WEBVTT

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All right , good afternoon . Uh , this ,

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uh , subcommittee will come to order .

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I ask unanimous consent that the chair

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be authorized to declare recess at any

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time without objection so ordered . Uh ,

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today we will hear from our witnesses

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on US Special Operations Forces and

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command on challenges and resource

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priorities for fiscal year 2027 . The

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up tempo for special operations

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continues to put demands on the force ,

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even with the major force drawdowns

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from Iraq and Afghanistan almost 5

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years ago . Recent consolidation . And

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downsizing of forces in Syria and Iraq

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bring only minor relief as our special

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operations forces continue

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counterterrorism efforts against

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violent extremist organizations ,

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military proxies , and non-state actors

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in both of those countries , as well as

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an increase of up tempo on the

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continent of Africa , ongoing

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operations in the Western Hemisphere ,

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and now requirements related to the

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ongoing operations supporting the fight

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in Iran . Special operators have

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adapted to meet the challenges of an

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evolving landscape of great power

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competition in every corner of the

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globe , while continuing to

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aggressively attack violent extremist

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organizations and transnational

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criminal networks , all in an effort to

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protect the homeland . Our adversaries

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are using . Cutting edge technology ,

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economic incentives , and illicit

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activities to attempt to gain footholds

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in every geographic combatant command's

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area of responsibility , and the

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battlefield has become increasingly

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contested and denied by the

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proliferation of peer adversary

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capabilities and malign influence , all

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while our crisis response force has

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been called upon repeatedly over the

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past few years to execute to execute

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exquisite challenging missions that

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only they can conduct . Special

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operations continue to be one of our

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most valuable tools in our toolbox ,

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used to showcase our dominance , to

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impose costs on our adversaries , to

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reestablish deterrence , and to provide

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the nation with a , with a position of

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advantage should deterrence fail . We

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ask a lot of our special operations

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forces , and the demands both on and

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for them will only continue to grow .

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It is critical we provide these elite

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operators and all that support them

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with the resources that they need . I

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was disappointed in the fiscal year 26

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budget submission for SOCOM from the

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Department of War . This committee

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worked diligently with SOCOM to provide

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critically needed resources to fill the

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gaps from over a decade of stagnant

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flat budgets through the reconciliation

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process , only to have them have the

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department submit a budget with a

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reduction to SOCOM . Making the budget

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awash and still flat . SOCOM's

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purchasing power has been reduced by

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14% since 2019 , despite increasing

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demand for support worldwide . I am ,

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however , optimistic about President

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Trump's direction to include a

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significant increase in the fiscal year

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207 defense budget and what this will

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mean for SOCOM in the future . I look

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forward to reviewing the budget and

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putting SOCOM on a path that increases

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to get them to a steady state of at

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least $20 billion annually in the

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budget . We look forward to , uh , to

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hearing how Congress can best support

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SOCOM , such that you can continue to

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provide the high return on investment

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the nation requires while

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simultaneously modernizing for the

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challenges of the future . Our

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witnesses today are the leaders in the

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special operations community . I want

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to welcome the Honorable Derek Anderson ,

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Assistant Secretary of Defense for

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Special Operations in Low intensity

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conflict , Office of Secretary of War ,

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and Admiral Frank Bradley , a commander

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of the United States Special Operations

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Command . In the interest of time , I

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am going to ask you to keep the

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witnesses to keep their opening remarks

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to 5 minutes or less , so we have

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sufficient time for questions and

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answers . I think you may have a

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combined opening statement . If so ,

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then make it 10 or 15 minutes . Uh ,

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with that , let me thank our witnesses

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again for for appearing here before us

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today and for your time . And I now

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recognize Ranking Member Crowe for any

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opening remarks you might have . Thank

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you , Chairman Jackson , uh , and to

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all the witnesses today and , and for

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the record , we're , we're not short .

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These chairs are just very big . I want

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to get that out there . In previous

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years , uh , we've opened this hearing

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by acknowledging how dynamic the global

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security environment is , and I would

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just want to say the state that is

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dynamic right now would be a massive

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understatement . The US is facing an

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increasingly turbulent global world

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order trained by accelerating strategic

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competition among major powers , more

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intense and unpredictable transnational

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challenges and multiple regional

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conflicts with far-reaching

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implications . The bar to access

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advanced technology like AI , drones ,

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and complex cyber tools has never been

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lower , allowing non-state actors and

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violent extremist organizations to

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punch above their weight , enabling

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them to destabilize countries and

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negatively influence our partners and

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our allies . And those are just the

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things we know to be true today . Who

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knows what challenges tomorrow will

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bring ? The challenges and threats of

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today and tomorrow demand the full

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attention of this administration and

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the Department of Defense . I urge them

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to especially consider how we support

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the unique capabilities of the special

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forces community who are called upon to

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assist combatant and functional

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commands in their campaigns at a

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rapidly increasing tempo . For more

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than 20 years , the special forces

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community has served as the primary

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tool in the fight against terrorism and

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countering violent extremist

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organizations . That was the mission

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required of us in Iraq , Afghanistan ,

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and elsewhere , a mission that I

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carried out as an Army Ranger . And

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while we still need to maintain that

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capability and not lose sight of those

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hard-won gains , we must also prepare

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to face future challenges . One , how

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is the special operations community

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postured to support this effort ? 2 ,

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do they have the right training ,

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manning , equipping , institutional

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support , funding , and professional

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military education system ? Another

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crucial question for this committee to

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address is SOCOM's budget , which has

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been relatively flat over the past

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decade . I share the chairman's

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concerns in this regard , given the ,

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the tremendous amount of strain and

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resourcing that's been placed on your

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command . It simply has not kept pace

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with inflation , resulting in a 14%

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reduction in buying power since 2019 ,

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though SOCOM's requirements have

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certainly not diminished , as we've

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pointed out . Despite the stagnation ,

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there has been a 35% increase in

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combatant command demand for special

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operations capabilities . So in a

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rapidly changing threat environment , a

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special operator is one of the

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country's greatest advantages and

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remains so today . It is our job to

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ensure we continue to hone and support

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this highly capable and agile force ,

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including resourcing critical gaps in

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SOCOM funding . So I look forward to

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hearing from our witnesses about how

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they are prepared to do this , what is

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needed for deterrence , and how we're

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going to meet this increasing challenge

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of skyrocketing demand while

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diminishing resourcing . Uh , for our

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capabilities . So Assistant Secretary

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Anderson and Admiral Bradley , I want

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to thank both of you and your teams ,

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uh , not just for this hearing , but

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the engagements that have led up to

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this , uh , the briefings that you've

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given to both , uh , the , the chairman

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and I , um , it is actually refreshing

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in this environment , the amount of ,

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uh , engagement and collaboration and

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information that you provided to your ,

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your command . You're setting the

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standard in my opinion , uh , with the

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Department of Defense , so we look

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forward to that continuing , uh , and

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with that , I yield back . Thank you .

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Uh , we will now hear from our

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witnesses . Uh , once this is done ,

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we're going to move into the question

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and answer session and immediately

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following one round of questions ,

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which won't take long since many of our

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members were not able to make it today ,

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uh , we will reconvene for the

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classified , uh , session , which will

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take place in Rayburn 2337 . Uh ,

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please be advised that we may have to

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break in the middle for votes on the

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floor . We will wait and see . Uh , and

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I understand you both have statements

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to give . So , uh , I will start with

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Secretary Anderson . We will begin with

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you . You'll recognize 4 or 5 minutes .

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Chairman Jackson , Ranking Member Crowe ,

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and other distinguished members of the

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committee , thank you for the

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opportunity to testify in the global

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posture of our nation's Special

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Operations forces . I'm honored to

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testify alongside Admiral Mitch Bradley ,

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commander of the United States Special

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Operations Command . I'd also like to

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take a moment to recognize the

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dedicated professionals from the SOLIC

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team who are here with us today , Mr .

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Randy Harvey , who leads the

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Secretariat's strategy Forces and

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integration portfolio . And Ms . Karat

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Teeter , who leads the Secretariat's

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capability , resources and analysis

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portfolio . The SOLT team together with

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their US SOCOM counterparts bring

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invaluable expertise , leadership , and

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insight as we advocate on behalf of the

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soft enterprise , our service members

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and their families . People are the

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foundation of SOF and of the Joint

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Force . They are our competitive

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advantage against our adversaries . We

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are thankful for those who have

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volunteered to serve , those currently

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in harm's way , and those who have made

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the ultimate sacrifice , including the

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13 service members we've lost during

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ongoing operations . We honor their

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lives and legacy . We'll never forget

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their sacrifice in defense of our

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country . Today's security environment

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is defined by simultaneity ,

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convergence , and speed . State

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adversaries , terrorist organizations ,

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and transnational criminal networks are

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increasingly aligned , technologically

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enabled , and active across domains and

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regions . To answer these challenges ,

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the national defense strategy marks a

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fundamental shift , directing the

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Department of War to implement a

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flexible , realistic approach to

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protect America's interests . Purpose

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built for this era , Soft provides

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capability and optionality comprising

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only 3% of the joint force and less

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than 2% of the department's budget ,

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roughly equivalent to the procurement

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cost of a single aircraft carrier .

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Soft delivers outsized strategic value .

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Soft provides senior leaders with

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scalable , tailorable , and asymmetric

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options across the full spectrum of

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competition and conflict . Leveraging

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persistent global presence ,

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generational relationships , and unique

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authorities , SOft shapes the operating

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environment , strengthens partners ,

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and impose costs on our adversaries .

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Every major operation has a soft

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component to it . Operations like

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Southern Spear , Rough Rider , Midnight

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Hammer , Absolute resolve , and Epic

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Fury have demonstrated our nation's

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prowess and commitment to confront our

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adversaries wherever they may be , from

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the Western Hemisphere across the

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Indo-Pacific to the Middle East ,

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Africa , Europe , and beyond . has been

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decisive in defending the homeland ,

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deterring China , and enabling our

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partners and allies . Should deterrence

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fail , SOF is postured with the joint

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force to prevail in high-end conflict .

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SOF also creates opportunities across

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all domains buy down risk and service

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pathfinders for the department . With

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our culture of rapid adaptation and

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agile problem solving , Soft

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accelerates the adoption of disruptive

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technologies , seeding investments in

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unmanned and autonomous systems , uh ,

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counter UXS , cyber and electronic

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warfare , and rapidly delivering tools

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to warfighters at the point of need .

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In accordance with the law and

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congressional guidance of which we are

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immensely grateful , the department has

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taken decisive and concrete steps to

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institutionalize SIC's oversight and

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advocacy role and strengthen the

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governance of the soft enterprise .

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Over the last year and a half , we have

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transformed the Secretariat for Special

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Operations to provide direct civilian

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oversight across organize , train , and

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equip responsibilities , not to

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duplicate or disrupt the operational

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execution of US SOCOM , but to support ,

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sustain , and strengthen it . This

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transformation moves us beyond the old

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advisory construct to a true exercise

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of authority , direction , and control

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through an analytical , disciplined ,

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data-driven , and strategically sound

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approach . While the maturation of

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these initiatives is ongoing , these

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foundational changes fulfill

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congressional intent and provide the

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oversight mechanisms needed to shape

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for structure , guide budgetary and

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planning processes , and forge the

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future of soft . The optionality that

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Soft delivers requires resourcing and

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investments to maintain our competitive

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edge . Soft needs sustained partnership ,

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predictable resourcing , and continued

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modernization . We greatly appreciate

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the support from this committee . I

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commit to continued collaboration with

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Congress and to make full use of my

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position in the department and

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alongside the services to ensure SOF

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remains resourced , ready , relevant ,

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and accountable and to ensure they can

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meet today's mission while transforming

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for tomorrow's challenges . I'm honored

12:26.432 --> 12:28.543
to lead the SOF Enterprise . I invite

12:28.543 --> 12:30.710
you to visit our special operators and

12:30.710 --> 12:32.877
their families across the globe to see

12:32.877 --> 12:34.932
firsthand the great work they do and

12:34.932 --> 12:37.099
the challenges they face . Our service

12:37.099 --> 12:39.154
members and their families represent

12:39.154 --> 12:41.210
the finest that America has to offer

12:41.210 --> 12:43.266
and there's something we as a nation

12:43.266 --> 12:45.432
should be proud of . Thank you for the

12:45.432 --> 12:46.821
opportunity to testify .

12:56.159 --> 12:58.215
Chairman Jackson , Re Member Crowe ,

12:58.215 --> 13:00.215
thank you very much . Distinguished

13:00.215 --> 13:02.437
members of the subcommittee , thank you

13:02.437 --> 13:04.381
for your , for this opportunity to

13:04.381 --> 13:06.326
represent the men and women of the

13:06.326 --> 13:06.159
United States Special Operations

13:06.159 --> 13:08.440
Command . I'm honored to testify here

13:08.440 --> 13:10.551
today with Assistant Secretary of War

13:10.551 --> 13:12.718
for a Special Operations Low Intensity

13:12.718 --> 13:14.829
conflict , Honorable Derek Anderson .

13:14.829 --> 13:16.969
Uh , in SOCOM , we rely upon the SLIC

13:16.969 --> 13:19.239
oversight , support , and advocacy to

13:19.239 --> 13:21.461
succeed in all of our global missions .

13:21.461 --> 13:23.780
I'm also joined today by uh the SOCOM

13:23.780 --> 13:26.150
Command Sergeant Major AJ Krugman , who

13:26.150 --> 13:28.261
exemplifies the professionalism , the

13:28.261 --> 13:30.317
leadership , and the backbone of our

13:30.317 --> 13:32.372
non-commissioned officer corps , the

13:32.372 --> 13:34.428
greatest in the world . On behalf of

13:34.428 --> 13:36.594
our entire community , I want to thank

13:36.594 --> 13:38.650
you for your enduring support and to

13:38.650 --> 13:40.594
any of our nation's finest who are

13:40.594 --> 13:42.817
listening to us today and considering a

13:42.817 --> 13:45.039
life of service in uniform , I want you

13:45.039 --> 13:46.817
to know that we are looking for

13:46.817 --> 13:48.928
critical thinkers who can fight . And

13:48.928 --> 13:50.817
creative makers who can solve the

13:50.817 --> 13:53.039
hardest problems . And if you're one of

13:53.039 --> 13:55.094
those people , then it's you that we

13:55.094 --> 13:57.206
are looking for distinguished members

13:57.206 --> 13:59.039
of this committee , we meet at a

13:59.039 --> 14:01.150
crucial moment as you've said today's

14:01.150 --> 14:03.094
security environment is defined by

14:03.094 --> 14:04.761
state adversaries , terrorist

14:04.761 --> 14:06.872
organizations , and criminal networks

14:06.872 --> 14:08.650
that are increasingly aligned ,

14:08.650 --> 14:10.594
technologically enabled and active

14:10.594 --> 14:12.539
across every domain . Our national

14:12.539 --> 14:14.317
defense strategy highlights the

14:14.317 --> 14:16.483
potential of simultaneity as a central

14:16.483 --> 14:18.428
problem , and your soft is the key

14:18.428 --> 14:20.760
component of its prescription . Today's

14:20.760 --> 14:22.760
environment rewards forces that can

14:22.760 --> 14:25.109
operate persistently and decisively ,

14:25.200 --> 14:27.144
often below the threshold of armed

14:27.144 --> 14:29.367
conflict , generating irregular effects

14:29.367 --> 14:31.640
by , through , and with our allies and

14:31.640 --> 14:34.640
partners in order to produce a whole

14:34.640 --> 14:36.760
effect that is much greater than the

14:36.760 --> 14:39.330
sum of its parts . Your special

14:39.330 --> 14:41.052
operations forces provide that

14:41.052 --> 14:43.599
capability comprising just 3% of the

14:43.599 --> 14:45.655
joint force and 2% of the budget has

14:45.655 --> 14:48.159
been stated . Your SOF enables and

14:48.159 --> 14:50.270
delivers an outsized strategic return

14:50.559 --> 14:53.000
by providing our nation's leaders with

14:53.000 --> 14:54.889
scalable , tailorable , and those

14:54.889 --> 14:57.320
asymmetric options that come across the

14:57.320 --> 14:59.487
spectrum of competition and conflict .

14:59.487 --> 15:02.049
Our purpose is our mission . This means

15:02.049 --> 15:04.271
we are laser focused on maintaining the

15:04.271 --> 15:06.160
readiness required to protect the

15:06.160 --> 15:08.382
homeland , to deter aggression from our

15:08.382 --> 15:10.271
facing challenge , China , and to

15:10.271 --> 15:12.438
enable true burden sharing by enabling

15:12.438 --> 15:14.605
and empowering the growing capacity of

15:14.605 --> 15:16.549
our allies and partners . But that

15:16.549 --> 15:18.271
mission is not accomplished by

15:18.271 --> 15:20.438
technology and equipment alone . It is

15:20.438 --> 15:22.660
executed by the most decisive advantage

15:22.660 --> 15:24.660
we have , our people empowered by a

15:24.660 --> 15:26.950
culture of meritocracy . Supported by

15:26.950 --> 15:29.117
critical programs that you have helped

15:29.117 --> 15:31.228
manifest like the preservation of the

15:31.228 --> 15:33.339
force and family , the health of your

15:33.339 --> 15:35.394
soft formation is strong , and it is

15:35.394 --> 15:37.617
getting stronger . To ensure that these

15:37.617 --> 15:39.728
exceptional men and women can succeed

15:39.728 --> 15:41.950
in the complex environments of tomorrow

15:41.950 --> 15:44.061
increasingly encroaching upon today ,

15:44.250 --> 15:46.130
we are making transformation our

15:46.130 --> 15:48.330
imperative . We must adapt faster than

15:48.330 --> 15:50.539
our adversaries . We must be able to

15:50.539 --> 15:52.261
project force through the most

15:52.261 --> 15:54.317
dangerous environments , and we must

15:54.317 --> 15:56.549
evolve to leverage the ubiquitous

15:56.549 --> 15:58.660
information environment that presents

15:58.660 --> 16:00.771
both a challenge and an opportunity .

16:00.771 --> 16:02.660
We must evolve our force divine ,

16:02.780 --> 16:04.659
design , accelerate capability

16:04.659 --> 16:06.492
development , and strengthen our

16:06.492 --> 16:08.437
partnerships with the services and

16:08.437 --> 16:10.270
allies to stay ahead of emerging

16:10.270 --> 16:12.326
threats . As a department's lead for

16:12.326 --> 16:14.437
experimentation and autonomy , we are

16:14.437 --> 16:16.381
not just adapting , we are driving

16:16.381 --> 16:18.215
change . We are working with the

16:18.215 --> 16:20.437
services to incorporate next generation

16:20.437 --> 16:22.770
capabilities , systems that are precise ,

16:22.770 --> 16:24.826
autonomous , affordable , consistent

16:24.826 --> 16:26.900
with the law of war . The goal is to

16:26.900 --> 16:29.122
deliver these tools with the element of

16:29.122 --> 16:31.011
surprise from unwarned access and

16:31.011 --> 16:33.349
placement at scale , ensuring our

16:33.349 --> 16:35.979
forces maintain a decisive advantage

16:35.979 --> 16:38.440
against any adversary . You see , SOF

16:38.440 --> 16:40.609
defends the homeland by dismantling

16:40.609 --> 16:42.400
threats far from our shores ,

16:42.650 --> 16:44.929
disaggregating terrorist networks . We

16:44.929 --> 16:47.040
deter aggression by strengthening the

16:47.040 --> 16:48.651
resilience of our alliance ,

16:48.651 --> 16:50.651
illuminating and exposing adversary

16:50.651 --> 16:52.651
malign behavior that preys upon our

16:52.651 --> 16:54.729
partners and allies . However , our

16:54.729 --> 16:56.618
ability to accomplish this is not

16:56.618 --> 16:58.890
guaranteed . It requires accelerated

16:58.890 --> 17:00.668
modernization in your continued

17:00.668 --> 17:02.723
partnership . Predictable resourcing

17:02.723 --> 17:04.779
for our program's modernization is a

17:04.779 --> 17:08.270
strategic necessity . Soft was purpose

17:08.270 --> 17:10.589
built for this era of competition , and

17:10.589 --> 17:13.109
we can provide an indispensable

17:13.109 --> 17:15.053
asymmetric advantage for the joint

17:15.053 --> 17:17.109
force and the nation . And with your

17:17.109 --> 17:18.949
continued support , we will meet

17:18.949 --> 17:21.229
today's missions while transforming to

17:21.229 --> 17:23.062
ensure that we are ready for the

17:23.062 --> 17:25.229
challenges of tomorrow . Thank you and

17:25.229 --> 17:27.173
I look forward to your questions .

17:27.173 --> 17:29.451
Thank you , Admiral . And uh with that ,

17:29.451 --> 17:31.507
we will start with the questioning ,

17:31.507 --> 17:33.673
and I will begin with uh my question ,

17:33.673 --> 17:35.840
uh , Admiral Bradley . I , uh , I know

17:35.840 --> 17:37.729
you've only been in command for a

17:37.729 --> 17:39.562
little over 5 months now , and I

17:39.562 --> 17:39.489
suspect you're most likely still

17:39.750 --> 17:41.583
assessing various aspects of the

17:41.583 --> 17:43.709
command , but what would you say the

17:43.709 --> 17:46.109
top 3 challenges are this fiscal year

17:46.109 --> 17:49.150
to sustain your 3 soft lines of effort ,

17:49.270 --> 17:52.010
which are win , people , and transform ,

17:52.300 --> 17:54.189
and what do we need to do here in

17:54.189 --> 17:56.356
Congress to help you succeed in that ?

17:56.356 --> 17:58.522
Chairman , thank you . Our , our , our

17:58.522 --> 18:00.578
first priority is always to maintain

18:00.578 --> 18:02.578
readiness for the , for the current

18:02.578 --> 18:04.467
threats that are out there . Uh ,

18:04.467 --> 18:06.522
Crisis response is that top priority

18:06.522 --> 18:08.633
for us , being able to respond , uh ,

18:08.633 --> 18:10.800
agilely to wherever it might present ,

18:10.800 --> 18:12.744
and of course the , the , uh , the

18:12.744 --> 18:15.078
demands on that , as has been mentioned .

18:15.078 --> 18:17.300
have been 300% increase over these last

18:17.300 --> 18:19.467
5 years . That pace continues . You'll

18:19.467 --> 18:21.689
remember a year ago when General Fenton

18:21.689 --> 18:23.356
was testifying and I was here

18:23.356 --> 18:25.522
supporting him as we were , uh , as we

18:25.522 --> 18:27.744
were telling the story , uh , that pace

18:27.744 --> 18:30.569
of , of growing usage but diminishing

18:30.569 --> 18:32.880
resources was causing us to have to eat

18:32.880 --> 18:34.880
into our modernization budget to be

18:34.880 --> 18:36.824
able to cash . Below those current

18:36.824 --> 18:38.991
operations , that's still the case and

18:38.991 --> 18:41.102
so today the modernization priorities

18:41.102 --> 18:43.324
that I would tell you uh are , are very

18:43.324 --> 18:45.269
similar to those from a year ago .

18:45.269 --> 18:47.436
Number 1 , to be able to project force

18:47.436 --> 18:48.991
into increasingly contested

18:48.991 --> 18:50.769
environments where uh where our

18:50.769 --> 18:52.936
adversaries are posing threats against

18:52.936 --> 18:54.713
us . Number 2 really is to take

18:54.713 --> 18:56.713
advantage of the fact that there is

18:56.713 --> 18:58.380
this ubiquitous information .

18:58.380 --> 19:00.213
Environment ubiquitous technical

19:00.213 --> 19:02.436
surveillance that it's out there . Many

19:02.436 --> 19:04.158
people see it as a threat . It

19:04.158 --> 19:05.936
certainly is , but it's also an

19:05.936 --> 19:07.880
advantage , an opportunity that we

19:07.880 --> 19:09.824
could leverage . The cyber and the

19:09.824 --> 19:11.880
virtual domain are critical maneuver

19:11.880 --> 19:11.641
spaces that we must take advantage of .

19:12.001 --> 19:13.962
Of course , another aspect of the

19:13.962 --> 19:16.073
rapidly evolving , changing character

19:16.073 --> 19:18.722
of warfare is the emergence of abundant

19:18.722 --> 19:21.589
lethal autonomy . And yes , that is a

19:21.589 --> 19:23.422
that is a threat that we have to

19:23.422 --> 19:25.533
contend with , but it's also one that

19:25.533 --> 19:27.422
we can leverage . And so that's ,

19:27.422 --> 19:29.422
that's also an area that uh that we

19:29.422 --> 19:29.339
will be looking to prioritize

19:29.339 --> 19:31.506
modernization . And finally , though ,

19:31.506 --> 19:33.810
this is the foundation and uh as as

19:33.810 --> 19:36.290
Secretary Anderson alluded to directly ,

19:36.579 --> 19:38.523
our people must continue to be our

19:38.523 --> 19:40.801
foundation , ensuring they are trained ,

19:40.801 --> 19:42.857
ready , supported , and educated for

19:42.857 --> 19:45.023
the future . Thank you , Admiral , and

19:45.023 --> 19:47.500
uh I , uh , I , I , I we'll work to get

19:47.500 --> 19:50.040
you additional resources because , uh ,

19:50.089 --> 19:52.145
you know , one thing I've learned on

19:52.145 --> 19:54.033
being in this committee the short

19:54.033 --> 19:53.959
period of time that I've been the chair

19:53.959 --> 19:56.126
and probably a little bit part of that

19:56.126 --> 19:58.348
is that uh there's , we , we absolutely

19:58.348 --> 20:00.570
in this particular community cannot eat

20:00.570 --> 20:02.792
into research and development testing ,

20:02.792 --> 20:04.737
evaluation , modernization efforts

20:04.737 --> 20:06.848
because that will quickly affect your

20:06.848 --> 20:09.070
ability to uh to , to fight in , in the

20:09.070 --> 20:11.403
months and years to come , so . Uh , we ,

20:11.403 --> 20:13.348
we will take that seriously . Uh ,

20:13.348 --> 20:12.979
Secretary Anderson , uh , you've been

20:12.979 --> 20:14.923
in the seat a few months less than

20:14.923 --> 20:17.035
Admiral Bradley , and I'm sure you're

20:17.035 --> 20:19.368
still assessing your priorities as well .

20:19.368 --> 20:21.590
Uh , SOCOM's budget , as we mentioned ,

20:21.590 --> 20:21.449
has been relatively flat for the past

20:21.449 --> 20:23.540
decade . In your , in your , in the

20:23.540 --> 20:25.540
combined written statement that was

20:25.540 --> 20:27.651
submitted , uh , you state that SOCOM

20:27.651 --> 20:29.707
comprises only 3% of the joint force

20:29.707 --> 20:31.762
and less than 2% of the department's

20:31.762 --> 20:33.596
budget , delivering a quote , an

20:33.596 --> 20:35.969
outsized strategic value . I personally

20:35.969 --> 20:37.747
believe SOCOM's budget needs to

20:37.747 --> 20:39.913
increase to a steady state of at least

20:39.913 --> 20:42.025
$20 billion a year . Um , how are you

20:42.025 --> 20:44.250
using your secretary-like position to

20:44.250 --> 20:46.528
advocate for a higher budget for SOCOM ?

20:46.969 --> 20:48.858
Uh , what do you think the future

20:48.858 --> 20:50.969
budget looks like for SOCOM ? And how

20:50.969 --> 20:53.489
do you quantify this outsized strategic

20:53.489 --> 20:57.180
value in your budget submission ? Mr .

20:57.199 --> 20:59.310
Chairman , uh , I first want to start

20:59.310 --> 21:01.366
off by thanking the committee , uh ,

21:01.366 --> 21:03.477
for those 907 authorities in the , in

21:03.477 --> 21:05.532
the NDA a few years ago that gave us

21:05.532 --> 21:07.755
that service-like ability . Uh , what I

21:07.755 --> 21:09.643
can tell you is , uh , within the

21:09.643 --> 21:11.643
department having that service-like

21:11.643 --> 21:13.755
ability , uh , allows us to work with

21:13.755 --> 21:15.921
the other military departments hand in

21:15.921 --> 21:18.088
hand , specifically when we talk about

21:18.088 --> 21:20.032
the resources not only that we are

21:20.032 --> 21:22.255
being provided , but the other services

21:22.255 --> 21:22.055
are being . Provided , it gives us an

21:22.055 --> 21:24.111
opportunity to go service to service

21:24.111 --> 21:26.064
from chief to chief and have those

21:26.064 --> 21:27.564
conversations about , uh ,

21:27.564 --> 21:29.786
modernizations and , and , and where we

21:29.786 --> 21:31.842
might be overlapping or where we can

21:31.842 --> 21:33.974
combine forces . So I think that 907

21:33.974 --> 21:35.974
capability and authorities that you

21:35.974 --> 21:38.196
gave us gets us , uh , in the room with

21:38.196 --> 21:40.474
the other services , uh , as far as in ,

21:40.474 --> 21:42.641
in , uh , echoing what Admiral Bradley

21:42.641 --> 21:44.863
spoke about in our modernization . Uh ,

21:44.863 --> 21:46.974
as we continue to modernize , uh , we

21:46.974 --> 21:49.500
see that technology , um , typically ,

21:49.540 --> 21:51.873
and I've heard various , uh , different ,

21:51.873 --> 21:53.873
um , uh , ranges , but , you know ,

21:54.459 --> 21:56.348
technology ends up being obsolete

21:56.348 --> 21:58.570
within 6 months . So our operators that

21:58.570 --> 22:00.737
are operating on the ground , not only

22:00.737 --> 22:02.737
utilizing the , the technology that

22:02.737 --> 22:04.903
they have internal to the department ,

22:04.903 --> 22:07.015
but also training by with and through

22:07.015 --> 22:09.070
our partners and the technology they

22:09.070 --> 22:11.292
have , uh , that is an absolutely other

22:11.292 --> 22:13.515
critical , uh , part of this . Ensuring

22:13.515 --> 22:15.570
that um you know we're staying up to

22:15.570 --> 22:17.237
speed with technology so that

22:17.237 --> 22:17.145
investment as Admiral Bradley said is

22:17.145 --> 22:19.265
absolutely crucial and then uh one of

22:19.265 --> 22:21.432
the other priorities I just uh like to

22:21.432 --> 22:23.432
highlight , Mr . Chairman is uh the

22:23.432 --> 22:25.654
POTIF program , the preservation of the

22:25.654 --> 22:27.654
force and family , uh , that , that

22:27.654 --> 22:29.709
investment that you made in the soft

22:29.709 --> 22:31.821
community absolutely , uh , increases

22:31.821 --> 22:33.821
our readiness and allows us to take

22:33.821 --> 22:35.876
care of our soldiers and sailors and

22:35.876 --> 22:38.098
airmen , uh , and I'm happy to get into

22:38.098 --> 22:40.098
more detail on that . Thank you . I

22:40.098 --> 22:41.987
appreciate that . I have one last

22:41.987 --> 22:44.043
question here . Uh , Admiral Bradley

22:44.043 --> 22:46.265
and Secretary Anderson , Section 863 of

22:46.265 --> 22:47.821
the FY 26 NDAA required the

22:47.821 --> 22:49.709
establishment of the SOCOM Urgent

22:49.709 --> 22:51.265
Innovative Technologies and

22:51.265 --> 22:53.321
Capabilities Initiative with funding

22:53.321 --> 22:55.432
that was allocated in the 2025 Budget

22:55.432 --> 22:57.569
Reconciliation Act . Uh , when do you

22:57.569 --> 22:59.291
expect to begin implementing ,

22:59.291 --> 23:01.402
implementing this requirement , and ,

23:01.402 --> 23:03.236
uh , how , how does it nest with

23:03.236 --> 23:05.236
SOCOM's transformation imperative ?

23:06.250 --> 23:08.472
Chairman , I'll , I'll start , uh , and

23:08.472 --> 23:10.583
just say that , uh , the appreciation

23:10.583 --> 23:12.750
for that investment and for the , uh ,

23:12.750 --> 23:14.770
the recognition of the agility with

23:14.770 --> 23:17.089
which SOCOM already operates . So in

23:17.089 --> 23:19.250
many ways those , uh , those , those

23:19.250 --> 23:21.770
capabilities inside the SOCOM unique

23:21.770 --> 23:23.881
acquisition process . Process give us

23:23.881 --> 23:26.103
unity of command to be able to both see

23:26.103 --> 23:27.826
a requirement to identify it ,

23:27.826 --> 23:29.881
articulate it , move resources to be

23:29.881 --> 23:32.103
able to execute against it , field it ,

23:32.239 --> 23:34.560
and get it out in a very rapid manner

23:34.560 --> 23:36.671
to be able to test , evaluate whether

23:36.671 --> 23:38.829
it's credible for the for the combat

23:38.829 --> 23:40.996
situations it might have to face . The

23:40.996 --> 23:42.718
authority given an 863 and the

23:42.718 --> 23:44.829
resources to be able to allow that to

23:44.829 --> 23:46.773
happen makes that makes us able to

23:46.773 --> 23:49.510
execute that more quickly . As we look

23:49.510 --> 23:51.910
to the other , the other initiatives

23:51.910 --> 23:53.966
that have come both from , from this

23:53.966 --> 23:56.132
chamber , from , from the Senate , and

23:56.132 --> 23:58.354
from the President , all in acquisition

23:58.354 --> 24:00.466
reform , SPEED Act , the forged Act ,

24:00.466 --> 24:02.688
all of those are really looking to take

24:02.688 --> 24:04.854
advantage of some of the pathways that

24:04.854 --> 24:06.966
SOCOM and SLC have been able to chart

24:06.966 --> 24:09.077
over the . Years and then extrapolate

24:09.077 --> 24:11.299
them out across the broader joint force

24:11.299 --> 24:13.354
and so the leadership that Secretary

24:13.354 --> 24:15.410
Anderson is talking about inside the

24:15.410 --> 24:17.577
Pentagon at the Secretariat level is a

24:17.577 --> 24:19.577
critical part to be able to harness

24:19.577 --> 24:21.743
some of that new authority that you've

24:21.743 --> 24:23.910
given us and be able to help the other

24:23.910 --> 24:25.966
services to be able to use it in the

24:25.966 --> 24:28.021
same way . Mr . Chairman , uh , uh ,

24:28.021 --> 24:30.243
echoing what Admiral Bradley said , the

24:30.243 --> 24:32.299
one thing I would , uh , uh , make a

24:32.299 --> 24:34.243
point of is when we talk about the

24:34.243 --> 24:36.132
military department to department

24:36.132 --> 24:36.040
relationships , uh , Admiral Bradley

24:36.040 --> 24:38.520
and I are , are 100% , um , working

24:38.520 --> 24:40.631
with the other departments not only ,

24:40.631 --> 24:43.040
uh , to give our lessons learned to the ,

24:43.050 --> 24:45.161
the Army , the Navy , the Air Force ,

24:45.161 --> 24:47.328
so that their acquisitions processes ,

24:47.328 --> 24:49.494
uh , get better , but also learn where

24:49.494 --> 24:51.494
we can . Better . There's certainly

24:51.494 --> 24:53.717
some lessons learned that we can , uh ,

24:53.717 --> 24:53.363
that we can get from the services , but ,

24:53.442 --> 24:55.609
uh , we will continue to work with you

24:55.609 --> 24:57.664
and this committee to ensure we keep

24:57.664 --> 24:59.831
you up to date on how we're exercising

24:59.831 --> 25:01.553
that authority . Thank you . I

25:01.553 --> 25:01.363
appreciate that . And as you , as you

25:01.363 --> 25:03.672
know , uh , the , uh , the , the , the

25:03.672 --> 25:05.912
focus of the NDA this last year was ,

25:05.932 --> 25:08.154
uh , you know , to reform , acquisition

25:08.154 --> 25:09.876
and procurement , that process

25:09.876 --> 25:11.932
altogether . This money was intended

25:11.932 --> 25:13.988
knowing that . SOCOM is already very

25:13.988 --> 25:16.154
good at that , better than most in the

25:16.154 --> 25:15.156
military . You already , you already

25:15.156 --> 25:17.323
have some area of expertise in there ,

25:17.323 --> 25:19.434
but to refine that process so that it

25:19.434 --> 25:21.489
could then be used as an example for

25:21.489 --> 25:23.600
other , you know , other areas in the

25:23.600 --> 25:25.600
military so that they could kind of

25:25.600 --> 25:27.600
mimic what was going on in a , in a

25:27.600 --> 25:29.767
lessons learned way . So I hope we get

25:29.767 --> 25:29.515
that done and I hope it turns out to be

25:29.515 --> 25:31.682
really successful and everybody learns

25:31.682 --> 25:33.571
a lot from it , but thank you . I

25:33.571 --> 25:33.526
appreciate it . With that , Mr . Crowe ,

25:33.605 --> 25:35.939
I recognize you . Thank you , Chairman .

25:36.050 --> 25:37.883
Um , I wanted to begin on , um ,

25:37.883 --> 25:39.883
something that I think that special

25:39.883 --> 25:42.290
operations forces are uniquely , uh ,

25:42.300 --> 25:44.411
equipped and trained to do , and that

25:44.411 --> 25:46.619
is working with civilian populations ,

25:46.739 --> 25:48.859
building trust , you know , you're

25:48.859 --> 25:51.026
known as force multipliers , and , and

25:51.026 --> 25:53.192
the genesis of that is you know better

25:53.192 --> 25:55.248
than . Than anybody is that you work

25:55.248 --> 25:57.303
with those local populations , you ,

25:57.303 --> 25:59.303
you build public sentiment , public

25:59.303 --> 26:01.699
trust , and you build foreign forces

26:01.900 --> 26:04.140
and , and a part of that is this

26:04.140 --> 26:06.029
understanding , you know , when I

26:06.029 --> 26:07.751
worked in the community , this

26:07.751 --> 26:09.862
understanding that uh you're going to

26:09.862 --> 26:12.084
do everything possible to protect local

26:12.084 --> 26:11.859
forces that built in the mission

26:11.859 --> 26:14.410
planning processes protecting civilians ,

26:14.619 --> 26:17.089
reducing civilian casualties , uh ,

26:17.099 --> 26:20.300
because nothing sets back . Years

26:20.300 --> 26:23.060
sometimes of trust building and , and

26:23.060 --> 26:25.116
relationship building than an errant

26:25.116 --> 26:28.500
strike , then uh um uh killing

26:28.500 --> 26:30.739
civilians , right ? Uh , it's not just

26:30.739 --> 26:33.140
inefficient and immoral and unlawful in

26:33.140 --> 26:35.362
certain circumstances , but it actually

26:35.362 --> 26:37.196
makes it harder for us to do our

26:37.196 --> 26:39.196
mission , which is why , you know ,

26:39.196 --> 26:41.251
this committee , uh , in Congress in

26:41.251 --> 26:44.459
the FY-19 NDAA required DOD to develop

26:44.459 --> 26:46.570
a comprehensive policy for preventing

26:46.570 --> 26:48.792
civilian harm , which it did . Uh , and

26:48.792 --> 26:51.670
then , uh , fiscal year 23 NDAA , I , I

26:51.670 --> 26:53.670
helped create a civilian protection

26:53.670 --> 26:55.837
center of excellence because I learned

26:55.837 --> 26:57.726
that , uh , that you can actually

26:57.726 --> 26:59.781
accomplish the tactical element of a

26:59.781 --> 27:02.270
mission , but then lose the endgame if

27:02.270 --> 27:04.326
the people that you're fighting with

27:04.326 --> 27:06.437
and working with actually don't trust

27:06.437 --> 27:08.437
you and support you . Those efforts

27:08.437 --> 27:10.492
have been slashed in the last year .

27:10.492 --> 27:13.060
80% of the CPCOE and the resources have

27:13.060 --> 27:15.300
been cut . Uh , the personnel that have

27:15.300 --> 27:17.619
been embedded in the combatant commands

27:17.619 --> 27:20.530
have been largely taken away . Uh , and ,

27:20.540 --> 27:22.707
uh , it , it seems like a , a terrible

27:22.707 --> 27:24.484
missed opportunity , but also a

27:24.484 --> 27:26.420
strategic error to not equip our

27:26.420 --> 27:28.642
operators and our forces with the tools

27:28.642 --> 27:31.099
they need to comprehensively address

27:31.099 --> 27:33.266
our adversaries and build the trust in

27:33.266 --> 27:37.079
our alliances . Um , in that vein , uh ,

27:37.130 --> 27:39.352
Secretary Anderson , on February 28th ,

27:39.352 --> 27:41.519
there was a girls elementary school in

27:41.519 --> 27:43.770
Iran that was struck . Uh , public

27:43.770 --> 27:46.170
reports say that 175 civilians , many

27:46.170 --> 27:48.114
of them children , were reportedly

27:48.250 --> 27:50.530
killed or wounded in that strike . Uh ,

27:50.569 --> 27:52.791
it's my understanding that there's been

27:52.791 --> 27:54.847
a preliminary investigation and that

27:54.847 --> 27:57.013
you might be aware of that . Is that ,

27:57.013 --> 27:59.347
uh , preliminary investigation complete ?

27:59.347 --> 28:01.458
And was there a 15-6 , uh , that came

28:01.458 --> 28:04.800
out of that ? Congressman , uh , first ,

28:04.839 --> 28:07.239
to answer your second question first ,

28:07.390 --> 28:09.920
currently , um , the , the incident is

28:09.920 --> 28:12.790
being investigated by CETCOM . Uh , I ,

28:12.800 --> 28:14.800
I wouldn't want to get ahead of the

28:14.800 --> 28:16.967
investigation , uh , and in the closed

28:16.967 --> 28:19.189
setting , I'm happy to give you some of

28:19.189 --> 28:19.000
the , the dates and details as how

28:19.000 --> 28:21.222
that's progressed , but it is currently

28:21.222 --> 28:23.444
being investigated . And what I can say

28:23.444 --> 28:25.278
is that , uh , the investigating

28:25.278 --> 28:27.444
officer is a general officer outside .

28:27.444 --> 28:29.611
Of the CENTCOM chain of command , so ,

28:29.611 --> 28:29.587
uh , there will be an unbiased ,

28:29.626 --> 28:31.906
impartial investigation that's

28:31.906 --> 28:34.073
conducted and , and Congressman , to ,

28:34.073 --> 28:36.295
to your point , uh , to be very clear ,

28:36.636 --> 28:38.858
uh , you're absolutely right . There is

28:38.858 --> 28:40.858
no strategic benefit , uh , for the

28:40.858 --> 28:43.025
United States or for the department in

28:43.025 --> 28:45.136
civilian harm , and that's what makes

28:45.136 --> 28:47.080
us different and separate from our

28:47.080 --> 28:49.192
adversaries . Uh , we continue . To ,

28:49.192 --> 28:51.414
to , uh , have a center of excellence ,

28:51.414 --> 28:53.580
a civilian harm center of excellence ,

28:53.580 --> 28:55.580
uh , and continue with those , uh ,

28:55.580 --> 28:57.636
reports , but I think you bring up a

28:57.636 --> 28:59.803
good point is , uh , what we're , what

28:59.803 --> 28:59.654
we've done within the command structure .

28:59.764 --> 29:01.734
If you look at from when a soft

29:01.734 --> 29:03.901
operators training at the ground level

29:03.901 --> 29:06.123
all the way through a general officer ,

29:06.123 --> 29:08.178
now they're taking civilian harm and

29:08.178 --> 29:09.845
ensuring that it is mitigated

29:09.845 --> 29:11.901
throughout the entire process . So I

29:11.901 --> 29:14.201
think , uh , that has shown a world of

29:14.201 --> 29:16.840
compliance , uh , to culture , and I

29:16.840 --> 29:18.840
think that's , that is where , uh ,

29:18.840 --> 29:20.951
we've been heading and , uh , again ,

29:20.951 --> 29:23.007
I'm happy to have more conversations

29:23.007 --> 29:25.229
and discuss some of those things in the

29:25.229 --> 29:24.720
closed setting . I , I appreciate that

29:24.720 --> 29:26.776
and I appreciate you saying that the

29:26.776 --> 29:29.053
the strategic importance of this , and ,

29:29.053 --> 29:31.276
and , and I don't doubt in any way that

29:31.276 --> 29:33.498
you're committed to that because I know

29:33.498 --> 29:33.201
you , you live this and you understand

29:33.201 --> 29:35.368
it and obviously as a part of what you

29:35.368 --> 29:37.479
do down Rage . Can you clarify , uh ,

29:37.479 --> 29:39.645
and this isn't a gotcha , I , I'm just

29:39.645 --> 29:41.812
honestly asking the question . Uh , so

29:41.812 --> 29:43.459
there , there has not been a

29:43.459 --> 29:45.570
preliminary investigation that's been

29:45.570 --> 29:47.681
completed . The initial investigation

29:47.681 --> 29:50.439
by Centcom is still underway . No ,

29:50.680 --> 29:52.680
Congressman , as you're well , well

29:52.680 --> 29:54.624
aware with the , the civilian harm

29:54.624 --> 29:56.624
mitigation , there'll be an initial

29:56.624 --> 29:58.736
investigation to determine whether or

29:58.736 --> 29:58.319
not a 15-6 should be opened , and

29:58.319 --> 30:00.375
that's been complete , correct ? And

30:00.375 --> 30:02.709
now there's a 15-6 , and there's a 15-6

30:02.709 --> 30:04.931
open and it's going to be a full , uh ,

30:04.931 --> 30:07.209
full investigation , Congressman . And ,

30:07.209 --> 30:09.209
and you have my commitment as we uh

30:09.209 --> 30:10.987
have in the past that once that

30:10.987 --> 30:13.209
investigation is complete and finalized

30:13.209 --> 30:15.153
that uh we'll make sure that we're

30:15.153 --> 30:17.431
available 6 is the one that's underway ,

30:17.431 --> 30:19.598
correct , correct . And , and , in the

30:19.598 --> 30:18.795
preliminary investigation did it

30:18.795 --> 30:20.739
determine that our US armed forces

30:20.739 --> 30:22.851
carried out the strikes ? On the , on

30:22.851 --> 30:25.017
the elementary school , I , I have not

30:25.017 --> 30:27.017
seen it , Congressman . Again , I'm

30:27.017 --> 30:29.128
happy to have a conversation enclosed

30:29.128 --> 30:31.295
right now I have the fact that a 156 ,

30:31.295 --> 30:33.573
a full on 15-6 , has been investigated .

30:33.573 --> 30:35.684
OK , but you haven't seen the results

30:35.684 --> 30:37.739
of the preliminary investigation . I

30:37.739 --> 30:37.650
have not . Have you , Admiral Bradley ?

30:38.390 --> 30:40.723
No , sir , I haven't . You haven't ? OK .

30:40.723 --> 30:43.030
All right . Um , I wanted to , um , go

30:43.030 --> 30:45.030
to the , one of your comments about

30:45.270 --> 30:48.250
lethal autonomous drones , right ? Um ,

30:48.770 --> 30:50.381
it's happening , right ? Our

30:50.381 --> 30:52.603
adversaries are doing it . Uh , there's

30:52.603 --> 30:54.770
been a , a lot of debate about , about

30:54.770 --> 30:57.550
the , the morality , the , the legality

30:57.550 --> 30:59.661
of taking a human outside of the kill

30:59.661 --> 31:02.069
chain , uh , and making that decision

31:02.069 --> 31:04.180
ourselves . You , you had mentioned ,

31:04.180 --> 31:06.500
um , Admiral Bradley , you said . Um ,

31:06.699 --> 31:08.421
lethal autonomous authority is

31:08.421 --> 31:11.280
happening . We need to leverage that

31:11.280 --> 31:13.502
ourselves . What did you mean by that ?

31:13.502 --> 31:15.447
Are you saying that there's been a

31:15.447 --> 31:17.669
decision within the administration that

31:17.669 --> 31:19.447
we will allow lethal autonomous

31:19.447 --> 31:21.339
authority with drones ?

31:23.489 --> 31:25.550
Congressman , I believe we employ

31:25.550 --> 31:28.280
lethal capability that has an amount of

31:28.280 --> 31:31.449
autonomy in it every day . Any of our

31:31.449 --> 31:34.569
IR guiding missiles has an amount of

31:34.569 --> 31:36.680
that baked into it . Can I drill down

31:36.680 --> 31:38.689
on that ? Is there , is there just

31:38.689 --> 31:40.869
sitting here today , is there a human

31:40.869 --> 31:42.980
in the kill chain ? There is always a

31:42.980 --> 31:45.091
human in the kill chain . OK . And is

31:45.091 --> 31:47.609
there , is there a debate about taking

31:47.609 --> 31:49.880
a human out of the kill chain ? I do

31:49.880 --> 31:52.160
not believe there is . What do you

31:52.160 --> 31:54.520
personally believe that the law of

31:54.520 --> 31:56.409
armed conflict and the law of war

31:56.409 --> 31:58.780
requires a human to be the decider

31:59.239 --> 32:02.050
about where and how lethal , uh , any

32:02.050 --> 32:04.161
lethal force should be delivered , no

32:04.161 --> 32:06.439
matter the vessel of that lethal force .

32:06.439 --> 32:08.661
It should be a human that's making that

32:08.661 --> 32:10.661
decision . I'm I'm very relieved to

32:10.661 --> 32:12.439
hear you say that . Thank you ,

32:12.439 --> 32:14.910
Chairman Ay back . Thank you , Mr .

32:15.030 --> 32:17.141
Scott . You recognize for 5 minutes .

32:17.141 --> 32:19.252
Thank you , Chairman . And uh , I too

32:19.252 --> 32:21.197
have the concerns about the budget

32:21.197 --> 32:23.141
constraints and what it's doing to

32:23.141 --> 32:25.252
modernization . Uh , I want to get to

32:25.252 --> 32:28.310
the , uh , proposed $3000 3000 dollars

32:28.699 --> 32:31.420
billet reduction and forces , and , uh ,

32:31.430 --> 32:33.597
Secretary Anderson , I understand it's

32:33.597 --> 32:35.708
predominantly intelligence analysts ,

32:35.708 --> 32:37.763
logistical staff , and psychological

32:37.763 --> 32:39.986
operations that you intend to make that

32:39.986 --> 32:42.208
the reductions will come from . Is that

32:42.208 --> 32:44.486
correct , Congressman ? That's correct .

32:44.589 --> 32:47.349
I want to ask , in , in the

32:47.349 --> 32:49.880
psychological operations , um , does

32:49.880 --> 32:52.800
that include what we would refer to as

32:52.800 --> 32:54.819
information warfare ? Uh , well ,

32:55.099 --> 32:57.239
Congressman , uh , I would say that

32:57.239 --> 32:59.130
there's information operations ,

32:59.260 --> 33:01.890
there's psychological operations , uh ,

33:02.180 --> 33:04.236
and I'm happy to again talk a little

33:04.236 --> 33:06.458
bit more in detail on the , uh , closed

33:06.458 --> 33:08.402
session , but we're doing a revamp

33:08.402 --> 33:10.458
within , uh , the Special Operations

33:10.458 --> 33:12.569
Command , specifically in UIOC , uh ,

33:12.569 --> 33:12.020
to , to ensure we have those

33:12.020 --> 33:14.020
capabilities readily available . I

33:14.020 --> 33:16.939
think it would be , uh , a good use of

33:16.939 --> 33:19.819
time for our military to study how

33:19.819 --> 33:22.041
effective the Russians have been on the

33:22.041 --> 33:24.390
continent of Africa . With information

33:24.390 --> 33:26.680
warfare and how effective they've been

33:26.680 --> 33:28.902
at getting the French kicked off of the

33:28.902 --> 33:32.400
continent and , and it has created

33:32.400 --> 33:34.511
significant challenges for us in that

33:34.511 --> 33:36.640
continent and I , I just , I want to

33:36.640 --> 33:40.119
make sure that that part of today's

33:40.119 --> 33:43.939
warfare is not ignored

33:44.520 --> 33:46.742
because we , we have to embrace it . We

33:46.742 --> 33:48.853
can see what they're doing . And know

33:48.853 --> 33:51.076
what they're doing and , and yet . We ,

33:51.076 --> 33:53.242
we have not been countering it at , at

33:53.242 --> 33:55.353
an effective rate and speed matters ,

33:55.353 --> 33:58.569
uh , with that . So , uh , sticking

33:58.569 --> 34:01.420
with Africa , uh , Russia , uh , Africa

34:01.420 --> 34:03.660
Corps , now , Wagner Group used to be

34:03.660 --> 34:06.839
Wagner Group in China , um . They're

34:06.839 --> 34:09.006
both expanding their security roles in

34:09.006 --> 34:12.689
Africa . What specific risk does this

34:12.689 --> 34:14.800
create for the US national security ,

34:14.800 --> 34:17.022
uh , for our need for critical minerals

34:17.022 --> 34:19.189
and our ability to operate in Africa ?

34:22.979 --> 34:25.146
Uh , Congressman , I , I can take that

34:25.146 --> 34:27.368
as a start point and , and sort of fall

34:27.368 --> 34:29.590
back on the previous , uh , question as

34:29.590 --> 34:31.757
well . I , I think one of the critical

34:31.757 --> 34:33.979
things in the information space that we

34:33.979 --> 34:35.868
have to do , and it , and it gets

34:35.868 --> 34:37.812
specifically to your point about ,

34:37.812 --> 34:37.620
about critical minerals and other

34:37.620 --> 34:39.979
threats on the African continent , is

34:39.979 --> 34:42.530
lever the high ground in information

34:42.530 --> 34:44.752
operations . That is the truth . And in

34:44.752 --> 34:46.974
almost every case , our adversaries are

34:46.974 --> 34:49.408
leveraging uh their positions for

34:49.408 --> 34:51.599
malign influence against the

34:51.599 --> 34:54.128
population's interests and merely uh

34:54.128 --> 34:56.128
what we , what we can do to be most

34:56.128 --> 34:57.906
effective is tell the truth and

34:57.906 --> 35:00.050
highlight that with you so in . In

35:00.050 --> 35:02.217
Africa , that is , that is clearly the

35:02.217 --> 35:04.383
case . And again , I don't want to get

35:04.383 --> 35:06.383
ahead of General Dag Anderson , the

35:06.383 --> 35:08.606
AFRICO commander who of course owns the

35:08.606 --> 35:10.494
strategy and understands this far

35:10.494 --> 35:12.661
better than any of us , but we provide

35:12.661 --> 35:14.828
support to him through these forces to

35:14.828 --> 35:16.939
help him to do just that . I think it

35:16.939 --> 35:19.106
would be a good use of tax dollars for

35:19.106 --> 35:21.272
us to get some , some actual footage .

35:21.272 --> 35:23.494
As you said , telling the truth of what

35:23.494 --> 35:26.129
China is doing with the harvesting of

35:26.129 --> 35:28.409
fish and exclusive economic zones off

35:28.409 --> 35:31.530
of the continent of Africa and show the

35:31.530 --> 35:35.149
citizens of that continent just how

35:35.489 --> 35:37.545
their natural resources , their food

35:37.545 --> 35:39.878
supply is being pillaged by the Chinese ,

35:39.878 --> 35:41.989
and I think that the Chinese would be

35:41.989 --> 35:44.290
much less welcome by the people of the

35:44.290 --> 35:47.050
continent if they knew just how much of

35:47.050 --> 35:50.530
the food supply was being stolen by

35:50.530 --> 35:54.419
China . So sticking to Africa ,

35:54.810 --> 35:57.000
uh , we lost the key access point in .

35:58.320 --> 36:01.479
Admiral , um , what , what has that

36:01.479 --> 36:03.590
done to the operational impact , your

36:03.590 --> 36:05.590
ability to conduct counterterrorism

36:05.590 --> 36:08.040
missions in Africa , uh , how has this

36:08.040 --> 36:11.520
impacted soft's ability with regard to

36:11.520 --> 36:15.199
speed ? In a crisis response ,

36:15.840 --> 36:17.959
Congressman , West Africa has been a

36:17.959 --> 36:20.070
particularly volatile region over the

36:20.070 --> 36:22.015
last several years and a number of

36:22.015 --> 36:24.292
countries that have changed leadership ,

36:24.292 --> 36:26.403
uh , in , in particularly in the case

36:26.403 --> 36:29.350
of , as several of the others . I would

36:29.350 --> 36:31.520
tell you that our soft generational

36:31.520 --> 36:34.360
long standing relationships with the

36:34.360 --> 36:36.860
professional military to military

36:36.959 --> 36:39.360
forces there have helped us to maintain

36:39.360 --> 36:41.610
some contact . in these troubling times

36:42.189 --> 36:45.270
and in fact we hope that as things

36:45.270 --> 36:47.437
evolve and those governments stabilize

36:47.437 --> 36:49.548
and new diplomatic connections can be

36:49.548 --> 36:51.659
made , they can be levered to be able

36:51.659 --> 36:53.659
to help us maintain indications and

36:53.659 --> 36:55.659
warning , awareness of threats that

36:55.659 --> 36:57.881
might be there , and ultimately to help

36:57.881 --> 36:59.881
them to police their own problems .

36:59.881 --> 37:01.937
Those relationships matter . I agree

37:01.937 --> 37:04.103
with you . They're still strong at the

37:04.103 --> 37:04.030
mill to mill level , and I hope we're

37:04.030 --> 37:06.197
able to leverage them to get back into

37:06.197 --> 37:08.308
Nigeria in 101 and 2001 . I also want

37:08.308 --> 37:10.530
to advocate for the ECO programs on the

37:10.530 --> 37:13.199
continent of Africa and , um , I know

37:13.199 --> 37:15.366
Secretary , uh , if I'm not mistaken ,

37:15.366 --> 37:17.729
you are a Green Beret . That's correct ,

37:17.810 --> 37:21.000
sir . And , um , but I , I , I very

37:21.000 --> 37:23.222
much believe in the ODA mission and the

37:23.222 --> 37:25.444
ECO programs and hope that we will find

37:25.444 --> 37:27.667
the funds to continue to expand them on

37:27.667 --> 37:29.722
that continent . With that , I yield

37:29.722 --> 37:29.449
back . Thank you , Mr . Scott . Mr .

37:29.570 --> 37:31.848
Tran , you're recognized for 5 minutes .

37:31.848 --> 37:33.848
Thank you so much , Chairman . Uh ,

37:33.848 --> 37:36.070
welcome , Admiral Bradley and Secretary

37:36.070 --> 37:38.014
Anderson . Thanks for being here .

37:38.014 --> 37:40.237
Admiral Bradley , the uh department has

37:40.237 --> 37:42.514
emphasized that adversaries like China ,

37:42.514 --> 37:42.270
Russia , and Iran are increasingly

37:42.270 --> 37:44.669
operating through proxies , criminal

37:44.669 --> 37:46.750
networks and influence , influence

37:46.750 --> 37:48.917
campaigns below the threshold of armed

37:48.917 --> 37:51.500
conflict . How central are special

37:51.500 --> 37:53.580
operations forces to countering uh

37:53.580 --> 37:55.691
those activities , and do you believe

37:55.691 --> 37:57.913
SOCOM currently has the authorities and

37:57.913 --> 37:59.580
resources required to compete

37:59.580 --> 38:01.913
effectively in that space ? Congressman ,

38:01.913 --> 38:03.969
thank you . Uh , in fact , I'd , I'd

38:03.969 --> 38:05.802
refer back to those generational

38:05.802 --> 38:07.969
partnerships and relationships that we

38:07.969 --> 38:10.024
build around the planet . Uh , today

38:10.024 --> 38:12.247
there are more than 6500 soft operators

38:12.247 --> 38:14.810
and enablers . Deployed around and in

38:14.810 --> 38:17.129
80 different countries in every one of

38:17.129 --> 38:19.129
those building and sustaining those

38:19.129 --> 38:21.240
relationships to your point about the

38:21.240 --> 38:22.907
influence operations that our

38:22.907 --> 38:24.962
adversaries are conducting , in most

38:24.962 --> 38:27.073
cases those are designed to prey upon

38:27.073 --> 38:29.240
our allies and our partners to be able

38:29.240 --> 38:31.407
to use that malign behavior to be able

38:31.407 --> 38:34.889
to gain uh gain unwarned access and uh

38:34.889 --> 38:37.310
and leverage . Um , our ability to be

38:37.310 --> 38:39.532
able to illuminate that malign behavior

38:39.532 --> 38:41.699
and then to pass it and make it , uh ,

38:41.699 --> 38:43.830
make our partners aware of it many

38:43.830 --> 38:46.300
times through diplomatic channels but

38:46.300 --> 38:48.189
sometimes directly mill to mill ,

38:48.189 --> 38:50.411
security service to security service is

38:50.411 --> 38:52.300
a critical way to be able to help

38:52.300 --> 38:54.244
undermine our adversaries' actions

38:54.244 --> 38:56.467
there . I appreciate that . And to your

38:56.467 --> 38:58.411
question about authorities , I , I

38:58.411 --> 39:00.300
would just reckon back to the 127

39:00.300 --> 39:02.467
programs a critical . Capability to us

39:02.467 --> 39:04.689
to be able to do that and we do believe

39:04.689 --> 39:06.856
those authorities are , are robust and

39:06.856 --> 39:09.078
appreciated . Thanks , Admiral . Let me

39:09.078 --> 39:11.133
ask you this , uh , SOCOM represents

39:11.133 --> 39:13.300
only about 3% of the joint force , yet

39:13.300 --> 39:15.133
combatant commanders continue to

39:15.133 --> 39:17.300
request support from special operation

39:17.300 --> 39:19.633
forces across nearly every theater . Uh ,

39:19.633 --> 39:21.744
does the demand for special operation

39:21.744 --> 39:23.744
forces currently exceed sustainable

39:23.744 --> 39:25.856
levels , and also what risk does that

39:25.856 --> 39:25.804
create for readiness and retention

39:25.804 --> 39:28.139
within the forces ? Congressman , thank

39:28.139 --> 39:30.540
you . Um , I , I would say it , uh ,

39:30.699 --> 39:33.219
well , to , to affirm they are asking

39:33.219 --> 39:35.419
for more than we have to offer every

39:35.419 --> 39:37.530
year since I've been paying attention

39:37.530 --> 39:39.697
to that . This last year was about 870

39:39.697 --> 39:41.530
different asks that we could not

39:41.530 --> 39:44.100
satisfy . Um , we are able to sustain

39:44.100 --> 39:46.211
because we only do the things that we

39:46.211 --> 39:48.550
were able to sustain . Um , that said ,

39:48.729 --> 39:50.840
uh , because of the work that both of

39:50.840 --> 39:53.007
these chambers have done , uh , really

39:53.007 --> 39:55.989
since 2006 QDR , we have the ability to

39:55.989 --> 39:57.711
sustain the level of force and

39:57.711 --> 40:00.010
commitment that we are at today . That

40:00.010 --> 40:02.729
that that that budget reduction or that

40:02.729 --> 40:04.729
budget , the buying power reduction

40:04.729 --> 40:06.896
over the last 5 to 6 years has limited

40:06.896 --> 40:09.118
our ability to be able to modernize and

40:09.118 --> 40:11.229
that's really the critical determiner

40:11.229 --> 40:13.370
for the future with the few resources

40:13.370 --> 40:15.481
we have that are in higher and higher

40:15.481 --> 40:17.481
demand to be able to make them more

40:17.481 --> 40:19.648
useful , we need to modernize them for

40:19.648 --> 40:22.110
the future . Thanks , Admiral . Uh , to

40:22.110 --> 40:24.332
either of the witnesses , and you , you

40:24.332 --> 40:26.750
both may answer , uh , looking 5 to 10

40:26.750 --> 40:28.806
years ahead , what do you believe is

40:28.806 --> 40:31.030
the greatest strategic risk facing the

40:31.030 --> 40:33.389
Special Operation Enterprise , and what

40:33.389 --> 40:35.469
is the one area where congressional

40:35.469 --> 40:37.636
support would have the greatest impact

40:37.636 --> 40:41.100
on SOCOM's ability to succeed ? I'll

40:41.100 --> 40:43.322
take a , I'll take a first stab at it .

40:43.322 --> 40:45.544
Um , if you'd asked me that question 10

40:45.544 --> 40:47.600
years ago , I would have defined the

40:47.600 --> 40:49.711
most dangerous crisis of the future ,

40:49.711 --> 40:52.100
uh , probably being in Iran or an

40:52.100 --> 40:54.780
Iranian surrogate or proxy force

40:54.780 --> 40:56.939
threatening freedom of navigation in

40:56.939 --> 40:58.939
and around the Middle East . And so

40:58.939 --> 41:01.106
that most dangerous crisis of 10 years

41:01.106 --> 41:03.217
ago is the most likely crisis that we

41:03.217 --> 41:05.449
face today . I would anticipate that

41:05.449 --> 41:07.671
along those same lines , the ability to

41:07.671 --> 41:09.530
project force into increasingly

41:09.530 --> 41:12.129
contested environments where US

41:12.129 --> 41:14.185
national interests are threatened is

41:14.185 --> 41:16.296
the characterization of the next most

41:16.296 --> 41:18.407
dangerous crisis , and that is why we

41:18.407 --> 41:21.370
have made our ability to do that our

41:21.370 --> 41:23.870
top modernization priority . Um , if

41:23.870 --> 41:25.870
you look at the operation conducted

41:25.870 --> 41:28.092
under absolute resolve into Venezuela ,

41:28.092 --> 41:29.648
uh , I would argue the most

41:29.648 --> 41:32.139
sophisticated integrated interagency

41:32.139 --> 41:34.629
joint force raid ever conducted . You

41:34.629 --> 41:36.909
get a peek at the modernization pathway

41:36.909 --> 41:39.076
that the joint force is on , and it is

41:39.076 --> 41:41.242
that ability . Thanks , Admiral . Mr .

41:41.242 --> 41:43.298
Sarker , can I get your take ? Yes ,

41:43.298 --> 41:45.409
Congressman , what I would say , uh ,

41:45.409 --> 41:47.576
Admiral Batley alluded to this earlier

41:47.576 --> 41:49.520
when we talk about the different .

41:49.520 --> 41:51.520
Threats that are across the world ,

41:51.520 --> 41:51.462
those relationships that we've

41:51.462 --> 41:53.583
maintained not just for years but for

41:53.583 --> 41:56.502
decades or how we , uh , build that

41:56.502 --> 41:58.613
value proposition that soft brings to

41:58.613 --> 42:00.280
the table , uh , specifically

42:00.280 --> 42:02.224
highlighting , and , and you asked

42:02.224 --> 42:04.391
Congressman what , what are one of the

42:04.391 --> 42:06.502
things Congress continued support for

42:06.502 --> 42:08.391
those 127 programs are absolutely

42:08.391 --> 42:10.558
essential to ensuring that we maintain

42:10.558 --> 42:12.724
that value proposition , uh , what one

42:12.724 --> 42:15.105
ODA or one . What one SEAL team is able

42:15.105 --> 42:17.416
to accomplish is absolutely

42:17.416 --> 42:19.638
astronomical for the joint force . So ,

42:19.638 --> 42:21.865
and then lastly again , uh , Admiral

42:21.865 --> 42:23.809
Bradley hit it on the head was our

42:23.809 --> 42:25.976
modernization efforts ensuring that we

42:25.976 --> 42:29.135
utilize autonomy and AI to

42:29.135 --> 42:32.795
efficiently conduct , um , uh ,

42:32.815 --> 42:34.815
staffing , all of those things that

42:34.815 --> 42:37.093
allow us to focus on operational needs .

42:37.093 --> 42:39.148
Thanks , Secretary . You bet . Thank

42:39.148 --> 42:40.982
you , Mr . Tran . Mr . Luo , you

42:40.982 --> 42:43.148
recognized for 5 minutes . Thank you ,

42:43.148 --> 42:45.204
Mr . Chairman . Mr . Secretary , I'm

42:45.204 --> 42:44.260
gonna rarely , thank you for coming

42:44.260 --> 42:46.427
today . Thank everyone in the room for

42:46.427 --> 42:48.482
your service and continued service .

42:49.020 --> 42:51.179
Admiral Bradley , MILCO funding for

42:51.179 --> 42:53.659
construction projects is about

42:53.659 --> 42:56.879
509 million , one of which

42:57.659 --> 42:59.937
Soft Human Performance Training Center .

43:00.550 --> 43:03.780
What is that ? Uh , congressman , that

43:03.780 --> 43:05.780
is one of our integrated facilities

43:05.780 --> 43:07.947
where we're able to bring together the

43:07.947 --> 43:10.002
preservation of the force and family

43:10.002 --> 43:12.058
program to be able to provide , uh ,

43:12.058 --> 43:14.113
synchronized and integrated care for

43:14.113 --> 43:16.224
our operators who are , uh , either ,

43:16.224 --> 43:18.224
uh , returning from service from an

43:18.224 --> 43:20.620
injury or who are enhancing their

43:20.620 --> 43:22.842
performance to be able to go out on the

43:22.842 --> 43:24.898
next mission . To be able to provide

43:24.898 --> 43:26.787
that continuity of care , is it a

43:26.787 --> 43:28.800
NICO-like institute ? No , no ,

43:29.040 --> 43:31.151
Congressman , it's there are a number

43:31.151 --> 43:33.373
of those in each one of our major force

43:33.373 --> 43:35.540
concentration centers that give us the

43:35.540 --> 43:37.540
ability to really permeate the care

43:37.540 --> 43:39.762
from the PTI program down to the lowest

43:39.762 --> 43:42.040
level possible . There's more than one .

43:42.040 --> 43:44.207
I only see one in . Delaware . I don't

43:44.207 --> 43:46.318
know how they ended up winning it . I

43:46.318 --> 43:46.020
think Texas would be in a better spot

43:46.020 --> 43:48.187
to hang it , but we'll talk about that

43:48.187 --> 43:50.242
later . Yes , Congressman , I , uh ,

43:50.242 --> 43:52.353
actually , I'm , I'm not aware of the

43:52.353 --> 43:54.631
one in Delaware , but , uh , but those ,

43:54.631 --> 43:56.631
those , uh , centers , we , uh , we

43:56.631 --> 43:58.687
increment through the , uh , through

43:58.687 --> 44:00.798
the budget to be able to give each of

44:00.798 --> 44:02.964
our force concentrations of components

44:02.964 --> 44:05.610
that capability . What is the , and I'm

44:05.610 --> 44:07.777
not , I hate to put you on the spot on

44:07.777 --> 44:09.999
this one , Admiral , but what does that

44:09.999 --> 44:12.054
look like ? And I've spent my entire

44:12.054 --> 44:14.277
post-military career trying to find the

44:14.277 --> 44:17.959
best . I don't say pipeline , but

44:17.959 --> 44:20.080
training mechanism for the brain and

44:20.080 --> 44:22.959
the body combined . Our special

44:22.959 --> 44:26.360
operations forces , we demand . The

44:26.360 --> 44:28.969
boat teams , you have to go faster . It

44:28.969 --> 44:31.199
has to be there quicker . It's a rugged

44:31.199 --> 44:33.199
ride . I don't know a boat operator

44:33.360 --> 44:35.693
that retires that can stand up straight .

44:36.080 --> 44:38.191
Most of them don't have their kidneys

44:38.191 --> 44:40.247
anymore and everything is wrong with

44:40.247 --> 44:42.358
them , but we push them harder and we

44:42.358 --> 44:44.524
push them faster . STVs , how deep can

44:44.524 --> 44:46.580
you dive ? How long can you go ? How

44:46.580 --> 44:48.747
cold can you sustain ? How cold can it

44:48.747 --> 44:50.858
be and you can sustain yourself to be

44:50.858 --> 44:53.024
mission capable . We keep going and we

44:53.024 --> 44:54.969
keep going and we keep going . Our

44:54.969 --> 44:57.024
operators are carrying heavier rucks

44:57.024 --> 44:58.691
outs because we keep throwing

44:58.691 --> 44:58.580
technology on top of them just weighs

44:58.850 --> 45:01.072
more than anything . Push harder , push

45:01.072 --> 45:04.639
faster . And we don't ever , I'm not

45:04.639 --> 45:06.750
wire brushing you , sir . This is the

45:06.750 --> 45:08.861
time that I get to vent . Thank you .

45:08.861 --> 45:11.310
But we do not , we do not take the time ,

45:11.320 --> 45:14.739
in my personal opinion . To take care

45:14.739 --> 45:17.179
of you . From start to finish ,

45:17.300 --> 45:19.356
baseline assessment to the time that

45:19.356 --> 45:21.244
you quit , retire . Excuse me , I

45:21.244 --> 45:24.239
should never say quit . OK . And when

45:24.239 --> 45:26.295
we have these performance facilities

45:26.295 --> 45:28.406
that were popping up , I want to know

45:28.406 --> 45:31.129
what's in it , because I don't need A

45:31.129 --> 45:33.407
six-pack and a bag of Cheetos . I mean ,

45:33.489 --> 45:35.378
we , we , this is the , the , the

45:35.378 --> 45:37.545
special operators in the United States

45:37.545 --> 45:39.656
of America is the , is the most , the

45:39.656 --> 45:42.159
most amazing asset . And I think we are

45:43.610 --> 45:46.830
We've not done our best . To take care

45:46.830 --> 45:49.850
of them because . And everyone in this

45:49.850 --> 45:52.072
room that's wearing a uniform right now

45:52.072 --> 45:54.183
needs to listen to what I'm saying to

45:54.183 --> 45:56.406
you . Because when you do leave and you

45:56.406 --> 45:58.517
fall into that deep dark black hole .

45:58.517 --> 46:00.628
Because you're not here anymore . And

46:00.628 --> 46:03.649
you're alone I think there's something

46:03.649 --> 46:05.705
we can do to catch the trajectory of

46:05.705 --> 46:07.705
change that because it's lonely out

46:07.705 --> 46:09.871
there and what I'm trying to deal with

46:09.871 --> 46:11.871
that in the VA , but if we can help

46:11.871 --> 46:14.093
inside the DOD , inside the community ,

46:14.093 --> 46:17.379
inside of our house . Uh , that is a

46:17.379 --> 46:21.330
win . Congressman , I absolutely

46:21.330 --> 46:23.497
agree with you , and I , and I suspect

46:23.497 --> 46:25.663
you probably dropped a half an inch of

46:25.663 --> 46:27.997
height , uh , in your time in the teams .

46:27.997 --> 46:30.163
That's why I'm shorter than my brother

46:30.163 --> 46:29.530
because I kept my head under the boat

46:29.530 --> 46:31.752
just like , uh , just like most of us ,

46:31.959 --> 46:34.126
um , and it , and it is exactly that ,

46:34.169 --> 46:36.570
that aim of community that these

46:36.570 --> 46:38.792
centers and the PTI program is allowing

46:38.792 --> 46:41.126
us to develop . So I'll just give you a ,

46:41.126 --> 46:43.237
uh , I'll take you on a small tour of

46:43.237 --> 46:45.237
what one of them looks like where a

46:45.237 --> 46:47.510
team . Of either SEALs or ODA or

46:47.510 --> 46:51.310
Raiders or our our Air Force

46:51.310 --> 46:53.477
special tactics folks would come in in

46:53.477 --> 46:55.588
the morning to begin to work their PT

46:55.588 --> 46:57.709
regimen for that day in that same

46:57.709 --> 47:00.030
facility would be those who are injured

47:00.030 --> 47:02.252
but can't work out with their teammates

47:02.252 --> 47:04.474
anymore that are going through rehab or

47:04.474 --> 47:06.530
going through care to be able to get

47:06.530 --> 47:08.641
back up on speed , but they're in the

47:08.641 --> 47:10.641
same facility , so there is still .

47:10.641 --> 47:12.641
Strong sense of community . If they

47:12.641 --> 47:14.808
can't go through rehab or maybe at the

47:14.808 --> 47:17.030
backside of their physical rehab , they

47:17.030 --> 47:19.197
check into the performance enhancement

47:19.197 --> 47:21.419
section where cognitive and performance

47:21.419 --> 47:23.586
psychologists help them to train their

47:23.586 --> 47:25.697
cognitive abilities to be smarter and

47:25.697 --> 47:28.590
to have better reaction time all still

47:28.590 --> 47:30.757
inside that same facility , so they're

47:30.757 --> 47:32.812
still the jabbing and going back and

47:32.812 --> 47:34.868
forth with their teammates . They're

47:34.868 --> 47:36.868
still part of the team . If some of

47:36.868 --> 47:38.979
those individuals in that performance

47:38.979 --> 47:38.939
enhancement , cognitive enhancement

47:38.939 --> 47:41.050
with the performance psychs find that

47:41.050 --> 47:42.828
they have care that needs to be

47:42.828 --> 47:44.717
attended to by a clinical psych ,

47:44.717 --> 47:46.717
there's no shame there . There's no

47:46.717 --> 47:49.020
stigma . They are now in a warm handoff

47:49.020 --> 47:51.219
through a door to a clinical psych to

47:51.219 --> 47:53.497
be able to get the care that they need .

47:53.497 --> 47:55.552
We've seen that in many cases this ,

47:55.552 --> 47:57.552
this holistic care , and it is very

47:57.552 --> 47:59.663
much modeled after the lessons from .

47:59.663 --> 48:01.886
Various NICO facilities and many others

48:01.886 --> 48:04.108
that are templated around the world has

48:04.108 --> 48:06.108
been able to reduce the stigma to a

48:06.108 --> 48:08.275
point where some 50% of our formations

48:08.275 --> 48:10.312
in some cases are making use of our

48:10.312 --> 48:12.672
behavioral health specialists now . I

48:12.672 --> 48:14.894
think that is one of the most important

48:14.894 --> 48:16.950
and the most telling statistics that

48:16.950 --> 48:19.172
we've got of the success of the program

48:19.172 --> 48:21.450
that PTIF has been able to fund for us ,

48:21.450 --> 48:23.561
but it's not just that . Reduction in

48:23.561 --> 48:25.672
the return time for our operators who

48:25.672 --> 48:28.003
are injured back to full duty , 75%

48:28.003 --> 48:30.724
reduction in that time , 70% reduction

48:30.724 --> 48:32.946
in the amount of time that it takes for

48:32.946 --> 48:35.113
somebody to get access to first care .

48:35.113 --> 48:37.224
In most cases it's less than 2 days .

48:37.224 --> 48:39.446
In many cases it is same day . And then

48:39.446 --> 48:41.668
the thing that really makes all of this

48:41.668 --> 48:43.835
hum , I think , best is the permeating

48:43.835 --> 48:46.002
nature of what we've been able to do .

48:46.002 --> 48:48.224
We've been Able to put , um , been able

48:48.224 --> 48:50.168
to put our psychs , our behavioral

48:50.168 --> 48:52.486
health specialists , our chaplains ,

48:52.696 --> 48:55.976
and our corpsmen down at the 05 level

48:55.976 --> 48:58.335
in almost every formation to be able to

48:58.335 --> 49:01.295
give a name to face recognition of the

49:01.295 --> 49:03.416
caregivers to the operators so that

49:03.416 --> 49:05.527
there's immediate access and you know

49:05.527 --> 49:07.638
the case history of the operators and

49:07.638 --> 49:09.694
the enablers that are being helped .

49:10.800 --> 49:12.911
What Thank you , Mr . Luttrell . Mr .

49:12.911 --> 49:15.078
Amade , you recognized for 5 minutes .

49:15.078 --> 49:17.050
Thank you , Mr . Chairman . And

49:17.050 --> 49:18.994
gentlemen , Secretary Anderson and

49:18.994 --> 49:21.217
Admiral Bradley , I think you guys make

49:21.217 --> 49:22.939
an incredible team . So I just

49:22.939 --> 49:25.161
encourage you to continue building that

49:25.161 --> 49:27.383
relationship . Uh , Admiral Bradley , I

49:27.383 --> 49:27.360
know you've talked about irregular

49:27.360 --> 49:30.600
triad before , uh , cyber special

49:30.600 --> 49:32.600
operations in space . Could you for

49:32.600 --> 49:34.656
this committee and uh for the public

49:34.656 --> 49:36.669
just describe what that is ? Um ,

49:37.020 --> 49:39.076
Congressman , thank you . Um , I , I

49:39.076 --> 49:41.020
talk about it generally when we're

49:41.020 --> 49:43.187
talking about the ubiquitous technical

49:43.187 --> 49:45.353
surveillance or ubiquitous information

49:45.353 --> 49:47.353
environment . It might be useful to

49:47.353 --> 49:49.409
just start there and say what in the

49:49.409 --> 49:51.631
world is that ? Well , um , we probably

49:51.631 --> 49:51.310
all know that more and more of the

49:51.310 --> 49:53.477
world spends more and more of its time

49:53.590 --> 49:55.701
in the virtual domain . You only have

49:55.701 --> 49:57.812
to look at your screen time indicator

49:57.812 --> 49:59.701
on your cell phones to be able to

49:59.701 --> 50:01.923
recognize that that that is in fact the

50:01.923 --> 50:03.979
case . And it is true that that time

50:03.979 --> 50:05.923
that you spend making more of your

50:05.923 --> 50:08.146
information available to the world is a

50:08.146 --> 50:10.312
vulnerability to you . It's a , it's a

50:10.312 --> 50:12.312
boon for our adversaries , but it's

50:12.312 --> 50:14.534
also an advantage for us looking at our

50:14.534 --> 50:16.701
adversaries who , who adhere and , and

50:16.701 --> 50:18.979
fall into that same trap . And so that ,

50:18.979 --> 50:20.646
that reality that that is the

50:20.646 --> 50:22.868
ubiquitous information environment . In

50:22.868 --> 50:24.979
order to take advantage of that , and

50:24.979 --> 50:26.812
we do through publicly available

50:26.812 --> 50:29.020
information , commercially acquirable

50:29.020 --> 50:31.076
information , and when appropriate ,

50:31.076 --> 50:33.131
authorized and within legal bounds ,

50:33.131 --> 50:35.298
clandestinely accessible information ,

50:35.379 --> 50:38.100
we can know incredibly more about both

50:38.100 --> 50:40.500
our adversaries and the societies with

50:40.500 --> 50:42.556
which within which those adversaries

50:42.556 --> 50:44.722
are operating that will allow us to be

50:44.722 --> 50:47.699
far more precise and far more lethal in

50:47.699 --> 50:49.921
our operations when they're required or

50:49.921 --> 50:52.199
far more effective in those operations .

50:52.199 --> 50:54.255
But in order to do that , we need to

50:54.255 --> 50:56.421
merge those three disciplines that you

50:56.421 --> 50:58.588
just described in that new triad . The

50:58.588 --> 51:00.532
cyber capability , of course , the

51:00.532 --> 51:02.588
maneuver in the virtual domain to be

51:02.588 --> 51:04.699
able to access and gain access to all

51:04.699 --> 51:06.921
that information . In almost every case

51:06.921 --> 51:09.120
that information transits through a

51:09.120 --> 51:11.639
space segment between one part of the

51:11.639 --> 51:13.639
globe and the other . Being able to

51:13.639 --> 51:15.750
intersect that or to be able to lever

51:15.750 --> 51:17.972
that to control it , to have freedom of

51:17.972 --> 51:20.083
maneuver there is critical . And then

51:20.083 --> 51:22.306
finally I mentioned your soft placement

51:22.306 --> 51:24.472
and access around the globe in over 80

51:24.472 --> 51:26.479
countries , some 6500 operators who

51:26.479 --> 51:28.757
have relationships that force multiple .

51:28.757 --> 51:30.868
Supply out to thousands , even more ,

51:30.868 --> 51:32.979
give us the ability to both lever our

51:32.979 --> 51:35.146
physical placement and access with the

51:35.146 --> 51:37.257
virtual placement and access that our

51:37.257 --> 51:39.479
Cybercom and NSA teammates have through

51:39.479 --> 51:41.590
the space segment to be able to lever

51:41.590 --> 51:43.479
all of that to our , our national

51:43.479 --> 51:45.590
interests . That , that's really what

51:45.590 --> 51:47.812
we're talking about when we , uh , when

51:47.812 --> 51:50.035
we discuss the space soft cyber triad ,

51:50.035 --> 51:52.146
right ? And given the army is cutting

51:52.146 --> 51:54.280
3000 special operation positions ,

51:54.610 --> 51:56.479
would this impede in trying to

51:56.479 --> 51:58.312
implement this irregular triad ?

51:59.290 --> 52:01.457
Congressman , any , any reduction , of

52:01.457 --> 52:03.568
course , is , is has to be adjusted ,

52:03.568 --> 52:05.623
and most of those billets that are ,

52:05.623 --> 52:07.734
that are being adjusted and moved out

52:07.734 --> 52:09.179
are in the intelligence ,

52:09.179 --> 52:11.199
communications and logistics , uh ,

52:11.209 --> 52:14.129
disciplines , and I , I , we completely

52:14.129 --> 52:16.185
understand why and how they're doing

52:16.185 --> 52:18.296
that because , frankly the . Services

52:18.296 --> 52:20.407
recognize that they need to build the

52:20.407 --> 52:22.518
same kind of capability that Soft has

52:22.518 --> 52:24.685
leverage to be able to manifest this ,

52:24.685 --> 52:26.907
but , but it does come at a cost . Uh ,

52:26.907 --> 52:28.962
we're adjusting and working with the

52:28.962 --> 52:31.129
services on how we might lever their ,

52:31.129 --> 52:33.185
uh , augmentation from other fielded

52:33.185 --> 52:35.518
formations to make up for it , but , uh ,

52:35.518 --> 52:37.740
but it is an adjustment , OK , and Mr .

52:37.740 --> 52:39.685
Secretary . You know , with social

52:39.685 --> 52:42.399
media and AI rising right now , and we

52:42.399 --> 52:44.455
know that this is a 24/7 information

52:44.455 --> 52:46.621
warfare . We can just look at the most

52:46.621 --> 52:48.677
recent example of Iran right now . A

52:48.677 --> 52:51.010
lot of Americans don't know what's real ,

52:51.010 --> 52:53.232
they don't know what's fake . Um , what

52:53.232 --> 52:55.066
changes from Congress would help

52:55.066 --> 52:57.100
improve , um , how we run overseas

52:57.100 --> 52:59.250
influence campaigns with the speed of

52:59.250 --> 53:01.250
this modern warfare that we're in ?

53:01.879 --> 53:04.046
Thank you , Congressman . Uh , I , I'm

53:04.046 --> 53:05.990
probably gonna sound like a broken

53:05.990 --> 53:07.823
record , but when we and Admiral

53:07.823 --> 53:10.046
Bradley talk about modernization , that

53:10.046 --> 53:12.212
is truly what it comes from . Uh , and

53:12.212 --> 53:14.323
when Congressman Scott was mentioning

53:14.323 --> 53:16.546
the information operations world , uh ,

53:16.546 --> 53:18.435
we're trying to build information

53:18.435 --> 53:20.546
operation warriors , individuals that

53:20.546 --> 53:22.712
are , are specifically honed in on the

53:22.712 --> 53:24.935
information environment . Uh , and we ,

53:24.935 --> 53:27.101
we've done some , um , uh , internal ,

53:27.101 --> 53:29.101
um , looking at ourselves to see if

53:29.101 --> 53:30.935
we're structured the right way ,

53:30.935 --> 53:33.157
specifically , not just within our ODAs

53:33.157 --> 53:34.990
and our SEAL teams and our , our

53:34.990 --> 53:37.219
raiders , but specifically within our

53:37.219 --> 53:39.275
information operations spectrum . So

53:39.275 --> 53:41.497
we've been working , and as you're well

53:41.497 --> 53:43.497
aware , Congressman , a majority of

53:43.497 --> 53:45.719
those , uh , service members preside in

53:45.719 --> 53:47.941
the Army , but we've worked with , uh ,

53:47.941 --> 53:47.820
United States Army Special Operations

53:47.820 --> 53:50.153
Command and looking at what that future .

53:50.153 --> 53:52.264
Looks like because as we talked about

53:52.264 --> 53:54.264
modernization , autonomy , AI , all

53:54.264 --> 53:56.376
those other things , our , our , uh ,

53:56.376 --> 53:58.209
information warriors , our cyber

53:58.209 --> 54:00.209
warriors are at a different type of

54:00.209 --> 54:02.431
level than say , I or Admiral Bradley .

54:02.431 --> 54:04.487
So , uh , we need to make sure we're

54:04.487 --> 54:04.435
structured properly and we're

54:04.435 --> 54:06.546
absolutely moving forward with that ,

54:06.546 --> 54:08.657
Congressman . Yeah , and especially ,

54:08.657 --> 54:10.879
you know , with Iran cutting off 90% of

54:10.879 --> 54:12.824
the internet access , I think it's

54:12.824 --> 54:15.046
important that we don't also lose sight

54:15.046 --> 54:15.004
in the most basics leaflet drops , you

54:15.004 --> 54:17.115
know , what we used to always do back

54:17.115 --> 54:19.393
in the day . And with that , I go back .

54:19.570 --> 54:21.681
Thank you and uh I would just like to

54:21.681 --> 54:23.903
say here as we close , uh , I wanted to

54:23.903 --> 54:26.126
say , uh , Mr . Secretary , thank you ,

54:26.126 --> 54:25.600
uh , Admiral , thank you , thank you

54:25.600 --> 54:27.656
for what you do . Thank you for your

54:27.656 --> 54:29.711
leadership . Thank you for your time

54:29.711 --> 54:29.600
today . Uh , thanks to all of the

54:29.600 --> 54:31.822
members here in the audience today that

54:31.822 --> 54:33.822
are in uniform . Thank you for your

54:33.822 --> 54:33.520
service to our country . We really

54:33.520 --> 54:35.520
appreciate it . I think the general

54:35.520 --> 54:37.576
consensus here and I've , you know ,

54:37.576 --> 54:39.742
I've talked to all the members here on

54:39.742 --> 54:38.939
both sides of the aisle , uh ,

54:38.949 --> 54:41.116
frequently about this . I think we all

54:41.116 --> 54:43.005
agree that , uh , that you're not

54:43.005 --> 54:44.949
resourced properly for what you're

54:44.949 --> 54:47.116
asked to do and so I think that that's

54:47.116 --> 54:47.000
going to be a continuing effort on our

54:47.000 --> 54:49.056
part to make sure that we get things

54:49.056 --> 54:51.111
done . Then we get you the resources

54:51.111 --> 54:53.278
and we get you the authorities and the

54:53.278 --> 54:55.167
127 echoes and and things of that

54:55.167 --> 54:57.389
nature . We we're going to work hard to

54:57.389 --> 54:59.500
make sure that we are supporting what

54:59.500 --> 55:01.778
you do and and what you're asked to do .

55:02.310 --> 55:04.532
And with that , Mr . Crow , do you have

55:04.532 --> 55:06.643
any closing remarks ? I'll skip so we

55:06.643 --> 55:08.754
can get down to the skiff . OK , with

55:08.754 --> 55:10.921
that , we're going to adjourn the open

55:10.921 --> 55:10.199
portion of the hearing here . We're

55:10.199 --> 55:12.919
going to move to Rayburn 3 2337 for the

55:12.919 --> 55:14.780
classified session and we are adjourned .