WEBVTT

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We meet this morning to receive

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testimony on the posture of United

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States Space Command . And United

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States Strategic Command . We're joined

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today by General Stephen Stephen

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Whiting . And Admiral Richard

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Correll . I think our witnesses

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For again appearing and for their long

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service to our nation . Over 2 years

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ago , the Congressional Strategic

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Posture Commission reached the

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unanimous bipartisan conclusion that

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the United States must fundamentally

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update our strategic capabilities to

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have any hope of countering growing

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threats from Russia , China , North

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Korea , and Iran .

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The progress we've made since then has

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been limited . But Russia and China

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have advanced by leaps and bounds in

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their nuclear and space programs . Even

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North Korea has outpaced our efforts as

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Kim Jong-un . steadily expands his

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nuclear and missile arsenals as we

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enter the 5th year . Of war

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criminal Vladimir Putin's war against

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Ukraine . Russia remains a major

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strategic threat to the United States .

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Moscow owns the world's largest and

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most modern nuclear arsenal , giving it

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a 10 to 1 advantage over the United

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States in tactical nuclear weapons .

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Russia has also developed new weapons

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unlike anything in the US inventory .

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It's um it stocks nuclear powered

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transoceanic autonomous torpedoes and

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international cruise missiles . For

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its part , Xi's China .

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is rapidly becoming an even greater

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threat . Beijing is expanding its

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nuclear arsenal at breakneck speed ,

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likely outpacing the US by the early

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2030s . Already it has successfully

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deployed an operational strategic triad

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of nuclear missiles , bombers , and

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submarines . Over the past few years ,

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China quadrupled the size of its

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nuclear arsenal . And built an ICBM

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network larger than our own here in the

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United States . The Chinese have flown

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a missile that can drop nuclear

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warheads from orbit anywhere on Earth

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with virtually no warning . Both Russia

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and China understand that space is a

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battlefield . They're openly developing

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and testing capabilities to degrade or

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destroy our satellite constellations .

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Each country has obliterated

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operational satellites , scattering

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thousands of fragments of debris

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and endangering hundreds of other

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orbital objects . Unfortunately , these

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aggressive actions only scratch the

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surface of Moscow and Beijing's

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militarization of space . North Korea

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is a less immediate threat than China

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or Russia . But it is a threat

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nonetheless . Kim Jong Un is

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increasingly able to attack the United

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States and our allies . North Korea is

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conducting frequent missile tests . And

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is working to fuel ballistic missile

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submarines . Both actions make one

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thing clear . Kim Jong Un believes he

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can achieve his goals through nuclear

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threats . Um , the Golden

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Dome Initiative is long overdue .

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Um , and is a reassessment of the

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capabilities we need to defend our

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homeland from strate strategic attacks .

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The president allowed the outdated New

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START treaty to expire . And he exposed

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Moscow's and Beijing's illicit nuclear

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testing . I believe both actions helped

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reset the strategic balance that has

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tipped against us for decades .

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Operation Operations Midnight Hammer

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and Epic Fury eliminated the threat of

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a nuclear armed Iran . Permanently ,

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I hope . Still , there's much more we

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need to do . We must restore the

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National Nuclear Security

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Administration's basic industrial

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capabilities . We must make progress on

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the Sentinel Intercontinental ballistic

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missile , the Columbia submarine , and

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the nuclear sea launched cruise missile

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programs . We must explore what

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additional nuclear and space

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capabilities we need to deter Putin's ,

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Xi's , and Kim's ambitions . These

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efforts require sustained investment

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and innovation . We can afford no less .

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During this hearing , I'd like to hear

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how we are managing the risk of

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maintaining critical military

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capabilities that are both too old and

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too few in number to meet the threats

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of today , much less the threats of

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tomorrow . I'd also like to leave this .

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Hearing , understanding better how our

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witnesses see the roles of their

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commands evolving under the latest

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national defense strategy , it's no

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secret that I believe this NDS falls

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short in several areas . I'm

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particularly concerned that the current

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strategy does not address space and

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nuclear threats with anywhere near the

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urgency they deserve . So undoubtedly

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we'll talk about that today . And I now

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turn to my friend and colleague Ranking

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Member Reed . Thank you very much , Mr .

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Chairman , and , uh , good morning to

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our witnesses , uh , General Whiting .

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Let me begin by thanking you for 36

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years of service to the nation . I

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understand this will be your last

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posture hearing , and I wanna wish you

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and your wife Tammy all the best as you

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go forward . Thank you for your service ,

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sir . And , uh , Admiral Carrell ,

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welcome . Uh , this is your first

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posture hearing before the committee .

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And I thank you as well for your

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service and the dedication of your

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family . We are operating in a

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historically dangerous strategic

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environment with the expiration of the

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new START Treaty for the first time in

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half a century , the United States and

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Russia lack a framework to regulate

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their nuclear forces . I believe we

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must pursue a successor agreement . The

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alternative , an unconstrained arms

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competition would serve no one's

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interests . At the same time , we now

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face two near peer nuclear rivals .

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China is rapidly expanding its arsenal ,

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with projections indicating it could

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reach rough parity with the United

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States and Russia by 2030 . This

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problem is already shaping the

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operational environment , including

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increasingly coordinated military

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activity between Russia and China ,

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such as joint strategic bombing patrols

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near Alaska and in the western Pacific .

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In addition , The concept of extended

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deterrence , the bedrock of our

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alliance system , particularly with

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NATO , is under serious strain . For

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generations , the US nuclear umbrella

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has reassured allies , deterred

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adversaries , and helped prevent the

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proliferation of nuclear weapons .

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Today , confidence in America . And its

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extended deterrence is eroding in

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Europe . There are growing discussions

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of alternate deterrence arrangements

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outside NATO . In Asia , allies are

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openly reconsidering their nuclear

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options . This trend has profound

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implications . If allies doubt the

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credibility of US commitments . Weapons

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proliferation becomes a rational

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response . Admiral Correll , from your

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perspective , I would like to know how

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you assess the risk of overlapping or

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competing deterrence frameworks and any

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update you have on how strategic

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Command is adapting its posture ,

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planning , and doctrine to this more

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complex dynamic with China and Russia .

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I also want to address the recent

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discussions about resuming nuclear

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testing . I do not believe nuclear

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testing would be necessary or

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constructive to our nuclear

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capabilities . We have invested $10

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billion in the National Ignition

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Facility , which allows us to study

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weapons physics without underground

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testing , a capability that Russia and

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China lack . Our laboratories have

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certified annually for nearly 25 years

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that we have no technical need to test .

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Additionally , it would invite others

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to follow suit . Enabling nations such

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as North Korea and potentially India

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and Pakistan to advance their own

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designs while eroding long-standing

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nonproliferation norms , Admiral

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Correll , I would value your

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perspective of the strategic costs and

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benefits of testing , particularly in

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terms of how it might shape the

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behavior of our nuclear armed states ,

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the other nuclear armed states .

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General Whiting , space is now a

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contested domain , and nearly every

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aspect of modern military operations

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depends upon space-based capabilities .

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Early phases of any future conflict

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will hinge on our ability to maintain

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command and control while denying the

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same to our adversaries . To the extent

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you can discuss this in an open setting .

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I would like your assessment on the

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resilience of our space-based command

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and control systems and the military

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services progress toward delivering

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integrated space-based effects into

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operational planning . I'm also

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interested in SpaceCom's role as a

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supporting command as a war fighting

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domain , space requires new battle

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management capabilities , especially

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the ability to detect a threat in space

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and to relay that information to a

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weapon system . This battle management

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directly affects our ability to protect

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troops on the ground , and SpaceCom

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must continue to fully integrate their

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capabilities , including command and

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control , with the other combatant

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commands . I would like to know what

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challenges you face in integrating with

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combatant commands such as IndoPaycom

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and what additional authorities or

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capabilities you need to meet those

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demands . I recognize many of these

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issues will be explored further in

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closed session . But it is important

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that we articulate to the extent

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possible the stakes and the trajectory

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in this forum as well . Thank you both

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again for your service . I look forward

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to your testimony . Thank you , Mr .

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Chairman . Thank you , Mr . Ranking

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Member . General Whiting , uh , would

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you like to make an opening statement ,

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sir ? Yes , Chairman . Chairman Wicker ,

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Ranking Member Reed , and distinguished

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members of the committee . It's an

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honor for Chief Master Sergeant Simmons

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and me to appear before you today

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alongside Admiral Correll and Command

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Sergeant Major Nauman . And I am

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privileged to testify before this

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committee for a 3rd time as the

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commander of the United States Space

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Command , representing the men and

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women who work tirelessly to ensure the

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United States maintains our dominance

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in space . US Space Command's area of

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responsibility is the ultimate high

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ground . From which we provide critical

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capabilities and overwatch that enhance

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the entire joint force . In space , we

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also protect American interests from

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the threats now arrayed against our

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space systems to include our opponents'

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capabilities that allow them to conduct

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space-enabled attacks . Thanks to the

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steadfast support of Congress , US

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space capabilities ranging from

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precision navigation and global

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communications to missile warning and

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real-time intelligence provide the

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joint force with unmatched precision ,

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accuracy , reach , and lethality . We

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saw the Joint Forces unmatched

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integration of multi-domain

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capabilities in Operation Midnight

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Hammer , Operation Absolute Resolve ,

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and more recently , Operation Epic Fury ,

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during which space effects were

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critical to mission success . As the

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Chairman of the Joint . Chiefs of staff

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recently highlighted space and cyber

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forces were the first movers ,

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employing layered and non-kinetic

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effects to enable freedom of maneuver

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for the joint force . General Kane's

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remarks underscore the importance of

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achieving and maintaining space

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superiority , not only to safeguard the

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systems essential for precision strike ,

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missile warning and tracking , and

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secure communications , but also to

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provide overwatch for terrestrial

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forces operating in harm's way . Should

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an adversary degrade or destroy our

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space capabilities , the joint forces'

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ability to fight as it is sized and

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designed would be immediately and

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materially impacted . At US Space

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Command , we command and control

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offensive and defensive capabilities

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provided by the military services to

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conduct operations that set favorable

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conditions for our joint warfighters .

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This operational imperative aligns with

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Secretary Hegseth's observation during

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his Arsenal of Freedom tour that quote

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space is the ultimate high ground , and

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we must deliver supporting fires from

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our positions of advantage to cover our

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maneuver forces . Make no mistake , our

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opponents are moving at an alarming

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pace , developing and deploying

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capabilities to deny us the use of

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space . China's on-orbit presence has

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grown exponentially , now operating

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over 1300 active satellites , a

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667% increase since

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2015 , including more than 510

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intelligence , surveillance and

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reconnaissance satellites . They are

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using these capabilities to integrate

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space-enabled effects across their

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forces . Making them more lethal ,

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precise , and far ranging , while

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fielding weapons purpose built to

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outmaneuver and destroy our satellites .

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At the same time , Russia continues to

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demonstrate capabilities designed to

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disrupt our assets , including the

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potential placement of a nuclear weapon

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on orbit , the single greatest threat

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to our space architecture . These

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developments threaten our joint force

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in every domain , since the control of

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space shapes outcomes on land , at sea .

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In the air and in cyberspace . To

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ensure US Space Command can deter

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conflict and maintain deterrence in

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space , we request continued

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congressional support of our key fiscal

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year 2027 priorities . This includes

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fielding integrated space fires ,

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active protection of our high valued

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satellites , enhancing our battle space

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awareness , building an integrated

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command and control system , sustaining

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our forces' freedom to maneuver , and

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providing sufficient cyber defenses of

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our space enterprise . We thank

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Congress for its support this past year ,

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which has enabled us to begin the

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disciplined transition to our permanent

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headquarters at Redstone Arsenal as

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directed by the president . To

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guarantee mission continuity , we are

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executing a phased relocation operating

14:43.679 --> 14:46.000
from interim facilities while a new

14:46.000 --> 14:47.889
purpose-built command and control

14:47.889 --> 14:49.778
headquarters is constructed . Our

14:49.778 --> 14:52.000
people are central to this effort , and

14:52.000 --> 14:54.111
we are using retention and relocation

14:54.111 --> 14:56.333
incentives to keep our mission critical

14:56.333 --> 14:58.222
talent throughout the move . Your

14:58.222 --> 15:00.278
continued support and authorizations

15:00.278 --> 15:03.109
for FY 26 and 27 are essential to

15:03.109 --> 15:04.998
accelerate the completion of this

15:04.998 --> 15:06.942
modern headquarters and ensure our

15:06.942 --> 15:09.070
uninterrupted readiness . With the

15:09.070 --> 15:11.014
continued support of Congress , US

15:11.014 --> 15:13.126
Space Command will remain prepared to

15:13.126 --> 15:15.348
address the evolving threat landscape .

15:15.348 --> 15:17.403
Deter aggression , counter adversary

15:17.403 --> 15:19.292
actions , and safeguard America's

15:19.292 --> 15:21.126
interests in space today and for

15:21.126 --> 15:23.014
generations to come . Armed armed

15:23.014 --> 15:25.126
conflict in space is not inevitable ,

15:25.126 --> 15:26.959
but should deterrence fail , the

15:26.959 --> 15:29.181
integrated space power of our team will

15:29.181 --> 15:31.514
provide a decisive advantage . Chairman ,

15:31.514 --> 15:33.626
my posture statement is submitted for

15:33.626 --> 15:33.429
the record , and I look forward to

15:33.429 --> 15:35.596
answering your questions . Thank you .

15:35.596 --> 15:38.169
And yes , you are going to need . Um ,

15:38.260 --> 15:41.780
the continued engagement , um , and

15:41.780 --> 15:43.947
doubling of effort from the Congress .

15:44.539 --> 15:46.706
Thank you for your statement , Admiral

15:46.706 --> 15:49.450
Correll . You are recognized . Good

15:49.450 --> 15:51.450
morning , Chairman Wicker , Ranking

15:51.450 --> 15:53.672
Member Reed , and distinguished members

15:53.672 --> 15:55.672
of the committee . Command Sergeant

15:55.672 --> 15:57.617
Major Naumann and I are honored to

15:57.617 --> 15:59.728
appear before you today alongside our

15:59.728 --> 16:01.839
teammates , General Whiting and Chief

16:01.839 --> 16:03.672
Master Sergeant Simmons . It's a

16:03.672 --> 16:05.728
privilege to represent the dedicated

16:05.728 --> 16:07.672
men and women of the United States

16:07.672 --> 16:09.728
Strategic Command and to discuss the

16:09.728 --> 16:11.839
critical role we play in safeguarding

16:11.839 --> 16:14.020
our nation's security . I'd like to

16:14.020 --> 16:16.131
begin by taking a moment to honor our

16:16.131 --> 16:19.599
fallen US service members . The Joint

16:19.599 --> 16:21.655
Force is eternally grateful to those

16:21.655 --> 16:23.766
that have paid the ultimate sacrifice

16:23.766 --> 16:25.599
and service of our country . Our

16:25.599 --> 16:27.766
thoughts and prayers remain with their

16:27.766 --> 16:29.988
families , and their legacy inspires us

16:29.988 --> 16:32.210
to continue our mission with unwavering

16:32.210 --> 16:34.000
resolve . This is my first time

16:34.000 --> 16:36.167
addressing this committee as commander

16:36.167 --> 16:38.389
of US Strategic Command , and I want to

16:38.389 --> 16:40.500
express my sincere gratitude for this

16:40.500 --> 16:42.989
committee's steadfast support . Your

16:42.989 --> 16:45.229
commitment to providing the resources

16:45.229 --> 16:47.451
necessary for us to execute our mission

16:47.630 --> 16:50.030
during this bi-generational period of

16:50.030 --> 16:52.280
modernization and recapitalization is

16:52.280 --> 16:55.309
deeply appreciated . I also extend my

16:55.309 --> 16:57.642
heartfelt thanks to the American people .

16:57.750 --> 17:00.030
Their unwavering support helps us to

17:00.030 --> 17:02.510
remain the most advanced , lethal , and

17:02.510 --> 17:04.677
credible fighting force in the world .

17:04.677 --> 17:06.829
It is their trust and confidence that

17:06.829 --> 17:08.996
drive us to excel in our mission every

17:08.996 --> 17:12.410
day . Our nation's nuclear forces , the

17:12.410 --> 17:14.521
foundation of our national security ,

17:14.530 --> 17:17.930
are safe , secure , effective , and

17:17.930 --> 17:20.369
credible . My confidence in this

17:20.369 --> 17:22.480
assessment is not based solely on our

17:22.480 --> 17:24.598
combat capability , but rather on the

17:24.598 --> 17:27.009
extraordinary professionals at US

17:27.009 --> 17:29.120
Strategic Command . They are the very

17:29.120 --> 17:31.920
essence of our credibility . And their

17:31.920 --> 17:34.829
expertise and dedication ensure that we

17:34.839 --> 17:37.000
remain ready to deter aggression and

17:37.000 --> 17:40.180
respond decisively when directed . As I

17:40.180 --> 17:42.219
testified before you today , Strat

17:42.219 --> 17:44.859
Common and its components stand ready ,

17:45.020 --> 17:47.300
not seeking out confrontation , but

17:47.300 --> 17:49.380
deterring strategic attack and

17:49.380 --> 17:51.819
underpinning all Department of War

17:51.819 --> 17:53.989
operational plans . The strategic

17:53.989 --> 17:56.045
capabilities provided by each leg of

17:56.045 --> 17:57.910
the triad , coupled with assured

17:57.910 --> 17:59.688
nuclear command , control , and

17:59.688 --> 18:02.609
communications , or NC3 systems

18:02.949 --> 18:05.229
underpin everything the department does

18:05.229 --> 18:07.340
in defense of our nation and American

18:07.340 --> 18:09.285
interests abroad . Our fundamental

18:09.285 --> 18:11.630
challenge , one that we successfully

18:11.630 --> 18:14.630
face each and every day , is to deter

18:14.630 --> 18:17.229
great power conflict and manage the

18:17.229 --> 18:19.430
complexities of deterring multiple

18:19.430 --> 18:22.229
nuclear competitors simultaneously .

18:22.780 --> 18:25.140
All while adapting to rapid

18:25.140 --> 18:28.089
technological change and advancements .

18:28.839 --> 18:31.160
This change is most evident in 5

18:31.160 --> 18:33.770
evolving threat vectors cyber .

18:34.680 --> 18:36.790
Counter US space capabilities , in

18:36.790 --> 18:39.012
other words , what can the adversary do

18:39.012 --> 18:41.012
to us in space to challenge what we

18:41.012 --> 18:43.290
deliver from space for the joint force ,

18:43.589 --> 18:45.756
a contested electromagnetic spectrum ,

18:46.390 --> 18:48.349
novel missile systems , and supply

18:48.349 --> 18:51.109
chain challenges . Adapting to today's

18:51.109 --> 18:53.220
strategic landscape demands sustained

18:53.220 --> 18:55.800
focus , vigilance , and modernization

18:55.800 --> 18:58.439
of our strategic forces . As we bring

18:58.439 --> 19:00.959
the B-21 bomber , the Columbia class

19:00.959 --> 19:02.800
submarine , and the Sentinel

19:02.800 --> 19:04.744
intercontinental ballistic missile

19:04.744 --> 19:06.689
system online , we will ensure the

19:06.689 --> 19:08.522
credibility of our deterrent for

19:08.522 --> 19:11.199
decades to come . Thank you once again

19:11.199 --> 19:13.088
for your support and trust in the

19:13.088 --> 19:15.421
soldiers , sailors , airmen , guardians ,

19:15.421 --> 19:17.421
and civilian , marines and civilian

19:17.421 --> 19:19.643
professionals who comprise US Strategic

19:19.643 --> 19:22.739
Command and for dedicating your time

19:22.739 --> 19:26.030
and effort to our mission and portfolio .

19:26.270 --> 19:28.492
I look forward to your questions . Uh ,

19:28.599 --> 19:31.250
thank you , Admiral Correll , um .

19:32.619 --> 19:35.119
It's gonna take uh quite a bit of

19:35.619 --> 19:38.859
resources , um , quite a plus up of

19:38.859 --> 19:41.420
resources to um .

19:42.609 --> 19:44.729
Make good on the last statement you

19:44.729 --> 19:47.560
made . About um

19:49.180 --> 19:51.124
Putting us where we need to be for

19:51.124 --> 19:53.347
decades to come . Can you comment about

19:53.347 --> 19:56.939
that ? Senator , I pay very close

19:56.939 --> 20:00.780
attention to the uh

20:01.099 --> 20:03.500
the ability to sustain all three legs

20:03.500 --> 20:06.839
of the triad and bridge to the next

20:06.839 --> 20:09.540
generation of capability . Uh , this

20:09.540 --> 20:11.959
committee and the legislator , uh ,

20:12.099 --> 20:15.479
legislature have been very supportive

20:15.790 --> 20:19.619
in providing funding to bring those new

20:19.619 --> 20:22.260
capabilities online and sustain the

20:22.260 --> 20:25.569
existing capabilities , um . That will

20:25.569 --> 20:27.890
be , as you said , Senator , that will

20:27.890 --> 20:31.650
be for the next 15 years , uh , that

20:31.650 --> 20:33.872
transition , and we'll need to continue

20:33.872 --> 20:35.983
to pay very close attention to that ,

20:36.250 --> 20:39.650
uh , in terms of the , uh , we pay

20:39.650 --> 20:41.539
close attention , that's going to

20:41.539 --> 20:43.650
require a great deal more resources ,

20:43.650 --> 20:46.510
is it not ? The resources are going to

20:46.510 --> 20:49.579
be approximately 5% of the defense

20:49.579 --> 20:53.390
budget to sustain existing capability

20:53.390 --> 20:55.989
and bridge to the new capability , and

20:55.989 --> 20:57.600
I would offer that that's an

20:57.600 --> 20:59.656
existential insurance policy for our

20:59.656 --> 21:03.630
country and and a good value

21:03.630 --> 21:06.040
proposition for our nation . And again ,

21:06.079 --> 21:08.246
I appreciate the committee's support .

21:08.246 --> 21:10.520
Yeah , absolutely , a required

21:10.520 --> 21:13.560
insurance policy . You know , it , it

21:13.560 --> 21:15.671
certainly is obvious that both of you

21:15.671 --> 21:18.560
are in this together , and we had some

21:18.560 --> 21:20.979
testimony about

21:22.310 --> 21:26.250
A nuclear armed space .

21:26.989 --> 21:30.510
Um , how close is , is anyone

21:30.930 --> 21:33.041
to getting to that ? I'll , I'll stay

21:33.041 --> 21:35.152
with you , Admiral Correll , and then

21:35.152 --> 21:36.874
move over to General Whiting .

21:39.900 --> 21:42.959
Russia has indicated and has been

21:42.959 --> 21:46.910
publicly acknowledged that

21:46.920 --> 21:50.660
they're working on a nuclear capability

21:51.760 --> 21:54.280
that could be placed in space . What's

21:54.280 --> 21:56.613
your estimate of how soon that might be ?

21:58.579 --> 22:00.579
With respect , I'd prefer to answer

22:00.579 --> 22:03.339
that in a closed testimony session . It

22:03.339 --> 22:06.810
would amount to a major game changer ,

22:07.060 --> 22:09.338
would it not ? Very , very significant ,

22:09.338 --> 22:11.171
and we have to , uh , we have to

22:11.171 --> 22:12.893
account for it in terms of the

22:12.893 --> 22:15.004
architecture that we have and what we

22:15.004 --> 22:17.171
can do about it , and the department's

22:17.171 --> 22:19.338
very focused on that . We do have some

22:19.338 --> 22:21.504
options , General Whiting . We will be

22:21.504 --> 22:24.949
in a closed session . Down in the skiff ,

22:25.060 --> 22:27.004
but what can you tell the American

22:27.004 --> 22:29.004
public in answer to my question ? I

22:29.004 --> 22:31.116
associate myself with Admiral Krall's

22:31.116 --> 22:33.171
comments , Chairman . You know , the

22:33.171 --> 22:36.430
reports are that Russia has developed a

22:36.430 --> 22:38.652
nuclear anti-satellite weapon that they

22:38.652 --> 22:40.874
could potentially place on orbit . They

22:40.874 --> 22:43.041
have not done that today . If they did

22:43.041 --> 22:45.729
that , that would be an indiscriminate .

22:45.969 --> 22:49.449
Weapon that if detonated on orbit would

22:49.449 --> 22:51.227
immediately place at risk every

22:51.227 --> 22:53.227
country's space capabilities in low

22:53.227 --> 22:55.890
Earth orbit the United States , China ,

22:56.089 --> 22:58.311
Russia , Japan , Europe , you name it .

22:58.311 --> 23:00.311
And so that would violate the Outer

23:00.311 --> 23:02.089
Space Treaty and would not be a

23:02.089 --> 23:04.089
development obviously that we could

23:04.089 --> 23:06.200
tolerate . Uh , um , and then tell us

23:06.200 --> 23:09.849
about , um , this debris that , uh ,

23:09.900 --> 23:13.329
was caused by the destruction . Of

23:14.250 --> 23:16.530
one of the satellites or one or more of

23:16.530 --> 23:18.660
the satellites , Chairman , in early

23:18.660 --> 23:22.050
2007 , China executed a hit to kill

23:22.050 --> 23:24.729
anti-satellite weapons test against one

23:24.729 --> 23:26.896
of their own defunct satellites . They

23:26.896 --> 23:29.118
did it at a relatively high altitude in

23:29.118 --> 23:31.229
low Earth orbit , and it created over

23:31.229 --> 23:33.609
33,600 pieces of long-lived debris that

23:33.609 --> 23:36.930
we still have to deal with today . And

23:36.930 --> 23:40.439
then in November of 2021 ,

23:40.650 --> 23:43.729
Russia executed a hit to kill ASAT test

23:43.729 --> 23:45.840
against one of their satellites , and

23:45.840 --> 23:47.840
that was about 3 months before they

23:47.840 --> 23:49.896
invaded Ukraine , which seemed to be

23:49.896 --> 23:51.785
they were sending a signal to the

23:51.785 --> 23:54.007
United States and to the West that they

23:54.007 --> 23:53.819
could hold our satellites at risk , and

23:53.819 --> 23:55.880
that created about 5 . 00 pieces of

23:55.880 --> 23:58.047
debris that we had to deal with at the

23:58.047 --> 24:00.213
time that even caused their cosmonauts

24:00.213 --> 24:02.047
on board the International Space

24:02.047 --> 24:04.269
Station to have to take shelter because

24:04.269 --> 24:06.380
of a potential collision between that

24:06.380 --> 24:08.324
debris and the International Space

24:08.324 --> 24:10.213
Station . Fortunately that didn't

24:10.213 --> 24:12.213
happen , but it was a reckless test

24:12.213 --> 24:14.158
nonetheless . It's been almost two

24:14.158 --> 24:16.324
decades since China did this , right ?

24:16.324 --> 24:18.380
That's correct , Senator . And , and

24:18.380 --> 24:20.602
more recently for Russia . Do you think

24:20.602 --> 24:23.300
China Realize that they should never do

24:23.300 --> 24:25.467
this again , or do you think it's just

24:25.467 --> 24:28.380
a matter of time ? I think the fact

24:28.380 --> 24:31.739
that they have not reconducted a

24:31.739 --> 24:34.660
similar test indicates that they

24:34.660 --> 24:36.900
realize that they made a mistake at the

24:36.900 --> 24:38.956
way in which they executed that test

24:38.956 --> 24:40.956
and the fact that we and they still

24:40.956 --> 24:43.122
have to deal with that debris . I hope

24:43.122 --> 24:45.344
that's the case , and we would not want

24:45.344 --> 24:45.099
to see a similar test like that happen .

24:45.339 --> 24:48.449
And when we deal with debris . Uh , you

24:48.449 --> 24:51.319
said we have to deal with it . Uh , um ,

24:51.780 --> 24:54.002
are , are we , uh , removing some of it

24:54.002 --> 24:56.113
somehow or are we just having to deal

24:56.113 --> 24:58.280
with it by avoiding it , Chairman , we

24:58.280 --> 25:00.447
do not have any way to remove it today

25:00.447 --> 25:02.280
other than just to allow natural

25:02.280 --> 25:04.113
gravity to pull it back into the

25:04.113 --> 25:04.005
Earth's atmosphere , but . Depending on

25:04.005 --> 25:06.227
the altitude that can take decades . So

25:06.227 --> 25:08.338
today we track it and then we provide

25:08.338 --> 25:10.805
warnings out to all , all satellite

25:10.805 --> 25:12.805
owner operators around the world so

25:12.805 --> 25:14.805
that they can maneuver their active

25:14.805 --> 25:16.805
satellites away from that debris if

25:16.805 --> 25:18.916
they're able to do that . Thank you ,

25:18.916 --> 25:21.249
Senator Reid . Thank you very much , Mr .

25:21.249 --> 25:23.844
Chairman . Admiral Correll , from a

25:23.844 --> 25:27.260
cost benefit perspective . Including

25:27.260 --> 25:29.739
not just monetary costs , but political

25:29.739 --> 25:32.260
cost . Do you see a military need right

25:32.260 --> 25:34.219
now for nuclear weapons testing ?

25:37.329 --> 25:39.410
Senator , the Department of Energy

25:39.410 --> 25:43.410
determines the need for nuclear warhead

25:43.410 --> 25:46.150
testing . The department does a variety

25:46.150 --> 25:48.569
of tests with our launchers and missile

25:48.569 --> 25:51.849
systems to validate the performance of

25:51.849 --> 25:54.369
those systems , and uh , I would

25:54.369 --> 25:56.591
associate myself with the comments from

25:56.591 --> 25:59.109
the Department of Energy with respect

25:59.109 --> 26:00.998
to , uh , with respect to nuclear

26:00.998 --> 26:04.930
warhead testing . Uh , can you update

26:04.930 --> 26:06.930
us on the current comments from the

26:06.930 --> 26:08.708
Department of Energy ? From the

26:08.708 --> 26:10.763
Department of Energy , yes , are you

26:10.763 --> 26:12.986
aware if they're taking a position that

26:12.986 --> 26:15.097
they have to test or that they're not

26:15.097 --> 26:16.930
testing ? That they have taken a

26:16.930 --> 26:19.097
position . I'm sorry , they have taken

26:19.097 --> 26:21.152
any type of position with respect to

26:21.152 --> 26:23.152
testing , i.e. , no further testing

26:23.152 --> 26:25.369
necessary . We must test , etc . On an

26:25.380 --> 26:28.390
annual basis , uh , I , uh , I am

26:28.390 --> 26:31.949
obligated to , um , review , um , a

26:31.949 --> 26:34.430
letter , um , and it's a joint letter

26:34.430 --> 26:36.486
between the Department of Energy and

26:36.486 --> 26:38.597
Department of Defense that looks hard

26:38.597 --> 26:41.189
at whether or not we need to do

26:41.189 --> 26:43.670
anything more in terms of nuclear

26:43.670 --> 26:47.130
warhead testing and in that most recent

26:47.130 --> 26:50.420
letter . They came forward to Congress ,

26:50.469 --> 26:53.339
it indicated we have the capabilities

26:53.339 --> 26:56.829
and sufficient testing to satisfy

26:57.619 --> 26:59.452
ourselves on the reliability and

26:59.452 --> 27:01.709
efficacy of our nuclear warheads , but

27:01.709 --> 27:04.670
we monitor that very closely , um , and

27:04.670 --> 27:06.503
I'll continue to provide my best

27:06.503 --> 27:09.010
military advice . What I would say is

27:09.270 --> 27:11.492
we would want to be in a position where

27:11.492 --> 27:15.189
if we needed to resume some kind of

27:15.189 --> 27:18.260
testing . That um that we had thought

27:18.260 --> 27:20.427
through that and have the and have the

27:20.427 --> 27:23.439
capabilities and then , um , you know ,

27:23.800 --> 27:27.280
to deter other nations

27:27.540 --> 27:31.540
from resuming or doing any

27:31.540 --> 27:35.180
kind of nuclear yield testing and those

27:35.180 --> 27:37.689
nations are signatory to a treaty that

27:37.689 --> 27:39.800
obligates them not to do that . Thank

27:39.800 --> 27:42.109
you , sir . General Whiting , uh ,

27:42.380 --> 27:45.060
you've stated very .

27:45.689 --> 27:48.010
Precisely that the opening stages of

27:48.010 --> 27:50.530
recent operations stressed the reliance

27:50.530 --> 27:53.050
on space-based command and control . I

27:53.050 --> 27:55.349
mean that's And that's gonna be the

27:55.349 --> 27:58.069
first sort of area of conflict in any

27:58.069 --> 28:01.750
major conflagration . Uh , are

28:01.750 --> 28:03.639
you concerned regarding the , the

28:03.639 --> 28:05.472
vulnerability of our space space

28:05.472 --> 28:09.150
command and control at this point ? Sir ,

28:09.310 --> 28:11.532
today we , our command and control does

28:11.532 --> 28:13.643
rely on a number of systems , some of

28:13.643 --> 28:15.810
which are legacy and were built before

28:15.810 --> 28:17.754
the era we find ourselves in today

28:17.754 --> 28:19.310
where they face a number of

28:19.310 --> 28:21.477
ground-based and space-based threats .

28:21.477 --> 28:23.532
And so we have to figure out ways to

28:23.532 --> 28:25.800
continue to defend those capabilities

28:25.800 --> 28:27.800
while they are modernized . We do .

28:27.800 --> 28:29.800
Have some new capabilities that are

28:29.800 --> 28:31.411
starting to arrive , such as

28:31.411 --> 28:33.022
proliferated low Earth orbit

28:33.022 --> 28:35.189
constellations , and that has added to

28:35.189 --> 28:37.244
our resiliency . So I think we're on

28:37.244 --> 28:39.467
the right path . We continue to need to

28:39.467 --> 28:41.356
execute on the programs that will

28:41.356 --> 28:43.578
continue to make us even more resilient

28:43.578 --> 28:45.744
going forward . Thank you . A question

28:45.744 --> 28:47.849
for both of you . The nation's

28:47.849 --> 28:50.410
principal text range , which both of

28:50.410 --> 28:53.609
you use is at Quin and

28:54.050 --> 28:56.589
ICBM range also space surveillance .

29:00.010 --> 29:01.954
I'm told that the condition of the

29:01.954 --> 29:04.489
infrastructure there is very much

29:04.810 --> 29:07.319
deteriorated . Uh , can each of you

29:07.319 --> 29:09.375
describe the importance of the range

29:09.375 --> 29:11.486
and your observation on its condition

29:11.486 --> 29:13.708
and what we have to do ? That this is a

29:13.708 --> 29:15.541
topic that is often overlooked .

29:15.650 --> 29:17.594
Senator , I , I have visited Kwadj

29:17.594 --> 29:20.280
Natoll , and it's a very important

29:20.280 --> 29:22.613
location for the United States military ,

29:22.613 --> 29:24.724
and as you indicate , it's a location

29:24.724 --> 29:26.836
from which we execute important space

29:26.836 --> 29:29.058
domain awareness operations , uh , both

29:29.058 --> 29:31.280
under the United States Space Force and

29:31.280 --> 29:33.336
the United States Army . Um , also ,

29:33.336 --> 29:35.558
unique , missile defense testing , uh ,

29:35.558 --> 29:37.558
can occur there as well . So from a

29:37.558 --> 29:39.447
Space command perspective , it is

29:39.447 --> 29:39.040
definitely a location that we want to

29:39.040 --> 29:41.207
see continued investment in so that we

29:41.207 --> 29:43.373
can continue to sustain the operations

29:43.479 --> 29:45.646
that are there , and , and I routinely

29:45.646 --> 29:47.868
have engagements with the United States

29:47.868 --> 29:49.646
Army to help them understand my

29:49.646 --> 29:51.923
requirements there . Admiral . I would ,

29:51.923 --> 29:54.589
uh , wholeheartedly agree with John

29:54.589 --> 29:56.756
Whiting's comments with respect to the

29:56.756 --> 30:00.119
importance of Quadrule , a toll . With

30:00.119 --> 30:02.790
respect to StratCom's portfolio , the

30:02.790 --> 30:06.040
Air Force uses that facility to test

30:06.040 --> 30:08.207
our intercontinental ballistic missile

30:08.207 --> 30:10.439
and validate that it performs end to

30:10.439 --> 30:12.661
end the way we expect it to do , and we

30:12.661 --> 30:15.760
conduct 3 to 4 tests a year , uh , and

30:15.760 --> 30:17.982
we use that range for those tests , and

30:17.982 --> 30:19.871
they provide incredibly important

30:20.709 --> 30:23.839
feedback on the accuracy and efficacy

30:23.839 --> 30:26.520
of the system . So , uh , we need to

30:26.520 --> 30:29.359
sustain it and , um , and . Um ,

30:30.109 --> 30:31.998
wholeheartedly support additional

30:31.998 --> 30:34.053
investments , and I would agree that

30:34.053 --> 30:36.165
there are challenges there with the ,

30:36.165 --> 30:38.276
with the infrastructure , and we need

30:38.276 --> 30:40.498
to pay very close attention to it . And

30:40.498 --> 30:42.665
then the other comment I would make um

30:42.665 --> 30:45.660
relative to capabilities and insights

30:45.660 --> 30:47.885
into . Testing you mentioned it in your

30:47.885 --> 30:49.663
opening remarks , Senator , the

30:49.663 --> 30:52.135
National Ignition Facility . That's a

30:52.135 --> 30:54.191
really , really important capability

30:54.191 --> 30:58.035
for our nation in terms of validating

30:58.255 --> 31:01.094
the efficacy of our stockpile . Thank

31:01.094 --> 31:03.316
you very much , gentlemen . Thank you ,

31:03.316 --> 31:05.189
ma'am . Thank you Senator Reed .

31:05.469 --> 31:08.430
Admiral , welcome . I've , uh , really

31:08.430 --> 31:10.486
appreciated our conversations on the

31:10.486 --> 31:13.150
need for a nuclear force posture that's

31:13.150 --> 31:16.329
relevant to our expected threat

31:16.329 --> 31:18.989
environment . Holding on to a force

31:18.989 --> 31:22.170
structure that was decided 16 years ago

31:22.310 --> 31:24.949
that was based on flawed assumptions is

31:24.949 --> 31:28.189
irresponsible . And risks eroding the

31:28.359 --> 31:31.040
the credibility of our nuclear

31:31.040 --> 31:33.439
deterrent . For example , the program

31:33.439 --> 31:36.839
of record for at least 100 B-21 bombers

31:36.839 --> 31:39.839
no longer appears to be sufficient . Do

31:39.839 --> 31:42.040
you still agree with your predecessor

31:42.040 --> 31:45.719
that we need to procure at least 145

31:45.719 --> 31:48.729
B-21s ? Yes , Senator ,

31:49.489 --> 31:53.410
I fully support 145 to meet StratCom's

31:53.410 --> 31:55.410
requirements , and it may be higher

31:55.410 --> 31:57.410
than that for the joint force , but

31:57.410 --> 32:00.300
through the Stratcom lens , 145 . And

32:00.300 --> 32:01.856
I've been encouraged by the

32:01.856 --> 32:04.699
department's strategy to consolidate

32:04.699 --> 32:08.260
acquisition authorities into a single

32:08.260 --> 32:11.979
diploom for the Centinel program and

32:11.979 --> 32:14.199
how are you working with General White

32:14.500 --> 32:16.699
to ensure that the program is meeting

32:16.699 --> 32:20.319
your requirements ? Uh , as you

32:20.319 --> 32:22.263
mentioned , Senator , uh , General

32:22.263 --> 32:24.239
White is a direct report portfolio

32:24.239 --> 32:26.520
manager reporting directly to Deputy

32:26.520 --> 32:29.239
Secretary Feinberg , uh , and I would

32:29.239 --> 32:31.680
say that is a very tight linkage that

32:31.680 --> 32:34.439
he's reporting , uh , if not , uh , at

32:34.439 --> 32:36.839
least once a week to twice a week in

32:36.839 --> 32:38.880
terms of , uh , collaboration ,

32:39.040 --> 32:41.319
coordination , and common understanding

32:41.520 --> 32:44.310
of where we stand with , uh , the

32:44.310 --> 32:47.040
Sentinel program . General White and

32:47.040 --> 32:49.207
myself and my component . Commander at

32:49.207 --> 32:52.214
Air Force Global strike talk at least

32:52.214 --> 32:55.645
once a week and , and discuss where we

32:55.645 --> 32:57.905
stand with respect to Sentinel , uh ,

32:58.015 --> 33:01.155
what the next milestone is , and , um ,

33:01.165 --> 33:03.498
and any challenges associated with that .

33:03.694 --> 33:06.415
And what I've seen since General White

33:06.415 --> 33:09.305
has taken the position as the dirt bomb

33:09.994 --> 33:12.694
is key milestones being pulled to the

33:12.694 --> 33:16.275
left and two that I would highlight is

33:16.979 --> 33:19.579
The milestone B certification that's

33:19.579 --> 33:21.746
required as a result of the Nama Kurdi

33:21.746 --> 33:23.635
breach , um , previously that was

33:23.635 --> 33:26.660
indicated to occur sometime in 2027 .

33:26.739 --> 33:28.850
He's now indicated that it will occur

33:28.850 --> 33:31.800
before the end of uh calendar year 2026

33:32.060 --> 33:34.459
and then first launch from uh from

33:34.459 --> 33:37.300
Vandenberg of the missile itself is

33:37.300 --> 33:40.219
expected in 2027 and that's also pulled

33:40.219 --> 33:43.609
to the left . So , um , it's a , it's a

33:43.609 --> 33:47.130
good mechanism . To , uh , to lay flat

33:47.130 --> 33:49.241
the understanding of , uh , where the

33:49.241 --> 33:51.770
challenges are going forward , we also

33:51.770 --> 33:53.881
need to , uh , ensure that the Men of

33:53.881 --> 33:56.650
Men 3 is going to remain , uh ,

33:56.770 --> 33:59.569
credible , safe , efficient , and

33:59.569 --> 34:03.250
effective . So what steps are you

34:03.250 --> 34:05.890
taking to make sure that that happens

34:05.890 --> 34:07.279
until Sentinel's ready ?

34:08.729 --> 34:11.050
Overcommunicating with stakeholders on

34:11.050 --> 34:13.689
any challenges as they as they occur ,

34:13.939 --> 34:17.419
and I see my responsibility to the

34:17.419 --> 34:20.820
department to to pay very close

34:20.820 --> 34:23.780
attention to sustainment where

34:23.780 --> 34:25.836
challenges might manifest themselves

34:25.836 --> 34:27.520
and then articulate how we're

34:27.520 --> 34:29.409
addressing those challenges or if

34:29.409 --> 34:31.580
there's any additional resources or

34:31.580 --> 34:33.524
assistance needed to address those

34:33.524 --> 34:35.747
challenges . Since , since you've taken

34:35.747 --> 34:39.060
command , um , do you Do you see any

34:39.060 --> 34:41.340
opportunities out there to be able to

34:41.340 --> 34:44.139
strengthen the work that we're , we

34:44.139 --> 34:46.659
need to see on NC3 modernization ?

34:48.800 --> 34:50.856
I , I would say that we're on a good

34:50.856 --> 34:52.989
trajectory with NC3 modernization .

34:53.360 --> 34:55.527
We've developed an analytic model that

34:55.527 --> 34:57.582
addresses the threats , those threat

34:57.582 --> 34:59.550
vectors that I talked about . To

34:59.550 --> 35:01.772
provide decision quality information to

35:01.772 --> 35:04.429
the department on future capability

35:04.429 --> 35:06.629
investments . One area I would

35:06.629 --> 35:08.573
highlight that's been a particular

35:08.573 --> 35:11.389
instance and very strong support from

35:11.389 --> 35:13.389
the department and other supporting

35:13.389 --> 35:15.310
agencies is cyber , and , and you

35:15.310 --> 35:17.532
notice that I listed that as the number

35:17.532 --> 35:19.699
one threat vector , and that was , you

35:19.699 --> 35:21.699
know , purposeful . Do you see some

35:21.699 --> 35:23.810
opportunities to be able to work with

35:23.810 --> 35:27.540
the private sector , um . As ,

35:27.659 --> 35:30.340
as , uh , with respect to being able to

35:30.340 --> 35:33.449
leverage , uh , their , uh , merging

35:33.449 --> 35:36.139
technologies that that they have as

35:36.139 --> 35:38.306
well , will Stratcom look at that , or

35:38.306 --> 35:40.659
are you already doing that ? We , we

35:40.659 --> 35:42.492
look at that and we look at that

35:42.492 --> 35:45.290
through uh what we refer to as the

35:45.290 --> 35:47.800
reach facility . It's an arrangement

35:47.800 --> 35:50.639
with , uh , that's associated with the

35:50.659 --> 35:54.300
University of Nebraska . And it's a ,

35:54.389 --> 35:57.229
it's an opportunity , it's a mechanism

35:57.229 --> 35:59.270
for the command to bring in smaller

35:59.270 --> 36:02.229
companies , look at new technology and

36:02.229 --> 36:05.479
how that might . be employed as we look

36:05.479 --> 36:07.646
at future capabilities and that's both

36:07.646 --> 36:10.199
for NC3 and for electromagnetic

36:10.199 --> 36:12.639
spectrum capabilities . Thank you and

36:12.639 --> 36:14.959
General Whiting , I have a question for

36:14.959 --> 36:17.679
you for the record about working with

36:17.679 --> 36:21.639
our NATO allies on capabilities ,

36:21.649 --> 36:23.760
being able to integrate with them as

36:23.760 --> 36:26.629
well . So thank you . Senator Shaheen ,

36:26.679 --> 36:29.000
you are recognized . Thank you , Madam

36:29.000 --> 36:31.969
Chair , um . Thank you both for being

36:31.969 --> 36:34.709
here and for your service . I , I want

36:34.709 --> 36:38.510
to start with the Iran war because we

36:38.510 --> 36:40.621
have seen that the Iranians have been

36:40.621 --> 36:43.070
targeting our satellites , our radars ,

36:43.149 --> 36:45.489
our communications capabilities there .

36:45.989 --> 36:48.550
Um , we've also seen reports that they

36:48.550 --> 36:51.679
are considering . strikes , cyber

36:51.679 --> 36:53.735
strikes in the United States against

36:53.735 --> 36:55.679
our systems , and we saw that they

36:55.679 --> 36:59.139
hacked Stryker Medical earlier this

36:59.139 --> 37:03.110
month that blocked some of the

37:03.110 --> 37:05.419
data was completely deleted and others

37:06.120 --> 37:09.439
was blocked . So General Whiting , are

37:09.439 --> 37:11.919
you concerned about Iranian-backed

37:11.919 --> 37:14.580
hacker groups who could be targeting

37:15.239 --> 37:17.072
our satellites , cutting off our

37:17.072 --> 37:20.949
communications . Trying to hack into

37:20.949 --> 37:24.929
our radar capabilities . Senator , we

37:24.929 --> 37:27.010
are as concerned about cyber

37:27.010 --> 37:29.010
generically as , as Admiral Correll

37:29.010 --> 37:30.788
mentioned because it's the soft

37:30.788 --> 37:32.843
underbelly of our space enterprise .

37:32.843 --> 37:34.899
There are countries , not Iran , but

37:34.899 --> 37:36.899
countries like Russia and China who

37:36.899 --> 37:39.066
have demonstrated they could attack us

37:39.066 --> 37:40.969
in space with ASAPT weapons or

37:40.969 --> 37:43.600
co-orbital satellites , um , but they

37:43.600 --> 37:45.822
would rather attack us in cyber because

37:45.822 --> 37:48.044
it's cheaper for them and harder for us

37:48.044 --> 37:50.211
to . So I believe the defenses that we

37:50.211 --> 37:52.433
have put in place for our cyber against

37:52.433 --> 37:55.645
those kind of threats are , are up to

37:55.645 --> 37:57.975
the challenge of an Iranian cyber

37:57.975 --> 38:00.274
attack , but it's not something that we

38:00.274 --> 38:02.385
ever rest on our laurels . We have to

38:02.385 --> 38:04.496
be very vigilant to make sure that we

38:04.496 --> 38:06.496
understand what their intent is and

38:06.496 --> 38:08.496
what their capability is , and then

38:08.496 --> 38:10.718
modify our defenses accordingly . And ,

38:10.770 --> 38:13.129
and do you , do you feel that same

38:13.129 --> 38:15.560
sense of assurance about the private

38:15.560 --> 38:17.560
sector and the threat that they are

38:17.560 --> 38:20.270
also could be facing from Iran ? Um ,

38:20.989 --> 38:23.156
well , ma'am , I think with the , uh ,

38:23.156 --> 38:25.267
the situation that you noted that was

38:25.267 --> 38:27.489
in the press here in the last couple of

38:27.489 --> 38:26.739
weeks , I think , uh , there probably

38:26.739 --> 38:28.850
are vulnerabilities there that , uh ,

38:28.850 --> 38:30.906
that a nation like , uh , Iran could

38:30.906 --> 38:33.600
seek to exploit . Thank you . Admiral

38:33.600 --> 38:35.378
Correll , are you , do you have

38:35.378 --> 38:37.544
anything to add to that ? Uh , I agree

38:37.544 --> 38:39.767
with General Whiting's characterization

38:39.767 --> 38:41.933
of that , and , um , you know , it's ,

38:41.933 --> 38:43.679
uh , having the , uh , sensing

38:43.679 --> 38:46.520
capability to understand when there's a

38:46.520 --> 38:48.889
sophisticated operator on the network

38:49.199 --> 38:52.850
that causes traffic patterns to , uh ,

38:52.860 --> 38:55.179
to adjust , a really sophisticated

38:55.360 --> 38:57.860
actor . We need that sensing capability

38:57.860 --> 38:59.804
and then the ability to vector the

38:59.804 --> 39:01.693
right subject matter expertise to

39:01.693 --> 39:04.639
address it where we see it . Um , uh ,

39:04.729 --> 39:06.951
this question is also for you , Admiral

39:06.951 --> 39:09.118
Correll , because it was reported last

39:09.118 --> 39:11.649
year that the Trump administration is

39:11.649 --> 39:13.538
considering making changes to the

39:13.538 --> 39:15.929
unified command plan that would , um ,

39:16.250 --> 39:18.250
hand over US command and control of

39:18.250 --> 39:20.770
nuclear weapons to the purview of the

39:20.770 --> 39:23.709
Supreme Allied Commander of NATO . Um ,

39:24.209 --> 39:27.030
I I know you don't want to comment on

39:27.209 --> 39:29.689
the policy there , but can you comment

39:29.689 --> 39:32.770
on how you view US command and control

39:32.770 --> 39:34.714
over nuclear weapons in a scenario

39:34.714 --> 39:36.326
where Article 5 is invoked ?

39:39.600 --> 39:42.550
Senator , I would say that uh the

39:42.550 --> 39:44.439
arrangement that we have with the

39:44.439 --> 39:48.330
Supreme Allied Commander uh is uh

39:48.639 --> 39:52.639
a uh a mechanism that has been in place

39:52.639 --> 39:55.969
for many years , uh , that uh

39:55.969 --> 39:58.959
functions appropriately for uh its

39:58.959 --> 40:02.199
intent , and , um , I've had no

40:02.199 --> 40:04.879
discussions within the department about

40:04.879 --> 40:07.389
adjustments , uh , to , uh , to that

40:07.389 --> 40:09.850
arrangement . And um should I be asked

40:09.850 --> 40:12.129
to , I'd provide my , my best advice

40:12.129 --> 40:15.580
with respect to that . Thank you . Um ,

40:16.449 --> 40:19.290
we have heard since the start of this

40:19.290 --> 40:21.350
war in Iran and actually even before

40:21.350 --> 40:24.169
that a number of our security partners

40:24.169 --> 40:26.649
have publicly questioned whether they

40:26.649 --> 40:28.705
should have their own nuclear weapon

40:28.705 --> 40:31.889
capabilities , whether they can rely on

40:32.209 --> 40:34.265
the United States nuclear umbrella .

40:35.169 --> 40:37.058
Can you comment on that ? Are you

40:37.058 --> 40:39.391
concerned about that ? Do you hear , um ,

40:39.391 --> 40:41.790
any of our allies and partners , um ,

40:41.800 --> 40:44.860
talking seriously about that and how

40:44.860 --> 40:48.439
are you thinking about addressing those

40:48.439 --> 40:52.179
concerns from our allies ? I

40:52.550 --> 40:55.270
have reasonably frequent conversations

40:55.270 --> 40:56.770
with Secretary Colby , our

40:56.770 --> 41:00.209
Undersecretary , uh , for , for policy ,

41:00.550 --> 41:03.560
and , um , at every opportunity , um ,

41:03.790 --> 41:06.790
in mill to mill engagements , um , I

41:06.790 --> 41:09.750
reinforce our extended deterrence

41:09.750 --> 41:12.270
commitment on the part of the United

41:12.270 --> 41:15.790
States and um I've detected no

41:15.790 --> 41:19.409
change in my mill to mill engagements .

41:19.899 --> 41:23.310
Uh , in , uh , in concern

41:23.310 --> 41:26.260
for , you know , uh , our commitment

41:26.260 --> 41:28.427
and our stated commitment with respect

41:28.427 --> 41:30.669
to that , and , and that includes in my

41:30.669 --> 41:32.949
discussions with , uh , with Secretary

41:32.949 --> 41:35.550
Colby , and I , I would highlight that ,

41:35.629 --> 41:39.199
um , StratCom has , uh , several

41:39.550 --> 41:42.310
liaison officers from other countries

41:42.310 --> 41:45.439
at our command . And we're scheduled to

41:45.439 --> 41:48.560
add a liaison officer from France to

41:48.560 --> 41:50.840
help with those communications and

41:50.840 --> 41:53.840
enable those , and that individual is

41:53.840 --> 41:56.939
scheduled to report this this summer .

41:57.479 --> 41:59.535
Well , thank you . I'm out of time ,

41:59.535 --> 42:01.757
but if I could just ask , has Secretary

42:01.757 --> 42:04.590
Colby shared your view of that

42:04.590 --> 42:07.889
situation ? When you had those

42:07.889 --> 42:10.030
conversations with him ? Oh , I , I ,

42:10.129 --> 42:12.889
uh , um , I feedback any conversations

42:12.889 --> 42:15.010
that I have with , uh , within the

42:15.010 --> 42:17.959
department , um , appropriately and ,

42:17.969 --> 42:20.290
um , and reinforce , you know , our

42:20.290 --> 42:22.457
extended deterrence commitments . Um ,

42:22.489 --> 42:25.229
there is a conventional burden sharing

42:25.639 --> 42:27.417
element to the national defense

42:27.417 --> 42:29.330
strategy , which , uh , which the

42:29.330 --> 42:31.663
department has talked about extensively ,

42:31.699 --> 42:33.921
and those are part of the conversations

42:33.921 --> 42:36.143
as well . Thank you . Thank you , Madam

42:36.143 --> 42:38.255
Chair . Thank you , Senator Shaheen .

42:38.255 --> 42:40.366
Senator Rounds , you are recognized .

42:40.366 --> 42:42.830
Thank you , Madam Chair . Um , first to

42:42.830 --> 42:44.997
both you , General Whiting and Admiral

42:44.997 --> 42:47.052
Karl , thank you for to you and your

42:47.052 --> 42:49.274
teams for your service to our country .

42:49.429 --> 42:51.485
Uh , I'd like to begin by asking you

42:51.485 --> 42:53.540
both , uh , a specific question with

42:53.540 --> 42:56.649
regard to the many systems that , uh ,

42:56.989 --> 42:59.156
that your commands rely on for missile

42:59.156 --> 43:01.322
warning , space-based , uh , sensing ,

43:01.322 --> 43:03.830
and nuclear command and control . Most

43:03.830 --> 43:05.709
of them depend on access to key

43:05.709 --> 43:07.780
portions of the electromagnetic

43:07.780 --> 43:10.560
spectrum . Can we talk a little bit

43:10.560 --> 43:12.439
about how critical it is to have

43:12.439 --> 43:15.439
assured access to the 3.1 to

43:15.560 --> 43:18.520
3.45 portion of the band in the

43:18.679 --> 43:22.669
7.4 to 8.4 band of the spectrum

43:23.199 --> 43:25.088
for the systems that SpaceCom and

43:25.088 --> 43:27.979
StratCom use to conduct your missions

43:28.600 --> 43:32.260
and in particular , the need for

43:33.040 --> 43:36.360
direct access for both of you to those

43:36.360 --> 43:38.693
parts of the spectrum , General Whiting .

43:39.570 --> 43:41.737
Senator , thank you for the question .

43:41.737 --> 43:43.792
Uh , certainly access to those bands

43:43.792 --> 43:45.903
that you highlighted is , is critical

43:45.903 --> 43:48.070
for our mission in the , uh , in the 3

43:48.070 --> 43:47.770
megahertz range that you highlighted .

43:47.810 --> 43:49.921
We have key radars there that support

43:49.921 --> 43:52.088
our space domain awareness and missile

43:52.088 --> 43:54.143
defense missions , and then in the 7

43:54.143 --> 43:56.254
gigahertz range , uh , we have uh key

43:56.254 --> 43:58.532
communications , satcom communications .

43:58.532 --> 44:00.532
And um and so we want to be able to

44:00.532 --> 44:02.699
make sure we can continue to operate .

44:02.699 --> 44:04.754
We , we recognize that the president

44:04.754 --> 44:06.699
has , has called for um the United

44:06.699 --> 44:08.921
States to win the 6G um race and um and

44:08.921 --> 44:10.754
we , we support the department's

44:10.754 --> 44:12.977
efforts to find technological solutions

44:12.977 --> 44:15.032
and ways that we can um uh share the

44:15.032 --> 44:17.088
spectrum , leverage the spectrum for

44:17.088 --> 44:19.310
our economy , uh , but also ensure that

44:19.310 --> 44:21.088
we have it for national defense

44:21.088 --> 44:23.366
purposes . Thank you , Admiral Correll .

44:23.366 --> 44:25.379
I would associate myself with the

44:25.379 --> 44:27.546
comments from General Whiting and just

44:27.546 --> 44:29.712
foot stomp , the incredible importance

44:29.712 --> 44:32.060
of sustaining that access . Our missile

44:32.060 --> 44:34.116
warning , missile tracking , missile

44:34.116 --> 44:36.500
defense capabilities would be severely

44:36.500 --> 44:38.790
impacted negatively . Thank you and ,

44:38.860 --> 44:40.971
and , and General Whiting , just to ,

44:40.971 --> 44:43.138
to go back on this a little bit , uh .

44:43.929 --> 44:46.689
What I'm concerned about is that both

44:46.689 --> 44:48.856
of those bands , the lower 3 and the 7

44:48.856 --> 44:50.911
and 8 bands , they're protected from

44:50.911 --> 44:53.199
spectrum auction . But some folks

44:53.199 --> 44:54.866
remain interested in shifting

44:54.866 --> 44:56.989
additional federal users back into

44:56.989 --> 44:59.156
those bands , which would then free up

44:59.156 --> 45:01.045
that portion of the band that the

45:01.045 --> 45:03.267
federal users had been using . But it ,

45:03.267 --> 45:05.560
it adds additional challenges within

45:05.560 --> 45:08.959
these bands that you rely on . In your

45:08.959 --> 45:11.149
professional military opinion , what

45:11.149 --> 45:13.479
would be the impact to our strategic

45:13.479 --> 45:15.590
communications , nuclear deterrence ,

45:15.590 --> 45:17.368
and homeland defense missions ,

45:17.639 --> 45:19.939
including Golden Dome ? If the military

45:19.939 --> 45:22.179
were forced to share those bands with

45:22.179 --> 45:25.209
other federal users in a suboptimal

45:25.209 --> 45:28.689
manner . Senator , with your caveat

45:28.689 --> 45:30.689
there about the suboptimal manner ,

45:30.689 --> 45:32.800
which would assume that we don't have

45:32.800 --> 45:34.967
the , the full usage and protection of

45:34.967 --> 45:36.967
that bandwidth , it , it would be a

45:36.967 --> 45:39.133
significant detriment to our mission ,

45:39.133 --> 45:41.300
uh , because the satellites we have on

45:41.300 --> 45:40.689
orbit today , we're going to rely on

45:40.689 --> 45:42.633
those for years and years , if not

45:42.633 --> 45:44.800
decades to come , and we can't . Can't

45:44.800 --> 45:46.967
shift them out of a band that might be

45:46.967 --> 45:48.967
using the bands that we just talked

45:48.967 --> 45:51.022
about , including , I would also say

45:51.022 --> 45:53.245
that's true for our ground-based radars

45:53.245 --> 45:55.300
that use those bands as well . So we

45:55.300 --> 45:55.254
have to figure out how to be able to

45:55.254 --> 45:57.574
continue to use our legacy systems that

45:57.574 --> 45:59.518
we're going to have to rely on for

45:59.518 --> 46:01.574
years to come . Admiral Correll , do

46:01.574 --> 46:05.149
you agree ? I agree . Thank you . Would

46:05.149 --> 46:07.590
it be fair to say that Washington DC is

46:07.590 --> 46:10.530
protected by radars in those bands ?

46:11.580 --> 46:13.580
Yes , Senator . What about Hawaii ?

46:14.500 --> 46:17.550
Same . What about Alaska ? Same . What

46:17.550 --> 46:19.494
about the west coast of the United

46:19.494 --> 46:22.590
States ? The same . Thank you . Uh

46:23.179 --> 46:25.346
Admiral Correll , just a little bit of

46:25.346 --> 46:27.512
a discussion , please , on with regard

46:27.512 --> 46:30.120
regarding the B-21 and uh and it's uh

46:30.699 --> 46:33.959
um Well , the growing demand for that

46:33.959 --> 46:36.520
particular product is coming online

46:36.520 --> 46:39.530
shortly . I'm just curious , um .

46:40.739 --> 46:43.550
When you were answering the question

46:43.550 --> 46:46.510
for Senator Fisher , you indicated that

46:46.510 --> 46:49.350
you agreed that 145 was an optimal

46:49.350 --> 46:51.350
number for the , for this . Can you

46:51.350 --> 46:53.550
talk a little bit about what the

46:53.550 --> 46:55.717
determining factors were that you used

46:55.717 --> 46:57.629
in coming up with that analysis ?

46:59.760 --> 47:02.790
When , when you look at , um , the , uh ,

47:02.800 --> 47:05.739
the required , um , readiness

47:06.120 --> 47:09.879
and uh timeliness of bomber

47:09.879 --> 47:12.679
response options with respect to uh

47:12.679 --> 47:16.250
Stratcom's operational plans

47:16.520 --> 47:20.479
that drives the number of 145 in

47:20.479 --> 47:23.389
terms of the capability of the B-21 ,

47:23.399 --> 47:25.066
and I could expound more in a

47:25.066 --> 47:27.288
classified setting , Senator , in terms

47:27.288 --> 47:30.030
of the capability of the B-21 . I would

47:30.030 --> 47:32.229
highlight that part of the big so what

47:32.229 --> 47:34.510
there is its ability to sense and

47:34.510 --> 47:36.732
maneuver in a contested electromagnetic

47:36.732 --> 47:40.590
spectrum . So yes , it's a conventional

47:40.590 --> 47:43.030
and strategic stand-in , standoff

47:43.030 --> 47:46.590
precision strike bomber . But it's also

47:46.590 --> 47:49.260
a key enabler for the joint force in

47:49.260 --> 47:51.909
terms of electromagnetic spectrum and

47:51.909 --> 47:53.909
its capabilities in that area along

47:53.909 --> 47:56.131
with other capabilities associated that

47:56.131 --> 47:58.242
we would have to talk in a classified

47:58.242 --> 48:00.353
setting . Very good , thank you . And

48:00.353 --> 48:02.576
once again , gentlemen , thank you both

48:02.576 --> 48:04.798
and your teams for your service . Thank

48:04.798 --> 48:07.020
you , Madam Chair . I believe Senator .

48:08.040 --> 48:10.500
Kate is next . Thank you , Mr . Chair ,

48:10.510 --> 48:12.566
and thanks to our witnesses for your

48:12.566 --> 48:14.621
service . I have one topic really to

48:14.621 --> 48:16.954
address with , with each of you . First ,

48:16.954 --> 48:19.010
Admiral Krell , I want to talk about

48:19.010 --> 48:20.843
the delays in the Columbia class

48:20.843 --> 48:24.520
submarine . Um , the , the delay in the

48:24.520 --> 48:28.399
first Columbia class suggests that

48:28.399 --> 48:30.520
it will be delivered about 12 to 16

48:30.520 --> 48:32.520
months after its originally planned

48:32.520 --> 48:34.889
date . Uh , what are , are you all

48:34.889 --> 48:38.489
doing to extend the , the extend the

48:38.489 --> 48:40.156
useful life of the Ohio class

48:40.156 --> 48:42.322
submarines so that we can , you know ,

48:42.322 --> 48:44.156
take care of any , uh , delay in

48:44.156 --> 48:47.550
Columbia production . Thanks , Senator

48:47.550 --> 48:51.050
Kaine . Um , the Navy has , uh , a plan

48:51.540 --> 48:53.989
to do maintenance on existing Ohio

48:53.989 --> 48:56.689
class submarines to extend their

48:56.689 --> 48:58.467
service life , and there's high

48:58.467 --> 49:00.467
confidence in the ability to extend

49:00.467 --> 49:03.729
their service life so that we , um , We

49:03.729 --> 49:07.050
can manage the risk of sustaining the

49:07.050 --> 49:09.969
capability we have to bridge to the

49:09.969 --> 49:12.191
Columbia class and the new capability ,

49:12.191 --> 49:14.358
and there's sufficient margin there to

49:14.358 --> 49:16.580
address that with the maintenance plans

49:16.580 --> 49:18.469
that the Navy and if they do that

49:18.469 --> 49:20.580
successfully , is it fair to say that

49:20.580 --> 49:23.110
Stratcom's capabilities will not be

49:23.110 --> 49:25.929
jeopardized so long as that Ohio class

49:25.929 --> 49:28.669
extension is done well ? Yes , Senator ,

49:28.919 --> 49:30.752
thank you , thank you for that .

49:32.330 --> 49:34.386
General Whiting , we're , we're very

49:34.386 --> 49:36.386
proud in Virginia of Wallops . Um ,

49:36.489 --> 49:38.449
Wallops is NASA's only owned and

49:38.449 --> 49:40.393
operated launch range , and it's a

49:40.393 --> 49:43.330
national asset that supports both

49:43.330 --> 49:45.552
governmental operations across multiple

49:46.050 --> 49:47.883
governmental agencies , but also

49:47.883 --> 49:51.500
commercial space flight . I think WLOPs

49:51.500 --> 49:53.500
will continue to play a key role in

49:53.500 --> 49:55.969
enabling national security missions at

49:55.969 --> 49:58.239
its launch range . How do you view

49:58.239 --> 50:01.320
WLOPS as an asset for Spacecom

50:01.320 --> 50:04.070
operations ? Yes , Senator , I , I

50:04.070 --> 50:05.792
think you well noted there the

50:05.792 --> 50:07.848
importance of wallops . Uh , I think

50:07.848 --> 50:09.848
it's been an amazing story over the

50:09.848 --> 50:12.181
last decade , uh , as the United States ,

50:12.181 --> 50:15.510
um , military at our ranges in Cape

50:15.510 --> 50:18.270
Canaveral at , uh , Vandenberg has ,

50:18.500 --> 50:21.780
has upped the launch tempo with the

50:21.780 --> 50:24.169
commercial , um , industry as they've

50:24.169 --> 50:26.780
ramped up . I think as that continues

50:26.780 --> 50:28.947
to go up , we're going to have to look

50:28.947 --> 50:30.836
at other launch locations to help

50:30.836 --> 50:32.891
absorb some of that capacity , and I

50:32.891 --> 50:35.058
think Wallops , having matured the way

50:35.058 --> 50:37.300
it has , could be a potential to to to

50:37.300 --> 50:39.244
do that . But from a Space Command

50:39.244 --> 50:41.022
perspective , we think that the

50:41.022 --> 50:42.856
capabilities of Wallops Island ,

50:42.856 --> 50:44.911
Senator , and the resilience that it

50:44.911 --> 50:44.689
provides into the broader launch

50:44.689 --> 50:47.229
enterprise are very important . Um , I ,

50:47.350 --> 50:49.572
I , last time I checked , I think there

50:49.572 --> 50:51.572
had been more rockets launched from

50:51.572 --> 50:53.461
Wallops than either Vandenberg or

50:53.461 --> 50:55.628
Canaveral , but not with the attention

50:55.628 --> 50:57.683
necessarily because they're unmanned

50:57.683 --> 50:59.794
rockets and they tend to be smaller .

50:59.794 --> 51:01.794
But the ability to hit orbits , you

51:01.794 --> 51:03.906
know , off the east coast as compared

51:03.906 --> 51:05.961
to where the other , um , ranges are

51:05.961 --> 51:08.017
are very important . The other thing

51:08.017 --> 51:10.239
about Wallops that's interesting , it ,

51:10.239 --> 51:12.350
it is a launch range that's used both

51:12.350 --> 51:14.350
for governmental and for commercial

51:14.350 --> 51:16.183
launches . What commercial space

51:16.183 --> 51:18.280
capabilities should we be leveraging

51:18.280 --> 51:21.100
more effectively ? And how do you think

51:21.100 --> 51:23.211
about the importance of collaboration

51:23.211 --> 51:25.044
with commercial space industry ,

51:25.399 --> 51:27.500
Senator , I think the US commercial

51:27.500 --> 51:30.139
space industry is one of the United

51:30.139 --> 51:32.250
States' most significant advantages ,

51:32.260 --> 51:34.482
not just for Space Command or the Space

51:34.482 --> 51:36.704
Force , but for our nation writ large .

51:36.704 --> 51:39.179
It is driving innovation . It is

51:39.179 --> 51:42.379
expanding economic opportunities . And

51:42.379 --> 51:44.490
so from a United States Space Command

51:44.490 --> 51:46.712
perspective , we want to make Sure that

51:46.712 --> 51:48.712
we are leveraging that innovation ,

51:48.712 --> 51:50.712
leveraging the cost curves that are

51:50.712 --> 51:52.546
delivering capability faster and

51:52.546 --> 51:54.379
cheaper , and then work with the

51:54.379 --> 51:56.046
services , the Space Force in

51:56.046 --> 51:58.157
particular , to be able to bring that

51:58.157 --> 52:00.379
capability into operation . So we think

52:00.379 --> 52:02.379
it's a massive advantage for us and

52:02.379 --> 52:04.657
then we see , we have a role , Senator ,

52:04.657 --> 52:06.768
in helping to defend those commercial

52:06.768 --> 52:08.823
companies who the US government most

52:08.823 --> 52:11.046
contracts with for space services . And

52:11.046 --> 52:13.101
we do that at a cell that we have in

52:13.101 --> 52:14.823
Vandenberg Space Force Base in

52:14.823 --> 52:17.046
California where we share information ,

52:17.046 --> 52:19.268
threat information up to the top secret

52:19.268 --> 52:21.212
level with those companies so they

52:21.212 --> 52:23.212
understand the domain that they are

52:23.212 --> 52:25.101
operating in and the threats that

52:25.101 --> 52:24.766
they're facing , and then they can

52:24.766 --> 52:26.988
share with us back the insights they're

52:26.988 --> 52:29.210
gaining from their operations as well .

52:29.210 --> 52:31.210
I think I'll ask a question for the

52:31.210 --> 52:33.433
record to pick up on a comment that the

52:33.433 --> 52:35.488
chairman made about the space debris

52:35.488 --> 52:37.850
problem . It's one thing if there's

52:37.850 --> 52:39.961
debris because of , you know , target

52:39.961 --> 52:42.979
shots on defunct satellites in orbit ,

52:43.459 --> 52:45.929
you know , continually when there's not

52:45.929 --> 52:48.560
a lot of satellites in orbit , but both

52:49.020 --> 52:51.139
governmental and private companies

52:51.139 --> 52:53.250
around the world are putting more and

52:53.250 --> 52:55.361
more satellites in orbit for security

52:55.361 --> 52:57.528
reasons , for communications reasons .

52:57.528 --> 53:00.739
And so that , that the value of what's

53:00.739 --> 53:03.709
up in orbit right now makes this debris

53:03.709 --> 53:06.389
problem much , much worse in terms of

53:06.389 --> 53:08.500
trying to get a handle on it . I know

53:08.500 --> 53:10.667
there's space treaties dealing with it

53:10.667 --> 53:12.667
and I know we generally have pretty

53:12.667 --> 53:14.889
good protocols about trying to minimize

53:14.889 --> 53:17.629
debris or , or avoid it , um , but this

53:17.629 --> 53:19.573
is going to be a larger and larger

53:19.573 --> 53:21.796
problem as more and more satellites get

53:21.796 --> 53:24.018
put up into orbit and so it's something

53:24.018 --> 53:26.073
that we have to get a hands on . One

53:26.073 --> 53:25.949
and I'm glad that the chairman raised

53:25.949 --> 53:28.116
it . Thank you , Mr . Chair . Uh , can

53:28.116 --> 53:30.338
you , can you tell us approximately how

53:30.338 --> 53:32.729
many satellites are in space right now ,

53:32.959 --> 53:35.719
all told , total number of trackable

53:35.719 --> 53:38.080
objects just went over 50,000 . And

53:38.080 --> 53:41.280
just to give you a , a , a context on

53:41.280 --> 53:43.280
that , when Space Command was stood

53:43.280 --> 53:45.919
back up 6.5 years ago , uh , from that

53:45.919 --> 53:48.030
time to today , that number's gone up

53:48.030 --> 53:51.110
almost 90% . It's almost doubled in 6.5

53:51.110 --> 53:54.830
years . And headed much

53:55.209 --> 53:58.750
higher . Uh , absolutely , um , we ,

53:58.879 --> 54:00.601
we've seen recent reports from

54:00.601 --> 54:02.601
commercial space companies that not

54:02.601 --> 54:04.768
only do they want to continue to build

54:04.768 --> 54:06.935
out these proliferated low Earth orbit

54:06.935 --> 54:09.157
communications constellations , but now

54:09.157 --> 54:10.990
go to space for data centers and

54:10.990 --> 54:13.212
artificial intelligence purposes . Um ,

54:13.212 --> 54:15.101
that's , that's a , that's a very

54:15.101 --> 54:17.157
exciting future that's coming . Uh ,

54:17.157 --> 54:19.101
thank you very much , uh , Senator

54:19.101 --> 54:21.157
Ernst . Thank you , Mr . Chair , and

54:21.157 --> 54:23.379
thank you gentlemen very much for being

54:23.379 --> 54:25.546
in front of us today and to your teams

54:25.546 --> 54:27.712
as well and their service to our great

54:27.712 --> 54:29.935
United States of America . Um , Admiral

54:29.935 --> 54:31.935
Correll , I'll start with you , and

54:31.935 --> 54:34.268
we're just gonna keep hammering on this ,

54:34.268 --> 54:36.435
but , uh , right now the United States

54:36.435 --> 54:38.546
is undertaking a once in a generation

54:38.546 --> 54:41.250
effort to modernize all three legs of

54:41.250 --> 54:44.189
the nuclear triad . Uh , we all know

54:44.189 --> 54:47.219
it's , it's incredibly essential to

54:47.270 --> 54:50.020
credible deterrence , uh , but it is ,

54:50.030 --> 54:53.110
of course , increasingly defined by the

54:53.110 --> 54:55.750
cost , uh , growth , the scheduled

54:55.750 --> 54:58.550
delays , and of course , uh , something

54:58.550 --> 55:00.606
we're well aware of here , budgetary

55:00.606 --> 55:03.120
pressures . Uh , so we have the

55:03.120 --> 55:05.231
president that says he wants to spend

55:05.479 --> 55:09.239
another $500 billion in defense .

55:09.439 --> 55:11.879
Uh , we have heard that we are going to

55:11.879 --> 55:14.659
get another request for $200 billion

55:15.320 --> 55:17.542
perhaps in the form of a supplemental .

55:17.750 --> 55:19.583
Uh , the , the department has to

55:19.583 --> 55:21.694
demonstrate that it can deliver these

55:21.694 --> 55:23.780
capabilities on time and on budget .

55:24.054 --> 55:26.415
Without crowding out our other critical

55:26.415 --> 55:29.534
priorities , so if you can tie it up

55:29.534 --> 55:32.735
neatly with a bow on it , uh , for the

55:32.735 --> 55:36.215
committee today , which programs are

55:36.215 --> 55:38.534
experiencing the most significant cost

55:38.534 --> 55:41.774
growth and scheduled delays and what

55:41.774 --> 55:45.125
specifically is driving those cost

55:45.125 --> 55:45.995
overruns ?

55:49.020 --> 55:51.310
Senator , I , uh , I don't want to duck

55:51.310 --> 55:53.469
the question , uh , but the , the

55:53.469 --> 55:56.389
direct report portfolio managers are

55:56.389 --> 55:58.445
the , are the subject matter experts

55:58.445 --> 56:01.969
with respect to , um , with respect to

56:02.070 --> 56:05.149
real-time reporting on costs and

56:05.149 --> 56:07.909
schedule , uh , with those programs . I

56:07.909 --> 56:11.409
would tell you that in , um . In my ,

56:11.429 --> 56:13.989
uh , interactions with the direct

56:13.989 --> 56:17.489
report portfolio managers and , uh ,

56:17.500 --> 56:19.750
and their leadership , so this is Vice

56:19.750 --> 56:22.590
Admiral Goucher and General White and

56:22.590 --> 56:25.610
Joe Gutline for Golden Dome , they're ,

56:25.709 --> 56:29.389
um , laser focused on delivering for

56:29.389 --> 56:33.189
our country and , um , understanding

56:33.189 --> 56:35.840
where the risks are . And addressing

56:35.840 --> 56:38.469
those risks in terms of schedule and

56:38.469 --> 56:42.000
keeping pressure on costs and , and

56:42.000 --> 56:44.167
that arrangement from my perspective ,

56:44.167 --> 56:46.560
the organizational arrangement of a

56:46.560 --> 56:49.159
direct report portfolio manager with a ,

56:49.280 --> 56:51.669
with a direct report to the deputy

56:51.669 --> 56:54.780
secretary has been very powerful in

56:55.560 --> 56:59.280
in keeping our foot on the gas for

56:59.280 --> 57:01.502
delivering the capability as you . Said

57:01.502 --> 57:03.860
on schedule and on budget and I

57:03.860 --> 57:05.949
acknowledge there's been significant

57:05.949 --> 57:08.540
challenges there in the past . No ,

57:08.610 --> 57:10.499
thank you , Admiral , and I and I

57:10.499 --> 57:12.499
appreciate you reiterating that . I

57:12.499 --> 57:14.499
think it's incredibly important . I

57:14.499 --> 57:16.221
know that we continue to place

57:16.221 --> 57:18.499
additional pressures on your shoulders ,

57:18.830 --> 57:20.949
uh , but those portfolio managers as

57:20.949 --> 57:22.989
well . But we as Congress , we also

57:22.989 --> 57:24.933
need to keep the pressure on those

57:24.933 --> 57:26.878
primes and , and others that are .

57:26.878 --> 57:29.070
Engaged in this process , uh ,

57:29.219 --> 57:31.163
understanding that we have limited

57:31.163 --> 57:33.219
resources and we absolutely need to

57:33.219 --> 57:36.340
modernize our nuclear triad , so

57:36.340 --> 57:38.284
pressure all the way around , um ,

57:38.379 --> 57:40.490
including here on the Hill on members

57:40.490 --> 57:42.739
in Congress , um , if we can turn just

57:42.739 --> 57:45.379
briefly to to Space calm as well , uh ,

57:45.459 --> 57:47.739
we have seen with the , the operations

57:47.739 --> 57:50.379
that are ongoing in Iran , we have seen

57:50.379 --> 57:52.600
then counterattacks coming from Iran .

57:53.199 --> 57:55.520
And General Whiting , we saw this

57:55.520 --> 57:59.290
incredible uh shot fired , uh , from

57:59.290 --> 58:02.860
Iran towards Diego Garcia . Uh ,

58:02.929 --> 58:06.199
so what we are learning from this , uh ,

58:06.250 --> 58:09.679
that that missile has tra it traveled

58:09.679 --> 58:12.959
over 2500 miles and it really just

58:12.959 --> 58:15.959
underscores the growing range of

58:15.969 --> 58:18.350
weapons and ballistic missiles coming

58:18.350 --> 58:22.145
from our adversaries . And what can

58:22.145 --> 58:25.465
we do then in that scenario and how do

58:25.465 --> 58:28.665
we adapt uh within SpaceCom to make

58:28.665 --> 58:30.332
sure that our missile warning

58:30.332 --> 58:32.504
architecture is able to account for

58:32.504 --> 58:34.945
these long range threats like this

58:34.945 --> 58:37.794
recent attempted strike on Diego Garcia .

58:38.929 --> 58:40.985
Senator , thank you for highlighting

58:40.985 --> 58:43.096
that . Um , at Diego Garcia , we have

58:43.096 --> 58:44.762
critical , uh , Space Command

58:44.762 --> 58:46.873
capabilities for our satellite , uh ,

58:46.873 --> 58:48.929
command and control as well as space

58:48.929 --> 58:50.818
domain awareness . So our missile

58:50.818 --> 58:53.040
warning architectures is absolutely the

58:53.040 --> 58:55.262
foundational capability that allows our

58:55.262 --> 58:57.485
joint force and our national leadership

58:57.485 --> 58:59.707
to know about those kinds of launches .

58:59.707 --> 59:02.040
Today , we do a very good job , in fact ,

59:02.040 --> 59:02.006
best in the world . Of detecting those

59:02.006 --> 59:04.006
kinds of launches , but ma'am , you

59:04.006 --> 59:06.173
asked about what kind of evolutions do

59:06.173 --> 59:08.284
we need . Um , the , the Congress has

59:08.284 --> 59:10.450
funded some several additional missile

59:10.450 --> 59:12.617
warning capabilities that are coming .

59:12.617 --> 59:14.784
There'll be a low Earth orbit tracking

59:14.784 --> 59:16.839
constellation , a medium Earth orbit

59:16.839 --> 59:18.839
tracking constellation , and then a

59:18.839 --> 59:20.950
modernized strategic constellation in

59:20.950 --> 59:23.117
geosynchronous orbit as those continue

59:23.117 --> 59:25.173
to come online . It will allow us to

59:25.173 --> 59:27.395
track those missiles and then have full

59:27.395 --> 59:29.284
custody all the way until they're

59:29.284 --> 59:31.395
impacting , and that allows us to tip

59:31.395 --> 59:33.941
and cue missile defenses to be even

59:33.941 --> 59:36.362
more successful . So those are

59:36.362 --> 59:38.473
important investments , ma'am , and I

59:38.473 --> 59:40.640
would ask for the Congress's continued

59:40.640 --> 59:42.751
support . Wonderful , and my time has

59:42.751 --> 59:42.481
expired . Thank you again , gentlemen ,

59:42.562 --> 59:44.784
very much . Thank you , Senator Ernst .

59:44.784 --> 59:48.669
Senator Scott . It , uh , it seems that

59:48.669 --> 59:52.189
you , uh , touched base 7.2

59:52.189 --> 59:54.429
seconds before Senator Cotton , so

59:54.429 --> 59:57.219
you're recognized right now . Thank you .

59:57.479 --> 59:59.312
That's the first time . Call for

59:59.312 --> 01:00:01.257
instant replay on that one . Can't

01:00:01.257 --> 01:00:04.000
imagine that happened . All right .

01:00:04.139 --> 01:00:06.472
Well , thank both of you for being here .

01:00:06.472 --> 01:00:08.472
Um , So , I , let me start and talk

01:00:08.472 --> 01:00:10.695
about something that's really important

01:00:10.695 --> 01:00:12.695
to Florida , uh , space dominance .

01:00:12.695 --> 01:00:14.861
It's a , it's a pretty big issue . I ,

01:00:14.861 --> 01:00:14.149
I got to serve as governor of Florida

01:00:14.149 --> 01:00:16.229
for 8 years and now senator . So we

01:00:16.229 --> 01:00:18.229
prioritized and put a lot of effort

01:00:18.229 --> 01:00:20.285
into , uh , the Space Ghost . It was

01:00:20.285 --> 01:00:22.507
right , I became governor right after ,

01:00:22.507 --> 01:00:24.618
uh , manned flight was shut down , so

01:00:24.618 --> 01:00:26.840
it's a big , it's a big issue . Um , we

01:00:26.840 --> 01:00:28.951
try to make sure that the Space Ghost

01:00:28.951 --> 01:00:31.173
is an aerospace hub and a model of what

01:00:31.173 --> 01:00:32.673
happens , um , when we use

01:00:32.673 --> 01:00:34.673
public-private partnerships to help

01:00:34.673 --> 01:00:36.785
America reach its exploration goals .

01:00:36.785 --> 01:00:39.007
So , unfortunately , we're not the only

01:00:39.007 --> 01:00:38.500
one trying to do this . Uh , we got

01:00:38.500 --> 01:00:40.860
adversaries like communist China . So

01:00:40.860 --> 01:00:43.082
I'm very appreciative the president has

01:00:43.082 --> 01:00:45.304
prioritized national security , uh , to

01:00:45.304 --> 01:00:47.082
include space , and I think the

01:00:47.082 --> 01:00:49.249
discussion today is really important .

01:00:49.249 --> 01:00:51.416
So General Wa , can you , can you talk

01:00:51.416 --> 01:00:50.979
about , uh , and explain to the

01:00:50.979 --> 01:00:53.260
American people why space is so

01:00:53.260 --> 01:00:56.060
important , um , to , to our national

01:00:56.060 --> 01:00:57.949
security and how adversaries like

01:00:57.949 --> 01:00:59.893
communist China , who's a complete

01:00:59.893 --> 01:01:02.116
adversary , can use it to undermine our

01:01:02.116 --> 01:01:04.260
country . Senator , thank you for the

01:01:04.260 --> 01:01:06.427
question . Uh , today , as we sit here

01:01:06.427 --> 01:01:08.939
in 2026 , the entire United States

01:01:08.939 --> 01:01:10.820
Joint Force is seized with an

01:01:10.820 --> 01:01:12.820
assumption they will have access to

01:01:12.820 --> 01:01:14.931
space capabilities through all levels

01:01:14.931 --> 01:01:17.098
of conflict . We do not have the force

01:01:17.098 --> 01:01:18.987
structure to fight the way we did

01:01:18.987 --> 01:01:21.042
before the space age when , when our

01:01:21.042 --> 01:01:23.042
systems were not space enabled . We

01:01:23.042 --> 01:01:24.931
didn't have precision strike , we

01:01:24.931 --> 01:01:26.820
didn't have a global navigation .

01:01:26.820 --> 01:01:28.987
communications . And so Senator , it's

01:01:28.987 --> 01:01:31.209
vital that we defend those capabilities

01:01:31.209 --> 01:01:33.209
in space so that we can continue to

01:01:33.209 --> 01:01:35.320
deliver them against the threats that

01:01:35.320 --> 01:01:37.487
are now arrayed against us , and we've

01:01:37.487 --> 01:01:39.542
seen just a dramatic increase in the

01:01:39.542 --> 01:01:41.542
threats over the last several years

01:01:41.542 --> 01:01:43.542
from China and from Russia . And so

01:01:43.542 --> 01:01:43.524
that's why at US Space Command , we say

01:01:43.524 --> 01:01:45.635
it's a moral responsibility to defend

01:01:45.635 --> 01:01:47.746
our space capabilities so that we can

01:01:47.746 --> 01:01:49.746
continue to support the rest of the

01:01:49.746 --> 01:01:51.802
joint force . Can you talk about the

01:01:51.802 --> 01:01:51.719
importance of public and private

01:01:51.719 --> 01:01:54.052
partnerships at the Florida Space Coast ?

01:01:55.159 --> 01:01:56.992
Yes , Senator , I , I've been an

01:01:56.992 --> 01:01:58.770
observer of that , not directly

01:01:58.770 --> 01:02:00.881
involved in it , but it's , uh , it's

01:02:00.881 --> 01:02:03.103
pretty remarkable to me how , uh , that

01:02:03.103 --> 01:02:05.215
public-private partnership is able to

01:02:05.215 --> 01:02:07.580
deliver infrastructure at , um , at

01:02:07.580 --> 01:02:09.636
Cape Canaveral and at , uh , Patrick

01:02:09.636 --> 01:02:12.179
Space Force Base to ensure that , that

01:02:12.179 --> 01:02:14.235
those ranges , those launch ranges ,

01:02:14.235 --> 01:02:16.457
that launch range has been able to keep

01:02:16.457 --> 01:02:18.290
up with the dramatic increase in

01:02:18.290 --> 01:02:20.346
commercial launch tempo . That we've

01:02:20.346 --> 01:02:22.512
seen , and I think it's true that that

01:02:22.512 --> 01:02:24.457
range has not been a constraint on

01:02:24.457 --> 01:02:26.568
commercial launch growing and , and a

01:02:26.568 --> 01:02:28.401
big part of that is not only the

01:02:28.401 --> 01:02:30.179
government investment , but the

01:02:30.179 --> 01:02:32.346
commercial and private investment that

01:02:32.346 --> 01:02:32.139
we've seen through Space Florida . Yeah ,

01:02:32.219 --> 01:02:34.386
we put , we , when I was governor , we

01:02:34.386 --> 01:02:36.386
put up a lot of money , but we , we

01:02:36.386 --> 01:02:36.350
were able to get a lot of companies to

01:02:36.350 --> 01:02:38.628
come in there and spend a lot of money .

01:02:38.628 --> 01:02:40.669
Um , so Blue Origin and , and , and

01:02:40.669 --> 01:02:42.891
Boeing , SpaceX , a lot of them spent a

01:02:42.891 --> 01:02:45.550
lot of money . So , Admiral , um , as

01:02:45.550 --> 01:02:47.717
we're all aware , the very real threat

01:02:47.717 --> 01:02:49.828
of adversaries like communist China ,

01:02:49.828 --> 01:02:52.050
it's not just in space . Um , communist

01:02:52.050 --> 01:02:53.939
China is also actively focused on

01:02:53.939 --> 01:02:55.828
dominance around the world . It's

01:02:55.828 --> 01:02:57.994
critical our nation is prepared to not

01:02:57.994 --> 01:02:57.949
only project peace through strength ,

01:02:58.110 --> 01:03:00.260
but also act if necessary . It's no

01:03:00.260 --> 01:03:02.316
secret the navy's had some struggles

01:03:02.316 --> 01:03:04.371
building ships , um , on time and on

01:03:04.371 --> 01:03:06.979
budget . Uh , Secretary Phelan , uh , I

01:03:06.979 --> 01:03:09.201
know he's working hard , uh , to try to

01:03:09.201 --> 01:03:11.257
change that . Can you talk about the

01:03:11.257 --> 01:03:13.090
importance of the Columbia class

01:03:13.090 --> 01:03:15.201
submarine and why you need that asset

01:03:15.201 --> 01:03:18.399
now ? Uh , the Columbia class submarine ,

01:03:18.489 --> 01:03:20.433
uh , represents our assured second

01:03:20.433 --> 01:03:22.570
strike capability for our nation , so

01:03:22.840 --> 01:03:25.479
it doesn't get any more important or

01:03:25.479 --> 01:03:27.646
necessary , uh , than that , Senator ,

01:03:27.800 --> 01:03:31.300
and so , uh , that . Submarine will be

01:03:31.300 --> 01:03:34.570
world class decades ahead of what China

01:03:34.570 --> 01:03:38.179
or Russia can produce in terms of

01:03:38.179 --> 01:03:41.179
technology , quietness , and capability .

01:03:41.500 --> 01:03:44.879
It's a , it's a critical capability

01:03:45.179 --> 01:03:49.100
for our deterrent and With

01:03:49.100 --> 01:03:51.156
uh , with the appointment of uh Vice

01:03:51.156 --> 01:03:53.267
Admiral Goucher as a direct portfolio

01:03:53.267 --> 01:03:55.419
manager , it's , uh , it will get a

01:03:55.419 --> 01:03:57.520
laser focus , which it , which it

01:03:57.520 --> 01:04:00.020
already has , uh , to , to deliver that

01:04:00.020 --> 01:04:02.830
capability for our nation . So the fact

01:04:02.830 --> 01:04:05.052
that it's late , is it , does it impact

01:04:05.052 --> 01:04:07.070
the Navy's resourcing decisions ?

01:04:08.879 --> 01:04:12.780
Um , the , uh , the Navy has

01:04:12.780 --> 01:04:15.530
to is continuing to fund Colombia , so

01:04:15.530 --> 01:04:18.209
it's had no negative impact on funding

01:04:18.209 --> 01:04:20.098
for Colombia and the priority and

01:04:20.098 --> 01:04:22.320
delivery . It remains the Navy's number

01:04:22.320 --> 01:04:25.050
one priority , and , and I see , um ,

01:04:25.209 --> 01:04:27.376
you know , and the Navy's budget backs

01:04:27.376 --> 01:04:29.487
that up , Senator , thank both of you

01:04:29.487 --> 01:04:31.709
and thanks for the men and women that ,

01:04:31.709 --> 01:04:35.669
uh , served with you . war , Thank

01:04:35.669 --> 01:04:38.550
you , Mr . Chairman . So President

01:04:38.550 --> 01:04:41.030
Trump has dragged us into war against

01:04:41.030 --> 01:04:43.389
Iran , and we're all paying the price .

01:04:43.750 --> 01:04:46.510
Service members have died . Oil prices

01:04:46.510 --> 01:04:48.550
are soaring , and we are facing a

01:04:48.550 --> 01:04:51.030
global economic crisis over the Strait

01:04:51.030 --> 01:04:54.590
of Hormuz . One big reason Donald

01:04:54.590 --> 01:04:56.870
Trump's go it alone approach to blowing

01:04:56.870 --> 01:04:59.419
up long-standing . American alliances .

01:04:59.780 --> 01:05:03.179
He has insulted and tariffed just

01:05:03.179 --> 01:05:05.939
about everyone , and he launched this

01:05:05.939 --> 01:05:09.340
war alongside Israel without telling

01:05:09.340 --> 01:05:11.739
our other allies . And then when he

01:05:11.739 --> 01:05:14.459
sees gas prices skyrocket , Donald

01:05:14.459 --> 01:05:16.348
Trump changes his tune and starts

01:05:16.348 --> 01:05:19.260
begging our allies to help us patrol

01:05:19.260 --> 01:05:21.482
the Strait of Hormuz , and our partners

01:05:21.482 --> 01:05:23.510
have said , They want to help , but

01:05:23.510 --> 01:05:26.159
only if the fighting stops . Admiral

01:05:26.159 --> 01:05:28.189
Correll , US Strategic Command is

01:05:28.189 --> 01:05:30.389
responsible for strategic deterrence

01:05:30.389 --> 01:05:32.909
and nuclear operations , and you have

01:05:32.909 --> 01:05:35.669
said repeatedly that alliances are

01:05:35.669 --> 01:05:38.939
critical to deterrence . So Admiral ,

01:05:39.030 --> 01:05:41.070
do Russia and China think that our

01:05:41.070 --> 01:05:44.149
alliances are strong when our partners

01:05:44.149 --> 01:05:45.449
refuse to help ?

01:05:48.280 --> 01:05:50.280
My military assessment is that they

01:05:50.280 --> 01:05:52.820
continue to think they're very strong

01:05:52.820 --> 01:05:56.540
and uh um and I think they're um ,

01:05:57.439 --> 01:05:59.661
China and Russia's behavior in terms of

01:05:59.661 --> 01:06:01.883
attempting to undermine those alliances

01:06:01.883 --> 01:06:04.739
demonstrates their continued concern

01:06:04.919 --> 01:06:07.270
for uh for America's alliances . Yeah ,

01:06:07.610 --> 01:06:09.554
I I I just have to say your answer

01:06:09.554 --> 01:06:12.500
makes no sense to me . That Russia and

01:06:12.500 --> 01:06:15.899
China watch us insult our allies , then

01:06:15.899 --> 01:06:17.788
beg for their help , and then our

01:06:17.788 --> 01:06:19.979
allies don't give that help , and you

01:06:19.979 --> 01:06:22.201
think Russia and China think there's an

01:06:22.201 --> 01:06:24.610
alliance that's working just great .

01:06:24.979 --> 01:06:27.580
Look , it is not only an embarrassment

01:06:27.580 --> 01:06:30.300
when the president begs and our allies

01:06:30.300 --> 01:06:33.179
say no . It is a national security

01:06:33.179 --> 01:06:37.020
threat because our enemies

01:06:37.020 --> 01:06:40.330
take note of that . It is your job to

01:06:40.330 --> 01:06:43.449
advise the secretary about how to deter

01:06:43.449 --> 01:06:46.489
our greatest threats , and you're

01:06:46.489 --> 01:06:48.433
telling me your view is there's no

01:06:48.433 --> 01:06:50.600
threat here , and I'm just telling you

01:06:50.600 --> 01:06:53.510
that just does not bear credible

01:06:53.510 --> 01:06:56.760
analysis . So look , Trump has

01:06:56.899 --> 01:06:59.100
alienated many of our allies , and

01:06:59.100 --> 01:07:01.780
those costs are becoming clear . At the

01:07:01.780 --> 01:07:03.979
same time we have launched war with

01:07:03.979 --> 01:07:07.020
Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu , who

01:07:07.020 --> 01:07:09.500
seems to be pursuing a completely

01:07:09.500 --> 01:07:11.750
different set of objectives . And

01:07:11.750 --> 01:07:14.649
President Trump is unwilling or unable

01:07:15.100 --> 01:07:18.590
even to rein in Netanyahu . On March

01:07:18.590 --> 01:07:21.310
18th , the Netanyahu government bombed

01:07:21.310 --> 01:07:23.709
one of the region's largest oil fields .

01:07:24.229 --> 01:07:26.285
Trump then posted that the US didn't

01:07:26.285 --> 01:07:28.245
even know in advance . And that we

01:07:28.245 --> 01:07:31.084
didn't want further oil strikes because

01:07:31.084 --> 01:07:33.364
of the economic danger that it would

01:07:33.364 --> 01:07:36.685
pose . So Admiral , does it enhance

01:07:36.685 --> 01:07:39.445
strategic deterrence to have major

01:07:39.445 --> 01:07:43.165
partners undermining explicit US policy

01:07:43.165 --> 01:07:43.804
goals ?

01:07:47.070 --> 01:07:49.600
Senator , I respectfully disagree with

01:07:49.600 --> 01:07:52.379
your overall assessment , and you know ,

01:07:52.909 --> 01:07:54.909
what part do you disagree with that

01:07:54.909 --> 01:07:56.965
Trump posted that we didn't know and

01:07:56.965 --> 01:07:59.139
didn't agree with what Netanyahu did ,

01:07:59.439 --> 01:08:01.661
but Netanyahu did it anyway . What part

01:08:01.661 --> 01:08:03.772
are you disagreeing , Senator ? I can

01:08:03.772 --> 01:08:05.661
just speak to my portfolio and my

01:08:05.661 --> 01:08:08.239
responsibilities , and you know , our

01:08:08.239 --> 01:08:11.379
capabilities remain ready to respond .

01:08:12.030 --> 01:08:16.000
And deter and they deter each and

01:08:16.000 --> 01:08:18.278
each and every day . I appreciate that ,

01:08:18.278 --> 01:08:20.479
but that is not my question . My

01:08:20.479 --> 01:08:22.720
question is , does it enhance strategic

01:08:22.720 --> 01:08:25.759
deterrence to have major partners

01:08:25.759 --> 01:08:29.419
undermining explicit US policy goals ?

01:08:30.240 --> 01:08:32.351
Strong mill to mill relationships and

01:08:32.351 --> 01:08:34.407
our alliance network are part of our

01:08:34.407 --> 01:08:37.339
overall deterrence . Look .

01:08:38.000 --> 01:08:41.160
Again , your answer just lacks any

01:08:41.160 --> 01:08:43.459
credibility . If this administration

01:08:43.959 --> 01:08:47.600
can't keep its main partner in line and

01:08:47.600 --> 01:08:49.600
can't keep its own story straight ,

01:08:49.640 --> 01:08:51.790
then we've got a problem . In June ,

01:08:51.839 --> 01:08:54.006
the White House issued a press release

01:08:54.006 --> 01:08:56.939
proclaiming that quote , Iran's nuclear

01:08:56.939 --> 01:08:59.959
facilities have been obliterated and

01:08:59.959 --> 01:09:02.660
suggestions otherwise are fake news .

01:09:02.879 --> 01:09:05.559
And yet now Iran's nuclear The program

01:09:05.559 --> 01:09:08.059
is one of the many changing reasons

01:09:08.398 --> 01:09:10.559
that the administration has given for

01:09:10.559 --> 01:09:13.188
this war . So Admiral Correll , let me

01:09:13.188 --> 01:09:15.299
ask one more . Does it help strategic

01:09:15.299 --> 01:09:18.398
deterrence when the White House changes

01:09:18.398 --> 01:09:20.599
its story minute by minute on the

01:09:20.599 --> 01:09:22.958
reasons for this war ? Senator Warren ,

01:09:24.488 --> 01:09:27.898
the witness on 3 occasions has said

01:09:27.898 --> 01:09:31.139
that . He is declining to answer that

01:09:31.139 --> 01:09:33.659
question because he disagrees with the

01:09:33.659 --> 01:09:35.969
premise . I , I , I appreciate that

01:09:35.969 --> 01:09:38.258
members are , are able to make whatever

01:09:38.258 --> 01:09:40.258
points they want , but I think it's

01:09:40.258 --> 01:09:42.314
clear why he's unable to answer your

01:09:42.314 --> 01:09:44.036
question because he completely

01:09:44.036 --> 01:09:46.202
disagrees with the premise . Glad that

01:09:46.202 --> 01:09:48.425
it's clear to you , Mr . Chairman , but

01:09:48.425 --> 01:09:50.591
with respect , I don't understand what

01:09:50.591 --> 01:09:52.814
part of the premise he disagrees with .

01:09:52.814 --> 01:09:54.939
I'm stating facts here and I'm asking

01:09:54.939 --> 01:09:57.939
if those facts are helpful for the

01:09:57.939 --> 01:10:00.379
United States or unhelpful for the

01:10:00.379 --> 01:10:03.009
United States . Admiral , you can

01:10:03.009 --> 01:10:06.620
answer the question if you're able . I

01:10:06.620 --> 01:10:08.787
have no further comments to make other

01:10:08.787 --> 01:10:10.953
than what I've previously said . Thank

01:10:10.953 --> 01:10:13.176
you , Senator Warren . Senator Cotton .

01:10:14.430 --> 01:10:16.609
Well , for the record , I , I think

01:10:16.609 --> 01:10:19.129
your credibility is very high , Admiral ,

01:10:19.540 --> 01:10:21.660
and you're the commander of strategic

01:10:21.660 --> 01:10:23.493
command . You're not the Central

01:10:23.493 --> 01:10:25.438
Command commander . You're not the

01:10:25.438 --> 01:10:27.438
Secretary of State . So I , I don't

01:10:27.438 --> 01:10:29.604
think it's in your portfolio to make .

01:10:29.790 --> 01:10:31.901
Judgments about allies all around the

01:10:31.901 --> 01:10:34.020
world . Frankly , I , I commend your

01:10:34.020 --> 01:10:36.069
restraint . By the 2nd or 3rd time

01:10:36.069 --> 01:10:38.236
you're asked the question , you didn't

01:10:38.236 --> 01:10:40.458
just borrow from the internet meme that

01:10:40.458 --> 01:10:43.879
this is a Wendy's , ma'am . But , uh ,

01:10:44.140 --> 01:10:46.196
I , I just want to press the point a

01:10:46.196 --> 01:10:49.169
little bit . This idea that we went it

01:10:49.169 --> 01:10:51.509
alone , obviously we didn't go it alone .

01:10:52.470 --> 01:10:55.700
With Israel , Israel is one of the most

01:10:55.700 --> 01:10:57.756
capable military partners we have in

01:10:57.756 --> 01:11:00.250
the world , correct , Admiral ? Yes ,

01:11:00.359 --> 01:11:04.250
Senator . um , and it seems like every

01:11:04.250 --> 01:11:06.649
Arab nation is with us as well . In

01:11:06.649 --> 01:11:08.890
fact , the ambassador from the United

01:11:08.890 --> 01:11:11.001
Arab Emirates just published an op ed

01:11:11.001 --> 01:11:12.946
today in the Wall Street Journal .

01:11:13.660 --> 01:11:15.716
Explaining why we need to finish the

01:11:15.716 --> 01:11:19.569
job in Iran . And the president of

01:11:19.709 --> 01:11:22.810
the UAE , Mohammad bin Zayed , has been

01:11:23.149 --> 01:11:26.310
an unflappable ally , as has the Crown

01:11:26.310 --> 01:11:28.919
Prince of Saudi Arabia . Mohammed bin

01:11:28.919 --> 01:11:31.600
Salman , even countries like Oman and

01:11:31.600 --> 01:11:34.439
Qatar . That tried to mediate

01:11:34.439 --> 01:11:36.459
differences , you know , maintain

01:11:36.459 --> 01:11:39.750
friendly relationships with Iran . have

01:11:40.089 --> 01:11:42.200
expressed their dismay for what's

01:11:42.200 --> 01:11:44.200
happened , not surprisingly , since

01:11:44.669 --> 01:11:47.020
What their friendly relations with Iran

01:11:47.020 --> 01:11:48.964
got them was a bunch of missiles ,

01:11:48.964 --> 01:11:51.990
missiles shot into their country . So I ,

01:11:52.029 --> 01:11:54.140
I think it's far from accurate to say

01:11:54.140 --> 01:11:56.910
we are going it alone in this war

01:11:56.910 --> 01:11:58.910
against Iran's revolutionary terror

01:11:58.910 --> 01:12:01.669
regime . Um , I want to borrow from

01:12:01.669 --> 01:12:03.910
both of your expertise about missiles

01:12:03.910 --> 01:12:06.589
in space , um , and build on what

01:12:06.589 --> 01:12:08.750
Senator Ernst was discussing , the

01:12:08.750 --> 01:12:10.583
launch of the intermediate range

01:12:10.583 --> 01:12:12.694
ballistic missile towards our base in

01:12:12.694 --> 01:12:14.583
Diego Garcia in the middle of the

01:12:14.583 --> 01:12:17.680
Indian Ocean . Um , that's bad .

01:12:19.410 --> 01:12:21.632
I'm glad that it failed . I'm glad that

01:12:21.632 --> 01:12:23.910
we shot down one . it also , of course ,

01:12:23.910 --> 01:12:26.950
shows that the , the fatwa against

01:12:27.779 --> 01:12:29.890
missiles of that range is not exactly

01:12:29.899 --> 01:12:31.899
worth the paper it was written on ,

01:12:31.899 --> 01:12:34.066
probably like the fatwas against other

01:12:34.066 --> 01:12:36.399
long range missiles and nuclear weapons .

01:12:36.399 --> 01:12:39.229
But let me just ask this , the , the

01:12:39.229 --> 01:12:40.930
technology needed not for an

01:12:40.930 --> 01:12:42.930
intermediate range missile , but an

01:12:42.930 --> 01:12:44.986
intercontinental missile , a missile

01:12:44.986 --> 01:12:47.097
that could hit the United States , it

01:12:47.097 --> 01:12:50.000
is pretty much the same as an

01:12:50.000 --> 01:12:52.222
intermediate range missile , isn't that

01:12:52.222 --> 01:12:54.870
right , Admiral Kura ? Yes , Senator ,

01:12:54.950 --> 01:12:57.172
that's correct . Uh , General Whiting ,

01:12:57.172 --> 01:12:59.470
isn't that correct ? Uh , it is ,

01:12:59.479 --> 01:13:01.257
Senator , and it's not too much

01:13:01.257 --> 01:13:03.312
different from a , uh , space launch

01:13:03.312 --> 01:13:05.423
vehicle either . Yeah , and you , you

01:13:05.423 --> 01:13:07.535
know , so you , you need enough boost

01:13:07.535 --> 01:13:09.646
or thrust to get something into space

01:13:09.646 --> 01:13:09.000
and you need a reentry vehicle to get

01:13:09.000 --> 01:13:12.120
it back from outer space or from space

01:13:12.120 --> 01:13:15.040
into the Earth's surface , um , and you

01:13:15.040 --> 01:13:17.151
said , General Riding , Iran has long

01:13:17.151 --> 01:13:20.040
had a space launch vehicle program . Um ,

01:13:20.490 --> 01:13:22.601
have you , in your observations about

01:13:22.601 --> 01:13:24.490
space , have you seen any Iranian

01:13:24.490 --> 01:13:26.546
astronauts up there lately ? They do

01:13:26.546 --> 01:13:28.823
not have a manned space flight program .

01:13:28.823 --> 01:13:31.046
Shocking . Do you think maybe the space

01:13:31.046 --> 01:13:33.157
launch vehicle program is just flimsy

01:13:33.157 --> 01:13:35.379
cover for an intercontinental missile ?

01:13:35.379 --> 01:13:37.157
I do think they were developing

01:13:37.157 --> 01:13:39.268
intercontinental ballistic missiles ,

01:13:39.268 --> 01:13:41.490
Senator , and , and Admiral Crell for a

01:13:41.490 --> 01:13:43.601
reentry vehicle , um , that what they

01:13:43.601 --> 01:13:45.657
used for that missile going to Diego

01:13:45.657 --> 01:13:47.768
Garcia , for that matter , the medium

01:13:47.768 --> 01:13:50.046
range missiles that are shot at Israel ,

01:13:50.046 --> 01:13:52.212
that'd be a suitable reentry vehicle ,

01:13:52.212 --> 01:13:54.323
right ? That's correct , Senator . So

01:13:54.323 --> 01:13:56.490
all you'd have to do in a , in a crude

01:13:56.490 --> 01:13:56.479
but functioning fashion is marry those

01:13:56.479 --> 01:13:59.240
two technologies , and Iran would be

01:13:59.240 --> 01:14:01.296
able to strike us here in the United

01:14:01.296 --> 01:14:03.184
States . Is that correct ? That's

01:14:03.184 --> 01:14:05.407
correct . And , and I have to say I , I

01:14:05.407 --> 01:14:07.629
think that could be done in a matter of

01:14:07.629 --> 01:14:09.851
months , not years , and maybe not that

01:14:09.851 --> 01:14:09.439
many months . Is that on your mind ,

01:14:09.560 --> 01:14:11.227
Admiral Correll at Stratcom ?

01:14:11.227 --> 01:14:13.490
Absolutely . OK , they demonstrate that

01:14:13.490 --> 01:14:15.490
technology . Thank you for that . I

01:14:15.490 --> 01:14:17.768
want to turn to slightly shorter range ,

01:14:17.768 --> 01:14:20.046
uh , weapons . You testified , Admiral ,

01:14:20.046 --> 01:14:21.879
um , at the House Armed Services

01:14:21.879 --> 01:14:24.439
Committee . That China seeks a larger

01:14:24.439 --> 01:14:26.161
and more diverse nuclear force

01:14:26.290 --> 01:14:29.330
comprised of systems ranging from low

01:14:29.330 --> 01:14:31.386
yield precision strike missiles to a

01:14:31.386 --> 01:14:33.497
bunch of other stuff . I want to talk

01:14:33.497 --> 01:14:35.552
about the low yield precision strike

01:14:35.552 --> 01:14:37.719
missiles and also the need that you've

01:14:37.719 --> 01:14:39.886
also discussed for an enhanced theater

01:14:39.886 --> 01:14:41.997
capable theater nuclear capability to

01:14:41.997 --> 01:14:44.290
counter such developments from China ,

01:14:44.370 --> 01:14:46.689
from Russia , from North Korea . Could

01:14:46.689 --> 01:14:49.479
you discuss what . Resources ,

01:14:49.640 --> 01:14:53.319
capabilities , authorities you need to

01:14:53.319 --> 01:14:55.430
counter the threat of theater nuclear

01:14:55.430 --> 01:14:59.180
forces . Yes , Senator , um , in terms

01:14:59.180 --> 01:15:01.299
of , uh , the , the deterrence

01:15:01.299 --> 01:15:04.540
challenge associated with uh Russia or

01:15:04.540 --> 01:15:06.651
China and their theater nuclear force

01:15:06.651 --> 01:15:09.970
capability , um , part of the , uh ,

01:15:09.979 --> 01:15:12.740
part of the strategy there is to ensure

01:15:12.740 --> 01:15:16.580
that we raise the threshold for use

01:15:16.580 --> 01:15:19.379
of that capability by Xi or Putin , and

01:15:19.379 --> 01:15:21.620
so we're investing in theater nuclear

01:15:21.620 --> 01:15:24.419
forces capabilities . And slick them in

01:15:24.419 --> 01:15:27.120
as a primary example of that capability

01:15:27.299 --> 01:15:30.620
intended to have a response that

01:15:30.939 --> 01:15:34.620
is in kind and could match should Xi or

01:15:34.620 --> 01:15:38.419
Putin determine to think that there was

01:15:38.419 --> 01:15:40.641
a lower threshold for use . Thank you .

01:15:40.641 --> 01:15:42.808
Well , I don't think we can do it fast

01:15:42.808 --> 01:15:44.870
enough . Uh , thank you very much ,

01:15:44.979 --> 01:15:47.149
Senator Cotton . Senator Kelly , thank

01:15:47.149 --> 01:15:49.669
you , Mr . Chairman . Uh , gentlemen ,

01:15:49.790 --> 01:15:51.901
thank you both for being here today .

01:15:51.901 --> 01:15:54.068
Admiral , I want to start with you and

01:15:54.068 --> 01:15:56.290
talk a little bit about missile defense

01:15:56.290 --> 01:15:58.649
and Golden Dome . Uh , as I understand ,

01:15:59.189 --> 01:16:01.356
the architecture envisions a much more

01:16:01.356 --> 01:16:04.109
expansive layered system capable of

01:16:04.109 --> 01:16:07.040
defending against large scale missile

01:16:07.040 --> 01:16:10.830
threats . Maybe including up to a

01:16:10.830 --> 01:16:13.589
salvo from peer adversaries . That kind

01:16:13.589 --> 01:16:15.910
of vision requires a large number of

01:16:15.910 --> 01:16:18.569
interceptors , far beyond our current

01:16:18.569 --> 01:16:20.589
inventories . We're talking about

01:16:20.589 --> 01:16:22.970
different ways how we could do this ,

01:16:23.549 --> 01:16:25.189
um , but also increasingly

01:16:25.189 --> 01:16:26.870
sophisticated electromagnetic

01:16:26.870 --> 01:16:29.069
countermeasures to deal with decoys ,

01:16:29.149 --> 01:16:31.316
jamming , other countermeasures . It's

01:16:31.316 --> 01:16:33.970
a complicated problem . Uh , we could

01:16:33.970 --> 01:16:36.609
be seeing , you know , issues with

01:16:36.609 --> 01:16:38.830
trying to , you know , intercept .

01:16:40.640 --> 01:16:43.799
You know , ICBMs that are on

01:16:43.799 --> 01:16:46.259
trajectories on different orbital

01:16:46.640 --> 01:16:48.759
inclinations because of the latitude

01:16:48.759 --> 01:16:51.092
they're launching from , some land base ,

01:16:51.092 --> 01:16:54.040
some sea base . So Admiral , how do you

01:16:54.040 --> 01:16:56.151
assess the operational feasibility of

01:16:56.151 --> 01:16:58.310
this approach ? I understand the

01:16:58.310 --> 01:17:00.310
argument that a more robust missile

01:17:00.310 --> 01:17:02.421
defense architecture could strengthen

01:17:02.421 --> 01:17:05.200
deterrence by denial and provide

01:17:05.200 --> 01:17:07.478
additional protection for the homeland ,

01:17:07.478 --> 01:17:10.180
but at scale . This becomes a question

01:17:10.680 --> 01:17:13.600
of cost , capability , and plain

01:17:13.600 --> 01:17:15.899
physics . One of my big concerns here

01:17:15.899 --> 01:17:18.720
is we spend $500 billion.01 trillion

01:17:18.720 --> 01:17:20.887
dollars , and we get to the end of the

01:17:20.887 --> 01:17:23.109
timeline here and we have a system that

01:17:23.109 --> 01:17:25.109
just fundamentally does not work or

01:17:25.109 --> 01:17:27.439
does not work well enough to increase

01:17:27.439 --> 01:17:31.390
deterrence . From

01:17:31.390 --> 01:17:33.501
my perspective , Senator , the , um ,

01:17:33.501 --> 01:17:36.310
the work initially on the sensor layer

01:17:36.310 --> 01:17:40.240
and the capability to detect and

01:17:40.240 --> 01:17:43.149
track advanced missiles that would be

01:17:43.149 --> 01:17:46.379
advanced uh hypersonics , um , advanced

01:17:46.379 --> 01:17:48.212
cruise missiles , and fractional

01:17:48.212 --> 01:17:50.629
orbital bombardment capability , that's

01:17:50.629 --> 01:17:53.000
step one in the architecture , um ,

01:17:53.149 --> 01:17:55.890
that we're talking about , um . And I

01:17:55.890 --> 01:17:58.168
also agree , I see the benefit in that ,

01:17:58.168 --> 01:18:00.334
you know , hypersonics with hypersonic

01:18:00.334 --> 01:18:02.950
glide vehicles being able to maneuver ,

01:18:03.379 --> 01:18:07.350
coming from a non-standard , let's say ,

01:18:07.419 --> 01:18:10.060
direction is something we have to focus

01:18:10.060 --> 01:18:13.649
on . It's like the bigger picture of a ,

01:18:14.020 --> 01:18:16.729
you know , salvo and being able to

01:18:16.729 --> 01:18:19.859
intercept , you know , multiple , uh ,

01:18:19.979 --> 01:18:21.590
multiple rounds coming at us

01:18:21.590 --> 01:18:23.810
simultaneously . Yes , Senator , and

01:18:23.810 --> 01:18:26.750
there's , there's a , uh , there's a

01:18:26.750 --> 01:18:30.069
universe of capabilities and efforts

01:18:30.069 --> 01:18:32.291
associated with that . You talked about

01:18:32.291 --> 01:18:34.402
space-based interceptors . That's one

01:18:34.402 --> 01:18:36.402
technology that will , will need to

01:18:36.402 --> 01:18:40.240
mature and um see what the limits are

01:18:40.240 --> 01:18:42.270
of that in terms of interception

01:18:42.270 --> 01:18:44.950
capabilities . Uh , Joan Klein is

01:18:44.950 --> 01:18:46.950
approaching it from a , from a kill

01:18:46.950 --> 01:18:49.779
chain perspective and understanding the

01:18:49.779 --> 01:18:51.859
whole system . That goes into the

01:18:51.859 --> 01:18:55.810
ability to launch an attack against ,

01:18:56.069 --> 01:18:59.339
against the US , um , so that includes

01:18:59.549 --> 01:19:01.870
looking closely at left of launch

01:19:01.870 --> 01:19:04.229
capabilities . So you're looking at

01:19:04.229 --> 01:19:06.509
left of launch , you know , initial

01:19:06.509 --> 01:19:09.819
launch , boost phase , uh , and , and

01:19:09.819 --> 01:19:13.149
the full range of capabilities there in

01:19:13.149 --> 01:19:16.450
terms of that golden dome for America .

01:19:16.910 --> 01:19:19.021
You think we can build something that

01:19:19.021 --> 01:19:22.479
achieves . The Requirements .

01:19:22.959 --> 01:19:25.240
I think we're gonna advance our

01:19:25.240 --> 01:19:27.073
understanding , our capabilities

01:19:27.073 --> 01:19:29.184
considerably with that effort . Yes ,

01:19:29.184 --> 01:19:31.240
Senator . Thank you . uh , general .

01:19:32.839 --> 01:19:35.600
There's been reports that last year

01:19:35.600 --> 01:19:39.500
China's SJ 25 and SJ21 maneuvered

01:19:39.879 --> 01:19:43.799
into Prox ops , um , and we

01:19:43.799 --> 01:19:45.855
think they may have done a satellite

01:19:45.855 --> 01:19:48.609
refueling . Experiment , probably an

01:19:48.609 --> 01:19:50.776
experiment . If confirmed , this would

01:19:50.776 --> 01:19:53.169
be the first time a satellite in geo

01:19:53.169 --> 01:19:54.970
refueled another , that's my

01:19:54.970 --> 01:19:57.089
understanding . That represents a

01:19:57.089 --> 01:19:59.359
significant leap , uh , not just in

01:19:59.359 --> 01:20:01.581
sustainment , but in China's capability

01:20:01.581 --> 01:20:03.649
to conduct precise rendezvous ,

01:20:04.279 --> 01:20:06.919
maneuver , prox ops , docking

01:20:06.919 --> 01:20:08.919
operations . So taken together with

01:20:08.919 --> 01:20:10.530
their broader investments in

01:20:10.530 --> 01:20:13.299
counterpace capabilities . Um , they're

01:20:13.299 --> 01:20:15.410
building a dynamic and maneuverdriven

01:20:15.410 --> 01:20:17.355
approach to space , one that would

01:20:17.355 --> 01:20:19.709
allow them to persist on orbit longer ,

01:20:20.109 --> 01:20:21.830
uh , reposition assets , and

01:20:21.830 --> 01:20:23.941
potentially hold US systems at risk .

01:20:24.270 --> 01:20:26.910
Can you comment about your concern and

01:20:26.910 --> 01:20:29.509
about what steps we should be taking to

01:20:29.509 --> 01:20:32.109
counter that or build our own

01:20:32.109 --> 01:20:35.459
capability to be able to match the ,

01:20:35.830 --> 01:20:38.589
the on-orbit persistence ?

01:20:39.680 --> 01:20:41.847
Senator , thank you for the question ,

01:20:41.847 --> 01:20:44.290
and we were watching that SJ 21 , SJ25

01:20:44.290 --> 01:20:46.457
operation last year very closely , and

01:20:46.457 --> 01:20:48.623
I think your question well articulated

01:20:48.623 --> 01:20:50.290
what is happening . China has

01:20:50.290 --> 01:20:52.346
demonstrated their sophistication on

01:20:52.346 --> 01:20:54.179
orbit to include now starting to

01:20:54.179 --> 01:20:56.290
deliver a maneuver , a broad maneuver

01:20:56.290 --> 01:20:58.850
capability on orbit , and my concern is

01:20:58.850 --> 01:21:01.089
if they develop that , they will have

01:21:01.089 --> 01:21:03.555
the ability to maneuver . Advantage the

01:21:03.555 --> 01:21:06.305
way the United States has for decades

01:21:06.475 --> 01:21:08.674
on the land , at sea and in the air

01:21:08.674 --> 01:21:10.730
used maneuver for our advantage . In

01:21:10.730 --> 01:21:12.952
fact , we talk about maneuver warfare .

01:21:12.952 --> 01:21:15.118
So Senator , my belief is that we need

01:21:15.118 --> 01:21:17.118
to deliver our own maneuver warfare

01:21:17.118 --> 01:21:19.118
capability to make sure that we can

01:21:19.118 --> 01:21:21.285
leverage the advantages that the Joint

01:21:21.285 --> 01:21:23.507
Force has developed over the decades in

01:21:23.507 --> 01:21:25.730
space as we have in other domains . All

01:21:25.730 --> 01:21:28.279
right , thank you , General . Senator

01:21:28.279 --> 01:21:30.446
Sullivan , thank you , Mr . Chairman .

01:21:30.446 --> 01:21:32.612
Thank you , gentlemen for being here .

01:21:32.959 --> 01:21:34.792
Admiral , I want to follow up on

01:21:34.792 --> 01:21:37.240
Senator Kelly's Golden Dome discussion .

01:21:37.319 --> 01:21:39.375
I've been one of the senators who've

01:21:39.375 --> 01:21:41.430
been very focused on missile defense

01:21:41.430 --> 01:21:43.763
for a long time , including Golden Dome .

01:21:44.540 --> 01:21:46.373
Senator Kramer and I here on the

01:21:46.373 --> 01:21:48.540
committee have focused a lot on that ,

01:21:48.620 --> 01:21:52.569
our Golden Dome Act . Uh , that we

01:21:52.569 --> 01:21:54.625
introduced last year , a lot of that

01:21:54.625 --> 01:21:57.580
was in the NDAA . General Gutline

01:21:58.319 --> 01:22:01.390
mentioned . That he clearly thought we

01:22:01.390 --> 01:22:04.790
had the technology to do this . Um ,

01:22:05.629 --> 01:22:07.462
I think we have the leadership .

01:22:07.462 --> 01:22:09.685
Certainly the president has made this a

01:22:09.685 --> 01:22:11.740
priority of his , which is Important

01:22:11.740 --> 01:22:14.018
for getting an initiative of this size ,

01:22:14.609 --> 01:22:17.810
um , and complexity completed . You

01:22:17.810 --> 01:22:19.866
have a lot of interest in Congress ,

01:22:19.866 --> 01:22:22.032
you have good funding from the Working

01:22:22.032 --> 01:22:24.199
Families Tax Cuts Act that we got done

01:22:24.199 --> 01:22:27.450
in July . So , but one of the things

01:22:27.450 --> 01:22:29.450
that General Gutlein mentioned that

01:22:29.450 --> 01:22:31.561
could be a challenge was actually not

01:22:31.561 --> 01:22:33.672
the technology but the organizational

01:22:33.672 --> 01:22:35.783
structure within the US government to

01:22:35.783 --> 01:22:38.109
make this happen . You know , we kind

01:22:38.109 --> 01:22:40.149
of , uh , in a hearing a number of

01:22:40.149 --> 01:22:42.589
months ago , we talked about this in

01:22:42.589 --> 01:22:46.100
some ways like , um , Manhattan Project

01:22:46.100 --> 01:22:49.299
2.0 , that's the scale . So , can you

01:22:49.299 --> 01:22:51.520
give me a sense from your perspective

01:22:51.939 --> 01:22:55.479
on how this is moving forward and , uh ,

01:22:55.779 --> 01:22:58.899
where we need to continue to , Focus ,

01:22:59.029 --> 01:23:01.979
as I mentioned in the NDAA , Senator

01:23:01.979 --> 01:23:04.146
Kramer and I were able to get a lot of

01:23:04.500 --> 01:23:08.339
elements of , Legislation supporting

01:23:09.000 --> 01:23:10.778
In accelerating the Golden Dome

01:23:10.778 --> 01:23:13.279
initiative into law , but I'd like your

01:23:13.279 --> 01:23:16.680
assessment . Um ,

01:23:17.180 --> 01:23:20.339
so Stratcom is one of the key , uh ,

01:23:20.540 --> 01:23:23.899
CCOs that is , uh , supporting Joe

01:23:23.899 --> 01:23:26.121
Gutlein's leadership on this effort and

01:23:26.121 --> 01:23:28.177
Stratcom , Joe Whiting at SpaceCom ,

01:23:28.180 --> 01:23:30.729
and then Joan Glo at NorthCO in

01:23:30.729 --> 01:23:33.500
particular for the Joint Force , um ,

01:23:33.819 --> 01:23:36.220
and from my perspective , uh , Joe

01:23:36.220 --> 01:23:38.442
Gutline's providing superb leadership .

01:23:38.442 --> 01:23:40.553
Yeah , I think he's doing a great job

01:23:40.553 --> 01:23:43.160
too , yeah , um , and , uh , right now

01:23:43.220 --> 01:23:45.899
he's focused on . The various

01:23:45.899 --> 01:23:48.620
capabilities , the as is capabilities

01:23:48.620 --> 01:23:51.000
in terms of the architecture to sense ,

01:23:51.500 --> 01:23:54.979
detect and track , uh , and integrating

01:23:54.979 --> 01:23:57.899
that , uh , all of that information so

01:23:57.899 --> 01:24:01.720
you have a data layer that , um , um ,

01:24:01.729 --> 01:24:04.109
enhances our ability to detect and

01:24:04.109 --> 01:24:07.700
track any kind of inbound uh threat .

01:24:08.109 --> 01:24:10.399
Um , and then integrating the command

01:24:10.399 --> 01:24:12.399
and control associated with that to

01:24:12.399 --> 01:24:14.910
your point about , you know , the

01:24:14.910 --> 01:24:17.021
organizational alignment , what's the

01:24:17.021 --> 01:24:18.854
optimum organizational alignment

01:24:18.854 --> 01:24:21.077
associated with that , and that's where

01:24:21.077 --> 01:24:23.310
he's focused for , uh , technology

01:24:23.310 --> 01:24:26.479
demonstration this summer on the

01:24:26.479 --> 01:24:28.646
command and control capability and how

01:24:28.646 --> 01:24:30.646
we've advanced that , and there's a

01:24:30.646 --> 01:24:32.757
number of innovative companies . That

01:24:32.757 --> 01:24:34.979
are closely aligned and supporting that

01:24:34.979 --> 01:24:37.201
effort , and I'm highly encouraged , we

01:24:37.201 --> 01:24:39.535
could talk more in a classified setting ,

01:24:39.535 --> 01:24:41.701
but I'm highly encouraged by , uh , by

01:24:41.701 --> 01:24:44.035
the progress that they're making . Good .

01:24:44.035 --> 01:24:45.868
I am as well . Let me , uh , you

01:24:45.868 --> 01:24:47.868
mentioned sense , detect , detect ,

01:24:47.868 --> 01:24:50.870
track , and there's one more element in

01:24:50.870 --> 01:24:53.549
that chain , and that's kill . Um , a

01:24:53.549 --> 01:24:57.479
lot of that currently . Um , those

01:24:58.209 --> 01:25:00.600
Elements of missile defense are based

01:25:00.600 --> 01:25:03.649
in Alaska . Actually , most of them in

01:25:03.649 --> 01:25:05.759
terms of ground-base , um ,

01:25:05.890 --> 01:25:08.750
interceptors , tracking . One of the

01:25:08.750 --> 01:25:10.694
things I've been concerned about ,

01:25:10.694 --> 01:25:13.910
Admiral , is , um , in 2017 , again ,

01:25:13.990 --> 01:25:16.212
working directly with the president and

01:25:16.212 --> 01:25:18.830
his team , my bill , the Advancing

01:25:18.830 --> 01:25:21.589
America's Missile Defense Act passed as

01:25:21.589 --> 01:25:23.910
part of the NDAA . They called for more

01:25:23.910 --> 01:25:25.966
ground-based missile interceptors at

01:25:25.966 --> 01:25:29.779
Fort Greeley . Which we built out 20

01:25:29.779 --> 01:25:33.600
more silos , but , um , they're empty

01:25:33.899 --> 01:25:36.620
and they , they remain empty , which to

01:25:36.620 --> 01:25:39.419
me makes zero sense . How quickly are

01:25:39.419 --> 01:25:42.620
we going to fill those 20 empty silos

01:25:42.620 --> 01:25:45.299
with the next generation ground-based

01:25:45.299 --> 01:25:47.466
missile interceptor ? It seems to me a

01:25:47.466 --> 01:25:50.700
huge , miss in our

01:25:51.439 --> 01:25:54.660
current posture to protect the country

01:25:55.200 --> 01:25:59.160
when we have Missile interceptor silos

01:25:59.160 --> 01:26:01.104
that are built , ready to go , and

01:26:01.104 --> 01:26:03.327
they're empty , and they remain empty .

01:26:04.520 --> 01:26:07.040
Um , Senator , I do not have the exact

01:26:07.040 --> 01:26:09.151
details on that . I can , I'll , I'll

01:26:09.151 --> 01:26:11.373
take that as a look up and come back to

01:26:11.373 --> 01:26:13.596
you and work with John Gutlein . I know

01:26:13.596 --> 01:26:15.484
we have challenges in our defense

01:26:15.484 --> 01:26:17.970
industrial base in terms of delivering ,

01:26:18.129 --> 01:26:20.296
you know , at scale , uh , some of the

01:26:20.296 --> 01:26:22.462
capabilities that we need . And , uh ,

01:26:22.520 --> 01:26:24.687
let me , uh , just , uh , thank you on

01:26:24.687 --> 01:26:26.687
that . And for the record , General

01:26:26.687 --> 01:26:28.909
Whiting , I , I would appreciate if you

01:26:28.909 --> 01:26:31.076
can give me a sense , and I don't want

01:26:31.076 --> 01:26:30.850
to run over my time here , so I'll just

01:26:30.850 --> 01:26:33.017
ask a question if you can provide it .

01:26:33.350 --> 01:26:35.500
On a lot of your missions , a key

01:26:35.500 --> 01:26:38.160
anchor point on that is Clare Space

01:26:38.160 --> 01:26:40.327
Force Station in Alaska , and I'm just

01:26:40.640 --> 01:26:43.200
wondering if you are looking at other

01:26:43.200 --> 01:26:45.859
missions and capabilities and build out

01:26:46.359 --> 01:26:48.415
of that critical area , particularly

01:26:48.415 --> 01:26:50.359
with the long range discrimination

01:26:50.359 --> 01:26:52.669
radar that's Now up and running is

01:26:52.669 --> 01:26:54.225
probably the most important

01:26:54.225 --> 01:26:56.502
ground-based radar system in the world ,

01:26:56.502 --> 01:26:59.509
uh , but if you can get back to me for

01:26:59.509 --> 01:27:01.509
a question for the record on that ,

01:27:01.509 --> 01:27:03.565
thank you , we will take that on the

01:27:03.565 --> 01:27:05.731
record . Thank you very much , Senator

01:27:05.731 --> 01:27:07.842
Sullivan , uh , Senator Rosen . Thank

01:27:07.842 --> 01:27:10.009
you , Chairman Wicker , Ranking Member

01:27:10.009 --> 01:27:12.065
Reed General and Admiral . Thank you

01:27:12.065 --> 01:27:11.790
for being here today and for your

01:27:11.790 --> 01:27:14.680
service , um . You know , I want to

01:27:14.680 --> 01:27:17.013
talk a little bit about nuclear testing .

01:27:17.149 --> 01:27:19.482
You know , as members of this committee ,

01:27:19.482 --> 01:27:21.705
they've heard me raise it over and over

01:27:21.705 --> 01:27:23.760
again . The Nevada National Security

01:27:23.760 --> 01:27:25.927
site , formerly the Nevada Test Site ,

01:27:25.927 --> 01:27:27.927
uh , continues and will continue to

01:27:27.927 --> 01:27:30.149
play a critical role in nuclear weapons

01:27:30.149 --> 01:27:32.371
development , but some of my colleagues

01:27:32.371 --> 01:27:32.040
on the other side like to throw about

01:27:32.040 --> 01:27:34.919
nuclear response as if it were nothing ,

01:27:35.120 --> 01:27:37.120
as if it were nothing , as if there

01:27:37.120 --> 01:27:38.839
were no consequences and no

01:27:38.839 --> 01:27:41.825
consequences that that last . For

01:27:41.825 --> 01:27:45.345
decades , even longer in some cases ,

01:27:45.654 --> 01:27:48.504
and so , um , Nevada was ground zero

01:27:48.745 --> 01:27:50.984
for a majority of these tests . The

01:27:50.984 --> 01:27:53.206
United States explosive nuclear testing

01:27:53.206 --> 01:27:57.205
from 1951 to 1992 with 100 atmospheric

01:27:57.424 --> 01:28:00.584
and 828 underground tests . There are

01:28:00.584 --> 01:28:02.584
consequences to what my friends are

01:28:02.665 --> 01:28:04.498
just bantering around like it is

01:28:04.498 --> 01:28:07.265
nothing . And after George HW Bush

01:28:07.265 --> 01:28:09.665
signed a testing moratorium in 1992 ,

01:28:09.944 --> 01:28:13.169
the US . Rightfully developed the

01:28:13.169 --> 01:28:15.058
stockpile stewardship program and

01:28:15.058 --> 01:28:17.490
subcritical experiments through which

01:28:17.490 --> 01:28:19.601
the Nevada National Security site has

01:28:19.601 --> 01:28:21.768
continued to certify the reliability ,

01:28:21.768 --> 01:28:23.879
the safety , the effectiveness of our

01:28:23.879 --> 01:28:26.830
nuclear stockpile , and using science

01:28:26.930 --> 01:28:29.350
and physics and math and technology .

01:28:30.490 --> 01:28:33.290
We do not need explosive nuclear

01:28:33.290 --> 01:28:35.319
testing . So today , the site's

01:28:35.319 --> 01:28:37.375
underground laboratory is undergoing

01:28:37.375 --> 01:28:39.330
major mining and construction to

01:28:39.330 --> 01:28:41.441
provide enhanced capabilities for the

01:28:41.441 --> 01:28:44.410
subcritical experiments , ECSE . It's

01:28:44.410 --> 01:28:47.000
going to host two of the most capable

01:28:47.000 --> 01:28:49.529
weapons radiographic systems in the

01:28:49.529 --> 01:28:51.640
world . Together with these efforts ,

01:28:51.640 --> 01:28:53.490
these machines will provide even

01:28:53.490 --> 01:28:55.330
greater certainty and data about

01:28:55.330 --> 01:28:57.663
performance of the US nuclear stockpile ,

01:28:57.663 --> 01:28:59.774
far better data than experts say than

01:28:59.774 --> 01:29:01.886
any information that could be gleaned

01:29:01.886 --> 01:29:04.108
if the US were to break that moratorium

01:29:04.108 --> 01:29:06.108
and conduct explosive nuclear tests

01:29:06.108 --> 01:29:08.219
either below ground or above ground ,

01:29:08.219 --> 01:29:10.386
as the president and some of his orbit

01:29:10.386 --> 01:29:12.759
have advocated . For decades , the

01:29:12.759 --> 01:29:14.815
directors of the National Laboratory

01:29:14.815 --> 01:29:16.981
StratCOM commanders and secretaries of

01:29:16.981 --> 01:29:18.815
Defense and Energy have annually

01:29:18.815 --> 01:29:21.279
certified the military effectiveness of

01:29:21.279 --> 01:29:24.649
our stockpile and certified . That it

01:29:24.649 --> 01:29:26.371
does not require resumption of

01:29:26.371 --> 01:29:28.450
explosive testing with over 1000

01:29:28.450 --> 01:29:30.770
subcritical experiments , robust

01:29:30.770 --> 01:29:32.992
computer modeling providing the data to

01:29:32.992 --> 01:29:35.270
support these positions . So Admiral

01:29:35.270 --> 01:29:37.740
Correll , following up on a question I

01:29:37.740 --> 01:29:39.907
asked you at your nomination hearing ,

01:29:39.907 --> 01:29:42.073
now that you've taken command , do you

01:29:42.073 --> 01:29:43.796
see any technical or strategic

01:29:43.796 --> 01:29:45.851
justification for resuming explosive

01:29:45.851 --> 01:29:47.962
testing , and do you agree with these

01:29:47.962 --> 01:29:50.129
data informed assessments that it , it

01:29:50.129 --> 01:29:52.351
is unnecessary for the United States to

01:29:52.351 --> 01:29:54.573
resume explosive nuclear testing of any

01:29:54.573 --> 01:29:58.549
kind ? Senator , as you mentioned ,

01:29:58.629 --> 01:30:02.229
I , um , uh , uh , review an annual

01:30:02.229 --> 01:30:04.390
assessment of our existing testing

01:30:04.390 --> 01:30:07.569
capability and its ability to , uh ,

01:30:07.589 --> 01:30:10.669
certify that our warheads are safe ,

01:30:10.750 --> 01:30:13.470
secure , effective , and remain

01:30:13.470 --> 01:30:16.029
credible as a deterrent , and that

01:30:16.029 --> 01:30:18.196
process will continue , um , and there

01:30:18.196 --> 01:30:20.549
are exquisite capabilities associated

01:30:20.549 --> 01:30:24.120
with that you mentioned . Many of those

01:30:24.120 --> 01:30:26.176
capabilities . In addition to that ,

01:30:26.176 --> 01:30:30.120
the national ignition facility is

01:30:30.120 --> 01:30:32.287
another really important one that give

01:30:32.287 --> 01:30:35.680
us insights as those

01:30:35.680 --> 01:30:38.359
warheads age , we need to continue to

01:30:38.359 --> 01:30:42.040
be vigilant about that . And

01:30:42.040 --> 01:30:43.873
I'll continue to provide my best

01:30:43.873 --> 01:30:46.839
military advice with respect for the

01:30:46.839 --> 01:30:49.500
need , should there be a need to resume

01:30:49.839 --> 01:30:53.259
any testing , but I stand by the letter

01:30:53.600 --> 01:30:56.680
that I endorse , you know , most

01:30:56.680 --> 01:31:00.120
recently this last year in terms of the

01:31:00.120 --> 01:31:02.640
sufficiency of testing . The only

01:31:02.640 --> 01:31:04.879
caveat I'd put on that is having the

01:31:04.879 --> 01:31:08.080
capability . To resume

01:31:08.700 --> 01:31:10.644
additional testing should the need

01:31:10.644 --> 01:31:13.620
arise , that we posture ourselves to be

01:31:13.620 --> 01:31:16.479
able to do that . Well , I'm gonna

01:31:16.479 --> 01:31:18.859
disagree with you there resuming , uh ,

01:31:18.919 --> 01:31:21.660
uh , putting us , sending a billion

01:31:21.660 --> 01:31:23.680
dollars to put us in a position to

01:31:23.680 --> 01:31:26.000
resume explosive testing after all the

01:31:26.000 --> 01:31:28.222
money that we have spent on the science

01:31:28.222 --> 01:31:30.160
so far with stockpile stewardship

01:31:30.160 --> 01:31:32.216
programs , enhanced capabilities for

01:31:32.216 --> 01:31:34.271
subcritical experiments , artificial

01:31:34.271 --> 01:31:36.160
intelligence for weapons design ,

01:31:36.160 --> 01:31:38.327
productions of new pits to replace the

01:31:38.327 --> 01:31:40.549
aging ones . All of these initiatives ,

01:31:40.774 --> 01:31:43.455
they will affect our certainty about

01:31:43.455 --> 01:31:46.214
our warhead performance and will be

01:31:46.214 --> 01:31:49.515
able to help us go forward and so , uh ,

01:31:49.535 --> 01:31:51.705
I believe we should be able to use

01:31:51.705 --> 01:31:54.095
those experiments to the safety of our

01:31:54.095 --> 01:31:55.984
American citizens where you'll be

01:31:55.984 --> 01:31:58.950
testing this . Uh , thank you , Senator

01:31:58.950 --> 01:32:01.259
Rosen . Clearly we have a disagreement

01:32:01.600 --> 01:32:05.009
on this , uh . Subject between you and

01:32:05.009 --> 01:32:07.120
the witness , but thank you , ma'am ,

01:32:07.270 --> 01:32:09.381
um , Senator Tuberville . Thank you ,

01:32:09.430 --> 01:32:11.430
Mr . Chairman . Good morning . Uh ,

01:32:11.509 --> 01:32:13.453
General Whiting , just a couple of

01:32:13.453 --> 01:32:15.287
updates , uh , a move from Space

01:32:15.287 --> 01:32:18.549
Command . Securing a new military

01:32:18.549 --> 01:32:21.750
construction agent , uh , today , March

01:32:21.750 --> 01:32:23.806
twenty-sixth is the deadline . Do we

01:32:23.806 --> 01:32:27.259
have any update on that ? Uh , Senator ,

01:32:27.310 --> 01:32:29.477
thank you for the question . Our , our

01:32:29.477 --> 01:32:31.754
move to Huntsville is , uh , is moving ,

01:32:31.754 --> 01:32:33.921
uh , forward , and we are right now in

01:32:33.921 --> 01:32:36.540
final discussions with , uh , elements

01:32:36.540 --> 01:32:38.651
of the , uh , United States Air Force

01:32:38.651 --> 01:32:40.818
and , uh , the Army Corps of Engineers

01:32:40.818 --> 01:32:42.984
to pull together what the team of that

01:32:42.984 --> 01:32:44.984
construction , uh , agent will look

01:32:44.984 --> 01:32:47.207
like . Uh , I , I believe the Secretary

01:32:47.207 --> 01:32:49.429
of the Air Force , Secretary Mink , and

01:32:49.429 --> 01:32:51.540
I will memorialize that . Decision in

01:32:51.540 --> 01:32:53.484
the very near future . So I'm very

01:32:53.484 --> 01:32:55.707
happy that we're able to take advantage

01:32:55.707 --> 01:32:57.762
of the MLCO reform language that the

01:32:57.762 --> 01:32:59.596
committee inserted into the last

01:32:59.596 --> 01:33:01.651
National Defense Authorization Act ,

01:33:01.651 --> 01:33:03.762
which is allowing us to build our new

01:33:03.762 --> 01:33:05.984
headquarters in a different way than we

01:33:05.984 --> 01:33:07.873
would have last year without that

01:33:07.873 --> 01:33:09.984
language . Existing facilities , what

01:33:09.984 --> 01:33:12.040
are you thinking about that ? Or are

01:33:12.040 --> 01:33:11.915
you thinking of new facilities ? Any ,

01:33:12.084 --> 01:33:14.419
any update on that ? Yes , Senator , as

01:33:14.419 --> 01:33:16.586
we're building that new headquarters ,

01:33:16.586 --> 01:33:18.586
that will take a few years , we are

01:33:18.586 --> 01:33:20.720
modifying existing facilities on

01:33:20.779 --> 01:33:23.310
Redstone Arsenal , and in fact , next

01:33:23.310 --> 01:33:25.421
month in April , we will do our first

01:33:25.421 --> 01:33:28.379
ribbon cutting on a top secret SKF

01:33:28.700 --> 01:33:30.867
that'll seat over 80 people , and then

01:33:30.867 --> 01:33:33.410
we will start moving personnel there to

01:33:33.419 --> 01:33:35.979
to begin work at that level . So I'm

01:33:35.979 --> 01:33:38.146
happy at the , the progress that we're

01:33:38.146 --> 01:33:40.312
making and that progress will continue

01:33:40.312 --> 01:33:42.312
over the next couple of years as we

01:33:42.312 --> 01:33:44.870
work to . a significant portion of our

01:33:44.870 --> 01:33:46.926
staff there even while the permanent

01:33:46.926 --> 01:33:48.981
headquarters is being built . Yeah .

01:33:48.981 --> 01:33:50.981
What's the timeline on that ? Is my

01:33:50.981 --> 01:33:53.148
understanding was it 3 to 7 years . Is

01:33:53.148 --> 01:33:54.870
that correct for the permanent

01:33:54.870 --> 01:33:56.981
headquarters , Senator ? Um , I would

01:33:56.981 --> 01:33:58.870
expect right now that , uh , that

01:33:58.870 --> 01:34:00.926
facility will break ground next year

01:34:00.926 --> 01:34:03.037
and will come online , uh , likely in

01:34:03.037 --> 01:34:05.790
2031 , uh , and then there'll be

01:34:05.790 --> 01:34:07.846
probably a year's worth of time that

01:34:07.846 --> 01:34:10.123
we're moving people into that facility ,

01:34:10.123 --> 01:34:12.123
but , but that's the timeline we're

01:34:12.123 --> 01:34:13.957
currently looking at . Personnel

01:34:13.957 --> 01:34:15.846
transition . Any update on that ,

01:34:15.846 --> 01:34:18.068
present , future ? Uh , yes , Senator .

01:34:18.068 --> 01:34:20.290
So we are , um , we have a small office

01:34:20.290 --> 01:34:22.346
that we've stood up there , about 20

01:34:22.346 --> 01:34:24.512
people right now , and then by the end

01:34:24.512 --> 01:34:26.568
of this year , uh , we are targeting

01:34:26.568 --> 01:34:28.734
that number to be closer to 200 people

01:34:28.734 --> 01:34:30.957
that will be working from Redstone from

01:34:30.957 --> 01:34:32.957
our headquarters . Of course , that

01:34:32.957 --> 01:34:34.901
will be paced with the delivery of

01:34:34.901 --> 01:34:37.123
interim facilities that are appropriate

01:34:37.123 --> 01:34:39.346
to the security classification level we

01:34:39.346 --> 01:34:41.179
need and that we have all of the

01:34:41.179 --> 01:34:43.401
appropriate IT . Networks , um , we are

01:34:43.401 --> 01:34:45.568
offering relocation incentives for our

01:34:45.568 --> 01:34:47.774
workforce in Colorado to consider

01:34:47.774 --> 01:34:49.674
moving to Alabama . We also are

01:34:49.674 --> 01:34:52.325
offering retention incentives because I

01:34:52.325 --> 01:34:54.381
need my workforce to stay with me in

01:34:54.381 --> 01:34:56.547
Colorado until their function is ready

01:34:56.547 --> 01:34:58.658
to move . And , and so those are some

01:34:58.658 --> 01:35:00.714
of the updates that we have as we're

01:35:00.714 --> 01:35:00.674
working the movement of personnel .

01:35:00.725 --> 01:35:02.845
Senator , talk about logistics for a

01:35:02.845 --> 01:35:05.459
second of Space commission . The Air

01:35:05.459 --> 01:35:07.403
Force has over 10% of its aircraft

01:35:07.403 --> 01:35:09.450
dedicated to aerial refueling .

01:35:09.700 --> 01:35:11.922
Satellites have historically been built

01:35:12.259 --> 01:35:15.129
with no way to refuel . Here in the US ,

01:35:15.209 --> 01:35:16.987
but the Chinese Communist Party

01:35:16.987 --> 01:35:18.598
demonstrated space refueling

01:35:18.598 --> 01:35:21.109
capabilities for the first time last

01:35:21.290 --> 01:35:24.689
year . Uh , any recommendations for the

01:35:24.689 --> 01:35:27.470
future ? Senator , you know well in

01:35:27.470 --> 01:35:30.049
your question that our traditional

01:35:30.049 --> 01:35:32.270
domains , air , land and sea , those

01:35:32.270 --> 01:35:34.381
military services that that have lead

01:35:34.381 --> 01:35:36.910
there have extraordinary percentages of

01:35:36.910 --> 01:35:39.700
their force dedicated to enabling

01:35:39.700 --> 01:35:42.310
maneuver through sustainment and

01:35:42.310 --> 01:35:44.470
logistics . In fact , there's a great

01:35:44.470 --> 01:35:46.637
quote from Admiral Nimitz in World War

01:35:46.637 --> 01:35:48.692
II that he said at sea replenishment

01:35:48.692 --> 01:35:50.859
and refueling is what won World War II

01:35:50.859 --> 01:35:52.803
for the US Navy because they could

01:35:52.803 --> 01:35:54.970
continue to fight . And as you noted ,

01:35:54.970 --> 01:35:56.692
in space we launch typically a

01:35:56.692 --> 01:35:58.803
satellite with all the fuel it's ever

01:35:58.803 --> 01:36:00.692
going to have , and every time we

01:36:00.692 --> 01:36:02.692
maneuver we expend fuel , and so we

01:36:02.692 --> 01:36:04.803
always have to have this discussion .

01:36:04.803 --> 01:36:06.748
Should I maneuver even though it's

01:36:06.748 --> 01:36:08.914
going to take life off the end of that

01:36:08.914 --> 01:36:08.729
satellite , and that creates a

01:36:08.729 --> 01:36:10.689
psychology of scarcity across our

01:36:10.689 --> 01:36:13.270
enterprise where we don't enable

01:36:13.270 --> 01:36:15.603
tactical commanders to maneuver the way .

01:36:15.603 --> 01:36:17.437
They might want to because we're

01:36:17.437 --> 01:36:19.770
concerned about the expenditure of fuel .

01:36:19.770 --> 01:36:21.770
So my recommendation , Senator , is

01:36:21.770 --> 01:36:23.659
that the United States develop an

01:36:23.659 --> 01:36:25.492
on-orbit logistics and servicing

01:36:25.492 --> 01:36:27.714
capability that would allow us to bring

01:36:27.714 --> 01:36:29.881
maneuver warfare to space the same way

01:36:29.881 --> 01:36:31.937
that the US Navy , US Air Force , US

01:36:31.937 --> 01:36:34.159
Army , US Marine Corps execute maneuver

01:36:34.159 --> 01:36:36.270
warfare in their respective domains .

01:36:36.270 --> 01:36:38.479
Thank you , Admiral . Submarines are

01:36:38.479 --> 01:36:40.759
the tip of the spear for our nuclear

01:36:40.759 --> 01:36:42.870
capabilities . The problem is we just

01:36:42.870 --> 01:36:44.981
don't . Can't seem to build them fast

01:36:44.981 --> 01:36:47.750
enough . So , uh , what flexibility and

01:36:47.750 --> 01:36:50.669
capability does StratCom gain if we

01:36:50.669 --> 01:36:53.509
were able to fill 16 Columbia class

01:36:53.509 --> 01:36:57.250
submarines versus 12 ? Senator , the

01:36:57.250 --> 01:37:00.270
existing capability we , uh , we have

01:37:00.850 --> 01:37:02.970
includes , uh , 14 Ohio class boats

01:37:02.970 --> 01:37:06.109
with 20 tubes . So that's 280 , uh ,

01:37:06.240 --> 01:37:09.089
launch tubes . Um , the program of

01:37:09.089 --> 01:37:12.290
record is a minimum of 12 Columbia with

01:37:12.290 --> 01:37:14.970
16 tubes each , and that's 192 . So

01:37:14.970 --> 01:37:18.669
that's 280 versus 192 , uh .

01:37:19.509 --> 01:37:22.100
Uh , Chairman Wicker in his opening

01:37:22.100 --> 01:37:24.322
remarks talked about the challenges and

01:37:24.322 --> 01:37:26.211
the complexities in the strategic

01:37:26.211 --> 01:37:28.629
environment . So additional capacity

01:37:28.629 --> 01:37:30.669
and capability at sea in terms of

01:37:30.669 --> 01:37:34.089
launchers is very beneficial , uh ,

01:37:34.109 --> 01:37:36.279
from my perspective . There's ongoing

01:37:36.279 --> 01:37:38.557
work within the department in terms of ,

01:37:38.557 --> 01:37:41.009
uh , in terms of force sufficiency ,

01:37:41.189 --> 01:37:43.356
and that work will inform any future .

01:37:43.356 --> 01:37:45.467
Your budget decisions associated with

01:37:45.467 --> 01:37:48.535
uh with Colombia , but if you , if you

01:37:48.535 --> 01:37:50.535
just , uh , do the math for what we

01:37:50.535 --> 01:37:53.935
have and the program of record , um , I

01:37:53.935 --> 01:37:56.055
will continue to advocate for

01:37:56.055 --> 01:37:58.166
additional capability at sea in terms

01:37:58.166 --> 01:38:00.388
of the Columbia Plus . I think Chairman

01:38:00.388 --> 01:38:03.430
Wicker's listening to that . Uh ,

01:38:04.129 --> 01:38:07.009
yes , uh , um , absolutely , but you're

01:38:07.009 --> 01:38:08.953
not suggesting that there are some

01:38:09.040 --> 01:38:11.207
questions I listened to more carefully

01:38:11.207 --> 01:38:13.429
than others , are you ? Maybe , maybe a

01:38:13.429 --> 01:38:16.569
little Admiral , the first part of your

01:38:16.569 --> 01:38:19.209
answer was about our capacity right now

01:38:19.209 --> 01:38:21.930
to build and , and , uh , really the ,

01:38:22.060 --> 01:38:25.089
the , um , the thrust of Senator

01:38:25.089 --> 01:38:27.919
Tuberville's question is , uh , uh ,

01:38:28.770 --> 01:38:32.189
how much . How much better

01:38:32.189 --> 01:38:35.689
defended we would be if we're able

01:38:36.069 --> 01:38:38.890
uh to , to reach the goal that he uh

01:38:39.629 --> 01:38:41.629
mentioned and the and the answer is

01:38:41.629 --> 01:38:43.796
that we very much need to do that , is

01:38:43.796 --> 01:38:46.129
that correct ? That's correct , Senator ,

01:38:46.129 --> 01:38:48.250
and that maximizes , uh , flexibility

01:38:48.250 --> 01:38:50.472
and options to present to , uh , to the

01:38:50.472 --> 01:38:52.806
president should the need arise , right ?

01:38:52.806 --> 01:38:55.028
And there's , um , I would just observe

01:38:55.028 --> 01:38:58.540
there's still time , um , before , uh ,

01:38:59.169 --> 01:39:02.169
Governor Tuberville moves , um , off

01:39:02.169 --> 01:39:04.490
the dais for us to make more progress

01:39:04.490 --> 01:39:06.657
on that , and he and I are teammates .

01:39:06.759 --> 01:39:09.520
Um , Senator Banks , uh , let's see ,

01:39:09.600 --> 01:39:11.939
Senator Blumenthal , you are next .

01:39:12.479 --> 01:39:14.701
Thank you . Thank you , Mr . Chairman .

01:39:14.701 --> 01:39:16.868
Thank you both for your service . Uh ,

01:39:16.868 --> 01:39:19.479
both of you are in charge of some of

01:39:19.479 --> 01:39:21.819
the most advanced technology and

01:39:21.879 --> 01:39:25.020
scientific breakthroughs available to

01:39:25.439 --> 01:39:28.779
our military , uh . Admiral Correll ,

01:39:28.859 --> 01:39:31.430
you are a graduate of the Fletcher

01:39:31.430 --> 01:39:35.109
School of Law and Diplomacy , uh ,

01:39:35.229 --> 01:39:37.451
and both of you , I'm sure are familiar

01:39:37.451 --> 01:39:39.830
with the importance of alliances . Uh ,

01:39:39.950 --> 01:39:42.061
how would you explain to the American

01:39:42.061 --> 01:39:45.290
people the importance of our alliances

01:39:45.709 --> 01:39:48.509
in the fields where you have authority ?

01:39:51.839 --> 01:39:54.006
Senator , thank you for the question .

01:39:54.006 --> 01:39:56.172
Certainly , um , from my perspective ,

01:39:56.172 --> 01:39:58.620
our partnerships in space are , uh ,

01:39:58.689 --> 01:40:00.967
one of our , uh , you know , strengths ,

01:40:00.967 --> 01:40:03.078
and it's something that , uh , Russia

01:40:03.078 --> 01:40:05.078
and China do not have . At US Space

01:40:05.078 --> 01:40:07.245
Command , I have the privilege to lead

01:40:07.245 --> 01:40:09.022
a named operation in space that

01:40:09.022 --> 01:40:10.911
includes 6 other countries . It's

01:40:10.911 --> 01:40:13.245
Canada , the United Kingdom , Australia ,

01:40:13.245 --> 01:40:15.300
New Zealand , France , and Germany ,

01:40:15.300 --> 01:40:17.245
where we operate together each and

01:40:17.245 --> 01:40:18.967
every day in space to maintain

01:40:18.967 --> 01:40:21.189
vigilance against threats and and track

01:40:21.189 --> 01:40:23.078
debris and , and to , to show our

01:40:23.078 --> 01:40:25.300
interoperability , and we're continuing

01:40:25.300 --> 01:40:27.022
to press forward with that and

01:40:27.022 --> 01:40:28.856
strengthen those relationships .

01:40:28.856 --> 01:40:32.770
Admiral . I would echo the sentiment

01:40:32.770 --> 01:40:35.103
expressed by uh General Whiting . Those ,

01:40:35.103 --> 01:40:37.759
uh , uh , alliances and partnerships

01:40:37.759 --> 01:40:41.040
are incredibly important to , uh , the ,

01:40:41.049 --> 01:40:44.919
um , uh . Uh , the overall deterrence

01:40:44.919 --> 01:40:48.160
that we present , um , against

01:40:48.160 --> 01:40:51.040
potential competitors or challengers

01:40:51.339 --> 01:40:53.506
with respect to US Strategic Command ,

01:40:53.506 --> 01:40:55.859
we have 4 liaison officers in the

01:40:55.859 --> 01:40:57.470
headquarters embedded in the

01:40:57.470 --> 01:40:59.979
headquarters , uh , and that includes

01:40:59.979 --> 01:41:03.250
Japan , Republic of Korea , uh , the UK ,

01:41:03.330 --> 01:41:06.540
of course , and Australia . And we

01:41:06.540 --> 01:41:10.339
are about to receive a 5th liaison

01:41:10.339 --> 01:41:12.569
officer embedded into our staff from

01:41:12.620 --> 01:41:15.379
from France , and that reinforces the

01:41:15.379 --> 01:41:17.259
importance of those mil to mill

01:41:17.259 --> 01:41:19.315
relationships , and they enhance our

01:41:19.315 --> 01:41:21.648
capabilities and our deterrence overall .

01:41:22.140 --> 01:41:25.500
There's been uh . A fair amount of

01:41:25.500 --> 01:41:29.040
turbulence . In our

01:41:29.379 --> 01:41:32.439
diplomatic relations with our allies .

01:41:32.939 --> 01:41:36.520
I think I'm using a euphemism . I'm

01:41:36.520 --> 01:41:38.879
hopeful that at your level of

01:41:38.879 --> 01:41:42.299
cooperation and partnership . The

01:41:42.299 --> 01:41:45.020
alliances continue to be strong and

01:41:45.020 --> 01:41:48.000
resilient , whatever the the political .

01:41:49.229 --> 01:41:52.560
Turmoil At the surface , uh ,

01:41:52.669 --> 01:41:56.140
underneath the , the

01:41:56.720 --> 01:41:58.942
potential contention , I'm hopeful that

01:41:59.080 --> 01:42:01.302
that your work together with our allies

01:42:01.302 --> 01:42:04.850
continues to be strong . Am I ? Wrong

01:42:04.850 --> 01:42:08.770
in that hope . Senator , I have

01:42:08.770 --> 01:42:10.970
seen no impact on our ability to , to

01:42:10.970 --> 01:42:13.137
partner , uh , the way that my command

01:42:13.137 --> 01:42:15.359
needs to partner and wants to partner ,

01:42:15.359 --> 01:42:17.526
and , uh , and I have not detected any

01:42:17.526 --> 01:42:19.692
reluctance on the , on the , uh , part

01:42:19.692 --> 01:42:21.692
of our partners to continue to move

01:42:21.692 --> 01:42:24.500
forward with us . And I have the same

01:42:24.500 --> 01:42:26.959
experience , Senator . Well , my hope

01:42:26.959 --> 01:42:30.930
is that that turbulence is Going to

01:42:30.930 --> 01:42:34.470
be passing a phase that We'll work

01:42:34.470 --> 01:42:38.220
through and reestablish in public

01:42:38.220 --> 01:42:40.580
statements and rhetoric , the

01:42:40.580 --> 01:42:43.109
appreciation for our partnership and

01:42:43.109 --> 01:42:46.640
alliances that . You reflected in your

01:42:46.899 --> 01:42:49.379
testimony because at the working level

01:42:49.379 --> 01:42:52.839
at the Point where rubber meets the

01:42:52.839 --> 01:42:54.895
road , so to speak , although that's

01:42:54.895 --> 01:42:57.379
not exactly a good analogy for space .

01:42:58.169 --> 01:43:00.113
Uh , I am very hopeful that we can

01:43:00.113 --> 01:43:03.040
sustain and enhance those alliances and

01:43:03.040 --> 01:43:05.262
that the American public appreciate how

01:43:05.479 --> 01:43:08.759
important they are . Uh , Admiral , uh ,

01:43:08.919 --> 01:43:12.109
could you , uh . Talk a little bit

01:43:12.109 --> 01:43:14.165
about the importance of the Columbia

01:43:14.165 --> 01:43:16.589
Class . I know you've spoken to Senator

01:43:16.589 --> 01:43:19.399
Kaine , uh , about the

01:43:20.080 --> 01:43:23.959
Impact of delays , but Maybe you

01:43:23.959 --> 01:43:25.959
can comment a little further on the

01:43:25.959 --> 01:43:28.070
importance of getting back on track .

01:43:29.200 --> 01:43:31.600
Yes , uh , the department has appointed

01:43:31.600 --> 01:43:33.759
a direct report portfolio manager ,

01:43:33.839 --> 01:43:36.560
Vice Admiral Goucher , to focus on

01:43:36.560 --> 01:43:39.379
submarine construction , um , and he

01:43:39.379 --> 01:43:41.410
has a direct , uh , reporting

01:43:41.410 --> 01:43:43.354
relationship with Deputy Secretary

01:43:43.354 --> 01:43:46.069
Feinberg . Uh , and the intent there is

01:43:46.069 --> 01:43:48.750
to , you know , is to have an

01:43:48.750 --> 01:43:52.009
individual , um , with the experience

01:43:52.310 --> 01:43:55.850
that can manage that program and , uh ,

01:43:55.870 --> 01:43:58.109
optimize the performance for delivery

01:43:58.109 --> 01:44:00.910
of , uh , Columbia and other submarine

01:44:00.910 --> 01:44:03.209
construction , Virginia class as well .

01:44:03.540 --> 01:44:07.129
The importance to our deterrent

01:44:07.129 --> 01:44:10.140
capability , I can't overstate that .

01:44:10.339 --> 01:44:12.506
All three legs are vitally important .

01:44:12.506 --> 01:44:14.561
They complement each other , and the

01:44:14.561 --> 01:44:16.728
sum of the parts are much greater than

01:44:16.728 --> 01:44:18.950
the whole . For the SSBN , that assured

01:44:18.950 --> 01:44:21.117
second strike capability that's always

01:44:21.117 --> 01:44:23.919
at sea , always ready to respond ,

01:44:24.299 --> 01:44:27.220
deters effectively , and I see that in

01:44:27.220 --> 01:44:29.720
the intel reporting record . And I know

01:44:29.720 --> 01:44:31.942
that General Dynamics and Electric Boat

01:44:31.942 --> 01:44:33.831
are really doing very dedicated ,

01:44:33.831 --> 01:44:36.520
valiant , monumental work in producing

01:44:36.520 --> 01:44:40.270
the Columbia and uh I think we

01:44:40.270 --> 01:44:42.799
should appreciate their contributions

01:44:42.799 --> 01:44:45.729
to our nation's national security .

01:44:46.850 --> 01:44:48.739
We have an incredible blue collar

01:44:48.739 --> 01:44:51.649
workforce committed to that . Best in

01:44:51.649 --> 01:44:53.705
the nation . Thank you . Thank you .

01:44:53.705 --> 01:44:56.330
Thank you , Mr . Chairman . Senator

01:44:56.330 --> 01:44:58.330
Banks , thank you , Mr . Chairman .

01:44:58.330 --> 01:45:00.441
General Whiting , you are tasked with

01:45:00.441 --> 01:45:02.750
the transregional missile defense

01:45:02.750 --> 01:45:05.819
mission . Which relies on space-based

01:45:05.819 --> 01:45:07.986
sensors . How critical is this mission

01:45:07.986 --> 01:45:11.930
to homeland defense ? Senator , it's

01:45:11.930 --> 01:45:14.152
foundational to homeland defense . Uh ,

01:45:14.152 --> 01:45:16.319
it is all about detecting threats that

01:45:16.319 --> 01:45:19.089
are launched in other areas of

01:45:19.089 --> 01:45:21.009
responsibility outside of this

01:45:21.009 --> 01:45:23.009
hemisphere and continent , and then

01:45:23.009 --> 01:45:25.290
being able to provide that warning to

01:45:25.290 --> 01:45:27.680
US Northern Command so that General

01:45:27.680 --> 01:45:30.649
Guillo under his authorities can employ

01:45:30.649 --> 01:45:33.294
national missile defenses . As he's

01:45:33.294 --> 01:45:35.127
able to do that , it can only be

01:45:35.127 --> 01:45:37.350
accomplished in space , is that right ?

01:45:37.350 --> 01:45:39.572
Correct , Senator , and it's one of the

01:45:39.572 --> 01:45:41.794
unique aspects that the US military has

01:45:41.794 --> 01:45:43.794
that any launch anywhere around the

01:45:43.794 --> 01:45:45.794
world , we detect that in near real

01:45:45.794 --> 01:45:45.615
time and provide that information to

01:45:45.615 --> 01:45:47.671
not only fielded forces but to other

01:45:47.671 --> 01:45:49.893
combatant commands and ultimately up to

01:45:49.893 --> 01:45:52.059
the president . Explain , explain more

01:45:52.059 --> 01:45:54.282
why that is the case , that it can only

01:45:54.282 --> 01:45:56.615
be accomplished in space . Um , Senator ,

01:45:56.615 --> 01:45:58.837
from space we have the unique advantage

01:45:58.837 --> 01:46:01.171
to be able to see the entire globe . Um ,

01:46:01.171 --> 01:46:00.790
and so we have satellites in

01:46:00.790 --> 01:46:03.109
geosynchronous orbits , satellites in

01:46:03.109 --> 01:46:05.589
highly elliptical orbits , and we can

01:46:05.589 --> 01:46:07.700
perform that detection . The Congress

01:46:07.700 --> 01:46:09.533
is investing in improved missile

01:46:09.533 --> 01:46:11.756
warning missile . Track missile defense

01:46:11.756 --> 01:46:13.700
capabilities that will allow us to

01:46:13.700 --> 01:46:15.867
improve our ability to have custody of

01:46:15.867 --> 01:46:17.978
those threats from launch all the way

01:46:17.978 --> 01:46:20.200
through to impact , which will continue

01:46:20.200 --> 01:46:20.084
to support our missile defenses . On

01:46:20.084 --> 01:46:22.306
that point , how urgent is it to deploy

01:46:22.306 --> 01:46:24.195
additional missile tracking space

01:46:24.195 --> 01:46:26.362
sensors with fire control capability ?

01:46:26.620 --> 01:46:28.509
To defeat hypersonic and advanced

01:46:28.509 --> 01:46:30.620
ballistic missile threats . Senator ,

01:46:30.620 --> 01:46:32.287
your question highlights this

01:46:32.287 --> 01:46:34.398
advancement of modern threats that we

01:46:34.398 --> 01:46:36.231
see like hypersonics , like aero

01:46:36.231 --> 01:46:38.398
maneuvering missiles , like fractional

01:46:38.398 --> 01:46:40.509
orbital bombardment systems , and for

01:46:40.509 --> 01:46:42.120
those we need these enhanced

01:46:42.120 --> 01:46:44.176
capabilities so that we can maintain

01:46:44.176 --> 01:46:46.419
custody of the threats to enable our

01:46:46.419 --> 01:46:49.060
missile defenses as we work on the next

01:46:49.060 --> 01:46:51.750
NDAA . Give us a time frame of how

01:46:51.750 --> 01:46:54.620
urgent is it . Uh , the threats are ,

01:46:54.839 --> 01:46:56.839
are present today , so we , we need

01:46:56.839 --> 01:46:58.950
these capabilities . You need more as

01:46:58.950 --> 01:47:01.172
soon as we can field the capabilities .

01:47:01.172 --> 01:47:03.395
Yes sir , ASAP . Yes sir . Uh , the CCP

01:47:03.395 --> 01:47:05.617
fields several counterpace weapons that

01:47:05.617 --> 01:47:07.672
could potentially disrupt or destroy

01:47:07.672 --> 01:47:09.672
our satellites . If our space-based

01:47:09.672 --> 01:47:11.895
sensors were disrupted , how would that

01:47:11.895 --> 01:47:14.061
impact the joint force ? Senator , the

01:47:14.061 --> 01:47:15.950
entire Joint Forces sizes with an

01:47:15.950 --> 01:47:18.172
assumption they'll have access to space

01:47:18.172 --> 01:47:20.395
capabilities . It's not only the number

01:47:20.395 --> 01:47:22.506
of forces we have , but it's the kind

01:47:22.506 --> 01:47:22.479
of capabilities . Precision guided

01:47:22.479 --> 01:47:25.060
weapons , for example , not only need

01:47:25.060 --> 01:47:27.649
the GPS signal to be able to be

01:47:27.649 --> 01:47:29.816
employed , but they need space-based .

01:47:29.816 --> 01:47:32.038
Based contributions to the kill chain .

01:47:32.038 --> 01:47:34.038
How do you find , fix , track , and

01:47:34.038 --> 01:47:36.205
target the location that you're trying

01:47:36.205 --> 01:47:38.427
to impact ? All of that is enabled from

01:47:38.427 --> 01:47:40.593
space , and without those capabilities

01:47:40.593 --> 01:47:42.649
we could not fight the way the joint

01:47:42.649 --> 01:47:42.314
force is designed . And would more

01:47:42.314 --> 01:47:44.203
space sensors build an additional

01:47:44.203 --> 01:47:46.435
resilience to ensure you are able to

01:47:46.435 --> 01:47:48.750
accomplish your mission ? Uh , yes ,

01:47:48.830 --> 01:47:50.608
the number is , uh , helps with

01:47:50.608 --> 01:47:52.274
resilience . Also , uh , uh ,

01:47:52.390 --> 01:47:54.334
distribution of those capabilities

01:47:54.334 --> 01:47:56.446
through multiple orbits also helps us

01:47:56.446 --> 01:47:58.668
with , uh , resilience . Uh , Admiral ,

01:47:58.668 --> 01:48:00.723
uh , you already talked a little bit

01:48:00.723 --> 01:48:03.001
about Slick them in and its importance .

01:48:03.001 --> 01:48:04.890
Um , could you , uh , your , your

01:48:04.890 --> 01:48:07.112
predecessor testified to this committee

01:48:07.112 --> 01:48:09.279
last year that SlickA in would provide

01:48:09.279 --> 01:48:11.223
an uh quote , an additional at-sea

01:48:11.223 --> 01:48:13.390
nuclear deterrent capability . Um , do

01:48:13.390 --> 01:48:16.169
you agree with that statement ? I do ,

01:48:16.229 --> 01:48:18.689
and specifically again , raising the

01:48:18.689 --> 01:48:21.609
threshold for a potential adversary

01:48:21.609 --> 01:48:25.049
contemplating use of a lower yield

01:48:25.049 --> 01:48:28.560
theater nuclear weapon . It's it's very

01:48:28.560 --> 01:48:31.270
helpful from a deterrence perspective

01:48:31.490 --> 01:48:34.450
to have a capability that is

01:48:35.410 --> 01:48:37.990
that is non-visible in terms of

01:48:38.080 --> 01:48:40.580
generation . That is , has a

01:48:40.580 --> 01:48:42.819
non-ballistic trajectory and is low

01:48:42.819 --> 01:48:45.089
yield overall . Can you explain the

01:48:45.089 --> 01:48:46.922
importance of having low yield ,

01:48:46.939 --> 01:48:48.819
survivable , persistent nuclear

01:48:48.819 --> 01:48:51.000
capabilities like Slickamin ? It

01:48:52.430 --> 01:48:55.959
puts , it complicates the

01:48:55.970 --> 01:48:58.750
adversary's potential adversaries's

01:48:58.750 --> 01:49:02.029
decision making , so Xi or Putin don't

01:49:02.029 --> 01:49:05.850
see a gap in the ability to deliver

01:49:06.509 --> 01:49:08.509
a theater nuclear , use a theater

01:49:08.509 --> 01:49:11.799
nuclear weapon . And put the position

01:49:11.799 --> 01:49:13.966
where they feel they're putting the US

01:49:13.966 --> 01:49:16.021
in a position where we would have to

01:49:16.021 --> 01:49:18.188
escalate beyond a theater capability .

01:49:18.319 --> 01:49:20.680
That that's a very helpful explanation .

01:49:20.879 --> 01:49:23.660
China is rapidly expanding its nuclear

01:49:24.439 --> 01:49:26.661
capabilities . It now includes expanded

01:49:26.661 --> 01:49:28.720
stockpiles and capable dual capable

01:49:28.720 --> 01:49:31.160
systems . What evidence do you see that

01:49:31.160 --> 01:49:32.938
China is shifting toward a more

01:49:32.938 --> 01:49:35.919
aggressive nuclear doctrine ? Uh ,

01:49:37.299 --> 01:49:40.370
China is , China's nuclear doctrine

01:49:40.370 --> 01:49:42.680
continues to evolve . We don't , um ,

01:49:43.229 --> 01:49:45.910
uh , and it remains to be seen where it

01:49:45.910 --> 01:49:48.109
ultimately lands . What I would say is

01:49:48.109 --> 01:49:51.189
they're developing capabilities both in

01:49:51.189 --> 01:49:54.890
terms of diversity and quantity

01:49:55.589 --> 01:49:58.750
and various mechanisms of delivery of

01:49:58.750 --> 01:50:00.861
those capabilities , which includes a

01:50:00.861 --> 01:50:02.972
full range , including an emphasis on

01:50:02.972 --> 01:50:05.220
theater nuclear capabilities . That are

01:50:05.220 --> 01:50:07.779
inconsistent with their stated no first

01:50:07.779 --> 01:50:09.835
use policy . Thank you . My time has

01:50:09.835 --> 01:50:13.680
expired . Thank you , Senator and

01:50:13.680 --> 01:50:17.669
Senator Sheehy . General , what uh do

01:50:17.669 --> 01:50:20.600
you assess as our resilience against a

01:50:20.600 --> 01:50:22.669
Chinese first strike against our

01:50:22.669 --> 01:50:26.180
orbital infrastructure ? Senator ,

01:50:26.379 --> 01:50:28.490
China has significantly increased the

01:50:28.490 --> 01:50:30.657
number of threats they can employ from

01:50:30.657 --> 01:50:32.768
both ground-based systems like direct

01:50:32.768 --> 01:50:34.990
send ASAT weapons , as well as on-orbit

01:50:34.990 --> 01:50:36.879
co-orbital ASAT capabilities . We

01:50:36.879 --> 01:50:39.101
continue to have the world's best space

01:50:39.101 --> 01:50:40.990
architecture , and we continue to

01:50:40.990 --> 01:50:43.046
develop and deploy capabilities that

01:50:43.046 --> 01:50:45.101
improve our resilience , um , but we

01:50:45.101 --> 01:50:46.810
must focus on those continued

01:50:46.810 --> 01:50:48.921
investments and the programs that the

01:50:48.921 --> 01:50:50.977
Congress has funded must continue to

01:50:50.977 --> 01:50:52.977
deliver so that we can maintain our

01:50:52.977 --> 01:50:55.032
resilience relative to those growing

01:50:55.032 --> 01:50:58.299
threats . How old is our GPS

01:50:58.890 --> 01:51:00.990
hardware and infrastructure

01:51:01.250 --> 01:51:04.000
architecture design of our GPS systems ?

01:51:04.580 --> 01:51:06.691
Senator , we have a mix of satellites

01:51:06.691 --> 01:51:08.524
on orbit today that provide that

01:51:08.524 --> 01:51:10.524
operational constellation . Some of

01:51:10.524 --> 01:51:12.636
them are probably 20 years old , some

01:51:12.636 --> 01:51:15.000
are recent launches . So those 20 year

01:51:15.000 --> 01:51:16.778
old satellites were built for a

01:51:16.778 --> 01:51:18.722
different era where we didn't face

01:51:18.722 --> 01:51:20.889
these kind of threats . And so we want

01:51:20.889 --> 01:51:22.833
to continue to see that capability

01:51:22.833 --> 01:51:25.089
modernized . Uh , and how new are some

01:51:25.089 --> 01:51:27.370
of the Chinese offensive systems

01:51:27.370 --> 01:51:30.330
designed to disrupt or destroy that

01:51:30.330 --> 01:51:32.441
infrastructure ? Um , there have been

01:51:32.441 --> 01:51:34.663
launches just within the last couple of

01:51:34.663 --> 01:51:36.663
months , uh , that are , you know ,

01:51:36.663 --> 01:51:38.997
capable of , uh , of impacting our , uh ,

01:51:38.997 --> 01:51:41.108
space , uh , capabilities . So , uh ,

01:51:41.108 --> 01:51:43.163
some of those , uh , Chinese threats

01:51:43.163 --> 01:51:42.750
are as up to date as they could

01:51:42.750 --> 01:51:45.129
possibly be , Senator . Right , so

01:51:45.129 --> 01:51:47.850
that's like . If you went down to the

01:51:48.229 --> 01:51:50.396
Apple store and and you walked in with

01:51:50.396 --> 01:51:52.396
a flip phone or perhaps even one of

01:51:52.396 --> 01:51:54.618
those old briefcase phones that we grew

01:51:54.618 --> 01:51:56.785
up with and traded that in for a , for

01:51:56.785 --> 01:51:59.950
an iPhone 17 , we're dealing with in

01:51:59.950 --> 01:52:02.350
some cases that gap of technological

01:52:02.350 --> 01:52:05.500
capability . I think you're right ,

01:52:05.569 --> 01:52:07.625
Senator . In some cases , uh , China

01:52:07.625 --> 01:52:10.890
has skipped a generation or two of

01:52:10.890 --> 01:52:13.370
legacy technology and , and gone right

01:52:13.370 --> 01:52:15.649
to using today's capabilities , and ,

01:52:15.729 --> 01:52:18.062
and they are demonstrating they're , uh ,

01:52:18.062 --> 01:52:20.229
developing some very capable systems .

01:52:20.290 --> 01:52:22.068
And do you think , uh , this is

01:52:22.068 --> 01:52:23.790
probably for both of you , but

01:52:23.790 --> 01:52:25.734
obviously , general , this is your

01:52:25.734 --> 01:52:25.569
domain primarily , but it would very

01:52:25.569 --> 01:52:27.736
quickly become the admiral's domain as

01:52:27.736 --> 01:52:29.736
well . You know , the , the opening

01:52:29.736 --> 01:52:31.847
shots of a potential conflict , which

01:52:31.847 --> 01:52:33.736
we hope never happens , but , but

01:52:33.736 --> 01:52:35.958
should it happen with , with , uh , our

01:52:35.958 --> 01:52:35.390
peer adversary , I don't use the word

01:52:35.390 --> 01:52:37.557
near peer cause I don't think they are

01:52:37.557 --> 01:52:39.779
near . I believe they are a peer . Um ,

01:52:39.790 --> 01:52:42.012
you think the , the first shots would ,

01:52:42.012 --> 01:52:44.123
would start in space ? Senator , I do

01:52:44.123 --> 01:52:46.290
think it's likely that in a conflict ,

01:52:46.290 --> 01:52:48.290
um , the first shots would occur in

01:52:48.290 --> 01:52:50.709
cyber and in space . Um , as you noted ,

01:52:50.750 --> 01:52:52.972
that is not inevitable that there has ,

01:52:52.972 --> 01:52:55.139
there will be a conflict , uh , but we

01:52:55.139 --> 01:52:57.470
do expect that , uh , that , uh , China

01:52:57.470 --> 01:52:59.692
would make an attempt to neutralize our

01:52:59.692 --> 01:53:01.970
space capabilities early in a conflict .

01:53:01.970 --> 01:53:03.970
Admiral , do you care to comment on

01:53:03.970 --> 01:53:06.137
that , Senator , I , I agree with that

01:53:06.137 --> 01:53:08.248
assessment and I would just say um we

01:53:08.248 --> 01:53:10.414
would expect a global all domain , you

01:53:10.414 --> 01:53:12.414
know , effort on the part of a pure

01:53:12.414 --> 01:53:14.748
adversary . Uh , exactly . I mean , the ,

01:53:14.748 --> 01:53:16.803
the , the next Pearl Harbor won't be

01:53:16.803 --> 01:53:19.081
around a small island with a few ships .

01:53:19.081 --> 01:53:20.859
It'll , it'll be a global space

01:53:20.859 --> 01:53:23.026
infrastructure attack . It is , I hope

01:53:23.026 --> 01:53:25.248
it doesn't happen , but , but if I were

01:53:25.248 --> 01:53:25.169
them , that's how I'd open it up . So ,

01:53:25.399 --> 01:53:27.510
because as you stated , general , our

01:53:27.510 --> 01:53:29.677
entire force structure from technology

01:53:29.677 --> 01:53:31.343
to force formations is really

01:53:31.343 --> 01:53:33.455
predicated on uninterrupted access to

01:53:33.455 --> 01:53:35.066
our space infrastructure and

01:53:35.066 --> 01:53:37.177
architecture with a low to no latency

01:53:37.177 --> 01:53:39.232
high bandwidth connection . Uh , and

01:53:39.232 --> 01:53:41.232
most of those connections are , are

01:53:41.232 --> 01:53:43.177
very vulnerable , um , both from a

01:53:43.177 --> 01:53:45.010
software hardware and just an EW

01:53:45.010 --> 01:53:47.066
perspective . So I think , uh , uh ,

01:53:47.066 --> 01:53:49.399
what I would ask from both of you being ,

01:53:49.399 --> 01:53:51.621
being , uh , the primary uniform voices

01:53:51.621 --> 01:53:53.677
around this paradigm is , is be very

01:53:53.677 --> 01:53:55.788
vocal that modernization is not going

01:53:55.788 --> 01:53:58.121
from a VHS tape to a DVD . Uh , it , it ,

01:53:58.121 --> 01:54:00.066
it's making sure we're the most up

01:54:00.066 --> 01:54:02.669
to-date latest 21st century streaming

01:54:02.669 --> 01:54:04.939
capability , and unfortunately , uh ,

01:54:05.089 --> 01:54:07.256
oftentimes modernization , by the time

01:54:07.256 --> 01:54:09.478
it goes through the programmer record ,

01:54:09.478 --> 01:54:11.645
the committees , the evaluations , the

01:54:11.645 --> 01:54:13.700
discussions , the bureaucracy , it's

01:54:13.700 --> 01:54:15.811
not modern anymore . It's just , uh ,

01:54:15.811 --> 01:54:17.867
it's just less old than the original

01:54:17.867 --> 01:54:19.922
model was . So , um , this is a time

01:54:19.922 --> 01:54:21.811
where I think you have bipartisan

01:54:21.811 --> 01:54:23.811
commitment to force modernization ,

01:54:23.811 --> 01:54:25.978
especially in this realm . And I'd ask

01:54:25.978 --> 01:54:25.490
you to be as vocal as possible and

01:54:25.490 --> 01:54:27.490
aggressive as possible to make sure

01:54:27.490 --> 01:54:29.546
we're not going from a VHS tape to a

01:54:29.546 --> 01:54:31.620
DVD . Uh , we are coming to the

01:54:31.620 --> 01:54:33.859
absolute most , uh , front edge of

01:54:33.859 --> 01:54:35.915
capability , so we're ready for that

01:54:35.915 --> 01:54:39.049
first strike . Thank you . Uh , thank

01:54:39.049 --> 01:54:42.950
you , Senator Sheehy for uh . Very , um ,

01:54:43.129 --> 01:54:45.129
sobering but appropriate line of

01:54:45.129 --> 01:54:47.720
questioning . This is , this concludes

01:54:47.720 --> 01:54:49.831
the open portion of today's hearing .

01:54:49.831 --> 01:54:51.831
Here's some matters that , um , are

01:54:51.831 --> 01:54:53.942
classified that we need to take up in

01:54:53.942 --> 01:54:55.887
the sensitive compartmented , um ,

01:54:57.040 --> 01:54:59.330
information facility , and we will

01:54:59.330 --> 01:55:02.930
reconvene there in precisely 15

01:55:02.930 --> 01:55:05.830
minutes with that we are resessed .