant lessons

01:12:58.189 --> 01:13:00.078
over time . We co-developed those

01:13:00.078 --> 01:13:02.189
systems with the Israelis and some of

01:13:02.189 --> 01:13:03.967
those capabilities are actually

01:13:03.967 --> 01:13:06.189
produced here in the United States . So

01:13:06.189 --> 01:13:08.245
in your professional opinion , would

01:13:08.245 --> 01:13:10.356
you say that the strategic , um , the

01:13:10.356 --> 01:13:12.578
strategic relationship we have with our

01:13:12.578 --> 01:13:14.745
Israeli allies are going to accelerate

01:13:14.745 --> 01:13:16.856
the ability for us to protect our own

01:13:16.856 --> 01:13:19.080
homeland ? The integration of our

01:13:19.080 --> 01:13:20.913
allies into our homeland defense

01:13:20.913 --> 01:13:22.802
equation is absolutely critical .

01:13:22.802 --> 01:13:25.024
General Gil , would you agree with that

01:13:25.024 --> 01:13:27.191
assessment ? Yes sir , I would . So we

01:13:27.191 --> 01:13:29.189
can say that it is beneficial to

01:13:29.189 --> 01:13:31.160
everyday American citizens that we

01:13:31.160 --> 01:13:33.180
maintain a very strong and robust

01:13:33.680 --> 01:13:35.847
relationship with our Israeli allies .

01:13:36.450 --> 01:13:38.561
The Israeli allies and others , yes ,

01:13:39.069 --> 01:13:40.958
obviously , but there's been some

01:13:40.958 --> 01:13:43.069
contentious things with people saying

01:13:43.069 --> 01:13:45.069
that we have no business partnering

01:13:45.069 --> 01:13:46.958
with Israel , and I fundamentally

01:13:46.958 --> 01:13:46.930
disagree with them , and I think that

01:13:46.930 --> 01:13:48.930
our ability to protect ourselves is

01:13:48.930 --> 01:13:50.986
accelerated by the fact that they're

01:13:50.986 --> 01:13:53.041
sitting there getting hammered every

01:13:53.041 --> 01:13:52.890
day by missiles and rockets , and we're

01:13:52.890 --> 01:13:55.799
not . Thank God . So I , I wanna thank

01:13:55.799 --> 01:13:57.466
you gentlemen , uh , for your

01:13:57.466 --> 01:13:59.729
dedication . Uh , I know that you did

01:13:59.729 --> 01:14:01.840
not ride a horse here . You flew in a

01:14:01.840 --> 01:14:04.959
plane , uh , right ? OK . So sometimes

01:14:04.959 --> 01:14:06.959
when we , we can't really visualize

01:14:07.040 --> 01:14:09.151
future technologies , we tend to mock

01:14:09.151 --> 01:14:11.262
them , and I think that that makes us

01:14:11.262 --> 01:14:13.540
lesser people . So thank you very much .

01:14:13.540 --> 01:14:15.596
You have my unwavering support . God

01:14:15.596 --> 01:14:17.540
bless you and the space worker . I

01:14:17.540 --> 01:14:20.279
yield . Gentleman yields back , uh ,

01:14:20.399 --> 01:14:22.455
now pleased to recognize the ranking

01:14:22.455 --> 01:14:24.621
member Mr . Moulton . Thank you very ,

01:14:24.621 --> 01:14:26.399
thank you very much , uh , Mr .

01:14:26.399 --> 01:14:28.621
Chairman . There's bipartisan agreement

01:14:28.621 --> 01:14:30.510
on this committee that our , uh ,

01:14:30.510 --> 01:14:32.343
incoming threat detection is not

01:14:32.343 --> 01:14:34.455
perfect , but I detected a circuitous

01:14:34.455 --> 01:14:36.839
and vague insult on my intelligence in

01:14:36.839 --> 01:14:39.759
the previous remarks , and I would just

01:14:39.759 --> 01:14:41.537
point out to the gentleman from

01:14:41.537 --> 01:14:43.759
Wisconsin , whether he's a gentleman or

01:14:43.759 --> 01:14:45.879
not . That the only person who voted

01:14:45.879 --> 01:14:47.823
against the formation of the Space

01:14:47.823 --> 01:14:50.101
Force on this committee was Republican .

01:14:52.000 --> 01:14:54.056
Lieutenant General Gainey , your air

01:14:54.056 --> 01:14:56.278
defenders saved thousands and thousands

01:14:56.278 --> 01:14:58.109
of lives in the Middle East . I

01:14:58.109 --> 01:15:00.331
disagree with the war , but I honor and

01:15:00.331 --> 01:15:02.620
praise the service of our air defenders

01:15:02.620 --> 01:15:04.676
and want our allies and the American

01:15:04.676 --> 01:15:07.410
people to appreciate that . Just give

01:15:07.410 --> 01:15:10.020
us an idea . I mean , approximately how

01:15:10.020 --> 01:15:12.131
many installations and cities are you

01:15:12.131 --> 01:15:14.242
currently protecting with Patriot and

01:15:14.242 --> 01:15:15.242
THAA batteries ?

01:15:18.089 --> 01:15:20.311
Remember Moulton , thank you , uh , for

01:15:20.311 --> 01:15:22.256
that question . Uh , I'm extremely

01:15:22.256 --> 01:15:24.580
proud of our air defenders currently ,

01:15:24.680 --> 01:15:27.169
uh , deployed in the Centcom AOR . Our

01:15:27.169 --> 01:15:30.790
thirty-second team are covering dozens

01:15:30.970 --> 01:15:33.649
of locations , facilities , uh , and

01:15:33.649 --> 01:15:35.816
some of that covers some of the city ,

01:15:35.816 --> 01:15:38.410
uh , out there , and the way that they

01:15:38.410 --> 01:15:41.200
are fighting this fight . You know , we

01:15:41.200 --> 01:15:43.509
have teenagers out of high school and ,

01:15:43.520 --> 01:15:45.799
uh , officers out of college sitting in

01:15:45.799 --> 01:15:49.310
that van day in and day out fighting a

01:15:49.319 --> 01:15:51.319
complex threat uh out there and are

01:15:51.319 --> 01:15:53.652
doing magnificently doing not only that ,

01:15:53.810 --> 01:15:57.459
we are . Rapidly reducing data

01:15:57.919 --> 01:16:00.086
and innovating in real time to be able

01:16:00.086 --> 01:16:02.030
to get after some of these complex

01:16:02.030 --> 01:16:04.030
threats that we thought we wouldn't

01:16:04.030 --> 01:16:03.839
have been able to do . And that's

01:16:03.839 --> 01:16:05.839
fantastic . I mean this is the most

01:16:05.839 --> 01:16:07.950
complex air defense fight that the US

01:16:07.950 --> 01:16:10.172
has has faced , uh , and , uh , and you

01:16:10.172 --> 01:16:12.506
can see the pride that you have in your ,

01:16:12.506 --> 01:16:14.617
in your soldiers which I appreciate ,

01:16:14.617 --> 01:16:16.839
um , protecting dozens of installations

01:16:16.839 --> 01:16:18.839
across the United across the Middle

01:16:18.839 --> 01:16:21.006
East , uh , General Gutlein , how many

01:16:21.006 --> 01:16:23.228
American cities are currently protected

01:16:23.228 --> 01:16:27.029
by Patriot or THAAD batteries ? Today

01:16:27.029 --> 01:16:29.251
there are none . Today there are none .

01:16:29.251 --> 01:16:31.100
So we're protecting dozens of

01:16:31.100 --> 01:16:33.211
installations in cities in the Middle

01:16:33.211 --> 01:16:35.211
East , but we're not protecting any

01:16:35.211 --> 01:16:37.211
American cities with these assets .

01:16:37.211 --> 01:16:40.129
Does that concern you ? Congressman ,

01:16:40.220 --> 01:16:42.331
I'm very concerned about the homeland

01:16:42.331 --> 01:16:44.164
defense equation . We are , uh ,

01:16:44.164 --> 01:16:46.053
vulnerable to a numerous array of

01:16:46.053 --> 01:16:47.942
threats that Golden Dome is being

01:16:47.942 --> 01:16:49.720
designed to get after . We have

01:16:49.720 --> 01:16:49.140
traditionally focused on the

01:16:49.140 --> 01:16:51.084
intercontinental ballistic missile

01:16:51.084 --> 01:16:53.362
threat , uh , and have not really , uh ,

01:16:53.362 --> 01:16:55.696
thought enough about the cruise missile ,

01:16:55.696 --> 01:16:57.862
the hypersonic missile , the ballistic

01:16:57.862 --> 01:17:00.084
missiles from air or from sea , nor now

01:17:00.084 --> 01:16:59.859
what we're seeing the expanding counter

01:16:59.859 --> 01:17:01.915
UAS threat . So we do need to expand

01:17:01.915 --> 01:17:04.192
our defense equation . I totally agree ,

01:17:04.192 --> 01:17:06.415
but if Golden Dome is such a priority ,

01:17:06.415 --> 01:17:08.303
then why are we expending so many

01:17:08.303 --> 01:17:10.169
Patriot and THAAD missiles ? At

01:17:10.169 --> 01:17:12.140
millions of dollars a copy in the

01:17:12.140 --> 01:17:14.500
Middle East , when we have not a single

01:17:14.500 --> 01:17:16.556
American city , not even the capital

01:17:16.556 --> 01:17:18.778
city of Washington DC protected here at

01:17:18.778 --> 01:17:22.569
home . Congressman , we are changing

01:17:22.569 --> 01:17:24.791
the defense equation of the homeland to

01:17:24.791 --> 01:17:27.013
get after those threats . Traditionally

01:17:27.013 --> 01:17:28.902
we we relied on , well , I'm just

01:17:28.902 --> 01:17:31.125
saying like we , we , we didn't have to

01:17:31.125 --> 01:17:33.125
start this war . So if we wanted to

01:17:33.125 --> 01:17:35.458
change this equation , it was so urgent ,

01:17:35.458 --> 01:17:35.009
then why are we not putting these

01:17:35.009 --> 01:17:36.953
batteries here at home rather than

01:17:36.953 --> 01:17:39.120
starting a war of choice in the Middle

01:17:39.120 --> 01:17:41.176
East ? It's eating up so much of our

01:17:41.176 --> 01:17:43.287
inventory . Congressman , my focus is

01:17:43.287 --> 01:17:45.398
on homeland defense . I cannot answer

01:17:45.398 --> 01:17:47.453
to the overseas conflict . Um , Mr .

01:17:47.453 --> 01:17:49.287
Berkowitz , in General Gutlein's

01:17:49.287 --> 01:17:51.398
opening statement , he makes a policy

01:17:51.398 --> 01:17:53.509
assertion that Golden Dome forces our

01:17:53.509 --> 01:17:55.453
adversaries to question whether an

01:17:55.453 --> 01:17:57.676
attack could ever succeed , making them

01:17:57.676 --> 01:17:57.430
less likely to threaten or attack the

01:17:57.430 --> 01:18:00.370
United States in the first place . How

01:18:00.370 --> 01:18:04.020
have we seen that theory either sort of

01:18:04.020 --> 01:18:06.131
supported by current events in Iran ?

01:18:10.939 --> 01:18:13.106
I mean , we just heard from Lieutenant

01:18:13.106 --> 01:18:15.106
General Gainey that we're literally

01:18:15.106 --> 01:18:17.217
protecting dozens of installations in

01:18:17.217 --> 01:18:19.106
cities . With our missile defense

01:18:19.106 --> 01:18:20.828
assets , which notably are not

01:18:20.828 --> 01:18:23.161
protecting American cities here at home .

01:18:23.609 --> 01:18:26.569
But Iran has just shot more drones and

01:18:26.569 --> 01:18:29.410
ballistic missiles at us and our Gulf

01:18:29.410 --> 01:18:32.910
allies than they ever have before . So

01:18:32.910 --> 01:18:35.132
it just seems like this basic theory of

01:18:35.132 --> 01:18:37.080
deterrence is not working with the

01:18:37.080 --> 01:18:40.950
current conflict . Um , Deterrence

01:18:40.950 --> 01:18:43.172
occurs in the cognitive domain . It's a

01:18:43.172 --> 01:18:45.283
psychological phenomenon in the minds

01:18:45.283 --> 01:18:48.790
of our adversaries . Um , I think we're .

01:18:49.660 --> 01:18:51.779
Talking about a regime that may be

01:18:51.779 --> 01:18:55.439
beyond deterrence . Um , they have , uh ,

01:18:56.180 --> 01:18:59.180
for decades pursued nuclear weapons and

01:18:59.180 --> 01:19:02.299
ballistic missiles . Uh , successive

01:19:02.299 --> 01:19:05.549
administrations have engaged them they

01:19:05.549 --> 01:19:07.660
weren't projecting power the way they

01:19:07.660 --> 01:19:09.993
are now until we started this war . And ,

01:19:09.993 --> 01:19:12.160
and my point is more focused just on ,

01:19:12.160 --> 01:19:14.271
I don't disagree with what you said ,

01:19:14.271 --> 01:19:16.493
that's a fine comment , but my point is

01:19:16.493 --> 01:19:18.493
more focused on the basic theory of

01:19:18.493 --> 01:19:20.493
deterrence with Golden Dome . Which

01:19:20.493 --> 01:19:22.605
says that if we have a robust missile

01:19:22.605 --> 01:19:24.771
defense , our adversaries won't attack

01:19:24.771 --> 01:19:26.660
us . And by the way , part of the

01:19:26.660 --> 01:19:28.771
rationale given for this war was that

01:19:28.771 --> 01:19:30.605
at some time in the future , the

01:19:30.605 --> 01:19:32.790
president said in a matter of days ,

01:19:33.370 --> 01:19:35.592
although our own intelligence community

01:19:35.592 --> 01:19:37.814
has said it's more like a decade , Iran

01:19:37.814 --> 01:19:39.870
will have the capability of shooting

01:19:39.870 --> 01:19:42.203
ballistic missiles at the United States .

01:19:42.270 --> 01:19:44.629
But that basic theory seems blown out

01:19:44.629 --> 01:19:46.907
of the water by our current experience ,

01:19:46.907 --> 01:19:49.129
which is that we have incredibly robust

01:19:49.129 --> 01:19:51.407
missile defense across the Middle East .

01:19:51.410 --> 01:19:53.410
We've been singing its praises in a

01:19:53.410 --> 01:19:56.470
very bipartisan way . And yet it has

01:19:56.470 --> 01:19:59.350
not stopped Iran in the least from

01:19:59.350 --> 01:20:02.910
shooting a lot of missiles and drones .

01:20:03.649 --> 01:20:07.600
At us and our allies , which to the To

01:20:07.600 --> 01:20:09.959
the basic , which also , you know , to

01:20:09.959 --> 01:20:12.200
the point is that missile defense is

01:20:12.200 --> 01:20:14.729
not perfect . You know , has ended the

01:20:14.729 --> 01:20:16.930
lives of , of several Americans .

01:20:18.140 --> 01:20:21.620
And So I think we should just be asking

01:20:21.620 --> 01:20:23.787
more questions . I'm unfortunately out

01:20:23.787 --> 01:20:25.898
of time , but Mr . Chairman , I yield

01:20:25.898 --> 01:20:28.009
back . Mr . Chairman , is it possible

01:20:28.009 --> 01:20:30.240
for me to , to respond ? Feel free to

01:20:30.240 --> 01:20:32.351
respond , sir . Um , Mr . Moulton , I

01:20:32.351 --> 01:20:34.407
just wanted to complete my thought ,

01:20:34.407 --> 01:20:36.959
which was , um . Deterrence is in the

01:20:37.000 --> 01:20:39.209
in the adversary's mind and in this

01:20:39.209 --> 01:20:42.370
case they have not been deterred at all .

01:20:42.569 --> 01:20:44.689
They have been killing American

01:20:44.689 --> 01:20:46.633
citizens for the better part of 40

01:20:46.633 --> 01:20:48.970
years through a variety of means , not

01:20:48.970 --> 01:20:52.450
just ballistic missiles , but through a

01:20:52.450 --> 01:20:54.839
variety of of have they ever killed

01:20:54.839 --> 01:20:57.117
Americans by ballistic missiles before .

01:20:58.750 --> 01:21:00.861
They have not , but they've used many

01:21:00.861 --> 01:21:03.139
other , many other tools , and I agree .

01:21:03.139 --> 01:21:05.083
And I've seen Americans personally

01:21:05.083 --> 01:21:06.972
killed by Iranians . So I think I

01:21:06.972 --> 01:21:09.194
understand this threat in a pretty real

01:21:09.194 --> 01:21:11.520
way . I've been there on the ground in

01:21:11.520 --> 01:21:13.680
Iraq , seeing Marines killed by

01:21:13.680 --> 01:21:17.089
Iranians . So I get that . I want to

01:21:17.089 --> 01:21:19.100
defeat them . I wanna win .

01:21:21.220 --> 01:21:22.942
I would like to be buying more

01:21:22.942 --> 01:21:25.180
interceptors . I would also like to

01:21:25.180 --> 01:21:28.589
prevent a war in the Pacific . What I

01:21:28.589 --> 01:21:30.669
don't want to be doing is getting

01:21:30.669 --> 01:21:32.910
bogged down in a war in the Middle East

01:21:33.310 --> 01:21:36.830
that we're losing . While also spending

01:21:36.830 --> 01:21:38.663
hundreds of billions of taxpayer

01:21:38.663 --> 01:21:41.100
dollars here at home on a theory of

01:21:41.100 --> 01:21:43.500
deterrence that seems pretty shaky .

01:21:43.870 --> 01:21:46.149
And if the hope is that what didn't

01:21:46.149 --> 01:21:48.149
work against the Iranians will work

01:21:48.149 --> 01:21:49.149
against Putin .

01:21:52.040 --> 01:21:53.818
That kind of hope is not a good

01:21:53.818 --> 01:21:57.560
strategy , at least in my mind . But

01:21:57.560 --> 01:21:59.727
I appreciate the conversation and look

01:21:59.727 --> 01:22:01.893
forward to continuing it . Thank you .

01:22:02.069 --> 01:22:04.750
Are you both finished ? Oh , no , no ,

01:22:04.870 --> 01:22:06.926
no , no , no . We , we'll carry this

01:22:06.926 --> 01:22:09.037
for the purposes of this discussion ,

01:22:09.037 --> 01:22:11.148
we'll and let me tell you , uh , Mr .

01:22:11.148 --> 01:22:13.203
Chairman , as you know , I very much

01:22:13.203 --> 01:22:13.029
appreciate the intellectual discussion

01:22:13.029 --> 01:22:15.085
that we are starting to have on this

01:22:15.085 --> 01:22:17.251
committee because I think for too long

01:22:17.251 --> 01:22:19.362
it's just been , hey , you want to do

01:22:19.362 --> 01:22:21.418
this , go ahead . And Mr . Berkowitz

01:22:21.418 --> 01:22:23.585
and others have really been willing to

01:22:23.585 --> 01:22:25.251
engage in this debate , which

01:22:25.251 --> 01:22:27.196
fundamentally is important for the

01:22:27.196 --> 01:22:26.930
American people , for the taxpayers ,

01:22:27.229 --> 01:22:29.285
uh , whose dollars we're supposed to

01:22:29.285 --> 01:22:31.507
supervise , so . Um , we may disagree .

01:22:31.507 --> 01:22:33.840
It may take , take us some time to come ,

01:22:33.840 --> 01:22:36.062
uh , to agreement on these issues , but

01:22:36.062 --> 01:22:38.229
this debate matters , and I appreciate

01:22:38.229 --> 01:22:40.451
your willingness to have it . And , and

01:22:40.451 --> 01:22:42.285
I've been uncharacteristically ,

01:22:42.285 --> 01:22:44.507
uncharacteristically light on the gavel

01:22:44.507 --> 01:22:46.118
today because we have such a

01:22:46.118 --> 01:22:48.173
distinguished panel in front of us ,

01:22:48.173 --> 01:22:47.930
and this is a very important topic and

01:22:47.930 --> 01:22:50.152
a very important hearing . And so we're

01:22:50.152 --> 01:22:53.370
gonna go to our final , uh , member for

01:22:53.370 --> 01:22:55.703
questioning , a gentleman from Colorado ,

01:22:55.703 --> 01:22:57.926
Mr . Crank , before , uh , going to the

01:22:57.926 --> 01:23:00.148
closed session . Uh , you're recognized

01:23:00.148 --> 01:23:02.314
for 5 minutes , sir . Thank you , Mr .

01:23:02.314 --> 01:23:01.799
Chairman . I also want to thank our

01:23:01.799 --> 01:23:04.021
witnesses , uh , for joining us today .

01:23:04.021 --> 01:23:06.132
And before I begin my questions , I'd

01:23:06.132 --> 01:23:08.509
like to take a moment . Uh , to honor

01:23:08.509 --> 01:23:11.069
Sergeant Benjamin Pennington , uh , who

01:23:11.069 --> 01:23:13.990
was killed by Iran during the opening

01:23:13.990 --> 01:23:16.270
days of Operation Epic Fury . Sergeant

01:23:16.270 --> 01:23:18.492
Pennington served with the Army's First

01:23:18.492 --> 01:23:20.709
Space Brigade at Fort Carson and

01:23:20.709 --> 01:23:22.765
supported the Army Space and Missile

01:23:22.765 --> 01:23:24.987
Defense Command while in Saudi Arabia .

01:23:24.987 --> 01:23:27.098
And , uh , General Gainey , thank you

01:23:27.098 --> 01:23:29.098
so much for supporting his family .

01:23:29.098 --> 01:23:31.060
I've spoken with Ben's dad , uh ,

01:23:31.069 --> 01:23:33.180
several times , and your outreach has

01:23:33.180 --> 01:23:35.013
meant a lot to him . Um , I also

01:23:35.013 --> 01:23:37.180
believe that had we not deployed those

01:23:37.180 --> 01:23:39.180
systems , had we not procured those

01:23:39.379 --> 01:23:41.899
weapons systems and deployed them and

01:23:41.899 --> 01:23:43.955
used them at the beginning of this ,

01:23:43.955 --> 01:23:46.177
there would have been a lot more of our

01:23:46.177 --> 01:23:48.232
American servicemen who would not be

01:23:48.232 --> 01:23:50.399
alive today . Um , General Gutlein , I

01:23:50.399 --> 01:23:52.621
appreciate our conversation last week .

01:23:52.621 --> 01:23:54.788
I'm confident you are the right person

01:23:54.788 --> 01:23:57.010
to lead this critical mission , uh , to

01:23:57.010 --> 01:23:59.232
defend our homeland . And we had a good

01:23:59.232 --> 01:24:01.177
conversation during our call about

01:24:01.177 --> 01:24:03.177
lessons learned from Operation Epic

01:24:03.177 --> 01:24:05.288
Fury regarding modern missile attacks

01:24:05.288 --> 01:24:07.455
and how you're applying them to Golden

01:24:07.455 --> 01:24:09.830
Dome . For everyone , uh , for everyday

01:24:09.830 --> 01:24:11.997
Americans who don't spend every waking

01:24:11.997 --> 01:24:13.997
hour thinking about missile defense

01:24:13.997 --> 01:24:15.830
like you do , I think there's an

01:24:15.830 --> 01:24:17.330
understandable , uh , uh ,

01:24:17.330 --> 01:24:19.441
understandable gap . In understanding

01:24:19.441 --> 01:24:21.552
how the missile threat has changed in

01:24:21.552 --> 01:24:23.552
the last 20 years , Iran showed the

01:24:23.552 --> 01:24:25.719
world how difficult it is to deal with

01:24:25.719 --> 01:24:27.774
mass swarms of traditional ballistic

01:24:27.774 --> 01:24:29.830
missiles , and in your testimony you

01:24:29.830 --> 01:24:31.886
discussed new technologies like FOBS

01:24:31.886 --> 01:24:34.052
and MERVs that threaten our homeland .

01:24:34.089 --> 01:24:36.970
In layman's terms , can you communicate

01:24:36.970 --> 01:24:38.859
what's different about the modern

01:24:38.859 --> 01:24:40.689
missile threat , how our legacy

01:24:40.689 --> 01:24:43.830
defenses currently fall short , and why

01:24:43.830 --> 01:24:46.052
Golden Dome is the right option to meet

01:24:46.052 --> 01:24:48.219
that threat . Yes , Representative , I

01:24:48.219 --> 01:24:50.108
can , and it's a very fundamental

01:24:50.108 --> 01:24:52.219
question of why we need Golden Dome .

01:24:52.219 --> 01:24:54.386
Uh , we , uh , have traditionally ride

01:24:54.386 --> 01:24:56.719
on our oceans , uh , to have , uh , the ,

01:24:56.719 --> 01:24:58.886
take the away game to the enemy . Uh ,

01:24:58.886 --> 01:25:00.997
while we have been , uh , focusing on

01:25:00.997 --> 01:25:03.108
the away game , they've been focusing

01:25:03.108 --> 01:25:05.219
on holding the homeland at risk , and

01:25:05.219 --> 01:25:04.950
not worse yet , they've also become

01:25:04.950 --> 01:25:06.910
very capable at it . Uh , they've

01:25:06.910 --> 01:25:09.021
increased their arsenal both in range

01:25:09.021 --> 01:25:10.799
and lethality , and now even in

01:25:10.799 --> 01:25:12.799
maneuverability , which makes these

01:25:12.799 --> 01:25:14.632
exceptionally challenging , uh ,

01:25:14.632 --> 01:25:16.854
threats to get after . Uh , what we are

01:25:16.854 --> 01:25:18.799
seeing in Iran is proof that these

01:25:18.799 --> 01:25:18.720
threats have been modernizing . They

01:25:18.720 --> 01:25:20.887
are becoming more lethal . Uh , we are

01:25:20.887 --> 01:25:22.529
seeing an exceptionally high

01:25:22.529 --> 01:25:24.859
operational tempo . We are seeing , uh ,

01:25:24.879 --> 01:25:26.546
threats from the multi-domain

01:25:26.546 --> 01:25:28.601
environment , meaning they're coming

01:25:28.601 --> 01:25:28.310
from air , they're coming from the sea ,

01:25:28.390 --> 01:25:30.390
they're coming from space , they're

01:25:30.390 --> 01:25:32.501
coming from land , uh , and they have

01:25:32.501 --> 01:25:34.557
figured out how to get some low-cost

01:25:34.557 --> 01:25:36.501
threats in there as well , uh , to

01:25:36.501 --> 01:25:38.612
challenge our depth , our , uh , uh ,

01:25:38.612 --> 01:25:40.609
uh , defenses . This is driving a

01:25:40.609 --> 01:25:43.509
demand for increased magazine depth and

01:25:43.509 --> 01:25:46.470
a demand for lower cost solutions to

01:25:46.470 --> 01:25:48.414
get after these factors , uh , and

01:25:48.414 --> 01:25:50.581
that's what Golden Dome is focusing on

01:25:50.581 --> 01:25:52.859
is how to change that defense equation ,

01:25:52.859 --> 01:25:54.748
uh , and we're doing that through

01:25:54.748 --> 01:25:53.910
partnerships with industry ,

01:25:54.009 --> 01:25:56.065
partnerships with the academia , and

01:25:56.065 --> 01:25:58.176
partnerships with the national labs .

01:25:58.176 --> 01:26:00.287
Uh , you know , boost phase intercept

01:26:00.287 --> 01:26:02.509
is particularly challenging aspect , of

01:26:02.509 --> 01:26:04.787
course , of Golden Dome is it requires ,

01:26:04.787 --> 01:26:06.953
um , much shorter decision timelines ,

01:26:06.953 --> 01:26:09.120
uh , for the warfighters . How are you

01:26:09.120 --> 01:26:11.459
addressing that challenge ? It is an

01:26:11.459 --> 01:26:13.870
incredible , uh , challenge , uh , uh ,

01:26:13.950 --> 01:26:16.172
that is gonna be incredibly difficult .

01:26:16.172 --> 01:26:17.950
However , I do believe that the

01:26:17.950 --> 01:26:20.061
technology exists to get after that ,

01:26:20.061 --> 01:26:22.283
uh , uh , threat today , and we believe

01:26:22.283 --> 01:26:24.394
we can solve it . What we do not know

01:26:24.394 --> 01:26:26.617
today is , can I do it at scale and can

01:26:26.617 --> 01:26:28.783
I do it affordably ? That that's going

01:26:28.783 --> 01:26:28.580
to be the huge challenge for boost

01:26:28.580 --> 01:26:30.858
phase intercept . Uh , I will tell you ,

01:26:31.109 --> 01:26:32.720
because we are so focused on

01:26:32.720 --> 01:26:34.665
affordability , if we cannot do it

01:26:34.665 --> 01:26:36.498
affordable , we will not go into

01:26:36.498 --> 01:26:38.665
production . And that's something that

01:26:38.665 --> 01:26:40.776
others have not understood because we

01:26:40.776 --> 01:26:40.529
are looking at the threats from a

01:26:40.529 --> 01:26:42.640
multi-dame domain perspective to make

01:26:42.640 --> 01:26:44.807
sure I have redundant capabilities and

01:26:44.807 --> 01:26:47.029
I don't have single points of failure .

01:26:47.029 --> 01:26:49.196
So if boost phase intercept from space

01:26:49.196 --> 01:26:51.196
is not affordable and scalable , we

01:26:51.196 --> 01:26:53.196
will not produce it because we have

01:26:53.196 --> 01:26:55.196
other options to get after it . And

01:26:55.196 --> 01:26:57.251
then , uh , finally , you're working

01:26:57.251 --> 01:26:59.473
under a pretty tight timeline , uh , to

01:26:59.473 --> 01:26:59.220
address the threat , meet the

01:26:59.220 --> 01:27:01.276
president's objectives . How are you

01:27:01.276 --> 01:27:03.331
leveraging your existing authorities

01:27:03.331 --> 01:27:05.620
and what regulatory or regulatory

01:27:05.620 --> 01:27:08.100
barriers , uh , may need to be removed

01:27:08.100 --> 01:27:10.450
to help you meet your deadline ? Yes ,

01:27:10.500 --> 01:27:12.722
sir . The , the authorities have really

01:27:12.722 --> 01:27:14.667
allowed us to gain unity of effort

01:27:14.667 --> 01:27:16.889
across the joint , uh , uh , services ,

01:27:16.889 --> 01:27:19.111
the military services departments , and

01:27:19.111 --> 01:27:21.056
as well as the agencies , but also

01:27:21.056 --> 01:27:22.778
across the rest of the federal

01:27:22.778 --> 01:27:22.660
government to make sure that we're all

01:27:22.660 --> 01:27:24.271
getting after the same thing

01:27:24.271 --> 01:27:26.271
simultaneously . Uh , I have , uh ,

01:27:26.271 --> 01:27:27.993
acquisition authority . I have

01:27:27.993 --> 01:27:30.104
contracting authority . I have budget

01:27:30.104 --> 01:27:29.939
authority , I have classification

01:27:29.939 --> 01:27:32.106
authority . I have all the authorities

01:27:32.106 --> 01:27:34.272
I need to be successful , and that has

01:27:34.272 --> 01:27:36.439
allowed us to build those partnerships

01:27:36.439 --> 01:27:38.439
to get after the threats in new and

01:27:38.439 --> 01:27:40.217
innovative ways . Well , I just

01:27:40.217 --> 01:27:42.328
wrapping up , thank you all for , for

01:27:42.328 --> 01:27:44.439
your service to our country . I don't

01:27:44.439 --> 01:27:46.439
think the American people generally

01:27:46.439 --> 01:27:48.772
understand this threat that's out there .

01:27:48.772 --> 01:27:50.883
Uh , we , they just don't think about

01:27:50.883 --> 01:27:53.050
it every day . Thank God we have folks

01:27:53.050 --> 01:27:52.970
like you have dedicated your careers

01:27:52.970 --> 01:27:55.026
and think about it every day . And ,

01:27:55.026 --> 01:27:57.137
and I told you this , General Gutlein

01:27:57.137 --> 01:27:59.303
before , um , you know , someday you ,

01:27:59.303 --> 01:28:01.359
you and all of you will look back at

01:28:01.359 --> 01:28:03.581
your grandkids will look back and , and

01:28:03.581 --> 01:28:02.770
thank you for the great work that you

01:28:02.770 --> 01:28:05.048
did on this . Thank you very much . Uh ,

01:28:05.048 --> 01:28:07.326
you're back . Gentlemen , Yield's back ,

01:28:07.326 --> 01:28:09.159
and I'd like to thank all of our

01:28:09.159 --> 01:28:11.159
witnesses today for their excellent

01:28:11.159 --> 01:28:13.103
testimony and answers and also our

01:28:13.103 --> 01:28:14.937
committee members for their very

01:28:14.937 --> 01:28:17.103
thoughtful and timely questions . Uh ,

01:28:17.103 --> 01:28:19.214
this will end the open session of the

01:28:19.214 --> 01:28:21.159
hearing and we'll take a , a brief

01:28:21.159 --> 01:28:23.500
comfort break and meet up in 2337 in 5

01:28:23.500 --> 01:28:25.410
to 10 minutes . Uh , this , uh ,

01:28:25.459 --> 01:28:26.259
hearing is adjourned .