WEBVTT

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Thank you all for being here . The

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committee meets today to receive

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testimony on the posture of the United

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States Northern Command . And the

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United States Southern Command , we are

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joined by General Gregory Guillo from

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the US Northern Command and General

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Frank Donovan from the US Southern

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Command . I want to thank our witnesses

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for appearing today and for their

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decades of service to our nation .

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Thank you , gentlemen . Um , Protecting

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the homeland is the first and most

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important duty of the federal

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government . Without a credible and

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effective homeland defense , there can

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be no United States of America for our

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250th anniversary . During the Cold War ,

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the Soviet Union represented the only

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true threat to the United States

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homeland . Today the threat environment

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is much more complicated . Both Russia

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and China possess a range of nuclear ,

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conventional space , and cyber

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capabilities that threaten the US

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homeland . Iran and Sunni jihadis

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remain intent on carrying out terrorist

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attacks in America . Tehran and

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Pyongyang have conducted cyber attacks

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against our critical infrastructure .

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And cartels are using innovative

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methods to traffic drugs and humans

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across our borders . All these

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adversaries share a common goal to

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reduce our influence in the Western

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Hemisphere and to harm Americans at

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home . To counter these threats , we

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need a coordinated homeland defense

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strategy . It must weave together

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conventional defenses and new

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partnerships with allies and partners

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in our region , and we certainly

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appreciate our allies and partners .

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We're paused . We are poised to make

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great progress on Golden Dome and

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similar efforts to protect the homeland

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from incoming drone and missile threats .

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I enthusiastically support these

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efforts . Golden Dome will reduce the

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threat posed by ballistic and cruise

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missiles from Russia , China , and

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North Korea . I look forward to hearing

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how General Guillo is working with the

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Golden Dome team to make these defenses

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a reality . In particular , I'd like to

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learn how his coordination with the

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Joint Interagency Task Force 401 will

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help counter the threat of small drones .

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Also apply NTHCO's professionalism in

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support of the Department of Homeland

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Security . This has helped reinforce

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our border and helped stop virtually

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all illegal immigration , a singular

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achievement . We know that homeland

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defense does not stop at our border

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with Mexico . More than 100,000

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Americans are killed annually in

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drug-related deaths . These immense and

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tragic losses come at the hands of

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South American cartels . Cartels

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contribute to violence , undermine

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regional stability , and are linked to

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human trafficking . Weapons smuggling

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and financial crime . I commend SOCOM

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for its execution of Operation Southern

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Spear . Which is helping to stop

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narco-terrorists from bringing drugs to

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our shores . It is also deterring

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future traffickers from attempting the

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same . I hope General Donovan can

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expand on the department's efforts to

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coordinate more closely with our

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Central and South American partners to

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fight back against cartels . China ,

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Russia , and Iran all target the

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Western Hemisphere in their influence

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operations . Xi Jinping seeks to

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control telecommunication systems ,

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critical infrastructure such as the

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Panama Canal and major deep water ports

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such as Shanghai

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in Peru . China has also expanded

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defense cooperation across South

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America through arms sales , police

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training , and space and cyber

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partnerships . Likewise , Russia is

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selling arms , providing military

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advisers , and expanding intelligence

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cooperation to South American nations .

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In exchange , it gets permission to

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deploy Russian military aircraft and

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naval vessels to the region . Together ,

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China and Russia exploit local

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corruption . And partner with hostile

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authoritarian regimes like Cuba and

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Nicaragua . They build influence and

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gain political leverage to target the

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United States close to home . We must

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resist these malign influence campaigns

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in our neighborhood , and that's what

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we're about today . I'd like to hear ,

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uh , General Donovan's ideas about how

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we could do so , especially through

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increased coordination with the

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economic defense unit . Intelligence

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community and the Office of Strategic

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Capital . So expect that question .

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I hope the Trump administration , for I ,

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I commend the Trump administration for

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the decisive action it has taken to

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reassert US interest near the homeland ,

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including the capture of Venezuelan

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President Nicolas Maduro and his wife C

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Celia Flores . I strongly support the

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more aggressive counter drug strategy .

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Um , this must emphasize border

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security , cripple the cartels , and

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expand security partnerships with Latin

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American countries in order to

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eliminate safe havens for the illicit

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networks that plague our hemisphere .

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So thank you gentlemen for being here ,

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and I now recognize my friend and

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colleague , the ranking member Senator

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Reed . Thank you very much , Mr .

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Chairman and General , uh , Donovan .

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General Guillo , thank you very much

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for being here this morning and for

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your leadership , and please pass our

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commendations on to the men and women

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you lead . Thank you very much ,

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General Guillo . Northern Command has

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been at the center of several

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significant and at times controversial

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domestic operations over the past year .

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Thousands of National Guard and active

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duty troops have been deployed to

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Washington , DC , Los Angeles , Chicago ,

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and Portland . Over the objections of

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the respective governors and mayors ,

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multiple federal courts have ruled

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against these deployments , and the

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Supreme Court itself has acted to limit

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the use of federalized National Guard

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forces . I want to be clear that the

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safety of our local communities is of

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the utmost importance , but the legal

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and constitutional framework that

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governs our military must not be eroded .

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Our nation has clear , long-standing

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laws to enforce the boundary between

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military and civilian law enforcement ,

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and the boundary exists for reasons

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deeply rooted in our democratic

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traditions . General Guillo , I would

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like to know what guardrails you have

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in place to ensure compliance with

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these laws . And an update on the

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financial and readiness cost from the

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missions to date on your command .

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Additionally , I would appreciate an

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update on the use of multiple

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Department of Defense developed high

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energy laser systems at the southwest

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border . I understand that these

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military systems were used despite .

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Explicit objections from the FAA which

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warned that the technology poses a

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grave risk of fatalities or permanent

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injuries to civilian aircraft and

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pilots , the shutdown of the airspace

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over El Paso raises serious questions

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about the legal authorities , the

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coordination process among federal

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agencies , and the standards governing

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the transfer and use of such weapons

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systems . Finally , on the subject of

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homeland missile defense and the

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proposed Golden Dome program , I would

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emphasize that this committee is

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supportive of robust homeland defense .

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We recognize the urgency that recent

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drone incursions and our adversaries'

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advanced missile capabilities create

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for the Northcom . General Guillo , I

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would appreciate our assessment of the

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Golden Dome's projected course beyond

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the 2028 time frame and its technical

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realism with respect of such systems

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such as space-based interceptors . In

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particular , I'd like to know how it

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fits within the broader architecture of

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deterrence , including its potential

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effects on strategic stability with

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Russia and China . General Donovan ,

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the scope of military activity in

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Southern Command has expanded

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dramatically over the past year . The

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deployment of thousands of military

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personnel and hundreds of ships and

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aircraft into your area of

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responsibility represents an

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extraordinary expansion of American

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military force in the Western

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Hemisphere . In January , that buildup

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culminated in the raid to capture

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former Venezuelan President Nicolas

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Maduro . The operation itself was a

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testament to the skill and courage of

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American service members , and every

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member of this committee joins in

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recognizing their incredible service ,

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but military excellence does not

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resolve the strategic and political

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questions that must follow . General ,

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I would ask for an update on the

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current status of our forces in the

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region , their assigned missions going

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forward , and any contingency planning

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for political instability in Venezuela .

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Additionally , to date , Operation

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Southern Sphere has resulted in 156

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fatalities from 45 air strikes on

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suspected narco trafficking boats . I

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continue to believe that this operation

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is strategically misguided . And of

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dubious legality , General Donovan , I

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would ask you to explain the objective

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of continuing this operation given that

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Maduro is no longer in power and to

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provide any measured effects on illicit

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drug flows into the United States .

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Finally , I would like to understand

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what operations , if any , are being

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planned or contemplated in or around

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Cuba , both military and humanitarian ,

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and what objectives your command is

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pursuing in this area . Gentlemen ,

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thank you again for your leadership and

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for the service of the men and women

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under your command , and I look forward

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to your testimonies . Thank you , Mr .

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Chairman . Thank you , Mr . Ranking

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Member General Guillo . You are now

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recognized for your opening statement .

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Thank you , Chairman Wicker , and good

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morning , uh , to you , Ranking Member

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Reed , and the distinguished members of

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this committee . Thank you for the

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opportunity to appear today alongside

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General Donovan and represent the

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dedicated and disciplined men and women

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of the United States Northern Command

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and North American Aerospace Defense

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Command . As the strategic environment

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has grown more complex , NORAD and US

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NORTHCOM have responded by transforming

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both commands , executing new missions ,

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and implementing innovative approaches

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to safeguard North America . Both

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commands campaigned 24/7 to deter

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adversaries and defend against threats

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in all domains . Since March of 2025 ,

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NORAD intercepted long-range bombers

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off the coasts of Alaska and Canada 19

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times , scrambled fighters 82 times ,

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and committed fighters from airborne

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patrols 156 times in support of

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Operation Noble Eagle , protecting the

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president , Washington DC , and

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national special security events . The

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commands tracked Russian and Chinese

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submarines and surface vessels in the

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approaches to North America and remain

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ready to defend against ballistic and

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cruise missile attacks . Our commands

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remain vigilant , capable , and

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committed . That commitment is

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evidenced by the operational units

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activated over the last year to secure

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the US southern border . USNRTHCOM

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established Joint Task Force Southern

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Border in March of 2025 . Since then ,

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JTFSB has supported Customs and Border

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Protection with unique military

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capabilities in all domains that have

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helped reduce illegal border activities

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to historic lows . Those service

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members are now executing the southern

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border mission with expanded

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authorities and within their

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occupational specialties , which is

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enhanced readiness and increased

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re-enlistment rates . US NRTHCOM also

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established Joint Interagency Task

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Force Counter-cartel , a whole of

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government enterprise dedicated to

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fusing intelligence used to help

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dismantle cartel networks . And to

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accelerate our integrated air and

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missile defense capabilities , US

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NORTHCOM activated Joint Task Force

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Gold to serve as the operational arm

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for the future layered defense systems

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provided by Golden Dome for America .

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US NRTHCOM is the department's

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synchronizer for countermall UAS

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activities in the continental US and

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Alaska . Thanks to the countermall UAS

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authorities provided by Congress and

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policies updated by Secretary Hegseth ,

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the service members along the border

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defeated 93 UAS that crossed the border

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and posed a threat to our personnel .

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Assuring our ability to operate in the

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High North is a strategic necessity .

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With the inclusion of Greenland into

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the USNRTHCO area of responsibility ,

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we are executing seamless defensive

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operations across the harsh environment

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of the Arctic , ensuring we are ready

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to defend the High North anytime and

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under all conditions . Domestically ,

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US NORTHCOM's mission to provide

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defense support to civil authorities

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remains a critical responsibility , and

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we stand ready to support lead federal

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agencies during natural disasters and

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key events including America's 250

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celebrations and World Cup 2026

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co-hosted by Canada , Mexico , and the

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United States . All NORAD and NORTHCOM

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missions are reinforced by partnerships .

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From our unique binational relationship

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with Canada through NORAD , our close

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cooperation with Mexico , the Bahamas ,

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and now Denmark and Greenland , trusted

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relationships are a cornerstone of

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regional security and homeland defense .

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The men and women of US NORTHCOM and

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NORAD have embraced these new

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challenges and are unwavering in their

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no-fail mission . The discipline ,

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defense of our homelands in all domains ,

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from all avenues of approach against

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all those who intend us harm . We

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appreciate the steadfast support of the

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committee , and I look forward to

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answering your questions today . We

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have the watch . Thank you very much ,

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General Donovan . Chairman Wicker ,

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Ranking Member Reed , and distinguished

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members of the committee , thank you

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for the opportunity to discuss the

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posture of the United States Southern

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Command . I'd like to thank the members

14:05.996 --> 14:08.107
of this committee for their trust and

14:08.107 --> 14:10.107
confidence you have placed in me to

14:10.107 --> 14:11.940
lead this organization at such a

14:11.940 --> 14:14.107
critical moment . On behalf of the men

14:14.107 --> 14:15.996
and women of SOUTHCOM , Sar Major

14:15.996 --> 14:17.773
Rodriguez and I appreciate your

14:17.773 --> 14:19.996
continued support . I'm joined today by

14:19.996 --> 14:22.218
my good friend General Greg Guillo . We

14:22.218 --> 14:24.440
are aligned with the department's focus

14:24.440 --> 14:26.384
on the Western Hemisphere . We are

14:26.384 --> 14:28.496
dedicated to rebuilding US leadership

14:28.496 --> 14:30.607
and presence in this critical part of

14:30.607 --> 14:32.829
the world . Let me begin by saying I've

14:32.829 --> 14:34.829
learned a lot in the past 42 days .

14:34.829 --> 14:36.440
About the dynamic region I'm

14:36.440 --> 14:38.384
responsible for and the incredible

14:38.384 --> 14:40.869
organization I am now leading . As this

14:40.869 --> 14:42.758
committee knows , last year was a

14:42.758 --> 14:45.270
pivotal moment in SOCOM's history , the

14:45.270 --> 14:47.150
command responsible for multiple

14:47.150 --> 14:49.869
priority missions and operations , each

14:49.869 --> 14:51.929
with enormous national security

14:52.030 --> 14:55.140
implications . The SouthTHCOM team rose

14:55.140 --> 14:57.299
to challenge while remaining true to

14:57.299 --> 14:59.609
its legacy of partnering and

14:59.609 --> 15:03.020
collaboration . I want to specifically

15:03.020 --> 15:05.739
thank the leaders of Joint Task Force

15:05.739 --> 15:07.940
Southern SER . This is SOUTHCOM's

15:07.940 --> 15:09.884
warfighting headquarters , who are

15:09.884 --> 15:11.718
leading our efforts against drug

15:11.718 --> 15:13.718
cartels and terrorist networks with

15:13.718 --> 15:15.773
incredible levels of professionalism

15:15.773 --> 15:19.330
and precision . Now we are ready to

15:19.330 --> 15:23.059
evolve for the future . The 2026

15:23.059 --> 15:25.226
national defense strategy lays out the

15:25.226 --> 15:27.309
threats we face in this hemisphere .

15:27.989 --> 15:30.267
And SouthCom's role in addressing them .

15:30.570 --> 15:32.780
In response , I've developed 4

15:32.780 --> 15:35.570
imperatives . First ,

15:36.190 --> 15:38.469
SOCOM strengthens hemispheric command

15:38.469 --> 15:40.989
and control by redesigning and building

15:40.989 --> 15:43.510
the SOUTHCOM headquarters for strategic

15:43.510 --> 15:46.150
level operations at range , speed , and

15:46.150 --> 15:49.309
scale . Second , SOCOM

15:49.309 --> 15:52.450
imposes total systemic friction on drug

15:52.450 --> 15:55.409
cartels and terrorist networks . This

15:55.409 --> 15:57.465
requires a hemispheric-wide approach

15:57.465 --> 16:00.049
led by SCO and NorthCO to help our

16:00.049 --> 16:02.105
partners degrade these organizations

16:02.105 --> 16:04.289
and reduce the threat they pose to our

16:04.289 --> 16:06.130
partners and to our nation .

16:07.880 --> 16:10.479
Third , SOUTHCOM develops and feels

16:10.479 --> 16:13.039
cost-effective modernized forces

16:13.190 --> 16:15.079
tailored for the missions in this

16:15.079 --> 16:16.880
hemisphere . These forces fully

16:16.880 --> 16:18.659
maximize operational maneuver ,

16:19.150 --> 16:21.479
autonomous systems , and human-machine

16:21.479 --> 16:23.701
teaming to greatly increase lethality ,

16:24.030 --> 16:26.239
all domain awareness , and most

16:26.239 --> 16:28.679
importantly , data sharing for US and

16:28.679 --> 16:31.940
partner forces . And finally , SOCOM

16:31.940 --> 16:35.039
denies adversary footholds and undue

16:35.039 --> 16:37.400
influence in this hemisphere . That

16:37.400 --> 16:39.344
includes their ability to position

16:39.344 --> 16:41.239
forces or other capabilities that

16:41.239 --> 16:43.350
threaten our homeland or our regional

16:43.350 --> 16:45.406
partners and challenge our access to

16:45.406 --> 16:47.880
key terrain like the Panama Canal and

16:47.880 --> 16:51.080
its approaches . These imperatives and

16:51.080 --> 16:53.080
the dynamic security environment we

16:53.080 --> 16:54.969
operate in will require the right

16:54.969 --> 16:57.080
structures , authorities , and forces

16:57.080 --> 16:59.640
to keep pace with mission needs . SOCO

16:59.640 --> 17:01.696
is moving out with speed and urgency

17:01.696 --> 17:03.862
and stands ready to work with Congress

17:03.862 --> 17:05.584
to defend our homeland and our

17:05.584 --> 17:07.807
hemisphere . I thank this committee for

17:07.807 --> 17:10.029
their unyielding support to US Southern

17:10.029 --> 17:11.807
Command and look forward to our

17:11.807 --> 17:13.807
discussion this morning . Thank you

17:13.807 --> 17:15.529
very much . Well , thank you ,

17:15.529 --> 17:17.751
gentlemen , and without objection , the

17:17.751 --> 17:20.609
entire statement . Of General Guillo .

17:21.859 --> 17:23.970
Uh , the entire prepared statement of

17:23.970 --> 17:26.640
General Glo consisting of 21 pages .

17:28.439 --> 17:31.859
Provided to us in advance and the

17:31.859 --> 17:33.989
entire statement of General Donovan ,

17:34.410 --> 17:36.780
uh , again , um , provided to us in

17:36.780 --> 17:39.058
advance consisting of 11 pages will be ,

17:39.219 --> 17:41.619
um , added into the record at this

17:41.619 --> 17:44.719
point without objection . um , OK ,

17:45.010 --> 17:47.880
well , General Donovan , tell us how

17:48.540 --> 17:52.219
the Maduro , um , effort , the removal

17:52.219 --> 17:54.459
of him and the installation of his vice

17:54.459 --> 17:58.430
president . Has affected

17:58.430 --> 18:02.310
our interests in the area . Mr .

18:02.469 --> 18:04.636
Chairman , soon after assuming command

18:04.636 --> 18:06.939
of SALTHCOM , I was , uh , directed to

18:06.939 --> 18:08.883
take a trip to Venezuela , uh , to

18:08.883 --> 18:11.150
Caracas , and meet with , um , the

18:11.150 --> 18:13.206
current leadership of the Venezuelan

18:13.206 --> 18:15.261
government , and , uh , I will pause

18:15.261 --> 18:17.428
just for a second to highlight who did

18:17.428 --> 18:19.483
you meet ? Uh , we met , um , Dulcie

18:19.483 --> 18:21.539
Rodriguez , um , and a number of her

18:21.539 --> 18:23.483
senior generals . The top 4 , Mr .

18:23.483 --> 18:25.483
Chairman , that we speak of , but I

18:25.483 --> 18:27.372
will highlight for one second the

18:27.372 --> 18:29.261
incredible work Ambassador or now

18:29.261 --> 18:31.510
Charia Ferdo is doing down there as our

18:31.510 --> 18:33.677
representative with a small team of 10

18:33.677 --> 18:35.899
diplomats . The work they're doing with

18:35.899 --> 18:38.232
the Venezuelan government is staggering .

18:38.232 --> 18:40.454
Is the charge as high as we'll get down

18:40.454 --> 18:42.677
there ? Chairman , I hope eventually we

18:42.677 --> 18:44.732
have an ambassador one day , and she

18:44.732 --> 18:46.954
was just recognized on the 5th of March

18:46.954 --> 18:49.121
as an official charge , and we put the

18:49.121 --> 18:51.177
raised the flag over the embassy the

18:51.177 --> 18:53.343
first time in , I think , 9 years . So

18:53.343 --> 18:55.510
a good moment . But we got a chance to

18:55.510 --> 18:55.079
meet with the government there ,

18:55.310 --> 18:57.088
highlight our concerns that had

18:57.088 --> 18:59.143
developed over time since the Maduro

18:59.143 --> 19:01.477
event . It was 46 days since that event ,

19:01.477 --> 19:03.699
so it was a pretty remarkable setting ,

19:03.699 --> 19:05.977
and we laid out what our concerns were .

19:05.977 --> 19:08.143
And since then that those actions have

19:08.143 --> 19:10.310
all been acted on by that government .

19:11.420 --> 19:15.020
In a , in a positive way that met with

19:15.020 --> 19:18.219
your um Approval . Yes , Mr . Chairman ,

19:18.310 --> 19:20.532
and I think in a classified setting one

19:20.532 --> 19:22.699
specific action against an actor we're

19:22.699 --> 19:24.866
very concerned about , um , aggressive

19:24.866 --> 19:26.754
action was taken . All right , we

19:26.754 --> 19:28.754
certainly have an opportunity to do

19:28.754 --> 19:30.754
that later on . Well , tell us then

19:30.754 --> 19:32.810
about coordination with the economic

19:32.810 --> 19:34.588
defense unit . The intelligence

19:34.588 --> 19:36.699
community and the Office of Strategic

19:36.699 --> 19:39.520
Capital , can you enlarge on my

19:39.859 --> 19:42.081
statement about that , Chairman ? Yes ,

19:42.081 --> 19:43.970
I can as we look at all the tools

19:43.970 --> 19:45.970
available to SOTHCOM and really our

19:45.970 --> 19:48.192
strength remains our ability to partner

19:48.192 --> 19:50.415
with these allies and partners . If you

19:50.415 --> 19:52.470
look at the recent America's counter

19:52.470 --> 19:54.581
cartel . Coalition now that we've set

19:54.581 --> 19:56.637
up that the Secretary has set up and

19:56.637 --> 19:58.748
that we believe SouthHCOM will take a

19:58.748 --> 20:00.581
key role in , we have more tools

20:00.581 --> 20:02.729
through OSC through EDU to bring to

20:02.729 --> 20:04.896
bear . So you have the exercises , you

20:04.896 --> 20:06.896
have the , you have even 4 military

20:06.896 --> 20:09.050
sales , but we have 17 actually now

20:09.050 --> 20:10.939
with Chile , 18 key partners that

20:10.939 --> 20:13.650
signed up to the for the ACCC to be

20:13.650 --> 20:15.761
part of this now and now we have more

20:15.761 --> 20:18.599
tools with partner partner . Nations

20:18.599 --> 20:20.599
partner , yes sir , partner nations

20:20.599 --> 20:22.821
that signed the agreement to be part of

20:22.821 --> 20:25.359
the the Americas without apostrophe

20:25.359 --> 20:28.359
countercartel coalition and the EDU and

20:28.359 --> 20:30.719
OSC give us additional capabilities we

20:30.719 --> 20:32.886
haven't had in the past , specifically

20:32.886 --> 20:34.941
we can counter other maligned actors

20:34.941 --> 20:37.108
like China directly with some economic

20:37.108 --> 20:40.050
incentives , Chairman . Is OAS um .

20:40.819 --> 20:42.875
Being utilized to the extent that it

20:42.875 --> 20:45.670
could . Chairman , I'll put it this way .

20:45.699 --> 20:48.589
In 43 days I have not contacted the OAS

20:48.589 --> 20:50.589
yet or really been fully involved .

20:50.709 --> 20:52.876
That is something I need to do , and I

20:52.876 --> 20:54.987
intend to pursue to ensure that we're

20:54.987 --> 20:56.820
fully aligned or they're full in

20:56.820 --> 20:58.987
support of the way forward . I think ,

20:58.987 --> 21:01.209
I think it's an , it's an opportunity .

21:02.010 --> 21:05.569
That we ought to try to enlarge and I

21:05.569 --> 21:07.291
say that for the benefit of my

21:07.291 --> 21:09.347
colleagues also um let's see General

21:09.347 --> 21:12.569
Guillo um . How are you working with

21:12.569 --> 21:15.209
the Golden Dome team , uh , to , to

21:15.209 --> 21:18.140
improve our defenses and particularly I

21:18.489 --> 21:20.267
promised to ask you about Joint

21:20.530 --> 21:22.930
Interagency Task Force 401 .

21:24.670 --> 21:26.739
Chairman , I'm working very closely

21:26.739 --> 21:28.795
with General Gutlein and his program

21:28.795 --> 21:31.017
office . In fact , the day after he was

21:31.017 --> 21:33.072
confirmed , uh , he flew to Colorado

21:33.072 --> 21:35.183
Springs where we outlined what I felt

21:35.183 --> 21:37.619
were the operational necessities . Uh ,

21:37.739 --> 21:40.089
for the Golden Dome , and then he

21:40.089 --> 21:42.311
agreed at that time that it one aligned

21:42.311 --> 21:44.311
with his approach , and 2 , that he

21:44.311 --> 21:46.367
felt he could build the architecture

21:46.367 --> 21:48.589
necessary to deliver that on time . And

21:48.589 --> 21:50.922
we also brought General Stephen Whiting ,

21:50.922 --> 21:52.756
who is the commander of US Space

21:52.756 --> 21:54.700
Command , uh , who's , uh , was in

21:54.700 --> 21:56.811
Colorado Springs and he was in on the

21:56.811 --> 21:58.867
meeting too , and so the three of us

21:58.867 --> 22:01.033
left fully aligned . Uh , since then ,

22:01.033 --> 22:03.367
as he's , uh , worked with industry and ,

22:03.367 --> 22:05.256
and developed this architecture ,

22:05.256 --> 22:07.145
anytime he finds something . That

22:07.145 --> 22:09.256
either the technology isn't there yet

22:09.256 --> 22:11.200
or maybe the cost is too high . He

22:11.200 --> 22:13.520
comes back to me and explains his

22:14.140 --> 22:16.084
adjustment and it confirms that it

22:16.084 --> 22:18.579
still meets our operational needs . I

22:18.579 --> 22:21.020
also gave him a general officer that is

22:21.020 --> 22:24.040
working as a liaison in his office . To

22:24.040 --> 22:25.929
ensure that there's no separation

22:25.929 --> 22:27.984
between the operational requirements

22:27.984 --> 22:30.318
and his development of the architecture .

22:30.318 --> 22:32.540
So in short , I think it's a very tight

22:32.540 --> 22:34.651
relationship . I'm very encouraged by

22:34.651 --> 22:36.762
it , and I think that we will be able

22:36.762 --> 22:38.818
to demonstrate the capabilities that

22:38.818 --> 22:40.959
have been advertised on or ahead of

22:40.959 --> 22:44.790
schedule . Thank you very much . Reed

22:44.790 --> 22:47.123
is now recognized . Thank you very much ,

22:47.123 --> 22:49.290
Mr . Chairman . Uh , General Donovan ,

22:49.290 --> 22:51.589
uh , the lethal bulk strikes that are

22:51.589 --> 22:54.469
being conducted in your AOR are based

22:54.469 --> 22:57.109
on a still a secret directive signed by

22:57.109 --> 22:59.349
the president ordering the Pentagon to

22:59.349 --> 23:01.910
conduct maritime strikes on these

23:01.910 --> 23:04.930
alleged drug trafficking boats , and

23:05.469 --> 23:08.150
the affiliation is with organizations

23:08.150 --> 23:10.910
that are still , uh , secret , um ,

23:11.270 --> 23:13.326
have not been revealed to the public

23:13.326 --> 23:15.437
yet . Uh , those operations have been

23:15.437 --> 23:17.548
going on for over 6 months , and as I

23:17.548 --> 23:19.910
indicated , uh , there are 157 .

23:22.829 --> 23:25.109
Killed in action or killed personnel ,

23:25.699 --> 23:28.032
uh , when you came before the committee ,

23:28.032 --> 23:30.255
you indicated that you would check each

23:30.255 --> 23:32.477
one of these operations . Have you been

23:32.477 --> 23:34.532
able to do that and what conclusions

23:34.532 --> 23:36.532
have you reached ? Ranking member ,

23:36.829 --> 23:39.209
before assuming command on 5 February ,

23:39.949 --> 23:42.171
I actually took a number of steps . I'd

23:42.171 --> 23:44.171
like to highlight them if I could .

23:44.171 --> 23:46.060
First one is I read all the legal

23:46.060 --> 23:48.060
opinions tied to these operations .

23:48.910 --> 23:50.854
Next , I read every single execute

23:50.854 --> 23:53.229
order SAHCOM's been given since well

23:53.229 --> 23:55.949
prior to Southern Spe to ensure that I

23:55.949 --> 23:57.989
could link those together so when I

23:57.989 --> 24:00.045
stepped into command , I could carry

24:00.045 --> 24:02.260
out those specific strikes if required

24:02.260 --> 24:04.371
and if they were part of the tactical

24:04.371 --> 24:06.593
solution . Well , thank you , General .

24:06.593 --> 24:10.560
uh . What is the metrics of success

24:10.650 --> 24:13.079
in this operation ? Is it the reduction

24:13.079 --> 24:15.800
of drugs entering the United States and

24:15.859 --> 24:17.699
by how much ? Are there metrics

24:17.699 --> 24:21.670
involved ? Ranking member , as I've

24:21.670 --> 24:23.837
looked at this over the last 43 days ,

24:24.030 --> 24:26.197
I cannot stand before you and tell you

24:26.197 --> 24:28.900
that there's a percentage drop in

24:28.900 --> 24:30.789
American deaths inside the United

24:30.789 --> 24:32.839
States or a number of a certain

24:32.839 --> 24:35.061
percentage of drugs reaching the United

24:35.061 --> 24:37.172
States . Looking forward , what I'm ,

24:37.189 --> 24:39.022
what we're building is an actual

24:39.022 --> 24:41.022
campaign against these cartels that

24:41.022 --> 24:42.911
will actually look at really more

24:42.911 --> 24:44.856
systemically across the board from

24:44.856 --> 24:47.099
point of production . Um , to point of

24:47.099 --> 24:49.210
delivery up in the plazas and look at

24:49.210 --> 24:51.266
it more holistically and really what

24:51.266 --> 24:53.043
I'd like , what I'm planning on

24:53.043 --> 24:55.210
applying is total systemic friction on

24:55.210 --> 24:57.266
these networks , and I believe these

24:57.266 --> 24:59.488
kinetic strikes are just one small part

24:59.488 --> 25:01.599
of that . Um , if you look at all the

25:01.599 --> 25:03.543
tools available , specifically the

25:03.543 --> 25:05.710
tools that will strengthen partners so

25:05.710 --> 25:07.932
they will have a better economic future

25:07.932 --> 25:09.877
in these towns , villages , cities

25:09.877 --> 25:11.877
where a lot of the production takes

25:11.877 --> 25:13.988
place , where these cartels and other

25:13.988 --> 25:16.155
nefarious actors like China can . Step

25:16.155 --> 25:18.377
in and influence . I believe that's the

25:18.377 --> 25:17.974
step in the measure of success that

25:17.974 --> 25:19.854
those those partner nations can

25:19.854 --> 25:21.965
actually create security environments

25:21.965 --> 25:24.214
where we start to stop this at the

25:24.214 --> 25:27.275
actual source itself . Can you indicate

25:27.275 --> 25:31.130
the chain of command above you ? Who is

25:31.130 --> 25:33.297
immediately above you then all the way

25:33.297 --> 25:35.408
up to the very top , the Secretary of

25:35.408 --> 25:37.574
the War to the President of the United

25:37.574 --> 25:39.686
States . Uh , and do you have contact

25:39.686 --> 25:41.797
with the White House directly through

25:41.797 --> 25:43.797
individuals in the White House ? No

25:43.797 --> 25:45.852
ranking member Reed , so you get all

25:45.852 --> 25:47.741
your orders from the secretary of

25:47.741 --> 25:49.829
defense . Those orders are from the

25:49.829 --> 25:52.051
Secretary of Defense translated through

25:52.051 --> 25:54.218
the Joint Staff in the form of execute

25:54.218 --> 25:55.885
orders , which are the ones I

25:55.885 --> 25:58.218
referenced . I've read every single one .

25:58.218 --> 26:00.162
Thank you very much , uh , General

26:00.162 --> 26:02.107
Guillo , uh , as I indicated in my

26:02.107 --> 26:04.162
opening statement , uh , you have at

26:04.162 --> 26:06.218
the orders of the president deployed

26:06.459 --> 26:08.348
significant forces throughout the

26:08.348 --> 26:10.570
United States , and you've drawn , uh ,

26:10.570 --> 26:12.792
the , the action has drawn criticism by

26:12.792 --> 26:14.859
many , uh , governors , mayors , and

26:14.859 --> 26:18.670
also the , the courts , uh . I'm

26:18.670 --> 26:20.640
really concerned though is looking

26:20.640 --> 26:22.939
beyond just what these deployments .

26:23.400 --> 26:25.579
The Secretary of Defense has set up a

26:26.719 --> 26:28.997
response force from the National Guard ,

26:29.000 --> 26:31.056
quick reaction force of the National

26:31.056 --> 26:33.222
Guard , which mobilize within 24 hours

26:33.400 --> 26:35.511
and can be sent anywhere at the order

26:35.511 --> 26:38.640
of the President to quell civilian

26:38.640 --> 26:42.040
disturbances . All of that adds up

26:42.040 --> 26:44.619
to the obvious question that the

26:44.619 --> 26:46.841
concern that these forces could be used

26:46.979 --> 26:49.201
to interrupt the First Amendment rights

26:49.201 --> 26:51.500
of Americans , particularly their right

26:51.500 --> 26:54.380
to vote . Uh , as you know , federal

26:54.380 --> 26:58.170
law explicitly bans the deployment of

26:58.170 --> 27:00.579
armed federal troops or any armed

27:00.579 --> 27:03.540
troops to polling places , uh ,

27:03.819 --> 27:06.920
specifically Section 18 USC Section

27:06.920 --> 27:10.250
592 . Makes it a crime punishable by up

27:10.250 --> 27:12.829
to 5 years in prison to deploy federal

27:13.449 --> 27:16.729
troops or armed men , uh , which I

27:16.729 --> 27:19.170
presumably would include ICE to any

27:19.170 --> 27:21.281
location where voting is taking place

27:21.281 --> 27:24.250
or election is being held unless such

27:24.250 --> 27:26.969
force be necessary to repel armed

27:26.969 --> 27:29.025
enemies of the United States , armed

27:29.025 --> 27:31.080
enemies of the United States . Other

27:31.080 --> 27:33.302
than that narrow legal exception I just

27:33.302 --> 27:35.302
described , do you agree that it is

27:35.302 --> 27:37.413
illegal to deploy the armed forces to

27:37.413 --> 27:39.530
polling places ? Senator , I am aware

27:39.530 --> 27:43.410
of the of the code , and I recognize

27:43.410 --> 27:45.354
that it is against the law , and I

27:45.354 --> 27:47.410
would not follow an unlawful order .

27:47.410 --> 27:49.299
And then thank you for noting the

27:49.299 --> 27:51.521
exception . Thank you very much , sir .

27:51.521 --> 27:53.743
Uh , with that , Mr . Chairman , uh , I

27:53.743 --> 27:56.329
will yield my 6 seconds . Uh , thank

27:56.329 --> 27:58.329
you , Mr . Ranking Member , Senator

27:58.329 --> 28:00.890
Fisher . Thank you Mr . Chairman . Uh ,

28:01.050 --> 28:03.770
General Guillo , I've appreciated our

28:03.839 --> 28:06.006
conversations over the years about the

28:06.006 --> 28:07.839
increasingly complex and diverse

28:07.839 --> 28:10.189
threats that we face to our homeland .

28:10.530 --> 28:13.770
You are always , um , insistent that

28:13.770 --> 28:15.969
improving domain awareness is

28:15.969 --> 28:18.729
foundational to protecting the homeland

28:18.729 --> 28:20.896
because after all we cannot shoot what

28:20.896 --> 28:23.750
we cannot see . How are you seeing our

28:23.750 --> 28:26.349
ability to detect and characterize

28:26.349 --> 28:29.050
threats earlier improve ?

28:31.050 --> 28:33.272
Senator , thank you for your support in

28:33.272 --> 28:35.494
those efforts . Uh , I am seeing , uh ,

28:35.494 --> 28:38.250
immediate improvement . Uh , we can see

28:38.250 --> 28:41.130
at longer ranges with more fidelity and

28:41.130 --> 28:43.489
also in a layered approach where one

28:43.489 --> 28:45.839
phenomenon or , or one system is no

28:45.839 --> 28:48.170
longer responsible solely to detect .

28:48.670 --> 28:50.781
Uh , we have backup systems as well .

28:50.890 --> 28:52.890
And then I also note because of the

28:52.890 --> 28:54.946
partnership with the Golden Dome for

28:54.946 --> 28:57.569
America Program Office , many of the

28:57.569 --> 28:59.949
domain awareness . Systems that we need

28:59.949 --> 29:01.727
for improved NORAD and NORTHCOM

29:01.727 --> 29:04.349
detection also serve the purpose of

29:04.349 --> 29:06.238
Golden Dome , and so we're really

29:06.238 --> 29:08.460
getting 2 or 3 for 1 with many of these

29:08.460 --> 29:10.670
systems that are either in development

29:10.670 --> 29:13.770
now or being implemented now or will be

29:13.790 --> 29:16.012
implemented in the near future . Yeah ,

29:16.012 --> 29:17.957
I really appreciated your comments

29:17.957 --> 29:20.599
about working with General Gutlein . On

29:20.599 --> 29:23.510
Golden Dome and how and how you are

29:23.510 --> 29:25.589
working together to make sure , uh ,

29:25.599 --> 29:27.800
first of all that we , we have what we

29:27.800 --> 29:30.140
need in order to protect this homeland

29:30.479 --> 29:33.439
and um the collaboration there will ,

29:33.550 --> 29:36.000
will hopefully hold down expenses as

29:36.000 --> 29:39.040
well as you each bring forth ideas that

29:39.040 --> 29:41.199
are , are necessary so I really

29:41.199 --> 29:44.180
appreciate uh your comments there . As ,

29:44.300 --> 29:47.500
as we're looking to , um , improve on ,

29:47.650 --> 29:49.761
on the threats , do you have anything

29:49.761 --> 29:51.928
specific you could say in this setting

29:51.939 --> 29:54.217
on what you think needs to be improved ?

29:55.750 --> 29:57.750
Senator , I'd like to see continued

29:57.750 --> 30:00.540
improvement in the persistence of our

30:00.540 --> 30:03.979
ability to detect and track adversaries

30:04.180 --> 30:06.347
from the seabed all the way to space .

30:06.750 --> 30:08.528
As I mentioned , it's a layered

30:08.939 --> 30:11.589
approach , and I have confidence in all

30:11.589 --> 30:13.811
the layers , but as the adversary grows

30:13.811 --> 30:15.645
capability , we need to see them

30:15.645 --> 30:17.867
further away from our continent than we

30:17.867 --> 30:19.978
have in the past . And so I'd like to

30:19.978 --> 30:22.200
See incremental improvement in reaching

30:22.200 --> 30:24.311
out further from our shores to ensure

30:24.311 --> 30:26.478
that we stay ahead of the adversary as

30:26.478 --> 30:28.700
they improve their capabilities . Thank

30:28.700 --> 30:32.449
you . Turning to your role as the NORAD

30:32.449 --> 30:35.310
commander , how are the US and Canadian

30:35.310 --> 30:38.530
militaries deepening their military

30:38.530 --> 30:41.329
partnership in the face of the greater

30:41.329 --> 30:44.520
threats ? Senator , uh , at the mill to

30:44.520 --> 30:46.576
mill level , uh , we're working very

30:46.576 --> 30:48.742
closely together as we have since 1958

30:48.742 --> 30:51.500
when NORAD was established , uh , with ,

30:51.760 --> 30:54.280
uh , Canadians and US members side by

30:54.280 --> 30:56.280
side in headquarters and out in the

30:56.280 --> 30:58.502
field . Uh , most recently , you , uh ,

30:58.650 --> 31:01.185
may have seen . That a combined force

31:01.185 --> 31:04.675
of NORAD fighters and

31:04.675 --> 31:06.875
tankers , both US and Canadian

31:06.875 --> 31:10.074
intercepted Russian aircraft north of

31:10.074 --> 31:12.155
Alaska that went from the Alaska

31:12.155 --> 31:14.425
natives into the Canadian natives and

31:14.425 --> 31:16.755
then back across . And because of the

31:16.755 --> 31:18.977
seamless approach that we have from the

31:18.977 --> 31:21.635
headquarters on down to units that is

31:21.635 --> 31:23.968
fully integrated on the same data links ,

31:23.968 --> 31:26.191
the same mission planning systems using

31:26.191 --> 31:28.819
the same . Refueling tankers operating

31:28.819 --> 31:30.986
sometimes from the same base , it's an

31:30.986 --> 31:33.959
incredibly tight , and I think

31:34.260 --> 31:37.520
inseparable relationship that we have

31:37.520 --> 31:39.520
to defend North America . It sounds

31:39.520 --> 31:42.780
like you're evolving and adjusting the

31:42.780 --> 31:45.569
relationship to meet the new threats

31:45.569 --> 31:48.339
that are out there . Yes ma'am , we

31:48.339 --> 31:50.172
absolutely are , and both of our

31:50.172 --> 31:52.172
countries are pursuing , uh , NORAD

31:52.172 --> 31:54.283
modernization capabilities that we'll

31:54.283 --> 31:56.395
make sure that we can stay ahead as I

31:56.395 --> 31:58.450
mentioned . Thank you , uh , General

31:58.450 --> 32:01.619
Donovan , uh , what actions is SOTHCOM

32:01.619 --> 32:03.859
taking to increase and leverage

32:03.859 --> 32:06.579
partnerships to advance , uh , our

32:06.589 --> 32:08.589
country's interests in the region ?

32:10.280 --> 32:12.410
Senator , we've had an opportunity to

32:12.410 --> 32:15.739
meet with almost every leader , uh , my ,

32:15.800 --> 32:18.280
my equivalent , the , the mods or Chods

32:18.280 --> 32:20.502
of the , of the southern countries that

32:20.502 --> 32:22.724
were tied to through the CHO conference

32:22.724 --> 32:24.836
we had with the chairman here in , in

32:24.836 --> 32:24.650
DC . And then this America's

32:24.650 --> 32:27.780
countercartel coalition , their ask is

32:27.780 --> 32:29.891
the same thing . They need assistance

32:29.891 --> 32:32.002
with domain awareness and really it's

32:32.002 --> 32:34.339
key between air domain awareness as we

32:34.339 --> 32:36.506
believe some of these drug trafficking

32:36.506 --> 32:38.450
flows are moving into the airspace

32:38.450 --> 32:40.617
again and maritime domain awareness to

32:40.617 --> 32:42.672
look out over the horizon , not only

32:42.672 --> 32:44.783
for the cartel . Efforts , but really

32:44.783 --> 32:47.006
the PRC , the Chinese influence illicit

32:47.006 --> 32:49.117
phishing . So really domain awareness

32:49.117 --> 32:51.228
is the is the thing they ask for more

32:51.228 --> 32:53.395
than anything else . Senator . To what

32:53.395 --> 32:55.283
extent can lessons from the Joint

32:55.283 --> 32:57.506
Security Cooperation Group Panama , how

32:57.506 --> 32:59.935
can those be applied to SOCOM's

32:59.935 --> 33:03.900
relationships to other countries ? I

33:03.900 --> 33:06.233
think that's an exemplar , uh , Senator ,

33:06.233 --> 33:08.344
that we're just starting to realize ,

33:08.344 --> 33:10.511
um , how we could export that to other

33:10.511 --> 33:09.939
places in South America , in the

33:09.939 --> 33:12.050
Caribbean and , and Central America .

33:12.050 --> 33:14.217
OK , thank you very much . Thank you ,

33:14.217 --> 33:16.217
Mr . Chairman . Thank you , Senator

33:16.217 --> 33:18.383
Fisher , Senator Shaheen . Thank you ,

33:18.383 --> 33:20.550
Mr . Chairman , and thank you both for

33:20.550 --> 33:19.979
being here this morning and for your

33:19.979 --> 33:22.300
service to our country . Um , General

33:22.300 --> 33:25.109
Donovan , throughout the past fall ,

33:25.339 --> 33:27.283
this committee was briefed several

33:27.283 --> 33:29.228
times on ongoing operations in the

33:29.228 --> 33:31.450
Caribbean , as you've heard from , um ,

33:31.450 --> 33:34.050
Senator Reid . And when we asked point

33:34.050 --> 33:37.250
blank about plans to remove Nicolas

33:37.250 --> 33:39.770
Maduro from power in Venezuela , we

33:39.770 --> 33:42.010
were told both at the cabinet level and

33:42.010 --> 33:44.232
from senior military leaders that there

33:44.232 --> 33:47.030
were no plans to conduct regime change

33:47.199 --> 33:50.180
and there . And yet come to find out ,

33:50.680 --> 33:52.624
the military was in the process of

33:52.624 --> 33:54.969
conducting rehearsals to remove Nicolas

33:54.969 --> 33:58.439
Maduro from power . So , General

33:58.439 --> 34:00.550
Donovan , now we're hearing President

34:00.550 --> 34:02.661
Trump make several comments about his

34:02.661 --> 34:05.719
intent to remove . From power of the

34:05.719 --> 34:08.889
current president of Cuba to own Cuba ,

34:09.439 --> 34:13.199
um , and while both Cuba and Venezuela

34:13.199 --> 34:15.421
are repressive regimes and I don't have

34:15.421 --> 34:17.659
any sympathy for their leadership ,

34:17.840 --> 34:19.896
they pose no immediate threat to the

34:19.896 --> 34:22.760
United States so I'm gonna ask you very

34:22.760 --> 34:25.239
directly , are we currently conducting

34:25.239 --> 34:27.295
any military rehearsals that involve

34:27.295 --> 34:29.649
seizing , occupying , or otherwise

34:29.649 --> 34:31.719
asserting control over Cuba ?

34:33.610 --> 34:35.721
Center , US Southern Command is not .

34:36.718 --> 34:39.909
Thank you . Um , Pardon me ?

34:41.129 --> 34:43.129
Is there any other command that you

34:43.129 --> 34:45.918
know of ? No , Senator . Thank you .

34:46.739 --> 34:49.789
Thank you , Senator Reid . Um , General

34:49.789 --> 34:52.689
Guillo . US space and satellite

34:52.689 --> 34:54.790
tracking infrastructure in Greenland

34:55.050 --> 34:56.661
now falls under your area of

34:56.661 --> 34:58.828
responsibility , as you pointed out in

34:58.828 --> 35:02.320
your testimony , um . And I noticed in

35:02.320 --> 35:04.431
your statement for the record that in

35:04.431 --> 35:06.598
addition to the US-Canada relationship

35:06.598 --> 35:08.431
through NORAD , you benefit from

35:08.431 --> 35:10.320
cooperation with the Danish armed

35:10.320 --> 35:12.153
forces and with the inclusion of

35:12.153 --> 35:15.000
Greenland in your AOR . So can you tell

35:15.000 --> 35:17.360
us , has the United States ever made a

35:17.360 --> 35:19.260
request of Denmark or Greenland

35:19.600 --> 35:21.919
regarding military cooperation that has

35:21.919 --> 35:24.239
not been granted or accommodated by the

35:24.239 --> 35:27.320
Danish and Greenlandic authorities ? No ,

35:27.399 --> 35:29.919
Senator , we have not . I enjoy a very

35:29.919 --> 35:31.919
strong relationship with the , uh ,

35:32.060 --> 35:35.800
Danis Chott , and , uh , every request

35:35.800 --> 35:37.856
and partnership opportunity has been

35:37.856 --> 35:40.919
fulfilled . Thank you . And , um , in

35:40.919 --> 35:43.141
your exchange with Senator Fisher , you

35:43.141 --> 35:45.308
talked about the efforts underway with

35:45.308 --> 35:47.600
Canada on NORAD . Can you speak a

35:47.600 --> 35:49.767
little , in a little greater detail to

35:49.767 --> 35:52.560
the benefit that Canada provides us as

35:52.560 --> 35:56.530
a partner in NORAD ? Senator , as

35:56.530 --> 35:58.697
I mentioned , they're fully integrated

35:58.697 --> 36:01.030
in , in all of our operations for NORAD ,

36:01.030 --> 36:04.729
uh . The benefits that I see underway

36:04.729 --> 36:07.550
and coming in the future are long range

36:07.550 --> 36:09.649
radar systems that can help detect

36:09.649 --> 36:12.030
threats at range , uh , an interest in

36:12.030 --> 36:14.790
joining us in satellite detection

36:14.790 --> 36:16.457
capabilities which would give

36:16.457 --> 36:18.989
persistence , and then the purchase of

36:18.989 --> 36:21.100
advanced fighter aircraft such as the

36:21.100 --> 36:23.322
F-35 , which would give us lethality to

36:23.322 --> 36:25.378
defeat threats further away from our

36:25.378 --> 36:27.489
continent . So is it fair to say that

36:27.489 --> 36:29.711
we're safer and stronger because of our

36:29.711 --> 36:31.767
partnership with Canada ? Uh , yes ,

36:31.767 --> 36:34.045
ma'am , and NORAD for sure . Thank you .

36:35.600 --> 36:37.656
As you point out in your testimony ,

36:37.656 --> 36:39.822
General Guilla , drone incursions over

36:39.822 --> 36:42.050
the United States pose a real threat to

36:42.050 --> 36:44.790
our homeland , especially over critical

36:44.790 --> 36:47.090
US military infrastructure . The

36:47.090 --> 36:49.370
Ukrainian armed forces have really made

36:49.370 --> 36:51.537
progress on both offensive and counter

36:51.537 --> 36:53.879
drone technology and are , as you know ,

36:53.929 --> 36:57.010
are now assisting in with air defense

36:57.010 --> 36:59.669
in the Middle East . Can you talk about

36:59.810 --> 37:02.750
the lessons that . have been learned

37:03.129 --> 37:05.073
from the Ukrainian military as you

37:05.073 --> 37:07.129
think about developing counter drone

37:07.129 --> 37:10.209
technology . Yes , Senator , and we're

37:10.209 --> 37:12.042
very fortunate , as the chairman

37:12.042 --> 37:14.209
mentioned , to have JAA 401 , which is

37:14.209 --> 37:16.610
a newly established organization that

37:16.610 --> 37:18.889
looks at the procurement and

37:18.889 --> 37:20.833
development of counter UAS systems

37:20.969 --> 37:23.136
which can be passed to combat commands

37:23.136 --> 37:25.919
like ours and others . First , I see

37:25.919 --> 37:28.260
that it's , it's important to move from

37:28.260 --> 37:31.219
a point defense , which counter UAS in

37:31.219 --> 37:33.330
the last few years has been into more

37:33.330 --> 37:35.219
of a regional area because of the

37:35.219 --> 37:37.739
longer range and indiscriminate nature

37:37.739 --> 37:40.100
with which the adversary has employed

37:40.100 --> 37:43.100
these systems . Also , they've helped

37:43.100 --> 37:45.322
illuminate that you can't have just one

37:45.322 --> 37:47.378
or two different defeat mechanisms .

37:47.378 --> 37:49.711
They have to be across multiple mediums ,

37:49.770 --> 37:51.820
everything from denying satellite

37:51.820 --> 37:53.969
guidance all the way to first person

37:53.969 --> 37:56.540
view and everything in between , which

37:56.540 --> 37:58.373
means that we have to expand our

37:58.373 --> 38:00.540
arsenal in ways that we didn't think 2

38:00.540 --> 38:02.651
or 3 years ago , and we wouldn't have

38:02.651 --> 38:04.873
known that without . The benefit of the

38:04.873 --> 38:06.762
Ukraine . Thank you . And General

38:06.762 --> 38:08.984
Donovan , when I was recently , Senator

38:08.984 --> 38:11.207
Blumenthal and I actually were recently

38:11.207 --> 38:13.318
in Odessa in Ukraine , and one of the

38:13.318 --> 38:15.262
people we met along the way was an

38:15.262 --> 38:18.445
official from Colombia who was working

38:18.445 --> 38:20.389
with the Ukrainian armed forces to

38:20.389 --> 38:24.139
combat drug cartels in . Uh ,

38:24.810 --> 38:27.250
this Latin America and in Colombia

38:27.250 --> 38:29.729
specifically , can you have , are you

38:29.729 --> 38:32.820
looking at some of those efforts to

38:32.820 --> 38:35.169
address what you're trying to do in ,

38:35.449 --> 38:38.850
uh , SOCOM to address cartels and the

38:38.850 --> 38:41.659
narcotics trade . Yes , Senator , we

38:41.659 --> 38:43.770
are . Colombia , after really decades

38:43.770 --> 38:45.826
of playing Colombia , they're a very

38:45.826 --> 38:47.826
effective organization and we still

38:47.826 --> 38:49.881
have very strong mill to mill ties ,

38:49.881 --> 38:52.103
and we actually Fusion Cell in Bogota ,

38:52.103 --> 38:54.159
so we continue to learn from their ,

38:54.159 --> 38:56.326
their successes they're having against

38:56.326 --> 38:58.270
the cartels and , and what they're

38:58.270 --> 39:00.603
learning is from the Ukrainians as well ,

39:00.603 --> 39:02.770
correct ? Absolutely , Senator . Thank

39:02.770 --> 39:02.040
you . Thank you , Mr . Chairman . Thank

39:02.040 --> 39:04.318
you , Senator Shaheen . Senator Cotton .

39:04.439 --> 39:06.661
Thank you gentlemen for your appearance

39:06.661 --> 39:08.661
and for your service . Um , General

39:08.661 --> 39:10.439
Donovan , I want to turn to the

39:10.439 --> 39:12.495
question of Cuba . I understand that

39:12.495 --> 39:14.606
you may not be actively rehearsing an

39:14.606 --> 39:17.139
invasion of Cuba , but surely we have

39:17.270 --> 39:19.214
plans to deal with any contingency

39:19.214 --> 39:21.270
related to Cuba . I mean , there's ,

39:21.270 --> 39:23.270
there's a vast cadre , thousands of

39:23.270 --> 39:25.159
majors and cardinals just sitting

39:25.159 --> 39:27.214
around the Pentagon making plans for

39:27.214 --> 39:29.548
every possible contingency in the world .

39:29.548 --> 39:31.714
Um , it'd be a mass unemployment event

39:31.714 --> 39:34.030
if we didn't have plans . For every

39:34.030 --> 39:36.308
potential crisis around the world , so .

39:36.699 --> 39:38.755
I want to ask specifically about one

39:38.755 --> 39:40.755
potential crisis given the state of

39:40.939 --> 39:42.939
play in Cuba , uh , which has never

39:42.939 --> 39:45.161
been able to stand on its own 2 ft . It

39:45.161 --> 39:47.161
relied for 30 years on support from

39:47.260 --> 39:49.689
Soviet Russia , and then it was wobbly

39:49.689 --> 39:52.540
in the 1990s until Chavez's Venezuela

39:52.540 --> 39:54.762
came to the rescue and supported it for

39:54.762 --> 39:58.149
the last 30 years , um . Are we

39:58.149 --> 40:00.260
prepared for any kind of humanitarian

40:01.070 --> 40:04.270
crisis in Cuba , uh , the possible flow

40:04.270 --> 40:07.790
of refugees or other civil

40:07.790 --> 40:10.310
disorder that may threaten our

40:10.310 --> 40:12.588
interests , especially if the decrepit ,

40:12.588 --> 40:14.754
corrupt Castro regime finally falls or

40:14.754 --> 40:17.699
flees . Senator , yes , we are .

40:18.060 --> 40:20.171
SouthCO , our core task , we have a ,

40:20.270 --> 40:22.492
we have an execute order to be prepared

40:22.492 --> 40:24.939
to support DHS in a mass migration

40:24.939 --> 40:27.050
event . They would take the lead . We

40:27.050 --> 40:29.272
would follow either at sea or primarily

40:29.272 --> 40:31.495
ashore at Guantanamo Bay where we would

40:31.495 --> 40:33.439
set up a camp . To deal with those

40:33.439 --> 40:35.370
migrants or any overflow from any

40:35.459 --> 40:37.649
situation in Cuba itself . Otherwise ,

40:37.790 --> 40:39.846
my other core task is to protect the

40:39.846 --> 40:42.012
embassy , which we are in contact with

40:42.012 --> 40:44.123
the embassy every single day . We had

40:44.123 --> 40:46.346
the CDA , the chargers affair hammer in

40:46.346 --> 40:45.899
my office about a week ago , and we

40:45.899 --> 40:48.066
talked about what he thought was going

40:48.066 --> 40:50.177
to happen in Cuba . And so we're very

40:50.177 --> 40:52.399
much aligned with the diplomats there .

40:52.399 --> 40:54.455
That's my responsibility . In Cuba ,

40:54.455 --> 40:56.677
the responsibility I have is protecting

40:56.677 --> 40:56.429
that that the base and those families

40:56.429 --> 40:58.530
and US Americans . Living on the

40:58.530 --> 41:00.530
eastern part of the island , so all

41:00.530 --> 41:02.308
those together we're constantly

41:02.308 --> 41:04.141
watching . If asked to support a

41:04.141 --> 41:06.308
humanitarian event , that's what we do

41:06.308 --> 41:08.308
actually very well . Also , we , we

41:08.308 --> 41:10.363
were very strong in logistics and we

41:10.363 --> 41:12.530
could move , uh , support and supplies

41:12.530 --> 41:14.863
if , if asked to do so . OK , thank you .

41:14.863 --> 41:14.489
Uh , you've been on the job now for a

41:14.489 --> 41:16.656
little over a month . Um , what's been

41:16.656 --> 41:18.656
your assessment of the state of our

41:18.656 --> 41:21.129
infrastructure , uh , in Latin America ,

41:21.290 --> 41:23.570
especially in the Caribbean ? Um , has

41:23.570 --> 41:25.989
it , it , does it need , uh ,

41:26.800 --> 41:28.967
additional support given the fact that

41:28.967 --> 41:30.911
SOUTHCOM is now a much more active

41:30.911 --> 41:33.022
combatant command than it has been in

41:33.022 --> 41:35.022
the past ? Senator , in the last 43

41:35.022 --> 41:37.133
days I learned a lot about the budget

41:37.133 --> 41:39.429
at SouthCom and I've looked at the The

41:39.429 --> 41:41.651
base and stations that we've had in the

41:41.651 --> 41:43.873
past like like Guantanamo Bay and other

41:43.873 --> 41:45.873
locations that we're coming back to

41:45.873 --> 41:47.873
like in Puerto Rico than areas like

41:47.873 --> 41:49.429
Sooko where we have a great

41:49.429 --> 41:51.651
relationship with the Hondurans , all ,

41:51.651 --> 41:53.985
all in different degrees need a refresh .

41:53.985 --> 41:55.873
I'd like to pause for a minute on

41:55.873 --> 41:58.096
Guantanamo Bay . I think that is one of

41:58.096 --> 42:00.262
the more key locations we have , and ,

42:00.262 --> 42:00.239
uh , and it is , I won't pull any

42:00.239 --> 42:02.350
punches , it's in rough shape because

42:02.350 --> 42:04.572
of the hurricane damage , we're down to

42:04.572 --> 42:06.906
one working pier and one refueling pier .

42:06.906 --> 42:09.072
Um , I believe that is a pivotal point

42:09.072 --> 42:11.469
for any operations in the Caribbean is ,

42:11.709 --> 42:13.979
is Gitmo . And so right now we're

42:13.979 --> 42:16.100
working for opportunities and the

42:16.100 --> 42:18.211
funding , um , and the resources . Is

42:18.211 --> 42:20.433
it MICO ? Is it other contingency funds

42:20.433 --> 42:22.656
to really figure out how to go to those

42:22.656 --> 42:24.711
key locations , and they become both

42:24.711 --> 42:26.878
not just logistics hubs , but maneuver

42:26.878 --> 42:28.933
hubs as we look at going on a , on a

42:28.933 --> 42:31.211
consistent countercartel campaign . Uh ,

42:31.211 --> 42:33.267
and or better partners and use those

42:33.267 --> 42:35.378
hubs for hubs of partnership like you

42:35.378 --> 42:37.489
mentioned before , how to export some

42:37.489 --> 42:36.830
of the good things we're doing in

42:36.830 --> 42:39.899
Panama . OK , and I , I trust that your

42:39.899 --> 42:42.010
budget request will reflect the needs

42:42.010 --> 42:44.010
for those infrastructure upgrades ,

42:44.010 --> 42:46.360
especially at Guantanamo Bay . Yes ,

42:46.449 --> 42:48.560
Senator , and , and how our budget is

42:48.560 --> 42:50.671
structured right now , uh , executive

42:50.671 --> 42:52.782
agents of the United States Army , so

42:52.782 --> 42:52.090
we're working with the United States

42:52.090 --> 42:54.489
Army on , on looking at that budget

42:54.489 --> 42:56.600
structure and then how do we actually

42:56.600 --> 42:58.767
have a budget built over time with the

42:58.767 --> 43:01.010
right amount of O&M to actually make

43:01.010 --> 43:03.066
improvements and sustain those , not

43:03.066 --> 43:05.232
just one year shots in the arm , but a

43:05.232 --> 43:07.232
sustained budget approach that will

43:07.232 --> 43:09.177
actually let us campaign from very

43:09.177 --> 43:11.510
effective forward locations . Thank you .

43:11.510 --> 43:13.677
Um , I think your appointment reflects

43:13.677 --> 43:15.732
in part that . Southern Command is a

43:15.732 --> 43:17.969
combatant command , not a training

43:17.969 --> 43:20.136
command and certainly not a diplomatic

43:20.136 --> 43:22.191
command , and I , I think the budget

43:22.191 --> 43:24.413
needs to reflect that as well . General

43:24.413 --> 43:26.747
Guillo , um . As the commander of NORAD ,

43:26.747 --> 43:28.802
uh , one of your central missions is

43:28.802 --> 43:30.858
the defense of American and Canadian

43:30.858 --> 43:33.169
airspace that depends on a robust

43:33.169 --> 43:35.330
fighter force , uh , but today's Air

43:35.330 --> 43:37.330
Force fleet is the smallest and the

43:37.330 --> 43:39.441
oldest it's ever been . The Air Force

43:39.441 --> 43:41.663
also struggles with low readiness rates

43:41.663 --> 43:43.830
for its fighters . Do you believe that

43:43.830 --> 43:45.941
NORTHCOM and NORAD would benefit from

43:45.941 --> 43:49.070
an expanded fighter force ? Yes ,

43:49.179 --> 43:51.459
Senator , we would . Uh , I , I would

43:51.459 --> 43:53.870
like to see continued modernization of

43:53.870 --> 43:56.250
4th generation fighter fleet . Uh ,

43:56.750 --> 43:58.969
frankly , sir , we don't need 5th gen

43:58.969 --> 44:01.429
to defend our borders . Those

44:01.429 --> 44:03.540
capabilities are better used overseas

44:03.540 --> 44:05.540
where their stealth , air to ground

44:05.540 --> 44:07.596
weapons , and penetration capability

44:07.596 --> 44:09.870
are needed . So , uh , revamped and

44:09.870 --> 44:12.669
modernized 4th gen . Uh , to include

44:12.669 --> 44:16.270
F-15EX , uh , in select locations would

44:16.270 --> 44:18.381
meet all of our requirements . Good .

44:18.381 --> 44:20.548
I'm , I'm glad you said that . I think

44:20.548 --> 44:20.469
we need more 4th generation fighters as

44:20.469 --> 44:23.169
well , like the F-15EX , and for that

44:23.169 --> 44:25.002
matter they can be pretty useful

44:25.002 --> 44:26.947
overseas once those 5th generation

44:26.947 --> 44:29.113
fighters and bombers plow the road and

44:29.113 --> 44:31.113
knock out the air defenses as we're

44:31.113 --> 44:30.979
seeing right now in Iran . Thank you ,

44:30.989 --> 44:33.350
gentlemen . General Donovan , how , how

44:33.350 --> 44:36.270
many , um , Americans are at Gitmo

44:36.270 --> 44:38.629
right now ? You know , Senator , I'm

44:38.629 --> 44:40.573
gonna , I'm gonna look at my cheat

44:40.573 --> 44:42.796
sheet because as I learned the , um , I

44:42.796 --> 44:45.018
do that often , um . Let me get back to

44:45.018 --> 44:47.018
you on it . Um , OK , that's fine .

44:47.018 --> 44:49.129
I'll let you know . I know what we're

44:49.129 --> 44:48.969
prepared for if migrants come in . I

44:48.969 --> 44:51.136
don't have the base structure and what

44:51.136 --> 44:53.413
we have down there right now , OK . Uh ,

44:53.413 --> 44:56.679
um , Are the Russians

44:57.300 --> 45:00.500
resupplying Cuba now and how much of a

45:00.500 --> 45:02.722
game changer is that or would that be ?

45:04.860 --> 45:06.916
Chairman , we haven't seen an active

45:06.916 --> 45:09.459
resupply of Russians coming to the aid

45:09.459 --> 45:12.219
of Cuba from a . I saw a news article

45:12.219 --> 45:14.386
about that . What we're tracking right

45:14.386 --> 45:15.997
now is one destroyer with an

45:15.997 --> 45:17.497
accompanying oiler which a

45:17.497 --> 45:19.719
replenishment ship heading towards Cuba

45:19.719 --> 45:22.300
on a port call . I believe that oiler

45:22.300 --> 45:24.300
is just supporting that ship moving

45:24.300 --> 45:26.300
there . I don't think it's going to

45:26.300 --> 45:26.020
deliver any . If it did , it wouldn't

45:26.020 --> 45:28.076
have the impact of scale . So that's

45:28.076 --> 45:30.353
the only event I'm tracking , Chairman .

45:30.379 --> 45:33.570
Thank you , Senator Blumenthal . Thanks ,

45:33.610 --> 45:35.929
Mr . Chairman . Thank you both for your

45:35.929 --> 45:38.689
service and to your families . Uh ,

45:39.250 --> 45:41.417
General Donovan , to your wife , and I

45:41.417 --> 45:43.250
understand your two children are

45:43.250 --> 45:45.417
Marines . Thank them as well for their

45:45.417 --> 45:47.810
service . Uh , there have been reports

45:47.810 --> 45:50.909
of a request by the Pentagon for

45:51.090 --> 45:54.699
$200 billion supplemental . It seems to

45:54.699 --> 45:58.489
me that A supplemental to

45:58.489 --> 46:02.489
support a . War that

46:02.790 --> 46:04.957
the president has never asked Congress

46:04.957 --> 46:07.709
to approve as constitutionally required

46:07.709 --> 46:09.931
without a clear statement of objectives

46:09.931 --> 46:12.010
or strategy . Disclosure of accurate

46:12.979 --> 46:15.090
information about the cost of the war

46:15.090 --> 46:17.629
or public hearings with relevant

46:17.629 --> 46:21.159
officials would make it a

46:21.510 --> 46:24.070
non-starter at this point . And it's

46:24.070 --> 46:27.229
added to a $1.5 trillion Department of

46:27.229 --> 46:31.050
Defense FY 27 . Request

46:32.000 --> 46:34.290
Uh , and could be misinterpreted or

46:34.290 --> 46:37.689
spun as congressional approval for the

46:37.689 --> 46:41.149
war . Are you aware of the requests

46:41.649 --> 46:43.649
made by the Department of Defense ,

46:43.649 --> 46:46.229
Department of War , for $200 billion

46:46.229 --> 46:49.899
supplemental ? Either of you , the

46:49.899 --> 46:51.788
senator , I read in the news this

46:51.788 --> 46:55.370
morning . Senator , I'm in the same

46:55.370 --> 46:57.703
position as General Donovan . Thank you .

46:57.703 --> 46:59.814
Uh , you've been asked , uh , General

46:59.814 --> 47:03.780
Donovan about . Plans and rehearsals

47:03.790 --> 47:06.850
for Cuba , are you aware of any

47:07.790 --> 47:10.889
plans to . Aid

47:12.060 --> 47:14.489
Non-governmental groups , exile groups ,

47:14.500 --> 47:17.729
or any other groups in

47:17.739 --> 47:20.520
potentially action within Cuba to

47:20.520 --> 47:23.020
overthrow this government or to take

47:23.020 --> 47:25.969
over if there is an overthrow . No ,

47:26.070 --> 47:30.040
Senator . And Are you aware of any

47:30.040 --> 47:32.969
contingency plans ? To

47:33.870 --> 47:37.149
Put American troops in Cuba if there is

47:37.149 --> 47:39.949
unrest there that threatens .

47:40.889 --> 47:44.040
Americans who are there now . Senator ,

47:44.600 --> 47:46.544
that situation , if it developed a

47:46.544 --> 47:48.489
physical security threat to the US

47:48.489 --> 47:50.711
embassy or the base at Gitmo , we would

47:50.711 --> 47:52.711
put US troops to defend US-American

47:52.711 --> 47:55.780
lives . Thank you . Um , as Senator

47:55.780 --> 47:59.459
Shaheena said , I have no Sympathy for

47:59.459 --> 48:01.860
repress the repressive regime there

48:01.860 --> 48:04.040
which has caused deaths and economic

48:04.379 --> 48:06.729
turmoil , but I think we should be

48:07.179 --> 48:10.100
informed about any such plans if they

48:10.100 --> 48:12.709
are made . Would you agree ? Yes ,

48:12.770 --> 48:15.689
Senator . Thank you . Um

48:16.899 --> 48:18.760
In terms of

48:20.500 --> 48:23.530
The seizure of boats .

48:25.239 --> 48:27.406
Emanating from Venezuela , is that are

48:27.406 --> 48:29.517
those operations continuing , General

48:29.517 --> 48:32.989
Donovan ? Senator , Southern Command

48:32.989 --> 48:34.989
continues to track the dark fleet ,

48:34.989 --> 48:36.933
those vessels have been designated

48:36.933 --> 48:38.870
carrying illicit oil from or to

48:38.870 --> 48:41.037
Venezuela . We continue to track those

48:41.037 --> 48:44.030
right now , all in our AOR are actually

48:44.030 --> 48:46.197
in port or not transiting . There have

48:46.197 --> 48:48.308
been a number of engagements . Called

48:48.308 --> 48:50.530
maritime interception operations . Some

48:50.530 --> 48:52.641
have happened in SouthTHCOM . One has

48:52.641 --> 48:54.808
happened in YuCom in the middle of the

48:54.808 --> 48:56.919
Atlantic , and one's happened also in

48:56.919 --> 48:59.030
Indopecom in the Indian Ocean . So we

48:59.030 --> 49:00.808
continue to track those illicit

49:00.808 --> 49:02.808
shipping and when directed , we can

49:02.808 --> 49:04.863
conduct interception operations . To

49:04.863 --> 49:07.040
what extent are other nations in the

49:07.040 --> 49:09.207
hemisphere aiding the United States in

49:09.207 --> 49:12.560
those operations ? Senator ,

49:13.340 --> 49:15.451
I do not know if we're getting direct

49:15.451 --> 49:17.673
aid in the sense of a tactical action .

49:17.673 --> 49:20.100
It is all US US personnel involved ,

49:20.139 --> 49:22.083
led by law enforcement , the Coast

49:22.083 --> 49:24.379
Guard , but I am not aware of other

49:24.379 --> 49:26.212
unless it's intel or information

49:26.212 --> 49:28.323
sharing . We depend on partners , but

49:28.323 --> 49:30.546
no other direct support . I do . I will

49:30.546 --> 49:32.546
tell you that we , um , part of our

49:32.546 --> 49:34.601
trip to , to Venezuela was to , um ,

49:34.601 --> 49:36.768
put pressure on that government to let

49:36.768 --> 49:38.768
us board two of the ships that they

49:38.768 --> 49:41.101
have in port , Pierside in Caracas . Um ,

49:41.101 --> 49:43.157
they executed the boarding and , and

49:43.157 --> 49:45.268
determined , uh , for us to determine

49:45.449 --> 49:47.370
what was actually on board . Uh ,

49:47.489 --> 49:49.489
during your nomination hearings , I

49:49.489 --> 49:52.489
asked you . Whether you supported

49:52.489 --> 49:54.770
releasing various Office of Legal

49:54.770 --> 49:56.992
Counsel opinions , I think there are at

49:56.992 --> 49:59.810
least 2 of them , which right now are

49:59.810 --> 50:02.489
classified . You deferred to the policy

50:02.489 --> 50:04.929
and legal advisors in the office of the

50:04.929 --> 50:07.449
Secretary . Uh , now that you're

50:07.449 --> 50:10.679
confirmed , uh . I'll ask you again ,

50:10.790 --> 50:13.012
do you believe that the American people

50:13.012 --> 50:15.649
should Have available or have access to

50:15.649 --> 50:17.871
those opinions that are the legal basis

50:17.871 --> 50:20.689
for the administration carrying out the

50:20.689 --> 50:23.929
strikes . Senator , the department has

50:23.929 --> 50:26.262
kept the information releases Authority .

50:26.262 --> 50:28.207
I'm just carrying out the assigned

50:28.207 --> 50:30.485
tasks . Thank you . My time is expired .

50:30.485 --> 50:32.707
Thank you , Mr . Chairman . Thank you ,

50:32.707 --> 50:34.762
Senator Blumenthal . Senator Ernst .

50:34.762 --> 50:34.659
Thank you , Mr . Chair , and thank you ,

50:34.669 --> 50:36.969
gentlemen and your teams as well for

50:37.229 --> 50:39.507
your exceptional service to our nation .

50:39.750 --> 50:42.260
Uh , General , uh , Guillo , I'll start

50:42.260 --> 50:45.209
with you , sir . Uh , I wanna start by

50:45.310 --> 50:48.360
highlighting the 185th Air refueling

50:48.360 --> 50:50.979
wing in Sio Sioux City , Iowa , uh ,

50:51.070 --> 50:52.792
which plays a critical role in

50:52.792 --> 50:54.903
supporting both global operations and

50:54.903 --> 50:57.830
homeland defense mission . Our airmen

50:57.830 --> 51:00.629
are operating the KC-135 tankers , and

51:00.629 --> 51:03.270
they do an exceptional job . Uh , that

51:03.270 --> 51:04.992
mission provides essential air

51:04.992 --> 51:07.214
refueling which enables everything from

51:07.214 --> 51:09.540
strategic bomber operations to fighter

51:09.540 --> 51:12.229
alert missions and rapid response here

51:12.229 --> 51:15.030
at home . This capability is essential

51:15.030 --> 51:18.070
to projecting power abroad while also

51:18.070 --> 51:20.590
supporting North NorthCO's homeland

51:20.830 --> 51:23.409
defense function . Ensuring the Sioux

51:23.409 --> 51:25.540
City Runway renovations are completed

51:25.540 --> 51:28.010
is critical to sustaining this tanker

51:28.010 --> 51:30.219
mission and maintaining the Air

51:30.219 --> 51:32.219
National Guard's ability to support

51:32.219 --> 51:35.080
combatant command operations overseas

51:35.340 --> 51:38.580
and contingency response in the United

51:38.580 --> 51:41.340
States . So sir , can you speak to the

51:41.340 --> 51:43.540
operational importance of maintaining

51:43.540 --> 51:45.939
strong aerial refueling capabilities in

51:45.939 --> 51:48.739
the nation's interior . And how

51:48.739 --> 51:50.239
critical it is to maintain

51:50.239 --> 51:52.295
infrastructure like the Siououx City

51:52.295 --> 51:54.110
Runway to ensure those missions

51:54.110 --> 51:56.060
continue to support both homeland

51:56.060 --> 51:59.159
defense and global force projection .

52:00.340 --> 52:02.618
Yes , yes , Senator , I absolutely can ,

52:02.618 --> 52:04.840
but first I'd say you mentioned the Air

52:04.840 --> 52:07.007
National Guard , the National Guard as

52:07.007 --> 52:09.219
a whole , and the success of the NORAD

52:09.219 --> 52:11.350
and NRTHCO mission starts and stops

52:11.350 --> 52:13.294
with our relationship with the Air

52:13.294 --> 52:15.406
National Guard and the National Guard

52:15.406 --> 52:17.689
to include that of Iowa . Regarding

52:17.689 --> 52:20.600
refuelers , that's our lifeline . We

52:20.600 --> 52:23.489
rely on some very incredible and

52:23.489 --> 52:25.600
incredibly capable fighter aircraft ,

52:25.850 --> 52:29.250
but the range and duration is limited ,

52:29.489 --> 52:32.590
especially when you're defending a vast

52:32.729 --> 52:35.360
homeland like the United States . And

52:35.360 --> 52:38.080
so with every launch of an alert

52:38.080 --> 52:39.802
fighter that seems to get more

52:39.802 --> 52:41.969
attention , there's a launch of one or

52:41.969 --> 52:44.136
two tankers to make sure that they can

52:44.136 --> 52:46.358
stay on station and flexible and mobile

52:46.639 --> 52:49.000
to meet the threat wherever it is . We

52:49.000 --> 52:51.056
could not do our job without the air

52:51.056 --> 52:53.159
refueling tankers . Thank you . I

52:53.159 --> 52:55.270
appreciate that . And with that , I'm

52:55.270 --> 52:57.215
going to yield back my time , Mr .

52:57.215 --> 52:59.548
Chair . Thank you . Thank you very much .

52:59.548 --> 53:01.969
We now have Senator Hirono .

53:03.449 --> 53:06.300
Thank you very much Mr . Chairman . Um ,

53:08.199 --> 53:12.120
So it The picture that

53:12.120 --> 53:14.639
uh is being painted with regard to our

53:14.639 --> 53:18.639
ability to uh engage in any kind of

53:18.639 --> 53:22.010
uh a um An operation in Cuba , the

53:22.010 --> 53:24.209
picture that is being painted in spite

53:24.209 --> 53:26.820
of , uh , assurances that , uh , there

53:26.820 --> 53:30.620
are no ongoing preparations to

53:30.620 --> 53:32.860
do anything particularly militarily ,

53:33.060 --> 53:35.393
but the picture I have is that , uh , I ,

53:35.393 --> 53:37.560
uh , that , uh , I'm getting is that ,

53:37.560 --> 53:39.782
uh , it would not take very long for us

53:39.782 --> 53:41.893
to be able to respond in some fashion

53:41.893 --> 53:44.219
if the president said , uh , we're , we

53:44.219 --> 53:46.330
are gonna go and we , we should seize

53:46.550 --> 53:49.330
Cuba . Uh , wouldn't we be able to

53:49.330 --> 53:52.530
execute on that in a pretty Expeditious

53:52.530 --> 53:55.270
way . Jim O'Donovan .

53:56.790 --> 53:59.899
Senator , since we do not have that

53:59.899 --> 54:02.580
plan , we have a number of tasks for

54:02.580 --> 54:04.580
Cuba , um , but since we have not ,

54:05.030 --> 54:07.197
we're not executing any rehearsals for

54:07.197 --> 54:09.030
that plan , the number of forces

54:09.030 --> 54:11.197
required , we have general ideas , but

54:11.197 --> 54:13.030
the focus right now is purely on

54:13.030 --> 54:14.974
securing Guantanamo Bay and the US

54:14.974 --> 54:17.197
embassy to protect American personnel .

54:17.197 --> 54:19.363
That is the only facts and figures and

54:19.363 --> 54:21.641
planning we have underway at this time .

54:21.641 --> 54:23.641
How long would it take for , if the

54:23.641 --> 54:25.752
president gave an order to seize Cuba

54:25.752 --> 54:27.474
because it's a pretty unstable

54:27.474 --> 54:29.697
situation there now ? How long would it

54:29.697 --> 54:31.808
take for you to be able to execute on

54:31.808 --> 54:34.070
that order ? Senator , I'd , I'd have

54:34.070 --> 54:36.181
to go through a planning process with

54:36.181 --> 54:38.237
the SOCOM team to determine what are

54:38.237 --> 54:40.403
the actual objectives of the operation

54:40.403 --> 54:42.514
to determine what size force would be

54:42.514 --> 54:44.737
required , but again , we are currently

54:44.737 --> 54:46.737
not executing that planning at this

54:46.737 --> 54:49.070
time . Uh , the picture I'm , I'm

54:49.070 --> 54:51.181
painting , and I don't wanna get into

54:51.181 --> 54:53.459
an argument with you , um , about this ,

54:53.459 --> 54:55.459
general , but , uh , I , I do think

54:55.459 --> 54:57.570
that , uh , uh , you're already there

54:57.570 --> 54:59.681
and therefore you're paying attention

54:59.681 --> 54:59.550
to what's going on there . It doesn't

54:59.550 --> 55:01.717
seem as though it would take very long

55:01.717 --> 55:03.883
for us to execute , uh , any kind of a

55:03.883 --> 55:06.189
plan there . Uh , Southern Command has

55:06.189 --> 55:09.310
previously worked with USAAID on

55:09.310 --> 55:12.050
humanitarian aid . Uh , uh , to Cuba ,

55:12.070 --> 55:14.126
and now that this aid has been cut ,

55:14.126 --> 55:16.489
has that not really , uh , made your ,

55:16.709 --> 55:19.389
the humanitarian aspects of , uh , what

55:19.389 --> 55:21.860
you're doing , uh , with regard to Cuba

55:21.860 --> 55:25.709
more difficult ? Secretary , as the

55:25.709 --> 55:28.070
US State Department is restructured in

55:28.070 --> 55:30.181
those elements that were USAid in the

55:30.181 --> 55:32.292
past , actually , I've asked a lot of

55:32.292 --> 55:34.459
questions about this because , because

55:34.459 --> 55:36.626
I grew up for 37 years , have operated

55:36.626 --> 55:38.903
with state and US aid across the globe .

55:38.903 --> 55:41.070
Uh , there are other entities who have

55:41.070 --> 55:41.010
taken up those , those . Roles inside

55:41.010 --> 55:43.177
of the State Department and now we are

55:43.177 --> 55:45.469
connected with them uh on the aid front

55:45.469 --> 55:47.610
in many ways similar both in disaster

55:47.610 --> 55:50.129
relief and in planning so we have some

55:50.129 --> 55:52.185
of the similar capabilities just not

55:52.185 --> 55:54.185
the name and we are learning how to

55:54.185 --> 55:56.073
actually work together in the new

55:56.073 --> 55:58.185
structure from the State Department .

55:58.185 --> 56:00.407
General , based on the questions from a

56:00.407 --> 56:00.169
number of the members of this committee ,

56:00.250 --> 56:02.179
you can see that there are , uh ,

56:02.239 --> 56:04.610
definitely expressed concerns about

56:04.610 --> 56:06.832
what might be in the president's mind .

56:06.929 --> 56:10.290
With regard to Cuba , General Gillo , I ,

56:10.409 --> 56:12.520
I know you are working closely with ,

56:12.520 --> 56:16.270
uh , General . Ger Gerle , I don't know

56:16.270 --> 56:18.548
if I'm pronouncing that correctly , uh ,

56:18.548 --> 56:20.714
Golden Dome , and as you know , Hawaii

56:20.714 --> 56:22.603
is unique for purposes of missile

56:22.603 --> 56:24.909
defense , uh , with you and , um , and

56:24.909 --> 56:27.500
Admiral Paparo shaping or sharing

56:27.500 --> 56:30.030
responsibilities based on , uh , the

56:30.030 --> 56:32.899
kind of threat being posed in terms of ,

56:32.909 --> 56:35.929
uh , our need for missile defense , so .

56:36.409 --> 56:39.570
Uh , General Gridline , Gridline

56:39.570 --> 56:41.850
previously committed to me that defense

56:41.850 --> 56:44.530
of Hawaii will be included as part of

56:44.530 --> 56:46.889
Globen , uh , Golden Dome mission , uh ,

56:47.129 --> 56:49.407
missile defense , sorry , architecture ,

56:49.407 --> 56:51.518
and I just wanna get that , uh , kind

56:51.518 --> 56:54.010
of commitment from you . Senator ,

56:54.100 --> 56:56.840
absolutely , uh , the defense of Hawaii

56:56.840 --> 56:59.459
from ballistic missiles is a

56:59.459 --> 57:01.681
responsibility of US Northern Command ,

57:01.790 --> 57:04.300
and from the very inception of our

57:04.300 --> 57:06.411
planning for Golden Dome with General

57:06.411 --> 57:08.356
Gutlein , uh , it has included the

57:08.356 --> 57:11.159
ability to protect . those islands from

57:11.159 --> 57:13.270
ballistic missile defense and to your

57:13.270 --> 57:15.326
comment , ma'am , on the cooperation

57:15.326 --> 57:17.270
with Admiral Poparo , since it's a

57:17.270 --> 57:19.409
shared defense of Hawaii between our

57:19.409 --> 57:21.576
two commands , we've combined our main

57:22.320 --> 57:24.376
exercises , northern edge and Arctic

57:24.376 --> 57:26.729
edge , to ensure that it is seamless

57:26.729 --> 57:28.979
protection . Thank you . That's

57:28.979 --> 57:31.201
reassuring . But General Donovan , in ,

57:31.201 --> 57:33.257
in light of what happened with the ,

57:33.257 --> 57:36.300
the strike on the , uh , school in Iran ,

57:36.500 --> 57:38.820
there is a concern that we ought to be

57:38.820 --> 57:40.820
doing everything we can to mitigate

57:40.820 --> 57:43.060
harm to uh to civilians . So during

57:43.060 --> 57:45.116
your confirmation hearing , I raised

57:45.116 --> 57:47.060
concerns about reports that , uh ,

57:47.469 --> 57:49.636
SOCOM lacked a functioning mechanism .

57:50.129 --> 57:52.889
To receive civilian casualty reports

57:52.889 --> 57:56.270
and that SOCOM civilian harm mitigation

57:56.850 --> 58:00.850
staff have been cut from 4 personnel

58:00.850 --> 58:03.449
to a single contractor . You had not

58:03.449 --> 58:05.449
assumed your responsibility at that

58:05.449 --> 58:07.570
point and I , I'd like to hear what

58:07.570 --> 58:10.399
steps SOCOM has taken to address the

58:10.399 --> 58:13.669
issue of of . Uh , mitigating civilian

58:13.669 --> 58:15.790
harm in any any of your actions .

58:16.580 --> 58:18.580
Senator , yes , and I did , I did .

58:18.580 --> 58:20.802
That's one of the first things I did to

58:20.802 --> 58:22.969
look at our , our program for not only

58:22.969 --> 58:25.080
planning but response to operations .

58:25.080 --> 58:27.191
And what I found , as you mentioned ,

58:27.191 --> 58:29.413
um , 4 positions , we had 4 positions .

58:29.413 --> 58:31.358
One , I'm paying for out of my own

58:31.358 --> 58:33.413
budget to ensure that I do have that

58:33.413 --> 58:35.636
capability built as a separate entity ,

58:35.636 --> 58:37.858
move the other capabilities into our J3

58:37.858 --> 58:40.024
fires and kinetic effects , so they're

58:40.024 --> 58:42.136
part of the planning cell and part of

58:42.136 --> 58:44.358
any investigations . I take it that you

58:44.358 --> 58:46.580
are increasing your capacity to be able

58:46.580 --> 58:48.469
to mitigate civilian harm . Yes ,

58:48.469 --> 58:50.358
Senator , thank you . Thank you ,

58:50.358 --> 58:53.790
Senator Hirono , Senator . King Thank

58:53.790 --> 58:56.229
you , Mr . Chairman . Um , General Glo ,

58:56.489 --> 58:58.767
uh , I wanna follow up a little bit on ,

58:58.767 --> 59:01.070
uh , Senator Shaheen's questions , uh ,

59:01.139 --> 59:03.419
with regard to , uh , discussions ,

59:03.669 --> 59:06.070
consultations , negotiations with

59:06.070 --> 59:08.126
Denmark and Greenland with regard to

59:08.126 --> 59:10.459
additional security assets in Greenland .

59:10.459 --> 59:12.681
Number 1 , are those discussions taking

59:12.681 --> 59:14.459
place , and number 2 , are they

59:14.459 --> 59:16.459
productive ? And number 3 , are you

59:16.459 --> 59:18.626
meeting any resistance to establishing

59:18.626 --> 59:20.681
additional , uh , security assets in

59:20.681 --> 59:23.689
Greenland ? Senator , we are , uh ,

59:23.709 --> 59:26.550
pursuing with Denmark , uh , expansion

59:26.550 --> 59:28.717
on the defense areas which are allowed

59:28.717 --> 59:31.399
under the 1951 agreement , and , uh ,

59:31.510 --> 59:33.669
we've uh the 1951 agreement is quite

59:33.669 --> 59:35.891
comprehensive . Yes , it's not really ,

59:35.891 --> 59:37.891
we don't really need a new treaty .

59:37.959 --> 59:40.860
It's very comprehensive and it and it's

59:40.860 --> 59:42.739
frankly very favorable to our

59:43.790 --> 59:45.901
operations or potential operations in

59:45.901 --> 59:47.901
Greenland . And so working with the

59:47.901 --> 59:50.750
Department of State , we , we have 3

59:50.750 --> 59:52.861
areas that we would like to negotiate

59:52.861 --> 59:55.399
with Denmark and Greenland to see if we

59:55.399 --> 59:57.689
could expand the defense areas from

59:57.689 --> 59:59.800
Patufik , where we are now into these

59:59.800 --> 01:00:01.633
other areas which would help our

01:00:01.633 --> 01:00:05.530
homeland defense mission . And my final

01:00:05.530 --> 01:00:07.419
question is , are you meeting any

01:00:07.419 --> 01:00:09.641
resistance ? Are they being cooperative

01:00:09.641 --> 01:00:11.697
and receptive to these discussions ,

01:00:11.697 --> 01:00:14.250
Senator , very cooperative with both

01:00:14.250 --> 01:00:17.489
Greenland and Denmark and very eager to

01:00:17.489 --> 01:00:20.070
discuss ways to move forward to improve

01:00:20.209 --> 01:00:22.098
our defense capabilities . Let me

01:00:22.098 --> 01:00:24.209
expand the vision a little bit to the

01:00:24.209 --> 01:00:26.320
Arctic . Do we have sufficient assets

01:00:26.320 --> 01:00:28.542
in the Arctic ? I'm worried about , for

01:00:28.542 --> 01:00:30.709
example , a lack of a port , deepwater

01:00:30.709 --> 01:00:32.987
port facility on the Arctic Ocean . Um ,

01:00:33.300 --> 01:00:35.959
whether or not we have , well , it's ,

01:00:36.860 --> 01:00:38.749
I'm , I'm sort of almost laughing

01:00:38.749 --> 01:00:41.739
because of our lack of icebreakers . We

01:00:41.739 --> 01:00:43.659
have about 1.5 icebreakers , and

01:00:43.659 --> 01:00:47.489
Russians have 40 , uh . Where , what

01:00:47.489 --> 01:00:49.656
are our gaps in the Arctic in terms of

01:00:49.656 --> 01:00:51.711
our ability because the Russians are

01:00:51.711 --> 01:00:53.878
building up their assets on the Arctic

01:00:53.878 --> 01:00:57.040
side very extensively . Senator , our

01:00:57.040 --> 01:00:59.040
challenges in the Arctic start with

01:00:59.040 --> 01:01:01.262
what you mentioned , uh , ports and the

01:01:01.262 --> 01:01:03.489
ability to navigate freely , uh ,

01:01:03.679 --> 01:01:05.679
through the harsh conditions of the

01:01:05.679 --> 01:01:07.889
Arctic , both in maritime , land , and

01:01:07.889 --> 01:01:11.320
air . Uh , so , uh , I'm working

01:01:12.129 --> 01:01:14.240
with our department and others to try

01:01:14.240 --> 01:01:17.729
to develop more ports , more airfields ,

01:01:17.979 --> 01:01:20.530
which leads to more options for our

01:01:20.530 --> 01:01:22.419
secretary and for the president ,

01:01:22.620 --> 01:01:24.899
should , should we need them up in the

01:01:24.899 --> 01:01:27.219
Arctic , and that is from Alaska all

01:01:27.219 --> 01:01:29.500
the way across through Canada and into

01:01:29.500 --> 01:01:32.620
Greenland . Final question on , on this

01:01:32.620 --> 01:01:35.010
area . One of your principal

01:01:35.010 --> 01:01:37.121
responsibilities is , is sensing , is

01:01:37.121 --> 01:01:38.843
knowing what's coming , domain

01:01:38.843 --> 01:01:41.229
awareness . Uh , my concern is that a

01:01:41.229 --> 01:01:43.285
lot of our doctrine and technology ,

01:01:43.285 --> 01:01:46.709
frankly , is geared toward yesterday's

01:01:46.719 --> 01:01:49.989
threats . Uh , we're not going to have

01:01:49.989 --> 01:01:53.790
time if a hypersonic is coming from

01:01:53.790 --> 01:01:56.320
somewhere in Siberia or somewhere in ,

01:01:56.399 --> 01:01:59.020
in the , in the Northern Pacific . Uh ,

01:01:59.800 --> 01:02:03.129
are we extending our sensor sense

01:02:03.719 --> 01:02:06.560
further off the coast of Alaska , for

01:02:06.560 --> 01:02:08.727
example , so that we have more time to

01:02:08.727 --> 01:02:10.679
assess the risk and to , to try to

01:02:10.679 --> 01:02:12.568
defeat it . It's a big difference

01:02:12.568 --> 01:02:15.229
between an ICBM when you have 20 or 30

01:02:15.229 --> 01:02:17.340
minutes and a hypersonic is coming at

01:02:17.340 --> 01:02:21.239
100 ft off the water at 6000 miles an

01:02:21.239 --> 01:02:23.295
hour . Can we detect that hypersonic

01:02:23.295 --> 01:02:26.129
right now ? Senator , we have the

01:02:26.129 --> 01:02:28.351
ability to detect the hypersonics now ,

01:02:28.370 --> 01:02:30.426
but I agree with you that we need to

01:02:30.426 --> 01:02:32.648
get better and see further , uh , so we

01:02:32.648 --> 01:02:34.648
have more decision space , and that

01:02:34.648 --> 01:02:37.679
would require us to . Move from one

01:02:37.679 --> 01:02:39.790
phenomenology into multiple . We have

01:02:39.790 --> 01:02:42.800
to have space , ground , surface , and

01:02:42.800 --> 01:02:44.856
undersea capability to detect all of

01:02:44.856 --> 01:02:47.133
those threats from further away . Well ,

01:02:47.133 --> 01:02:49.133
as you know , we're moving into the

01:02:49.133 --> 01:02:50.967
defense bill season here at this

01:02:50.967 --> 01:02:53.669
committee . Please let us know what's

01:02:53.669 --> 01:02:55.780
necessary in that area so that we can

01:02:55.780 --> 01:02:57.836
be sure that we address it in the in

01:02:57.836 --> 01:02:59.891
the defense bill that's coming up in

01:02:59.891 --> 01:03:02.058
several months . Thank you , Senator .

01:03:03.110 --> 01:03:06.370
Uh , uh , General Donovan , are the ,

01:03:06.709 --> 01:03:09.949
are the SAHCOM countries cooperating on

01:03:09.949 --> 01:03:12.282
this anti-drug mission ? In other words ,

01:03:12.282 --> 01:03:14.171
are the , are the governments our

01:03:14.171 --> 01:03:16.629
partners ? Are they standing aside ?

01:03:16.699 --> 01:03:19.030
Are they corrupted by the cartels ?

01:03:19.110 --> 01:03:21.889
What's the level of cooperation from

01:03:22.149 --> 01:03:24.149
the other countries in the region ?

01:03:24.929 --> 01:03:26.985
Senator , obviously on the surface ,

01:03:26.985 --> 01:03:29.290
the recent announcement at our

01:03:29.290 --> 01:03:30.901
headquarters , the America's

01:03:30.901 --> 01:03:33.068
Countercartel Coalition , we have 18 .

01:03:33.219 --> 01:03:35.441
You know , signing members that do want

01:03:35.441 --> 01:03:37.608
to get at these problems that all with

01:03:37.608 --> 01:03:39.608
different degrees of capabilities ,

01:03:39.608 --> 01:03:41.775
whether that's a functional military ,

01:03:41.775 --> 01:03:43.886
a police capability , or even a legal

01:03:43.886 --> 01:03:45.775
system that will actually support

01:03:45.775 --> 01:03:47.719
getting at these problem sets . So

01:03:47.719 --> 01:03:49.719
really that's the goal of the , the

01:03:49.719 --> 01:03:51.830
coalition is to determine how best to

01:03:51.830 --> 01:03:53.886
help each of those partners actually

01:03:53.886 --> 01:03:55.830
find the way forward to counter in

01:03:55.830 --> 01:03:57.997
their . And then the US would play the

01:03:57.997 --> 01:04:00.108
role maybe as a synchronizer or bring

01:04:00.108 --> 01:04:02.275
in the capabilities to enhance their ,

01:04:02.275 --> 01:04:04.108
their capabilities and each have

01:04:04.108 --> 01:04:06.163
different degrees . But do they have

01:04:06.163 --> 01:04:08.386
the will ? That's the real question , I

01:04:08.386 --> 01:04:10.608
guess it varies . It varies , but , but

01:04:10.608 --> 01:04:12.497
Senator , I've been from that CHO

01:04:12.497 --> 01:04:14.989
conference here in DC and then the ACCC

01:04:14.989 --> 01:04:17.879
we had in our headquarters of , um , I

01:04:17.879 --> 01:04:19.879
believe they do have . The will and

01:04:19.879 --> 01:04:21.990
they're and they're looking to follow

01:04:21.990 --> 01:04:25.139
and and really execute operations that

01:04:25.139 --> 01:04:27.600
could again range from local security

01:04:27.600 --> 01:04:29.899
and improving the lives of their

01:04:29.899 --> 01:04:32.699
citizens all the way to offensive

01:04:32.699 --> 01:04:34.921
options if required . Thank you . Thank

01:04:34.921 --> 01:04:37.032
you , Mr . Chairman . I have a couple

01:04:37.032 --> 01:04:39.088
more questions that we can follow up

01:04:39.088 --> 01:04:41.199
after the next . Yes , thank you . We

01:04:41.199 --> 01:04:40.580
will take another round . Senator

01:04:40.580 --> 01:04:43.090
Slotkin . Thank you . Thanks to both of

01:04:43.090 --> 01:04:46.139
you for being here . Um ,

01:04:47.080 --> 01:04:50.110
General Guillo , uh , you know , I , I

01:04:50.110 --> 01:04:52.166
was in the Homeland Security hearing

01:04:52.166 --> 01:04:54.388
yesterday for the incoming Secretary of

01:04:54.388 --> 01:04:57.189
Homeland Security , talking about what

01:04:57.189 --> 01:05:00.110
he would do if asked to put armed ICE

01:05:00.110 --> 01:05:03.879
agents at polling locations . Um , and

01:05:03.879 --> 01:05:06.290
so could you just state for us very

01:05:06.290 --> 01:05:09.979
clearly , um , Do you believe that it

01:05:09.979 --> 01:05:13.060
is legal to put uniformed military

01:05:13.060 --> 01:05:16.800
active duty at polling locations or any

01:05:16.800 --> 01:05:20.439
other parts of the voting process ,

01:05:20.560 --> 01:05:24.360
ballot , you know , uh , centers , um ,

01:05:24.939 --> 01:05:28.699
for political purposes ? Senator , it

01:05:28.699 --> 01:05:32.159
is , uh . strictly illegal to do what

01:05:32.159 --> 01:05:34.479
you described , putting military at a

01:05:34.479 --> 01:05:37.479
polling place unless the , as Senator

01:05:37.479 --> 01:05:39.659
Reid mentioned , the exception for

01:05:40.510 --> 01:05:42.732
countering an armed rebellion , right ?

01:05:42.732 --> 01:05:44.954
There is an exception for countering an

01:05:44.954 --> 01:05:47.232
armed . Um , force and armed rebellion .

01:05:47.232 --> 01:05:49.288
We didn't need uniformed military at

01:05:49.288 --> 01:05:51.454
our polls during World War Two , after

01:05:51.454 --> 01:05:54.949
Pearl Harbor in Korea , during Vietnam ,

01:05:55.209 --> 01:05:58.370
during the riots , um , in the 60s ,

01:05:58.689 --> 01:06:00.629
and after 9/11 when we had been

01:06:00.629 --> 01:06:02.685
attacked . Impact on our soil . So ,

01:06:02.685 --> 01:06:04.851
and yesterday the Director of National

01:06:04.851 --> 01:06:06.851
Intelligence mentioned in her world

01:06:06.851 --> 01:06:08.962
mentioned no mention in the worldwide

01:06:08.962 --> 01:06:11.073
threat briefing of any threats to our

01:06:11.073 --> 01:06:13.073
elections . So are you aware of any

01:06:13.073 --> 01:06:15.239
threats that meet the definition of

01:06:15.300 --> 01:06:18.219
armed force , you know , countering the

01:06:18.219 --> 01:06:20.163
United States that would be , that

01:06:20.163 --> 01:06:22.386
would require you to consider deploying

01:06:22.386 --> 01:06:25.300
to the polls ? Senator , I'm not aware

01:06:25.300 --> 01:06:27.356
of any threats at this time . And if

01:06:27.356 --> 01:06:29.620
you were asked to move uniformed

01:06:29.620 --> 01:06:32.459
military into polling locations without

01:06:32.459 --> 01:06:34.780
any credible threat reporting of an

01:06:34.780 --> 01:06:36.669
armed force countering the United

01:06:36.669 --> 01:06:39.100
States , would you send those forces in ?

01:06:40.139 --> 01:06:42.361
Ma'am , I recognize that that's against

01:06:42.361 --> 01:06:44.361
the law , and I would not follow an

01:06:44.361 --> 01:06:46.840
unlawful order . Thank you . Um , that

01:06:46.840 --> 01:06:49.860
hits my ears in a , an important way ,

01:06:50.000 --> 01:06:53.719
um , since I made a 92nd video with

01:06:53.719 --> 01:06:56.419
Senator Kelly . I met , uh , that said

01:06:56.560 --> 01:06:58.199
the uniformed military has a

01:06:58.199 --> 01:07:00.830
requirement to refuse illegal orders ,

01:07:01.030 --> 01:07:03.199
and because of that , we , they

01:07:03.199 --> 01:07:05.255
attempted to criminally indict us in

01:07:05.255 --> 01:07:07.477
front of a grand jury for sedition . So

01:07:07.477 --> 01:07:09.532
I appreciate the ease with which you

01:07:09.532 --> 01:07:11.755
say just what should be a very standard

01:07:11.755 --> 01:07:13.810
thing , what I know you all learn in

01:07:13.810 --> 01:07:16.032
sort of basic training . Let me turn to

01:07:16.032 --> 01:07:18.032
a very different issue , and that's

01:07:18.032 --> 01:07:20.366
artificial intelligence . Um , you know ,

01:07:20.366 --> 01:07:22.366
there's been a bunch of talk lately

01:07:22.366 --> 01:07:23.921
about the use of artificial

01:07:23.921 --> 01:07:26.032
intelligence in military targeting in

01:07:26.032 --> 01:07:28.088
the kill chain and sort of the , the

01:07:28.088 --> 01:07:30.879
decisions , um , on life and death . Um ,

01:07:31.100 --> 01:07:33.267
and there's also been discussion about

01:07:33.267 --> 01:07:36.429
domestic surveillance , right ? Um . Do

01:07:36.429 --> 01:07:38.485
you agree that it is illegal for the

01:07:38.485 --> 01:07:40.540
Department of Defense to surveil the

01:07:40.540 --> 01:07:43.270
American people unless individual

01:07:43.270 --> 01:07:45.550
Americans have proven a threat to US

01:07:45.550 --> 01:07:48.330
security ? Yes , Senator , that falls

01:07:48.330 --> 01:07:51.860
under the Intel oversight and I'm very

01:07:51.860 --> 01:07:54.138
aware and we follow all of those rules .

01:07:54.138 --> 01:07:56.193
Yeah , um , and I think , you know ,

01:07:56.193 --> 01:07:58.729
the , we never want our military , um ,

01:07:58.860 --> 01:08:00.971
you know , we don't want anyone to be

01:08:00.971 --> 01:08:02.804
questioning that our military is

01:08:02.804 --> 01:08:04.693
looking at , um , uh , you know ,

01:08:04.693 --> 01:08:07.010
Americans , um . Uh , as a topic to

01:08:07.010 --> 01:08:10.129
surveil , um , so do you believe that

01:08:10.129 --> 01:08:12.209
we should have restrictions in place

01:08:12.209 --> 01:08:14.431
that would just say for everybody , for

01:08:14.431 --> 01:08:16.890
the AI companies , for any future or

01:08:16.890 --> 01:08:18.970
current Secretary of Defense , um ,

01:08:19.169 --> 01:08:21.169
that you cannot use artificial

01:08:21.169 --> 01:08:23.770
intelligence for mass surveillance of

01:08:23.770 --> 01:08:27.759
American citizens ? Senator ,

01:08:27.779 --> 01:08:30.890
doing so would violate the intel

01:08:30.890 --> 01:08:33.112
oversight rules that I mentioned and so

01:08:33.112 --> 01:08:35.334
I support the rules that are in place .

01:08:35.334 --> 01:08:37.446
Great . And what about having a human

01:08:37.446 --> 01:08:39.919
being in the loop . On , on decisions

01:08:39.919 --> 01:08:42.109
of life and death , you know , of , of

01:08:42.109 --> 01:08:44.509
targeting , um , I think about nuclear

01:08:44.509 --> 01:08:47.209
weapons , right ? Right now there's no

01:08:47.629 --> 01:08:49.830
law saying that you couldn't have

01:08:49.830 --> 01:08:51.997
artificial intelligence and sort of an

01:08:51.997 --> 01:08:54.709
autonomous , um , system , make

01:08:54.709 --> 01:08:56.876
decisions on the deployment of nuclear

01:08:56.876 --> 01:08:59.042
weapons . Um , what do you think about

01:08:59.042 --> 01:09:01.990
having a human being in the decision

01:09:01.990 --> 01:09:04.790
tree on the use of lethal force ?

01:09:05.799 --> 01:09:08.439
Senator , having a human being on the

01:09:08.439 --> 01:09:11.359
loop in all decisions , I think is

01:09:11.359 --> 01:09:13.759
important . Some more than others ,

01:09:14.149 --> 01:09:17.819
obviously , and every use of artificial

01:09:17.819 --> 01:09:20.041
intelligence that we use in our command

01:09:20.189 --> 01:09:22.500
does have humans at the appropriate

01:09:22.500 --> 01:09:24.819
places on the on the loop to make sure

01:09:24.819 --> 01:09:27.540
that we are making the right decision

01:09:27.540 --> 01:09:29.540
with the right information . Yeah ,

01:09:29.540 --> 01:09:31.651
well , I think , Mr . Chairman , this

01:09:31.651 --> 01:09:33.540
is an issue that we should . On a

01:09:33.540 --> 01:09:35.429
bipartisan basis , take up in the

01:09:35.429 --> 01:09:37.762
committee for this NDAA because I think ,

01:09:37.834 --> 01:09:39.778
you know , we shouldn't be leaving

01:09:39.778 --> 01:09:41.667
decision making up to any private

01:09:41.667 --> 01:09:43.890
company or any one Secretary of Defense

01:09:43.890 --> 01:09:46.001
or Administration . We need to do our

01:09:46.001 --> 01:09:48.112
job and put some rules of the road in

01:09:48.112 --> 01:09:50.223
place . So look forward to discussing

01:09:50.223 --> 01:09:52.223
that this year's NDAA . Thank you ,

01:09:52.223 --> 01:09:54.334
Senator Budd . Thank you , Chairman .

01:09:54.334 --> 01:09:56.334
Thank you all for being here . Uh ,

01:09:56.334 --> 01:09:58.167
it's good to see you both . So ,

01:09:58.167 --> 01:10:00.390
General Donovan , in your short time in

01:10:00.390 --> 01:10:02.278
the seat , um , how have you seen

01:10:02.278 --> 01:10:04.445
special operations forces contributing

01:10:04.445 --> 01:10:06.556
to countering the expanding influence

01:10:06.556 --> 01:10:06.540
of China , Russia , and other

01:10:06.540 --> 01:10:08.762
adversaries in the Western Hemisphere ?

01:10:10.200 --> 01:10:12.089
Senator , thank you . The role of

01:10:12.089 --> 01:10:14.256
special operations forces , I think we

01:10:14.256 --> 01:10:16.367
all believe that their role is direct

01:10:16.367 --> 01:10:18.367
action and what we see maybe in the

01:10:18.367 --> 01:10:20.256
movies . The reality is irregular

01:10:20.256 --> 01:10:22.367
warfare and irregular warfare options

01:10:22.367 --> 01:10:24.533
are the strength of special operations

01:10:24.533 --> 01:10:26.478
forces . So in SOCOM , when we see

01:10:26.478 --> 01:10:28.478
those activities by PRC or Russia ,

01:10:28.478 --> 01:10:30.700
China or Russia or other actors , it is

01:10:30.700 --> 01:10:32.910
always the special forces that really

01:10:33.129 --> 01:10:35.330
set the conditions to determine what

01:10:35.330 --> 01:10:37.497
comes next . They're very agile . Um ,

01:10:37.500 --> 01:10:39.278
mature , and we can put them in

01:10:39.278 --> 01:10:41.056
locations where either in a low

01:10:41.056 --> 01:10:43.111
visibility or an overt um capability

01:10:43.111 --> 01:10:44.944
working with partners directly .

01:10:44.944 --> 01:10:47.056
They're really our best first tool to

01:10:47.056 --> 01:10:49.222
assess the situation and determine the

01:10:49.222 --> 01:10:51.389
way ahead . Thank you for that . Let's

01:10:51.389 --> 01:10:51.310
talk for a minute about soft

01:10:51.310 --> 01:10:53.588
integration with Ecuador , if you will .

01:10:53.588 --> 01:10:55.390
So I saw that Ecuadorian and US

01:10:55.390 --> 01:10:57.819
military forces completed a successful

01:10:57.819 --> 01:10:59.375
operation against terrorist

01:10:59.375 --> 01:11:01.709
organizations on March 3rd . Uh , so

01:11:01.709 --> 01:11:03.931
what are some of the success stories of

01:11:03.931 --> 01:11:06.098
this operation and any lessons learned

01:11:06.098 --> 01:11:08.600
for the broader region ? Senator ,

01:11:08.680 --> 01:11:10.680
hopefully in a closed session I can

01:11:10.680 --> 01:11:12.736
provide additional details , but the

01:11:12.736 --> 01:11:14.624
success is that from a phone call

01:11:14.624 --> 01:11:16.736
between President Ebola and President

01:11:16.736 --> 01:11:19.609
Trump to moving forces very quickly to

01:11:19.609 --> 01:11:22.209
partner with our Ecuadorian forces , it

01:11:22.209 --> 01:11:24.265
was a very short timeline . Now that

01:11:24.265 --> 01:11:26.265
was based on years' investment over

01:11:26.265 --> 01:11:28.209
time of Ecuadorian partnership at

01:11:28.209 --> 01:11:30.265
different types of training events ,

01:11:30.265 --> 01:11:31.931
but the fact that the special

01:11:31.931 --> 01:11:33.876
operations forces , including both

01:11:33.876 --> 01:11:35.931
ground forces and air forces , could

01:11:35.931 --> 01:11:38.200
quickly plan . With the Ecuadorians to

01:11:38.200 --> 01:11:40.319
ensure that any use of force fell

01:11:40.319 --> 01:11:42.839
within our requirements . Very

01:11:42.839 --> 01:11:45.006
impressed on how again the Ecuadorians

01:11:45.006 --> 01:11:48.200
operated on both those operations and

01:11:48.200 --> 01:11:50.033
in a short period of time , very

01:11:50.033 --> 01:11:52.279
professional planning , and I took part

01:11:52.279 --> 01:11:54.112
in both , observing both , and I

01:11:54.112 --> 01:11:56.223
thought very professional execution .

01:11:56.549 --> 01:11:58.549
General , what's your assessment on

01:11:58.549 --> 01:12:00.771
their willingness in Ecuador , um , and

01:12:00.771 --> 01:12:02.993
their capability to take a greater role

01:12:02.993 --> 01:12:05.049
in contributing to regional security

01:12:05.049 --> 01:12:07.105
there ? And then what are some other

01:12:07.105 --> 01:12:08.938
countries in SOCOM that are also

01:12:08.938 --> 01:12:11.160
leading the way ? I would say Ecuador

01:12:11.160 --> 01:12:13.049
is , is a primary focus . We just

01:12:13.049 --> 01:12:14.938
recently established Senator , an

01:12:14.938 --> 01:12:16.882
Ecuador fusion cell , and with the

01:12:16.882 --> 01:12:19.049
Ecuadorian Minister of Defense because

01:12:19.049 --> 01:12:21.271
they are , they're leading the way very

01:12:21.271 --> 01:12:23.382
similar to the fusion cell we have in

01:12:23.382 --> 01:12:25.382
Colombia , the one that's in Mexico

01:12:25.382 --> 01:12:25.140
City right now . There's different

01:12:25.140 --> 01:12:27.418
fusion cells in the region . The other ,

01:12:27.620 --> 01:12:30.180
the other nation that is really , is

01:12:30.180 --> 01:12:32.759
stepping forward is Paraguay . Recently

01:12:32.759 --> 01:12:34.981
signed a SOFA agreement with the United

01:12:34.981 --> 01:12:36.926
States , status of force agreement

01:12:36.926 --> 01:12:39.200
which allows us to operate much more

01:12:39.200 --> 01:12:41.200
closely together , and there's some

01:12:41.299 --> 01:12:43.243
great opportunities there with air

01:12:43.243 --> 01:12:45.466
domain awareness . We have FMS sales of

01:12:45.466 --> 01:12:47.632
radars coming down to increase the air

01:12:47.632 --> 01:12:50.154
domain awareness . So , so . is another

01:12:50.154 --> 01:12:52.674
recent kind of a leader , but I will

01:12:52.674 --> 01:12:54.396
tell you the America's Counter

01:12:54.396 --> 01:12:56.452
Coalition , that is a counter cartel

01:12:56.452 --> 01:12:58.563
coalition with 18 members right now ,

01:12:58.563 --> 01:13:00.674
all seem to have different degrees of

01:13:00.674 --> 01:13:02.785
desire to move forward very quickly .

01:13:02.785 --> 01:13:02.674
So I think we have a number of partners

01:13:02.674 --> 01:13:04.452
moving forward at this time . I

01:13:04.452 --> 01:13:06.674
appreciate that , General Guillo . It's

01:13:06.674 --> 01:13:08.896
good to see you . I saw that NTHCOM and

01:13:08.896 --> 01:13:11.063
NORAD just wrapped wrapped up Exercise

01:13:11.063 --> 01:13:13.007
Arctic Edge last week . So tell us

01:13:13.007 --> 01:13:15.118
about some of the key lessons learned

01:13:15.118 --> 01:13:16.785
from the exercise in terms of

01:13:16.785 --> 01:13:18.730
NORTHCOM's priorities and Um , are

01:13:18.730 --> 01:13:20.396
there areas that you need any

01:13:20.396 --> 01:13:22.618
congressional support with um regarding

01:13:22.618 --> 01:13:25.680
that ? Senator , uh , Arctic Edge ,

01:13:25.740 --> 01:13:27.962
this year I , I deliberately moved from

01:13:27.962 --> 01:13:31.859
the warm months in Alaska into the

01:13:31.859 --> 01:13:33.915
harsher conditions to ensure that we

01:13:33.915 --> 01:13:36.819
had the ability to generate forces and

01:13:36.819 --> 01:13:38.979
execute in the harshest conditions .

01:13:39.020 --> 01:13:41.076
And so we learned some lessons about

01:13:41.076 --> 01:13:42.853
that . The forces in . That are

01:13:42.853 --> 01:13:44.909
stationed in Alaska are very good at

01:13:44.909 --> 01:13:47.131
that , but as we brought forces in from

01:13:47.131 --> 01:13:49.298
the outside , we see that they need to

01:13:49.298 --> 01:13:51.631
make sure they have the right equipment ,

01:13:51.631 --> 01:13:51.259
right viscosity of oil in their

01:13:51.259 --> 01:13:53.220
generators and , and the right

01:13:53.220 --> 01:13:55.220
procedures to operate on the flight

01:13:55.220 --> 01:13:58.080
line to generate , launch , and receive

01:13:58.080 --> 01:14:01.270
and repair aircraft . The operational

01:14:01.270 --> 01:14:03.492
focus was on cruise missile defense and

01:14:03.492 --> 01:14:05.603
so we brought out some cruise missile

01:14:05.603 --> 01:14:07.830
replicators that gave us a lot of

01:14:07.830 --> 01:14:09.886
insights on how we would defend that

01:14:09.886 --> 01:14:12.052
critical landscape and others from the

01:14:12.052 --> 01:14:14.330
cruise missile threat . So it's a very ,

01:14:14.330 --> 01:14:18.060
very , uh , Profitable exercise for us .

01:14:18.240 --> 01:14:20.819
What did we learn ? 4th generation

01:14:20.819 --> 01:14:22.986
fighter aircraft such as the ones that

01:14:22.986 --> 01:14:25.160
we have in Alaska are very important .

01:14:25.419 --> 01:14:27.475
And with the cruise missile threat ,

01:14:27.475 --> 01:14:30.140
having aircraft like the F-15E or the

01:14:30.140 --> 01:14:32.779
F-15EX , which has longer range ,

01:14:32.890 --> 01:14:35.140
longer duration , and more missiles on

01:14:35.140 --> 01:14:37.700
board to defeat that threat , would be

01:14:37.700 --> 01:14:39.922
critical in the future . Just quickly ,

01:14:39.922 --> 01:14:41.867
thank you , General . So I saw the

01:14:41.867 --> 01:14:43.922
Arctic Edge also was trilateral with

01:14:43.922 --> 01:14:46.033
Canadians and the Danes . Um , why is

01:14:46.033 --> 01:14:48.089
Greenland important for our national

01:14:48.089 --> 01:14:50.256
security and what was cooperation with

01:14:50.256 --> 01:14:52.311
the Danes like ? Senator , uh , very

01:14:52.311 --> 01:14:54.422
briefly , it's because we spent a lot

01:14:54.422 --> 01:14:56.311
of time looking at our 10 o'clock

01:14:56.311 --> 01:14:58.256
approach through Alaska and our 12

01:14:58.256 --> 01:14:58.240
o'clock approach through Canada .

01:14:58.819 --> 01:15:00.763
Having a full cooperation on the 2

01:15:00.763 --> 01:15:02.580
o'clock approach , uh , through

01:15:02.580 --> 01:15:04.879
Greenland with Denmark is essential .

01:15:05.339 --> 01:15:07.520
The cooperation and the participation

01:15:07.520 --> 01:15:09.631
by the Danes in special operations as

01:15:09.631 --> 01:15:11.919
well as in fighters was outstanding .

01:15:12.060 --> 01:15:14.669
Thank you . Uh , thank you very much ,

01:15:14.750 --> 01:15:16.830
Senator Kelly . Thank you , Mr .

01:15:16.839 --> 01:15:19.439
Chairman . Uh , General Donovan , I

01:15:19.439 --> 01:15:22.069
wanna , uh , start with Operation

01:15:22.069 --> 01:15:24.790
Southern Spear and the continued use of

01:15:24.790 --> 01:15:27.109
maritime strikes . As of March 9th ,

01:15:27.229 --> 01:15:30.149
the Joint Task Force Southern Spear has

01:15:30.149 --> 01:15:32.316
reportedly conducted , I think , about

01:15:32.316 --> 01:15:34.549
45 boat strikes , resulting in the

01:15:34.549 --> 01:15:38.129
deaths of approximately 156 people .

01:15:38.580 --> 01:15:40.747
That's a significant number of strikes

01:15:40.747 --> 01:15:43.080
and casualties in what is fundamentally

01:15:43.080 --> 01:15:46.220
a counter trafficking mission , not a

01:15:46.220 --> 01:15:48.740
traditional armed conflict . These

01:15:48.740 --> 01:15:50.939
operations raise serious concerns and

01:15:50.939 --> 01:15:53.779
questions about effectiveness and a

01:15:53.779 --> 01:15:56.419
strategic outcome . I want to

01:15:56.419 --> 01:15:58.752
understand the strategic rationale here .

01:15:58.939 --> 01:16:01.620
These repeated boat strikes suggest a

01:16:01.620 --> 01:16:03.299
tactical approach that may be

01:16:03.299 --> 01:16:06.069
generating headlines . But it's far

01:16:06.069 --> 01:16:08.450
less clear that they're producing

01:16:08.450 --> 01:16:11.910
durable security outcomes . To me

01:16:11.910 --> 01:16:14.870
this operation looks like a cycle of

01:16:14.870 --> 01:16:18.060
reactive strikes with limited long-term

01:16:18.060 --> 01:16:20.390
impact . So General , what evidence do

01:16:20.390 --> 01:16:23.350
you have that this campaign is actually

01:16:23.350 --> 01:16:26.430
degrading cartel operations rather than

01:16:26.430 --> 01:16:30.049
simply destroying some low level assets ,

01:16:30.109 --> 01:16:33.430
boats . And killing some people and

01:16:33.430 --> 01:16:35.830
displacing some trafficking routes .

01:16:38.069 --> 01:16:40.125
Senator , in the last 43 days I've ,

01:16:40.125 --> 01:16:42.839
I've looked directly at that . Provide ,

01:16:42.879 --> 01:16:45.046
I couldn't provide you say measures of

01:16:45.046 --> 01:16:47.157
effectiveness of the current effort ,

01:16:47.157 --> 01:16:49.157
but I will share with you that what

01:16:49.157 --> 01:16:51.046
I've seen , the reports I've read

01:16:51.046 --> 01:16:53.212
talking to partner nations , primarily

01:16:53.212 --> 01:16:55.268
partner nations that I've talked and

01:16:55.268 --> 01:16:57.212
had this exact same conversation .

01:16:57.212 --> 01:16:58.990
We've seen changes in the narco

01:16:58.990 --> 01:17:02.419
traffickers' patterns and in the closed

01:17:02.419 --> 01:17:04.641
setting . I'd like to provide some more

01:17:04.641 --> 01:17:06.697
details specifically on that , but I

01:17:06.697 --> 01:17:08.863
will , looking forward , Senator , the

01:17:08.863 --> 01:17:10.975
boat strikes aren't the answer . What

01:17:10.975 --> 01:17:13.197
we're , what we're moving for right now

01:17:13.197 --> 01:17:15.030
is a it might be an extension of

01:17:15.030 --> 01:17:17.197
Southern Sphere , but really a counter

01:17:17.197 --> 01:17:19.660
cartel campaign process that puts

01:17:19.875 --> 01:17:22.097
Systemic friction across this network .

01:17:22.097 --> 01:17:23.931
The number of networks . We know

01:17:23.931 --> 01:17:26.153
there's a number of cartels involved on

01:17:26.153 --> 01:17:28.319
4 or 5 different land and sea routes ,

01:17:28.319 --> 01:17:30.319
but putting total systemic friction

01:17:30.319 --> 01:17:32.375
from point of production to point of

01:17:32.375 --> 01:17:34.708
delivery , which would be in the plazas ,

01:17:34.708 --> 01:17:36.875
putting that together , I believe that

01:17:36.875 --> 01:17:36.625
actually kinetic strikes will be one of

01:17:36.625 --> 01:17:38.625
the many tools and probably not the

01:17:38.625 --> 01:17:40.681
most effective tool when we actually

01:17:40.681 --> 01:17:42.514
look at it as more of a campaign

01:17:42.514 --> 01:17:44.569
approach . Yeah , I agree . You said

01:17:44.569 --> 01:17:46.458
it's not the answer . It's not an

01:17:46.458 --> 01:17:48.979
effective tool . And it's hard to find

01:17:48.979 --> 01:17:51.720
a measure of effectiveness here . I get

01:17:51.720 --> 01:17:53.609
the systemic friction thing , but

01:17:53.609 --> 01:17:55.664
consider for a second , General , we

01:17:55.664 --> 01:17:57.887
moved a battle group halfway across the

01:17:57.887 --> 01:17:59.887
planet to do this , and then had to

01:17:59.887 --> 01:18:03.220
move it back for the war in Iran , um .

01:18:04.080 --> 01:18:07.140
So I am , you know , concerned about ,

01:18:07.319 --> 01:18:10.859
um , a strategic goal here

01:18:11.120 --> 01:18:13.759
and having the intended effect of

01:18:13.759 --> 01:18:17.410
reducing the , the inflow

01:18:17.879 --> 01:18:20.279
of drugs into our country , especially

01:18:20.279 --> 01:18:22.600
when you consider that the , the , the

01:18:22.600 --> 01:18:26.080
thing where the most

01:18:26.080 --> 01:18:29.290
significant . Uh , downside for the

01:18:29.290 --> 01:18:31.457
American people is fentanyl , and that

01:18:31.457 --> 01:18:33.346
mostly comes through the southern

01:18:33.346 --> 01:18:35.529
borders , the land borders , and if we

01:18:35.529 --> 01:18:37.529
would put those kind of resources ,

01:18:37.609 --> 01:18:39.831
when you , when you think about what it

01:18:39.831 --> 01:18:41.942
takes to have a battle group there on

01:18:41.942 --> 01:18:44.290
station , multiple ships burning a lot

01:18:44.290 --> 01:18:47.250
of fuel , crew members , and if you put

01:18:47.250 --> 01:18:50.709
that kind of resource towards dealing

01:18:50.709 --> 01:18:53.220
with the fentanyl problem at the ports

01:18:53.220 --> 01:18:56.089
of entry , I think that would have a

01:18:56.089 --> 01:18:59.759
greater . strategic impact

01:18:59.939 --> 01:19:02.060
on the overall problem . I , I got

01:19:02.060 --> 01:19:04.600
about 1 minute and 15 left . General

01:19:04.600 --> 01:19:06.779
Glo , in your written testimony , you

01:19:06.779 --> 01:19:08.946
stated that Iran's military capability

01:19:08.946 --> 01:19:11.859
has been severely degraded by the

01:19:11.859 --> 01:19:14.459
strikes executed during Midnight Hammer

01:19:14.459 --> 01:19:17.990
and epic fury , but that Iran seems to

01:19:17.990 --> 01:19:21.259
retain some capacity to direct reprisal

01:19:21.259 --> 01:19:23.040
attacks on the homeland through

01:19:23.040 --> 01:19:25.970
asymmetric means . So how has the war

01:19:25.970 --> 01:19:28.680
in Iran altered the overall threat

01:19:28.680 --> 01:19:30.509
landscape to the homeland ,

01:19:30.680 --> 01:19:32.919
specifically as a degradation of Iran's

01:19:33.209 --> 01:19:35.950
conventional warfare systems increased

01:19:36.490 --> 01:19:39.410
the likelihood of harder to detect

01:19:39.649 --> 01:19:41.970
asymmetric attacks like cyber and the

01:19:41.970 --> 01:19:43.970
potential for homegrown violent

01:19:43.970 --> 01:19:47.500
extremists ? Senator ,

01:19:47.700 --> 01:19:50.500
approaching the beginning of the

01:19:50.500 --> 01:19:52.444
operations , I was concerned about

01:19:52.444 --> 01:19:54.389
cyberattacks and espionage . I was

01:19:54.389 --> 01:19:56.333
worried about terrorism and lethal

01:19:56.333 --> 01:19:58.444
plots , and I was also very concerned

01:19:58.444 --> 01:20:00.500
about the missile capabilities where

01:20:00.500 --> 01:20:02.611
they have a space launch vehicle with

01:20:02.611 --> 01:20:04.556
the capability and range and throw

01:20:04.556 --> 01:20:06.556
weight that could be turned into an

01:20:06.556 --> 01:20:09.589
ICBM and threaten us . Certainly the

01:20:09.589 --> 01:20:11.533
cyberattacks and the terrorism and

01:20:11.533 --> 01:20:13.790
lethal plot concerns remain , and I'm

01:20:13.790 --> 01:20:15.623
very hopeful that the strikes by

01:20:15.623 --> 01:20:19.370
Centcom will negate the

01:20:19.870 --> 01:20:21.926
ballistic missile threat , but we'll

01:20:21.926 --> 01:20:24.037
wait for the debrief to see if that's

01:20:24.037 --> 01:20:25.870
actually happened , but I'm very

01:20:25.870 --> 01:20:27.814
confident it will be . All right ,

01:20:27.814 --> 01:20:30.037
let's let's follow up on this in the in

01:20:30.037 --> 01:20:32.203
the SCI after this hearing . Yes sir .

01:20:32.203 --> 01:20:35.200
All right , thank you . Very good then

01:20:35.200 --> 01:20:38.270
Senator Scott . Thank you , Chairman .

01:20:38.689 --> 01:20:40.800
Well , first off , thanks both of you

01:20:40.800 --> 01:20:43.022
for being here . Thanks for all the men

01:20:43.022 --> 01:20:42.569
and women that served for both of you .

01:20:42.649 --> 01:20:44.649
My questions today are gonna be for

01:20:44.649 --> 01:20:46.871
General Donovan . Um , as you know , my

01:20:46.871 --> 01:20:48.982
state has a large Venezuelan-American

01:20:48.982 --> 01:20:50.982
population , many of whom came here

01:20:50.982 --> 01:20:53.038
seeking freedom after witnessing the

01:20:53.038 --> 01:20:54.982
evils of Chavez and Maduro and his

01:20:54.982 --> 01:20:56.760
thugs firsthand . It's clear to

01:20:56.760 --> 01:20:58.593
everyone that Operation Absolute

01:20:58.593 --> 01:21:00.593
Resolve was a success thanks to our

01:21:00.593 --> 01:21:02.816
warfighters and the decisive leadership

01:21:02.816 --> 01:21:02.609
of the president , Secretary of War .

01:21:03.310 --> 01:21:05.310
Today , Maduro and his thugs are no

01:21:05.310 --> 01:21:07.088
longer uh wreaking havoc in our

01:21:07.088 --> 01:21:09.199
hemisphere and putting American lives

01:21:09.199 --> 01:21:09.069
at risk by sending deadly drugs into

01:21:09.069 --> 01:21:11.419
our country . Joe Domanan , while I

01:21:11.419 --> 01:21:13.363
know you could spend a lot of time

01:21:13.363 --> 01:21:15.586
outlining just how crucial every person

01:21:15.586 --> 01:21:17.697
in the unit's contribution was to the

01:21:17.697 --> 01:21:19.363
Operation Success , could you

01:21:19.363 --> 01:21:21.586
specifically talk about the 22nd Marine

01:21:21.586 --> 01:21:23.641
Expeditionary Unit and what they did

01:21:23.641 --> 01:21:26.459
and their success ? Senator , thank you .

01:21:26.509 --> 01:21:28.620
And when I talk about the 22nd Marine

01:21:28.620 --> 01:21:30.842
Expedition Unit , you have to also talk

01:21:30.842 --> 01:21:32.953
about the amphibious ready group that

01:21:32.953 --> 01:21:32.870
they ride on because that team is an

01:21:32.870 --> 01:21:34.990
incredible , you know , synchronized

01:21:34.990 --> 01:21:37.430
joint force that is still on , on , on

01:21:37.430 --> 01:21:39.652
task today at 12 nautical miles off the

01:21:39.652 --> 01:21:41.708
coast of Venezuela . This was key in

01:21:41.708 --> 01:21:43.541
the visit , I think I told you ,

01:21:43.541 --> 01:21:45.763
Senator , I traveled to Caracas to meet

01:21:45.763 --> 01:21:47.930
with . That government and our amazing

01:21:48.100 --> 01:21:50.540
sheriff's affairs there , their safety

01:21:50.540 --> 01:21:52.290
and security is based on that

01:21:52.290 --> 01:21:54.512
amphibious platform , those marines and

01:21:54.512 --> 01:21:56.734
sailors 12 nautical miles off the coast

01:21:56.734 --> 01:21:58.790
with that quick reaction force , but

01:21:58.790 --> 01:22:01.459
also with a Roll 2+ surgical suite , 4

01:22:01.459 --> 01:22:03.919
ORs , operating tables ready to respond .

01:22:04.350 --> 01:22:06.406
That that that's the only capable we

01:22:06.406 --> 01:22:08.572
have in the entire region until we get

01:22:08.572 --> 01:22:10.572
back to Gitmo where we have a naval

01:22:10.572 --> 01:22:12.794
base hospital that doesn't have similar

01:22:12.794 --> 01:22:14.850
surgical capabilities . So that that

01:22:14.850 --> 01:22:17.017
marine expeditionary unit , and then I

01:22:17.017 --> 01:22:19.183
will tell you with a bit of pride just

01:22:19.183 --> 01:22:21.128
just on . Four days ago we had our

01:22:21.128 --> 01:22:23.294
first picture of the flag being raised

01:22:23.294 --> 01:22:25.017
over the embassy , and when we

01:22:25.017 --> 01:22:27.239
recognized it as the US embassy again ,

01:22:27.239 --> 01:22:29.017
and those were Marines and soft

01:22:29.017 --> 01:22:31.072
teammates around the flag with their

01:22:31.072 --> 01:22:33.128
ambassador with their diplomat , the

01:22:33.128 --> 01:22:35.128
CDA , putting that flag up . That's

01:22:35.128 --> 01:22:34.964
what Demieux continues to do today .

01:22:36.310 --> 01:22:38.477
Moving forward , how do you assess the

01:22:38.477 --> 01:22:40.643
importance of maintaining a continuous

01:22:40.643 --> 01:22:42.810
amphibious readiness group presence in

01:22:42.810 --> 01:22:45.143
SouthTHCOM ? As we look at all Senators ,

01:22:45.143 --> 01:22:47.310
all the capabilities that were brought

01:22:47.310 --> 01:22:49.254
to SOUTHCOM for Operation Absolute

01:22:49.254 --> 01:22:51.199
Resolve and other activities , the

01:22:51.199 --> 01:22:53.366
carrier strike group that we mentioned

01:22:53.366 --> 01:22:55.532
before with Senator Kelly , incredible

01:22:55.532 --> 01:22:57.477
capabilities , but there's a whole

01:22:57.477 --> 01:22:59.588
joint force from very clandestine low

01:22:59.588 --> 01:23:01.643
observable aircraft to , to high-end

01:23:01.643 --> 01:23:03.421
destroyer systems , Aegis class

01:23:03.421 --> 01:23:05.366
cruisers . The reality is the AGMU

01:23:05.366 --> 01:23:07.080
itself , um , sustaining that

01:23:07.080 --> 01:23:08.969
capability in SouthHCOM is , is .

01:23:09.169 --> 01:23:11.810
Important because alone by itself as it

01:23:11.810 --> 01:23:14.689
operates as a three ship group , I call

01:23:14.689 --> 01:23:16.745
it the Swiss Army knife of the Joint

01:23:16.745 --> 01:23:19.078
Force . It can do just about everything .

01:23:19.078 --> 01:23:21.810
And as far as the economy of force , it

01:23:21.810 --> 01:23:23.921
can deliver relief supplies or it can

01:23:23.921 --> 01:23:26.143
deliver a connect strike if it had to .

01:23:26.143 --> 01:23:28.310
It's the most effective tool we have .

01:23:28.310 --> 01:23:30.532
The reality is we don't have enough and

01:23:30.532 --> 01:23:30.430
that's just , that's a challenge that

01:23:30.430 --> 01:23:33.080
we , uh , in the , in the 90s , we had

01:23:33.080 --> 01:23:35.319
what , what was called heel to toe AMU

01:23:35.319 --> 01:23:37.652
deployments when 11 out , one came back .

01:23:37.720 --> 01:23:39.887
We've dropped our numbers of available

01:23:39.887 --> 01:23:42.053
ships and so we can't do that . We are

01:23:42.053 --> 01:23:44.276
looking at alternatives that we want to

01:23:44.276 --> 01:23:46.331
use other platforms like the literal

01:23:46.331 --> 01:23:48.553
combat ship and maybe the expeditionary

01:23:48.553 --> 01:23:50.720
support base , other combinations that

01:23:50.720 --> 01:23:52.887
would be less than what an ARMU brings

01:23:52.887 --> 01:23:55.053
to SouthHCOM . What are the risks that

01:23:55.053 --> 01:23:54.790
you'll encounter if you don't have the

01:23:54.790 --> 01:23:58.700
assets ? If we don't have those assets ,

01:23:58.740 --> 01:24:01.709
and I think about a a really I think my

01:24:01.709 --> 01:24:03.709
most important role is to obviously

01:24:03.709 --> 01:24:05.765
achieve the mission but take care of

01:24:05.765 --> 01:24:07.820
our joint force team members . If we

01:24:07.820 --> 01:24:09.987
don't have that surgical suite , if we

01:24:09.987 --> 01:24:12.098
don't have the long range flights for

01:24:12.098 --> 01:24:14.042
whether it's a kinetic strike or a

01:24:14.042 --> 01:24:16.042
logistics transport , we just can't

01:24:16.042 --> 01:24:18.209
operate . It goes back to also looking

01:24:18.209 --> 01:24:20.431
at our , our . Bases in the region that

01:24:20.431 --> 01:24:22.542
hadn't hadn't received a whole lot of

01:24:22.542 --> 01:24:24.376
upkeep over the last decades and

01:24:24.376 --> 01:24:26.320
whether that's again reopening and

01:24:26.320 --> 01:24:28.455
occupy taking part in operations in

01:24:28.455 --> 01:24:30.288
Puerto Rico and the Puerto Rican

01:24:30.288 --> 01:24:32.177
government has been amazing . The

01:24:32.177 --> 01:24:34.233
Puerto Rican National Guard has been

01:24:34.233 --> 01:24:36.344
the backbone of a lot of operations ,

01:24:36.344 --> 01:24:36.145
but are we going to stay if we are ,

01:24:36.185 --> 01:24:38.296
are we going to invest the same thing

01:24:38.296 --> 01:24:40.779
in Guantanamo Bay . In other locations

01:24:40.779 --> 01:24:42.819
like Sotoa , Honduras , great

01:24:42.819 --> 01:24:45.041
relationships , great support , but are

01:24:45.041 --> 01:24:47.097
we up to speed to be able to operate

01:24:47.097 --> 01:24:49.263
without those key heavier assets ? And

01:24:49.263 --> 01:24:51.541
that's what we're looking at right now ,

01:24:51.541 --> 01:24:51.459
Senator . Can you talk about the

01:24:51.459 --> 01:24:53.737
importance of Homestead Air Force Base ?

01:24:54.390 --> 01:24:56.680
We believe Homestead is , I believe

01:24:56.680 --> 01:24:58.902
it's key location , especially for high

01:24:58.902 --> 01:25:01.124
wing , if we have big wing autonomous ,

01:25:01.124 --> 01:25:03.520
um , ISR type platforms , specifically

01:25:03.520 --> 01:25:05.576
as we look at really bringing that ,

01:25:05.576 --> 01:25:08.149
that machine-human teaming with what we

01:25:08.149 --> 01:25:10.149
could launch there and sustain over

01:25:10.149 --> 01:25:12.260
especially the Caribbean , um , would

01:25:12.260 --> 01:25:14.149
be key to any , um , our plans to

01:25:14.149 --> 01:25:16.260
really develop a almost an autonomous

01:25:16.260 --> 01:25:18.316
maritime domain awareness , um , and

01:25:18.316 --> 01:25:20.538
really go seabed to space , but I think

01:25:20.538 --> 01:25:22.593
Homestead plays a key role in that .

01:25:22.593 --> 01:25:24.593
Thanks to both of you and , and the

01:25:24.593 --> 01:25:24.000
people you work with .

01:25:32.000 --> 01:25:34.560
Uh , thank you , uh , Senator

01:25:34.560 --> 01:25:37.589
Gillibrand . Thank you , Mr . Chairman .

01:25:37.810 --> 01:25:41.009
Um , I still have grave

01:25:41.009 --> 01:25:44.330
concerns about uh how the targeting was

01:25:44.330 --> 01:25:48.049
done , uh , how the choice of the first

01:25:48.049 --> 01:25:51.910
Iran attack that hit a girls' school ,

01:25:52.209 --> 01:25:55.680
um , took place . And , We need to

01:25:55.680 --> 01:25:59.040
have a bipartisan hearing , discussion

01:25:59.040 --> 01:26:01.151
and legislation about the use of AI ,

01:26:01.439 --> 01:26:03.495
whether it's used , when it's used ,

01:26:03.649 --> 01:26:06.069
how it's used . We don't have any

01:26:06.069 --> 01:26:08.236
details about that strike , whether AI

01:26:08.236 --> 01:26:10.291
was used in targeting . We obviously

01:26:10.291 --> 01:26:12.291
need to know that . But I'd like to

01:26:12.291 --> 01:26:14.291
learn from both of you , and I know

01:26:14.291 --> 01:26:16.291
that , um , Senator Slotkin covered

01:26:16.291 --> 01:26:18.790
this , and you said that currently no

01:26:18.790 --> 01:26:20.457
AI is being used for domestic

01:26:20.457 --> 01:26:24.359
surveillance , and you said that ,

01:26:24.790 --> 01:26:27.950
uh , AI is not using in decision making

01:26:27.950 --> 01:26:30.709
for a kinetic attack . So I'd like to

01:26:30.709 --> 01:26:33.549
have a commitment from you that uh you

01:26:33.549 --> 01:26:36.970
will not use AI for decision making

01:26:37.149 --> 01:26:39.709
and making the final decision about

01:26:39.709 --> 01:26:43.089
whether to attack a location , to

01:26:43.140 --> 01:26:45.418
strike a location and use lethal force .

01:26:45.709 --> 01:26:47.820
And second , I want a commitment from

01:26:47.820 --> 01:26:49.987
both of you that you will not be using

01:26:49.987 --> 01:26:51.987
AI for any domestic surveillance in

01:26:51.987 --> 01:26:55.790
your AORs . Senator , to the first , I

01:26:55.790 --> 01:26:58.310
will make all decisions at my authority ,

01:26:58.319 --> 01:27:00.990
or it will be to someone who is legally

01:27:00.990 --> 01:27:03.157
delegated the authority . It will be a

01:27:03.157 --> 01:27:05.669
human , and then we will not use , uh ,

01:27:05.750 --> 01:27:07.870
we will not surveil US citizens .

01:27:08.629 --> 01:27:12.089
General Donovan . Senator , we will not

01:27:12.089 --> 01:27:15.180
surveil US citizens , and as you were

01:27:15.180 --> 01:27:17.490
speaking , Senator , we were involved

01:27:17.490 --> 01:27:19.712
in a process last night , the targeting

01:27:19.712 --> 01:27:21.546
process . There were only humans

01:27:21.546 --> 01:27:23.768
involved . The data was helping us make

01:27:23.768 --> 01:27:25.768
decisions in a closed setting , I'd

01:27:25.768 --> 01:27:27.879
like to share with you watching these

01:27:27.879 --> 01:27:29.712
young Americans make really hard

01:27:29.712 --> 01:27:29.649
decisions . They made the right

01:27:29.649 --> 01:27:32.049
decisions in the end . I'm aware that

01:27:32.049 --> 01:27:34.216
our service members are trained to the

01:27:34.216 --> 01:27:36.759
highest standards for targeting in

01:27:36.759 --> 01:27:38.648
warfare . I know that our service

01:27:38.648 --> 01:27:40.569
members follow the law of war . I

01:27:40.569 --> 01:27:42.680
understand they follow all the Geneva

01:27:42.680 --> 01:27:44.736
Conventions , and I have great faith

01:27:44.736 --> 01:27:46.902
that they will continue to do so . I'm

01:27:46.902 --> 01:27:48.847
deeply concerned with General with

01:27:48.847 --> 01:27:50.847
Secretary Hegseth's decision making

01:27:50.847 --> 01:27:52.569
with regard to undermining the

01:27:52.569 --> 01:27:55.770
personnel and department whose job is

01:27:55.770 --> 01:27:59.350
to . Protect civilians and to assure

01:27:59.609 --> 01:28:01.831
compliance with all those laws of war .

01:28:01.831 --> 01:28:03.887
I'm deeply concerned about Secretary

01:28:03.887 --> 01:28:06.129
Hegseth's rhetoric , saying that we

01:28:06.129 --> 01:28:08.240
need a lethal force and we don't need

01:28:08.240 --> 01:28:10.490
these types of protections . I'm deeply

01:28:10.490 --> 01:28:12.890
concerned about his firing of senior

01:28:12.890 --> 01:28:15.049
counsel and JAGs throughout the

01:28:15.049 --> 01:28:17.271
services . Those are some of the best .

01:28:17.271 --> 01:28:19.382
Trained men and women we have to make

01:28:19.382 --> 01:28:21.493
sure our warfighters have the tools ,

01:28:21.493 --> 01:28:23.660
advice , and guidance that you need to

01:28:23.660 --> 01:28:25.716
fight wars consistent with America's

01:28:25.716 --> 01:28:28.245
values . So I'm deeply concerned how

01:28:28.254 --> 01:28:30.935
those protections will be eroded . And

01:28:30.935 --> 01:28:33.575
so I'd like your commitment that those

01:28:33.575 --> 01:28:35.694
protections will not be eroded under

01:28:35.694 --> 01:28:39.620
your command . Senator , they ,

01:28:39.799 --> 01:28:42.560
they will not be eroded and uh just to

01:28:42.560 --> 01:28:46.180
illustrate the JAG and our command is

01:28:46.180 --> 01:28:48.291
integrated into all of our activities

01:28:48.291 --> 01:28:50.458
and is in fact sitting behind me right

01:28:50.458 --> 01:28:52.600
now . Thank you , General . General

01:28:52.600 --> 01:28:54.990
Donovan . Very similar , Senator , um ,

01:28:55.200 --> 01:28:57.256
they , they will not be eroded in US

01:28:57.256 --> 01:28:59.478
Southern Command . Thank you . Um , I'd

01:28:59.478 --> 01:29:02.069
like to turn to the issue of , uh ,

01:29:02.160 --> 01:29:06.069
UASs . Um , when we had , uh , Mr .

01:29:06.229 --> 01:29:08.740
Diliveson here , uh , I asked him about

01:29:08.740 --> 01:29:10.979
the requirements that DOD pushes down

01:29:11.160 --> 01:29:14.160
to DHS when it allows DHS to use DOD

01:29:14.160 --> 01:29:18.020
counter UAS systems and whether . That

01:29:18.020 --> 01:29:20.187
included requirements for coordination

01:29:20.187 --> 01:29:23.020
with relevant agencies . Um , he said

01:29:23.020 --> 01:29:25.700
that the policy defers to NorthCom on

01:29:25.700 --> 01:29:28.700
this question . So General Guilla , I'd

01:29:28.700 --> 01:29:30.700
like you to talk to us a little bit

01:29:30.700 --> 01:29:32.939
about what requirements , including for

01:29:32.939 --> 01:29:36.100
interagency coordination , do you pass

01:29:36.100 --> 01:29:38.609
down to DHS in order for them to take

01:29:38.609 --> 01:29:40.720
possession of the systems , and I ask

01:29:40.720 --> 01:29:42.942
this in the context of the recent drone

01:29:42.942 --> 01:29:44.720
drone incursion over one of our

01:29:44.720 --> 01:29:46.831
military bases that was just reported

01:29:46.831 --> 01:29:50.529
on today . Senator , when the uh

01:29:51.160 --> 01:29:53.669
counter UAS laser system was uh

01:29:53.669 --> 01:29:55.520
temporarily transferred from our

01:29:55.520 --> 01:29:58.439
department to DHS , uh , JTF Southern

01:29:58.439 --> 01:30:00.661
Border , which is the organization that

01:30:00.661 --> 01:30:04.600
was operating the laser , uh , Told DHS

01:30:04.600 --> 01:30:06.660
that it was , uh , they would do the

01:30:06.660 --> 01:30:10.009
training , but any coordination must be

01:30:10.009 --> 01:30:12.120
through their department because it's

01:30:12.120 --> 01:30:15.180
operating under 124N , which is a code

01:30:15.180 --> 01:30:17.347
that we do not have experience with or

01:30:17.347 --> 01:30:19.458
understand . We operated under 130I .

01:30:20.620 --> 01:30:23.200
But bigger than that , we understand

01:30:23.200 --> 01:30:24.811
that there has to be massive

01:30:24.811 --> 01:30:27.000
coordination , and I think that our

01:30:27.000 --> 01:30:29.167
coordination with FAA , with DHS , and

01:30:29.167 --> 01:30:31.200
with others was strong before , but

01:30:31.200 --> 01:30:34.319
this highlighted an area that required

01:30:34.319 --> 01:30:36.319
improvement , and we have addressed

01:30:36.319 --> 01:30:38.375
those since then . Thank you . Thank

01:30:38.375 --> 01:30:40.486
you , Mr . Chairman . Uh , uh , thank

01:30:40.486 --> 01:30:44.470
you , Senator Kramer . Thank

01:30:44.470 --> 01:30:46.248
you Mr . Chairman . Thank you ,

01:30:46.248 --> 01:30:48.470
generals both for being here , for your

01:30:48.470 --> 01:30:50.692
service , and , and certainly , um , to

01:30:50.692 --> 01:30:52.859
the men and women under your command .

01:30:52.859 --> 01:30:55.026
Thank you all . Um , I wanna follow up

01:30:55.026 --> 01:30:57.192
a little bit on , on the , the , the ,

01:30:57.192 --> 01:30:59.549
uh , counter UAS topic , um , that's

01:30:59.549 --> 01:31:01.716
began with Senator Shaheen and , and a

01:31:01.716 --> 01:31:03.882
little bit now with Senator Gillibrand

01:31:03.882 --> 01:31:05.882
and , and talk to General Gil . You

01:31:05.882 --> 01:31:08.105
know , first of all though , let me ask

01:31:08.105 --> 01:31:10.327
a question . Uh , I guess this was also

01:31:10.327 --> 01:31:12.271
came up under Senator Shaheen with

01:31:12.271 --> 01:31:14.490
regard to Canada and their involvement

01:31:14.490 --> 01:31:16.546
and their role and their partnership

01:31:16.546 --> 01:31:18.712
and , and I agree with everything that

01:31:18.712 --> 01:31:20.990
she asked and everything that you said ,

01:31:20.990 --> 01:31:22.990
but one question that , that , um ,

01:31:22.990 --> 01:31:25.101
I've been thinking a lot about is one

01:31:25.101 --> 01:31:27.323
of the encouraging things in , in the ,

01:31:27.323 --> 01:31:29.379
the new administration in Canada , I

01:31:29.379 --> 01:31:31.490
think , and I've , I've met the Prime

01:31:31.490 --> 01:31:33.768
Minister in a couple of occasions , um ,

01:31:33.768 --> 01:31:35.879
was , is that their commitment to put

01:31:35.879 --> 01:31:38.046
more of their own resources into their

01:31:38.046 --> 01:31:40.379
own defense , and he made the 2% pledge .

01:31:40.379 --> 01:31:42.379
But we've , you know , we've gotten

01:31:42.379 --> 01:31:42.220
kind of used to pledges that aren't

01:31:42.220 --> 01:31:45.049
fulfilled , um , by certain countries .

01:31:46.259 --> 01:31:48.299
Is there evidence , pretty solid

01:31:48.299 --> 01:31:50.355
evidence that they're acting on that

01:31:50.355 --> 01:31:52.759
commitment to get to 2% or , or greater ,

01:31:52.939 --> 01:31:56.379
um , in their defense budget ? Senator ,

01:31:56.470 --> 01:31:58.692
like in our system , you know , it , it

01:31:58.692 --> 01:32:00.803
takes a while for the procurement and

01:32:00.803 --> 01:32:02.526
the , and the employment , but

01:32:02.526 --> 01:32:04.581
everything I'm seeing at my level is

01:32:04.581 --> 01:32:07.049
full commitment . To include exchanges

01:32:07.049 --> 01:32:09.609
with our F-35 base at Ielson where

01:32:09.609 --> 01:32:11.810
we're bringing their pilots and

01:32:11.810 --> 01:32:13.977
maintainers in to learn how to operate

01:32:13.977 --> 01:32:16.209
5th generation in the Arctic air

01:32:16.209 --> 01:32:19.660
defense radar and satellite discussions .

01:32:19.970 --> 01:32:22.089
So everything I'm seeing at NORAD is

01:32:22.089 --> 01:32:25.209
full commitment and full eagerness to

01:32:25.209 --> 01:32:27.879
expand . I appreciate that , um ,

01:32:27.890 --> 01:32:30.009
validation . It's my observation as

01:32:30.009 --> 01:32:32.231
well , but I don't see it as closely as

01:32:32.231 --> 01:32:34.342
you do , so that's very encouraging .

01:32:34.342 --> 01:32:34.020
So thank you for that , and I think

01:32:34.020 --> 01:32:36.187
it's important for us all to take note

01:32:36.187 --> 01:32:38.490
of that , um , that commitment , um ,

01:32:38.819 --> 01:32:41.819
so with regard to the uh unauthorized

01:32:41.819 --> 01:32:44.939
incursions of , of UAS , uh , into

01:32:44.939 --> 01:32:47.339
particularly over our bases and , and ,

01:32:47.350 --> 01:32:50.720
uh , the use of counter UAS . Um , one

01:32:50.720 --> 01:32:52.664
of the things to , to address that

01:32:52.664 --> 01:32:54.831
threat in my part of the world is , of

01:32:54.831 --> 01:32:56.942
course , that the ACC has named Grand

01:32:56.942 --> 01:32:58.998
Forks Air Force Base as their , uh ,

01:32:58.998 --> 01:33:00.942
point defense , as a point defense

01:33:00.942 --> 01:33:02.887
battle lab . In fact , I think I'm

01:33:02.887 --> 01:33:02.359
going out there in a couple of weeks to

01:33:02.359 --> 01:33:06.120
cut a ribbon , um , on that . And , and

01:33:06.120 --> 01:33:09.560
the , the whole PDBL , uh , is ACC's

01:33:09.560 --> 01:33:11.838
designated organization to assume that ,

01:33:11.838 --> 01:33:13.504
you know , the tactical , the

01:33:13.504 --> 01:33:15.727
experimental , um , training , uh , you

01:33:15.727 --> 01:33:18.100
know , Uh , just helping us to better

01:33:18.100 --> 01:33:20.600
inform policy as well as , as decisions

01:33:20.600 --> 01:33:23.020
on , on the spot . Um , but I , I , I'd

01:33:23.020 --> 01:33:24.964
also just add to that that Colonel

01:33:24.964 --> 01:33:27.076
Rozelle is at the 319th , the , the ,

01:33:27.076 --> 01:33:29.560
the reconnaissance wing at Grand Forks

01:33:29.950 --> 01:33:32.959
really is well postured and , and , and

01:33:32.959 --> 01:33:35.779
able to leverage industry contacts , uh ,

01:33:35.859 --> 01:33:37.637
over at Grand Sky , which is an

01:33:37.637 --> 01:33:40.600
enhanced use lease , uh , UAS uh , park ,

01:33:40.779 --> 01:33:43.700
uh , with , Big and small and , and

01:33:43.700 --> 01:33:46.979
innovative industries . Um , maybe you

01:33:46.979 --> 01:33:49.479
could just elaborate a little bit on

01:33:50.020 --> 01:33:52.660
the role of , of all the above . It

01:33:52.660 --> 01:33:54.827
seems to me this is not just an all of

01:33:54.827 --> 01:33:56.771
government or an all of , of joint

01:33:56.771 --> 01:33:59.959
force , but an all of innovation , um ,

01:34:00.419 --> 01:34:02.641
challenge that needs , that needs to be

01:34:02.641 --> 01:34:04.808
dealt with . Maybe you could give me ,

01:34:04.808 --> 01:34:06.863
you know , your take on , on how you

01:34:06.863 --> 01:34:08.863
see it all coming together . Yeah ,

01:34:08.863 --> 01:34:10.752
Senator , it's certainly a , uh ,

01:34:10.752 --> 01:34:12.808
missionary that has expanded greatly

01:34:12.808 --> 01:34:14.863
over the last couple of years . Uh ,

01:34:14.863 --> 01:34:16.697
our command was named the , uh ,

01:34:16.697 --> 01:34:18.810
department synchronizer with not only

01:34:18.810 --> 01:34:20.977
within our department , but within the

01:34:20.977 --> 01:34:22.810
interagency . And then they also

01:34:22.810 --> 01:34:25.032
established Jayada 401 , which has been

01:34:25.032 --> 01:34:27.240
a fantastic organization commanded by

01:34:28.379 --> 01:34:30.609
General Matt Ross , who has done a

01:34:30.609 --> 01:34:32.776
great job of getting with industry and

01:34:32.776 --> 01:34:35.819
bringing in a lot of the legislative

01:34:35.819 --> 01:34:38.419
requirements that combatant command is

01:34:38.419 --> 01:34:40.475
not equipped to address . So teaming

01:34:40.475 --> 01:34:42.979
with them . And installations such as

01:34:42.979 --> 01:34:46.419
Grand Forks , we see , we have , and

01:34:46.419 --> 01:34:48.697
also , sir , with the , with this body ,

01:34:48.697 --> 01:34:50.919
uh , your committee helped us last year

01:34:50.919 --> 01:34:54.879
with 4 authorities that we needed

01:34:55.060 --> 01:34:57.779
to ensure that we could effectively

01:34:57.779 --> 01:35:00.899
employ . UAS to defend installations

01:35:00.899 --> 01:35:03.359
and one of those was to allow us to

01:35:03.359 --> 01:35:06.080
exchange information with local and

01:35:06.080 --> 01:35:08.549
state capabilities with our

01:35:09.359 --> 01:35:11.581
department's capabilities on the base ,

01:35:11.581 --> 01:35:14.600
and that has since been addressed and I

01:35:14.600 --> 01:35:16.711
think It's just going to get stronger

01:35:16.711 --> 01:35:18.878
and stronger and more necessary to tie

01:35:18.878 --> 01:35:20.822
instead of single point counter US

01:35:20.822 --> 01:35:22.669
capabilities into a network that

01:35:22.669 --> 01:35:24.725
extends beyond bases and into cities

01:35:24.725 --> 01:35:26.613
and communities . And does higher

01:35:26.613 --> 01:35:28.836
education play some role in some of the

01:35:28.836 --> 01:35:30.891
institutions that have those kind of

01:35:30.891 --> 01:35:33.058
capabilities , research capabilities ?

01:35:33.058 --> 01:35:33.020
I'm sorry , can you say higher

01:35:33.149 --> 01:35:35.371
education ? Uh , absolutely , we work ,

01:35:35.371 --> 01:35:37.316
uh , with , uh , the University of

01:35:37.316 --> 01:35:39.538
Arizona , University of Texas El Paso ,

01:35:39.538 --> 01:35:41.705
and many others , uh , that have great

01:35:41.705 --> 01:35:43.871
systems that use , uh , common off the

01:35:43.871 --> 01:35:45.982
shelf capabilities that we can spread

01:35:45.982 --> 01:35:48.038
very quickly . Thank you very much .

01:35:48.038 --> 01:35:50.260
Thank you , Chairman . Uh , thank you ,

01:35:50.260 --> 01:35:52.427
Senator Cramer , Senator Kaine . Thank

01:35:52.427 --> 01:35:54.705
you , Mr . Chair , and General Donovan ,

01:35:54.705 --> 01:35:56.760
the , uh , National Defense strategy

01:35:56.760 --> 01:35:58.760
lists the Western Hemisphere as the

01:35:58.760 --> 01:36:00.705
most important region for national

01:36:00.705 --> 01:36:02.593
security . And I actually am very

01:36:02.593 --> 01:36:05.140
supportive of that recognition . I have

01:36:05.140 --> 01:36:07.259
some real concerns about the legality

01:36:07.259 --> 01:36:09.779
of the boat strikes in international

01:36:09.779 --> 01:36:11.501
waters and the legality of the

01:36:11.501 --> 01:36:13.819
Venezuela operation . And as you and I

01:36:13.819 --> 01:36:16.640
have talked before , I also worry about

01:36:16.939 --> 01:36:20.049
uh a US posture that suggests that the

01:36:20.140 --> 01:36:22.307
attitude toward the region should be a

01:36:22.500 --> 01:36:24.970
kind of a updating of the Monroe

01:36:24.970 --> 01:36:27.339
Doctrine because having lived in Latin

01:36:27.339 --> 01:36:29.859
America that really lands badly . In

01:36:29.859 --> 01:36:32.081
Latin America , it suggests the US will

01:36:32.081 --> 01:36:34.137
be a dominator rather than a partner

01:36:34.137 --> 01:36:36.192
and what nations want is a partner ,

01:36:36.192 --> 01:36:38.419
not a dominator . But still , I think

01:36:38.419 --> 01:36:40.979
the escalation of the priority of the

01:36:40.979 --> 01:36:43.201
Western Hemisphere makes a lot of sense

01:36:43.201 --> 01:36:45.368
in your discussion of things like this

01:36:45.368 --> 01:36:48.939
uh counter uh cartel consortium that

01:36:48.939 --> 01:36:50.883
you're putting together . I mean ,

01:36:50.883 --> 01:36:52.883
that's the kind of thing I think we

01:36:52.883 --> 01:36:54.717
should do more of . But here's a

01:36:54.717 --> 01:36:56.772
challenge . Every year , the SATHCOM

01:36:56.772 --> 01:36:59.240
posture hearing involves the COCOM

01:36:59.240 --> 01:37:01.439
saying they're under-resourced to do

01:37:01.439 --> 01:37:03.879
the more modest mission we've been

01:37:03.879 --> 01:37:06.339
expecting of them , and now the NDS

01:37:06.339 --> 01:37:08.450
suggests that the mission will become

01:37:08.450 --> 01:37:10.561
even more important . I think Senator

01:37:10.561 --> 01:37:12.839
Cotton , when I was at another hearing ,

01:37:12.839 --> 01:37:15.061
asked you some resource questions . Let

01:37:15.061 --> 01:37:17.228
me ask a different question , which is

01:37:17.228 --> 01:37:19.172
about sort of the structure of the

01:37:19.172 --> 01:37:21.540
SAUHCOM HQ and operation . Do you have

01:37:21.540 --> 01:37:23.759
the current structure that you need ?

01:37:24.240 --> 01:37:27.879
To take on effectively this mission of

01:37:28.370 --> 01:37:31.799
increasing importance . Senator , thank

01:37:31.799 --> 01:37:33.966
you . Um , no , we do not . And , um ,

01:37:34.000 --> 01:37:36.439
in 43 days , the strength , I realized

01:37:36.439 --> 01:37:38.495
the strength , I knew it all along .

01:37:38.495 --> 01:37:40.717
The strength of SCO is that partnership

01:37:40.717 --> 01:37:40.680
and , and , and the relationships

01:37:40.680 --> 01:37:42.791
throughout the region . I found out a

01:37:42.791 --> 01:37:44.958
couple of things , um , that right now

01:37:44.958 --> 01:37:47.069
currently because of over the years ,

01:37:47.069 --> 01:37:49.069
maybe how SouthCom is viewed , soon

01:37:49.069 --> 01:37:51.180
we'll say economy of force , whatever

01:37:51.180 --> 01:37:52.958
it was , we ended up with a 1/3

01:37:52.958 --> 01:37:55.124
military , 1/3 GS government service ,

01:37:55.124 --> 01:37:58.600
1/3 contractor . Headquarters , it's ,

01:37:58.680 --> 01:38:00.791
it's not sustainable . And so I think

01:38:00.791 --> 01:38:02.902
of almost like a two layer cake now ,

01:38:02.902 --> 01:38:04.736
Senator , that the base layer of

01:38:04.736 --> 01:38:06.791
theater security cooperation , we do

01:38:06.791 --> 01:38:09.013
some great things and that's the , that

01:38:09.013 --> 01:38:08.720
is really the strength that enables

01:38:08.720 --> 01:38:10.776
everything else to be at that , that

01:38:10.776 --> 01:38:12.776
next level , and we'll call it that

01:38:12.776 --> 01:38:14.998
kind of hemispheric approach to be able

01:38:14.998 --> 01:38:17.276
to partner better with NorthCom . That ,

01:38:17.276 --> 01:38:19.220
that layer of the cake is not even

01:38:19.220 --> 01:38:18.919
existent . And so that's what we're

01:38:18.919 --> 01:38:21.086
working on right now . We want to make

01:38:21.086 --> 01:38:23.086
the base layer strong to do what it

01:38:23.086 --> 01:38:25.030
needs to do . We'll find the right

01:38:25.030 --> 01:38:25.000
balance of , of people , the right

01:38:25.000 --> 01:38:27.580
talent . To be able to actually

01:38:27.580 --> 01:38:29.413
function as a geographic command

01:38:29.413 --> 01:38:31.979
command and not at the low tactical

01:38:31.979 --> 01:38:34.035
level . We have elements that can do

01:38:34.035 --> 01:38:36.201
this , but actually the adjacent to be

01:38:36.201 --> 01:38:38.423
a good partner with the partners in the

01:38:38.423 --> 01:38:40.535
region , um , and then also how do we

01:38:40.535 --> 01:38:42.757
actually , um , I would say compete for

01:38:42.757 --> 01:38:44.923
resources . On an equal level to other

01:38:44.923 --> 01:38:47.090
geographic combatant commands . What I

01:38:47.090 --> 01:38:46.725
have found though , Senator , is that

01:38:46.725 --> 01:38:48.781
right now the budget resources comes

01:38:48.781 --> 01:38:50.947
from an executive agent , which is the

01:38:50.947 --> 01:38:53.058
United States Army because we live on

01:38:53.058 --> 01:38:55.003
an Army Army compound . So it's an

01:38:55.003 --> 01:38:57.225
interesting look at this . Is that do I

01:38:57.225 --> 01:38:59.225
expect the Army then to fund . Uh ,

01:38:59.225 --> 01:39:01.392
campaigning in South America , they're

01:39:01.392 --> 01:39:03.392
not structured to do so . There's a

01:39:03.392 --> 01:39:02.990
mismatch here , Senator . Well , you ,

01:39:03.069 --> 01:39:05.125
you're 43 days in , so you're not at

01:39:05.125 --> 01:39:08.189
the end of this analysis and decision

01:39:08.189 --> 01:39:10.522
about what the right structure would be ,

01:39:10.522 --> 01:39:12.745
but obviously we want to be in dialogue

01:39:12.790 --> 01:39:14.901
with you so that the committee can do

01:39:14.901 --> 01:39:16.623
the right thing to elevate the

01:39:16.623 --> 01:39:18.734
importance of SOCOM to where it needs

01:39:18.734 --> 01:39:21.069
to be given the NDS . Um , a question

01:39:21.069 --> 01:39:24.100
about the , the boat strikes . I , um ,

01:39:24.189 --> 01:39:27.379
have reviewed . The all the material

01:39:27.379 --> 01:39:29.435
available to Congress on each of the

01:39:29.435 --> 01:39:31.601
strikes current through last week , so

01:39:31.601 --> 01:39:33.823
there might have been one or two that I

01:39:33.823 --> 01:39:35.601
haven't looked at , and I would

01:39:35.601 --> 01:39:37.879
encourage my colleagues to do the same .

01:39:37.879 --> 01:39:40.046
The last time that I got briefed about

01:39:40.046 --> 01:39:42.101
the targeting criteria , which was a

01:39:42.101 --> 01:39:44.323
classified briefing , was in December .

01:39:44.323 --> 01:39:46.212
Do you know whether the targeting

01:39:46.212 --> 01:39:48.101
criteria with respect to the boat

01:39:48.101 --> 01:39:50.157
strikes in international waters have

01:39:50.157 --> 01:39:52.790
changed or not since December ? Senator ,

01:39:53.040 --> 01:39:54.984
I do not believe it's changed . It

01:39:54.984 --> 01:39:57.151
hasn't changed since I took over , but

01:39:57.151 --> 01:39:59.096
I haven't seen any changes since .

01:39:59.096 --> 01:40:01.207
We're still using the same process of

01:40:01.207 --> 01:40:03.207
near certain reasonable certainty ,

01:40:03.207 --> 01:40:05.318
reasonable certainty , near certainty

01:40:05.318 --> 01:40:04.640
to make the final decision , right ?

01:40:04.919 --> 01:40:06.975
Well , I don't want to get into this

01:40:06.975 --> 01:40:08.863
more and open . I may ask another

01:40:08.863 --> 01:40:11.197
question in classified . General Guillo ,

01:40:11.560 --> 01:40:13.616
you've been asked some questions . I

01:40:13.616 --> 01:40:15.782
think the chair asked you about Jayada

01:40:15.782 --> 01:40:17.782
401 . You were just engaging with ,

01:40:17.782 --> 01:40:20.116
with Senator Gillibrander on UAS issues .

01:40:20.116 --> 01:40:21.782
Um , and we had a really good

01:40:21.782 --> 01:40:24.004
discussion about it . I think the Jiata

01:40:24.004 --> 01:40:26.116
41 , Matt Ross , I , I , I think it's

01:40:26.116 --> 01:40:28.282
now sort of in a , a good place that's

01:40:28.282 --> 01:40:30.338
giving the committee some confidence

01:40:30.338 --> 01:40:29.979
about it . However , the confidence

01:40:29.979 --> 01:40:32.312
that I have is about the aerial concern .

01:40:32.379 --> 01:40:34.268
I'm starting to get more and more

01:40:34.268 --> 01:40:36.490
worried about . Um , surface and marine

01:40:36.490 --> 01:40:39.689
uncrewed weapons systems that could do

01:40:39.689 --> 01:40:41.578
damage to ships in port and other

01:40:42.200 --> 01:40:44.422
assets that we have . Talk a little bit

01:40:44.422 --> 01:40:46.810
about from the NCO space , what are you

01:40:46.810 --> 01:40:48.866
doing to make sure that we're really

01:40:48.866 --> 01:40:50.921
appropriately assessing and guarding

01:40:50.921 --> 01:40:52.977
against other uncrewed systems other

01:40:52.977 --> 01:40:55.549
than the aerial systems . Senator , I

01:40:55.549 --> 01:40:58.009
share your concern , and , uh , I think ,

01:40:58.020 --> 01:41:00.131
uh , General Ross would tell you that

01:41:00.131 --> 01:41:02.580
we look at unmanned systems as opposed

01:41:02.580 --> 01:41:04.819
to aerial , uh , more and more

01:41:04.819 --> 01:41:06.819
frequently . I really would like to

01:41:06.819 --> 01:41:08.930
learn from Admiral Cooper and CENTCOM

01:41:08.930 --> 01:41:11.041
and some of the work that he has done

01:41:11.041 --> 01:41:13.263
in his present position , but also in a

01:41:13.263 --> 01:41:15.375
previous position when he was the 5th

01:41:15.375 --> 01:41:17.597
Fleet commander there , where he used ,

01:41:17.597 --> 01:41:19.319
unmanned detection systems and

01:41:19.319 --> 01:41:21.486
defensive systems , uh , in and around

01:41:21.486 --> 01:41:23.597
ports there in the Middle East . Uh ,

01:41:23.609 --> 01:41:25.870
so I think you'll see that as becoming

01:41:26.600 --> 01:41:29.330
an increasing focus of ours , to the

01:41:29.330 --> 01:41:31.552
point where sometimes you don't say UAS

01:41:31.552 --> 01:41:33.719
anymore , you just talk about unmanned

01:41:33.719 --> 01:41:35.719
systems . Yeah , thanks so much . I

01:41:35.719 --> 01:41:37.830
yell back . And thank you very much ,

01:41:37.830 --> 01:41:39.886
Senator Banks . General Guillo , can

01:41:39.886 --> 01:41:41.886
you talk more about what we want in

01:41:41.886 --> 01:41:44.219
Greenland ? I mean , as I understand it ,

01:41:44.219 --> 01:41:46.520
the , the agreement is that , um , the

01:41:46.520 --> 01:41:48.631
unofficial agreement is that we would

01:41:48.631 --> 01:41:52.419
have more troop presence , more bases ,

01:41:52.879 --> 01:41:56.870
uh , Golden Dome pre presence there ,

01:41:56.879 --> 01:41:59.157
and then kick the Chinese out . I mean ,

01:41:59.157 --> 01:42:01.323
is that , is that accurate ? What more

01:42:01.323 --> 01:42:03.546
do we want ? From , from my perspective

01:42:03.546 --> 01:42:05.546
at NORAD and NHCOM , Senator , uh ,

01:42:05.546 --> 01:42:08.140
what I want is the resources and the

01:42:08.140 --> 01:42:10.580
force projection capability along that

01:42:10.580 --> 01:42:13.180
avenue of approach to North America ,

01:42:13.330 --> 01:42:15.441
which , you know , through the Arctic

01:42:15.441 --> 01:42:17.560
is , is our most , uh , the shortest

01:42:17.560 --> 01:42:19.671
route , so therefore in many ways our

01:42:19.671 --> 01:42:21.893
most vulnerable route . We're very well

01:42:21.893 --> 01:42:24.060
established in Canada and Alaska , and

01:42:24.060 --> 01:42:26.060
having more capability along what I

01:42:26.060 --> 01:42:28.116
call the 2 o'clock approach would be

01:42:28.116 --> 01:42:30.171
key . Space systems to enable Golden

01:42:30.171 --> 01:42:32.282
Dome , the ability to launch fighters

01:42:32.282 --> 01:42:34.282
and tankers to be the first line of

01:42:34.282 --> 01:42:36.339
defense against cruise missiles that

01:42:36.339 --> 01:42:39.350
could be launched from the Arctic . And

01:42:39.350 --> 01:42:42.500
then also having soft and ports

01:42:42.500 --> 01:42:45.959
for soft presence and then for regular

01:42:46.580 --> 01:42:49.100
activities and then port presence for

01:42:49.100 --> 01:42:51.589
our navy which also gives us a Golden

01:42:51.589 --> 01:42:53.533
Dome and ballistic missile defense

01:42:53.533 --> 01:42:55.422
capability . Can you give us some

01:42:55.422 --> 01:42:57.589
context though on what we have now and

01:42:57.589 --> 01:42:59.756
And what this agreement that President

01:42:59.756 --> 01:43:01.922
Trump is negotiating would allow us to

01:43:01.922 --> 01:43:04.033
do that we can't do currently . Yes ,

01:43:04.033 --> 01:43:06.256
Senator , what we have now is access to

01:43:06.256 --> 01:43:08.145
Paufik Air Base , which is at the

01:43:08.145 --> 01:43:10.089
northern part of Greenland , which

01:43:10.089 --> 01:43:12.311
gives us some of the fighter and tanker

01:43:12.311 --> 01:43:13.978
capability and a lot of space

01:43:13.978 --> 01:43:16.089
capability . Uh , but we don't have a

01:43:16.089 --> 01:43:18.145
permanent presence for the SOF , and

01:43:18.145 --> 01:43:20.367
then we don't have a permanent presence

01:43:20.367 --> 01:43:22.478
for some of the maritime capabilities

01:43:22.478 --> 01:43:22.250
that , that I need , and that's what

01:43:22.250 --> 01:43:24.528
we're working with , uh , Denmark , uh ,

01:43:24.528 --> 01:43:26.694
to , to get more access to . It sounds

01:43:26.694 --> 01:43:28.861
like Denmark and Greenland are willing

01:43:28.861 --> 01:43:30.972
to give us that . They've been very ,

01:43:30.972 --> 01:43:30.569
very supportive partners . There's been

01:43:30.569 --> 01:43:32.625
a lot of noise about this , a lot of

01:43:32.625 --> 01:43:34.513
politics about Greenland , but it

01:43:34.513 --> 01:43:36.458
sounds like these negotiations are

01:43:36.458 --> 01:43:38.513
productive and could lead to a place

01:43:38.513 --> 01:43:38.259
that would leave America better off .

01:43:38.410 --> 01:43:40.521
Yes , sir , they're very productive ,

01:43:40.521 --> 01:43:42.743
and the need there is very real . Thank

01:43:42.743 --> 01:43:45.609
you , um . General Donovan , can , can

01:43:45.609 --> 01:43:47.970
you talk more about , um , uh , uh ,

01:43:47.979 --> 01:43:50.090
Senator Kaine was talking about the ,

01:43:50.090 --> 01:43:52.146
the , what some of us would call the

01:43:52.146 --> 01:43:54.312
Trump corollary to the Monroe Doctrine

01:43:54.312 --> 01:43:56.146
and what , what that means , the

01:43:56.146 --> 01:43:57.979
national security strategy , and

01:43:57.979 --> 01:44:00.257
specifically , um , I'm curious , what ,

01:44:00.257 --> 01:44:02.590
what , what does that mean to , to Cuba ?

01:44:02.590 --> 01:44:02.180
I mean , what , what would happen if ,

01:44:02.259 --> 01:44:04.537
if the Chinese were kicked out of Cuba ?

01:44:04.537 --> 01:44:06.537
Would , would that be , would we be

01:44:06.537 --> 01:44:08.370
better off for that ? Is that an

01:44:08.370 --> 01:44:10.600
accurate ? Um , way to interpret the

01:44:10.600 --> 01:44:14.509
Trump corollary . Senator , I'm

01:44:14.509 --> 01:44:16.770
not tracking a heavy presence of China

01:44:16.770 --> 01:44:19.910
in Cuba at this time . Our focus again

01:44:19.910 --> 01:44:22.132
remains on our core tasks of protecting

01:44:22.132 --> 01:44:24.709
the embassy and our operations in Gitmo ,

01:44:24.850 --> 01:44:26.794
so I'm not tracking specific about

01:44:26.794 --> 01:44:28.683
China unless you have some of the

01:44:28.683 --> 01:44:30.683
smaller maybe intel collection type

01:44:30.683 --> 01:44:32.961
capabilities that we believe are there ,

01:44:32.961 --> 01:44:32.270
but that's that's all I'm tracking this

01:44:32.270 --> 01:44:34.549
time . Have there been public reports

01:44:34.549 --> 01:44:36.910
that there are Chinese intelligence

01:44:36.910 --> 01:44:39.950
facilities in Cuba ? Um , yes , there

01:44:39.950 --> 01:44:42.172
have been reports of that , and again ,

01:44:42.172 --> 01:44:43.950
and the department's 2025 China

01:44:43.950 --> 01:44:46.069
military power report indicates that

01:44:46.069 --> 01:44:48.350
China , uh , has likely considered

01:44:48.350 --> 01:44:50.950
military basing , at least considered

01:44:50.950 --> 01:44:54.149
it in Cuba . Yes , Senator , as you

01:44:54.149 --> 01:44:56.149
mentioned , the bigger concern is a

01:44:56.149 --> 01:44:58.316
collection capability that close to US

01:44:58.316 --> 01:45:00.316
shores . That's , that's my biggest

01:45:00.316 --> 01:45:00.169
concern . Not very robust , but still

01:45:00.169 --> 01:45:02.391
there . So what does , so unpack for us

01:45:02.391 --> 01:45:04.391
what the national security strategy

01:45:04.391 --> 01:45:08.359
means then vis a vis Cuba . With a

01:45:08.359 --> 01:45:10.490
focus on the Western Hemisphere , the

01:45:10.490 --> 01:45:12.657
reality is , do we , we have to ensure

01:45:12.657 --> 01:45:14.712
that those maligned actors , whether

01:45:14.712 --> 01:45:17.609
it's China or Russia or Iran , anywhere

01:45:17.609 --> 01:45:19.276
in South America , how are we

01:45:19.276 --> 01:45:21.689
countering them from different degrees

01:45:21.689 --> 01:45:23.689
of capabilities you bring ? I think

01:45:23.689 --> 01:45:25.800
most of those would be economic . And

01:45:25.800 --> 01:45:27.911
most of them would be partnerships to

01:45:27.911 --> 01:45:29.911
enable our partners to identify the

01:45:29.911 --> 01:45:31.911
threat . That's why maritime domain

01:45:31.911 --> 01:45:34.078
awareness becomes a big peace force so

01:45:34.078 --> 01:45:36.022
that our partners can see over the

01:45:36.022 --> 01:45:38.078
horizon , whether that's seeing drug

01:45:38.078 --> 01:45:39.967
traffickers or seeing illicit PRC

01:45:39.967 --> 01:45:42.022
Chinese fishing fleets , both same ,

01:45:42.022 --> 01:45:44.245
same , so they can actually make better

01:45:44.245 --> 01:45:46.356
decisions and we're there as a better

01:45:46.356 --> 01:45:48.467
partner . Would you say that National

01:45:48.467 --> 01:45:50.689
security strategy is a warning to China

01:45:50.689 --> 01:45:52.800
not to , not to think about it . Stay

01:45:52.800 --> 01:45:55.022
away , or we'll do something about it .

01:45:55.022 --> 01:45:57.078
Absolutely good . I like that . Um ,

01:45:57.078 --> 01:45:59.245
China's nuclear powered guided missile

01:45:59.245 --> 01:46:01.356
submarines threaten the US homeland .

01:46:01.370 --> 01:46:03.314
How important is it that we detect

01:46:03.314 --> 01:46:05.370
those Chinese submarines before they

01:46:05.370 --> 01:46:08.200
enter US waters ? Senator , it's , it's

01:46:08.200 --> 01:46:10.479
of the highest importance , and I have

01:46:10.479 --> 01:46:12.990
asked for , and the Navy is certainly

01:46:12.990 --> 01:46:15.759
supportive of increased undersea

01:46:15.759 --> 01:46:17.759
detection capability , both the

01:46:17.759 --> 01:46:19.981
Atlantic and the Pacific to ensure that

01:46:19.981 --> 01:46:22.819
we detect threats to our continent

01:46:23.040 --> 01:46:25.207
further and further away . Thank you .

01:46:25.207 --> 01:46:27.799
I yield back . Thank you , Senator

01:46:27.799 --> 01:46:31.310
Peters . Thank you , uh , Mr . Chairman .

01:46:32.270 --> 01:46:34.649
Uh , General Gal , uh , the war with

01:46:34.649 --> 01:46:37.310
Iran has already led to , uh , state

01:46:37.310 --> 01:46:39.569
sponsored , uh , cyberattacks here in

01:46:39.569 --> 01:46:41.736
the United States . In fact , uh , the

01:46:41.736 --> 01:46:43.930
pro-Iranian hackers attacked a

01:46:43.930 --> 01:46:45.986
Michigan-based , uh , medical device

01:46:45.986 --> 01:46:48.263
company , uh , just recently , as , uh ,

01:46:48.263 --> 01:46:50.430
I'm sure you're well aware of . But in

01:46:50.430 --> 01:46:52.597
addition to , uh , cyberattacks , um ,

01:46:52.597 --> 01:46:54.763
I think it's , uh , certainly it's not

01:46:54.763 --> 01:46:56.850
unreasonable to assume that Iran is

01:46:56.850 --> 01:46:58.870
also working hard to initiate .

01:47:01.919 --> 01:47:04.141
Us , uh , here , uh , in the homeland ,

01:47:04.141 --> 01:47:06.640
uh , uh , as well . Uh , Obviously , uh ,

01:47:06.700 --> 01:47:08.700
your command OTHCO plays a critical

01:47:08.700 --> 01:47:10.867
role in deterring and preventing these

01:47:10.867 --> 01:47:12.422
kinds of , uh , kinetic and

01:47:12.422 --> 01:47:14.509
cyberattacks through your defensive

01:47:14.509 --> 01:47:16.731
operations , intelligence sharing , and

01:47:16.731 --> 01:47:18.953
integration , uh , with Cyber Command .

01:47:19.060 --> 01:47:21.282
Uh , but , uh , I just want to get your

01:47:21.282 --> 01:47:23.504
sense , uh , generally , uh , given the

01:47:23.504 --> 01:47:25.616
setting that we're in right now . But

01:47:25.616 --> 01:47:27.949
generally , how do you assess this risk ?

01:47:28.700 --> 01:47:30.922
Senator , I think you described it very

01:47:30.922 --> 01:47:33.144
well , or I shared the description that

01:47:33.144 --> 01:47:36.759
you gave is that their cyber capability

01:47:36.759 --> 01:47:39.740
is real and it is significant , and

01:47:39.740 --> 01:47:42.100
they have the ability to find what they

01:47:42.100 --> 01:47:44.779
think are the weakest points in our

01:47:44.779 --> 01:47:47.500
cyber defense , which unfortunately are

01:47:47.500 --> 01:47:49.500
some of the critical infrastructure

01:47:49.740 --> 01:47:51.684
that we have across the US , and I

01:47:51.684 --> 01:47:53.907
think that they're vulnerable to remain

01:47:53.907 --> 01:47:56.569
vulnerable to Iranian attacks . So we

01:47:56.569 --> 01:48:00.140
have , uh , we have , uh , CISA and

01:48:00.140 --> 01:48:02.251
other groups associated with Homeland

01:48:02.251 --> 01:48:04.029
Security and others . Uh , your

01:48:04.029 --> 01:48:06.196
relationship with them , I know you do

01:48:06.196 --> 01:48:08.529
cooperate on a regular basis , but , uh ,

01:48:08.529 --> 01:48:10.529
we've also seen that , uh , about a

01:48:10.529 --> 01:48:12.529
third of the cyber professionals at

01:48:12.529 --> 01:48:14.700
CISA were , uh , basically , uh ,

01:48:15.009 --> 01:48:17.065
removed from the department , kicked

01:48:17.065 --> 01:48:19.299
out , or took risks , uh , and , uh ,

01:48:19.609 --> 01:48:21.776
they are not able to do what they were

01:48:21.776 --> 01:48:23.609
able to do in the past . Are you

01:48:23.609 --> 01:48:25.665
backfilling that , or do we have a ,

01:48:25.720 --> 01:48:27.553
we're actually an enhanced cyber

01:48:27.553 --> 01:48:29.776
vulnerability now , sir , I don't think

01:48:30.240 --> 01:48:33.080
that we have an enhanced vulnerability

01:48:33.080 --> 01:48:35.080
right now , but it does take strong

01:48:35.080 --> 01:48:37.302
cooperation between our command , Cyber

01:48:37.302 --> 01:48:40.919
Command , the FBI , and CISA to ensure

01:48:40.919 --> 01:48:43.560
that we share information and on

01:48:43.560 --> 01:48:45.782
potential attacks and ensure that we're

01:48:45.782 --> 01:48:47.893
covered to the best degree possible .

01:48:47.893 --> 01:48:50.116
But you , your command is on heightened

01:48:50.116 --> 01:48:52.227
alert for all of these . Absolutely ,

01:48:52.227 --> 01:48:54.282
yes sir . Good . Yeah , there's been

01:48:54.282 --> 01:48:56.282
some , uh , discussion about , uh ,

01:48:56.282 --> 01:48:58.393
Greenland by , uh , some of my , uh ,

01:48:58.393 --> 01:49:00.560
my colleagues . Uh , I was , uh , on a

01:49:00.560 --> 01:49:00.220
recent trip up there and we were at ,

01:49:00.229 --> 01:49:02.396
uh , B Defik , uh , which , uh , is an

01:49:02.396 --> 01:49:04.507
incredible facility , uh , completely

01:49:04.507 --> 01:49:06.839
dark when I was there , about 750 miles

01:49:06.839 --> 01:49:08.728
north of the , uh , of the Arctic

01:49:08.728 --> 01:49:11.520
Circle , uh , but clearly a , uh , a ,

01:49:11.600 --> 01:49:13.878
an important , uh , strategic position ,

01:49:13.878 --> 01:49:15.959
uh , for us there . Couple of things

01:49:15.959 --> 01:49:17.959
related to that trip . Uh , when we

01:49:17.959 --> 01:49:19.792
were there , the folks , uh , in

01:49:19.792 --> 01:49:22.015
Greenland , uh , were incredibly , uh ,

01:49:22.015 --> 01:49:24.410
angry . That the United States , the

01:49:24.410 --> 01:49:26.000
rhetoric coming from this

01:49:26.000 --> 01:49:27.889
administration was that they were

01:49:27.889 --> 01:49:29.944
either going to be purchased , which

01:49:29.944 --> 01:49:32.111
they were pretty clear to tell us that

01:49:32.111 --> 01:49:34.167
they cannot be bought , or they were

01:49:34.167 --> 01:49:36.649
going to have a military invasion . In

01:49:36.649 --> 01:49:38.760
fact , when I was there , they talked

01:49:38.760 --> 01:49:41.209
about a power outage that they had in

01:49:41.209 --> 01:49:44.970
Nuke in the capital city there , and

01:49:44.970 --> 01:49:47.081
everybody was in fear that this meant

01:49:47.081 --> 01:49:49.149
the Americans were invading . Uh ,

01:49:49.330 --> 01:49:51.497
children were highly distressed . They

01:49:51.497 --> 01:49:53.497
didn't go to school , uh , which is

01:49:53.497 --> 01:49:55.719
pretty outrageous that an ally believes

01:49:55.719 --> 01:49:57.830
that when power goes out , that means

01:49:57.830 --> 01:49:59.997
US troops are invading . It's a pretty

01:49:59.997 --> 01:50:02.163
horrible situation that we're in right

01:50:02.163 --> 01:50:04.330
now . Uh , some of the comments that I

01:50:04.330 --> 01:50:06.552
heard from people were highly emotional

01:50:06.552 --> 01:50:08.719
and felt betrayed , uh , by the United

01:50:08.719 --> 01:50:10.663
States . So tell me , what are you

01:50:10.663 --> 01:50:12.830
doing in your command . To try to work

01:50:12.830 --> 01:50:15.870
with our ally and get past what was a

01:50:15.870 --> 01:50:17.926
pretty horrible situation for them ,

01:50:17.926 --> 01:50:20.092
but , you know , I've I've often found

01:50:20.092 --> 01:50:22.390
that I think it's true in life , if you

01:50:22.390 --> 01:50:24.629
breach someone's trust , it takes a lot

01:50:24.629 --> 01:50:26.830
of work to get that trust back . How

01:50:26.830 --> 01:50:28.941
are you gonna get , how are , how are

01:50:28.941 --> 01:50:30.997
we , are you in particular with your

01:50:30.997 --> 01:50:33.219
command , because I know you care a lot

01:50:33.219 --> 01:50:33.069
about Greenland . How are we gonna

01:50:33.069 --> 01:50:37.000
regain this trust ? Senator , I , I

01:50:38.259 --> 01:50:40.481
We try to maintain the trust that we've

01:50:40.481 --> 01:50:42.703
established with both Greenland through

01:50:42.703 --> 01:50:44.759
our military operations and with our

01:50:44.759 --> 01:50:48.009
partners in Denmark by being open and

01:50:48.009 --> 01:50:51.359
transparent and seeking new and

01:50:51.359 --> 01:50:54.209
improved ways to partner together , and

01:50:54.209 --> 01:50:56.759
we've done that even since your recent

01:50:56.759 --> 01:51:00.470
visit and With Noble Defender , an

01:51:00.470 --> 01:51:02.589
exercise that had traditionally been

01:51:02.589 --> 01:51:05.470
only NORAD forces , we partnered with

01:51:05.470 --> 01:51:08.069
Denmark for the most recent Noble

01:51:08.069 --> 01:51:10.430
Defender and then for our Arctic Edge

01:51:10.430 --> 01:51:13.229
exercise also including Denmark , which

01:51:13.229 --> 01:51:16.350
is the military presence that that

01:51:16.350 --> 01:51:18.790
Greenland has . Um , so being open ,

01:51:18.879 --> 01:51:20.768
transparent , and , and exploring

01:51:20.768 --> 01:51:22.712
opportunities where we can partner

01:51:22.712 --> 01:51:24.823
together is where I want to show that

01:51:24.823 --> 01:51:27.046
we are a valued partner and , and , and

01:51:27.046 --> 01:51:29.268
can be trusted , and I think that we've

01:51:29.268 --> 01:51:31.379
been very successful in that . Well ,

01:51:31.379 --> 01:51:33.712
if I may , Mr . Chairman , just briefly ,

01:51:33.712 --> 01:51:35.935
certainly that is good , uh , and , and

01:51:35.935 --> 01:51:35.339
when I talked to the military ,

01:51:35.470 --> 01:51:37.692
especially the Danish military , that ,

01:51:37.692 --> 01:51:39.914
that relationship is still there . That

01:51:39.914 --> 01:51:41.970
wasn't where the problem was . Where

01:51:41.970 --> 01:51:44.081
the problem is , is with the people ,

01:51:44.081 --> 01:51:43.979
uh , uh , who are not part of the

01:51:43.979 --> 01:51:46.090
military , and I would just hope that

01:51:46.090 --> 01:51:48.257
as you continue these kinds of , and ,

01:51:48.257 --> 01:51:50.312
uh , efforts as you just described ,

01:51:50.312 --> 01:51:52.312
that's actually communicated to the

01:51:52.312 --> 01:51:54.257
general populace of , of Greenland

01:51:54.257 --> 01:51:56.479
because that's where the , that's where

01:51:56.479 --> 01:51:58.535
the trust has been , has been broken

01:51:58.535 --> 01:51:58.459
and , and where the work is really

01:51:58.459 --> 01:52:00.681
going to be necessary . Yes , Senator ,

01:52:00.689 --> 01:52:02.911
thank you . Thank you , Senator Peter .

01:52:02.911 --> 01:52:04.911
Senator Sullivan , thank you , Mr .

01:52:04.911 --> 01:52:06.911
Chairman and gentlemen , thanks for

01:52:06.911 --> 01:52:09.200
your service and To your staff and team

01:52:09.200 --> 01:52:11.520
members , thank you as well . General

01:52:11.520 --> 01:52:13.799
Gi , I wanna appreciate the meeting in

01:52:13.799 --> 01:52:16.799
my office yesterday . I , I , uh , talk

01:52:16.799 --> 01:52:18.910
about this chart a lot . By the way ,

01:52:18.910 --> 01:52:20.966
this chart's actually running out of

01:52:20.966 --> 01:52:23.021
room now . These are all the Russian

01:52:23.021 --> 01:52:25.188
and Chinese incursions into the Arctic

01:52:25.188 --> 01:52:29.060
and uh The Alaska AOR that you and the

01:52:29.060 --> 01:52:31.339
IndoECO commander are both responsible

01:52:31.339 --> 01:52:34.770
for . Um , the tempo , as I mentioned ,

01:52:34.810 --> 01:52:37.088
is increasing . We're out of room here .

01:52:37.088 --> 01:52:38.977
We've had two Russian Bear bomber

01:52:38.977 --> 01:52:41.049
incursions in the last Three weeks .

01:52:41.169 --> 01:52:44.410
The last one , in our response , which

01:52:44.410 --> 01:52:46.870
was , uh , NOORAD , we launched , uh ,

01:52:46.879 --> 01:52:50.759
9 assets , 2 F-16s , 2 F-35s , and AWAC ,

01:52:51.529 --> 01:52:54.709
and I think 4 or 5 tankers .

01:52:55.250 --> 01:52:57.306
Now , you know , when these make the

01:52:57.306 --> 01:52:59.361
news , they never make the news down

01:52:59.361 --> 01:53:01.417
here , by the way , in Alaska , they

01:53:01.417 --> 01:53:03.639
make the news . But you know , we say ,

01:53:03.639 --> 01:53:05.417
oh , the Russians came into our

01:53:05.417 --> 01:53:07.472
airspace , we intercepted them . But

01:53:07.472 --> 01:53:09.649
these are highly complex , high-risk .

01:53:10.379 --> 01:53:14.259
Missions , dangerous . Our uh airmen ,

01:53:14.700 --> 01:53:17.299
guard , reserve , active duty , they do

01:53:17.299 --> 01:53:19.859
a great job . But can you explain a

01:53:19.859 --> 01:53:22.799
little bit of the danger and complexity ?

01:53:23.220 --> 01:53:25.620
I'll bring up a map here . Um , you

01:53:25.620 --> 01:53:27.620
know , we're launching from JBar or

01:53:27.620 --> 01:53:30.779
Ielson . I mean , how far are our F-16s

01:53:30.779 --> 01:53:33.250
and F-thirty-fives flying just to

01:53:33.250 --> 01:53:35.319
intercept the Russians before they

01:53:35.899 --> 01:53:39.310
cross into Aratus ? Senator , uh ,

01:53:39.549 --> 01:53:41.827
you're absolutely right . It's a , the ,

01:53:41.827 --> 01:53:43.827
the picture of our fighters next to

01:53:43.827 --> 01:53:46.120
their bombers , you know , looks very ,

01:53:46.140 --> 01:53:48.919
uh , uh , harmless and , and very easy ,

01:53:49.020 --> 01:53:51.020
but especially from Alaska with the

01:53:51.020 --> 01:53:53.131
distances and the harsh environment .

01:53:53.700 --> 01:53:55.756
Make it very complex . When they get

01:53:55.756 --> 01:53:57.689
the alert Klaxon to scramble from

01:53:57.689 --> 01:54:00.740
either Eelson or Elmendorf , they know

01:54:00.740 --> 01:54:02.907
that they're probably going to have to

01:54:02.907 --> 01:54:06.259
fly 1500 to 1600 miles from the nearest

01:54:06.259 --> 01:54:08.426
suitable concrete to land if they have

01:54:08.426 --> 01:54:10.648
an emergency just to intercept the just

01:54:10.648 --> 01:54:12.648
to intercept . Just to get , that's

01:54:12.648 --> 01:54:14.592
only halfway through the mission ,

01:54:14.592 --> 01:54:16.648
right ? 1500 miles . Yeah , not even

01:54:16.648 --> 01:54:18.537
halfway , sir , because they'll ,

01:54:18.537 --> 01:54:20.759
they'll intercept them , then they'll ,

01:54:20.759 --> 01:54:22.759
uh , them for the duration of their

01:54:22.759 --> 01:54:24.815
period , then they have to fly , fly

01:54:24.815 --> 01:54:27.037
back . So these missions are often 6 to

01:54:27.037 --> 01:54:30.810
8 hours in . Flight gear that has to

01:54:30.810 --> 01:54:33.890
accommodate if they eject and survive

01:54:33.890 --> 01:54:36.120
and so they're it's 50 below zero in

01:54:36.120 --> 01:54:38.169
Alaska . That's right . So , their

01:54:38.169 --> 01:54:40.169
cockpits are comfortable , but they

01:54:40.169 --> 01:54:42.391
have to wear the gear in case they have

01:54:42.391 --> 01:54:44.502
to leave the cockpit in an ejection .

01:54:44.502 --> 01:54:46.280
Uh , these are some of the most

01:54:46.280 --> 01:54:49.799
challenging and uh . Uh , really brave

01:54:49.799 --> 01:54:51.939
missions that that we can do . So I

01:54:51.939 --> 01:54:53.979
want to commend our Alaska-based

01:54:53.979 --> 01:54:56.146
military . They're doing a great job .

01:54:56.146 --> 01:54:57.923
How many tank , how many tanker

01:54:57.979 --> 01:55:00.299
top-offs would a mission like that

01:55:00.299 --> 01:55:02.979
entail if they go to the extent of the

01:55:02.979 --> 01:55:05.169
Aleutians or up into on the north part

01:55:05.169 --> 01:55:07.058
of your map there . I would say a

01:55:07.058 --> 01:55:09.165
minimum of 6 air refuelings often at

01:55:09.165 --> 01:55:11.444
night in that cumbersome gear , uh ,

01:55:11.734 --> 01:55:13.774
and which gives me just a second to

01:55:13.774 --> 01:55:15.718
point out that the tankers and the

01:55:15.718 --> 01:55:17.885
AWACS are also up there to make sure ,

01:55:17.885 --> 01:55:19.941
uh , that , that we can complete the

01:55:19.941 --> 01:55:22.107
mission along with the fighters . So a

01:55:22.107 --> 01:55:24.163
couple of other quick things . Thank

01:55:24.163 --> 01:55:23.975
you for that . And , uh , and again , I

01:55:23.975 --> 01:55:26.694
want to thank them , our military . So

01:55:26.694 --> 01:55:28.861
let's say you're doing an intercept up

01:55:28.861 --> 01:55:32.040
here , Arctic Ocean . You're in an F-16 .

01:55:32.890 --> 01:55:36.740
You lose an engine . In February In the

01:55:36.740 --> 01:55:38.907
middle of the night , how's that gonna

01:55:38.907 --> 01:55:41.439
play out for that pilot ? F-16s have

01:55:41.439 --> 01:55:43.272
one engine , right ? They have ,

01:55:43.272 --> 01:55:45.439
they're a single engine . Uh , if they

01:55:45.439 --> 01:55:47.772
have any engine indications , hopefully ,

01:55:47.772 --> 01:55:47.600
you know , that I know they will be

01:55:47.600 --> 01:55:49.767
heading back over land . So if they do

01:55:49.767 --> 01:55:51.989
have to eject , at least it's over land

01:55:51.989 --> 01:55:54.156
and not over the water . If the engine

01:55:54.156 --> 01:55:56.319
is , uh , still working , you know ,

01:55:56.399 --> 01:55:58.879
they're 1500 miles or so from the

01:55:58.879 --> 01:56:01.319
nearest suitable runway at , at Isleson .

01:56:01.509 --> 01:56:03.398
Let me ask you a kind of combined

01:56:03.398 --> 01:56:05.120
question . Uh , I spoke to the

01:56:05.120 --> 01:56:07.176
Secretary of the Air Force , General

01:56:07.176 --> 01:56:09.120
Wilsbach , very recently . The Air

01:56:09.120 --> 01:56:11.398
Force has committed to me 10 years ago ,

01:56:11.398 --> 01:56:14.060
10 years ago , uh , to get more KC-135s

01:56:14.060 --> 01:56:16.227
up to Iselson for this exact purpose ,

01:56:16.229 --> 01:56:18.229
but other reasons . I think they're

01:56:18.229 --> 01:56:20.340
working it , but 10 years is a long ,

01:56:20.340 --> 01:56:22.229
hell of a long time to wait for a

01:56:22.229 --> 01:56:24.396
commitment from the Air Force . I hope

01:56:24.396 --> 01:56:26.451
we get on it . But we also need more

01:56:26.451 --> 01:56:25.970
infrastructure , right ? We're

01:56:26.390 --> 01:56:28.557
reopening the Navy base at ADA . We're

01:56:28.557 --> 01:56:30.668
building out a port in Nome finally .

01:56:30.950 --> 01:56:33.061
We're looking at Dead Horse up here .

01:56:33.290 --> 01:56:35.457
Uh , we're looking at king salmon down

01:56:35.457 --> 01:56:38.379
here . Can you talk about both the need

01:56:38.379 --> 01:56:41.310
for tankers . And expanded

01:56:41.310 --> 01:56:43.709
infrastructure that you're working on

01:56:43.959 --> 01:56:46.015
that can help make this mission more

01:56:46.015 --> 01:56:48.910
doable , more safe , and to give the

01:56:48.910 --> 01:56:51.750
power projection that we need to make

01:56:51.750 --> 01:56:53.694
sure that uh when the Russians and

01:56:53.694 --> 01:56:55.583
Chinese keep doing this , and all

01:56:55.583 --> 01:56:57.694
indications are they're going to keep

01:56:57.694 --> 01:56:59.861
doing it , that we have the ability to

01:56:59.861 --> 01:57:02.028
intercept them . Yes sir , we need the

01:57:02.028 --> 01:57:04.139
tankers , and I know the Air Force is

01:57:04.139 --> 01:57:06.250
working on that . That's the lifeline

01:57:06.250 --> 01:57:08.306
up there . All of the bases that you

01:57:08.306 --> 01:57:10.528
pointed out are extremely important for

01:57:10.528 --> 01:57:12.861
a couple of reasons . One is resiliency .

01:57:12.861 --> 01:57:14.972
Uh , Safety , uh , as you mentioned ,

01:57:14.972 --> 01:57:17.194
and also it gives the president and the

01:57:17.194 --> 01:57:19.270
secretary options if we do come into

01:57:19.270 --> 01:57:21.700
conflict . We have more avenues of

01:57:21.700 --> 01:57:24.220
approach that we can defend or project

01:57:24.220 --> 01:57:26.276
power from if necessary . Well , I I

01:57:26.276 --> 01:57:28.498
look forward to continuing to work with

01:57:28.498 --> 01:57:28.379
you on all these . Thanks for your

01:57:28.379 --> 01:57:30.379
great service . Thank you , Senator

01:57:30.379 --> 01:57:32.490
Sullivan . Is , is there an objection

01:57:32.490 --> 01:57:34.657
to putting copies of these two posters

01:57:34.657 --> 01:57:37.450
in the record so ordered , uh ,

01:57:37.819 --> 01:57:41.569
Senator Duckworth . Thank you

01:57:41.569 --> 01:57:43.736
Mr . Chairman General General Guillo ,

01:57:43.736 --> 01:57:45.902
I wish I could ask you about the range

01:57:45.902 --> 01:57:48.125
of threats from adversaries that I know

01:57:48.125 --> 01:57:50.236
your team is battling every day , but

01:57:50.236 --> 01:57:52.458
instead , President Trump has forced us

01:57:52.458 --> 01:57:52.399
to again grapple with another possible

01:57:52.399 --> 01:57:54.689
unprecedented domestic misuse of our

01:57:54.689 --> 01:57:57.560
military . He seems , uh , to , he ,

01:57:57.649 --> 01:57:59.970
his seeming desire to send troops to

01:57:59.970 --> 01:58:02.137
polling places in February , President

01:58:02.137 --> 01:58:04.303
Trump said , and I quote , Republicans

01:58:04.303 --> 01:58:06.414
ought to nationalize the voting , end

01:58:06.414 --> 01:58:08.248
quote . And in . late February ,

01:58:08.248 --> 01:58:10.414
multiple media outlets reported that a

01:58:10.414 --> 01:58:12.137
draft executive order is being

01:58:12.137 --> 01:58:14.192
circulated that would use a claim of

01:58:14.192 --> 01:58:16.303
foreign interference as justification

01:58:16.303 --> 01:58:18.470
to declare a national emergency around

01:58:18.470 --> 01:58:20.359
our elections . Let me be clear ,

01:58:20.359 --> 01:58:22.359
sending troops to polling places is

01:58:22.359 --> 01:58:24.581
illegal unless it is necessary to repel

01:58:24.581 --> 01:58:26.637
armed enemies of the United States ,

01:58:26.637 --> 01:58:28.748
and we can't forget that US code also

01:58:28.748 --> 01:58:30.803
outlaws troops from intimidating any

01:58:30.803 --> 01:58:32.914
voter from fully exercising the right

01:58:32.914 --> 01:58:35.026
of suffrage at any general or special

01:58:35.026 --> 01:58:36.692
election . General Guillo , I

01:58:36.692 --> 01:58:38.637
appreciate you previously that you

01:58:38.637 --> 01:58:40.470
previously committed before this

01:58:40.470 --> 01:58:42.414
committee to establish guard rails

01:58:42.414 --> 01:58:41.729
within your authorities for

01:58:41.729 --> 01:58:43.451
domestically deployed troops ,

01:58:43.569 --> 01:58:45.569
including by distinguishing between

01:58:45.569 --> 01:58:47.529
military and federal agents . If

01:58:47.529 --> 01:58:49.362
President Trump orders troops to

01:58:49.362 --> 01:58:51.307
American cities around the midterm

01:58:51.307 --> 01:58:53.362
elections , what guardrails will you

01:58:53.362 --> 01:58:55.418
commit to within your authorities to

01:58:55.418 --> 01:58:57.585
ensure that no voters feel intimidated

01:58:57.585 --> 01:58:59.807
by the presence of troops ? Senator , I

01:58:59.807 --> 01:59:01.918
very clearly understand the law there

01:59:01.918 --> 01:59:04.770
and the illegality of putting armed

01:59:04.770 --> 01:59:06.770
forces there unless , as you said ,

01:59:06.770 --> 01:59:08.826
there is the exception for the armed

01:59:08.826 --> 01:59:11.048
rebellion . And so if given the order ,

01:59:11.048 --> 01:59:13.500
I would look at it very closely and if

01:59:13.500 --> 01:59:16.850
it did not meet what I felt were , you

01:59:16.850 --> 01:59:18.910
know , the legal hurdles , I would

01:59:18.910 --> 01:59:21.189
consult with my JAG and then I would

01:59:21.189 --> 01:59:23.229
bring up that concern with the

01:59:23.229 --> 01:59:25.285
Secretary and the chairman to ensure

01:59:25.285 --> 01:59:27.451
that I could stay on the right side of

01:59:27.451 --> 01:59:29.673
the law . Thank you . If you're ordered

01:59:29.673 --> 01:59:31.840
to deploy troops to provide logistical

01:59:31.840 --> 01:59:33.896
support to federal agents around the

01:59:33.896 --> 01:59:36.118
election . Would you see any reason for

01:59:36.118 --> 01:59:35.419
having troops in full battle dress ,

01:59:35.740 --> 01:59:37.620
body armor , um , carrying their

01:59:37.620 --> 01:59:39.564
weapons and ammunition if it's for

01:59:39.564 --> 01:59:41.564
logistical support , Senator , uh ,

01:59:41.564 --> 01:59:43.620
logistical support is not one of the

01:59:43.620 --> 01:59:45.676
exceptions , so no , I would not see

01:59:45.676 --> 01:59:48.540
any reason to use armed and uniformed

01:59:48.540 --> 01:59:50.484
members around a polling place for

01:59:50.484 --> 01:59:52.540
logistics . Thank you . Would you be

01:59:52.540 --> 01:59:54.762
advised that they not be allowed around

01:59:54.762 --> 01:59:57.549
a certain radius of polling places ? Uh ,

01:59:57.839 --> 02:00:00.117
Senator , I don't think that's defined ,

02:00:00.117 --> 02:00:01.950
but I don't think they should be

02:00:01.950 --> 02:00:01.620
anywhere near there where we would give

02:00:01.620 --> 02:00:03.731
the perception that we're trying to ,

02:00:03.731 --> 02:00:06.600
uh , uh , operate illegally . Thank you .

02:00:07.350 --> 02:00:09.572
Uh , missuing trips around the election

02:00:09.572 --> 02:00:11.239
is just another way that this

02:00:11.239 --> 02:00:13.350
administration is shifting the burden

02:00:13.350 --> 02:00:13.339
of legal liability onto service members .

02:00:13.419 --> 02:00:15.970
This is my concern because the statutes

02:00:15.970 --> 02:00:18.026
specify that any member of the armed

02:00:18.026 --> 02:00:20.248
forces who deploys to polling places or

02:00:20.248 --> 02:00:22.414
intimidates voters could be imprisoned

02:00:22.414 --> 02:00:24.640
or disqualified from office . As we saw

02:00:24.640 --> 02:00:26.862
during the December hearing on domestic

02:00:26.862 --> 02:00:28.751
deployments that I secured , this

02:00:28.751 --> 02:00:30.973
administration is comfortable thrusting

02:00:30.973 --> 02:00:32.807
our service members into legally

02:00:32.807 --> 02:00:34.918
ambiguous situations and leaving them

02:00:34.918 --> 02:00:36.751
to hang out to dry without legal

02:00:36.751 --> 02:00:38.751
protection . We know that President

02:00:38.751 --> 02:00:38.600
Trump , who grandstands and rallies

02:00:38.600 --> 02:00:40.656
that he's all about warfighters , is

02:00:40.656 --> 02:00:42.767
actually the fastest to betray them .

02:00:42.767 --> 02:00:45.100
As a guardsman or as a former guardsman ,

02:00:45.100 --> 02:00:47.322
it's always gonna be in my heart , this

02:00:47.322 --> 02:00:49.267
is serious to me . We saw the toll

02:00:49.267 --> 02:00:50.989
Trump's misadventure last year

02:00:50.989 --> 02:00:52.989
deploying troops to American cities

02:00:52.989 --> 02:00:52.919
took on my fellow guardsmen and on

02:00:52.919 --> 02:00:55.030
their communities that we call home .

02:00:55.319 --> 02:00:57.589
Taxpayers had to pay $21 million for

02:00:57.589 --> 02:00:59.256
President Trump's decision to

02:00:59.256 --> 02:01:01.311
federalize 500 guardsmen in Illinois

02:01:01.311 --> 02:01:03.533
alone , troops who , despite his claims

02:01:03.533 --> 02:01:05.589
that they reduced crime in Chicago ,

02:01:05.589 --> 02:01:07.645
never actually set foot in Chicago .

02:01:07.645 --> 02:01:09.700
They sat around training sites for 3

02:01:09.700 --> 02:01:11.700
months away from their families and

02:01:11.700 --> 02:01:13.700
civilian careers because the courts

02:01:13.700 --> 02:01:15.756
found the deployments illegal within

02:01:15.756 --> 02:01:17.978
the 1st 24 hours , and yet he kept them

02:01:17.978 --> 02:01:20.145
there for another 3 months through the

02:01:20.145 --> 02:01:22.145
Christmas holidays and now he might

02:01:22.145 --> 02:01:21.899
once again pull our military away from

02:01:21.899 --> 02:01:23.899
their their . Daily lives to police

02:01:23.899 --> 02:01:25.788
Americans this time to intimidate

02:01:25.788 --> 02:01:27.732
voters with no basis in facts , no

02:01:27.732 --> 02:01:29.788
basis in law , and at the expense of

02:01:29.788 --> 02:01:32.010
millions of taxpayer dollars . I'd like

02:01:32.010 --> 02:01:34.010
to use my remaining time to turn to

02:01:34.010 --> 02:01:36.177
operations in SouthCOM , another arena

02:01:36.177 --> 02:01:38.121
concerning misuse of force by this

02:01:38.121 --> 02:01:40.232
administration . General Donovan , in

02:01:40.232 --> 02:01:42.455
our private conversations prior to your

02:01:42.455 --> 02:01:44.566
confirmation , I expressed my concern

02:01:44.566 --> 02:01:44.415
about this administration's targeting

02:01:44.415 --> 02:01:46.526
decisions and what you might be asked

02:01:46.526 --> 02:01:48.654
to do once you are in leadership of

02:01:48.654 --> 02:01:50.876
SOCOM . Now that you're in the seat , I

02:01:50.876 --> 02:01:53.098
want to follow up on our conversation .

02:01:53.098 --> 02:01:55.120
What guidance have you received or

02:01:55.120 --> 02:01:57.799
issued for how to treat associates of a

02:01:57.799 --> 02:01:59.743
group differently from a confirmed

02:01:59.743 --> 02:02:03.370
direct member of a group ? Senator ,

02:02:03.419 --> 02:02:05.641
thank you , and associates affiliates ,

02:02:05.641 --> 02:02:07.752
I think is the term we're using now ,

02:02:07.752 --> 02:02:07.740
is that the same term , Senator ? Well ,

02:02:08.080 --> 02:02:10.024
the administration and their legal

02:02:10.024 --> 02:02:12.191
justifications are calling these folks

02:02:12.191 --> 02:02:14.247
associates , but it's different from

02:02:14.247 --> 02:02:16.302
being a confirmed direct member of a

02:02:16.302 --> 02:02:18.399
group . We have a definition of

02:02:18.399 --> 02:02:20.343
affiliates tied to that classified

02:02:20.343 --> 02:02:22.288
definition in a closed setting . I

02:02:22.288 --> 02:02:24.455
would like to share word for word what

02:02:24.455 --> 02:02:26.677
that definition is , Senator . OK , but

02:02:26.677 --> 02:02:26.129
this is about the term associate ,

02:02:26.169 --> 02:02:28.225
which is what the administration has

02:02:28.225 --> 02:02:29.947
used . I'm concerned about the

02:02:29.947 --> 02:02:32.058
looseness of the term that SouthTHCOM

02:02:32.058 --> 02:02:34.113
has been using to publicly report an

02:02:34.113 --> 02:02:36.002
individual we killed , specific ,

02:02:36.002 --> 02:02:38.113
specifically affiliate or associate .

02:02:38.113 --> 02:02:40.391
Those are the two words that were used ,

02:02:40.391 --> 02:02:40.160
which implies an even weaker

02:02:40.160 --> 02:02:42.470
association with any concerning threat .

02:02:43.169 --> 02:02:45.225
To be clear , striking people in the

02:02:45.225 --> 02:02:47.391
Caribbean Sea under weak justification

02:02:47.391 --> 02:02:49.669
is not only disturbing , it is illegal .

02:02:49.669 --> 02:02:51.780
This campaign has not been authorized

02:02:51.780 --> 02:02:53.725
by Congress , so despite what this

02:02:53.725 --> 02:02:55.613
administration may say or want to

02:02:55.613 --> 02:02:55.459
believe , this is not a global war on

02:02:55.459 --> 02:02:57.237
terror when the American people

02:02:57.237 --> 02:02:59.181
authorize the use of force through

02:02:59.181 --> 02:02:58.779
their congressional representative

02:02:58.779 --> 02:03:00.946
after attacks on September 11th . This

02:03:00.946 --> 02:03:03.168
is a different situation entirely , one

02:03:03.168 --> 02:03:05.335
in which the administration is risking

02:03:05.335 --> 02:03:07.612
American troops and innocent civilians .

02:03:07.612 --> 02:03:09.668
At the expense of American taxpayers

02:03:09.668 --> 02:03:11.501
with no transparency or rational

02:03:11.501 --> 02:03:11.410
justification , thank you , Mr .

02:03:11.419 --> 02:03:13.141
Chairman . Thank you , Senator

02:03:13.141 --> 02:03:15.030
Duckworth , Senator Schmidt , you

02:03:15.030 --> 02:03:17.086
recognizing you temporarily have the

02:03:17.086 --> 02:03:19.220
gavel . Wow , big promotion there .

02:03:19.339 --> 02:03:21.506
Thank you , Senator . Thank you , Mr .

02:03:21.506 --> 02:03:23.506
Chairman . Um , General Donovan , I

02:03:23.506 --> 02:03:25.617
wanted to ask you , the PRC is , uh ,

02:03:25.617 --> 02:03:27.672
dramatically sort of increased their

02:03:27.672 --> 02:03:29.617
footprint by way of infrastructure

02:03:29.617 --> 02:03:31.970
ports . Uh , including , I think , one

02:03:31.970 --> 02:03:34.026
of the largest distant water fishing

02:03:34.026 --> 02:03:36.303
fleets in the world , but in your view ,

02:03:36.303 --> 02:03:38.569
well , in the 2025 national security

02:03:38.569 --> 02:03:40.791
strategy , it declares that we're going

02:03:40.791 --> 02:03:42.919
to deny non-hemispheric , uh ,

02:03:42.970 --> 02:03:44.859
competitors the ability to own or

02:03:44.859 --> 02:03:47.081
control significant vital assets in our

02:03:47.081 --> 02:03:49.081
hemisphere . What are some of those

02:03:49.081 --> 02:03:52.350
assets , uh , that are of concern ? I

02:03:52.350 --> 02:03:55.899
think The primary asset I'm concerned

02:03:55.899 --> 02:03:57.677
about is the Panama Canal is to

02:03:57.677 --> 02:03:59.899
maintain the Panama Canal open for free

02:03:59.899 --> 02:04:01.955
flow of commerce , but with the true

02:04:01.955 --> 02:04:03.899
focus of ensuring that we can flow

02:04:03.899 --> 02:04:06.066
forces , US forces east to west of the

02:04:06.066 --> 02:04:08.066
Panama Canal . Further south in the

02:04:08.066 --> 02:04:10.232
southern Cone , you have other mineral

02:04:10.232 --> 02:04:12.121
assets we're concerned with . I'm

02:04:12.121 --> 02:04:11.600
concerned about an undersea cable

02:04:11.819 --> 02:04:14.041
coming into Chile that the PRC are tied

02:04:14.041 --> 02:04:17.140
to and otherwise the dual use nature of

02:04:17.140 --> 02:04:19.251
almost everything they install in our

02:04:19.251 --> 02:04:21.080
region . Um , I , I think it's

02:04:21.080 --> 02:04:23.080
encouraging that , uh , that , that

02:04:23.080 --> 02:04:26.700
Panama acted on this . Um , it doesn't

02:04:26.700 --> 02:04:28.756
feel like a , a one and done kind of

02:04:28.756 --> 02:04:30.978
thing though . So what , what's kind of

02:04:30.978 --> 02:04:32.867
on the horizon that we have to be

02:04:32.867 --> 02:04:34.922
mindful of ? Senator , thank you for

02:04:34.922 --> 02:04:37.089
with with regard to the Panama Canal .

02:04:37.089 --> 02:04:36.899
Well , thank you for highlighting that

02:04:36.899 --> 02:04:39.232
President Molino , a great partner , um ,

02:04:39.232 --> 02:04:41.839
the fact that we are holding the

02:04:42.020 --> 02:04:44.500
Panamax , SOCOM's largest excise , the

02:04:44.500 --> 02:04:46.444
first time in 14 years in Panama .

02:04:46.689 --> 02:04:48.745
There's 24 other nations coming , so

02:04:48.745 --> 02:04:50.856
they're becoming not only holding the

02:04:50.856 --> 02:04:53.022
Chinese at bay , they've also become ,

02:04:53.022 --> 02:04:55.133
uh , key partners in the region . And

02:04:55.133 --> 02:04:57.133
we believe that , you know , things

02:04:57.133 --> 02:04:59.133
like the jungle training operations

02:04:59.133 --> 02:05:01.133
school , those are core not only to

02:05:01.133 --> 02:05:03.356
increase our capabilities as US service

02:05:03.356 --> 02:05:05.245
members , but also to bring other

02:05:05.245 --> 02:05:07.189
partners together to develop those

02:05:07.189 --> 02:05:09.411
relationships . And Senator , what I've

02:05:09.411 --> 02:05:11.467
also realized in these 1st 43 days ,

02:05:11.467 --> 02:05:13.300
that same environment that these

02:05:13.300 --> 02:05:15.411
cartels thrive in , that they look to

02:05:15.411 --> 02:05:17.522
create those anarchic situations that

02:05:17.522 --> 02:05:19.467
they can flourish in . The PRC are

02:05:19.467 --> 02:05:19.020
right there with them . The Chinese are

02:05:19.020 --> 02:05:21.076
right in those same areas , you're ,

02:05:21.076 --> 02:05:23.187
countering the local government , and

02:05:23.187 --> 02:05:25.076
then the Chinese can move in very

02:05:25.076 --> 02:05:27.131
quickly and build the cheap school ,

02:05:27.131 --> 02:05:27.060
the cheap soccer stadium , or the cheap

02:05:27.060 --> 02:05:29.171
road and gain influence . And I think

02:05:29.171 --> 02:05:31.338
the more we work with these partners ,

02:05:31.338 --> 02:05:33.338
exercise like Panamax where we show

02:05:33.338 --> 02:05:35.504
that we're good partners and teammates

02:05:35.504 --> 02:05:37.838
and use some of the other tools we have ,

02:05:37.838 --> 02:05:39.727
the economic defense unit off the

02:05:39.727 --> 02:05:41.893
streets of Capitol , we're introducing

02:05:41.893 --> 02:05:44.060
new tools to counter the PRC influence

02:05:44.060 --> 02:05:46.227
in the region , and it feels like post

02:05:46.227 --> 02:05:49.620
the . The post Maduro , it feels like ,

02:05:50.120 --> 02:05:52.560
um , that a lot of folks are coming our

02:05:52.560 --> 02:05:54.782
way , right in that part of the world ,

02:05:54.782 --> 02:05:57.004
more sort of Latin American governments

02:05:57.004 --> 02:05:59.116
and , and friends are becoming better

02:05:59.116 --> 02:06:01.600
friends and people who were maybe um .

02:06:03.279 --> 02:06:06.160
Not so outwardly , um , favorable to us

02:06:06.160 --> 02:06:08.160
have sort of come our way . Is that

02:06:08.160 --> 02:06:10.330
your assessment ? A senator that maybe

02:06:10.330 --> 02:06:11.997
you've heard of the America's

02:06:11.997 --> 02:06:14.219
Countercartel Coalition . It started as

02:06:14.219 --> 02:06:16.441
a conference in our headquarters led by

02:06:16.441 --> 02:06:16.120
the Secretary about two weeks ago .

02:06:16.529 --> 02:06:18.751
They signed a document that we now have

02:06:18.751 --> 02:06:20.862
a coalition that will have a military

02:06:20.862 --> 02:06:22.862
aspect to it , and I say military ,

02:06:22.862 --> 02:06:25.085
it's , it's really , it's partners that

02:06:25.085 --> 02:06:24.970
are willing to join with us to move

02:06:24.970 --> 02:06:27.490
forward on the against the cartels with

02:06:27.490 --> 02:06:29.546
different degrees based on what they

02:06:29.546 --> 02:06:31.819
can bring , but a pretty positive , and

02:06:31.819 --> 02:06:34.041
you can , you can sense that folks want

02:06:34.041 --> 02:06:36.319
to get at this problem set . Thank you ,

02:06:36.319 --> 02:06:38.597
General Geo . I wanted to ask you . Uh ,

02:06:38.597 --> 02:06:41.379
for , for counter UAS threats that are

02:06:41.379 --> 02:06:43.546
the threats that are out there sort of

02:06:43.546 --> 02:06:45.657
counter US , um , Missouri is home to

02:06:45.657 --> 02:06:47.768
Whiteman Air Force Base , obviously .

02:06:47.768 --> 02:06:50.370
Um , how are you assessing the threat

02:06:50.370 --> 02:06:52.426
level to military installations that

02:06:52.426 --> 02:06:54.537
are out there right now and , and how

02:06:54.537 --> 02:06:56.592
far along are we encountering that ?

02:06:56.729 --> 02:06:58.840
Senator , we've seen an increase from

02:06:58.840 --> 02:07:00.951
last year in the number of detections

02:07:00.951 --> 02:07:03.007
over military installations over the

02:07:03.007 --> 02:07:05.229
course of the year . Some of that might

02:07:05.229 --> 02:07:07.285
be due to the fact that we have more

02:07:07.285 --> 02:07:09.507
detection capability now than we did in

02:07:09.507 --> 02:07:11.451
the past , and then our ability to

02:07:11.451 --> 02:07:13.673
defeat them has improved , uh , whereas

02:07:13.673 --> 02:07:15.785
a year ago , almost everyone that was

02:07:15.785 --> 02:07:17.840
detected was not defeated . Uh , now

02:07:17.840 --> 02:07:20.007
about 25% of the ones that we detect ,

02:07:20.007 --> 02:07:22.979
we're able to defeat . Uh , I pay

02:07:22.979 --> 02:07:25.035
particular attention to , uh , white

02:07:25.035 --> 02:07:27.257
men and other strategic bases , whether

02:07:27.257 --> 02:07:30.700
submarine , uh , uh , silos or aircraft ,

02:07:30.879 --> 02:07:32.823
and work very closely with Admiral

02:07:32.823 --> 02:07:34.935
Correll at StratCom to make sure that

02:07:34.935 --> 02:07:37.101
either through the services or through

02:07:37.101 --> 02:07:39.157
our own capabilities at NCO , we are

02:07:39.157 --> 02:07:41.268
protecting those vital locations from

02:07:41.268 --> 02:07:43.879
UASs . Um , you could put me in the

02:07:43.879 --> 02:07:46.390
category of , um , of somebody who's

02:07:46.390 --> 02:07:48.560
very supportive of our efforts to , to

02:07:48.560 --> 02:07:50.782
increase our presence , our footprint .

02:07:50.782 --> 02:07:53.490
Um , um , in Greenland , I think it's

02:07:53.490 --> 02:07:55.768
vital for a bunch of different reasons .

02:07:55.768 --> 02:07:58.859
Um , what are sort of the , uh , what

02:07:58.859 --> 02:08:01.026
are the designs that we might have for

02:08:01.026 --> 02:08:02.692
expansion given the strategic

02:08:02.692 --> 02:08:04.859
importance that it has ? Where , where

02:08:04.859 --> 02:08:07.081
do you see that right now ? Why is that

02:08:07.081 --> 02:08:09.026
important ? Senator , is extremely

02:08:09.026 --> 02:08:11.137
important , uh , strategically , uh ,

02:08:11.137 --> 02:08:13.137
and operationally for our command .

02:08:13.137 --> 02:08:15.081
We're very supportive of expanding

02:08:15.081 --> 02:08:16.803
access to and cooperation with

02:08:16.803 --> 02:08:19.026
Greenland and Denmark . I have a strong

02:08:19.026 --> 02:08:21.137
relationship with the Danish C Chad ,

02:08:21.137 --> 02:08:23.137
and we're working together to bring

02:08:23.137 --> 02:08:25.248
more capability there . What I'd like

02:08:25.248 --> 02:08:27.192
to see added to what we have now ,

02:08:27.192 --> 02:08:29.870
which is primarily space and initial

02:08:29.870 --> 02:08:33.459
fighter and tanker response , is more

02:08:33.459 --> 02:08:35.348
locations where we can do special

02:08:35.348 --> 02:08:37.237
operations and more access in the

02:08:37.237 --> 02:08:39.799
maritime domain . To build up our

02:08:39.799 --> 02:08:42.279
defense , defensive approaches from

02:08:42.279 --> 02:08:44.439
that northeast approach to North

02:08:44.439 --> 02:08:46.550
America . Thank you , General . Thank

02:08:46.550 --> 02:08:48.772
you . Thank you , Mr . Chairman . Thank

02:08:48.772 --> 02:08:50.995
you , Senator Schmidt , Senator Rosen .

02:08:50.995 --> 02:08:53.050
Well , thank you , Chairman Wicker ,

02:08:53.050 --> 02:08:55.106
Ranking Member Reed for holding this

02:08:55.106 --> 02:08:54.700
hearing , and I'd really like to thank

02:08:54.700 --> 02:08:56.756
General Guillo and General Donovan ,

02:08:57.100 --> 02:08:59.322
not just for testifying today , but for

02:08:59.322 --> 02:09:01.489
your lifetime of service , um , to the

02:09:01.489 --> 02:09:03.890
nation . Thank you . Um , I wanna start

02:09:03.890 --> 02:09:05.834
with you , General , uh , Guillo ,

02:09:05.850 --> 02:09:07.770
about , um , defense of critical

02:09:07.770 --> 02:09:09.770
infrastructure because defending

02:09:09.770 --> 02:09:11.992
critical infrastructure in the homeland

02:09:11.992 --> 02:09:14.048
from cyber attacks involves multiple

02:09:14.048 --> 02:09:16.214
federal entities as we know . Civilian

02:09:16.214 --> 02:09:18.437
agencies such as the Cyber Security and

02:09:18.437 --> 02:09:20.437
Infrastructure Security Agency CISA

02:09:20.529 --> 02:09:22.890
have primary responsibility for working

02:09:22.890 --> 02:09:25.057
with the . Infrastructure owners while

02:09:25.057 --> 02:09:27.279
the Department of Defense brings unique

02:09:27.279 --> 02:09:29.334
capabilities in cyber operations and

02:09:29.334 --> 02:09:31.424
homeland defense , countries such as

02:09:31.424 --> 02:09:33.368
China and Russia have demonstrated

02:09:33.584 --> 02:09:35.665
sophisticated cyber operations that

02:09:35.665 --> 02:09:37.554
could potentially disrupt power ,

02:09:37.584 --> 02:09:39.825
transportation , or communications

02:09:39.825 --> 02:09:42.785
networks inside the United States . So

02:09:42.785 --> 02:09:45.240
can you speak to how . Uh , excuse me ,

02:09:45.359 --> 02:09:47.137
Northern Command fits into that

02:09:47.137 --> 02:09:49.192
framework and specifically what role

02:09:49.192 --> 02:09:51.120
does NHCO play in supporting the

02:09:51.120 --> 02:09:53.220
defense of critical infrastructure

02:09:53.520 --> 02:09:55.464
against cyber threats ? How do you

02:09:55.464 --> 02:09:57.742
coordinate these responsibilities , um ,

02:09:57.742 --> 02:09:59.959
with other agencies ? Excuse me ,

02:10:00.560 --> 02:10:02.227
Senator , defense of critical

02:10:02.227 --> 02:10:04.660
infrastructure happens to be one of the

02:10:04.660 --> 02:10:07.240
3 or 4 main goals for our headquarters

02:10:07.240 --> 02:10:09.680
this year to improve our capability for

02:10:09.680 --> 02:10:11.736
all the reasons that you mentioned .

02:10:11.919 --> 02:10:13.919
Starting with the cyber , we have a

02:10:13.919 --> 02:10:16.030
very strong working relationship with

02:10:16.030 --> 02:10:18.141
First Cyber Command , with CISA , and

02:10:18.141 --> 02:10:20.649
with the FBI to make sure that it's a

02:10:20.649 --> 02:10:23.660
seamless defense of of our networks ,

02:10:23.890 --> 02:10:25.946
not only within our own department ,

02:10:25.946 --> 02:10:27.779
but as it goes out into critical

02:10:27.779 --> 02:10:29.501
infrastructure and the defense

02:10:29.501 --> 02:10:31.668
industrial base because we need all of

02:10:31.668 --> 02:10:33.723
those entities to be free from cyber

02:10:33.723 --> 02:10:35.501
threats for us to be successful

02:10:35.501 --> 02:10:37.668
militarily in defending the homeland .

02:10:37.709 --> 02:10:39.430
Uh , so we have a very strong

02:10:39.430 --> 02:10:41.839
relationship and then we , uh , work

02:10:41.839 --> 02:10:44.189
and exercise and tabletop exercise with

02:10:44.189 --> 02:10:47.419
them to make sure that on the , um , uh ,

02:10:47.430 --> 02:10:49.541
cyber front that we are unified and ,

02:10:49.541 --> 02:10:52.669
and very , uh , uh , sharing of all

02:10:52.669 --> 02:10:54.891
information that we have . Uh , I think

02:10:54.891 --> 02:10:56.947
the defense industrial , excuse me ,

02:10:56.947 --> 02:10:59.002
the , uh , critical defense critical

02:10:59.002 --> 02:11:01.450
infrastructure . faces more threats

02:11:01.450 --> 02:11:03.450
than just cyber . There's certainly

02:11:03.450 --> 02:11:05.890
physical threats that they have . And

02:11:05.890 --> 02:11:07.834
in that regard , uh , working very

02:11:07.834 --> 02:11:10.209
closely with the National Guard from

02:11:10.209 --> 02:11:12.410
each state where they recently had

02:11:12.410 --> 02:11:14.850
their tag conference in Colorado where

02:11:14.850 --> 02:11:16.850
we hosted that , and then we made a

02:11:16.850 --> 02:11:19.017
pact this year to work with each state

02:11:19.017 --> 02:11:21.017
to see what critical infrastructure

02:11:21.017 --> 02:11:23.128
they felt that they would protect and

02:11:23.128 --> 02:11:25.350
then what they might need from Title 10

02:11:25.350 --> 02:11:27.350
forces to augment that to make sure

02:11:27.350 --> 02:11:29.628
that we had a seamless protection . Of ,

02:11:29.628 --> 02:11:31.850
uh , defense critical infrastructure in

02:11:31.850 --> 02:11:33.961
the physical domain as well as in the

02:11:33.961 --> 02:11:35.961
cyber domain . Thank you . In in in

02:11:35.961 --> 02:11:38.128
Nevada we have , uh , lots of critical

02:11:38.128 --> 02:11:40.294
infrastructure , uh , Hoover Dam , and

02:11:40.294 --> 02:11:42.128
others . So thank you for that ,

02:11:42.128 --> 02:11:44.239
General Donovan . I wanna move to you

02:11:44.239 --> 02:11:46.350
and talk about Guantanamo Bay because

02:11:46.350 --> 02:11:46.140
with the use of our naval base .

02:11:46.254 --> 02:11:49.254
Guantanamo Bay to house undocumented

02:11:49.254 --> 02:11:51.198
individuals detained in the United

02:11:51.198 --> 02:11:53.143
States . I have concerns about the

02:11:53.143 --> 02:11:54.476
delineation between the

02:11:54.476 --> 02:11:57.055
responsibilities of DOD and ICE and

02:11:57.055 --> 02:11:58.999
whether the military was ever made

02:11:58.999 --> 02:12:01.222
whole after having to foot the bill for

02:12:01.222 --> 02:12:03.222
the Department of Homeland Security

02:12:03.222 --> 02:12:05.333
carrying out its mission . So General

02:12:05.333 --> 02:12:07.388
Donovan , for those who are deported

02:12:07.388 --> 02:12:09.111
now being held at Guantanamo ,

02:12:09.111 --> 02:12:11.919
Guantanamo , excuse me , um , are

02:12:11.919 --> 02:12:13.697
military personnel charged with

02:12:13.697 --> 02:12:15.975
guarding , carrying , and feeding them ?

02:12:15.975 --> 02:12:18.197
If so , who , who's paying for it ? And

02:12:18.197 --> 02:12:18.040
what is the division of

02:12:18.040 --> 02:12:20.439
responsibilities between DOD and ICE

02:12:20.439 --> 02:12:23.629
there ? Senator ,

02:12:24.399 --> 02:12:26.566
SCO's job is to ensure safety , care ,

02:12:26.566 --> 02:12:29.649
and treatment of those IAs at that

02:12:29.649 --> 02:12:33.200
facility at Gitmo . Currently those all

02:12:33.200 --> 02:12:35.311
costs associated with that go through

02:12:35.311 --> 02:12:37.033
the services , not directly to

02:12:37.033 --> 02:12:39.144
SouthTHCO , so I'd have to defer that

02:12:39.144 --> 02:12:41.144
to the service of the Comptroller .

02:12:41.144 --> 02:12:43.200
Well , can you tell me that , do you

02:12:43.200 --> 02:12:45.200
have plans to hold , um , people at

02:12:45.200 --> 02:12:47.033
Gitmo for years if they can't be

02:12:47.033 --> 02:12:49.144
returned to their country of origin ?

02:12:49.144 --> 02:12:50.978
And again , um , what about your

02:12:50.978 --> 02:12:53.089
manpower if you do that ? Resources ,

02:12:53.089 --> 02:12:55.367
are you gonna be coming to us for that ?

02:12:55.367 --> 02:12:57.589
Can you speak to that at all , please ?

02:12:57.589 --> 02:12:59.422
Again , um , Senator , those are

02:12:59.422 --> 02:13:01.540
decisions that would be at DHS and

02:13:01.540 --> 02:13:03.540
above the Secretary , so we'll just

02:13:03.540 --> 02:13:04.984
continue to carry out our

02:13:04.984 --> 02:13:07.040
responsibility of providing security

02:13:07.040 --> 02:13:09.373
for that actual camp itself . Thank you .

02:13:09.373 --> 02:13:11.540
I'm going to build a little bit , uh ,

02:13:11.540 --> 02:13:11.379
General Guillo , on , uh , Senator

02:13:11.379 --> 02:13:13.046
Duckworth's remarks about DOD

02:13:13.046 --> 02:13:15.459
deployment to American cities , um .

02:13:17.609 --> 02:13:20.220
And I'm just concerned that our

02:13:20.220 --> 02:13:22.387
guardsmen , our guardsmen are going to

02:13:22.387 --> 02:13:25.740
be placed in . Dangerous situations

02:13:25.740 --> 02:13:27.759
deployed to patrol American cities

02:13:28.259 --> 02:13:29.981
where they're working in close

02:13:29.981 --> 02:13:31.815
proximity to ICE and involved in

02:13:31.815 --> 02:13:33.926
sensitive community interactions . So

02:13:33.926 --> 02:13:36.459
what guidance has been provided to our

02:13:36.459 --> 02:13:38.459
guardsmen in order to avoid eroding

02:13:38.459 --> 02:13:40.403
trust in diverse communities where

02:13:40.403 --> 02:13:42.459
they're patrolling , and what is the

02:13:42.459 --> 02:13:44.700
division of missions responsibility

02:13:44.700 --> 02:13:47.540
between DOD and ICE as it refers to our

02:13:47.540 --> 02:13:51.410
National Guard ? Senator , uh , at

02:13:51.410 --> 02:13:53.930
this time there are no guard forces

02:13:53.930 --> 02:13:56.689
under my command in any of the cities

02:13:56.689 --> 02:13:58.856
that you mentioned , but in the past ,

02:13:58.856 --> 02:14:00.911
as you know , we did have some under

02:14:00.911 --> 02:14:02.967
Title 10 authorities , and the first

02:14:02.967 --> 02:14:05.022
thing that they're briefed when they

02:14:05.022 --> 02:14:07.245
come under Title 10 is not so much what

02:14:07.245 --> 02:14:09.467
they can do , but what they cannot do ,

02:14:09.467 --> 02:14:11.689
and that is they cannot execute any law

02:14:11.689 --> 02:14:13.522
enforcement activities , even if

02:14:13.522 --> 02:14:15.839
they're perhaps policemen . In their

02:14:15.839 --> 02:14:17.839
civilian job or if they're military

02:14:17.839 --> 02:14:19.783
policemen in their guard unit , if

02:14:19.783 --> 02:14:21.950
they're under Title 10 authorities due

02:14:21.950 --> 02:14:24.061
to the Posse Comitatus Act , they are

02:14:24.061 --> 02:14:25.783
not allowed to execute any law

02:14:25.783 --> 02:14:28.006
enforcement activities , and that's the

02:14:28.006 --> 02:14:30.228
first level of briefing that we gave in

02:14:30.228 --> 02:14:32.450
the past when we had forces assigned to

02:14:32.450 --> 02:14:32.040
us . But at this time , all of the

02:14:32.040 --> 02:14:35.000
guard forces that are operating in

02:14:35.000 --> 02:14:36.944
various cities , they're not under

02:14:36.944 --> 02:14:38.944
Title 10 , so therefore they're not

02:14:38.944 --> 02:14:41.111
under my authority . Thank you . Thank

02:14:41.111 --> 02:14:43.830
you , Senator Rosen . Senator . Warren ,

02:14:44.229 --> 02:14:47.069
thank you , Mr . Chairman . President

02:14:47.069 --> 02:14:49.509
Trump and Secretary Hegseth are

02:14:49.509 --> 02:14:52.750
repeatedly dragging the US military

02:14:52.750 --> 02:14:56.100
across both legal and moral lines .

02:14:56.509 --> 02:14:58.779
Trump and Hegseth have plunged us into

02:14:58.779 --> 02:15:02.029
an illegal war with Iran , where a US

02:15:02.029 --> 02:15:05.750
airstrike appears to have killed 150

02:15:05.750 --> 02:15:08.589
schoolchildren . And it's not just in

02:15:08.589 --> 02:15:10.979
Iran . Under Trump and Hegseth , the

02:15:10.979 --> 02:15:13.729
military fired on civilians . and

02:15:13.729 --> 02:15:16.450
shipwrecked survivors in the Caribbean ,

02:15:16.540 --> 02:15:20.069
and now , Secretary Hegseth is

02:15:20.069 --> 02:15:23.270
threatening to give no quarter to

02:15:23.270 --> 02:15:27.049
adversaries . This is not who

02:15:27.049 --> 02:15:29.529
we are . Our enemies might not care

02:15:29.529 --> 02:15:32.529
about civilian casualties , but the US

02:15:32.529 --> 02:15:36.529
military always , always has , and that

02:15:36.529 --> 02:15:39.529
is why Secretary Hegseth's attacks on

02:15:39.529 --> 02:15:42.770
the guard rails that prevent civilian

02:15:42.770 --> 02:15:45.990
harm and civilian casualties is so

02:15:45.990 --> 02:15:49.720
dangerous . So take the JAGs . Now more

02:15:49.720 --> 02:15:52.930
than ever we need strong independent

02:15:52.930 --> 02:15:55.040
military lawyers , but there are

02:15:55.040 --> 02:15:58.759
serious concerns that JAAGs cannot

02:15:58.759 --> 02:16:01.700
give honest legal advice right now . So

02:16:02.000 --> 02:16:04.167
General Guillo , let me ask you , have

02:16:04.167 --> 02:16:07.160
you seen any evidence of the JAG Corps

02:16:07.160 --> 02:16:10.959
being sidelined , whether at NorthCO or

02:16:10.959 --> 02:16:13.979
elsewhere in the department ? Senator ,

02:16:14.029 --> 02:16:16.830
I've not seen any evidence of the JAGs

02:16:16.830 --> 02:16:19.100
being sidelined in our command . I'll

02:16:19.100 --> 02:16:21.990
point out that our JAG is included in

02:16:21.990 --> 02:16:24.212
all of our battle rhythm meetings , and

02:16:24.212 --> 02:16:26.379
in fact , our JAG is sitting behind me

02:16:26.379 --> 02:16:28.490
right now . Yes , and I just want you

02:16:28.490 --> 02:16:31.390
to know I'm glad to hear that , glad to

02:16:31.390 --> 02:16:33.723
hear it's not happening in your command .

02:16:34.269 --> 02:16:36.870
But we know that this is a problem

02:16:36.870 --> 02:16:39.160
across the department . Secretary

02:16:39.160 --> 02:16:42.559
Hegseth fired TJAGs because he thought

02:16:42.559 --> 02:16:46.440
they were roadblocks , and he

02:16:46.440 --> 02:16:49.200
installed his personal lawyer to

02:16:49.200 --> 02:16:53.160
retrain military lawyers to water down

02:16:53.160 --> 02:16:56.080
constraints . He reassigned hundreds of

02:16:56.080 --> 02:16:59.419
JAGs to work on Trump's . Radical

02:16:59.419 --> 02:17:01.780
immigration agenda and last week the

02:17:01.780 --> 02:17:04.540
secretary said he's starting a quote

02:17:04.540 --> 02:17:08.219
ruthless overhaul of the JAG system .

02:17:09.018 --> 02:17:12.018
Look , for decades , military lawyers

02:17:12.018 --> 02:17:14.185
have worked side by side with officers

02:17:14.185 --> 02:17:16.240
to make sure that strikes are lawful

02:17:16.298 --> 02:17:18.418
and that they minimize civilian

02:17:18.418 --> 02:17:21.178
casualties . That doesn't make us

02:17:21.178 --> 02:17:24.978
weaker . It saves innocent lives and it

02:17:24.978 --> 02:17:28.098
prevents fueling terrorism . But

02:17:28.098 --> 02:17:30.579
Secretary Hegseth has blamed Jags for

02:17:30.579 --> 02:17:34.499
what he calls quote stupid rules of

02:17:34.499 --> 02:17:37.000
engagement . So General Donovan , let

02:17:37.000 --> 02:17:40.320
me ask you , if a JAG or a civilian

02:17:40.320 --> 02:17:43.059
harm advisor says to distinguish

02:17:43.400 --> 02:17:45.122
between a military base and an

02:17:45.122 --> 02:17:47.289
elementary school in an airstrike , is

02:17:47.289 --> 02:17:49.233
that a stupid rule of engagement ?

02:17:52.009 --> 02:17:55.209
No , Senator . Yeah , uh , look , Jags

02:17:55.209 --> 02:17:57.370
can't give their best advice if they

02:17:57.370 --> 02:18:00.370
fear losing their job just for raising

02:18:00.370 --> 02:18:03.490
legal concerns with an operation . One

02:18:03.490 --> 02:18:06.169
way we protect the integrity of legal

02:18:06.169 --> 02:18:08.469
advice in our military is by creating

02:18:08.849 --> 02:18:12.250
for-cause removal protections for our

02:18:12.250 --> 02:18:14.950
JAGs . Commanders also need to be able

02:18:14.950 --> 02:18:17.172
to speak up when they're being asked to

02:18:17.172 --> 02:18:19.339
break the law . General Donovan , your

02:18:19.339 --> 02:18:21.849
predecessor was reportedly ousted .

02:18:22.440 --> 02:18:24.719
Because he raised concerns about the

02:18:24.719 --> 02:18:28.110
legality of the Caribbean boat strikes .

02:18:28.519 --> 02:18:30.408
Will you commit to informing this

02:18:30.408 --> 02:18:33.110
committee if SATHCOM is directed to do

02:18:33.110 --> 02:18:36.080
something that you or your JAG thinks

02:18:36.080 --> 02:18:39.799
may be illegal ? Senator ,

02:18:39.919 --> 02:18:43.480
my first obligation if I face what I

02:18:43.480 --> 02:18:46.320
believe is an unlawful legal order is

02:18:46.320 --> 02:18:48.500
to obviously seek legal counsel , um ,

02:18:49.200 --> 02:18:50.756
discuss that with my higher

02:18:50.756 --> 02:18:52.978
headquarters , and then , um , and then

02:18:52.978 --> 02:18:55.144
move forward and not carry out a legal

02:18:55.144 --> 02:18:57.367
order . Yeah , I , I , maybe you didn't

02:18:57.367 --> 02:18:59.422
hear my question . My question was ,

02:18:59.422 --> 02:19:01.311
will you commit to informing this

02:19:01.311 --> 02:19:03.480
committee if SouthCO is directed to do

02:19:03.480 --> 02:19:06.320
something that you or your JAG thinks

02:19:06.320 --> 02:19:10.268
is illegal ? If I reported that to

02:19:10.268 --> 02:19:12.435
this committee , Senator , it would be

02:19:12.435 --> 02:19:14.546
through my chain of command , but you

02:19:14.546 --> 02:19:16.324
would make sure that we got the

02:19:16.324 --> 02:19:18.309
information . I would report to my

02:19:18.309 --> 02:19:20.365
chain of command , and you would not

02:19:20.365 --> 02:19:22.587
take any responsibility for making sure

02:19:22.587 --> 02:19:24.420
we got that information . You do

02:19:24.420 --> 02:19:25.865
realize we have oversight

02:19:25.865 --> 02:19:28.480
responsibilities here . Senator , I

02:19:28.480 --> 02:19:30.647
would work that information through my

02:19:30.647 --> 02:19:32.869
chain of command . All right , that's a

02:19:32.869 --> 02:19:34.924
very concerning answer here . Look ,

02:19:34.924 --> 02:19:36.869
what's happening right now is very

02:19:36.869 --> 02:19:38.869
dangerous . We need our nonpartisan

02:19:38.869 --> 02:19:40.813
military leaders to double down on

02:19:40.813 --> 02:19:42.924
their commitment to following the law

02:19:42.924 --> 02:19:45.091
and speaking up when they are asked to

02:19:45.091 --> 02:19:47.091
break it , and Congress needs to be

02:19:47.091 --> 02:19:49.309
able to step in and rein in this

02:19:49.309 --> 02:19:51.280
lawless commander in chief and his

02:19:51.280 --> 02:19:54.040
self-styled Secretary of War . Thank

02:19:54.040 --> 02:19:57.349
you . Uh , I think we have

02:19:57.849 --> 02:20:00.040
another series of questions by Senator

02:20:00.040 --> 02:20:02.262
Reid . Uh , Mr . Chairman , thank you .

02:20:02.262 --> 02:20:04.484
I have one question . General Donovan ,

02:20:04.484 --> 02:20:07.599
you noted twice that you reviewed every

02:20:07.599 --> 02:20:11.000
single executor exord related to the

02:20:11.000 --> 02:20:13.849
boat strikes . Uh , just to confirm ,

02:20:13.959 --> 02:20:16.480
it was important to you , to your

02:20:16.480 --> 02:20:18.719
understanding and oversight of these

02:20:18.719 --> 02:20:21.440
strikes , to review these exord

02:20:21.440 --> 02:20:23.329
documents . All of them , is that

02:20:23.329 --> 02:20:25.730
correct ? Yes , Senator , thank you ,

02:20:25.769 --> 02:20:28.049
sir . Uh , Ms . Chairman , I would just

02:20:28.049 --> 02:20:30.610
like to reiterate that there is a legal

02:20:30.610 --> 02:20:32.499
requirement for the department to

02:20:32.499 --> 02:20:35.360
provide those exports to the committee

02:20:35.790 --> 02:20:38.012
which you and I have requested multiple

02:20:38.012 --> 02:20:39.919
times to include letters to the

02:20:39.919 --> 02:20:42.230
Secretary of Defense . Uh , Section

02:20:42.230 --> 02:20:46.209
1744 of the FY20

02:20:46.209 --> 02:20:49.459
NDAA requires UD to provide the

02:20:49.459 --> 02:20:52.450
exos at the request of the , uh ,

02:20:52.700 --> 02:20:56.349
committee . Uh , but , uh , in

02:20:56.759 --> 02:21:00.030
FY 25 Section 1067 ,

02:21:00.490 --> 02:21:02.849
it requires you to DOD to provide a

02:21:02.849 --> 02:21:05.330
copy of any new or revised exOs within

02:21:05.330 --> 02:21:07.900
15 days , so there's no requirement for

02:21:07.900 --> 02:21:10.339
request . The Secretary has not

02:21:10.339 --> 02:21:13.200
fulfilled this legal requirement , and

02:21:13.419 --> 02:21:15.363
your testimony , General Donovan ,

02:21:15.580 --> 02:21:18.059
further confirms in my mind that we

02:21:18.059 --> 02:21:20.500
need these documents to understand and

02:21:20.500 --> 02:21:23.120
oversee , that's our role , oversee

02:21:23.620 --> 02:21:26.290
these operations . I just , for the

02:21:26.290 --> 02:21:28.512
record , want to make that very clear .

02:21:28.700 --> 02:21:31.679
Thank you , Mr . Chairman . Uh , thank

02:21:31.679 --> 02:21:34.120
you , Senator Reed . If there's nothing

02:21:34.120 --> 02:21:37.500
further , let's , uh , let's reconvene

02:21:37.500 --> 02:21:41.200
at , um . At 12 , uh , uh , at

02:21:41.200 --> 02:21:43.759
12:10 in the skip . Will that be all

02:21:43.759 --> 02:21:47.120
right , gentlemen ? Uh , and we are

02:21:47.120 --> 02:21:48.400
recessed until then .